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Uruguayan Independence Day Celebrated in The Hague

The Embassy of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay marked his country’s Independence Day with a grand and festive reception. Held on August 27 at the Leonardo Royal Hotel in The Hague, the event drew over 200 distinguished guests from various sectors of Dutch society.

Ambassadors, chiefs of international missions, diplomats, academics, business leaders, and representatives from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, along with members of the Uruguayan community, all responded to H.E. Ambassador Dr. Álvaro González Otero’s invitation to celebrate ‘Día de la Independencia’—Uruguay’s National Day, commemorating its independence from Brazil in 1825.

H.E. Dr. Álvaro González Otero, Ambassador of Uruguay. National Day 2024 The Hague.

After nearly 200 years of conflict and civil unrest under Spanish and then Brazilian rule, Uruguay has emerged as a country renowned for its welcoming people, stunning landscapes, first-class meat production, and high-quality wine. In recent decades, Uruguayans have enjoyed a stable democracy, a steady improvement in living conditions, and overall well-being.

In a packed room with an animated audience, Ambassador González Otero took the microphone to thank all the attendees for their sincere affection for his people and country. He then proudly expressed:

“Two years have quickly passed since I arrived in this lovely kingdom. Since then, we have started to shift the focus of the Embassy, placing more emphasis on our bilateral relations. The Netherlands and Uruguay have more in common than people might imagine. We share international principles, landscapes, agricultural production, developed services, qualified exports, and a progressive lifestyle.

We also share strong commitments to the well-being of our citizens and visitors, the protection of human rights, environmental sustainability, progressive social policies, and significant efforts towards renewable energy and climate action. Both countries also emphasize education, democratic governance, and active participation in international organizations promoting peace and development. So, we will keep working to boost our bilateral relations.”

Uruguay National Day, August 27 at the Leonardo Royal Hotel in The Hague.
From the Embassy of Uruguay, Counsellor Pablo Bayarres, Ambassador Gonzalez Otero and Hans Akerboom, Deputy Director Protocol and Host Country Affairs from the Netherlands.

Ambassador González Otero then listed some of the most relevant initiatives undertaken by the Embassy over the last few months:

Uruguayan participation in the World Hydrogen Summit 2024: Led by the Minister of Industry, Energy, and Mining, Ms. Elisa Facio, with over 50 representatives from various sectors of the public and private sectors.

Active participation in the “26th World Energy Congress.”

Cooperation Project with Delft Institute for Water Education: Since 2011, Uruguayan professionals specializing in water resources have participated in the Delft Institute program for advanced training. Initially, the program began with 40 scholarships, resulting in 37 professionals successfully completing their studies. This early success led to the program’s relocation and implementation at the Technological University of Uruguay, now featuring regional participation. The program has since had two new editions in 2022 and 2024, expanding to include 17 professionals from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Peru. This development has transformed Uruguay into a regional hub in the field of water resource education.

Uruguay’s status as one of the 32 signing states of the Ljubljana – The Hague Convention in February 2024.

Positioning Uruguay as a potential living and working destination for Dutch farmers.

Interactions with RVO and Port of Rotterdam related to port cooperation.

Exploring and initiating new cooperation projects with Westland Municipality and Wageningen University.

Meetings with private sector actors related to agribusiness.

Preparation for the Capitan Miranda’s visit to Amsterdam: Uruguay’s school tall ship has already confirmed its participation in Sail Amsterdam 2025.

Multilateral achievements: The Embassy has made progress in multilateral areas, including ongoing contributions and work with international organizations based in The Hague: the ICJ, ICC, OPCW, HCCH, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Additionally, a closer relationship with The Hague Academy of International Law has been pursued. Significant advances have also been made through the coordinated work of the GRULAC Group in relation to various international organizations.

H.E. Mr. Fernando Arias, OPCW Director General , Ambassador Gonzalez Otero and Mr Arias spouse, Patricia van Oordt.

Following his remarks, Ambassador González Otero invited the audience to watch a short video about Uruguay, which made a great impression on those present. He expressed, “Uruguay is an exceptional country that has developed a dynamic and robust culture, shaped by a fascinating blend of gaucho traditions, European influences, and the unique Rioplatense spirit. Tango, folklore, candombe, and milonga are examples of its rich artistic musical expression. Uruguayan gastronomy, featuring high-quality meat, wine, and dairy products, especially the beloved ‘dulce de leche,’ delights palates and consistently wins prestigious awards worldwide.”

“The work we have done does not mean we are satisfied; we want to continue advancing in a deeper process. The bilateral relationship is already strong, but the potential to strengthen bonds in several key areas is even greater.”

The Ambassador of Uruguay, H.E. Alvaro Gonzalez Otero and the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Graciela Gatti Santana with her husband Mr Gustavo Segovia.

The event was conceived to showcase the rich and diverse culture of Uruguay, a nation with a population of approximately 3,495,527 as of 2022.

The national anthems of Uruguay and the Netherlands were performed by the Uruguayan opera singer Sara de los Campos. After the ambassador’s speech, the Embassy paid tribute to two influential musicians: José “El Sabalero” Carbajal and Jaime Roos, who both lived in the Netherlands. Jaime Roos settled in Amsterdam in 1978, where he played bass in several salsa, rock, and jazz groups. He had a son and remained in the Netherlands until 1984 when he returned to Uruguay.

Carbajal spent his days in the Netherlands with his wife, Anke van Haastrecht, and their two children. Anke was invited to share some special stories from their life together.

Uruguayan opera singer Sara de los Campos.
Uruguayan drummers Luis Gradin, Marcelo Terra, and Nicolás Sánchez.

The enthusiastic audience enjoyed an authentic performance by talented Uruguayan drummers Luis Gradin, Marcelo Terra, and Nicolás Sánchez. The celebration continued with Uruguayan wine, classic savory empanadas, and dulce de leche, which delighted the crowded room and completed the great celebration.

Ambassador González Otero concluded the event by thanking his Embassy team: Counselor Pablo Bayarres, Chancellor Gustavo Morales, his assistant Juan Diego, and Martha Hernández and Sofía Anastasiou. He then led a warm toast for the people of the Netherlands, Uruguay, and the necessary and desired peace in the world.

China: A New Actor in the Contemporary Multipolar World

By Mariarosaria Iorio, Political Analyst

I. The post-cold war world  

International relations are nowadays characterised by major changes that started at the end of the 80s with the fall of the Berlin Wall.  Indeed, the end of the cold war was marked by the dislocation of the two main political blocks, namely the Soviet Union and the Western World. Such a dislocation resulted in the marginalization of the post-war multilateral system embodied in the United Nations, and the standstill of the multilateral trade negotiations in the late 90s in the context of the World Trade Organisation.  New lines of political thought have been facing each other since then, while reshaping the post-cold war world in a number of fragmented and variable sub-blocks of countries. 

The United States decided to put itself first by concentrating on its internal affairs, while withdrawing from international affairs.  

Europe, the old continent, looks for an efficient strategy towards autonomy from the United States.  Europe also tries, not without difficulty, to create a more cohesive internal and external political approach.  The reality is however evolving rather more towards fragmentation of Europe in favour of European National fragmented interests. Such a fragmentation is the natural consequence of the decadence of the European Institutional and collective actions to the advantage of individual Sates actions and interests.   In sum, what seemed to be a structured and coherent European Union block fighting for the promotion of its economic and political values all over the world has somehow become an alliance at variable geometry both internally and externally.  The disorganisation of the leadership results in a chaotic and unpredictable European External and Internal action. 

Thereof, the empty influence spaces left on the international relations scene has given new international actors the opportunity to emerge.  

Meanwhile, the fragmentation of the European Institutions has also impacted the EU-USA relations within NATO, and affected the security and peace sphere.  Security issues have been on and off on the European agenda.    

In this context, Russia that has lost its empire in the 80s looks now for a new power game. In spite of the disruption of the Soviet Union, Russia attempts either by influence or by force to exercise power in its ancient affiliate countries.  Russia that was supposed to be defeated with the fall of the Berlin Wall takes back its role of opponent to the Western World on the international scene at least as it concerns the international affairs philosophy.  Thus, creating a tension aimed at restoring its power in the world.   

