At the summit held on 3-4 July 2024 in the Kazakh capital, Astana, the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) signed the “Astana Declaration,” formally approving Belarus’s accession to the organisation as its tenth member state.
Belarus’s membership in this organisation holds a strategic geopolitical dimension, as the country borders three EU member states, as well as Russia to the east and northeast, Ukraine to the south, Poland to the west, and Lithuania and Latvia to the northwest. This summit marked the inaugural meeting in the “SCO Plus” format, which includes 10 member states and 14 dialogue partner states. Dialogue partner status has been available since 2008. Guest participants at the summit included the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the United Nations, and Turkmenistan.
The SCO is the successor of the Shanghai Five, established in 1996 by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan in response to security threats posed by terrorism and separatism in Central Asia. These concerns intensified, particularly following the US military intervention in Afghanistan. In its foreign policy, the organisation adheres to the principles of non-alignment, cooperation with other countries and regions, and openness to the outside world. The organisation has since evolved into the largest and most populous comprehensive regional organisation in the world in terms of geographical scope and population size, covering approximately 80% of Eurasia and 40% of the global population. As of 2023, its aggregated GDP accounted for about 32% of the global total GDP[2]. Turkey, a NATO member, holds dialogue partner status alongside other states that belong to the Western economic and military structure, such as Egypt, Israel, Iraq, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain.
The advantages of Belarus’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
Belarus’s membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is significant from several perspectives. Initially established as a regional organisation of Asia-Pacific countries, the SCO has now expanded to include a Euro-Asian dimension with Belarus’s inclusion. For Belarus, joining the SCO marks a notable shift in Minsk’s official foreign policy towards the East. This transformation began four years ago, particularly after the turbulent opposition demonstrations following the elections, in which the West attempted to interfere with the results to overthrow President Alexander Lukashenko‘s government. It became clear that the previous multilateral approach, which relied on balancing relations with both the West and Russia, was futile. This approach failed to provide external security for Belarus, instead making the country more vulnerable to external threats and placing it in a precarious position and vacuum between major powers, as it was not institutionally aligned with either side. Belarus has identified key priorities for its SCO membership, aiming to develop economic cooperation with the East and aspiring to act as a bridge connecting the SCO with the European Union.
In line with the “Astana Declaration,” Belarus places importance on and is committed to fostering a more representative, equitable, and pluralistic global order. It believes that cooperation within the SCO can serve as a foundation for a more equitable and balanced security structure in Eurasia and globally while upholding principles of peaceful dispute resolution, non-use of force, and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. The declaration also underscores the necessity of respecting each state’s right to independently choose its form of internal governance and development paths.
Belarus’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation further underscores its distinct political trajectory compared to its post-Soviet neighbours — Poland, the Baltic states, and Ukraine—where the trend towards integration into Euro-Atlantic structures has been accompanied by increasing Russophobia and populist rhetoric. This trend has often proved more detrimental than beneficial to Western interests.
In the early 1990s, it seemed that Belarus was poised to follow a similarly perilous path. Why did this not happen? The reason lies in the fact that Russophobia based on local ethnic nationalism was not as deeply ingrained in Belarusian society as it was in the Baltic states and Ukraine. This allowed Belarus to engage with its Western and Eastern neighbours in a more measured and pragmatic manner, free from ideological constraints and stereotypes.
Western analysts approach the expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) into Belarus with scepticism, often characterising it as a Chinese geopolitical initiative aimed at countering both Russia and the EU and viewing it as a potential manifestation of Chinese hegemony. However, the SCO includes countries like India, which are geopolitical rivals of China and have frequent border disputes. This illustrates that the SCO operates within a multilateral framework designed to coordinate the sometimes conflicting interests of major Eurasian actors. This is evidenced by Turkey’s participation in a recent summit, with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in attendance, reflecting Ankara’s desire, as a NATO member, to upgrade its status from a dialogue partner to a full member of the SCO. This move is part of Turkey’s broader strategy to enhance its relations with both the West and, simultaneously, with Russia and China. Turkey acts as a bridge connecting the SCO with the EU, while Belarus represents the final station and gateway to Western Europe. The participation of UN Secretary-General António Guterres at the Astana summit reflects the UN’s ambition to position itself as an inclusive organisation that engages with all major international actors.
