LATEST ARTICLES

Uruguayan Independence Day Celebrated in The Hague

The Embassy of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay marked his country’s Independence Day with a grand and festive reception. Held on August 27 at the Leonardo Royal Hotel in The Hague, the event drew over 200 distinguished guests from various sectors of Dutch society.

Ambassadors, chiefs of international missions, diplomats, academics, business leaders, and representatives from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, along with members of the Uruguayan community, all responded to H.E. Ambassador Dr. Álvaro González Otero’s invitation to celebrate ‘Día de la Independencia’—Uruguay’s National Day, commemorating its independence from Brazil in 1825.

H.E. Dr. Álvaro González Otero, Ambassador of Uruguay. National Day 2024 The Hague.

After nearly 200 years of conflict and civil unrest under Spanish and then Brazilian rule, Uruguay has emerged as a country renowned for its welcoming people, stunning landscapes, first-class meat production, and high-quality wine. In recent decades, Uruguayans have enjoyed a stable democracy, a steady improvement in living conditions, and overall well-being.

In a packed room with an animated audience, Ambassador González Otero took the microphone to thank all the attendees for their sincere affection for his people and country. He then proudly expressed:

“Two years have quickly passed since I arrived in this lovely kingdom. Since then, we have started to shift the focus of the Embassy, placing more emphasis on our bilateral relations. The Netherlands and Uruguay have more in common than people might imagine. We share international principles, landscapes, agricultural production, developed services, qualified exports, and a progressive lifestyle.

We also share strong commitments to the well-being of our citizens and visitors, the protection of human rights, environmental sustainability, progressive social policies, and significant efforts towards renewable energy and climate action. Both countries also emphasize education, democratic governance, and active participation in international organizations promoting peace and development. So, we will keep working to boost our bilateral relations.”

Uruguay National Day, August 27 at the Leonardo Royal Hotel in The Hague.
From the Embassy of Uruguay, Counsellor Pablo Bayarres, Ambassador Gonzalez Otero and Hans Akerboom, Deputy Director Protocol and Host Country Affairs from the Netherlands.

Ambassador González Otero then listed some of the most relevant initiatives undertaken by the Embassy over the last few months:

Uruguayan participation in the World Hydrogen Summit 2024: Led by the Minister of Industry, Energy, and Mining, Ms. Elisa Facio, with over 50 representatives from various sectors of the public and private sectors.

Active participation in the “26th World Energy Congress.”

Cooperation Project with Delft Institute for Water Education: Since 2011, Uruguayan professionals specializing in water resources have participated in the Delft Institute program for advanced training. Initially, the program began with 40 scholarships, resulting in 37 professionals successfully completing their studies. This early success led to the program’s relocation and implementation at the Technological University of Uruguay, now featuring regional participation. The program has since had two new editions in 2022 and 2024, expanding to include 17 professionals from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Peru. This development has transformed Uruguay into a regional hub in the field of water resource education.

Uruguay’s status as one of the 32 signing states of the Ljubljana – The Hague Convention in February 2024.

Positioning Uruguay as a potential living and working destination for Dutch farmers.

Interactions with RVO and Port of Rotterdam related to port cooperation.

Exploring and initiating new cooperation projects with Westland Municipality and Wageningen University.

Meetings with private sector actors related to agribusiness.

Preparation for the Capitan Miranda’s visit to Amsterdam: Uruguay’s school tall ship has already confirmed its participation in Sail Amsterdam 2025.

Multilateral achievements: The Embassy has made progress in multilateral areas, including ongoing contributions and work with international organizations based in The Hague: the ICJ, ICC, OPCW, HCCH, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Additionally, a closer relationship with The Hague Academy of International Law has been pursued. Significant advances have also been made through the coordinated work of the GRULAC Group in relation to various international organizations.

H.E. Mr. Fernando Arias, OPCW Director General , Ambassador Gonzalez Otero and Mr Arias spouse, Patricia van Oordt.

Following his remarks, Ambassador González Otero invited the audience to watch a short video about Uruguay, which made a great impression on those present. He expressed, “Uruguay is an exceptional country that has developed a dynamic and robust culture, shaped by a fascinating blend of gaucho traditions, European influences, and the unique Rioplatense spirit. Tango, folklore, candombe, and milonga are examples of its rich artistic musical expression. Uruguayan gastronomy, featuring high-quality meat, wine, and dairy products, especially the beloved ‘dulce de leche,’ delights palates and consistently wins prestigious awards worldwide.”

“The work we have done does not mean we are satisfied; we want to continue advancing in a deeper process. The bilateral relationship is already strong, but the potential to strengthen bonds in several key areas is even greater.”

The Ambassador of Uruguay, H.E. Alvaro Gonzalez Otero and the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Graciela Gatti Santana with her husband Mr Gustavo Segovia.

The event was conceived to showcase the rich and diverse culture of Uruguay, a nation with a population of approximately 3,495,527 as of 2022.

The national anthems of Uruguay and the Netherlands were performed by the Uruguayan opera singer Sara de los Campos. After the ambassador’s speech, the Embassy paid tribute to two influential musicians: José “El Sabalero” Carbajal and Jaime Roos, who both lived in the Netherlands. Jaime Roos settled in Amsterdam in 1978, where he played bass in several salsa, rock, and jazz groups. He had a son and remained in the Netherlands until 1984 when he returned to Uruguay.

Carbajal spent his days in the Netherlands with his wife, Anke van Haastrecht, and their two children. Anke was invited to share some special stories from their life together.

Uruguayan opera singer Sara de los Campos.
Uruguayan drummers Luis Gradin, Marcelo Terra, and Nicolás Sánchez.

The enthusiastic audience enjoyed an authentic performance by talented Uruguayan drummers Luis Gradin, Marcelo Terra, and Nicolás Sánchez. The celebration continued with Uruguayan wine, classic savory empanadas, and dulce de leche, which delighted the crowded room and completed the great celebration.

Ambassador González Otero concluded the event by thanking his Embassy team: Counselor Pablo Bayarres, Chancellor Gustavo Morales, his assistant Juan Diego, and Martha Hernández and Sofía Anastasiou. He then led a warm toast for the people of the Netherlands, Uruguay, and the necessary and desired peace in the world.

China: A New Actor in the Contemporary Multipolar World

By Mariarosaria Iorio, Political Analyst

I. The post-cold war world  

International relations are nowadays characterised by major changes that started at the end of the 80s with the fall of the Berlin Wall.  Indeed, the end of the cold war was marked by the dislocation of the two main political blocks, namely the Soviet Union and the Western World. Such a dislocation resulted in the marginalization of the post-war multilateral system embodied in the United Nations, and the standstill of the multilateral trade negotiations in the late 90s in the context of the World Trade Organisation.  New lines of political thought have been facing each other since then, while reshaping the post-cold war world in a number of fragmented and variable sub-blocks of countries. 

The United States decided to put itself first by concentrating on its internal affairs, while withdrawing from international affairs.  

Europe, the old continent, looks for an efficient strategy towards autonomy from the United States.  Europe also tries, not without difficulty, to create a more cohesive internal and external political approach.  The reality is however evolving rather more towards fragmentation of Europe in favour of European National fragmented interests. Such a fragmentation is the natural consequence of the decadence of the European Institutional and collective actions to the advantage of individual Sates actions and interests.   In sum, what seemed to be a structured and coherent European Union block fighting for the promotion of its economic and political values all over the world has somehow become an alliance at variable geometry both internally and externally.  The disorganisation of the leadership results in a chaotic and unpredictable European External and Internal action. 

Thereof, the empty influence spaces left on the international relations scene has given new international actors the opportunity to emerge.  

Meanwhile, the fragmentation of the European Institutions has also impacted the EU-USA relations within NATO, and affected the security and peace sphere.  Security issues have been on and off on the European agenda.    

In this context, Russia that has lost its empire in the 80s looks now for a new power game. In spite of the disruption of the Soviet Union, Russia attempts either by influence or by force to exercise power in its ancient affiliate countries.  Russia that was supposed to be defeated with the fall of the Berlin Wall takes back its role of opponent to the Western World on the international scene at least as it concerns the international affairs philosophy.  Thus, creating a tension aimed at restoring its power in the world.   