The group of emerging and developing economies that constitute a new variable block with a large portion of population employed in agriculture have emerged as new actors in the world’s geo-political discourses.  At the head of this block on the international scene, there is China.  The shaky international leadership context has indeed given China a new space. China’s   communist past combined with its market-based economic strategy gives it a particular position.  

China is The One that can communicate to Russia. China is also The One that can have an influence on the Western economic and political scene as China owns a big part of Western Foreign Debt  

China embeds a horizontal strategy in both its trade and development policies, while producing at low wages.  Its production system coupled with its pragmatic political approach has reshaped the international power structure.  The top-down approach of the Western World faces now the competition created by the horizontal win-win approach proposed by China in both developing and industrialized countries.

Indeed, as a result of the decline of the Western World global hegemony based on market access and economic and social liberalism as a means to ensure economic growth and promote economic development, the vision promoted by China’s discourse, centred on the protection of livelihoods and local sovereign choices finds new adepts.  Furthermore, China has successfully attempted to promote a trade-off approach to international cooperation during the last 20 years.  A cooperation that does not interfere in internal affairs of partner countries as it has often reproached to the Western countries involved in international cooperation.  

As the developing countries leader, China positions itself as the spoke country for the poor.  As a new world powerful economic actor China plays as the guarantor of the Western Economic stability.  China positions itself as the bridge between the rich and the poor.  It is representing a different hegemonic game that only changes in its discourse, while still pursuing its own interests and influence zones.  Such a situation poses the question of the values that the international regime wants to embrace.  Indeed, this changing world results in an increased number of conflicts – be new or historical conflicts.  

The dislocation of the traditional leaders of the international relations has definitely created a chaotic and unpredictable scenario.  Chaos has in some cases been chosen as a political strategy to disrupt the post-1945 international regime. Such a disruption has benefitted new actors, and given space to new lines of thought.  These new lines of thought have attacked the existing international framework but has not yet succeeded in creating a new regime.  The increasing unbalance of power and the lack of leadership on the international political scene is risky. 

The reduction by choice of leadership of the United States has indeed resulted in the weakening of the values emerged as a result of the dramatic experience of Second World War, namely freedom of thought and freedom of speech to mention only a few.   We are now facing a much more authoritarian world with force used as a means to manage the political arena.  Dialogue seems to be a rather consuming exercise that has left its place to the use of force.  Force is no longer seen as the last option but rather the opening act for political dialogue.  Nationalism and individual interests are now at the centre of the political game. This trend is taking the world to instability and conflict.  

The peoples of the world are more and more questioning the existing system. People’s needs and expectations are not met.  The new emerged actors, such as China have given the hope of a possible change in the present international system without fundamentally questioning its rationale but rather trying to rip a slate of the cake.  

The struggle for influence among countries has not succeeded in building a peaceful and stable world. Citizens will have to face the challenge of building a new era of peace and stability worldwide.

Derrière les murs du Palais de la Paix : permanence et changements de la Cour internationale de Justice

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S.E. M. Philippe Couvreur est arrivé à La Haye en avril 1982, où il a d’abord occupé le poste d’assistant spécial aux bureaux du greffier et du greffier adjoint de la Cour internationale de Justice.

Il a ensuite exercé les fonctions de Secrétaire, Premier Secrétaire et Secrétaire juridique principal, avant d’être élu Greffier de la Cour en 2000, et réélu en 2007 et 2014. Pour marquer l’anniversaire de ses débuts à la Cour, il y a 35 ans, Diplomat Magazine l’a invité à témoigner de son expérience unique au service de cette institution, des évolutions qu’il a pu y observer, et à partager le regard qu’il porte sur les changements qui ont marqué la Cour et La Haye au cours des trois dernières décennies.
Philippe Couvreur avec le Pape Jean-Paul II prise le 13 mai 1985.
Je suis arrivé à La Haye en avril 1982 — de façon aussi inattendue que j’avais entamé des études de droit treize ans auparavant (mais c’est là une autre histoire…) — pour occuper un poste temporaire à la Cour internationale de Justice. La Cour était alors la seule institution judiciaire internationale existante au plan universel. Son activité, particulièrement faible à la fin des années 1970, ne pouvait en ce temps-là guère laisser présager du succès que rencontrerait la Cour dans les décennies à venir. Mon bienveillant maître de Louvain, le professeur Paul de Visscher, fils du célèbre internationaliste Charles de Visscher, unique juge belge à la Cour, m’avait prédit des jours aussi sereins qu’heureux, écoulés à lire et à écrire des ouvrages dans la solitude des imposants murs de la bibliothèque du Palais de la Paix…
Les mémoires ont été dûment déposés dans l’affaire El Salvador c. Honduras dans la salle Bol le 1 juin 1988, l’affaire du Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime.
En rejoignant la Cour, un frais matin d’avril, dont je garde un souvenir très précis, le jeune juriste que j’étais découvrit, non sans étonnement, une organisation de taille très modeste, le Greffe, qui en est l’organe administratif, alors composé de moins d’une quarantaine de fonctionnaires. Le fonctionnement de la Cour reposait entièrement sur cette équipe restreinte de personnel permanent, auquel s’ajoutait, selon que de besoin, un personnel temporaire pour faire face au surcroît de travaux linguistiques et de sténodactylographie lors des sessions (publiques et privées) de la Cour. Je me rappelle avoir été frappé par la personnalité haute en couleur de certains de ces traducteurs indépendants, dont la grande culture littéraire m’émerveillait. Cette structure très économique du Greffe impliquait une grande polyvalence de ses membres, et les Secrétaires de la Cour — ses fonctionnaires supérieurs — étaient appelés, en sus de leurs travaux de recherches juridiques, de préparation des documents de la Cour, et de rédaction de la correspondance diplomatique, à assumer eux-mêmes l’essentiel des tâches linguistiques (traduction et interprétation) et d’information, ainsi que la supervision de nombreuses activités administratives et logistiques.
La Grande salle de Justice, l’affaire Relative au Timor Oriental (Portugal c. Australie) Arrêt du 30 juin 1995.
Il n’était nullement rare qu’un nouveau venu comme moi ait à passer week-ends et nuits blanches au Palais de la Paix à effectuer les travaux les plus divers… allant jusqu’à imprimer et polycopier, sur de vieilles machines à stencils ronéotype, des décisions dont la Cour devait donner la lecture en séance publique le lendemain ! Dès mon arrivée au Greffe, j’ai eu le bonheur et le privilège d’être initié et associé à l’ensemble des fonctions de l’institution sous la patiente supervision de personnalités d’exception, tels que MM. Torres Bernárdez et Pillepich, alors respectivement Greffier et Greffier adjoint. J’en ai retiré le plus grand bénéfice, puisque cette immersion sans préparation dans toutes les facettes de l’activité du Greffe m’a permis d’acquérir de ce dernier une connaissance unique — de l’intérieur — et sous tous ses aspects —, un acquis particulièrement précieux au moment où j’ai été amené, bien des années plus tard, à assumer la délicate responsabilité d’en assurer la gestion au plus haut niveau. Devenir un fonctionnaire du Greffe au début des années 1980 signifiait accepter de se couler sans discussion dans un moule à tous égards exigeant, et se donner corps et âme, avec humilité et discrétion, à l’institution, sans penser à soi ni parler de soi. Depuis ces années d’initiation, j’ai été le témoin de profondes transformations de la Cour, rendues inévitables à la fois pour répondre à l’accroissement considérable de ses activités, avec la disparition du monde bipolaire qui avait relégué le règlement judiciaire à un rôle quelque peu marginal, et pour saisir les opportunités nouvelles offertes, notamment, par le progrès des technologies et de la communication. Entre 1982 et aujourd’hui, le nombre de fonctionnaires a ainsi presque triplé (il a quasiment doublé depuis l’an 2000, année de ma première élection en tant que Greffier). L’organisation du travail a été progressivement spécialisée entre les divers départements, juridique, linguistique et chargé de l’information, qui furent créés en 1997, et les services techniques. Par ailleurs, les Membres de la Cour ne disposèrent pas, pendant longtemps, de « référendaires » — ils s’y sont d’ailleurs longtemps refusés—, et l’assistance apportée aux juges en matière judiciaire était principalement répartie entre les fonctionnaires du Département des affaires juridiques.
H.E. Philippe Couvreur avec la Reine Beatrix photo prise pendant le 50 eme anniversaire de la Cour (18-04-1996).
Les cinq premiers postes de juristes référendaires ne furent obtenus de l’Assemblée générale et créés qu’en 2002, à l’issue de difficiles négociations que je me souviens avoir menées avec beaucoup de plaisir et d’intérêt ; le nombre de ces postes s’est progressivement accru, pour s’élever à quinze aujourd’hui. Les divers développements qui ont marqué le monde au cours des dernières décennies n’ont pas manqué de soulever pour la Cour de nouveaux défis. Comme c’est le cas pour toute institution, elle n’a pu les relever en faisant table rase des enseignements de son histoire ni, à l’inverse, en ne saisissant pas toutes les opportunités offertes par le temps présent. A ces différents égards, la Cour est certainement parvenue, au fil des ans, à assurer un équilibre, toujours délicat, entre changements et continuité. La continuité de la Cour est bien sûr inscrite dans son Statut, qui fait partie intégrante de la Charte des Nations Unies, et reflétée dans ses méthodes judiciaires, qui ont été très largement élaborées par sa devancière, la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, et héritées d’elle. Cette continuité historique était particulièrement présente lorsque j’ai rejoint le Greffe. Ainsi, en manière d’anecdote, divers hauts fonctionnaires alors en poste avaient eux-mêmes côtoyé, au début de leur carrière, d’anciens fonctionnaires de la Cour permanente. Tous nourrissaient à l’égard de cette dernière le plus grand respect. Il régnait d’ailleurs dans les couloirs du Palais de la Paix une atmosphère feutrée et délicieusement surannée, évocatrice de la défunte Société des Nations. Je me souviens en avoir encore utilisé maintes fournitures de bureau ! La continuité jurisprudentielle et procédurale entre les deux Cours constitue pour les Etats une garantie importante de sécurité et de prévisibilité juridiques. Cette continuité, juridique et historique, de même que l’expérience accumulée en plus de quatre-vingt-dix ans d’exercice de la fonction judiciaire, sont pour la Cour un facteur crucial de légitimité.
H.E. Philippe Couvreur vec le Roi Willem-Alexander photo prise pendant le 70 eme anniversaire de la Cour (20-04-2016).
En même temps, la Cour a eu, à l’évidence, à s’adapter aux changements du monde réel dans lequel elle opère, comme aux nécessités et opportunités nouvelles de chaque époque traversée. L’une des transformations notoires auxquelles j’ai assisté fut l’ouverture croissante de la Cour sur l’extérieur : longtemps à l’écart, à dessein, des organes politiques des Nations Unies, la Cour a souhaité se faire plus et mieux entendre de ces organes et des Etats membres. Elle a ainsi rompu avec ce qui était parfois perçu comme un « splendide isolement » au sein des Nations Unies, même si elle défend toujours jalousement son autonomie. La Cour doit en outre désormais également tenir compte des nombreuses autres juridictions, internationales ou régionales, qui ont été créées ces dernières années, et veiller, autant que possible, à assurer l’harmonie du « concert judiciaire » que permet ce foisonnement de cours et tribunaux sur la scène internationale. Davantage ouverte sur la communauté internationale et ses réalités, la Cour s’est montrée de plus en plus attentive, non seulement à sa place dans l’Organisation des Nations Unies, mais aussi à la poursuite des objectifs de celle-ci et à sa mission propre au service du règlement pacifique des différends internationaux. Des différends de plus en plus complexes, tant juridiquement que factuellement, en même temps que politiquement plus denses, lui ont été soumis. En révisant constamment, selon que de besoin, ses méthodes de travail, elle a su les résoudre rapidement et efficacement, à un coût particulièrement modeste pour la communauté internationale, tout en assurant le développement du droit. Enfin, pour conclure sur une note plus prosaïque, mais qui est loin d’être négligeable, je ne peux taire la chance que j’ai eue de connaître l’extraordinaire développement de la ville de La Haye au cours des 35 dernières années. Celle-ci offre aujourd’hui à la Cour, comme aux nombreuses institutions internationales qui s’y sont installées à sa suite, une qualité de vie et un cadre de travail uniques, qui sont très loin de ressembler à ce que j’ai trouvé en y arrivant. A l’image de l’imposante stature du Palais de la Paix où elle siège, symbole mondialement connu de la justice internationale, la Cour est une institution solidement établie. En dépit des périodes de doute ou de désaffection qu’elle a traversées par le passé, son rôle est unanimement salué au sein de la communauté internationale et le recours à ses services par les Etats n’a jamais été aussi soutenu. 35 ans après, je continue de mesurer chaque jour le privilège qui est le mien de servir au mieux de mes capacités l’organe judiciaire principal des Nations Unies. —– Les photos dans l’article sont une courtoisie de la Cour International de Justice.