Belarus has substantial economic interests in cooperating with SCO countries, especially China, to leverage Chinese railway routes for accessing existing trade ports and establishing new trade routes between Europe and the East. As a landlocked country, Belarus has no choice but to strengthen its involvement in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (B&R). Rail and road transport have historically been vital for Belarusian exports, but their importance has drastically declined since Belarus lost access to the Baltic and Ukrainian ports due to the Russia-Ukraine war.
Eurasia as the epicentre of future geopolitical conflict
Belarus’s accession to the SCO as a full member is seen as a move with significant political and security implications, especially amidst the intensifying confrontation between the West and Russia in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. This development aligns with the organisation’s aspirations to become a power centre that serves as a counterbalance to Western institutions, particularly NATO. However, internal disagreements and a lack of consensus among member states could constrain these ambitions and undermine the organisation’s effectiveness and regional importance. The primary challenge lies in the struggle for influence, particularly between China and Russia. China seeks to advance its commercial interests through the Belt and Road Initiative and the Central Corridor project (TUTIT), which extends from China through Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan in Central Asia, reaching the Caspian Sea and extending to Europe via Turkish railways and ports.
The decline in freight traffic by the Belarusian State Railway Company (BCh) from January to September 2024 is attributed to Belarus’s pivot towards utilizing Chinese land routes for its imports and exports. This shift may help Belarus generate additional revenue through parallel channels.
Analysts suggest that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) remains a major global player with increasing regional and international significance, despite uncertainties about its future direction and nature. The question remains whether the SCO will evolve into an anti-Western and effectively adversarial platform or whether it will succeed in establishing itself as a viable economic and security alliance alongside NATO. Such ambitions depend on the organisation’s ability to achieve internal coordination and prevent disputes from escalating in ways that could undermine its future and cohesion.
Chinese military exercises in Belarus
China and Belarus recently completed a joint military exercise held from July 8 to 19, 2024, near the Belarusian city of Brest, just five kilometres from the border with Poland, a NATO member. The manoeuvres, named “Eagle Assault,” lasted 11 days and took place just before the NATO leaders’ summit in Washington from July 9 to 11, 2024. Belarus has characterized these military exercises as a response to the “aggressive foreign policy of the West towards Belarus” and to “Ukrainian provocations.”[3]
The Chinese Ministry of Defense stated that the exercises aimed to enhance the training and coordination capabilities of the participating military forces, as well as to deepen practical cooperation between the two countries’ armed forces. A delegation from the Chinese Central Military Commission also held talks in Minsk, where both sides discussed the prospects for Belarusian-Chinese military training cooperation and agreed on new areas of collaboration. This latest demonstration of their security and defence capabilities and partnership comes just days after Belarus acceded to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which is supported by both Beijing and Moscow.
Belarusian-Chinese military exercises demonstrate that President Lukashenko is pursuing a multilateral policy and is not merely a satellite of Moscow, as he is often portrayed within the EU. It is premature to discuss a division of influence between Russia and China within Belarus, which maintains a high degree of sovereignty and will seek to further strengthen it. This includes diversifying its foreign relations with major players such as the United States and the European Union, in addition to China and Russia.
EU policy towards Belarus
Belarus is one of the few European countries that has not sought membership in the European Union, nor has the EU extended an offer of membership to Minsk.
The European Economic Community (EEC) recognised Belarus’s independence in 1991, and Belarus has signed several bilateral and multilateral agreements with the EU. In 1995, Belarus and the EU signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, but this agreement was never ratified by the EU. Belarus is a member of the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences[4] for trade relations and is also part of the EU’s Eastern Partnership[5]. Relations between Belarus and the EU began to deteriorate after Alexander Lukashenko was elected President in 1994, and Belarus was excluded from the European Neighbourhood Policy in response to the establishment of an authoritarian regime under Lukashenko.
There have been periods of improved relations between Belarus and the EU. In 2015, the EU suspended most sanctions against Belarusian officials. In 2016, the travel ban imposed on Lukashenko in 2000 was lifted. That same year, two opposition candidates were elected to the Belarusian parliament[6], and the death penalty was suspended. These developments were seen by some EU officials as steps towards democratisation. However, certain power centres and lobbying groups have pursued a different path, focusing on destabilising the country.
