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Uruguayan Independence Day Celebrated in The Hague

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Uruguayan Independence Day Celebrated in The Hague

The Embassy of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay marked his country’s Independence Day with a grand and festive reception. Held on August 27 at the Leonardo Royal Hotel in The Hague, the event drew over 200 distinguished guests from various sectors of Dutch society.

Ambassadors, chiefs of international missions, diplomats, academics, business leaders, and representatives from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, along with members of the Uruguayan community, all responded to H.E. Ambassador Dr. Álvaro González Otero’s invitation to celebrate ‘Día de la Independencia’—Uruguay’s National Day, commemorating its independence from Brazil in 1825.

H.E. Dr. Álvaro González Otero, Ambassador of Uruguay. National Day 2024 The Hague.

After nearly 200 years of conflict and civil unrest under Spanish and then Brazilian rule, Uruguay has emerged as a country renowned for its welcoming people, stunning landscapes, first-class meat production, and high-quality wine. In recent decades, Uruguayans have enjoyed a stable democracy, a steady improvement in living conditions, and overall well-being.

In a packed room with an animated audience, Ambassador González Otero took the microphone to thank all the attendees for their sincere affection for his people and country. He then proudly expressed:

“Two years have quickly passed since I arrived in this lovely kingdom. Since then, we have started to shift the focus of the Embassy, placing more emphasis on our bilateral relations. The Netherlands and Uruguay have more in common than people might imagine. We share international principles, landscapes, agricultural production, developed services, qualified exports, and a progressive lifestyle.

We also share strong commitments to the well-being of our citizens and visitors, the protection of human rights, environmental sustainability, progressive social policies, and significant efforts towards renewable energy and climate action. Both countries also emphasize education, democratic governance, and active participation in international organizations promoting peace and development. So, we will keep working to boost our bilateral relations.”

Uruguay National Day, August 27 at the Leonardo Royal Hotel in The Hague.
From the Embassy of Uruguay, Counsellor Pablo Bayarres, Ambassador Gonzalez Otero and Hans Akerboom, Deputy Director Protocol and Host Country Affairs from the Netherlands.

Ambassador González Otero then listed some of the most relevant initiatives undertaken by the Embassy over the last few months:

– Uruguayan participation in the World Hydrogen Summit 2024: Led by the Minister of Industry, Energy, and Mining, Ms. Elisa Facio, with over 50 representatives from various sectors of the public and private sectors.

– Active participation in the “26th World Energy Congress.”

– Cooperation Project with Delft Institute for Water Education: Since 2011, Uruguayan professionals specializing in water resources have participated in the Delft Institute program for advanced training. Initially, the program began with 40 scholarships, resulting in 37 professionals successfully completing their studies. This early success led to the program’s relocation and implementation at the Technological University of Uruguay, now featuring regional participation. The program has since had two new editions in 2022 and 2024, expanding to include 17 professionals from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Peru. This development has transformed Uruguay into a regional hub in the field of water resource education.

– Uruguay’s status as one of the 32 signing states of the Ljubljana – The Hague Convention in February 2024.

– Positioning Uruguay as a potential living and working destination for Dutch farmers.

– Interactions with RVO and Port of Rotterdam related to port cooperation.

– Exploring and initiating new cooperation projects with Westland Municipality and Wageningen University.

– Meetings with private sector actors related to agribusiness.

– Preparation for the Capitan Miranda’s visit to Amsterdam: Uruguay’s school tall ship has already confirmed its participation in Sail Amsterdam 2025.

– Multilateral achievements: The Embassy has made progress in multilateral areas, including ongoing contributions and work with international organizations based in The Hague: the ICJ, ICC, OPCW, HCCH, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Additionally, a closer relationship with The Hague Academy of International Law has been pursued. Significant advances have also been made through the coordinated work of the GRULAC Group in relation to various international organizations.

H.E. Mr. Fernando Arias, OPCW Director General , Ambassador Gonzalez Otero and Mr Arias spouse, Patricia van Oordt.

Following his remarks, Ambassador González Otero invited the audience to watch a short video about Uruguay, which made a great impression on those present. He expressed, “Uruguay is an exceptional country that has developed a dynamic and robust culture, shaped by a fascinating blend of gaucho traditions, European influences, and the unique Rioplatense spirit. Tango, folklore, candombe, and milonga are examples of its rich artistic musical expression. Uruguayan gastronomy, featuring high-quality meat, wine, and dairy products, especially the beloved ‘dulce de leche,’ delights palates and consistently wins prestigious awards worldwide.”

“The work we have done does not mean we are satisfied; we want to continue advancing in a deeper process. The bilateral relationship is already strong, but the potential to strengthen bonds in several key areas is even greater.”

The Ambassador of Uruguay, H.E. Alvaro Gonzalez Otero and the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Graciela Gatti Santana with her husband Mr Gustavo Segovia.

The event was conceived to showcase the rich and diverse culture of Uruguay, a nation with a population of approximately 3,495,527 as of 2022.

The national anthems of Uruguay and the Netherlands were performed by the Uruguayan opera singer Sara de los Campos. After the ambassador’s speech, the Embassy paid tribute to two influential musicians: José “El Sabalero” Carbajal and Jaime Roos, who both lived in the Netherlands. Jaime Roos settled in Amsterdam in 1978, where he played bass in several salsa, rock, and jazz groups. He had a son and remained in the Netherlands until 1984 when he returned to Uruguay.

Carbajal spent his days in the Netherlands with his wife, Anke van Haastrecht, and their two children. Anke was invited to share some special stories from their life together.

Uruguayan opera singer Sara de los Campos.
Uruguayan drummers Luis Gradin, Marcelo Terra, and Nicolás Sánchez.

The enthusiastic audience enjoyed an authentic performance by talented Uruguayan drummers Luis Gradin, Marcelo Terra, and Nicolás Sánchez. The celebration continued with Uruguayan wine, classic savory empanadas, and dulce de leche, which delighted the crowded room and completed the great celebration.

Ambassador González Otero concluded the event by thanking his Embassy team: Counselor Pablo Bayarres, Chancellor Gustavo Morales, his assistant Juan Diego, and Martha Hernández and Sofía Anastasiou. He then led a warm toast for the people of the Netherlands, Uruguay, and the necessary and desired peace in the world.

China: A New Actor in the Contemporary Multipolar World

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China: A New Actor in the Contemporary Multipolar World

By Mariarosaria Iorio, Political Analyst

I. The post-cold war world  

International relations are nowadays characterised by major changes that started at the end of the 80s with the fall of the Berlin Wall.  Indeed, the end of the cold war was marked by the dislocation of the two main political blocks, namely the Soviet Union and the Western World. Such a dislocation resulted in the marginalization of the post-war multilateral system embodied in the United Nations, and the standstill of the multilateral trade negotiations in the late 90s in the context of the World Trade Organisation.  New lines of political thought have been facing each other since then, while reshaping the post-cold war world in a number of fragmented and variable sub-blocks of countries. 

The United States decided to put itself first by concentrating on its internal affairs, while withdrawing from international affairs.  

Europe, the old continent, looks for an efficient strategy towards autonomy from the United States.  Europe also tries, not without difficulty, to create a more cohesive internal and external political approach.  The reality is however evolving rather more towards fragmentation of Europe in favour of European National fragmented interests. Such a fragmentation is the natural consequence of the decadence of the European Institutional and collective actions to the advantage of individual Sates actions and interests.   In sum, what seemed to be a structured and coherent European Union block fighting for the promotion of its economic and political values all over the world has somehow become an alliance at variable geometry both internally and externally.  The disorganisation of the leadership results in a chaotic and unpredictable European External and Internal action. 

Thereof, the empty influence spaces left on the international relations scene has given new international actors the opportunity to emerge.  

Meanwhile, the fragmentation of the European Institutions has also impacted the EU-USA relations within NATO, and affected the security and peace sphere.  Security issues have been on and off on the European agenda.    

In this context, Russia that has lost its empire in the 80s looks now for a new power game. In spite of the disruption of the Soviet Union, Russia attempts either by influence or by force to exercise power in its ancient affiliate countries.  Russia that was supposed to be defeated with the fall of the Berlin Wall takes back its role of opponent to the Western World on the international scene at least as it concerns the international affairs philosophy.  Thus, creating a tension aimed at restoring its power in the world.   

The group of emerging and developing economies that constitute a new variable block with a large portion of population employed in agriculture have emerged as new actors in the world’s geo-political discourses.  At the head of this block on the international scene, there is China.  The shaky international leadership context has indeed given China a new space. China’s   communist past combined with its market-based economic strategy gives it a particular position.  

China is The One that can communicate to Russia. China is also The One that can have an influence on the Western economic and political scene as China owns a big part of Western Foreign Debt  

China embeds a horizontal strategy in both its trade and development policies, while producing at low wages.  Its production system coupled with its pragmatic political approach has reshaped the international power structure.  The top-down approach of the Western World faces now the competition created by the horizontal win-win approach proposed by China in both developing and industrialized countries.

Indeed, as a result of the decline of the Western World global hegemony based on market access and economic and social liberalism as a means to ensure economic growth and promote economic development, the vision promoted by China’s discourse, centred on the protection of livelihoods and local sovereign choices finds new adepts.  Furthermore, China has successfully attempted to promote a trade-off approach to international cooperation during the last 20 years.  A cooperation that does not interfere in internal affairs of partner countries as it has often reproached to the Western countries involved in international cooperation.  

As the developing countries leader, China positions itself as the spoke country for the poor.  As a new world powerful economic actor China plays as the guarantor of the Western Economic stability.  China positions itself as the bridge between the rich and the poor.  It is representing a different hegemonic game that only changes in its discourse, while still pursuing its own interests and influence zones.  Such a situation poses the question of the values that the international regime wants to embrace.  Indeed, this changing world results in an increased number of conflicts – be new or historical conflicts.  

The dislocation of the traditional leaders of the international relations has definitely created a chaotic and unpredictable scenario.  Chaos has in some cases been chosen as a political strategy to disrupt the post-1945 international regime. Such a disruption has benefitted new actors, and given space to new lines of thought.  These new lines of thought have attacked the existing international framework but has not yet succeeded in creating a new regime.  The increasing unbalance of power and the lack of leadership on the international political scene is risky. 

The reduction by choice of leadership of the United States has indeed resulted in the weakening of the values emerged as a result of the dramatic experience of Second World War, namely freedom of thought and freedom of speech to mention only a few.   We are now facing a much more authoritarian world with force used as a means to manage the political arena.  Dialogue seems to be a rather consuming exercise that has left its place to the use of force.  Force is no longer seen as the last option but rather the opening act for political dialogue.  Nationalism and individual interests are now at the centre of the political game. This trend is taking the world to instability and conflict.  

The peoples of the world are more and more questioning the existing system. People’s needs and expectations are not met.  The new emerged actors, such as China have given the hope of a possible change in the present international system without fundamentally questioning its rationale but rather trying to rip a slate of the cake.  

The struggle for influence among countries has not succeeded in building a peaceful and stable world. Citizens will have to face the challenge of building a new era of peace and stability worldwide.

Derrière les murs du Palais de la Paix : permanence et changements de la Cour internationale de Justice

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Derrière les murs du Palais de la Paix : permanence et changements de la Cour internationale de Justice

S.E. M. Philippe Couvreur est arrivé à La Haye en avril 1982, où il a d’abord occupé le poste d’assistant spécial aux bureaux du greffier et du greffier adjoint de la Cour internationale de Justice.

