By Burak Haylamaz.
“Does presidential system enshrine in your heart?” This question was asked by foremost journalist Mehmet Ali Birand to the former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who currently holds the seat of head of state, on 05.06.2011 in the TV programme 32.Gun (32th day). Mr. Erdogan confirmed his wishes towards a presidential system but preceded his sentence by stating that he had no intent to insist, that he merely wanted to discuss it and refer to the will of people.
[1] From that day on, Turkey has politically discussed the advantages and disadvantages of a presidential system in Turkey. Moreover, a transition from the parliamentary system to a presidential system had already been taken into practice under the ruling of Justice and Development Party (hereinafter JDP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan through the constitutional amendments of 2007 which provided that the head of state would be elected by popular votes.[2] Therefore, Turkey could be considered as a semi-presidential system since 2007 where the head of state is directly elected and have a mandate of his own, thus being not accountable to parliament meanwhile the head of government is elected by parliament and accountable to it with regards to confidence rule.[3] However, the system has still been outweighed parliamentary system as the Constitution of Turkey vested the head of state with merely ceremonial powers. Therefore, although executive power is shared between the President and the government, many executive functions are predominantly exercised by the government, such as introducing a bill[4] and bearing responsibility for the implementation of the general policy[5]. Furthermore, almost all presidential decrees need a countersignature of the Prime Minister and the ministers concerned, thus they are held responsible for these decrees instead of the President himself.
[6] The first popular elections for head of state were held in 2014 and Mr. Erdogan became the first directly elected president of the Republic of Turkey. Nevertheless, the reality of possessing merely ceremonial powers has not been welcomed by Mr. Erdogan as it did not suit his own book. Consequently, he has acted as a president of a presidential system, hiding behind the fact that he was directly elected by popular will and that he therefore had a responsibility towards the nation.
Besides, he claimed that the executive system had practically changed whether this reality was admitted or not. According to his statements, the only thing that had to be done was to put pen to paper and to promote this reality within the legal framework.[7] For this purpose, Mr. Erdogan has consistently encouraged his former party JDP, holding a single-party government, to initiate the process for necessary constitutional amendments related to the establishment of the presidential system. Recently, it appears that the preliminary will and subsequently, de facto actions of Mr. Erdogan are very likely to be materialized since JDP, with the support of one opposition party NMP (Nationalist Movement Party), submitted proposals for constitutional amendment, which are predominantly concerned with the regulation of executive branch, to the National Assembly on 10/12/2016[8]. Furthermore, on January 21,2017, the Turkish Parliament approved the constitutional amendments.[9] However, since the law on the amendments to the Constitution was adopted by less than two-thirds majority of the parliament, it will be submitted to popular referendum.[10] In case affirmative answers will superior in referendum, these proposed amendments will enter into force.
This paper aims to touch on the contents of the constitutional amendments and whether these amendments comply with the features of a presidential system. In that point, the proposed amendments will be compared with a world-renowned presidential system, namely United States. Thereafter, a legal-based prediction and the concerns of the author pursuant to the course of events in Turkey will be touched upon prior to the conclusion.
1.Constitutional Amendments
Constitutional amendments package consists of 18 articles, which mostly aim to switch Turkey to a presidential system. This section is dedicated to examine noticeable articles.
Article 4 of the proposed constitutional amendments regulates the parliamentary terms and election of both the president and the parliament.[11] According to this article, the term of parliament is increased from 4 to 5 years and both parliamentary and presidential elections will be held on the same day, every five years. The latter, also known as concurrent elections[12] may jeopardise the principle of separation of powers that is one of the essential feature in a presidential system. Since both elections manifest the will of constituents in a certain time, it is very likely that both the President and the majority party in parliament will be composed of the same political colour throughout the term.