The group of emerging and developing economies that constitute a new variable block with a large portion of population employed in agriculture have emerged as new actors in the world’s geo-political discourses.  At the head of this block on the international scene, there is China.  The shaky international leadership context has indeed given China a new space. China’s   communist past combined with its market-based economic strategy gives it a particular position.  

China is The One that can communicate to Russia. China is also The One that can have an influence on the Western economic and political scene as China owns a big part of Western Foreign Debt  

China embeds a horizontal strategy in both its trade and development policies, while producing at low wages.  Its production system coupled with its pragmatic political approach has reshaped the international power structure.  The top-down approach of the Western World faces now the competition created by the horizontal win-win approach proposed by China in both developing and industrialized countries.

Indeed, as a result of the decline of the Western World global hegemony based on market access and economic and social liberalism as a means to ensure economic growth and promote economic development, the vision promoted by China’s discourse, centred on the protection of livelihoods and local sovereign choices finds new adepts.  Furthermore, China has successfully attempted to promote a trade-off approach to international cooperation during the last 20 years.  A cooperation that does not interfere in internal affairs of partner countries as it has often reproached to the Western countries involved in international cooperation.  

As the developing countries leader, China positions itself as the spoke country for the poor.  As a new world powerful economic actor China plays as the guarantor of the Western Economic stability.  China positions itself as the bridge between the rich and the poor.  It is representing a different hegemonic game that only changes in its discourse, while still pursuing its own interests and influence zones.  Such a situation poses the question of the values that the international regime wants to embrace.  Indeed, this changing world results in an increased number of conflicts – be new or historical conflicts.  

The dislocation of the traditional leaders of the international relations has definitely created a chaotic and unpredictable scenario.  Chaos has in some cases been chosen as a political strategy to disrupt the post-1945 international regime. Such a disruption has benefitted new actors, and given space to new lines of thought.  These new lines of thought have attacked the existing international framework but has not yet succeeded in creating a new regime.  The increasing unbalance of power and the lack of leadership on the international political scene is risky. 

The reduction by choice of leadership of the United States has indeed resulted in the weakening of the values emerged as a result of the dramatic experience of Second World War, namely freedom of thought and freedom of speech to mention only a few.   We are now facing a much more authoritarian world with force used as a means to manage the political arena.  Dialogue seems to be a rather consuming exercise that has left its place to the use of force.  Force is no longer seen as the last option but rather the opening act for political dialogue.  Nationalism and individual interests are now at the centre of the political game. This trend is taking the world to instability and conflict.  

The peoples of the world are more and more questioning the existing system. People’s needs and expectations are not met.  The new emerged actors, such as China have given the hope of a possible change in the present international system without fundamentally questioning its rationale but rather trying to rip a slate of the cake.  

The struggle for influence among countries has not succeeded in building a peaceful and stable world. Citizens will have to face the challenge of building a new era of peace and stability worldwide.

Derrière les murs du Palais de la Paix : permanence et changements de la Cour internationale de Justice

0

S.E. M. Philippe Couvreur est arrivé à La Haye en avril 1982, où il a d’abord occupé le poste d’assistant spécial aux bureaux du greffier et du greffier adjoint de la Cour internationale de Justice.

Il a ensuite exercé les fonctions de Secrétaire, Premier Secrétaire et Secrétaire juridique principal, avant d’être élu Greffier de la Cour en 2000, et réélu en 2007 et 2014. Pour marquer l’anniversaire de ses débuts à la Cour, il y a 35 ans, Diplomat Magazine l’a invité à témoigner de son expérience unique au service de cette institution, des évolutions qu’il a pu y observer, et à partager le regard qu’il porte sur les changements qui ont marqué la Cour et La Haye au cours des trois dernières décennies.
Philippe Couvreur avec le Pape Jean-Paul II prise le 13 mai 1985.
Je suis arrivé à La Haye en avril 1982 — de façon aussi inattendue que j’avais entamé des études de droit treize ans auparavant (mais c’est là une autre histoire…) — pour occuper un poste temporaire à la Cour internationale de Justice. La Cour était alors la seule institution judiciaire internationale existante au plan universel. Son activité, particulièrement faible à la fin des années 1970, ne pouvait en ce temps-là guère laisser présager du succès que rencontrerait la Cour dans les décennies à venir. Mon bienveillant maître de Louvain, le professeur Paul de Visscher, fils du célèbre internationaliste Charles de Visscher, unique juge belge à la Cour, m’avait prédit des jours aussi sereins qu’heureux, écoulés à lire et à écrire des ouvrages dans la solitude des imposants murs de la bibliothèque du Palais de la Paix…
Les mémoires ont été dûment déposés dans l’affaire El Salvador c. Honduras dans la salle Bol le 1 juin 1988, l’affaire du Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime.
En rejoignant la Cour, un frais matin d’avril, dont je garde un souvenir très précis, le jeune juriste que j’étais découvrit, non sans étonnement, une organisation de taille très modeste, le Greffe, qui en est l’organe administratif, alors composé de moins d’une quarantaine de fonctionnaires. Le fonctionnement de la Cour reposait entièrement sur cette équipe restreinte de personnel permanent, auquel s’ajoutait, selon que de besoin, un personnel temporaire pour faire face au surcroît de travaux linguistiques et de sténodactylographie lors des sessions (publiques et privées) de la Cour. Je me rappelle avoir été frappé par la personnalité haute en couleur de certains de ces traducteurs indépendants, dont la grande culture littéraire m’émerveillait. Cette structure très économique du Greffe impliquait une grande polyvalence de ses membres, et les Secrétaires de la Cour — ses fonctionnaires supérieurs — étaient appelés, en sus de leurs travaux de recherches juridiques, de préparation des documents de la Cour, et de rédaction de la correspondance diplomatique, à assumer eux-mêmes l’essentiel des tâches linguistiques (traduction et interprétation) et d’information, ainsi que la supervision de nombreuses activités administratives et logistiques.
La Grande salle de Justice, l’affaire Relative au Timor Oriental (Portugal c. Australie) Arrêt du 30 juin 1995.
Il n’était nullement rare qu’un nouveau venu comme moi ait à passer week-ends et nuits blanches au Palais de la Paix à effectuer les travaux les plus divers… allant jusqu’à imprimer et polycopier, sur de vieilles machines à stencils ronéotype, des décisions dont la Cour devait donner la lecture en séance publique le lendemain ! Dès mon arrivée au Greffe, j’ai eu le bonheur et le privilège d’être initié et associé à l’ensemble des fonctions de l’institution sous la patiente supervision de personnalités d’exception, tels que MM. Torres Bernárdez et Pillepich, alors respectivement Greffier et Greffier adjoint. J’en ai retiré le plus grand bénéfice, puisque cette immersion sans préparation dans toutes les facettes de l’activité du Greffe m’a permis d’acquérir de ce dernier une connaissance unique — de l’intérieur — et sous tous ses aspects —, un acquis particulièrement précieux au moment où j’ai été amené, bien des années plus tard, à assumer la délicate responsabilité d’en assurer la gestion au plus haut niveau. Devenir un fonctionnaire du Greffe au début des années 1980 signifiait accepter de se couler sans discussion dans un moule à tous égards exigeant, et se donner corps et âme, avec humilité et discrétion, à l’institution, sans penser à soi ni parler de soi. Depuis ces années d’initiation, j’ai été le témoin de profondes transformations de la Cour, rendues inévitables à la fois pour répondre à l’accroissement considérable de ses activités, avec la disparition du monde bipolaire qui avait relégué le règlement judiciaire à un rôle quelque peu marginal, et pour saisir les opportunités nouvelles offertes, notamment, par le progrès des technologies et de la communication. Entre 1982 et aujourd’hui, le nombre de fonctionnaires a ainsi presque triplé (il a quasiment doublé depuis l’an 2000, année de ma première élection en tant que Greffier). L’organisation du travail a été progressivement spécialisée entre les divers départements, juridique, linguistique et chargé de l’information, qui furent créés en 1997, et les services techniques. Par ailleurs, les Membres de la Cour ne disposèrent pas, pendant longtemps, de « référendaires » — ils s’y sont d’ailleurs longtemps refusés—, et l’assistance apportée aux juges en matière judiciaire était principalement répartie entre les fonctionnaires du Département des affaires juridiques.
H.E. Philippe Couvreur avec la Reine Beatrix photo prise pendant le 50 eme anniversaire de la Cour (18-04-1996).
Les cinq premiers postes de juristes référendaires ne furent obtenus de l’Assemblée générale et créés qu’en 2002, à l’issue de difficiles négociations que je me souviens avoir menées avec beaucoup de plaisir et d’intérêt ; le nombre de ces postes s’est progressivement accru, pour s’élever à quinze aujourd’hui. Les divers développements qui ont marqué le monde au cours des dernières décennies n’ont pas manqué de soulever pour la Cour de nouveaux défis. Comme c’est le cas pour toute institution, elle n’a pu les relever en faisant table rase des enseignements de son histoire ni, à l’inverse, en ne saisissant pas toutes les opportunités offertes par le temps présent. A ces différents égards, la Cour est certainement parvenue, au fil des ans, à assurer un équilibre, toujours délicat, entre changements et continuité. La continuité de la Cour est bien sûr inscrite dans son Statut, qui fait partie intégrante de la Charte des Nations Unies, et reflétée dans ses méthodes judiciaires, qui ont été très largement élaborées par sa devancière, la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, et héritées d’elle. Cette continuité historique était particulièrement présente lorsque j’ai rejoint le Greffe. Ainsi, en manière d’anecdote, divers hauts fonctionnaires alors en poste avaient eux-mêmes côtoyé, au début de leur carrière, d’anciens fonctionnaires de la Cour permanente. Tous nourrissaient à l’égard de cette dernière le plus grand respect. Il régnait d’ailleurs dans les couloirs du Palais de la Paix une atmosphère feutrée et délicieusement surannée, évocatrice de la défunte Société des Nations. Je me souviens en avoir encore utilisé maintes fournitures de bureau ! La continuité jurisprudentielle et procédurale entre les deux Cours constitue pour les Etats une garantie importante de sécurité et de prévisibilité juridiques. Cette continuité, juridique et historique, de même que l’expérience accumulée en plus de quatre-vingt-dix ans d’exercice de la fonction judiciaire, sont pour la Cour un facteur crucial de légitimité.
H.E. Philippe Couvreur vec le Roi Willem-Alexander photo prise pendant le 70 eme anniversaire de la Cour (20-04-2016).
En même temps, la Cour a eu, à l’évidence, à s’adapter aux changements du monde réel dans lequel elle opère, comme aux nécessités et opportunités nouvelles de chaque époque traversée. L’une des transformations notoires auxquelles j’ai assisté fut l’ouverture croissante de la Cour sur l’extérieur : longtemps à l’écart, à dessein, des organes politiques des Nations Unies, la Cour a souhaité se faire plus et mieux entendre de ces organes et des Etats membres. Elle a ainsi rompu avec ce qui était parfois perçu comme un « splendide isolement » au sein des Nations Unies, même si elle défend toujours jalousement son autonomie. La Cour doit en outre désormais également tenir compte des nombreuses autres juridictions, internationales ou régionales, qui ont été créées ces dernières années, et veiller, autant que possible, à assurer l’harmonie du « concert judiciaire » que permet ce foisonnement de cours et tribunaux sur la scène internationale. Davantage ouverte sur la communauté internationale et ses réalités, la Cour s’est montrée de plus en plus attentive, non seulement à sa place dans l’Organisation des Nations Unies, mais aussi à la poursuite des objectifs de celle-ci et à sa mission propre au service du règlement pacifique des différends internationaux. Des différends de plus en plus complexes, tant juridiquement que factuellement, en même temps que politiquement plus denses, lui ont été soumis. En révisant constamment, selon que de besoin, ses méthodes de travail, elle a su les résoudre rapidement et efficacement, à un coût particulièrement modeste pour la communauté internationale, tout en assurant le développement du droit. Enfin, pour conclure sur une note plus prosaïque, mais qui est loin d’être négligeable, je ne peux taire la chance que j’ai eue de connaître l’extraordinaire développement de la ville de La Haye au cours des 35 dernières années. Celle-ci offre aujourd’hui à la Cour, comme aux nombreuses institutions internationales qui s’y sont installées à sa suite, une qualité de vie et un cadre de travail uniques, qui sont très loin de ressembler à ce que j’ai trouvé en y arrivant. A l’image de l’imposante stature du Palais de la Paix où elle siège, symbole mondialement connu de la justice internationale, la Cour est une institution solidement établie. En dépit des périodes de doute ou de désaffection qu’elle a traversées par le passé, son rôle est unanimement salué au sein de la communauté internationale et le recours à ses services par les Etats n’a jamais été aussi soutenu. 35 ans après, je continue de mesurer chaque jour le privilège qui est le mien de servir au mieux de mes capacités l’organe judiciaire principal des Nations Unies. —– Les photos dans l’article sont une courtoisie de la Cour International de Justice.