Los cuentos de Salarrué

La Embajada de El Salvador y la Asociación Hispánica de La Haya organizaron en mayo, un conversatorio sobre la obra del escritor salvadoreño Salvador Salazar Arrué, conocido como “Salarrué”. La actividad estuvo a cargo de la abogada y notaria Mirella Pocasangre de Vázquez, quien se distinguió por su emotiva narrativa de los cuentos de este prestigioso autor.

El público presente, entre ellos miembros de la Asociación Hispánica de La Haya, escritores latinoamericanos, miembros del cuerpo diplomático, de la prensa y amigos de El Salvador, llenó la sala participando activamente con preguntas sobre el autor y el léxico utilizado en sus cuentos.

Edith Bergansius, presidenta de la Asociación Hispánica de La Haya, recibió a los invitados y presentó el evento mencionando que: “La idea de tener este conversatorio sobre los cuentos de ‘Salarrué’ nació hace aproximadamente un año, cuando tuvimos una actividad similar en el Instituto Cervantes de Utrecht. Desde ese momento fijamos una fecha. Así que gracias a ustedes también, miembros de la asociación y a mis colegas del cuerpo diplomático que nos acompañan; realmente es un honor y un gusto tenerlos aquí”.

S.E. Álvaro González Otero, Embajador del Uruguay y S.E. Agustín Vázquez Gómez, Embajador de El Salvador durante la presentación en la Asociación Hispánica de La Haya.

El Embajador de El Salvador, S.E. Agustín Vázquez Gómez, presentó el evento y conversó con el público sobre las iniciativas de los embajadores latinoamericanos para promover el uso del español en los organismos internacionales.

“Particularmente, tenemos acá al embajador de Uruguay, S.E. Álvaro González Otero, quien en este período es el coordinador del Grupo de Amigos del Español en La Haya. Lo que nosotros hacemos es tratar de promover el uso de nuestra lengua en los organismos internacionales aquí representados.

En algunos lo hemos logrado con mucho éxito; en otros todavía se está trabajando. Pero les puedo asegurar que iniciativas como esta, y con la presencia del coordinador del Grupo de Amigos del Español en La Haya, estamos sembrando la semilla.

El día de hoy queremos compartir un poco acerca de El Salvador, de su belleza y de su riqueza natural que podemos disfrutar. Pero tenemos un activo mucho más importante, que es nuestra gente. Nuestra gente es muy cálida, muy amigable, muy abierta, muy dispuesta y siempre estamos de la mano para ayudar y recibir incluso a aquellos que no conocemos.

El día de hoy queremos invitarlos a todos ustedes, a través de la voz de mi querida esposa, a que podamos conocer un poco más acerca de un escritor salvadoreño del cual nosotros nos sentimos muy orgullosos. Así que, con este preámbulo, reitero nuestro agradecimiento por permitirnos estar aquí, en su casa, en la Asociación Hispánica”.

Posteriormente, dio paso a Mirella Pocasangre y a su vívida narrativa sobre Salvador Salazar Arrué, artísticamente conocido como “Salarrué”, quien a través de sus cuentos reflejó la idiosincrasia de El Salvador.

Mirella Pocasangre

“‘Salarrué’ narró la simplicidad de nuestra vida y cómo somos. Con esas historias simples y divertidas toca el corazón; es la forma en la cual nosotros vivimos nuestro día a día en El Salvador. Es un artista que, de una manera muy hábil, logró capturar la identidad del salvadoreño y hoy queremos concentrarnos en esa parte de nuestra identidad cultural. Y sobre todo conversar acerca del mejor escritor de todos, para mí. Creo que cuando escuchen sus historias también dirán: sí, es el mejor escritor de El Salvador”.