Il a ensuite exercé les fonctions de Secrétaire, Premier Secrétaire et Secrétaire juridique principal, avant d’être élu Greffier de la Cour en 2000, et réélu en 2007 et 2014. Pour marquer l’anniversaire de ses débuts à la Cour, il y a 35 ans, Diplomat Magazine l’a invité à témoigner de son expérience unique au service de cette institution, des évolutions qu’il a pu y observer, et à partager le regard qu’il porte sur les changements qui ont marqué la Cour et La Haye au cours des trois dernières décennies.
Philippe Couvreur avec le Pape Jean-Paul II prise le 13 mai 1985.
Je suis arrivé à La Haye en avril 1982 — de façon aussi inattendue que j’avais entamé des études de droit treize ans auparavant (mais c’est là une autre histoire…) — pour occuper un poste temporaire à la Cour internationale de Justice. La Cour était alors la seule institution judiciaire internationale existante au plan universel. Son activité, particulièrement faible à la fin des années 1970, ne pouvait en ce temps-là guère laisser présager du succès que rencontrerait la Cour dans les décennies à venir. Mon bienveillant maître de Louvain, le professeur Paul de Visscher, fils du célèbre internationaliste Charles de Visscher, unique juge belge à la Cour, m’avait prédit des jours aussi sereins qu’heureux, écoulés à lire et à écrire des ouvrages dans la solitude des imposants murs de la bibliothèque du Palais de la Paix…
Les mémoires ont été dûment déposés dans l’affaire El Salvador c. Honduras dans la salle Bol le 1 juin 1988, l’affaire du Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime.
En rejoignant la Cour, un frais matin d’avril, dont je garde un souvenir très précis, le jeune juriste que j’étais découvrit, non sans étonnement, une organisation de taille très modeste, le Greffe, qui en est l’organe administratif, alors composé de moins d’une quarantaine de fonctionnaires. Le fonctionnement de la Cour reposait entièrement sur cette équipe restreinte de personnel permanent, auquel s’ajoutait, selon que de besoin, un personnel temporaire pour faire face au surcroît de travaux linguistiques et de sténodactylographie lors des sessions (publiques et privées) de la Cour. Je me rappelle avoir été frappé par la personnalité haute en couleur de certains de ces traducteurs indépendants, dont la grande culture littéraire m’émerveillait. Cette structure très économique du Greffe impliquait une grande polyvalence de ses membres, et les Secrétaires de la Cour — ses fonctionnaires supérieurs — étaient appelés, en sus de leurs travaux de recherches juridiques, de préparation des documents de la Cour, et de rédaction de la correspondance diplomatique, à assumer eux-mêmes l’essentiel des tâches linguistiques (traduction et interprétation) et d’information, ainsi que la supervision de nombreuses activités administratives et logistiques.
La Grande salle de Justice, l’affaire Relative au Timor Oriental (Portugal c. Australie) Arrêt du 30 juin 1995.
Il n’était nullement rare qu’un nouveau venu comme moi ait à passer week-ends et nuits blanches au Palais de la Paix à effectuer les travaux les plus divers… allant jusqu’à imprimer et polycopier, sur de vieilles machines à stencils ronéotype, des décisions dont la Cour devait donner la lecture en séance publique le lendemain ! Dès mon arrivée au Greffe, j’ai eu le bonheur et le privilège d’être initié et associé à l’ensemble des fonctions de l’institution sous la patiente supervision de personnalités d’exception, tels que MM. Torres Bernárdez et Pillepich, alors respectivement Greffier et Greffier adjoint. J’en ai retiré le plus grand bénéfice, puisque cette immersion sans préparation dans toutes les facettes de l’activité du Greffe m’a permis d’acquérir de ce dernier une connaissance unique — de l’intérieur — et sous tous ses aspects —, un acquis particulièrement précieux au moment où j’ai été amené, bien des années plus tard, à assumer la délicate responsabilité d’en assurer la gestion au plus haut niveau. Devenir un fonctionnaire du Greffe au début des années 1980 signifiait accepter de se couler sans discussion dans un moule à tous égards exigeant, et se donner corps et âme, avec humilité et discrétion, à l’institution, sans penser à soi ni parler de soi. Depuis ces années d’initiation, j’ai été le témoin de profondes transformations de la Cour, rendues inévitables à la fois pour répondre à l’accroissement considérable de ses activités, avec la disparition du monde bipolaire qui avait relégué le règlement judiciaire à un rôle quelque peu marginal, et pour saisir les opportunités nouvelles offertes, notamment, par le progrès des technologies et de la communication. Entre 1982 et aujourd’hui, le nombre de fonctionnaires a ainsi presque triplé (il a quasiment doublé depuis l’an 2000, année de ma première élection en tant que Greffier). L’organisation du travail a été progressivement spécialisée entre les divers départements, juridique, linguistique et chargé de l’information, qui furent créés en 1997, et les services techniques. Par ailleurs, les Membres de la Cour ne disposèrent pas, pendant longtemps, de « référendaires » — ils s’y sont d’ailleurs longtemps refusés—, et l’assistance apportée aux juges en matière judiciaire était principalement répartie entre les fonctionnaires du Département des affaires juridiques.
H.E. Philippe Couvreur avec la Reine Beatrix photo prise pendant le 50 eme anniversaire de la Cour (18-04-1996).
Les cinq premiers postes de juristes référendaires ne furent obtenus de l’Assemblée générale et créés qu’en 2002, à l’issue de difficiles négociations que je me souviens avoir menées avec beaucoup de plaisir et d’intérêt ; le nombre de ces postes s’est progressivement accru, pour s’élever à quinze aujourd’hui. Les divers développements qui ont marqué le monde au cours des dernières décennies n’ont pas manqué de soulever pour la Cour de nouveaux défis. Comme c’est le cas pour toute institution, elle n’a pu les relever en faisant table rase des enseignements de son histoire ni, à l’inverse, en ne saisissant pas toutes les opportunités offertes par le temps présent. A ces différents égards, la Cour est certainement parvenue, au fil des ans, à assurer un équilibre, toujours délicat, entre changements et continuité. La continuité de la Cour est bien sûr inscrite dans son Statut, qui fait partie intégrante de la Charte des Nations Unies, et reflétée dans ses méthodes judiciaires, qui ont été très largement élaborées par sa devancière, la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, et héritées d’elle. Cette continuité historique était particulièrement présente lorsque j’ai rejoint le Greffe. Ainsi, en manière d’anecdote, divers hauts fonctionnaires alors en poste avaient eux-mêmes côtoyé, au début de leur carrière, d’anciens fonctionnaires de la Cour permanente. Tous nourrissaient à l’égard de cette dernière le plus grand respect. Il régnait d’ailleurs dans les couloirs du Palais de la Paix une atmosphère feutrée et délicieusement surannée, évocatrice de la défunte Société des Nations. Je me souviens en avoir encore utilisé maintes fournitures de bureau ! La continuité jurisprudentielle et procédurale entre les deux Cours constitue pour les Etats une garantie importante de sécurité et de prévisibilité juridiques. Cette continuité, juridique et historique, de même que l’expérience accumulée en plus de quatre-vingt-dix ans d’exercice de la fonction judiciaire, sont pour la Cour un facteur crucial de légitimité.
H.E. Philippe Couvreur vec le Roi Willem-Alexander photo prise pendant le 70 eme anniversaire de la Cour (20-04-2016).
En même temps, la Cour a eu, à l’évidence, à s’adapter aux changements du monde réel dans lequel elle opère, comme aux nécessités et opportunités nouvelles de chaque époque traversée. L’une des transformations notoires auxquelles j’ai assisté fut l’ouverture croissante de la Cour sur l’extérieur : longtemps à l’écart, à dessein, des organes politiques des Nations Unies, la Cour a souhaité se faire plus et mieux entendre de ces organes et des Etats membres. Elle a ainsi rompu avec ce qui était parfois perçu comme un « splendide isolement » au sein des Nations Unies, même si elle défend toujours jalousement son autonomie. La Cour doit en outre désormais également tenir compte des nombreuses autres juridictions, internationales ou régionales, qui ont été créées ces dernières années, et veiller, autant que possible, à assurer l’harmonie du « concert judiciaire » que permet ce foisonnement de cours et tribunaux sur la scène internationale. Davantage ouverte sur la communauté internationale et ses réalités, la Cour s’est montrée de plus en plus attentive, non seulement à sa place dans l’Organisation des Nations Unies, mais aussi à la poursuite des objectifs de celle-ci et à sa mission propre au service du règlement pacifique des différends internationaux. Des différends de plus en plus complexes, tant juridiquement que factuellement, en même temps que politiquement plus denses, lui ont été soumis. En révisant constamment, selon que de besoin, ses méthodes de travail, elle a su les résoudre rapidement et efficacement, à un coût particulièrement modeste pour la communauté internationale, tout en assurant le développement du droit. Enfin, pour conclure sur une note plus prosaïque, mais qui est loin d’être négligeable, je ne peux taire la chance que j’ai eue de connaître l’extraordinaire développement de la ville de La Haye au cours des 35 dernières années. Celle-ci offre aujourd’hui à la Cour, comme aux nombreuses institutions internationales qui s’y sont installées à sa suite, une qualité de vie et un cadre de travail uniques, qui sont très loin de ressembler à ce que j’ai trouvé en y arrivant. A l’image de l’imposante stature du Palais de la Paix où elle siège, symbole mondialement connu de la justice internationale, la Cour est une institution solidement établie. En dépit des périodes de doute ou de désaffection qu’elle a traversées par le passé, son rôle est unanimement salué au sein de la communauté internationale et le recours à ses services par les Etats n’a jamais été aussi soutenu. 35 ans après, je continue de mesurer chaque jour le privilège qui est le mien de servir au mieux de mes capacités l’organe judiciaire principal des Nations Unies. —– Les photos dans l’article sont une courtoisie de la Cour International de Justice.

Ukraine and the Cost of Peace Without Credible Guarantees

Diplomat Magazine
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Ukraine and the Cost of Peace Without Credible Guarantees

Peace Negotiations amid Electoral Calculations and Europe’s Responsibility

“Peace becomes durable when violating it costs more than upholding it.”

By Major General (Two Stars) (retd) Corneliu Pivariu

Developments in October 2026 show that military pressure on Ukraine is unfolding alongside negotiations, selective sanctions relief and Western disagreements over the costs of support. Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s address to the Hudson Institute and the local humanitarian agreement announced by the White House for Oleshky point to the existence of channels for dialogue, but do not establish that a comprehensive settlement is within reach.

The analysis examines whether tactical Russian concessions could benefit the Trump administration politically ahead of the congressional elections, while treating this interpretation as a hypothesis. For Kyiv, the immediate risk is a further reduction in aid or the imposition of additional conditions. The positions of Bulgaria and Slovakia illustrate the fragmentation of support, without amounting to a withdrawal of European support as a whole. The durability of peace depends on verifiable obligations, predictable funding and the guarantors’ capacity to respond. Romania has an interest in helping to define these conditions and in developing its own security capabilities.

1. The Stakes of Peace and Sanctions Policy

Ukraine could reach a settlement that constrains its future without its army having capitulated. Russian military pressure, the conditions attached to U.S. support and the difficulties of European coordination could narrow Kyiv’s options to the point of accepting commitments it would struggle to sustain. The urgency of ending the loss of human life is beyond question. Yet the terms for ending the fighting must also be judged by their ability to prevent renewed aggression. This is why the word “credible” is essential: guarantees must influence the adversary’s calculations and be enforceable when a crisis occurs.

Access to resources, the costs of security and a say in decision-making are all at stake in the negotiations. Territory remains a fundamental issue, alongside Ukraine’s right to arm itself, choose its partners and protect its economy. Retaining institutions and internationally recognised borders can coexist with permanent external constraints. The effective exercise of sovereignty must therefore form part of any assessment of an agreement.

Changes to the U.S. sanctions regime have altered the terms of the negotiations. On 9 October, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License No. 135, authorising, subject to the exceptions specified in the document, transactions involving Russian-origin diesel, including imports into the United States, until 7 April 2027.[1] Separately, the presidential order of 16 October granted waivers from the new sanctions and tariffs provided for in the Graham legislation, signed into law on 18 September. The earlier measures specified in the order remain in force.[2]

The diplomatic value of these decisions depends on the commitments obtained from Russia. Easing economic pressure can support diplomacy if it is tied to verifiable obligations and clear deadlines. Granting benefits before those obligations have been fulfilled could encourage Moscow to believe that military pressure also brings economic rewards.

2. The Local Ceasefire and Electoral Calculations

Against this background, on 23 October, the White House announced that Melania Trump had secured agreement from Russia and Ukraine on a temporary cessation of military operations confined to Oleshky, in the Kherson region. The stated aim is to deliver humanitarian aid and prepare for the evacuation of civilians through a safe corridor. The U.S. statement envisages implementation beginning on 29 October. Implementation and compliance will need to be verified on the ground.[3]

The initiative has humanitarian value in its own right. If it enables supplies to reach the population and civilians to be evacuated, its benefits should be acknowledged regardless of the broader political dispute. At the same time, a local arrangement demonstrates a willingness to engage in limited cooperation, rather than agreement on the general terms of peace. The safety of access corridors, civilians’ freedom of choice and the continuity of humanitarian access will provide the first concrete criteria for assessing the outcome.