Philippines Secretary of Foreign Affairs Theresa Ma.Lazaro visits The Netherlands

By Roy Lie Atjam

The Embassy of the Philippines proudly hosted a “Meet and Greet Cocktail Reception” in celebration of H.E. Ma. Theresa P. Lazaro‘s visit, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, on May 18. This historic occasion not only honored her visit but also marked the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the Philippines and the Netherlands.

This visit is particularly significant, as it is the first official visit by a Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Netherlands in 33 years—since Secretary Roberto Romulo’s visit in 1993. Secretary Lazaro engaged in important discussions with the Netherlands Foreign Minister, Mr. Tom Berendsen, at the distinguished Johan de Witt House, dating back to 1655, in The Hague. Both Ministers pledged to enhance the regularity of high-level political and economic exchanges, specifically through bilateral consultations.

ASEAN They discussed key topics such as technology, transnational crime, and other vital issues that will fortify cooperation. Their commitment to deepen collaboration on water management and bolster supply chain resilience promises substantial benefits for both nations. A wide range of subjects was thoroughly discussed, paving the way for a brighter future together.

Ambassador Malaya and Philippines Embassy staff with Minister Ma. Theresa P. Lazaro.
H.E. Mr. Eduardo Malaya, Ambassador of the Philippines to the Netherlands presenting a souvenir to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, H.E. Ma. Theresa P. Lazaro.

The discussions featured the Ambassador of the Philippines in the Netherlands, H.E. Mr. Eduardo Malaya, along with various stakeholders. With the Philippines assuming the chairmanship of ASEAN this year, both parties recognized the Netherlands’ proactive involvement in ASEAN initiatives.

In addition, the two Ministers seized the opportunity to address the global ramifications of security challenges emerging in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific. Following the constructive dialogue, a joint statement was released, underscoring their shared commitments.

H.E. Mr. Eduardo Malaya, Ambassador of the Philippines.

In his welcoming remarks, Ambassador Malaya expressed his enthusiasm: “It’s an honor to welcome everyone to the Embassy of the Philippines for this special reception honoring the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, H.E. Ma. Theresa P. Lazaro. It’s a significant moment for any ambassador to host a head of state or Foreign Minister. Moreover, we gather to celebrate the remarkable 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the Philippines and the Netherlands.”

The Ambassador went on to say, “this reception being the last engagement of the Secretary for this trip, I can say that the Visit has been highly successful, with the Secretary having had a substantive meeting with Foreign Minister Tom Berendsen, an important Joint Statement issued that sets out the strategic direction for cooperation, and a well-received address at a forum at the prestigious Clingendael Institute, among others. Our reception tonight nicely caps off the Secretary’s highly productive day in The Hague. This is the cherry on top, so to speak.

H.E. Ma. Theresa P. Lazaro, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines during her speech at the embassy in The Hague.

Madame Secretary, the Embassy team and I wish to convey how truly grateful we are for taking time in your very busy – being also the Chair of the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings, among others– to visit the Netherlands.

If the Embassy team and I have been able to deliver in some ways in carrying out our mission.

it is because we have close collaborators and steadfast partners in undertaking our work.

A great part of our accomplishments, we owe to many of the people gathered here tonight.

Once again, welcome Madame Secretary and the delegation and our partners and friends in the business and Filipino communities. Together, let us continue working toward a future marked by greater prosperity and enduring partnership between the Philippines and the Netherlands.”

Mabuhay po kayong lahat! Thank you, dank u wel, maraming salamat.