¿Quién era “Salarrué”? ¿Cuáles eran sus orígenes?

Nació el 22 de octubre de 1899 en Sonsonate, conocida como la ciudad de los cocos por su proximidad con la costa, una zona rodeada de montañas y con una tradición indígena muy marcada. Su abuelo era español.

A los ocho años fue llevado a vivir a San Salvador, la capital, y posteriormente a Santa Tecla, ciudad cercana donde estudió en el Liceo Salvadoreño. Su madre había sido escritora, por lo que desde niño estuvo rodeado de libros y de personas vinculadas al arte.

“Salarrué” consiguió una beca para estudiar en Estados Unidos cuando tenía 18 años. Estudió pintura en Baltimore, Maryland, razón por la cual siempre decía que su profesión era la de pintor.

En 1923, a los 24 años, contrajo matrimonio con la artista plástica Zélie Lardé Arthés, de padres franceses, quien fue la madre de sus tres hijas: Olga, Teresa y María Teresa.

Diplomaticos de El Salvador durante el evento.

“Salarrué” escribió Cuentos de Cipotes —como se les llama a los niños en El Salvador—, historias contadas desde el imaginario infantil, incluyendo su propio lenguaje; y Cuentos de Barro, relatos costumbristas de adultos. También escribió historias fantásticas que transportaban al lector a mundos imaginarios. Publicó numerosos libros y recopilaciones, obtuvo reconocimientos del Congreso de su país y recibió la Orden José Matías Delgado, una de las más importantes distinciones de El Salvador.

En 1975 falleció, dejando como legado sus secretos, sus pinturas y sus cuentos, que hoy continúan siendo compartidos. Mirella, entre sus lecturas animadas, contó cómo desde niña leía sus cuentos y cómo “Salarrué” se convirtió en su héroe literario.

Luego de la lectura de dos bellos cuentos, el evento continuó con una degustación de gastronomía salvadoreña.

Climate Change, Democracy and the Rising Voice of Youth in the Netherlands

Climate change is no longer just an environmental issue. In the Netherlands, where much of the land lies below sea level and agriculture dominates, it has become a democratic challenge. Rising seas and extreme weather are not abstract threats – they are reshaping communities and demanding urgent policy action. Yet the most vulnerable voices are often the quietest in political debates.

Dion Huidekooper embodies the growing influence of youth in shaping this conversation. In November 2025 he transitioned from chairing the Jonge Klimaatbeweging (Youth Climate Movement) to becoming a Member of the House of Representatives for Democrats 66. With experience as an Energy and Climate advisor at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy and at Energie Beheer Nederland (EBN), Huidekooper brings a pragmatic, “climate-optimist” perspective, focusing on sustainability, the circular economy, environmental policy and long-term public transport solutions. His journey signals that youth activism is no longer just protest – it is now a path to formal power.

The stakes are high. Climate impacts are not evenly felt. Vulnerable communities in the Caribbean Netherlands and low-lying areas across the country face immediate threats, yet their needs are often overshadowed by powerful economic interests. Dutch democracy prides itself on consensus, but this system risks leaving the people most at risk unheard, unless institutions actively seek inclusive participation.

Youth movements are filling this gap. Beyond demonstrations, young people now engage directly in policymaking, advisory councils and civic initiatives. They push for policies that look decades ahead, advocating climate goals for 2040 and 2050 rather, than short-term electoral wins. By demanding a seat at the table, they challenge traditional politics to balance immediate pressures with long-term survival.

This generational shift is not merely symbolic. It is a test of Dutch democracy itself. Effective climate policy requires that both vulnerable communities and future generations influence decision making. Youth involvement demonstrates how democratic participation can strengthen environmental action, while injecting ambition, optimism and long-term thinking into political discourse.

The Netherlands faces a defining moment. Rising seas and intensifying weather are unavoidable realities. Whether democratic institutions adapt to include those most affected, and whether young voices like Huidekooper’s shape the policies of tomorrow, will determine the country’s resilience. For his generation, the fight for climate justice is inseparable from the fight for a stronger, more inclusive democracy.

This article is produced by Lauren van Laarhoven-Hargreaves, Beatrise Abelkalna, Alexandra Osina, Taeyun Kim, Matvii Drotsyk, Veronika Martemianova, Barbara Gama, Mariam Kirakossian, Charahja van Broekhoven, participants in the Bright Future Foundation, as part of the European Union’s “Participate & Promote Democracy” Youth Participation project, in cooperation with Diplomat Magazine, Embassy of the Netherlands in Armenia and young members of the Armenian partner organization Promising Youth.

The Bahamas: 2026 Investment Outlook at the Crossroads of Tourism and Maritime Trade

By Silas Cooper

Looking ahead to 2026, the country’s economic trajectory is shaped by the convergence of tourism recovery, maritime expansion, and fiscal recalibration. For European stakeholders assessing Caribbean engagement, key considerations include macroeconomic stability, climate vulnerability, demand concentration, security perception, and infrastructure capacity. The Bahamas presents a distinctive case: a tourism-driven economy reinforced by strategic maritime positioning, close proximity to the United States, and a long-standing tax-neutral framework.

Positioned along critical Atlantic routes and deeply integrated into North American travel flows, The Bahamas occupies a unique role within the wider transatlantic economic space. As European actors seek diversified partnerships in the Caribbean, the country offers a combination of established demand, geographic advantage, and evolving fiscal discipline.

Tourism as a Structural Economic Anchor

Tourism remains the central pillar of the Bahamian economy, contributing approximately 50–60% of GDP and accounting for the majority of foreign exchange earnings. Visitor numbers have rebounded strongly in the post-pandemic period, supported by sustained cruise growth and stable stopover demand.

The country’s proximity to Florida, extensive airlift connectivity, and mature resort infrastructure continue to underpin its competitive position within the Caribbean. This dynamic reflects not short-term recovery, but structural demand rooted in geography, income levels, and established travel patterns.

Beyond hospitality, tourism activity supports a broader ecosystem of services, including marina operations, cruise-linked retail, logistics, and security infrastructure, creating layered economic value across multiple sectors.

Maritime Positioning and Atlantic Connectivity

In parallel with its tourism sector, The Bahamas holds a strategic position along major Atlantic shipping and cruise corridors. Key hubs such as Nassau and Freeport serve as important nodes for cruise throughput, container transshipment, and maritime services.

Ongoing port redevelopment and capacity expansion reflect confidence in long-term growth in both passenger and cargo flows. These developments extend the country’s economic relevance beyond tourism, reinforcing its role within regional logistics networks and global maritime trade.

For European stakeholders, this position aligns with broader interests in secure, efficient Atlantic supply chains and resilient port infrastructure.

Fiscal Adjustment and Macroeconomic Direction

Public debt rose significantly in the aftermath of Hurricane Dorian and the COVID-19 pandemic. However, recent assessments by the International Monetary Fund indicate a return to fiscal consolidation, including primary surplus recovery and improved debt management.

Although debt-to-GDP levels remain elevated, the overall trajectory has stabilized. The direction of fiscal policy, characterized by gradual adjustment and institutional commitment, suggests a framework of managed recovery rather than systemic imbalance.

This evolving macroeconomic environment reflects a broader effort to strengthen credibility and maintain investor confidence while supporting long-term growth.

Transatlantic Demand and Market Concentration

Tourism flows remain heavily linked to the United States, reflecting geographic proximity, strong transport connectivity, and longstanding economic ties. While this concentration introduces exposure to U.S. economic cycles, it also provides a stable and predictable demand base.

Short travel times and high disposable income among U.S. travelers continue to support premium positioning within the hospitality sector. Historically, this corridor has underpinned consistent visitor volumes and maritime activity, reinforcing the resilience of the tourism model.

At the same time, there is gradual scope for diversification, particularly through targeted engagement with European and other international markets.

Climate Risk and Resilience Strategy

As a low-lying archipelago, The Bahamas faces significant exposure to hurricanes, sea-level rise, and climate-related infrastructure stress. These risks are structural and must be incorporated into long-term planning and development strategies.