The approaching U.S. congressional elections, scheduled for 3 November 2026, provide an additional incentive for visible diplomatic results.[4] In my assessment, Putin might see value in limited, reversible concessions that would give the Trump administration and Republican candidates a boost to their public standing. He might then seek more substantial U.S. concessions on sanctions, the normalisation of relations or the conditions imposed on Kyiv. This scenario remains an analytical hypothesis, which the Oleshky humanitarian agreement does not in itself confirm.

Such a scenario would create an asymmetry if Russia offered temporary gestures in exchange for lasting political or economic benefits. Moscow could retain its underlying objectives and its freedom to resume pressure after the election. Russia’s conduct after securing the first benefits would be more revealing than the media impact of the initial announcements.

3. Zelenskyy’s Position and Military Dependencies

On 23 October, speaking to the Hudson Institute by videoconference, Zelenskyy outlined the prospect of negotiations between Ukrainian, U.S. and Russian teams in the first half of November. He called for European participation, continued U.S. pressure on Moscow and a move from technical talks to a meeting of leaders. He welcomed the return of 270 Ukrainians from captivity, but criticised the restrictions on Starlink and Starshield and the delays in interceptor deliveries that had already been agreed.[5]

In the ensuing discussion, Zelenskyy argued for a ceasefire, including sector-specific arrangements if a comprehensive agreement proved impossible, the maintenance of sanctions and funding for a strong Ukrainian army for at least ten years after peace was achieved.[6] Military support would help deter renewed aggression while the Ukrainian economy recovered. The request raises legitimate questions about the size of the force, partners’ contributions and oversight of expenditure; it does not demonstrate an intention to continue the war for the same period.

Zelenskyy also described hybrid pressure on Europe—drones, cyberattacks and destabilisation in the Black Sea—as a Russian attempt to divide allies and reduce aid to Ukraine. He called for a clear mechanism for responding to future aggression.[7] In practical terms, this warning raises questions about European defence preparedness: the availability of forces, air defence and the ability to turn promises into action. Support for Kyiv and the strengthening of European defence must be planned together.

Economic pressure also has an industrial dimension. On 24 October, Kyiv announced new sanctions against Russian arms manufacturers and suppliers of machinery, raw materials and components, including foreign electronics.[8] The effectiveness of Western measures must also be judged by their ability to disrupt the supply chains that sustain Russia’s defence industry, rather than simply by the number of entities placed on sanctions lists. Controls on exports and intermediaries complement military deterrence.

On satellite communications, Zelenskyy announced on 24 October that Starlink and Starshield service speeds had been restored to their pre-restriction levels, following tests reported by the Ministry of Defence. He thanked the United States for its support while maintaining his call for the delivery of missile interceptors.[9] The episode shows that diplomatic engagement can restore an essential capability without removing uncertainty about the continuity of cooperation.

Restoring the services eases an immediate difficulty, but the strategic dependency remains. Access to infrastructure, control over it and permission to use it for a particular mission are distinct matters. Defence planning must address contractual terms, notification of changes and backup options. For Europeans, diversifying capabilities requires investment, integration and training. Cooperation with the United States remains essential, alongside efforts to reduce dependencies that constrain freedom of decision.

4. Western Support and the Limits of European Cohesion

The European Union (EU) officially maintains its support for peace underpinned by robust and credible guarantees. The European Council conclusions of 15–16 October express regret at the U.S. easing of sanctions on Russian diesel and reaffirm Europe’s contribution to Ukraine’s security.[10] Financial support includes the €90 billion loan for 2026–2027. Separately, Russian central bank assets worth approximately €210 billion are immobilised in the EU. Freezing these assets does not make them automatically available to finance Ukraine. The principal, the income it generates and the loan mechanisms must be treated separately.[11]

The volume of support announced does not, by itself, guarantee that aid will continue. What matters is that payment authorisations, equipment deliveries, production and maintenance result in capabilities that can be used when they are needed. Expenditure on refugees, future commitments and actual deliveries serve different purposes. European governments must explain these distinctions, oversee the funds and address their own social difficulties. Support whose public justification is eroding becomes more vulnerable to domestic political change.

Bulgaria offers a concrete example. On 20 October, Prime Minister Rumen Radev stated that his country could not contribute to the new funding requested by Kyiv, referring to the €70 billion request discussed at the European Council. On 21 October, the government approved constructive abstention on funding the procurement of new lethal weapons through the European Peace Facility, while maintaining non-lethal support.[12] These positions restrict Bulgaria’s participation in specific forms of assistance. Presenting them as an end to all Bulgarian contributions would go beyond what the decisions actually say.

In Slovakia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed on 24 October that Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár would travel to Moscow for the intergovernmental commission meeting on 26 October. The stated priority is energy security; talks with Sergey Lavrov are also planned. Bratislava says it is pursuing cooperation in sectors not covered by European sanctions.[13] The announcement concerns a resumption of institutional dialogue with Moscow, rather than a new Fico–Putin meeting. This approach illustrates the differences between national priorities and the European policy of maintaining pressure on Moscow.

For Zelenskyy, such developments increase the risk of reduced support, delays or additional conditions. Trade relations with Russia, energy costs and social discontent can influence governments’ decisions even if the common official position does not immediately change. Any reduction in contributions would have to be offset by other partners, who face limits of their own. Fragmentation can make aid less predictable and weaken Kyiv’s negotiating position before the effects become apparent on the battlefield.

Ukraine’s leadership must also manage the cost of its own public messaging. Firmness can protect Ukraine’s essential objectives, while highlighting military dependencies can mobilise support. Yet a tone perceived as an ultimatum may strengthen resistance among some partners or deepen public fatigue. A reduction in aid cannot be explained solely by Zelenskyy’s rhetoric: industrial capacity, budgets, economic interests and donors’ political choices also play a role. Kyiv’s diplomacy has an interest in setting clear priorities, with achievable objectives and clearly accepted responsibilities.

This requires transparency, oversight of expenditure and a credible explanation of the gradual transition towards financing its own defence. Supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty is compatible with critically examining its leadership’s decisions. At the same time, pressure for compromise must be accompanied by a clear explanation of the protection to be provided after an agreement is signed. Demanding immediate concessions from a vulnerable state in exchange for inadequately defined promises could aggravate the very problem the agreement is meant to resolve.

5. Negotiations and Security Guarantees

Negotiations are taking place alongside discussions about meetings between the major powers. On 19 October, the Kremlin confirmed that the possibility of a Putin–Trump–Xi meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in China had been discussed, while specifying that neither the meeting nor its agenda had been agreed.[14] The possible China–U.S.–Russia trilateral must be distinguished from the Ukraine–U.S.–Russia negotiations mentioned by Zelenskyy. The former could place the Ukrainian issue within a broader negotiation in which Kyiv and Europe would have limited influence over the initial agenda.

The participation of Ukraine and European states must be commensurate with the obligations and risks they would be expected to bear. Dialogue between major powers can open up useful possibilities, but implementing an agreement requires the acceptance and cooperation of those directly affected. Europe can strengthen its influence through a core group of states able to offer predictable support and operational proposals. The capacity to finance, produce and deliver gives it weight at the negotiating table.

The experience of the Budapest Memorandum explains Kyiv’s mistrust of general formulations. On 5 December 1994, as part of the process in which Ukraine relinquished the Soviet nuclear weapons located on its territory and acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom reaffirmed their commitment to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and existing borders and to refrain from the threat or use of force against it.[15]

The Memorandum provided security assurances and envisaged consultations, as well as efforts to secure a response from the UN Security Council in the situations concerning the use of nuclear weapons specified in the text. It did not establish a collective defence mechanism comparable to that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion in 2022 showed that these commitments had failed to prevent aggression by Russia, one of the signatory states.

Credible guarantees require clarity about which authority will establish that violations have occurred, how decisions will be made and what means of response will be available. Timelines, available forces, logistical support and funding must be specified. No diplomatic formula can eliminate every risk, but essential ambiguities can be reduced before an agreement is reached. A solemn obligation that lacks either the capacity or the will to enforce it carries little weight in the calculations of a potential aggressor.

Sanctions relief and economic benefits can be phased in according to compliance with commitments and made subject to suspension mechanisms. At the same time, ending the fighting and legally resolving territorial disputes may follow different timetables. An armistice can allow the state to recover and the population to be protected without legal recognition of territorial gains achieved by force, provided it preserves Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and limits the possibility of a new offensive.

In my assessment, the more likely short-term prospect remains continued confrontation alongside negotiations and limited agreements. In Oleshky, implementation of the announced agreement will provide a concrete test of compliance with commitments. Consolidating a coherent European position could strengthen the guarantees underpinning a future agreement; fragmentation of support could hasten a vulnerable compromise.

6. Implications for Romania and the Republic of Moldova

For Romania, the implications are direct. The October European Council conclusions condemn attacks on commercial shipping, including incidents in the exclusive economic zones of Romania and Bulgaria, and call for the restoration of safe civilian navigation in the Black Sea.[16] Bucharest needs air defence, maritime surveillance and protection for energy and port infrastructure. Logistical capacity and military mobility must be backed by sufficient resources and procedures that can be applied in a crisis.

The Republic of Moldova must be included in the same assessment. A weakened Ukraine could heighten pressure on Chișinău without making a direct military attack inevitable. Energy interconnections, the continuity of transport services and support for institutions strengthen regional resilience. Romania can contribute to a durable peace through domestic preparedness and participation in defining the obligations that affect its security. Geography can be translated into influence if it is backed by capabilities and clear political proposals.

Conclusions

A ceasefire must be judged by its effects on the population and its ability to prevent renewed aggression. Local humanitarian initiatives deserve support and verification on the ground. Extending them into a comprehensive agreement requires separate commitments, monitoring mechanisms and a credible response to violations.

Any tactical concessions by Putin would not justify disproportionate or hard-to-reverse concessions from the West. Their possible electoral value to the Trump administration remains an analytical hypothesis. Reciprocity and verification of compliance with commitments must take precedence when assessing the outcome of negotiations.

For Kyiv, maintaining Western support is becoming a condition for preserving its freedom to negotiate. Zelenskyy must combine firmness with prioritising requests and accepting domestic responsibilities. Europeans must ensure the political backing and industrial capacity needed to sustain aid, so that war fatigue does not become a decisive advantage for Moscow.

The lesson of Budapest is that the means and mechanisms for enforcing new guarantees must be established before an agreement is signed. For Romania, what is at stake is a viable Ukrainian state, a resilient Republic of Moldova and the security of regional shipping and infrastructure. The cost of peace without such guarantees would also be borne by those who had little influence over the negotiations.

Brașov, 25 October 2026

Selected Bibliography

1. Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, 5 December 1994. UN Treaty Series, vol. 3007, No. 52241. Document.

2. U.S. Treasury and the White House. OFAC General License No. 135, 9 October, and Executive Order No. 14436, 16 October 2026. Document 1; Document 2.

3. Office of the President of Ukraine. Address and discussion at the Hudson Institute, 23 October; restoration of Starlink/Starshield services and new sanctions, 24 October 2026. Document 1; Document 2; Document 3; Document 4.

4. Reuters. Andrea Shalal and Olena Harmash. Report on the negotiations and guarantees requested by Zelenskyy, 23 October 2026. Document.

5. The White House. First Lady Melania Trump Secures Ceasefire Between Russia and Ukraine, Localized to Oleshky. 23 October 2026. Document.

6. U.S. Federal Election Commission. 2026 general election calendar. Document.

7. European Council and Council of the European Union. Conclusions of 15–16 October 2026 and EU financial assistance to Ukraine. Document 1; Document 2.

8. Bulgarian News Agency. The Prime Minister’s statements on funding for Ukraine and the decision on the European Peace Facility. 20–21 October 2026. Document 1; Document 2.

9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia. Statement on the consultations in Moscow. 24 October 2026. Document.

10. Reuters. Kremlin says Putin, Trump and Xi could hold a three-way meeting in China next month. 19 October 2026. Document.

[1] U.S. Treasury, OFAC, General License No. 135, 9 October 2026, paragraphs (a)–(b). Document.

[2] The White House, Executive Order No. 14436 on implementing the Graham legislation, 16 October 2026, section 4. Document.

[3] The White House, statement on the local agreement in Oleshky, 23 October 2026; implementation scheduled for 29 October. Document.

[4] U.S. Federal Election Commission, 2026 general election calendar: 3 November. Document.