At first glance, it can be seen as an advantage considering it provides stability due to the conciliation between separated branches. Nevertheless, it may cause two severe problems. First, since the elections of two separated branches are held on the same day, the coattail effect will probably occur. The coattail effect is the correlation between presidential vote and legislative vote where the popular political party leader can attract votes for the same party’s candidates in the legislative race.[13] For instance, the presidential candidate of the party will get the attention of media and have significant finance for the campaign[14], creating an opportunity for legislative candidates of the same party to easily get a seat in parliament by making use of the popularity of the candidate running for head of executive.[15] Therefore, the competition for parliamentary seats will not be actualized on the basis of equal grounds. Secondly, this election method prevents constituents from reflecting their wills throughout the five years term.
It is possible for voters to become uncomfortable from the actions of the powerholders and change their political preferences. However, they have to wait until the next elections to reflect their new preferences. In the United States, for instance, the constituents’ preferences are better reflected because both chambers of parliament’s seats are re-elected at least once during the term of the presidency. The lower chamber, House of Representatives, is elected for a two years term[16], and one-third of the upper chamber, the Senate, is re-elected every two years.[17] Therefore, the constituents have a chance to show their political choices more frequently. In case they do not approve the political policies of the President, they may cast a vote for a different political colour than the President’s in parliamentary elections and indicate to the President that the voters do not approve his actions. However, the proposed constitutional amendments in Turkey completely disregard this reality. It hinders to reflect wills of people for five years and eventually oblige them to put up with the possible dissatisfactory actions of powerholders.
Article 6 of the proposed constitutional amendments is related to abolishment of parliamentary scrutiny over the executive branch. Hereunder, parliament will not have the competence to oversight ministers and hold the government accountable anymore. Besides, the obligation of ministers to answer oral questions in parliament is abolished.[18] These can be seen as some main features of the presidential system with the aim to provide a strict separation of powers between different branches, particularly between the executive and the legislature.[19] Both branches are no longer accountable to each other just like in the United States. However, in the United States even if the executive is not accountable to parliament, Congress can exercise parliamentary oversight by scrutinizing policies and public hearings.[20] Furthermore, the Congress not only exercises the power of confirmation hearings, e.g. power of President to make treaties can only be exercised by and with the advice of the Senate[21], but also has the power of the purse that is an important tool to have control over the executive branch.[22] Therefore, the parliament can curb the power of the President constitutionally which is a feature not foreseen in the proposed constitutional amendments in Turkey.
First of all, although it might seem crucial to abolish the accountability of executive to provide for a presidential system, closing the door on checks and balances is not acceptable in any system since it may lead to despotism.[23] However, respective articles in proposed amendments jeopardise the checks and balances acutely by abolishing the oral questions. Because oral questions ensure that each government official is conscious of the possibility of facing the oversight of the parliament in case he has exceeded the power conferred to him by the constitution. Secondly, even further threatened, Article 15 of the proposed amendments states that the President will also be competent to draw up the annual budget and will submit it to the parliament for approval.[24]If the annual budget statute does not enter into force on the determined time period, hence the parliament does not approve it, the budget of the previous year will remain by being augmented. Although the parliament will possess, as the last instance, the power to determine whether the annual budget enters into force or not, the main check and balance tool of parliament, namely the power of the purse, will be undermined. Thus, the head of the executive, besides his executive functions, will hold the spending power. Even if he will have to submit it to the approval of the parliament, it can be considered like the general conditions to be accepted to download the software for your iPhone. While the President drafts the annual budget, he puts the parliament in a position of “take-it-or-leave it.” Therefore, these articles might lead to the despotism of the executive since an excessive power is provided, without checks and balances with the legislative.