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Ma. Theresa P. Lazaro, confidently addressed the gathering, expressing her deep admiration for the significant achievements made and underscoring the critical importance of her visit. Joining her were two other speakers joined her: former Dutch Ambassador Saskia de Lange and Ms. Jofelle Tesorio.  As a token of appreciation, the Embassy presented Secretary Ma. Theresa P. Lazaro with a personalized Delft blue tile that prominently features her official portrait. The event concluded with an engaging reception on the lawns of the chancellery, complete with cocktails, live music, and ample opportunities for productive networking.

Regulating the Unregulatable? Cyber Warfare Treaties and the Breakdown of Traditional Arms Control Logic 

By Ayya Sheptukhina

The development of an international treaty regulating cyber warfare raises a fundamental challenge for international law: whether existing arms control models, particularly those governing nuclear weapons, can be adapted to cyberspace. Recent developments, including the adoption of a United Nations Convention against Cybercrime in 2024 and the establishment of a permanent UN cybersecurity mechanism in 2025, suggest increasing institutionalisation. However, these developments do not overcome the structural differences between nuclear and cyber domains. While nuclear arms control is built on material scarcity, state monopoly, and verification, cyber governance is shaped by intangibility, diffuse power, and persistent uncertainty. These differences fundamentally constrain the design and effectiveness of any cyber warfare treaty.

Nuclear arms control regimes are grounded in the materiality and scarcity of weapons. Nuclear weapons are finite, capital-intensive, and controlled by states, enabling legal frameworks focused on non-proliferation and disarmament. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the fundamental apparatus of this system (Aboul-Enein, 2017, p.3). Although the regime suffers from a legal gap due to the absence of binding timelines for disarmament (Aboul-Enein, 2017, pp.4–5), it has developed into an extensive treaty-based architecture (Finaud, 2020, pp.1–2). Yet its stability is increasingly fragile. Persistent divisions between nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) continue to impede progress (Jaramillo, 2022, pp.2–3), and the expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026 removed the last binding constraint on major nuclear arsenals (U.S. Department of State, 2026).

By contrast, cyberspace presents a fundamentally different regulatory object. Cyber capabilities are intangible, dual-use, and widely accessible, with low barriers to entry for both states and non-state actors. As Hughes (2010, pp.523–524) demonstrates, individuals and non-state groups can conduct disruptive operations at relatively low cost. These characteristics undermine traditional arms control logic: cyber capabilities cannot be meaningfully counted, limited, or eliminated. Regulation must therefore focus on conduct rather than capability.

The evolution of cyber governance reflects both progress and limitation. Mačák (2016, p.127) characterises the field as being in a state of “crisis,” marked by failed treaty-making, limited state practice, and reliance on non-binding norms. While this diagnosis remains analytically useful, recent developments complicate it. The United Nations Convention against Cybercrime, adopted in 2024 and opened for signature in 2025, represents the first global legally binding instrument in this domain (United Nations, 2024; United Nations, 2025a). The establishment of a permanent UN cybersecurity mechanism further signals a shift toward institutional continuity (United Nations, 2025b).

At the same time, there are emerging signs of gradual development in customary international law. Between 2024 and 2026, the international legal landscape matured as a growing number of states and regional bodies articulated formal positions on the application of international law in cyberspace. Notably, both the African Union and the European Union adopted common positions addressing sovereignty, due diligence, and state responsibility in the cyber domain (African Union, 2024; Council of the European Union, 2024).

Building on earlier frameworks developed by states such as the United Kingdom, France, and Canada, more recent contributions from countries including Austria, South Korea, and Thailand have expanded the geographical and legal diversity of state practice (Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, 2024; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, 2025; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, 2025). While these statements do not yet amount to consensus, they contribute to a more representative global compendium of state practice, potentially supporting the gradual formation of customary norms. 

Nevertheless, these developments remain limited in scope. The cybercrime convention regulates criminal activity rather than state conduct in cyber warfare, leaving a gap in the regulation of cyber hostilities (Hughes, 2010, p.524). At the same time, states continue to avoid articulating fully convergent legal positions, constraining the crystallisation of customary law (Mačák, 2016, pp.130–131). Institutionalisation, therefore, does not necessarily produce legal clarity.

A defining specificity of cyber regulation is the problem of attribution, which has intensified with recent advances in artificial intelligence. Unlike nuclear activities, which can be monitored through physical verification mechanisms, cyber operations are inherently opaque. As Mačák notes, attribution is a central challenge for international law (Mačák, 2016, p.127). Recent threat assessments indicate that AI is increasingly used by both state and non-state actors to scale cyber operations and complicate adversary tracking (ENISA, 2025; Microsoft, 2025). The emergence of more autonomous, agentic AI systems further raises questions about responsibility where harmful outcomes may not be directly attributable to human intent (UNIDIR, 2026).

These developments reinforce a shift from deterministic to probabilistic attribution, where responsibility is inferred from patterns of behaviour, infrastructure, and effects rather than conclusively proven. This undermines legal frameworks that rely on establishing intent and complicates enforcement. At the same time, adaptive forms of malicious code further challenge static verification methods (ENISA, 2025). Together, these dynamics constrain the feasibility of treaty-based enforcement systems comparable to those in nuclear arms control.

The actor landscape further differentiates cyberspace. While nuclear regimes are state-centric, cyber operations involve a broad range of non-state actors, including corporations and decentralised groups (Mačák, 2016, p.127). Increasingly, private technology companies play a central role in attribution by providing technical analysis and threat intelligence, further diffusing authority away from states (Microsoft, 2025). This pluralisation of norm-making challenges the traditional state monopoly over international law and complicates treaty design.

Thus, cyber governance shows incremental progress, but any treaty remains distinct from nuclear arms control: diffuse, dual-use capabilities and uncertain attribution require regulating behaviour, not eliminating weapons. 

References:

Aboul-Enein, S. (2017) ‘Toward a non-nuclear world: The NPT regime – nuclear disarmament and the challenge of a WMDFZ in the Middle East’, International Journal of Nuclear Security, 3(1), Article 5. 

African Union (2024) Common African position on international law applicable to the use of information and communication technologies in cyberspace. Adopted by the 37th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly.

Council of the European Union (2024) Council conclusions on a common understanding of the application of international law to cyberspace. 14755/24.

ENISA (2025) ENISA threat landscape 2025. Athens: European Union Agency for Cybersecurity. Available at: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-2025 (Accessed: 1 May 2026).

Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs (2024) Austria’s position on international law in cyberspace. Vienna: Republic of Austria.

Finaud, M. (2020) Multilateralism and arms control: The end of an era? Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

Hughes, R. (2010) ‘A treaty for cyberspace’, International Affairs, 86(2), pp. 523–541.

Jaramillo, C. (2022) Death by a thousand red lines. Beyond Nuclear International. Available at: https://beyondnuclearinternational.org (Accessed: 1 May 2026).

Mačák, K. (2016) ‘Is the international law of cyber security in crisis?’, in Pissanidis, N., Rõigas, H. and Veenendaal, M. (eds.) 2016 8th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon). Tallinn: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, pp. 127–139.

Microsoft (2025) Microsoft digital defense report 2025. Redmond, WA: Microsoft.  Available at: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/security-insider/threat-landscape/microsoft-digital-defense-report-2025 (Accessed: 1 May 2026).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea (2025) Statement by the Government of the Republic of Korea on the application of international law in cyberspace. Seoul: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5674/view.do?seq=321145 (Accessed: 1 May 2026). 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand (2025) National position of the Kingdom of Thailand on the application of international law in cyberspace. Bangkok: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available at: https://mfa.go.th/en/content/th-s-national-position-on-app-of-il-cyberspace-en  (Accessed: 1 May 2026). 

United Nations (2024) United Nations convention against cybercrime. New York: United Nations General Assembly. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/cybercrime/convention/home.html (Accessed: 1 May 2026). 

United Nations (2025a) United Nations convention against cybercrime opens for signature in Hanoi. New York: United Nations Office of Legal Affairs. Available at: https://www.un.org/ola/en/news/united-nations-convention-against-cybercrime-opens-signature-hanoi (Accessed: 1 May 2026). 

United Nations (2025b) Final report of the Open-ended Working Group on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies 2021–2025. New York: United Nations. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4084927?v=pdf  (Accessed: 1 May 2026). 

UNIDIR (2025) Artificial intelligence in the military domain and its implications for international peace and security: An evidence-based road map for future policy action. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. Available at: https://unidir.org/publication/artificial-intelligence-in-the-military-domain-and-its-implications-for-international-peace-and-security-an-evidence-based-road-map-for-future-policy-action/ (Accessed: 1 May 2026). 

