By Bilal Hussain.
The newsflash of Sultanate of Oman joining the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT) — forty county military alliance led by Saudi Arabia to fight terrorism— have taken many by surprise. A geopolitical shift that would get Oman closer to many countries especially to the Saudi kingdom, however, it might take the Sultanate away from Iran.
Confirming that Oman will join a coalition of Islamic states to combat terrorism, Oman’s Foreign Ministry has issued a statement. The statement is said to have emphasised that the Sultanate’s accession to the alliance of Islamic States to combat terrorism comes in the context of a common understanding of Islamic countries.
The change in the foreign policy by the Sultanate of Oman is expected to build new cooperation with Saudis while many apprehend the shift might annoy Iran. Oman is strategically located on the canal of Hormuz—the fine waterway between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula, 40 percent of the world’s seaborne crude oil passes through the passage—has a history of productive dealings with Iran.
According to the some reports the Sultanate has always maintained relations with Iran and played a role to mediate a ceasefire that ended the fighting. And on many occasions in past Oman has taken positions that were contrary to other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member of which Oman is a member concerning the region. The present move is seen as the return of Oman to the GCC accord against Iran.
Notably, after an attack on Saudi embassy in Tehran over the execution of a prominent Shi’ite cleric, the Saudi kingdom suspended ties with Iran last year. This further aggravated the fragile relationship and widened the gulf between the Saudi Aribia and Iran.
The IMAFT is formed a year ago, a move welcomed by US in wake of the global fight against Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria. The cooperation excludes both Iran and Iraq, though it is not openly intended to oppose Iran.
According to a report by the RAND Corporation— a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges— “The alliance reflects a new Saudi determination to act on behalf of its own security interests. Riyadh no longer sees the United States as the reliable ally it once was.” Also, the report mentions that Oman, has opposed Saudi efforts to move the GCC toward a closer alliance and was notably absent from the list of nations in the Riyadh announcement.
With this development in the backdrop, will trade between Oman-Iran survive which has surged since international sanctions were lifted against Iran earlier this year? According to the data released by the National Centre for Statistics and Information of Oman, imports from Iran went up by 396.2 percent to OMR183.1 million, from OMR36.9 million in the same period last year. According to experts, bilateral trade between Oman and Iran was likely to touch US$5 billion within five years, from the current $1 billion.
While, bilateral trade between Oman and Saudi Arabia has seen a sharp rise since 2011, increasing by an overall 73%, while the Sultanate’s non-oil exports to Saudi surged by 90% in 2013. Now, the trade is expected to surge through new business opportunities and areas of collaboration that will be mutually beneficial to both countries. Prince Mohammed is also expected to travel to Muscat in coming weeks to prepare for a visit by King Salman.
And given the historical position of the Sultanate, it would be of great interest to see how long Oman will remain associated with the alliance. In past, Oman has never followed the policy of Riyadh or Abu Dhabi with respect to Iran, except briefly after the fall of the shah. Iran is believed to have militarily supported Sultan Qaboos, after he gained power in 1970, to end a rebellion backed by South Yemen.
There is a ray of hope and some optimism as covered by the RAND Corporation in a report mentioning, “It consistently evident in Qaboos’s foreign policy is pragmatism. Qaboos overestimates neither Oman’s capabilities nor other nations’ intentions toward the Sultanate. Nor does he rule out former enemies as potential partners, or the use of bold initiatives that, though unpopular with his fellow Arab rulers, serve the long-term goals of securing Oman’s political, economic, and military needs.”
It would be really a challenging task for the diplomats of Oman to see to it that the how Oman can maintain good relations with Iran and at the same time improve relations with Saudi Arabia. Or does the hostility of Saudi Arabia and Iran toward one another mean that the Oman must choose between them—in either case, to the detriment of Oman’s interests?
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About the author:
Bilal Hussain is a freelancer and writer based in Middle East. He was previously the sub-editor of the business section for Greater Kashmir and Kashmir Times. His principal interests are conflict economy, capital markets, the developmental sector, and ecological economics.