In response, resilience has become increasingly embedded in national policy and investment frameworks. Climate adaptation financing, infrastructure reinforcement, and sustainability-focused redevelopment are gaining momentum, supported in part by international partnerships, including those with institutions such as the World Bank.

This evolving approach positions resilience not only as a necessity, but as a defining feature of future development across tourism and maritime infrastructure.

Security Perception and Economic Performance

Security concerns, particularly in urban areas such as Nassau, continue to feature in international discourse. However, tourism data indicates that visitor growth has remained resilient despite periodic negative perceptions.

Tourism zones and major resort areas typically operate with structured security frameworks and coordinated oversight. This distinction between national perception and sector-specific performance highlights the importance of localized, asset-level analysis.

Effective security integration remains a central component of sustaining confidence and ensuring operational continuity within key economic zones.

Infrastructure Capacity and Growth Pressures

Rising visitor volumes and expanding cruise operations have increased pressure on ports, airports, utilities, and urban infrastructure. While this presents operational challenges, it also reflects underlying demand strength.

Managing this growth will require continued investment in capacity expansion, modernization, and sustainability. Areas such as port development, transport systems, marina infrastructure, and energy integration represent important avenues for future development.

In this context, infrastructure pressure signals economic momentum, provided it is matched by coordinated planning and investment.

Strategic Outlook

The Bahamas occupies a distinctive position at the intersection of tourism-driven liquidity and maritime connectivity. Its role within Atlantic travel and trade routes, combined with ongoing fiscal adjustment and resilience planning, reinforces its relevance in a shifting global economic landscape.

For European partners, the country offers a platform for deeper engagement in sectors linked to infrastructure, sustainability, and services supporting international mobility and trade.

The Bahamas does not present a risk-free environment. However, it offers a combination of structural demand, geographic advantage, and policy evolution that distinguishes it within the Caribbean. As global attention increasingly turns toward resilient infrastructure, sustainable tourism, and secure maritime networks, The Bahamas is positioned to remain an important node within both regional and transatlantic systems.

About the author
Silas Cooper is Honorary Consul of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas in the Netherlands, focusing on economic diplomacy, bilateral relations, and strategic investment engagement.

Embassy Seminar on Dutch Labor Law 2026 Edition

By Roy Lie Atjam

The Hague, 22 April 2026 – Russell Advocaten and Diplomat Magazine, in collaboration with Leonardo Royal Hotel, successfully hosted the 2026 edition of its annual Embassy Seminar on Dutch Employment Law for embassies and consulates in the Netherlands.

With decades of experience assisting diplomatic missions with legal matters, Russell Advocaten welcomed more than 90 participants, including ambassadors, deputy heads of mission, and HR officers.

The seminar, held from 9:30 to 12:00, followed by a lunch, was led by Mr. Jan Dop, LL.M., specialist in Employment Law, together with Reinier W.L. Russell, Managing Partner of the firm. Their presentations focused on the practical application of Dutch labour law for diplomatic missions, helping embassies better understand local legal obligations concerning locally hired staff in the Netherlands.

The conference addressed important issues including employment law, dismissal procedures, employee illness and sick leave obligations, personnel policies, handbooks and codes of conduct, employee participation, and works councils.

The lawyers also explained the legal responsibilities of employers regarding sick employees, including the mandatory involvement of the Arbo/company doctor and the financial consequences of non-compliance.

Particular attention was given to Dutch regulations concerning employee illness, including the principle that, in general, an employee cannot be dismissed during the first two years of illness. Through practical examples and interactive discussions, the seminar provided participants with a clearer understanding of complex Dutch labour regulations applicable to diplomatic missions.

Mr. Dop and Mr. Russell were assisted by four additional lawyers from Russell Advocaten, who answered numerous questions from participants and commented on specific cases raised during the seminar.

Beyond its legal value, the seminar also provided an excellent opportunity for representatives of diplomatic missions to exchange experiences with colleagues in a professional and discreet environment.

Coffee break at Leonardo Royal Hotel. Dutch Labor Law seminar for diplomats 2026.

Russell Advocaten Diplomatic Desk and Diplomat Magazine also shared the seminar notes and presentation materials with all attendees following the conference. Participants with additional questions or specific legal matters are invited to contact Russell Advocaten and its Embassy Desk specialists for further assistance regarding Dutch employment and labour law applicable to diplomatic missions in the Netherlands.

The Normalization of Dysfunction: Between Administrative Failure and the Erosion of the Social Contract

Case Study: Curtea de Argeș

“It is not crises that destroy a society, but the habit of living with them.”


By Major General (Two Stars) (retd) Corneliu Pivariu

In the analysis of major geopolitical transformations, there is a tendency to prioritize large-scale conflicts, strategic decisions, and rivalries between powers. Much less frequently examined are those slow, seemingly marginal processes which, over time, erode the internal structure of states. Yet history shows that major strategic weaknesses do not emerge suddenly; they accumulate quietly within societies[1].

The recent situation in Curtea de Argeș[2]—where a significant community faced prolonged disruptions in the supply of potable water—offers a relevant case study[3]. Not because of its uniqueness, but because it reflects a broader dynamic: the transformation of dysfunction from exception into norm.

From Administrative Incident to Systemic Symptom

At a strictly technical level, situations such as interruptions in water supply may have multiple explanations: infrastructure works, management deficiencies, lack of investment, or insufficient coordination between institutions[4]. In the vicinity of the Vidraru dam[5], such factors can generate real disruptions.

The problem arises, however, when risks are known, preventive measures are absent, and solutions are delayed or not implemented[6].

At this point, we are no longer dealing with a simple incident, but with a dysfunctional operating pattern that extends beyond the specific case and points to a systemic failure.

Institutional Failure: Between Incompetence and Inertia

The most robust explanation for such situations is not conspiracy, but rather a combination of structural factors:

  • fragmentation of institutional responsibilities
  • lack of a culture of anticipation
  • political prioritization of other domains
  • absence of real accountability for failure[7]

Vidraru Lake and the Curtea de Argeș water crisis (2025–2026)
Contrast between the technical reality of a planned intervention on strategic hydropower infrastructure (Vidraru Lake—full versus drained) and its perceived impact on the local community (queues for drinking water in Curtea de Argeș), in a context marked by delayed response, deficient communication, and structural vulnerabilities.

Source: open-source images (for illustrative purposes)

These elements generate a specific type of vulnerability: the state does not fail spectacularly, but slowly, repeatedly, and predictably.

Societal Response: Adaptation, Not Resistance

One of the most relevant aspects of such situations is not only the dysfunction itself, but the population’s reaction to it. Instead of sustained mobilization, there often emerges a combination of adaptation to substandard conditions, reduced expectations, and withdrawal into the private sphere.

This behavior should not be simplistically interpreted as passivity, cultural resignation, or deliberate manipulation. Rather, it results from well-known social mechanisms that emerge when citizens are repeatedly exposed to administrative failures, unmet promises, and the absence of visible consequences for responsible institutions[8].

1. Civic Fatigue

After repeated exposure to local crises, deficiencies in public services, and delayed institutional responses, the community’s capacity to react diminishes. Citizens begin to perceive dysfunction not as an intolerable exception, but as a reality they must live with. This fatigue does not eliminate dissatisfaction, but transforms it from civic energy into individual frustration.

2. Lack of Trust in Collective Action

When people no longer believe that protest, formal complaints, public pressure, or civic participation can produce change, the motivation for collective action declines. The problem is no longer just a lack of resources, but the loss of belief that institutions can be compelled to respond. At this point, the social contract is affected at its core: the citizen continues to bear the costs of the state, but no longer believes in the state’s ability to fulfill its basic obligations[9].

3. Pragmatic Adaptation

In the absence of credible institutional solutions, individuals seek private ones: personal water reserves, informal networks, withdrawal from public engagement, acceptance of improvisation as normality. While rational at the individual level, this adaptation becomes harmful at the collective level. It reduces pressure on institutions, fragments community solidarity, and transforms a public problem into a series of unequal and vulnerable private solutions.

Thus, the societal response does not confirm the existence of a “social engineering experiment,” but indicates something deeper: the weakening of civic reflexes and the reduced capacity of communities to transform dissatisfaction into institutional correction[10].