U.S. Department of State (2026) New START treaty expiration and status update. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State. Available at: https://www.state.gov/new-start-treaty (Accessed: 1 May 2026).

Uruguay Donates Symbolic Sculpture to the ICC

“The Totem of the Human Tribe” Unveiled at ICC Headquarters in The Hague

On 22 May 2026, H.E. Mr. Álvaro Enrique González Otero, Ambassador of Uruguay to the Netherlands, together with H.E. Ms. Tomoko Akane, President of the International Criminal Court (ICC), unveiled the sculpture “El Tótem de la Tribu Humana” (The Totem of the Human Tribe) at the ICC headquarters in The Hague, the Netherlands.

The monumental artwork, created by renowned Uruguayan artist Roberto Vivo and donated by the Government of Uruguay to the ICC, stands as a powerful symbol of fraternity, diversity, and international justice. Previously exhibited at the Venice International Art Biennale, the sculpture invites reflection on humanity’s shared pursuit of peace and coexistence.

The unveiling ceremony was attended by Roberto Vivo, who travelled to The Hague to personally present his magnificent oeuvre, alongside a distinguished gathering of ambassadors, heads of mission, judges, art collectors, and distinguish friends of Uruguay.

The unveiling ceremony was attended by a distinguished gathering of ambassadors, heads of mission, judges, art collectors, and distinguish friends of Uruguay.

Among the notable guests were H.E. Sahar Ghanem, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps; H.E. Graciela Gatti Santana, President of United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals; Luis Moreno Ocampo, first Prosecutor of the ICC; and Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi, former President of the ICC.

A special message from Yamandú Orsi, President of Uruguay, was read in person by ambassador González Otero during the ceremony.

In his message, President Orsi declared “The sculpture evokes the idea of a diverse humanity and embodies universal values such as dignity, peaceful coexistence, and respect among peoples. This donation is a source of national pride, and its installation within the premises of the Court amplifies a message of peace that is especially necessary at this delicate moment, when wars are multiplying and threatening the very foundations of the international order.”

Ambassador González Otero underscored the symbolic importance of installing the sculpture at the Court.

“If there is one place where this idea acquires concrete meaning, it is precisely here, at the International Criminal Court,” he said. “An institution that represents the collective effort of States to affirm that, beyond geographical, cultural, political and religious differences, there exist fundamental values that must be safeguarded through law and justice.”

H.E. Ms. Tomoko Akane, President of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Reflecting on current global challenges, the Ambassador noted that the ICC remains a tangible expression of international commitment to justice and accountability. He recalled that the entry into force of the Rome Statute in 2002 marked a milestone in the development of international law, establishing a unique forum where States agree to uphold common legal principles in the belief that justice strengthens peace, stability, and international coexistence.

He further reaffirmed Uruguay’s longstanding commitment to international criminal law and to the fight against impunity, noting the country’s early support for the Rome Statute and its incorporation into Uruguay’s domestic legal framework through comprehensive legislation.

Ambassador expressed “Uruguay has historicaly demonstrated its vocation and commitment to international law, and the current Government continues to promote the strengthening of multilateralism. Uruguay’s role as a contributor to international and global public goods – such as the maintenance to international peace and security, the consolidation and development of international law through participation in norm-setting fora and international courts, support for disarmament, food, security, global health, and commitment to addressing climate change – has distinguished our country as a cooperative actor in advancing solutions to global challenges.”

“The presence of this work at the seat of the Court carries profound symbolic value. Its vary title – Human tribe Totem – evokes the idea of a shared humanity, diverse yet interconnected, united by common principles and by the conviction that human dignity must be universally protected”.

“The Totem of the Human Tribe” by Roberto Vivo at the ICC.

Roberto Vivo an internationally renowned sculptor, writer, and painter with a remarkable artistic trajectory developed primarily in the United States, Italy, and Uruguay; and author of the book War: A Crime Against Humanity, reflecting on the message conveyed through his work, stated: “Today we are unveiling this sculpture, which I call ‘The Totem of the Human Tribe.’”

“Those who enter the Totem of the Human Tribe connect with the earth and are able to gaze out in the four cardinal directions — a celebration of the diversity that the four points of the compass provide. And when they enter, I hear getting inside the sculpture and feel the connection with Mother Earth.”

H.E. Mr. Álvaro Enrique González Otero, Ambassador of Uruguay to the Netherlands.

“It encompasses discovering the positive value of variety. It embraces a preference for diversity over unanimity. This sculpture invites the public to become part of a novel global concept: Humanity.”

Vivo expressed: “Consensually creating global laws to protect the Human Tribe, and to put an end to wars — like the unspeakable human tragedies unfolding right now in Ukraine, Iraq, Syria, Israel, and the Gaza Strip, as well as in so many other places around the world.”

“In a nuclear age, war as a mechanism to manage conflict is obsolete. Worse still, nuclear war threatens to make the Human Tribe itself obsolete, rendering it subject to self-inflicted extinction. War begets revenge. Justice puts a stop to it. Justice is civilization. War is nihilist barbarism.”

Part of the attendees to the unveil ceremony at ICC.

Addressing the audience during the ceremony, Judge Akane highlighted the profound relevance of the artwork to the Court’s mission.

“The Human Tribe Totem is particularly fitting for the International Criminal Court because it speaks to our shared humanity,” she stated. “Its symbolism reminds us that the ICC was created not for the interests of any single nation or region, but for humanity as a whole.”

She continued by emphasizing the contemporary significance of the sculpture: “At a time when conflicts and human suffering continue to make headlines, this artwork serves as a powerful reminder of the importance of solidarity, accountability, and the rule of law. It reminds us that justice is not an abstract principle, but a responsibility shared by all nations and peoples.”

Since relocating to its permanent premises in December 2015, the ICC has received artistic donations from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Slovenia, Tunisia, and now Uruguay.

The installation of The Totem of the Human Tribe adds another meaningful cultural landmark to the ICC headquarters, reinforcing the enduring connection between art, diplomacy, and the universal pursuit of justice.

Voices of Civilizations: Bridging Cultures through Music

The Final of the 2026 “Culture China · Water Cube Cup” Chinese Song Contest, Netherlands Division was recently held in the Netherlands. On 21 May, in connection with the United Nations World Day for Cultural Diversity for Dialogue and Development, the organizing committee released a special feature entitled “Voices of Civilizations”, using Chinese songs as a cultural medium to engage in dialogue and share perspectives on international public themes such as civilizational exchange, cultural diversity, and youth cross-cultural expression.

The United Nations World Day for Cultural Diversity for Dialogue and Development calls attention to the importance of understanding, respect, and dialogue among different cultures and civilizations. As an important cultural extension of this year’s Netherlands Division, “Voices of Civilizations” explored how music — an art form capable of transcending language, geography, and cultural boundaries — can create deeper connections through genuine interaction, shared listening, and emotional resonance.

The special dialogue brought together Peter van Bergen, Dutch contemporary music PhD owner and researcher; Hanqing Zhou, European-based Chinese baritone, and Vice President of the European Chinese Students Entrepreneurship Foundation; Shen-Ai Ho, young pianist and performing artist from Taiwan, China; Viola Cheung, soprano from Hong Kong, China; and Xige, music producer from Inner Mongolia, China. Drawing on their respective backgrounds in vocal performance, piano, music production, contemporary music, and cross-cultural artistic practice, the guests shared reflections on how music connects hearts, supports the growth of young people, and advances dialogue among civilizations.

The guests noted that genuine civilizational exchange should not remain at the level of displaying cultural symbols. Rather, it should be built upon mutual listening, understanding, respect, and long-term emotional connection. As a universal language, music enables people from different cultural backgrounds to resonate through shared listening experiences. It also helps overseas youth rediscover their own cultural roots in multicultural environments and develop more open, confident, and inclusive forms of expression.

The guests further observed that Chinese songs carry not only the beauty of the Chinese language, but also rich cultural emotions, life experiences, and aesthetic traditions. In an era of increasingly frequent global cultural exchanges, the international dissemination of Chinese songs is not only an artistic pathway for the global expression of Chinese culture, but also an important means of enhancing mutual understanding among civilizations and expanding the space for public dialogue.