Article 7 and 8 of the proposed constitutional amendments regulate the election system, terms and tasks of the President, being some of the most controversial areas in the amendments. According to Article 7, the President is directly and popularly elected for a term of five years. The term is also renewable only once meaning that one candidate can only be President for a maximum of ten years. However, this period can be exceeded in cases the parliament decides to the renewal of elections by three-fifths of majority during the second term of the presidency. In that situation, both parliamentary and presidential elections will be held on the same day as mentioned above[25] and the incumbent President will be able to re-become a candidate for the new elections.[26] Therefore, the President may remain in office for a tenure of 15 years (3 terms). This kind of power holding for a long time is the prognostication of the words of Lord Acton[27] and can trigger a single-party dictatorship by a professionalized party, especially when the parliament and the President have the same political colour during this long-time period.[28]
Furthermore, the preamble of Article 7 also indicates one of the desired outcomes of the proposed article, making it possible for the President to be a member of the political party of his own instead of the principle of neutrality of the presidential seat which was adopted in the current constitution.[29] Even though the drafters of the proposed amendments have the intention to switch Turkey to a presidential system by strictly preserving the separation of powers, this article lays down the groundwork for a fusion of powers. It can be considered that it also endures in the United States where, for instance, the new President Donald Trump is a republican candidate. However, this argument is rebuttable. Since the United States has a federal system, it hinders the smooth-working party system because this system focuses on the localism[30] and contributes to partisan fragmentation and lack of cohesiveness.[31] Therefore, several types of Republicans can be seen domestically and some of them can possibly have more in common with the opponent political party.
For instance, conservative Republicans can find more common grounds with conservative Democrats than with liberal Republicans and liberal Democrats. Thus, even if the President represents a sole political colour, it is not guaranteed that he/she will be constantly supported by the political party of this political colour. Consequently, it is not possible to define the President as a leader of the party that he stands for. However, things are different in Turkey. The constitutional amendments preserve the unitary origin of Turkey. Thus, both the political party in parliament and the President whose bounds with that political party are protected, are met on the same line. Furthermore, as mentioned before it will be quite possible for the President and the majority party in parliament to have the same political colour since both presidential and parliamentary elections will be held on the same day.[32] It is not an unpredictable scenario that the President, exercising executive functions, will remain faithful to his political party that controls the majority of the seats in parliament, thus controlling the legislative branch. In that situation, it is evident that it will cause to undermine the idea of trias politica ascribed by the political philosopher Montesquieu.
Additionally, Article 8 regulates the field of the power of the President who will both control the seat of head of state and of head of government. Therefore, the Prime Minister position will be abolished and the President will occupy the latter’s position. According to this article, the President will have the power to issue a presidential decree on matters related to executive powers, except the matters related to basic rights, personal rights and duties, and political rights and duties. In that point, the article gives an important authority to the head of state, pursuant to the feature of the presidential system, by empowering him with the power to issue executive orders. However, the article includes some tasks of the President that may severely jeopardize the mechanism of checks and balances. The President will have the power to appoint the ministers without the advice or consent of the parliament. This regulation is diametrically opposed to the presidential system of United States where the Senate approves the appointment of the President.[33] Furthermore, the power to control the military, which is restricted to the authorization of the parliament in the current constitution[34], will be granted to the President. Even though the power to declare war is still under the tasks of the parliament, vesting the President with the powers to use military power without any checks and balances has to be questioned.
In the United States, even if the President has the power to use military, War Powers Resolution Act provides a parliamentary check on the presidential power.[35] Furthermore, the power of the purse of the Congress curbs the President from discretionary actions. However, the proposed constitutional amendments in Turkey do not include any checks and balances mechanism over the power of the President. The parliament has neither a say over the task of the President while using the military, nor holds the excessive power of the purse as mentioned above.[36] Therefore, it might lead to the seat of the head of executive to use an excessive amount of discretionary power.