[5] Office of the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s opening address to the Hudson Institute, 23 October 2026. Document.

[6] Reuters, Andrea Shalal and Olena Harmash, report on Zelenskyy’s address and answers at the Hudson Institute, 23 October 2026. Document.

[7] Office of the President of Ukraine, report on the meeting with Hudson Institute representatives, 23 October 2026: hybrid attacks and mechanisms for security guarantees. Document.

[8] Office of the President of Ukraine, new sanctions against manufacturers and suppliers serving Russia’s defence industry, 24 October 2026. Document.

[9] Office of the President of Ukraine, announcement of the restoration of Starlink and Starshield services, 24 October 2026. Document.

[10] European Council, conclusions of 15–16 October 2026, EUCO 14/26, paragraphs 18–20 and 25. Document.

[11] Council of the European Union, EU financial assistance to Ukraine, updated 14 October 2026; the support loan and immobilised Russian assets. Document.

[12] Bulgarian News Agency (BTA), Prime Minister Radev’s statements of 20 October and the decision on constructive abstention of 21 October 2026. Document 1; Document 2.

[13] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia, statement of 24 October 2026 on Juraj Blanár’s visit and the meeting in Moscow on 26 October. Document.

[14] Reuters, report on the Kremlin’s position regarding a possible Putin–Trump–Xi meeting in China, 19 October 2026. Document.

[15] Budapest Memorandum, 5 December 1994, paragraphs 1–6, authentic English text, UN Treaty Series, vol. 3007, No. 52241, pp. 168–170. Document.

[16] European Council, conclusions of 15–16 October 2026, EUCO 14/26, paragraph 17 on shipping in the Black Sea. Document.

The Hague’s International Community: A Major Contributor to the Regional Economy

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The Hague’s International Community: A Major Contributor to the Regional Economy

New municipal research reveals the economic impact of 520 international organisations and more than 110 embassies and consulates in The Hague region, linking them to nearly 45,000 jobs and €8.6 billion in annual expenditure.

The Hague’s reputation as the international city of peace and justice is built on more than its diplomatic missions, international courts and organisations. Its international community is also a major contributor to the local and regional economy, supporting employment, business activity, education and cultural exchange.

According to the latest Monitor International Organisations in The Hague, commissioned by the Municipality of The Hague and conducted by research agency Decisio, the region was home to 520 international organisations in 2025. Their number has increased by 211% since 2005, when the municipality began monitoring the sector, and by 5.9% compared with the previous measurement in 2023.

These findings demonstrate the continued growth of The Hague’s international profile and the importance of the organisations that have chosen the city and its surrounding region as their base.

An International Centre for Peace and Justice

The Hague hosts a diverse network of international organisations, diplomatic missions, non-governmental organisations and institutions working in areas ranging from international law and human rights to security, humanitarian affairs and development.

Among its best-known institutions are the International Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, based at the Peace Palace, the International Criminal Court, OPCW, ESA, Eurojust and Europol. The wider international ecosystem also includes NGOs, knowledge institutions and organisations whose activities connect The Hague with governments, businesses and civil society around the world.

Diplomatic missions are an essential part of this environment. The presence of more than 110 embassies and consulates, alongside international organisations and their professional networks, helps sustain the city’s distinctive international character.

Together, these institutions make The Hague a centre for diplomacy, international cooperation and the development of solutions to global challenges.

A Substantial Economic Contribution

The latest municipal research quantifies the sector’s economic importance. International organisations are associated with approximately 44,900 jobs across the region, including around 29,700 in The Hague itself. These figures encompass both direct employment within the organisations and indirect employment generated through suppliers and other businesses.

The study identifies approximately 19,700 direct jobs within international organisations and a further 25,200 indirect jobs across the wider economy. These activities support a broad range of professions, from legal, policy and research specialists to staff working in hospitality, catering, security, logistics and other services.

The sector accounts for approximately 10% of The Hague’s economy. Its presence generates an estimated €8.6 billion in additional annual expenditure across the region, of which approximately €4.4 billion reaches organisations and businesses as revenue and added value.

The economic benefits extend well beyond the organisations themselves. International staff, visiting delegations, conferences and professional events generate demand for hotels, restaurants, transport, retail, event venues and other local services.

The research estimates that international organisations attract approximately 1.66 million business visitors annually and host more than 11,000 events each year. These activities contribute to the regional economy while creating opportunities for businesses and professionals to engage with an international clientele.

Employment and Opportunities Across the Region

The impact of the international sector extends across a wide range of occupations and skill levels. According to the study, 58% of the jobs associated with the sector are accessible to practically trained workers. This proportion rises to 76% among indirect jobs, including those in hospitality, security, logistics and facilities management.

These findings underline that the benefits of hosting international organisations are not confined to diplomats, lawyers or other highly specialised professionals. They also support employment opportunities for people working in essential services and across the regional supply chain.

The economic relationship between international organisations and local businesses is therefore an important part of the region’s wider prosperity.

Education, Knowledge and Cultural Exchange

The international community also contributes to The Hague’s educational and cultural environment. International schools help make the region attractive to diplomatic families and international professionals, while higher education institutions bring together students and researchers from different countries.

Institutions such as Leiden University’s The Hague Campus, The Hague University of Applied Sciences and the University of the Arts The Hague contribute to the city’s academic and cultural life. The Royal Academy of Art and the Royal Conservatoire, in particular, connect international perspectives with artistic education and creative practice.

The presence of international organisations also creates opportunities for conferences, public discussions, exhibitions and exchanges of expertise. These activities connect the city’s diplomatic community with academic institutions, cultural organisations, businesses and residents.

Sustaining The Hague’s International Position

The latest figures confirm that The Hague’s international sector is both a defining feature of the city and a significant economic force. The growth from the first municipal monitoring exercise in 2005 to 520 organisations in 2025 reflects the region’s continuing role as a base for institutions working on international law, peace, justice and other global concerns.

Maintaining this position requires more than attracting organisations. It also depends on a supportive operating environment, suitable accommodation, international education, accessible transport and services that meet the needs of organisations, their staff and visiting delegations.

For The Hague and its surrounding region, the international community is therefore not simply a symbol of global engagement. It is an important source of employment, expenditure, knowledge and cultural exchange, connecting the city’s international mission with the everyday life and economic activity of the region.

Source: Municipality of The Hague and Decisio, Monitor International Organisations in The Hague, 2025 data, published in June 2026.

The International Court of Justice at 80: A Vital Institution for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

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The International Court of Justice at 80: A Vital Institution for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

By H.E. Mr Santiago Villalpando, Registrar of the International Court of Justice

As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) marks the 80th anniversary of its inaugural sitting, its role in the international legal order has never been more relevant. The Court, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, is experiencing an unprecedented level of activity, reflecting both the complexity of contemporary international relations and the trust that States continue to place in international law. H.E. Mr. Santiago Villalpando, who assumed office as Registrar earlier this year for a seven-year term, reflects on the Court’s growing workload, its enduring mandate, the responsibilities of the Registry and the importance of its relationship with the diplomatic community in The Hague.

An increasingly active Court

The Court has never been busier, and the figures speak for themselves. As of today, there are 24 pending cases on its docket. Between 2021 and 2025, an average of 4.6 new cases per year were brought to the Court, including both contentious cases and requests for advisory opinions, compared with an annual average of nearly half that number, or 2.4 cases, between 1946 and 2020.

The nature of proceedings has also evolved, as shown by the multiplication of incidental proceedings. For example, the parties to a case often request provisional measures, which reveals that they feel a sense of urgency: indeed, provisional measures are indicated by the Court when it finds, among other things, that the rights of the States concerned are at an imminent risk of irreparable prejudice. Furthermore, a growing number of States that are not directly involved in a dispute decide to file requests for intervention. This bears testimony to the fact that disputes brought before the Court are of interest to the international community as a whole, for example, in matters concerning human rights and international humanitarian law.

The Court is therefore a beehive of activity. The general public may only be aware of a few weeks of hearings per year and the occasional formal sitting for the delivery of a judgment or advisory opinion, but internally the Court’s schedule is as busy as can be, with countless deliberations, drafting committees, first and second readings of judgments, and administrative and judicial meetings. Delivering three or four substantive decisions per year — which is the pace that the Court has imposed itself in recent times — means that there is never a down moment in the Court’s internal calendar. The Court has also adapted its working methods to the new environment, for example through the use of information technology.

All these developments speak of the continued relevance of the Court’s mandate and the trust placed in it by Member States. Thirty years ago, when the Court was turning fifty, a mentor of mine published an article entitled “The International Court of Justice: 50 years old and (for the time being) not a wrinkle!” As the Court commemorates its 80th anniversary this year, it seems to have taken a sip from the Fountain of Youth!

Eight decades of international justice

The Court is commemorating its 80th anniversary this year, and one may wonder why this anniversary is so significant. I believe it demonstrates the enduring vitality of one momentous idea contained in the Charter of the United Nations, which led to the adoption of the Court’s Statute and its first public sitting in 1946: the conviction that an international court fully integrated within the United Nations could play a central role in achieving the objectives of international peace and security, friendly relations, international cooperation and respect for human rights embedded in the Charter.

Consider, for a moment, what had happened in the 80 years that preceded that inaugural public sitting. Back in 1866, there was growing confidence in international law, but there were no multilateral institutions and the idea of a World Court was but a distant utopia. The 1863 Lieber Code and the first 1864 Geneva Convention had launched the regulation of the laws of war. The United States and Great Britain had agreed to settle their disputes regarding the American Civil War through arbitration, which eventually led to the famous 1872 Alabama arbitral award.

In the decades that followed, numerous attempts were made to systematise the peaceful settlement of disputes through the application of international law. Some of these attempts proved successful, such as the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1899 and that of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1920, under the auspices of the League of Nations. Other attempts failed, such as the proposed creation of an International Prize Court in 1907 and the 1937 Convention aiming at establishing, for the first time, an international criminal court, which never entered into force.

But most of all, the Judges who sat for the first time at the Peace Palace in 1946 were tragically conscious that, to paraphrase the Preamble of the Charter, “the scourge of war” had, twice in their lifetime, “brought untold sorrow to mankind”.

The trust placed in the Court by the international community, as it marks its 80th anniversary, demonstrates that the intuition of the negotiators at San Francisco was right. In its eight decades of existence, the Court has proved remarkably resilient, even in periods of profound international turmoil, in ensuring the peaceful settlement of disputes and the attainment of the principles of the Charter.

The foundations of the Court’s lasting role

The establishment of the Court embodies several core propositions.

First, the judicial function is an indispensable component of the United Nations. The novelty of the Court, compared with its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, is that it is fully integrated within the institutional structure of the United Nations as one of its principal organs, at the same level as the General Assembly, the Security Council or the Secretariat. This has ensured its stability, allowing it to give effect to the commitment undertaken by Member States, under Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter, to settle their international disputes through peaceful means.

Judicial means, however, are not intended to replace the other means of peaceful settlement of disputes listed in Article 33 of the Charter, such as good offices, mediation or even arbitration. The second feature of the Court’s Statute is therefore that it enriches the options available to States to solve their controversies based on international law. The cardinal principle remains that the Court’s jurisdiction is consensual, but the Statute offers several different ways of expressing such consent and open the door to the judicial option.

Third, the Court reflects the diversity of the international community in which it operates. The composition of the Court has always strived to represent the major legal systems of the world, which has been made possible both by the procedure for the election of its Members (which involves the General Assembly and the Security Council) and by its configuration. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that since its inception the Court has had fifteen Members, contrary to the Security Council, which had only eleven members in 1945. When the Council’s composition was revised in 1963 to better represent the changes in the international community emerging from decolonisation, it was aligned with that of the Court!

Lastly, the Court’s Statute offers numerous advantages that may incentivise States to opt for this means of peaceful settlement. A permanent judicial institution, for example, has pre-established rules of procedure detailing the various phases of the judicial process, ready for States to use. These cover the number of pleadings, the organisation of hearings, the languages to be used, how to raise objections or obtain provisional measures, and the binding character of the final judgment, among other matters. The Court also renders judgments that contain a detailed explanation of the reasons leading to the resolution of a dispute, based on a rich body of jurisprudence. Its proceedings are public, mirroring the old adage, already proclaimed in the first of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points in 1919, that “diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view”. Transparency and predictability are key features of the Court’s success.