The Internal Social Fracture: A Strategic Vulnerability

From a geopolitical analytical perspective, such phenomena cannot be reduced to simple administrative dysfunctions. They represent manifestations of an internal fracture affecting the fundamental relationship between state and citizen.

This fracture does not emerge suddenly, but is gradually constructed through the accumulation of episodes in which the state fails to perform its basic functions, while citizens adjust their expectations accordingly. Over time, the relationship becomes imbalanced: citizens’ obligations remain, but the state’s capacity to provide essential services becomes uncertain.

Concretely, this internal social fracture manifests through: the weakening of trust between state and citizen, diminished social cohesion, fragmentation of community solidarity, and the emergence of individual coping strategies that replace collective solutions.

In the long term, these processes generate direct strategic consequences. First, they reduce mobilization capacity in times of crisis, as citizens no longer perceive the state as a legitimate and effective actor. Second, they limit societal resilience—the ability to absorb shocks and return to normality. Third, they affect the credibility of the state, both internally and in relation to external partners.

In this sense, the internal social fracture is not merely a social issue, but a strategic risk multiplier[11].

Beyond Conspiracy: The Real Risk

Interpretations that attribute such situations to “social engineering experiments” are, in most cases, expressions of deep distrust in institutions and the need to find a coherent explanation for repeated dysfunctions. While they may have media impact and emotional mobilization potential, they risk shifting analysis away from structural causes toward hypotheses that are difficult to substantiate.

The real danger does not lie in a hidden, centralized plan, but in a far more banal—and therefore more difficult to counter—process: the normalization of dysfunction[12].

This process emerges[13] when problems persist without clear institutional consequences, responsibility is diffuse and difficult to assign, and public reaction remains limited or fragmented. Under these conditions, dysfunction is no longer perceived as a deviation from the norm, but as part of everyday normality.

Implications for Romania

Cases such as the one analyzed indicate a trend which, if not corrected, may have cumulative effects on the functioning of the Romanian state. At first glance, this appears to be a local issue related to water management. In reality, such episodes reveal the vulnerability of an institutional architecture where preventive planning is weak, accountability is diffuse, and public communication becomes reactive rather than anticipatory.

The first implication is the decline in trust in institutions. When basic services become unreliable, the citizen no longer perceives the state as a guarantor of everyday order, but as a distant, slow, and often incapable structure.

The second implication is the acceleration of internal and external migration. Communities facing fragile public services, degraded infrastructure, and lack of predictability become less attractive for residence, investment, and economic development.

The third implication concerns the state’s capacity to implement complex public policies. A state that struggles to manage basic services will face even greater difficulties in areas requiring strategic coordination: energy transition, critical infrastructure, civil defense, societal resilience, crisis management, or effective absorption of European funds.

In this sense, the Curtea de Argeș case should not be viewed as a local anomaly, but as an indicator. It shows what happens when physical infrastructure, administrative capacity, and social trust deteriorate simultaneously.

Societies do not degrade only through major shocks, but also through the gradual accumulation of accepted dysfunction. When citizens become accustomed to the absence or fragility of essential services, and institutions are no longer compelled to perform, the social contract begins to erode.

The Curtea de Argeș case is relevant precisely because it cannot be reduced to a simple malfunction, a punctual error, or an isolated technical explanation. It concentrates three vulnerabilities: insufficiently managed critical infrastructure, fragmented institutional responsibility, and limited societal response. Together, these describe a pattern of dysfunction that can be replicated across other areas of public life.

In a world marked by geopolitical competition, economic pressures, energy crises, and strategic instability, the resilience of a state is not measured only by military capabilities or external alliances. It is also measured by its capacity to maintain essential services, anticipate risks, and preserve citizens’ trust in institutions.

The real question is not whether such situations are the result of a hidden plan, but whether society and the state still have the capacity to correct them before they become the norm.

Because in the absence of that capacity, dysfunction is no longer an exception—it becomes a rule of operation.

Brașov, April 27, 2026


[1] National Institute of Statistics (INS), Public Utilities Infrastructure in Romania. Data series on water supply and sewerage, Bucharest, annual editions 2018–2024. Highlights major disparities between urban and rural areas and systemic vulnerabilities in water infrastructure.

[2]  Curtea de Argeș is a municipality located in southern Romania, in Argeș County, with a population of approximately 25,000–30,000 inhabitants (according to recent estimates). The city has major historical significance, being one of the first capitals of Wallachia in the Middle Ages and home to important heritage sites such as the Curtea de Argeș Monastery. Functionally, the city and its surrounding area depend significantly on regional water and energy infrastructure, including systems associated with the Vidraru dam.
Relevance in context: highlights the direct impact of infrastructure dysfunctions on a medium-sized urban community with regional importance.

[3] The potable water supply crisis in the municipality of Curtea de Argeș began in early November 2025, when the quality parameters of water supplied through the public network started to exceed permitted limits, leading to usage restrictions for the population. Although water supply was not completely interrupted on a constant basis, the distributed water was, for most of the period, unfit for consumption and used only for domestic purposes, with occasional episodes of total interruption. The situation affected approximately 30,000–50,000 inhabitants in the municipality and surrounding areas.
Remedial works on the water treatment infrastructure effectively began on March 27, 2026, more than four months after the onset of the crisis, with an estimated completion date of July 15, 2026. These data highlight not only the prolonged duration of the dysfunction but also the latency of structural intervention, suggesting deficiencies in anticipation, coordination, and institutional response, characteristic of the process of normalization of dysfunction analyzed in this study.

[4] Court of Accounts of Romania, Public Report on the Administration of Public Utility Services, Bucharest, 2022. Identifies recurring deficiencies: lack of preventive investments, poor management, and diffuse institutional responsibility.

[5] The Vidraru dam and hydroelectric power plant represent one of Romania’s most important hydro-energy developments. The Vidraru hydropower plant was commissioned on December 9, 1966, and utilizes the hydro-energy potential of the Argeș River over a sector of approximately 28 km, between Cumpăna and Oiești, exploiting a total head of 324 m. The installation has a capacity of 220 MW and an average annual production of approximately 400 GWh, while the reservoir has a total volume of around 465 million m³, of which 320 million m³ represent usable volume.
Relative to Romania’s net electricity production in 2025, estimated at approximately 49.3 TWh, Vidraru’s average annual output represents about 0.8% of national production; in terms of instantaneous power, its 220 MW may account for several percent of actual output within the National Energy System, depending on time and demand conditions.
The refurbishment of Vidraru has been pursued through multiple procurement procedures since 2016, with the contract awarded in July 2024 for approximately €188.38 million to an international consortium consisting of Electromontaj SA (Romania), Končar – Generatori i Motori (Croatia), and Litostroj Power (Slovenia). The project does not aim to increase installed capacity, which remains around 220 MW, but to modernize hydromechanical and electrical equipment in order to improve efficiency, reliability, and lifespan. In this context, annual electricity production may increase marginally, estimated at 5–10%, depending on hydrological conditions.
The total duration of the works is approximately five years, with completion estimated for 2028–2029. The controlled emptying of the reservoir began on August 1, 2025, with an estimated completion date of February 28, 2026, marking the first full emptying since 1974. According to Hidroelectrica, the operation was necessary for interventions on hydromechanical equipment and bottom outlet structures.
Public discourse has included opinions suggesting that certain works on such infrastructure could be carried out in stages or without complete reservoir drainage; in the absence of comprehensive publicly available technical documentation on alternative solutions considered for Vidraru, this hypothesis should be treated with caution, yet remains relevant for evaluating planning quality and institutional communication.

[6] Image usage note: The images used in this material serve an illustrative and analytical purpose. They originate from open public sources or materials distributed in the public domain. Copyright belongs to the legal rights holders. In the event of justified requests regarding their use, the author is available to provide explicit attribution or remove the images.

[7] World Bank, Romania – Systematic Country Diagnostic Update, Washington, D.C., 2023. Highlights governance deficits and limited administrative capacity as major factors behind public service inefficiency.

[8] OECD, Government at a Glance: Romania, Paris, 2021. Indicates low levels of institutional trust and administrative performance below the European average;
European Commission, Rule of Law Report – Romania, Brussels, 2023, signals structural issues regarding administrative efficiency and accountability mechanisms.