The event was organized by the Organizing Committee of the 2026 “Culture China · Water Cube Cup” Chinese Song Contest, Netherlands Division. The organizing committee stated that it will continue to connect its cultural activities with international public themes such as the United Nations World Day for Cultural Diversity for Dialogue and Development and the International Day for Dialogue among Civilizations. Through Chinese songs and artistic exchange, the committee aims to further promote people-to-people exchanges between China and the world, encourage mutual learning among civilizations, and allow music to play a positive role in connecting emotions, deepening understanding, and building consensus in cross-cultural communication.

The Mechanism in its sunset phase: a responsible conclusion of the justice cycle

0

By H.E. Mrs. Graciela Gatti, President of the United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

When the United Nations Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 respectively, it marked a significant expression of the international community’s commitment to the rule of law and an effort to restore human dignity in the aftermath of the mass atrocities of the early 1990’s. These ad hoc Tribunals, which were later succeeded by the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (commonly referred to as “the Mechanism”), achieved ground-breaking results.

They authoritatively interpreted and gave concrete effect to the Genocide Convention and international humanitarian law. In relation to nearly 200 indictees, these courts held accountable those most responsible for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, through trials and appeals adhering to the highest standards of fairness.

While the Mechanism has entered its “sunset phase”, it still carries real responsibilities to real people – obligations entrusted to the institution by the Security Council to ensure justice remains fair, effective, and durable. These include judicial oversight of protective measures granted to approximately 3,200 victims and witnesses and ensuring due process and effective implementation of sentences for the 38 convicted persons incarcerated under the Mechanism’s authority. Other important residual functions are the Prosecution’s assistance to national jurisdictions and the management of the archives of the ad hoc Tribunals and the Mechanism.

As the institution has evolved and its mandate has narrowed, the question of how its remaining functions should be managed — whether through continuation, transfer, or termination — has become increasingly important. In the current biennial review of the Mechanism’s progress and work, the Security Council will soon consider two reports by the Secretary-General on the possible transfer of functions and is expected to take decisions on the future jurisdiction of the Mechanism. I consider that there are clear options for the responsible transfer and termination of certain functions and other changes to the Mechanism’s mandate will allow it to become a very small, purely judicial institution, carrying out only limited, non-resource-intensive judicial functions essential to the completion of the justice cycle.

The most pertinent proposals made by the Secretary-General are as follows: The Mechanism’s Prosecution currently provides extensive assistance to various domestic prosecution efforts aimed at closing the impunity gap for fugitives and accused suspected of committing international crimes in the former Yugoslavia and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. However, this technical assistance to national jurisdictions, as well as the Registry’s management of the archives, which is vital to preserving an accurate historical record to support research and counter revisionism and genocide denial, do not need to remain embedded within a judicial institution and could instead be transferred to the UN Secretariat. Furthermore, under appropriate circumstances, some administrative functions related to the day-to-day supervision of conditions of imprisonment could also be transferred to States, if compliance with minimum international standards is ensured.

However, the Secretary-General’s reports recognize that a limited number of judicial functions must remain at the international level in order to best ensure due process and the interests of justice. I will address the two most critical ones in turn:

First, the judicial authority to vary protective measures for victims and witnesses. Protective measures assured these individuals’ anonymity in proceedings before the ad hoc Tribunals and the Mechanism based on objective safety concerns. Many witnesses continue to fear retaliation or re-traumatization if their identities or testimony are disclosed; nevertheless, their evidence may be critical to key domestic accountability processes and allowing access to it may be necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice in national cases. International judges are uniquely placed to impartially balance these competing interests and make determinations on varying protective measures fairly and consistently. Witnesses and victims who testified against those responsible for mass atrocities relied on assurances of international judicial protection. Preserving that guarantee is essential not only to the legacy of our work, but also to maintaining confidence in witness protection in future international criminal proceedings.

Second, the authority to designate enforcement States and to decide on pardon, commutation of sentence, or early release. Retaining this function at the international level ensures the most fair and uniform treatment of convicted persons regardless of where imprisonment takes place. Considering that the numerous States enforcing sentences under the authority of the Mechanism have varying early release and sentence remission practices, the transfer of this function to States creates credible risks of arbitrary, disparate and unequal treatment of prisoners.

The Mechanism is working diligently towards its ultimate closure. While the Mechanism’s residual judicial functions do not garner the same publicity as the capture of fugitives and the issuance of verdicts, this does not make these processes less important to the justice cycle. Hastily terminating or transferring critical judicial functions risks disparate and arbitrary application of the law, as well as irreparable damage to the entire accountability process.

The Mechanism remains committed to guaranteeing the international community’s substantial investment in justice and will continue to uphold the more than three decades of groundbreaking advancements in human rights and international criminal law.

Aishath Shaan Shakir reinforces ties to Sweden through accreditation

Thursday, 16 April 2026, Stockholm, Kingdom of Sweden: Maldives has reinforced its diplomatic presence in Sweden, with Ambassador Aishath Shaan Shakir presenting her Letters of Credence to King Carl XVI Gustaf, marking the start of her tenure as non-resident Ambassador to the Scandinavian country.
The ceremony was held at the Royal Palace in central Stockholm, followed by an audience with the Head of State. During the tête-à-tête, Ambassador Shaan conveyed greetings from President Mohamed Muizzu, along with those of the Maldivian government and people, to the Swedish monarch, government, and population. 

Discussions during the audience reflected on the existing relationship between the Maldives and Sweden, with Ambassador Shaan expressing interest in expanding cooperation across areas of shared interest during her tenure. Currently trade ties are limited but ca. 2000 Swedes visit Maldives on a yearly basis. Ambassador Shaan was accompanied by Saifulla Waleed, Second Secretary at the Maldives Embassy in Germany that is co-accredited to Sweden. 

As part of her visit to Stockholm, she also held meetings with senior officials at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden. These discussions focused on strengthening bilateral engagement and exploring collaboration within multilateral forums. Previously, the then Foreign Minister of Maldives Abdulla Shahid paid a visit to Sweden in May 2023 in connection with the EU Indo-Pacific Forum. Another important milestone was the visit of then President Mohamed Nasheed in 2009 to Sweden to receive the Anna Lindh Award for his role in securing the peaceful transition to democracy in Maldives. 

Sweden does entertain an honorary consulate in Malé, capital of Maldives, whereas the non-resident embassy is based in New Delhi, India. Swedish Ambassador Jan Thesleff presented his credentials to then President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih in 2023; year that marked also the forty-fifth anniversary of diplomatic ties between Sweden and Maldives. 

Ambassador Shaan Shakir concurrently serves as the Maldives’ Ambassador to Germany, as well as non-resident Ambassador to Norway and Finland, reflecting a broader diplomatic mandate across Northern Europe. Aishath Shaan Shakir arrived in Germany after serving in the capacity as Chief of Protocol at the Maldivian Foreign Ministry. She led her first mission in Bangladesh in the capacity as high commissioner from 2016 to 2020. Having joined the diplomatic service in 1984, she has served likewise in Saudi Arabia and Malaysia.

For further information 

The Royal House of Sweden: https://www.kungahuset.se/arkiv/nyheter/2026-04-16-kungen-gav-hogtidliga-audienser

Government of Sweden: https://www.regeringen.se/sveriges-regering/utrikesdepartementet/sveriges-forbindelser-med-omvarlden/asien-och-oceanien/maldiverna/

Embassy of Maldives in Germany (co-accredited to Sweden): https://www.maldivesembassy.de

Ambassador Maeve Monica Collins pays inaugural visit to Bremen

Wednesday, 13 May 2026, Free Hanseatic City of Bremen, Germany: Mayor Andreas Bovenschulte welcomed Irish Ambassador Maeve Monica Collins to Bremen City Hall. Following the welcome, Ambassador Collins signed the city’s Golden Book.

During their meeting, Mayor Bovenschulte and Ambassador Collins discussed opportunities for cooperation between Bremen and Ireland. The conversation also covered Bremen’s presidency of the Bundesrat (Federal Council of States) and Ireland’s upcoming presidency of the Council of the European Union, which it will assume in the second half of this year.

Earlier in the day, Ambassador Collins paid introductory visits to the Bremen State Parliament (Bremische Bürgerschaft) and the Chamber of Commerce. 