The Registry: administrative, judicial and diplomatic responsibilities

As my predecessor, Philippe Gautier, pointed out in an article he wrote for Diplomat Magazine in 2022, the Registrar’s role includes a wide range of duties of an administrative, judicial and diplomatic nature.

On the administrative front, the Registrar manages the work of the Registry. The Registry works as a small international institution, which includes not only the lawyers who directly assist the Judges in the discharge of their judicial mandate, but also specialised personnel working on linguistic matters, protocol, public information, archives, library services, information technology, document processing, publication, human resources, budget, security, administrative support and so on.

The greatest challenge for the Registrar in this area will certainly be ensuring the sustainability of the support that the Registry provides to the Court. The General Assembly has granted some additional resources to the Court in recent years, but the exponential increase in the workload remains an enduring challenge. Fortunately, the Registry comprises an experienced team of international civil servants whose commitment to the mandate of the Court goes very far!

The Registrar must also offer his personal legal expertise to the Court in judicial proceedings. The Rules of Court spell out numerous distinct functions specifically assigned to the Registrar, from keeping a General List of all cases to transmitting pleadings and documents to the parties or ensuring the publication of the Court’s judgments, advisory opinions and orders.

But the Registrar also attends all public hearings, deliberations and drafting committee meetings. He is therefore expected not only to contribute to the resolution of procedural incidents, but also to assist the Judges in the preparation of the Court’s judgments and advisory opinions as they come into being. This is the reason why the Registrar is to be an experienced international lawyer, who may provide substantive support to the Court in shaping its decisions.

Lastly, the Rules of Court provide that the Registrar is “the regular channel of communications to and from the Court”, which hints at his diplomatic role. Beyond the strictly procedural aspects of this function, the Registrar is to be an effective counterpart for the agents of the parties in proceedings, governments and the diplomatic community, as well as the United Nations system and the general public. There is a strong informal component in maintaining productive relations with stakeholders at all levels and in all circumstances, from formal hearings to various diplomatic functions.

The diversity and breadth of the Registrar’s responsibilities are among the most rewarding aspects of the position, while also making it demanding, especially in light of the budgetary realities  across the Organisation. Another challenge, but also an interesting aspect of the role, is to contribute to the continuous modernisation of the Court’s practice while preserving its traditions and legal heritage.

A close relationship with the diplomatic community

It is not serendipitous that The Hague is often described as the international city of peace and justice. Compared with my prior position at UNESCO in Paris, where I sometimes felt quite lonely in my role as Legal Adviser, what strikes me about the diplomatic community in The Hague is that it is filled with lawyers!

The local diplomatic corps comprises very experienced individuals who have a thorough knowledge not only of bilateral and multilateral relations, but also of the intricacies of international law and, more particularly, of the Court’s judicial proceedings. I am impressed with the legal depth of the exchanges I am having with ambassadors and legal advisers, even in the most casual of conversations.

I would like the diplomatic community to see the Registry of the International Court of Justice as a partner that can support them in the performance of their duties with respect to the judicial settlement of their disputes. As I said, the Registrar is the formal channel of communication between the Court and Member States, but this relationship goes further than that.

For example, the Registry can be a resource for diplomats to obtain authoritative information about the Court, its jurisprudence, its practices and rules, so as to ensure the smooth conduct of proceedings. The Registry can also work closely with embassies to promote a better understanding of the principal judicial organ of the United Nations among their own governments, academia and the general public.

This is one of the Registry’s key objectives, to which we contribute frequently by receiving the highest dignitaries, as well as groups of civil servants, judges, students and professors, and even a younger audience eager to know more about what happens behind the impressive façade of the Peace Palace.

As the International Court of Justice looks ahead after eight decades of existence, its continued activity and the confidence placed in it by States demonstrate the enduring relevance of the principles on which it was founded. Supporting the judicial work, maintaining close relations with the diplomatic community and helping the wider public understand the role of the Court are essential parts of the Registry’s mandate. I am proud to be part of this endeavour.

South African Food Festival Returns to The Hague with Celebrity Chef Zola Nene

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South African Food Festival Returns to The Hague with Celebrity Chef Zola Nene

19–20 November 2026 | Leonardo Royal Hotel The Hague

The flavours and culinary traditions of South Africa will take centre stage in The Hague on 19 and 20 November 2026, when the Embassy of South Africa and South African Tourism present a special South African Food Festival at Leonardo Royal Hotel The Hague. The event will feature renowned South African chef Zola Nene, who will personally prepare the culinary experience in collaboration with the hotel’s chef, Sido de Brabander, and his team.

Open to the public, the two-day festival will offer guests an opportunity to discover South African cuisine through the creativity and expertise of one of the country’s best-known culinary personalities. The event will bring South African gastronomy to a Dutch and international audience, introducing visitors to the country’s food traditions and the cultural influences that shape its diverse culinary identity.

Chef Zola Nene: Celebrating South African Cuisine

Zola Nene is an award-winning chef, food stylist, television personality and cookbook author whose work has introduced South African cuisine to audiences both at home and internationally. She trained at the Institute of Culinary Arts in Stellenbosch after discovering her passion for cooking during a professional experience in the United Kingdom.

Her television career began as resident chef on South Africa’s Expresso Morning Show on SABC 3. She subsequently appeared as a judge on The Great South African Bake Off and MasterChef South Africa, and presented her own cooking programme, Celeb Feasts with Zola.

Nene is also the author of several cookbooks, including Simply Delicious, Simply Zola and Simply Seven Colours. Her publications have received international recognition at the Gourmand World Cookbook Awards. Her cooking draws inspiration from South African food heritage, familiar ingredients and the presentation of traditional dishes in accessible, contemporary ways.

For the November festival, Nene will personally cook and work alongside Chef Sido de Brabander and the Leonardo Royal Hotel’s culinary team to curate a menu celebrating South African gastronomy. The menu is currently in preparation, with further details to be announced.

A Taste of South Africa in The Hague

“South African cuisine reflects the country’s varied cultural heritage, regional traditions and locally available ingredients. From traditional home cooking and vegetable-rich dishes to distinctive spices, grilled specialities and celebrated desserts, its food culture offers a wide range of flavours and culinary stories” Said H.E. Mr. Vusi Madonsela, Ambassador of South Africa.

The festival will provide an occasion to explore this heritage in an international setting, bringing together gastronomy, cultural exchange and hospitality. The collaboration between the Embassy of South Africa, South African Tourism and Leonardo Royal Hotel The Hague highlights the role of food in introducing a country’s culture and traditions to new audiences.

The presence of Chef Zola Nene, working directly with the hotel’s culinary team, will give the festival a distinctive character. The menu will be developed to present a South African food experience to guests in The Hague, with more information on the dishes.

Event Details and Reservations

South African Food Festival

  • Dates: Thursday, 19 November, and Friday, 20 November 2026
  • Venue: Leonardo Royal Hotel The Hague
  • Address: Van Stolkweg 1, 2585 JL The Hague, The Netherlands
  • Organisers: Embassy of South Africa and South African Tourism, Leonardo Royal Hotel and Diplomat Magazine.
  • Featured chef: Zola Nene, in collaboration with Chef Sido de Brabander and the Leonardo Royal Hotel culinary team

The festival is open to the public. Reservations are strongly recommended to ensure that a table is available.

Location: Leonardo Royal Hotel The Hague – Google Maps.

Diplomat Magazine will continue to share updates as the South African Food Festival takes shape, inviting readers to mark their calendars for two days of South African culinary culture in The Hague.

Instituto Ibero-Americano de La Haya: nuevas publicaciones, oportunidades académicas y agenda internacional para 2026-2027

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Instituto Ibero-Americano de La Haya: nuevas publicaciones, oportunidades académicas y agenda internacional para 2026-2027

La institución anuncia la finalización de una colección de 34 volúmenes sobre corrupción y crimen organizado transnacional, actualiza su curso modelo sobre Derecho Internacional Penal y la Corte Penal Internacional y abre nuevas convocatorias para investigadores y estudiantes.

El Instituto Ibero-Americano de La Haya para la Paz, los Derechos Humanos y la Justicia Internacional (IIH) presenta sus principales publicaciones, actividades académicas y convocatorias para el segundo semestre de 2026 y el primero de 2027.

Entre las novedades destacan la conclusión de una serie de 34 volúmenes dedicada a las respuestas a la corrupción asociada al crimen organizado transnacional, la actualización del Curso Modelo de Derecho Internacional Penal y Corte Penal Internacional, y la apertura de nuevas ediciones del Concurso de Simulación Judicial sobre la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI) y de dos certámenes académicos.

El Instituto también prepara la XIV Semana Ibero-Americana de la Justicia Internacional, prevista en La Haya en 2027, que reunirá actividades académicas, encuentros institucionales y presentaciones de nuevas publicaciones.

1. Finaliza una serie de 34 volúmenes sobre corrupción y crimen organizado transnacional

La serie de investigación sobre corrupción y crimen organizado transnacional, desarrollada entre 2020 y 2026, ha concluido con la publicación de 34 obras colectivas en español.

El proyecto fue impulsado por la Red de Investigación sobre Respuestas a la Corrupción Asociada al Crimen Organizado Transnacional, integrada por 300 investigadores de América Latina, Europa y Norteamérica, organizados en 13 grupos de trabajo, bajo la dirección académica del profesor Héctor Olasolo.

La colección comprende 27 obras temáticas, cinco tomos de Elementos de Análisis y Reflexión y dos tomos dedicados al Programa de Acción. La investigación contó con financiación del Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación de Colombia, las universidades del Rosario y Pontificia Javeriana, y el IIH.

Las 34 obras forman parte de la colección Perspectivas Ibero-Americanas sobre la Justicia, publicada por la editorial Tirant lo Blanch. Todos los volúmenes pueden consultarse y descargarse gratuitamente a través de la página de la colección:

Consultar la colección completa

Los dos volúmenes finales, disponibles desde el 15 de octubre de 2026, presentan las recomendaciones del programa de acción:

  • Tomo I. Medidas institucionales y normativas a la luz de las actuales normas y estrategias globales y nacionales anticorrupción que identifican el fenómeno de la corrupción con conductas individuales desviadas. Incluye un apéndice sobre medidas extrajurídicas recomendadas para abordar las redes del narcotráfico marítimo y sus prácticas de corrupción en el entorno de la ciudad-puerto.Descargar el Tomo I
  • Tomo II. Programa de acción para abordar el fenómeno en su integridad, incluyendo sus manifestaciones de carácter colectivo: hacia un nuevo paradigma. Incluye un apéndice dedicado a la región amazónica.Descargar el Tomo II

Como continuación de este trabajo, se prepara una trilogía en inglés que recogerá los principales resultados de los Elementos de Análisis y Reflexión (volúmenes 43-47) y del Programa de Acción (volúmenes 54-55). Se prevé que las tres obras estén disponibles en acceso abierto en mayo de 2027 y se presenten durante la XIV Semana Ibero-Americana de la Justicia Internacional, en La Haya.

2. Actualización del Curso Modelo de Derecho Internacional Penal y Corte Penal Internacional

Desde finales de septiembre de 2026 está disponible la versión actualizada del Curso Modelo de Derecho Internacional Penal y Corte Penal Internacional, ofrecido gratuitamente por la Unidad de Asuntos Públicos de la Secretaría de la Corte Penal Internacional.

El curso está dirigido a profesores y académicos de habla hispana que deseen preparar programas de enseñanza sobre Derecho Internacional Penal y la CPI, tanto en estudios de grado como de posgrado.

Su estructura comprende 16 semanas de clases, acompañadas de lecturas recomendadas en español y disponibles en acceso abierto.

El diseño original, publicado en 2019, y la actualización de 2026, que incluye una revisión del curso y de las lecturas recomendadas, se realizaron bajo la dirección académica del profesor Héctor Olasolo. En la actualización participaron las investigadoras Mariana Molina Flórez, Paula Alejandra Gómez Matamoros, Daniela Velásquez Aponte y Francisca Gomes da Silva Seabra.

Acceso gratuito al curso:

Curso Modelo de Derecho Internacional Penal y Corte Penal Internacional

3. Nuevas convocatorias para estudiantes e investigadores

El 1 de octubre de 2026 se abrieron las convocatorias correspondientes al segundo semestre de 2026 y al primero de 2027. Estas incluyen el XIV Concurso de Simulación Judicial sobre la CPI, el XVI Certamen de Ensayos Blattmann, Odio Benito y Steiner sobre Justicia Internacional Penal (CEBOS), el X Certamen de Estudios Críticos sobre la Justicia (CEJC) y la recepción continua de artículos para el Anuario Ibero-Americano de Derecho Internacional Penal (ANIDIP).