[9] Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Harvard University Press, 1970. Foundational theoretical model: citizens respond to dysfunction through “voice” (protest) or “exit” (withdrawal/adaptation);
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, 1965. Explains the difficulty of collective mobilization in the absence of direct incentives;
Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, Simon & Schuster, 2000. Describes the erosion of social capital and its impact on civic participation.

[10] Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the European Union, editions 2022–2024. Indicates low levels of institutional trust and civic participation in Romania compared to the EU average.

[11] Freedom House, Nations in Transit – Romania, 2023, highlights stagnation in institutional reforms and weakening accountability mechanisms;
Stanford Social Innovation Review, “The Era of Relational Intelligence,” 2023. Relevant for the concept of social cohesion and the relationship between trust and institutional functionality.

[12] RUSI, State Resilience and Societal Cohesion in Hybrid Conflict, London, 2022, correlates societal cohesion with states’ capacity to withstand crises;
EUISS, Resilience in the EU: Strategic Implications, Paris, 2022, introduces the concept of “societal resilience” as a security component.

[13] Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, 1968—central argument: instability arises when social mobilization exceeds institutional capacity;
Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014—explains institutional degradation through political capture and administrative inefficiency.

Clingendael Academy hosts yearly Corps Diplomatique

on The Hague, City of Peace and Justice

By Martijn PluimAnne Aagten

On the 20th of April 2026, the Clingendael Academy hosted the annual Corps Diplomatique seminar, ‘The Hague, International City of Peace and Justice’, aimed at gathering diplomats and international institutions based in The Hague. This year’s turnout of 50+ participants allowed for constructive and in-depth discussions. 

The seminar opened with words of welcome from the Clingendael Academy Director, Martijn Pluim, and the Dutch Ambassador for International Organisations, H.E. Paul van den Ijssel.

Following was the keynote lecture on AI in diplomacy which was given by a member of the UN Secretary General’s High Level Advisory Board on AI, Jimena Sofiá Viveros Àlvarez. Her interactive lecture encouraged the audience to engage and reflect on the current use of AI in different scenarios and what should be prioritised in governance discussions.  

Member of UN Secretary General’s High Level Advisory Board on AI, Jimena Sofiá Viveros Àlvarez

The second part of the seminar focused on the legal international institutions in The Hague and their respective roles in upholding international law.

Representatives from the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the International Court of Justice and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons joined us to share about the work of these key institutions as well their challenges and opportunities.

This second part of the seminar allowed for participants to understand how legal institutions operate to keep executing and protecting international law. 

German President Steinmeier pays official visit to Sweden

Wednesday, 6 May 2026, Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson received Germany’s Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier for a bilateral meeting in Stockholm.

“It is an honour to receive Germany’s President Frank-Walter Steinmeier in Stockholm. Germany is one of our closest partners and Allies. Together we enhance Europe’s competitiveness and capacity for innovation, and make our region and all NATO Allies stronger. Support to Ukraine is a top priority for both our countries,” says Mr Kristersson.

Germany is Sweden’s most important trading partner, and the world’s fourth largest economy. The two countries are likeminded with respect to many social issues and have broad bilateral cooperation. The aim of the visit is to further advance the already warm Swedish-German relations. The leaders are expected to discuss regional security, total defence and bilateral relations.

The President paid the official visit to Sweden over the day and was accompanied by his wife, Ms Elke Büdenbender. The President and Ms Büdenbender also visited Muskö Naval base and attended a luncheon at the Royal Palace at the invitation of The King and Queen of Sweden. 

Year 2026 marks the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany. 

For further information 

The Swedish Government: https://www.government.se/press-releases/2026/04/prime-minister-to-receive-germanys-federal-president/

German Federal Presidency: https://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Berichte/DE/Frank-Walter-Steinmeier/2026/05/260506-07-Reise-SWE-FIN.html

Picture courtesy of Embassy of Sweden in Germany – Encounter between the Swedish Prime Minister and the German stakeholders

What Western coverage of the Islamic Republic of Iran often misses

By Hans Noot, Associate director of Human Rights Without Frontiers

HRWF (05.06.2026) – When Iran appears in the news, the focus is usually on missiles, sanctions, nuclear talks, and clashes with the United States or Israel. Those issues matter. But they do not fully explain how Iran’s rulers think about power, survival, and the future.

One important part of the picture is religious. The Islamic Republic is not only a state with political interests. It is also a system that speaks in the language of faith, sacrifice, justice, and waiting for a divinely guided future. In that language, endurance is not just strategy. It can also be a moral duty.

In Shia Islam, many believers await the return of the Mahdi, the so called “twelfth Imam,” who is expected to appear at the end of time and establish justice. For many Christian and Jewish readers, this may sound somewhat familiar, since their own traditions also contain hopes for a final age of peace and justice under a divinely chosen figure. Belief in the return of the Mahdi is not unique to Iran, and it is not automatically political. 

For many Shia believers, it is a source of hope and patience. But in Iran, state leaders have often used this language in public life, linking religion to government behavior and national resistance. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has said that “the message of Islam is the establishment of justice,” and that waiting for the Mahdi means “we should move and not remain idle,” adding that efforts toward justice bring society closer to that goal. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also spoke in explicitly Mahdist terms, saying that the government knows the Hidden Imam’s identity, and that the government was preparing the ground for his coming and that foreign powers were trying to prevent it.

That language matters because it changes how we understand the regime’s choices. A system that sees itself as defending a sacred order may not think in the same way as a government that is only trying to maximize power in the ordinary political sense. Iran may be more willing to endure pain, accept isolation, and even absorb damage if that is seen as part of a larger moral struggle.

This does not mean that every decision in Tehran is driven by theology. It would be too simple to say that the regime is controlled by apocalyptic thinking. It is not. Iranian leaders are also practical, tactical, and highly concerned with staying in power. But that practical survival is often sourced from strong beliefs and wrapped in religious language. The result is a worldview in which resisting pressure, preserving the system, and waiting for a promised future can all be part of the same story.

That is one reason Western coverage can feel incomplete. News reports often treat Iran as if it were guided only by calculations of military strength or diplomatic leverage. Those factors are real, but they are not the whole picture. If one ignores the regime’s religious vocabulary, one may miss why it speaks with such certainty, why it frames compromise as dangerous, and why it presents endurance as a virtue in itself.

Many Western readers think of peace mainly as the absence of war. In some Shia schools of thought, peace is understood more as a just order: a world in which oppression is removed, truth is honored, and society is aligned with divine justice. From that perspective, Iran often presents the West not simply as a military rival, but as a civilizational challenge, because values such as secularism, moral relativism, materialism, individualism, and a liberal international order are seen as in tension with that vision of justice. 

There is also a broader human point here. Governments do not act only from fear, interest, or rational planning. They also act through stories about who they are and what they believe history is for. In Iran, one of those stories is that hardship is meaningful, resistance is noble, and justice will ultimately arrive through divine fulfillment. That story can help explain why the regime presents itself as both threatened and unbroken.

In the end, the point is not that Iran is ruled by prophecy rather than politics, or that every move it makes can be explained by theology. The point is simpler and more useful: to understand Iran fully, we have to listen not only to its weapons and negotiations, but also to its language of meaning. In that language, survival is not merely self-preservation, and resistance is not merely defiance; both can be presented as part of a sacred struggle toward justice. That is why Western coverage of Iran often feels incomplete. It sees the pressure, but not always the moral story the regime tells itself about why pressure must be endured. Once that story is understood, Iran’s behavior becomes less mysterious, even when it remains deeply troubling.

The International Criminal Court as a cornerstone of international law

By H.E. Mrs. Carolina Olarte Bácares, Ambassador of Colombia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Colombian candidate for the International Criminal Court Judge election (2027-2036)

Seventy years ago —in 1956— amid the escalation of various global problems and conflicts within the context of what became known as the Cold War, US international jurist and diplomat Phillip Jessup wrote an article entitled “The Universal Nature of Human Problems.” In it, he questioned whether it was possible to envision any legal mechanism for resolving them. Faced with this dilemma, Jessup pointed out that, given the complexity of these issues and the intricate interests involved, it would be naive not to acknowledge that international law has inherent limitations in its effective management. He argued that behind the concept of the state and the law produced by states, as free and equal entities, lay unsettling realities that prevented consensus on solutions, or that even when consensus existed, it was ultimately disregarded when applying the rules created for that purpose.