At the State Parliament, Ambassador Collins was welcomed by Speaker Antje Grotheer. During the latter meeting, topic of conversation was U.S. online platforms. According to Collins, Ireland serves as a key technology hub for these companies. It is essential, she noted, to develop “smart” regulations — specifically to make the internet safer for children and protect them from dangers — while simultaneously preserving Ireland’s role as a technology hub.

Ambassador Collins has served in a diplomatic career spanning more than three decades, with postings and senior appointments across Europe, Asia, and North America. He began his service with the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs in 1990 as Third Secretary in the Anglo-Irish Division in Dublin, later moving to the Economic Division and serving at the Embassy of Ireland in Bern and Ottawa. Over the years, he took on increasingly senior roles, including positions in the Development Cooperation Division, the Department of Finance, and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Secretariat in Belfast.

His career also includes extensive leadership in Irish and European external relations. He served as Joint Director General at the International Fund for Ireland, then as Ambassador of Ireland to Viêt Nam and later to Finland.

In 2011, he joined the European External Action Service as Deputy Head of Delegation at the EU Delegation in Japan, before returning to senior roles in Dublin as Regional Director in the Asia-Pacific Unit and later as Director General of the EU Division. He went on to serve as Deputy Permanent Representative of Ireland to the European Union in Brussels, and since August 2024 has been Ambassador at the Embassy of Ireland in Berlin.

For further information 

City of Bremen: https://www.senatspressestelle.bremen.de/pressemitteilungen/irische-botschafterin-zum-antrittsbesuch-im-bremer-rathaus-485054?asl=bremen02.c.732.de

Bremen State Assembly: https://www.bremische-buergerschaft.de/index.php?id=35&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=2415&cHash=5bda8bb9aa4e972579bd757294547d38

The One-China Principle is Not to Be Challenged

0

The International Community Has Once Again Rejected the Participation of Taiwan Region in the World Health Assembly

By H.E. Mr. Bo Shen, Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

On May 18, the General Committee and the Plenary Session of the 79th World Health Assembly (WHA) respectively decided to reject the so-called proposal of “inviting Taiwan to participate in the WHA as an observer” submitted by certain countries. This marks the 10th consecutive year that the WHA has rejected such a proposal. This outcome once again demonstrates that the one-China principle is a prevailing consensus of the international community and a fundamental principle that the World Health Organization must uphold. Any attempt to challenge this principle under the pretext of public health issues will receive no support from the international community.

Recently, the authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and a small number of countries have continuously hyped up the so-called issue of “Taiwan’s participation in international organizations” and even claimed that “Taiwan is excluded from the global health system.” Although such statements are made under the guise of public health and humanitarian concerns, their true purpose is to politicize health issues and use them as a pretext to challenge United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 and the post-war international order.

There is but one China in the world. Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory, and the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China. This is both a historical fact and a principle of international law. The Taiwan question has a clear historical background and legal context. In 1895, Japan forcibly occupied Taiwan after invading China. During World War II, the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation clearly stipulated that all territories Japan had stolen from China should be restored to China. In 1945, China resumed the exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan. In 1971, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758, restoring all lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations and explicitly resolving the question of the representation of the whole of China, including Taiwan, in the UN system.

This resolution not only confirmed the lawful seat of the Government of the People’s Republic of China within the United Nations system, but also established an indisputable fact: Taiwan is not a country, and China has only one seat in the United Nations. Therefore, the World Health Organization, as a specialized agency of the United Nations, must abide by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 and World Health Assembly Resolution WHA25.1. The participation of China’s Taiwan region in activities of international organizations must be handled in accordance with the one-China principle. This is an established international norm, rather than what some describe as a “unilateral demand” by China.

In the past, China’s Taiwan region participated in the World Health Assembly under the name “Chinese Taipei.” This was not a so-called “right granted to Taiwan by the international community,” but rather a special arrangement reached through cross-Strait consultations on the basis that both sides adhered to the one-China principle. Since 2016, the DPP authorities have refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus, which embodies the one-China principle, and have stubbornly adhered to the separatist position of “Taiwan independence,” thereby causing this arrangement to lose its political foundation. The responsibility lies entirely with the DPP authorities themselves.

More importantly, the claim that “Taiwan is excluded from the global health system” is completely inconsistent with the facts. The Chinese central government attaches great importance to the health and well-being of compatriots in Taiwan. Provided that the one-China principle is upheld, channels for information and technical exchanges between China’s Taiwan region and the World Health Organization have always remained open and unimpeded.

Over the past year alone, the central government approved applications from 18 medical and health experts from China’s Taiwan region to participate in WHO technical activities, covering areas such as immunization strategies, vaccine development, mental health, and digital health. Under the framework of the International Health Regulations, China’s Taiwan region is able to promptly access and report health emergency information to the WHO.

The two sides across the Taiwan Strait also maintain smooth information-sharing mechanisms on infectious disease outbreaks and have continued exchanges and cooperation in the field of medical and health care. These facts fully demonstrate that the so-called “gap in the international pandemic prevention system” is nothing more than a fabricated narrative.

In recent years, a tiny minority of countries have repeatedly attempted to distort United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 and the fundamental fact that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory. This not only challenges China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also undermines the post-World War II international order and the authority of the United Nations. The international community clearly recognizes this. During this year’s World Health Assembly, the overwhelming majority of countries explicitly reaffirmed their commitment to the one-China principle, supported United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, opposed the participation of Taiwan region in the World Health Assembly, and expressed support for China’s position through measures such as sending letters to the Director-General of the World Health Organization. This once again demonstrates that upholding the one-China principle represents international justice, the will of the people, and the prevailing trend of the times.

As the global landscape becomes increasingly complex and unstable, it is all the more important for all countries to jointly uphold the international system with the United Nations at its core and the international order based on international law, rather than create ambiguity and confrontation on issues concerning the core interests of other countries.

The Taiwan question is entirely China’s internal affair and brooks no foreign interference. No matter what the DPP authorities say or do, they cannot change the fact that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one and the same China and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory. Nor can they alter the historical trend toward China’s ultimate and inevitable reunification. Upholding the one-China principle, safeguarding the authority of the United Nations, and maintaining the post-World War II international order serve the common interests of the international community and are also conducive to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

Weather Warfare and the Future of International Law

By Ayesha Asim

For decades, weather warfare occupied a marginal yet persistent place within international security discourse, situated uneasily between military history, scientific experimentation, and geopolitical speculation. In 2026, however, amid renewed tensions in the Middle East, environmental manipulation has quietly re-emerged as a subject of legal and diplomatic concern.

Recent online claims linking rainfall patterns in Iran and Iraq to attacks on US-linked radar infrastructure revived debate concerning the potential militarisation of environmental technologies. Reports circulating across regional media and digital platforms states that rainfall increased following strikes on military radar systems associated with US operations in the Middle East. For example, The Jerusalem Post reported on viral claims that “stolen rains” had returned after disruptions to alleged weather-control operations. Similar narratives also appeared in regional commentary and online discussions following reports of Iranian strikes on radar installations in Iraq and the Gulf region.

The allegations quickly attracted public attention across the region. Yet meteorological experts and scientific authorities strongly rejected such assertions. Iranian weather officials publicly stated that military or aviation radar systems cannot manipulate large-scale precipitation systems. Independent scientific assessments similarly found no evidence supporting the existence of operational technologies capable of engineering regional droughts or storms through radar installations alone. Various news reports and fact-check investigations likewise concluded that the allegations lacked scientific substantiation.

Nevertheless, the controversy itself remains legally and politically significant. Even where claims are scientifically unsupported, their political significance reflects growing international anxiety regarding environmental insecurity and the future strategic implications of climate-related technologies.

In regions already confronting drought, desertification, and severe water scarcity, environmental vulnerability has increasingly become intertwined with geopolitical rivalry and national security concerns.

The concept of environmental manipulation as a method of warfare is not entirely new. During the Vietnam War, the United States conducted Operation Popeye, a covert cloud-seeding programme intended to prolong monsoon conditions along enemy supply routes. The operation intensified international concern regarding environmental modification techniques and ultimately contributed to the adoption of the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, commonly referred to as the ENMOD Convention.