Article 11 of the proposed constitutional amendments regulates the renewal of the elections. According to the article, the President decides for the renewal of the elections, namely both parliamentary and presidential elections. In that case, both parliamentary and presidential elections are held on the same day. Therefore, the President can dissolve the parliament himself with the presidential decree with the condition to also renew the presidential elections. On the other hand, the parliament has a power to decide on the renewal of the elections by a three-fifths majority. Again, in that case, parliamentary and presidential elections are held jointly. This article is antipodal to the main philosophy of the presidential system that adopts a strict separation of powers. It is a sine qua non feature of the presidential system that neither the President nor the legislature can dismiss each other[37] because neither of them is constitutionally subordinated by the other.[38] Instead of a switch to the presidential system, this article clearly aims a fusion of executive and legislative powers, particularly in favour of the executive-holder. Indeed, if we compare the domain of the dismissal power of each branch, it is clear that the President may decide to discharge the parliament and call for early elections in an easier way than the parliament since it is not that facile for the parliament to provide a three-fifths super majority to call for new elections. In addition to that, in case the parliament is formed by the opposition-majority against the President[39], the President can dissolve the parliament as he pleases and may take the office with the support of a friendly majority after the new elections.
This scenario is politically difficult to be actualized. Thus, it is apparent that this article provides the presidential seat to pool and concentrate more power by undermining the separation of powers and moving away from a presidential system.
Article 14 of the proposed constitutional amendments has also eroded the separation of powers by providing considerable influence of executive over the judiciary branch. The article mentions that the head of the executive appoints half (6) of the member of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors, an institution charged with the dismissal and appointment of the civil and administrative judiciary judges and prosecutors.[40] Since, again, the appointments from the President does not require the consent or advice of any institution, it is possible for one of the uppermost institution of judiciary branch to be formed as an executive-shaped branch. Correspondingly, it is possible for judges to be appointed politically in accordance with the view of the executive. Moreover, it threatens the judicial independence since courts cannot decide freely because of the fear of undue influence from the executive branch.
2. Pres(s)idential System
This section of the article aims to point out whether the proposed constitutional amendments comply with the presidential system or not. In order to reach an accurate conclusion, it is beneficial to emphasise on the essential features of the presidential system. Apart from the other government systems, in the presidential system, the head of executive is directly elected by mandate of his own, therefore neither accountable to the parliament nor owes commencement or continuation of his seat to the tolerance of the parliament.[41] In response, the parliament can correspondingly not be dissolved by the executive.[42] Therefore, the executive and the legislative powers are exercised independently from each other, adopting a strict separation of powers.[43] The main purpose of the separation of powers is to curb powerholders of any branch to obtain highly concentrated power.[44] In order to ensure that, separation of powers is supplemented with a system of checks and balances where each branch has the power to watch over the other branches to check on them for the purpose of preventing an abuse of power. For instance, in the United States both branches are regulated respectively in the first three articles of US Constitution. The check and balances are also provided by the Constitution; judges check the legislative branch whether it remains within the limits of power that conferred to it[45], the legislature has the power of the purse[46] and the power of approval on the appointments of the executive[47]-including the President’s nominations for federal judges- and finally the President is involved in the law-making process by his suspensive veto power[48].
The proposed constitutional amendments in Turkey do not provide such a presidential system since both legislature and executive may boot out each other on the condition to subsequently discharge themselves.[49] Therefore, it is possible to deduce that the proposed system is an interpretation of parliamentary system where the head of the executive can dissolve the parliament while the parliament can oust the head of the executive. We used the notion of interpretation because the proposed system has also some deviations from the parliamentary system. First of all, in a parliamentary system, there is a Prime Minister near to the head of state under the roof of the executive branch. However, the position of the Prime Minister is abolished in the proposed constitutional amendments.[50] Therefore, prominent constitutional law scholar Kemal Gozler qualifies this system as “non-Prime Ministerial Parliamentary System.”[51] Secondly, in the proposed system, it is difficult for the legislative to oust the executive, as it requires a three-fifths majority. If we compare it with the other parliamentary systems, this distinction will be apparent. For instance, in Germany, the Chancellor who has a significant influence on the implementation of the executive power, can be ousted by constructive vote, namely with an absolute majority of the parliament.[52] Therefore, the proposed system apparently strengthens the hand of the executive by making it difficult to oust the seat of presidency.