3.1. XIV Concurso de Simulación Judicial sobre la Corte Penal Internacional

Organizado anualmente por el IIH en colaboración con la Unidad de Asuntos Públicos de la Corte Penal Internacional, el Concurso CPI ofrece a los equipos participantes la oportunidad de profundizar en el Derecho Internacional Penal mediante la preparación de escritos jurídicos y la participación en audiencias orales.

La convocatoria, el caso y la información sobre la estructura y el calendario de esta edición están disponibles en la página oficial:

Consultar la convocatoria del XIV Concurso CPI

Fechas principales:

  • 5 de noviembre de 2026: fecha límite para enviar preguntas aclaratorias.
  • 8 de abril de 2027: cierre de inscripciones.
  • 15 de abril de 2027: presentación de los memoriales escritos correspondientes a Fiscalía, Víctimas y Defensa.
  • 31 de mayo al 3 de junio de 2027: audiencias orales en la Universidad de La Haya para las Ciencias Aplicadas, en el marco de la XIV Semana Ibero-Americana de la Justicia Internacional.
  • 4 de junio de 2027: audiencia final en la Sala de Audiencias I de la Corte Penal Internacional, ante los magistrados hispanohablantes de la Corte.

Consultas: cpiconcursoiih@gmail.com

3.2. XVI Certamen de Ensayos Blattmann, Odio Benito y Steiner (CEBOS)

El XVI Certamen CEBOS invita a presentar trabajos académicos sobre justicia internacional penal. La convocatoria establece un proceso de selección y evaluación por un jurado internacional, con la posibilidad de publicar los ensayos seleccionados en el Anuario Ibero-Americano de Derecho Internacional Penal (ANIDIP).

Calendario previsto:

  • 3 de diciembre de 2026: fecha límite para presentar resúmenes de 300 palabras.
  • 18 de diciembre de 2026: selección de los resúmenes por el jurado internacional.
  • 1 de marzo de 2027: fecha límite para entregar los ensayos completos, de entre 8.000 y 10.000 palabras.
  • 1 de abril de 2027: publicación de los resultados de la evaluación del jurado internacional.
  • Diciembre de 2027: publicación de los ensayos seleccionados en el volumen XV (2027) del ANIDIP, una vez concluida la evaluación anónima.
  • Abril de 2028: presentación de los ensayos seleccionados en el IX Congreso de Derecho Internacional de la Universidad del Rosario.
  • Última semana de mayo de 2028: presentación durante la XIV Semana Ibero-Americana de la Justicia Internacional.
  • Primera semana de junio de 2028: incorporación de los autores seleccionados a las redes de investigación del IIH.

Consultar la convocatoria del XVI Certamen CEBOS

Consultas: iih.certamensayos@gmail.com

3.3. X Certamen de Estudios Críticos sobre la Justicia (CEJC)

El X Certamen CEJC promueve la investigación interdisciplinaria sobre la justicia y sus distintas dimensiones. Su calendario y estructura son los mismos que los del Certamen CEBOS.

Al presentar el resumen, los participantes deberán indicar la disciplina en la que concursan. Las categorías son:

  1. Filosofía.
  2. Psicología.
  3. Ciencia y Tecnología.
  4. Justicia y Derecho Nacional.
  5. Justicia y Derecho Internacional.
  6. Justicia Comunitaria y Antropología.
  7. Justicia Transcendente y Teología.
  8. Relaciones Internacionales y Ciencia Política.

La convocatoria y las condiciones de participación están disponibles en la página del Instituto:

Consultar la convocatoria del X Certamen CEJC

Consultas: iih.certamensayos@gmail.com

3.4. Recepción de artículos para el ANIDIP

El Anuario Ibero-Americano de Derecho Internacional Penal (ANIDIP), publicación de la Universidad del Rosario en colaboración con el IIH y la editorial Tirant lo Blanch, mantiene abierta de forma continua la recepción de artículos de investigación.

Los trabajos recibidos pueden iniciar el correspondiente proceso de evaluación anónima. La fecha de cierre para cada volumen anual es el 31 de mayo. Los artículos presentados después de esa fecha se considerarán para el volumen del año siguiente.

Envío de artículos y directrices para autores:

Consultar la plataforma de ANIDIP

4. XIV Semana Ibero-Americana de la Justicia Internacional: agenda prevista para 2027

La XIV Semana Ibero-Americana de la Justicia Internacional está prevista en La Haya, Países Bajos, del 24 de mayo al 9 de junio de 2027.

El programa provisional puede consultarse en la página del IIH. El programa definitivo se publicará el 1 de febrero de 2027.

Consultar el programa de la Semana Ibero-Americana

Entre las actividades anunciadas figuran las siguientes:

Ceremonia inaugural en la Corte Penal Internacional

La programación contempla una ceremonia inaugural en la sala de conferencias de la Corte Penal Internacional.

Fase oral del XIV Concurso CPI y encuentros con embajadas iberoamericanas

Los equipos participantes intervendrán en las audiencias orales del concurso y mantendrán encuentros con embajadas iberoamericanas con sede en La Haya.

Más información sobre el Concurso CPI

IV Día Polifónico de la Justicia Internacional

El programa incluye una nueva edición del Día Polifónico de la Justicia Internacional, que se organizará en colaboración con distintas entidades internacionales. La participación de la Fundación Africana para el Derecho Internacional (AFIL) está pendiente de confirmación.

X Seminario de Pensamiento Ibero-Americano sobre la Justicia

El seminario se celebrará en la Universidad de La Haya para las Ciencias Aplicadas y reunirá actividades académicas y presentaciones editoriales. Entre las iniciativas previstas figuran:

  • Un homenaje a la profesora Concepción Escobar Hernández, de España.
  • La presentación del primer tomo de los trabajos de la Red Ibero-Americana de Escuelas de Pensamiento sobre la Justicia Internacional.
  • La presentación de las versiones en español e inglés del libro Legado del Concurso CPI por su XV Aniversario (2012-2026).
  • La exposición de los ensayos seleccionados en el XV Certamen CEBOS y el IX Certamen CEJC.
  • La presentación de nuevas publicaciones de la colección Perspectivas Ibero-Americanas sobre la Justicia y del ANIDIP.

Más información sobre el Seminario

Presentación del programa de acción contra la corrupción asociada al crimen organizado transnacional

También se prevé presentar el programa de acción desarrollado a partir de la investigación sobre la corrupción vinculada al crimen organizado transnacional, con especial atención a América Latina.

La celebración está prevista provisionalmente para el 26 de mayo de 2027, de 14:30 a 18:00, en la Embajada de Guatemala en los Países Bajos, a la espera de confirmación definitiva.

Encuentro de la Red Ibero-Americana de Escuelas de Pensamiento sobre la Justicia Internacional Penal

La programación contempla el II Seminario Internacional de esta red y su II Reunión de Coordinación, dedicados al intercambio académico y al desarrollo de sus líneas de trabajo.

Reuniones anuales de las redes de investigación

Durante la Semana también están previstas las reuniones de coordinación de dos redes del IIH:

  • La XIII Reunión Anual de Coordinación de la Red de Investigación Perspectivas Ibero-Americanas sobre la Justicia.
  • La VIII Reunión Anual de Coordinación de la Red de Investigación sobre Respuestas a la Corrupción Asociada al Crimen Organizado Transnacional.

5. Redes de investigación y publicaciones de acceso abierto

El IIH mantiene una actividad continuada de investigación, formación y difusión académica mediante publicaciones gratuitas y redes internacionales de colaboración.

Entre sus principales recursos se encuentran:

1. Colección Perspectivas Ibero-Americanas sobre la Justicia (2018-2026)

Comprende los volúmenes 1 a 55, con obras dedicadas a distintas dimensiones de la justicia internacional.

Consultar y descargar los volúmenes

2. Anuario Ibero-Americano de Derecho Internacional Penal (ANIDIP), 2013-2026

La publicación reúne investigaciones especializadas en Derecho Internacional Penal. Su colección comprende los volúmenes 1 a 13.

Consultar ANIDIP

3. International Law Clinic Reports / Informes de la Clínica Jurídica Internacional (2020-2026)

Esta serie bilingüe, en inglés y español, comprende seis volúmenes.

Consultar la colección en el repositorio de la Universidad del Rosario

Consultar la serie en la página del IIH

4. Red Ibero-Americana de Escuelas de Pensamiento sobre la Justicia Internacional Penal

Iniciada en junio de 2026, esta red impulsa la colaboración académica y el intercambio de perspectivas sobre la justicia internacional penal.

Más información sobre la Red

5. Red de Investigación sobre Respuestas a la Corrupción Asociada al Crimen Organizado Transnacional (2020-2026)

Esta red internacional ha coordinado el trabajo académico que dio lugar a la serie de 34 volúmenes sobre corrupción y crimen organizado transnacional.

Más información sobre la Red

6. Red de Investigación Perspectivas Ibero-Americanas sobre la Justicia (2015-2026)

Esta iniciativa reúne a investigadores que trabajan en distintas áreas relacionadas con la justicia desde perspectivas iberoamericanas.

Más información sobre la Red

Información y contacto

Para consultas sobre el Concurso CPI, los certámenes académicos y las actividades del Instituto, se puede contactar con el IIH a través de los siguientes correos electrónicos:

Las convocatorias, los programas y las publicaciones pueden consultarse también en el sitio web oficial del Instituto Ibero-Americano de La Haya.

Armenia Celebrates 35 Years of Independence in The Hague

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Armenia Celebrates 35 Years of Independence in The Hague

Diplomacy, cultural heritage and Armenian gastronomy take centre stage at a distinguished National Day reception

The Embassy of the Republic of Armenia in the Netherlands celebrated the 35th anniversary of Armenia’s independence with an elegant reception in The Hague, bringing together Dutch politicians, representatives of government ministries, diplomats, international courts and organisations, and members of the Armenian diaspora.

The gathering reflected the warmth and hospitality associated with Armenia, combining formal diplomatic exchanges with music, gastronomy and an opportunity to learn more about the country’s history, achievements and ambitions.

H.E. Mr. Viktor Biyagov, Ambassador of Armenia, Armenia National Day in The Hague 2026.

H.E. Mr. Viktor Biyagov, Ambassador of Armenia to the Netherlands, personally welcomed his distinguished guests and delivered an address reflecting on the significance of independence, Armenia’s development over the past three and a half decades, and the country’s aspirations for peace, economic cooperation and closer international engagement.

The attendance included members of the Dutch Senate and House of Representatives, senior officials from several ministries, and a strong representation from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Representatives of international courts and organisations based in The Hague, members of the diplomatic corps and the Armenian diaspora also joined the celebration, underscoring Armenia’s connections with the international community.

H. E. Spyros Attas, Ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus, H.E. Jeffrey Curmi, Ambassador of Malta and H.E. Elizabeth Konstantinova Varbanova, Ambassador of Bulgaria.

Among others we remarked the presence of the Secretary General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, H.E. Mr Marcin Czepelak, the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, H.E. Ambassador Sabrina Dallafior, the President of the International Criminal Court, H.E. Judge Tomoko Akane, the Secretary General of the HCCH, H.E. Mr Chirtophe Bernasconi, the Director of Protocol Ms Gabriella Sancisi, the Dutch Ambassador for International Organisations, H.E. Mr. Erik Weststrate and Ms. Joanneke Balfoort, Director of the Europe Department at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Also many Members of Senate and House of Representatives of the Netherlands.

Senator Henk Marquart Scholtz, Ambassador of Estonia, H.E. Mr. Paul Teesalu and the Ambassador of Algeria, H.E. Mustafa Abdelhak Gasmi.

From the dream of independence to a new chapter

In his address, Ambassador Biyagov recalled the long historical journey behind Armenia’s independence, describing it as the fulfilment of a dream preserved across generations.

“For nearly five centuries, the dream of a free Armenia was kept alive in the hearts of our people,” he said, paying tribute to those who had struggled and sacrificed in the hope of establishing an independent state.

The Ambassador referred to September 1991, when the Armenian people made the historic decision to determine their own future. He acknowledged the difficulties that marked the early years of independence, including regional conflict, economic hardship, a severe energy crisis and disruptions to traditional trade routes.