Under Article I of the ENMOD Convention, states parties undertake not to engage in military or hostile environmental modification techniques having “widespread, long-lasting or severe effects” as a means of destruction, damage, or injury against another state. At the time of its drafting, the treaty primarily contemplated large-scale climatic interventions capable of producing floods, earthquakes, or other forms of environmental disruption.

Nearly five decades later, however, scientific and technological developments have complicated the legal landscape considerably.

Contemporary geoengineering proposals, including solar radiation management and large-scale atmospheric interventions, are increasingly discussed within scientific and policy circles as potential responses to climate change. Although many remain experimental, several possess dual-use characteristics, meaning technologies designed for civilian climate mitigation may theoretically acquire strategic or military applications.

International law remains insufficiently prepared to regulate this emerging ambiguity.

One major challenge concerns attribution. Unlike conventional military attacks, environmental manipulation may prove exceptionally difficult to detect, measure, or conclusively attribute to a particular state actor. Climate systems are inherently complex, and ordinary weather variability can itself generate suspicion in politically volatile environments. Under such conditions, perception may become as geopolitically consequential as scientific verification.

This dynamic is particularly visible in the Middle East, where water scarcity has increasingly evolved into a matter of national and regional security. Iran, Iraq, and neighbouring states face mounting ecological pressures arising from prolonged droughts, declining river flows, and rising temperatures. In such circumstances, narratives involving “climate theft” or foreign environmental interference gain political traction not because they are scientifically established, but because environmental stress has intensified geopolitical mistrust.

The result is a dangerous convergence of climate anxiety, information warfare, and strategic competition.

For international lawyers and policymakers, the central concern is therefore not whether present radar systems can control rainfall. There is no credible evidence that they can. Rather, the more pressing issue is whether existing international legal frameworks are capable of regulating future environmental technologies before geopolitical tensions outpace legal governance.

The ENMOD Convention itself remains limited in both scope and enforcement capacity. Drafted before the emergence of contemporary climate engineering debates, the treaty lacks comprehensive verification mechanisms and provides limited guidance regarding dual-use environmental technologies. At the same time, major powers increasingly regard technological dominance, including leadership in climate-related innovation, as part of broader strategic competition.

As climate pressures intensify globally, allegations of environmental manipulation may increasingly become instruments of propaganda, coercion, and diplomatic confrontation, regardless of whether such claims are scientifically substantiated.

What was once regarded as speculative may soon emerge as a serious challenge for international security governance.

The renewed debate surrounding weather warfare, therefore, reveals less about secret technologies controlling rainfall and more about the evolving nature of insecurity in the twenty-first century. Climate change is no longer merely an environmental issue. It is increasingly embedded within questions of sovereignty, technological governance, military strategy, and state responsibility under international law.

In that sense, future disputes over climate intervention technologies may prove far more consequential than the present controversy itself.

About the author:

Ayesha Asim, PhD Scholar in law and LLM International Law (Gold Medallist), Legal Analyst, lecturer, and with extensive experience in legal research, advisory, policy analysis and teaching. She can be reached at ayeshamalyc09@gmail.com.

Threads of Heritage: Weaving Southeast Asia’s Living Tradition

By Roy Lie Atjam

Amsterdam, 12 May 2026 – The highly anticipated opening ceremony of the joint traditional textile exhibition, THREADS OF HERITAGE: Weaving Southeast Asia’s Living Tradition, was a captivating celebration presented by the Embassies of the ASEAN Community in The Hague. Set against the backdrop of the beautifully renovated Indonesia House Amsterdam (IHA), this exceptional venue stands out as the largest and most diverse Indonesian Promotion Centre in Europe.

Once serving as the Indonesian Consulate General Office from 1967 to 1976, the building has been reborn after almost five decades of vacancy, culminating in its inauguration in 2024 by Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, H.E. Retno L.P. Marsudi, and the Indonesian Ambassador in the Netherlands, H.E. Mayerfas.

ASEAN TEXTILE EXHIBITION

During today’s  immersive program, attendees were invited to embark on a journey of cultural exchange, walking among an exquisite array of traditional textiles from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. The exploration was guided by the eminent textile anthropologist Dr. Sandra Niessen, whose deep understanding of the subject brought each piece to life.

H.E. Amrih Jinangkung, Ambassador of Indonesia and H.E. J. Eduardo Malaya, Ambassador of the Philippines with anthropologist Dr. Sandra Niessen.

She illuminated the intricate weaving techniques, revealing the rich cultural symbolism woven into each motif, and conveyed the historical significance of these treasured textile traditions that reflect the soul of the region. Dr. Niessen’s presentation was a masterclass, meticulously detailing the artistry and heritage of Southeast Asian weaving, shaped by her more than forty years of devoted research a commitment that has woven itself into the fabric of her identity.

With a background of Canadian-Dutch descent, she shared a heartfelt reflection on her yearning for Southeast Asian ancestry, adding a personal touch to her scholarly discourse.

H.E. Amrih Jinangkung, Ambassador of Indonesia to the Netherlands.

The inaugural welcome remarks were delivered by the Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia in the Netherlands, H.E. Amrih Jinangkung. A  summary of his address follows:

It is a great honour for me to welcome you all to this special event, where we come together to celebrate and preserve one of our most precious cultural treasures: traditional textiles of ASEAN.

First of all, I would like to extend my warm congratulations to the Philippines on the successful hosting of the 48th ASEAN Summit in Cebu last week. The success of the Summit and today’s event clearly demonstrate our shared commitment to a stronger and more united ASEAN.

We all know that diversity is the greatest strength of ASEAN. This rich cultural diversity, inherited from our ancestors, is something cherish we must protect together. One of its most beautiful expressions is the extraordinary variety of our traditional textiles.

Today’s joint exhibition is a wonderful showcase of that diversity and richness. The displayed textiles come in many forms— fabrics, ceremonial costumes, shawls, scarves, and woven garments— each carrying its own unique origin and cultural meaning.

We are honored to see T’nalak from the Philippines, woven using Abaka fibers and linked to T’boli mythological traditions.

We also have the colorful H’mong Costume from Vietnam, known for its intricate embroidery with indigo dyeing reflecting the mountain cultures of northern Vietnam.

From Thailand, we see the elegance of Phaa Poom. Thai textiles are renowned for their refined silk weaving traditions, rich gold-thread embroidery, and regional patterns that once reflected royal courts and local kingdoms.

Malaysia presents Songket, textiles woven with metallic gold or silver threads that historically symbolized nobility and prestige in the Malay Sultanates. Songket weaving itself requires immense patience and skill, often taking months to complete a single ceremonial cloth.

For Indonesia, we proudly present Tenun Ikat. Allow me to share a little more about the this piece that is on display today. One of the featured textiles is called “Hinggi Kaliuda” from East Sumba. This remarkable cloth combines plants and animals motifs.

In Sumbanese culture, each motif carries profound symbolism: horses represent greatness, strength, and social status; hens and roosters symbolize unity and family harmony; prawns signify death and reincarnation; while flowers represent beauty and the continuity of life. Traditionally, such textiles were worn during important ceremonies and were considered symbols of honor and ancestral connection.

In addition to the exhibition we are enjoying here today, we were also honoured last month to witness the beautiful exhibition of Thailand’s Chut Thai (Thai National Costume), graciously led by Her Royal Highness Princess Sirivannavari Nariratana Rajakanya.

I would like to extend my warmest congratulations to Ambassador Asi and Madam for the outstanding success of the exhibition. Many of us are still captivated by the display, which continues at De Bijenkorf in Amsterdam.

Traditional textiles are much more than fabric; they represent a cherished heritage, preserved for generations. Shaped by local wisdom and cultural values, these textiles carry deep meaning through intricate motifs that tell stories of ancient myths, spirituality, and social status. Beyond ceremonial uses, traditional textiles play a vital role in our daily lives and are essential for local economies.

 From sarongs and batik to the Barong in the Philippines, they enrich our routines and culture. For many families and artisans, textile production is a labor of love and a source of livelihood, preserving valuable skills and promoting cultural sustainability. These textiles accompany us through significant life moments, making them integral to our identity.

We take pride in the international recognition of our textiles by UNESCO: Indonesian Batik (2009), Malaysian Songket (2021), and Tais from Timor-Leste (2021). We also support Thailand’s efforts to recognize Chut Thai as part of our shared cultural heritage.

In conclusion, an exhibition tour followed. Guests were invited to mingle, view textile exhibits and engage with the curators.