The actual intention of these articles should be questioned if the proposed constitutional amendments do not stipulate a switch to a presidential system. What is then the purpose behind all these constitutional amendments?
This question can be answered by examining what these articles bring on the field of separation of powers and checks and balances. In the upcoming explanation, the conclusion that the proposed constitutional amendments secure a fusion of power in favour of the executive branch will be reached. Since both parliamentary and presidential elections will be held on the same day, it is desired by the drafters to provide that the same political line will hold both powers. This argument can also be supported by the article 8 of the amendments that the President can furthermore be a member of the political party he stood for. And, in case the parliament is formed by the opposition-majority, the President has a strong political tool, compared with what the parliament holds, since he can easily dissolve the parliament with a presidential decree and may take the seat with the support of a friendly majority in parliament. On the other hand, the proposed amendments serve the fusion of powers by undermining the system of checks and balances as well. First of all, appointments of the President and using military are not checked by any institution. Since these powers are totally under the discretionary power of the President, it leads the accumulation of too much power in the hands of the executive. Secondly, the executive conserves too much influence on the formation of the judicial branch.
The President has the competence to appoint six members of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) again without any approval or advice of any institution. Therefore, in case the constitutional amendments will enter into force, not only the legislative but also the judicial branch will be shaped under the influence of the executive.
Furthermore, it should be noted that there is no restriction over the power of central authority in Turkey. In federal systems, most executive power is under the competence of the federal entities.[53] Thus, the federal government can be balanced in this way. However, the unitary formation of the Turkey is preserved in those constitutional amendments. Therefore, all powers are used from the central authority without any restrictions by any entity which may also encourage the executive to use highly concentrated power.
Clearly, the fusion of powers in the hands of the executive without any restriction is the desired goal of the proposed constitutional amendments. Furthermore, it is crystal-clear that this desire may undermine the liberty and the democracy. In his best-known work The Spirits of the Laws Montesquieu illustrates this point by stating;
“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and the liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression. There would be end of everything, were the same man or same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, (…)”[54]
Therefore, the drafters of the constitutional amendments in Turkey may have made a huge mistake by assisting the possibility of a fusion of power in the hands of the executive since it will pave the way for tyranny and threatening liberties and freedoms. Thus, I would like to call the desired system as a pres(s)idential system as a system which has not the characteristics of a presidential system, undermines the systems of both separation of powers and checks and balances, and correspondingly sets a severe pressure on liberty.
3. Quo Vadis, Turkey? [55]
There is a noticeable link between the current president Mr Erdogan and the majority party in parliament, namely Justice and Development Party that forms the government either since Mr Erdogan is the founder chairperson of the JDP[56] and has acted in the same line with that party on the way of ‘new Turkey’.[57] Therefore, it can be considered that both legislative and executive functions are under the influence of the same body, JDP. According to Montesquieu, there can be no liberty in that situation. It is also supported by the report of the Freedom of House where the trend arrow showing the freedom status in Turkey has been scrolled down gradually.[58] The Human Rights Watch’s 2015 World Report also stated that both JDP and Mr Erdogan has undermined human rights and rule of law in Turkey by demonstrating intolerance to the freedom of media, through the harassment of the opposition and by bringing the police, prosecutors and judges under greater executive control.[59] Furthermore, if we look at the actions of the executive-shaped authority only within a year; there are more than 100,000 people -including judges, teachers, police officers, military officers- are suspended[60], 146 journalists[61] and 9 opposition party members are arrested, 130 media business is closed, more than 32,000 people is remanded in custody[62] in the course of witch-hunted process. These anti-democratic actions have been taken under the practically changed executive system -without having the legal framework- as Mr Erdogan claims.[63] The question is what will happen if this executive system is supported by a legal framework as the proposed constitutional amendments aim to reach? Where does Turkey go from here? I would like to answer it by using an argument from the best-known work of the classical Greek philosopher Plato, ‘The Republic’.