Despite these challenges, Armenia developed its economy, advanced its scientific and cultural institutions, and established diplomatic relations around the world. The country became an active member of the international community, building partnerships while pursuing its own national priorities.

Armenia National Day – The Hague 2026.

Looking ahead, Ambassador Biyagov emphasised Armenia’s commitment to pursuing lasting peace in the region. He outlined a vision of a region in which borders are respected, communication routes are open, and neighbouring countries focus on the opportunities offered by cooperation rather than conflict.

He also highlighted the growing importance of international economic cooperation in Armenia’s foreign policy, alongside traditional economic sectors and emerging technologies. Referring to the establishment of a major artificial intelligence facility in Armenia through Firebird in partnership with NVIDIA, he presented technological development as part of the country’s ambition to strengthen its position in the global digital economy.

The Ambassador described this vision as the beginning of a new chapter for Armenia, centred on democratic governance, innovation, education and opportunities for younger generations to build their futures at home. Independence, he stressed, should be experienced in everyday life through personal freedom, safety and dignity.

Ambassador Biyagov and the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps and Ambassador of Yemen, H.E. Ms Sahar Ghanem.

Armenia and the Netherlands: a growing partnership

A significant part of Ambassador Biyagov’s address was devoted to relations between Armenia and the Netherlands, which he described as a successful partnership since Armenia regained its independence.

“Since regaining independence, Armenia has enjoyed a robust and successful partnership with the Netherlands,” the Ambassador stated. He highlighted regular political dialogue, an expanding economic partnership, and close ties in culture, education and people-to-people relations.

He also expressed appreciation for Dutch support in strengthening Armenia’s trade capacities and expanding its access to the European market, underlining the importance of international cooperation in the country’s economic development.

In particular, Ambassador Biyagov expressed gratitude for the Netherlands’ support for the European Union’s autonomous trade measures, describing this as an important contribution to Armenia’s economic diversification and closer integration with Europe.

“I want to express my deepest gratitude to our dear colleagues at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Their dedication, vision, and hard work have made this exceptional level of cooperation possible,” he said.

His remarks acknowledged the role of diplomatic engagement and the work of officials on both sides in developing bilateral relations. The strong presence of Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs representatives at the reception provided a fitting setting for this expression of appreciation.

The Ambassador also reaffirmed Armenia’s commitment to multilateralism, a principle of particular relevance in The Hague, home to international courts and organisations.

“Here in The Hague, the global City of Peace and Justice, we do our utmost to contribute meaningfully to the vital work of international organizations and international courts,” he said.

Looking towards the international agenda, he highlighted Armenia’s preparations to host the United Nations Biodiversity Conference COP17 in Yerevan in October 2026, under the theme “Taking Action for Nature”. The conference represents an opportunity for Armenia to contribute to international discussions on biodiversity and environmental protection.

Armenian gastronomy brings culture to the table

The celebration also offered guests an opportunity to experience Armenia through its culinary traditions. Two chefs, Arayik Amzayan and Stepan Burmistrov, travelled to The Hague to present Armenian gastronomy ahead of the Armenian Food Festival, scheduled for 24 and 25 September at the Leonardo Royal Hotel The Hague.

Armenia gastronomy by Chefs Arayik Amzayan and Stepan Burmistrov.

Their culinary knowledge, creativity and professionalism were evident in an outstanding buffet-style presentation featuring a selection of traditional Armenian dishes. The display introduced guests to the diversity of Armenian cuisine, with its distinctive flavours, presentation and traditions of hospitality.

The chefs’ participation connected the National Day celebration with the forthcoming Food Festival, extending the Embassy’s cultural presentation beyond the formal programme. Armenian cuisine offered a welcoming way for guests to discover another dimension of the country’s heritage and contemporary identity.

Black Swan Quintet, Armenia National Day 2026.

The reception was further enriched by a musical performance from the Black Swan Quintet, whose contribution added an artistic dimension to the evening.

In his closing remarks, Ambassador Biyagov thanked the guest chefs and their team for making the celebration special through their culinary creativity. He also expressed appreciation to the musicians for their performance and to the Embassy staff for their professionalism and dedication in bringing the event together.

Celebrating independence and looking ahead

The 35th anniversary of Armenia’s independence provided an occasion to reflect on the country’s historical journey while looking towards its future. The Ambassador’s address linked the meaning of independence with Armenia’s aspirations for peace, economic development, technological progress and constructive international engagement.

Through diplomacy, music and gastronomy, the National Day reception presented Armenia as a country proud of its history, attentive to its cultural traditions and determined to shape its future through international partnerships.

The evening concluded in an atmosphere of hospitality and exchange, bringing together representatives of the Dutch and international communities to mark a significant milestone in Armenia’s modern history.

Ms. Ani Hakobyan, Second Secretary of the Embassy, Ms Kristina Stepanyan, First Secretary of the Embassy, Ms. Elina Mkrtchyan, First Secretary of the Embassy, in charge of Consular Affairs and Ambassador Viktor Biyagov.

From the First Hague Peace Conference to Modern Arbitration: The Evolution of the Permanent Court of Arbitration

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From the First Hague Peace Conference to Modern Arbitration: The Evolution of the Permanent Court of Arbitration

By H.E. Dr. Hab. Marcin Czepelak, Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration

The Hague’s identity as an international city of peace and justice began with an idea advanced at the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899: international disputes should be resolved through law and peaceful means rather than force. Convened in The Hague, the Conference led to the adoption of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). As such, the creation of the PCA was not simply an institutional development in international arbitration; it was a foundational moment in the emergence of The Hague as a centre for international peace and justice.

The PCA’s institutional framework was revised and expanded by the 1907 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, adopted at the Second Hague Peace Conference. By then, the history of the PCA was already closely tied to that of the city itself. The Court’s headquarters were established in The Hague soon after its creation, and its presence there from 1900 onwards formed an important part of the foundations upon which The Hague developed into a leading centre of international diplomacy and law.

Hearing in PCA Case No. 1900-01 (Arbitration relative to the vessels “Cape Horn Pigeon,” “James Hamilton Lewis,” “C. H. White,” and “Kate and Anna” (U.S.A./Russia)), with Tobias Asser serving as sole arbitrator.

Between 1907 and 1913, the PCA’s Founding States further reinforced that connection by building a dedicated courthouse for the PCA in the heart of The Hague: the Peace Palace. The Palace provided a tangible expression of the principle that international disputes should be resolved peacefully and in accordance with international law. For more than a century, the PCA’s headquarters, now also the seat of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), have provided a setting in which States and other international actors come together to resolve disputes, uphold the rule of law, and advance international cooperation.

Yet the strength of an international institution is measured not only by the circumstances of its creation, but by its capacity to remain relevant as the international system changes. Over the last 127 years, the PCA has evolved considerably. What began primarily as a mechanism for inter-State arbitration developed into a broader institution capable of administering proceedings involving States, State entities, international organisations and private parties. The Court’s work encompasses a wide range of subjects, including territorial and maritime disputes, investment, trade and environmental disputes, and other areas of international law.

Hearing in PCA Case No. 2012-04 (Arbitration Between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia) at the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s headquarters, the Peace Palace.
Photo credit: Permanent Court of Arbitration.

This process of adaptation continues today. The PCA Arbitration Rules 2012 consolidated earlier procedural frameworks into a unified set of rules applicable across a broad range of disputes. More recently, the PCA Administrative Council adopted additional Optional Protocols in 2024 concerning emergency interim measures, scrutiny of awards and expedited procedure, followed in 2026 by an Optional Protocol concerning preliminary dismissal of claims. These developments are best understood not simply as technical amendments, but as part of the PCA’s institutional evolution to provide contemporary parties with procedures suited to modern disputes.

The expansion of The Hague’s international community has mirrored the PCA’s development. What began with the First Peace Conference of 1899 has grown into a dense ecosystem of international courts, tribunals, organisations, diplomatic missions and institutions all working towards upholding the rule of law. The PCA was the first institution to give The Hague its international legal vocation, and its continued presence has helped maintain the link between the city’s origin as a place of diplomacy and its present role as a centre for international dispute settlement.

For the diplomatic community, perhaps the most enduring significance of the PCA lies in the combination of continuity and adaptability that has defined the institution. Since 1899, it has provided a steadfast framework for the peaceful settlement of international disputes while adapting its practices and procedures to meet the needs of a changing world. From the first international effort to establish permanent mechanisms for dispute settlement to today’s sophisticated and flexible arbitration procedures, the PCA has shown that permanence does not mean immobility.

The PCA continues to provide a forum where States and other international actors can address their differences through dialogue, negotiation, and where necessary, submit their disputes to peaceful resolution, carrying forward the principle at the heart of the Hague Peace Conferences: that international disputes can be resolved through law rather than force.

The Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, H.E. Dr. Hab. Marcin Czepelak, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria, H.E. Dr. Velislava Petrova-Chamova.
Photo credit: Permanent Court of Arbitration / Frank van Beek.

Saudi Arabia Celebrates 96th National Day in The Hague, Highlighting Vision 2030 and Saudi-Dutch Relations

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Saudi Arabia Celebrates 96th National Day in The Hague, Highlighting Vision 2030 and Saudi-Dutch Relations

The Hague, September 2026 — The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia marked its 96th National Day on 23 September, commemorating the unification of the country in 1932 by King Abdulaziz Al Saud and the establishment of the modern Kingdom. Across Saudi Arabia, the anniversary was celebrated with military displays, traditional folk dances, parades, concerts and fireworks, reflecting the country’s history, cultural heritage and ambitions for the future.

This year’s celebrations were held under the theme “Our Pride Lies in Our Nature”, highlighting six core values: authenticity, courage, determination, generosity, hospitality and vision. The theme reflected the Kingdom’s commitment to preserving its cultural identity while pursuing economic diversification, social development and international cooperation.

In The Hague, the anniversary was celebrated at the emblematic Hotel Des Indes, where H.E. Mr. Shahir Khalid A. Al Khaniny, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the Netherlands, hosted a reception attended by a distinguished gathering of Dutch officials, ambassadors, representatives of international organisations, business leaders, academics, and members of the Saudi community.

The event brought together representatives of the diplomatic corps from countries across the world, alongside members of the business and aviation sectors, cultural and media representatives, and senior executives of companies with strong ties to Saudi Arabia. Representatives of the national carrier Saudia in the Netherlands were also among the guests. Saudi students and members of the Saudi community residing in the Netherlands joined in marking the national occasion.

For Ambassador Al Khaniny, who arrived in the Netherlands in January 2026, this was his first National Day reception in The Hague. The gathering offered an opportunity to recognise the strong relations between Saudi Arabia and the Netherlands and the connections cultivated during his first months in the country.

Ambassador H.E. Mr. Shahir Al Khaniny, of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with Saudi diplomats and high business representatives.

A vision for the Kingdom’s future

Following the interpretation of the national anthems, Ambassador Al Khaniny welcomed his guests and expressed his appreciation for their presence and friendship.

“It is with great pleasure that I welcome you all today, in joining to celebrate the National Day of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Your presence is deeply appreciated, and I am truly grateful for your friendship,” he said.

The Ambassador underlined the significance of the anniversary at a time of far-reaching transformation within the Kingdom, guided by the ambitious objectives of Saudi Vision 2030.

Ambassador of Estonia, H.E. Mr. Paul Teesalu, Ambassador of Chile, H.E. Mr. Hernan Bascunan, Ambassador of Venezuela to the International Organizations, H.E. Mr. Hector Constant Rosales, Ambassador of Brazil, H.E. Mr. Fernando Simas Magalhães, Ambassador of Dominican Republic, H.E. Mr. Carlos de la Mota and the Ambassador of Cuba, H.E. Ms. Eva Yelina Silva Walker.

“This year, we celebrate this occasion with immense pride in the transformation taking place across the Kingdom, guided by the ambitious objectives of Saudi Vision 2030—a transformation marked by unprecedented development, economic growth, social progress, innovation, and expanding opportunities across all sectors.”

He added that Saudi Arabia was advancing with confidence towards “a more diversified, prosperous, and sustainable future.”

Launched in 2016, Saudi Vision 2030 provides the framework for the Kingdom’s economic and social transformation, seeking to diversify the economy, develop new sectors, expand investment opportunities and enhance the quality of life. The National Day theme complemented these objectives by placing the values of Saudi society alongside the country’s aspirations for the coming decades.