Just as Jessup’s diagnosis remains relevant today, so too does his prediction: history teaches us that human beings, despite themselves, will continue to encounter one another, remain together, and interact. Therefore, there is a social basis for the normative —in this case the international community—, to continue to be a relevant and necessary governance scheme to guarantee stability and survival for humanity.

International law has never had an easy path to fulfilling its mission. The aspirations of equality and fraternity promoted for human society have eventually been contrasted with the irrational use of force and discrimination in the actions and motivations of States. However, if we examine the workings of international law —including its institutions such as the International Criminal Court— there are outstanding milestones that illustrate how it has been able to address highly complex problems and seemingly insurmountable controversies.

H.E. Ms. Carolina Olarte Bácares.

International law has done this by means of taking into account diverse interests and limited resources so as to find the best possible solution. First, it performs as a laboratory of ideas that promote a worldview in which differences can coexist, and the disparity of resources can be managed to avoid severe harm to humanity. Second, international law can be regarded as a legitimate arena for debate and discussion among opposing sides. Ultimately, the field had provided a key contribution in preventing the normalization of the use of force as an everyday tool. In other words, international law is a barrier against irrationality and barbarity, and it functions precisely because it is a common forum and language for States and other stakeholders to interact.

A great example that crystallizes such considerations is the International Criminal Court (ICC). Its institutional mandate to ensure that international crimes are investigated, prosecuted, and punished according to the highest standards of retributive and restorative justice, embodies the aims of legal innovation, the opportunity of deliberation and the moral standing over violence.     

The ICC embodies the international community’s tradition of prosecuting the most heinous crimes, established in Nuremberg and Tokyo and progressively developed in both national court and ad hoc international tribunals. Therefore, the establishment of the Rome Statute System should be seen as a milestone for all humanity, including states that are not currently States Parties.

Be as it may, the Court’s consistent commitment to upholding human conscience in the context of the criminal responsibility of those who have led criminal actions against global legal interests is being faced through actions focused on preventing its functioning and discrediting its achievements. Such actions have come to dispute its very existence and continuity as a cornerstone of international law. 

Against this backdrop, and with the conviction that the ICC should be supported to remain the arena for the most significant developments in the field of international criminal justice, Colombia decided to support its continuity by submitting my candidacy as an ICC judge for the next election process, corresponding to the period 2027-2036. I am originally and have conducted most of my professional work in Colombia, a country that suffered a prolonged and degrading internal armed conflict.

Therefore, I believe its experience in seeking a just and lasting peace through transitional justice could be instrumental for empowering the already prevailing work of the ICC. Moreover, to reaffirm the latter´s legitimacy as a unique mechanism for maintaining global peace and security while promoting the rights of the victims and social reconciliation.

From my work as an international law practitioner before international tribunals, I have observed that the system is under considerable pressure from those who tend to discredit norms and decisions when they do not align with their particular interests. However, since its inception in the post-war era, international criminal law has been conceived as a means of holding those responsible for the graves offenses accountable, thus preventing a relapse of violence and other structural causes of such crimes. Therefore, ensuring consistency in the application of international decisions is crucial, as selectivity cannot be an option in a rules-based international order.

In turn, the many years I have devoted to human rights and transitional justice scholarship in a complex context such as Colombia’s, have conveyed a powerful idea to me: that the already legitimate objectives of international criminal justice can be amplified even further if, in addition to fulfilling its retributive function, it can also promote the redress of harm caused by such illegal conduct. Whereas the ICC has already taken important steps in such direction, I think that more can be done to ensure that the scope of the ICC is leveraged to contribute to international peace and security from the perspective of the victims, who are the ones who remind us why we are here and why we do what we do.

Finally, the ICC embodies one of our species’ greatest aspirations: to coexist despite our differences, so that the social conflicts that naturally arise from these divergences —including international crimes— can be addressed through non-violent means and thus meet social expectations on accountability. As a diplomat based in the City of International Peace and Justice, I have been able to deepen my capacity to fully apprehend the mechanisms involved in the quest for cooperation and consensus, which happen to be fundamental for the exercise of judicial functions under the constant pressure of multifaceted political dynamics.

All in all, the ICC is a cornerstone of the international justice system, whose objective is to protect individuals from the indiscriminate use of violence and to promote accountability for human rights violations and the commission of international crimes. With this in mind, my candidature seeks to draw upon the experience gained by many countries and more recently condensed by Colombia`s peace laboratory, with its transitional justice and peacebuilding project, to strengthen the mechanisms the Court already uses to fulfill its mandate.

Hospitality at the Heart of Diplomacy: A Personal Reflection on The Hague’s International Future

By Thomas Kortleve

The Hague has long stood at the crossroads of diplomacy, international law, and global cooperation. As Chairman of the Hague Hotel Consultation (Haags Hoteloverleg), I have had the privilege of experiencing first-hand how deeply our hospitality sector is intertwined with this international ecosystem. It is a role I have come to value not only professionally, but personally.

Over the years, I have genuinely enjoyed building relationships with the many embassies based in our city. What began as practical cooperation has grown into something far more meaningful. There is a shared understanding that hospitality in The Hague is not just about offering rooms, but about facilitating dialogue, trust, and connection. Working closely with embassy teams—often under time pressure and with high expectations—has shown me the strength of collaboration when mutual respect and clarity are in place.

Hotels in The Hague have become reliable partners to the diplomatic community. We provide spaces for meetings, quiet negotiations, and moments of informal exchange that often prove just as valuable as formal discussions. These interactions have reinforced my belief that our sector plays a subtle yet essential role in supporting the city’s diplomatic mission.

This role was never more visible than during the NATO Summit in 2026. For me, it was not only a professional milestone, but also a moment of pride. Welcoming heads of state, ministers, and international delegations required an extraordinary level of coordination. What stood out most was the spirit of collaboration—between hotels, embassies, government institutions, and security services. The success of the summit confirmed that The Hague can operate at the very highest international level, and that our hospitality sector is ready to meet that responsibility.

At the same time, experiences like these also highlight the work that still lies ahead. The Dutch hospitality sector, and particularly that of The Hague, is facing increasing pressure. Rising costs, labour shortages, and regulatory complexity such as the increase on vat on overnight stays from 9% to 21%, continue to challenge our ability to remain competitive. Meanwhile, other European cities are moving quickly, investing heavily in infrastructure and positioning themselves effectively in the international market.

For The Hague, the challenge is also one of focus. We are globally recognized as the city of peace and justice, yet we have not fully translated that identity into a strong and consistent position as a leading conference and business destination. Our facilities are excellent, but not yet sufficient in scale or integration to capture the full potential of the international market.

This is why the coming years will be decisive. With new policymakers shaping the future of our city, we have a clear opportunity to make strategic choices that will define our long-term success. One of my key wishes is the development of a stronger and more coherent international zone. Such an environment would not only benefit embassies and international organizations, but also create a more attractive ecosystem for global companies.

Equally important is the expansion of our conference capacity. The World Forum remains an iconic venue with enormous potential. By investing in its growth and better connecting it with surrounding hotels and infrastructure, we can position The Hague once again as a leading European congress city. This is not simply about prestige—it is about creating sustainable economic value and ensuring that we remain relevant in an increasingly competitive landscape.

At the same time, we must strengthen our efforts beyond the city itself. Our lobbying—both nationally and internationally—needs to become more focused and effective. If we want to attract corporates, international organizations, and (b)leisure visits, we must tell a clearer and more compelling story about what The Hague and Scheveningen have to offer. This requires alignment between public and private stakeholders, and a willingness to invest in long-term positioning.

Ultimately, a strong hospitality sector is inseparable from a strong economy. When we succeed in attracting international visitors and events, the benefits extend far beyond our hotels. They support local businesses, cultural institutions, and the broader urban economy.

Looking ahead, I remain optimistic. The relationships we have built with embassies, the experience gained during events such as the NATO Summit, and the commitment within our sector provide a solid foundation. What we need now is ambition and direction.

By strengthening our international zone, expanding our conference infrastructure, and sharpening our global positioning, The Hague can continue to grow—not only as a centre of diplomacy, but as a vibrant, competitive, and internationally connected city.