Plato mentions five types of regimes in Book VIII of The Republic, namely aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny. Each regime is represented by a man and possesses significant virtues such as freedom, as an outstanding feature of democracy (democratic man). Freedom initially makes democracy the best form of government where it is even possible for philosophers to live under the roof of it.[64] However, this freedom must be established based on necessities. Otherwise, it would have inevitable consequences where the democratic man will become a slave of his unnecessary desires. In that situation, the son of the democratic man will become a tyrant due to degeneration. The ruling of the tyrannical man is the worst form of government, where a tyrant would deny any restriction by law and act discretionarily in order to satisfy his insatiable appetite.[65] Hence, it is possible to say that democracy opens the gates for tyranny, a potential dictatorship, if the freedom corrupts. In that point, it is important to distinguish what is an unnecessary desire that corrupts the virtue of freedom. Plato makes the distinction between necessary and unnecessary desires by revealing that;
“(…) Will not the desire of eating, that is, of simple food and condiments, in so far as they are required for health and strength, be of the necessary class?
That is what I should suppose.
The pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways; it does us good and it is essential to the continuance of life?
Yes.
But the condiments are only necessary in so far as they are good for health.
Certainly. (…) ”[66]
As it can be seen supra paragraphs, the proposed constitutional amendments are not good condiments for the “health” of Turkey because they may contribute to the strengthening of the executive in an excessive way while destroying the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances. Thus, the proposed articles pave the way for a powerholder to actualize the unnecessary desires of him, eventually causing the corruption of freedom and prompt to a tyranny or dictatorship.
In that point, the legal-based predictions and concerns may be perceived as too unrealistic. However, it should be known that history repeats itself. A prominent example in history, Alexander Lukashenko took the seat of presidency in 1994 in Belarus and obtained an overwhelming victory (70.5%) in a referendum for constitutional amendments in 1996.[67] The constitutional amendments aimed to secure the presidency at the expense of the legislative and judiciary, meaning that undermining the system of separation of powers.[68] Lukashenko’s administration still governs Belarus. However, Lukashenko has transformed his presidency into a de facto dictatorship. Therefore, the country is known as “the last dictatorship in Europe”[69] and sanctioned by the European Union because of the lack of protection for human rights, democracy and rule of law.[70] Hence, it is not an unrealistic prediction that the executive leader of Turkey will take the same steps as Lukashenko did, on the way for dictatorship.
4.Conclusion
If the proposed constitutional amendments enter into force, Turkey will not only have an ambiguous governmental system but will also welcome significant violations to the doctrine of separation of powers in favor of the executive branch at the expense of an independent legislature and judiciary. These changes will inherently bring several consequences. First, liberty can be damaged by the actions of a strengthened executive power. The one holding the power is not essential in this issue. As Lord Acton said, “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”[71]Therefore, no matter who is the holder of the power, the power solely tends to corrupt. Moreover, in case the power is not restricted but absolute, it will in turn corrupt absolutely. Secondly, the democratic formation of Turkey will be threatened due to these changes. The state may naturally preserve democracy under the constitution. Nevertheless, democracy is not a de jure but a de facto phenomenon. It should be known that both constitutions of Belarus and Syria guarantee the democratic formation of their countries. However, both countries are ruled under a dictatorship. Even today, Turkey has started to be associated with dictatorship, thus any legal endorsement will provide the way to legitimize and uphold it. Consequently, it is essential for Turkey to retreat on the way to dictatorship.