H.E. Dr Alvaro Gonzalez Otero, Ambassador of Uruguay, H.E. Ms Caroline Chipeta, Ambassador of Tanzania and H.E. Ms. Sahar Ghanem, Ambassador of Yemen and Dean of the Diplomatic Corps.

A century of friendship between Saudi Arabia and the Netherlands

The Ambassador also highlighted the longstanding friendship between Saudi Arabia and the Netherlands, noting the historical foundations of a relationship that has developed into a broad partnership.

He recalled the early diplomatic contacts between the two countries, including the meeting between Prince Faisal and Queen Wilhelmina, which contributed to strengthening relations and expanding commercial ties. A century later, Saudi-Dutch cooperation encompasses a wide range of shared interests and opportunities.

“A century later, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the Netherlands went beyond the ties of the past and advanced to a partnership with a strong present and an even greater future,” Ambassador Al Khaniny stated.

Cooperation between the two countries extends across investment, energy, sustainability, water management, agriculture, logistics, innovation, education and science. These fields offer opportunities to combine Saudi Arabia’s development ambitions with Dutch expertise in areas such as water technology, sustainable agriculture, port operations and logistics, and innovative solutions for the energy transition.

The presence of business representatives and senior executives at the reception reflected the importance of these economic connections. The gathering also provided a setting for further exchanges among Dutch and Saudi stakeholders, reinforcing the role of diplomatic engagement in supporting trade, investment and institutional cooperation.

The Ambassador of the Kingdom of Morocco, H.E. Mr. Mohammed Bashri, the ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, H.E. Mr. Khalid Al-Kadi, the Ambassador of Egypt, H.E. Mr. Emad Hanna Kamel and the Ambassador of Switzerland, H.E. Mrs. Corinne Suzanne Cicéron Bühler.

Dialogue and international cooperation

Addressing the wider international context, Ambassador Al Khaniny emphasised the importance of diplomacy and multilateral cooperation at a time of growing geopolitical tensions and continuing conflicts.

“At a time when the world is witnessing growing tensions and an increasing number of conflicts, it stipulates the need for dialogue, diplomacy, and the peaceful resolution of disputes through bilateral engagement and multilateral efforts,” he said.

With world leaders and representatives of the international community gathering in New York for the High-Level Week of the United Nations General Assembly, he stressed the importance of effective multilateralism and the contribution of international organisations to addressing shared challenges.

The Ambassador noted the role of these institutions in strengthening cooperation, advancing peace and security, and promoting constructive engagement among nations. His remarks carried particular relevance in The Hague, home to numerous international organisations and judicial institutions dedicated to international law and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

He also expressed his sincere appreciation to the Dutch Government and people for their friendship, hospitality and continued cooperation with Saudi Arabia.

“May the bonds of friendship between the two Kingdoms continue to deepen, and may Saudi-Dutch relations continue to flourish for the benefit of our two nations and in support of greater international cooperation and prosperity,” Ambassador Al Khaniny, concluded.

“May the bonds of friendship between the two Kingdoms continue to deepen, and may Saudi-Dutch relations continue to flourish for the benefit of our two nations and in support of greater international cooperation and prosperity,” he concluded.

An evening of friendship and exchange

The official proceedings were followed by a reception, during which guests took the opportunity to exchange views and strengthen professional and personal connections in a friendly atmosphere.

The gathering at Hotel Des Indes brought together the diplomatic, political, academic and business communities, illustrating the breadth of relationships linking Saudi Arabia and the Netherlands. For the Saudi community in the Netherlands, the occasion was also an opportunity to celebrate their country’s history, identity and achievements while sharing the significance of the national anniversary with their Dutch hosts and international friends.

Will Zelenskyy make an exit?

Diplomat Magazine
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Will Zelenskyy make an exit?

By Sazzad Haider

The geopolitical landscape shifted overnight when President Donald Trump pivoted on his energy policy, lifting a strategic cluster of sanctions on Russian fossil fuels.

Ultimately, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, has removed certain sanctions that were previously imposed on Russian fossil fuel exports. In recent days, he has concluded an agreement with the Russian Federation to facilitate the importation of diesel fuel.

The move culminated in a formal agreement to resume the import of Russian diesel, a decision that effectively prioritized American fuel stability over the diplomatic front. For President Zelenskyy, the agreement was more than a policy shift; it was a calculated betrayal.

“The fuel is there, we just need the handshake,” Trump had remarked during a closed-door briefing.

For Donald Trump, the geopolitical calculus of Eastern Europe is a matter of balance sheets and resource acquisition. He has increasingly signaled that Volodymyr Zelenskyy is a liability—a leader whose tenure has become an obstacle to a more lucrative strategic alignment with Vladimir Putin. In Trump’s estimation, the strategic weight of the Russian Federation far outweighs that of the current Ukrainian administration. The motivation is fundamentally economic: access to Russian diesel and the opening of sprawling bilateral trade sectors that have remained frozen since the conflict began. To Trump, a ceasefire isn’t just a diplomatic victory; it is the prerequisite for a massive industrial pivot.

The world has learned not to mistake Trump’s “impossible” proposals for mere rhetoric. Years ago, his public obsession with purchasing Greenland was laughed off as a surreal eccentricity. Yet, through a series of quiet, aggressive security arrangements, he managed to embed a U.S. military presence on the island, turning a punchline into a strategic foothold.

He is now applying that same disruptive logic to Kyiv. By championing immediate Ukrainian elections, Trump is framing Zelenskyy’s inability to secure a peace treaty as a disqualifying failure. He has grown particularly caustic regarding Zelenskyy’s authorization of strikes on Russian energy infrastructure—moves Trump views as sabotage of future trade assets. Zelenskyy, sensing the shifting wind in Washington, has offered a counter-proposal: elections can happen, but only if Russia agrees to a sixty-day cessation of hostilities first.

The shift in the American wind had become a gale. With Elon Musk openly calling for Zelenskyy’s exit, the Ukrainian president found himself operating in a strategic vacuum where former allies now functioned as critics. To stabilize the collapse of confidence, Zelenskyy pivoted toward Europe, treating the continent as a lifeline rather than a supplement. During a targeted diplomatic circuit in the United Kingdom, he met with King Charles and Prime Minister Andy Burnham, pushing for the specific, high-end unmanned aerial systems and missile technology required to keep a defensive line from buckling. It was a desperate, calculated gambit to prove that while Trump’s confidence had evaporated, the European machinery of war remained operational.

Five years of grinding attrition have left Ukraine a map of scars, with a fifth of its land currently functioning as a Russian colony. Zelenskyy remains the face of the resistance, though his hand is guided by the logistics of Washington and Brussels; without their shipments of shells and sensors, the front lines would collapse into the mud.

The machinery of democracy has stalled, rendered obsolete by the physical impossibility of polling stations in a war zone. Because no one has voted in years, Zelenskyy’s mandate has shifted from a democratic one to a survivalist one, leaving his actual popularity an open question. Yet, there is a lingering anxiety that the only thing more dangerous than an election not held is an election that is. Should the polls actually open, the process would not be a domestic affair, but a geopolitical theater—one where American influence could pivot the presidency, just as Trump has suggested.

The G20 summit is scheduled to convene in Miami during December, with Russian President Vladimir Putin expected to attend. His participation, considering the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, would generate substantial discomfort among European allies. As a result, Trump is endeavoring to establish an accord with Putin regarding Ukraine before the conference takes place. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy has designated the complete withdrawal of Russian military personnel—including the relinquishment of Russian authority over Crimea—as his essential condition for conflict resolution; such an outcome would represent a significant setback for Putin. Trump, however, aims to achieve a settlement through territorial concessions granted to Russia—an arrangement that the steadfast Zelenskyy would find unacceptable.

Should Zelenskyy be removed and replaced by a pro-American, Trump-aligned leader—whether through democratic processes or other means—the pathway would open for negotiating a peace settlement with Russia contingent upon territorial concessions. The United States has invested considerable financial resources in supporting Ukraine’s defense, yet Trump demonstrates reluctance to increase this expenditure further. Moreover, Trump has already secured preliminary agreements regarding Ukraine’s mineral wealth for 2025, effectively positioning American interests over the nation’s rare earth elements, lithium, and titanium reserves. Given that active military operations currently impede the full-scale extraction and utilization of these resources, achieving peace has become a higher priority for Trump than for Ukraine war itself.

 President Trump has accumulated substantial financial returns through his significant capital investments directed toward the Ukrainian conflict, thereby establishing effective control over Ukraine’s considerable mineral resource base. Furthermore, as a consequence of military operations spanning both the Middle East and Ukraine, the United States has attained dominance within the global energy sector; the nation presently exports substantially more petroleum than it requires for domestic consumption.

In response to the Ukrainian conflict, the European Union has implemented comprehensive sanctions against Russia. These measures have constrained the Union’s capacity to obtain Russian petroleum and natural gas, compelling it to source these essential commodities from the United States at substantially higher costs. Within this geopolitical context, President Trump independently negotiated a procurement agreement for diesel fuel from Russia while circumventing the established sanctions regime; however, he preserved the sanctions framework for all other parties, effectively preventing them from importing Russian petroleum derivatives. This arrangement mandates that Russian diesel acquisitions occur exclusively through United States intermediaries. The United States currently exercises regulatory control over a significant portion of petroleum supplies derived from the Middle East, Venezuela, and Russia.

The Middle East has ceased to function as the predominant energy-supplying region, as American energy enterprises now exercise exclusive dominance over the international petroleum market.

Fundamentally, the petroleum trade constitutes the central factor underlying both the Ukrainian conflict and tensions in the Middle East—a circumstance for which civilian populations bear the consequences.

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About the author: Sazzad Haider is writer & journalist, lives in Dhaka, Bangladesh. He is Editor in Chief of Diplomatic Journal.

E-mail: diplomaticjournal9@gmail.com

Navigating the Digital Shift: Guy Kortes on AI, Media and Young Voters

Diplomat Magazine
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Navigating the Digital Shift: Guy Kortes on AI, Media and Young Voters

How social media and artificial intelligence are reshaping political engagement among young voters

For many young people, political news no longer begins with a newspaper or television broadcast. It starts with a social media post, short video or algorithmic recommendation. This shift is changing how young people access information, engage with politics and understand democracy.

Young participants of Bright Future’s “Participate and Promote Democracy” EU funded youth participation project spoke with Guy Kortes, current national chairman of the Jonge Democraten, the youth organization, affiliated with D66, about the opportunities and risks of this digital transformation.

Kortes sees social media, as an important tool for making political information more accessible. It allows young people to encounter news, participate in discussions and express their views. Yet accessibility can come at a cost. Short-form content may simplify complex political issues and leave little room for context or nuance.

The changing media environment also raises questions about the future of independent journalism. Kortes supports stronger protection against copyright infringement, so journalists can be fairly compensated, when their work is used by AI systems. He also sees subscription-based models as one way for media organisations to remain financially sustainable.

Misinformation presents another challenge. Kortes argues for clear legal boundaries, while keeping platforms responsible for content moderation. At the same time, freedom of expression should remain protected, unless content becomes dangerous or hateful.

He rejects broad social media bans for young people, favouring age-specific restrictions, that protect vulnerable users without excluding young people from digital participation. Transparency is equally important. Media organisations should disclose sponsorships, financial interests and potential foreign influence, while safeguards must prevent such rules from being misused to silence critical voices.

Kortes also stresses the importance of protecting journalists from threats and political intimidation. Governments have a responsibility to provide practical protection, while politicians should avoid encouraging hostility towards journalists, simply because they disagree with their reporting.

Artificial intelligence makes these challenges more urgent. AI can generate convincing content, reproduce bias and make manipulated information harder to identify. Kortes therefore supports greater transparency, stronger regulation and greater responsibility from platforms.

Ultimately, he sees media literacy and critical thinking, as essential democratic skills. Schools should help young people evaluate sources, recognise manipulation and deepfakes and use AI responsibly.

In an information environment, where anyone can publish or generate content, knowing how to question information may be as important as having access to it.

This article is produced by Peace Ojoma Idoko, Mariia Lesnikova, Charahja van Broekhoven, Felisita Fideline Sinartio,Rina Takahashi, Otabek Abdullaev, Adam Harutyunyan, participants in the Bright Future Foundation, as part of the European Union’s “Participate & Promote Democracy” Youth Participation project, in cooperation with Diplomat Magazine, Embassy of the Netherlands in Armenia and young members of the Armenian partner organization Promising Youth.

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