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[1] Ibrahim Sari, Baskanlik Sistemi: Bol-Parcala-Tut (1st edition, Net Medya Yayincilik, Antalya 2016) pp33
[2] Constitution of The Republic of Turkey 1982, Article 101
[3] Aalt Willem Heringa, Constitutions Compared an Introduction to Comparative Constitutional Law (4th edition, Intersentia, 2016) pp201
[4] Constitution of The Republic of Turkey 1982, Article 88
[5] Constitution of The Republic of Turkey 1982, Article 112
[6] Constitution of The Republic of Turkey 1982, Article 105
[7] Erdinc Celikkan, ‘Erdogan urges change in charter due to the de facto change in president’s new role’ (2015) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-urges-change-in-charter-due-to-de-facto-change-in-presidents-new-role.aspx?pageID=238&nID=86992&NewsCatID=338> accessed 08 January 2017
[8] The proposal and preamble of the constitutional amendments [10/12/2016] TBMMB No: 97045
[9] Law on changing the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [21/07/2017] TBMMB No: 6771
[10] Constitution of The Republic of Turkey 1982, Article 175
[11] Law on changing the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [21/07/2017] TBMMB No: 6771, Article 4
[12]David J.Samuels and Matthew S. Shugart, Presidents, Parties and Prime Ministers; How to Seperation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behaviour ( 1st edition, Cambridge University Press, 2010) pp129
[13] Paul Allen Beck, Party Politics in America, (8th edition, New York, Longman, 1997), pp. 251.
[14] David Samuels, ‘Concurrent Elections, Discordant Results: Presidentialism, Federalism, and Governance in Brazil’ in David Samuels (eds), Comparative Politics ( Vol. 33, No.1, City University of New York, 2000) pp.3
[15] Kenneth L. Hill, An Essential Guide To American Politics And The American Political System (Bloomington, Author House, 2012), pp.81
[16] The Constitution of the United States 1787 (USA) Article 1/2
[17] Ibid. 3, pp.117
[18] Law on changing the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [21/07/2017] TBMMB No: 6771, Article 6
[19] Raymond A. Smith, The American Anomaly: US Politics and Government in Comparative Perspective (3rd edition, United Kingdom, Routledge, 2014) pp.40
[20] Ibid.3, pp.187
[21] The Constitution of the United States 1787 (USA) Article 2/2
[22] The Constitution of the United States 1787 (USA) Article 1/8 and Article. 1/9
[23] James L. Sundquist, Constitutional Reform and Effective Government (Revised edition, Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1992), pp.278
[24] Law on changing the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [21/07/2017] TBMMB No: 6771, Article 15
[25] Law on changing the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [21/07/2017] TBMMB No: 6771, Article 4
[26] Law on changing the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [21/07/2017] TBMMB No: 6771, Article 11
[27] “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely”
[28] Natasha Ezrow and Erica Frantz, Dictators and Dictatorships; Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and Their Leaders ( New York, Continuum, 2011) pp.34
[29] Constitution of The Republic of Turkey 1982, Article 101
[30] E. Allen Helms, ‘The President and Party Politics’ [1949] TJP pp.42-43
[31] David Samuels, ‘Concurrent Elections, Discordant Results: Presidentialism, Federalism, and Governance in Brazil’ in David Samuels (eds), Comparative Politics ( Vol. 33, No.1, City University of New York, 2000) pp.2
[32] ibid. 11
[33] The Constitution of the United States 1787 (USA) Article 2/2
[34] Constitution of The Republic of Turkey 1982, Article 92
[35] Eric Talbot Jensen, ‘Future War and the War Powers Resolution’ (2013) 29(3) EILR <http://law.emory.edu/eilr/content/volume-29/issue-3/article/war-powers-resolution.html > accessed 08 January 2017
[36] Ibid. 24
[37] Herman Schwarts, ‘Buildings Blocks for a Constitution’, in: Constitutionalism and Emerging Democracies (EJUSDS 2004) pp.14
[38] Ibid.3, pp182
[39] Since Article 4 of the proposed constitutional amendments provides that both parliamentary and presidential elections is held on same day, political contradiction between the presidency and majority of parliament may probably not occur since constituents vote for a political party they preferred in a certain time for two separated powers jointly. Therefore, voters are apt to choose party and correspondingly candidate of presidency of the same party at the time of election.
[40] High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, http://www.hcjp.gov.tr/About.aspx
[41] Ibid.3, pp.26
[42] Ibid.3, pp.182
[43] Kemal Gozler, ‘Elveda Kuvvetler Ayriligi, Elveda Anayasa: 10 Aralik 2016 Tarihli Anayasa Degisikligi Teklifi Hakkinda Bir Elestiri’ (2016) <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/elveda-anayasa-v2.htm> accessed 08 January 2017
[44] Julia Hargrove, Judicial Branch of Government (Teaching and Learning Company, 2000) pp.8
[45] The Constitution of the United States 1787 (USA) Article 3
[46] The Constitution of the United States 1787 (USA) Article 1/8
[47] The Constitution of the United States 1787 (USA) Article 2/2
[48] The Constitution of the United States 1787 (USA) Article 1/7
[49] Law on changing the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [21/07/2017] TBMMB No: 6771, Article 11
[50] Law on changing the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [21/07/2017] TBMMB No: 6771, Article 8
[51] Ibid.41
[52] Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 1949 (FRG) Article 67
[53] Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (translated by Anders Wedberg, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1945) pp.321
[54] Baron De Montesquieu, The Sprits of the Laws (translated by Thomas Nugent, Complete Edition, New York, Cosimo Classics, 1914, translated by Thomas Nugent in 2011) pp.151
[55]Latin phrase that meaning “Where are you going?” This question was asked by Miriam Goldschmitt in The Diplomat magazine by UNSA, thus I would like to answer the question by following legal steps.
[56] Founding Members of Justice and Development Party http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/yonetim/kurucu-uyeler
[57] Nebi Mis and Ali Aslan, Erdogan Siyaseti ve Kurucu Cumhurbaskanligi Misyonu (Seta, 2014) pp.25
[58] Freedom in the World (2016), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/turkey accessed 08 January 2017
[59] World Report 2015: Turkey, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/turkey accessed 08 January 2017
[60]Tim Arango, Ceylan Yeginsu and Safak Timur,” Turks see purge as Witch Haunt of ‘Medieval’ Darkness” (2016) TNYT http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/world/europe/turkey-erdogan-gulen-purge.html?_r=0 accessed 08 January 2017
[61] Name of the arrested journalists, http://tutuklugazeteciler.blogspot.nl/ accessed 08 January 2017
[62] News Agencies, Turkey: 32,000 jailed for links to group ‘behind’ coup http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/turkey-32000-jailed-links-group-coup-160928090832760.html accessed 08 January 2017
[63] Ibid.7
[64] Geoffrey Allan Plauche, The Cycle of Decline of Regimes in Plato’s Republic, http://gaplauche.com/blog/2011/04/13/the-cycle-of-decline-of-regimes-in-platos-republic/?utm_source=wordtwit&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=wordtwit accessed 08 January 2017
[65] Plato, The Republic (Book VIII), (translated and introduction by R.E. Allen, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2006,)
[66] Ibid.62
[67] Michael R. Gordon, ‘President of Belarus Wins Referandum on Expanding His Power’ (1996) TNYT http://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/26/world/president-of-belarus-wins-referendum-on-expanding-his-power.html accessed 08 January 2017
[68] Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution, ‘Country Reports: Belarus 1996’ https://www.princeton.edu/~pcwcr/reports/belarus1996.html accessed 08 January 2017
[69] Brian Bennett, ‘The Last Dictatorship in Europe: Belarus Under Lukashenko’ ( 1st edition, United Kingdom, Hurst & Company, 2011)
[70] The Council of the European Union, 15 October 2012, Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Belarus
[71] Lionel S. Lewis, ‘When Power Corrupts: Academic Governing Boards in the Shadow of the Adelphi Case’ (New Jersey, Transaction Publishers, 2000)