Relations between Belarus and the EU reached their lowest point following opposition protests held after the presidential elections in August 2020. The EU imposed sanctions on Belarusian officials responsible for “violence and election fraud.”[7]
Historical experience has likely played a role in shaping the EU’s stance, particularly due to the negative attitudes of the Baltic EU member states towards Belarus. The transition of the Baltic states from being part of the Soviet Union (USSR) to full EU and NATO membership has transformed their historical grievances into frustrations regarding their shared Soviet past. This aspect has, in many instances, negatively affected EU-Belarus relations.
The EU should formulate its policy based on a positive, cooperative approach that encourages rather than deters engagement, leaving no room for historical grievances, regardless of their origins.
Analysts argue that the EU needs to adopt a more balanced, substantive, and cautious policy towards Belarus, avoiding the influence of unilateral interests from neighbouring countries, primarily Poland and the Baltic states, which have historical grievances and their own bilateral interests and disputes. It is already evident that some neighbouring countries have exploited their EU membership to place Belarusian individuals and companies on the EU’s “blacklist,” largely driven by their own unilateral interests and subjective perceptions.
U.S. policy towards Belarus
The United States recognized the independence of the Republic of Belarus in 1991, and on 28 December 1991, Belarus and the United States established diplomatic relations.
The United States encouraged Belarus to conclude an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and adhere to the agreed-upon measures within the framework of macroeconomic stabilization programs and other reforms, including the commitment to accelerate the privatization process to create a more favourable business and investment climate. Although there were some direct U.S. private investments in Belarus, their scale did not expand significantly due to the slow pace of reforms.
The golden period in the normalisation of relations with the U.S. occurred following the visit of U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton to Minsk on 29 August 2019. During this visit, Bolton met with Lukashenko to discuss improving relations between the two countries. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also visited Belarus for the first time in 26 years to offer American assistance following Russia’s decision to halt energy supplies to Belarus[8]. The U.S. State Department described the purpose of the visit as an effort to reaffirm the United States’ commitment to Belarus’s sovereignty, independence, stability, and prosperity, and demonstrate a desire to normalise bilateral relations.
President Donald Trump, in line with his foreign policy doctrine, faced criticism from major media outlets both in the U.S. and internationally. Nine days after the outbreak of unrest following the elections in Belarus, he coldly remarked, “I like seeing democracy,” adding, “‘Democracy’ is a very important word. It doesn’t seem like it’s too much democracy there, in Belarus.” He noted that the protests were “peaceful,” without addressing the violence that occurred after the elections, and added, “I support democracy.” To conclude any further discussion, he stated, “Okay, any other question?”[9]
“America First” is the foreign policy doctrine promoted and adopted by Donald Trump during his first presidential term (2017-2021). This doctrine emphasizes prioritizing American interests in international affairs, even if it contradicts the principles of multilateral cooperation traditionally upheld by U.S. diplomacy. If Trump is re-elected as President, a key question is how his policies might affect transatlantic relations between the United States and Europe.
By selecting James David Vance as his vice-presidential candidate, Donald Trump sent a clear signal to the world that the United States would shift towards isolationism. Vance has limited experience in foreign policy. In an interview with right-wing journalist and political consultant Steve Bannon, Vance stated, “I don’t really care what happens to Ukraine one way or another.” He is one of the most vocal critics of U.S. military aid to Ukraine, urging Kyiv to halt military operations and urgently negotiate with Putin while dismissing the feasibility of restoring Ukraine’s pre-war borders. His doctrine is clear: “Ukraine must accept the results of the war with Russia without U.S. support.”[10]
Trump’s potential re-election could alter how the United States perceives issues related to the European Union, including the conflict in Ukraine and certainly in relations with Belarus.
Could Belarus play a key role in peace efforts in Ukraine?
Re-elected European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (EPP/CDU) addressed the European Parliament, stating: “Europe cannot control dictators and demagogues around the world, but we can decide to protect our own democracy. Europe cannot decide elections across the globe, but we can decide to invest in the security and defence of our continent. Europe cannot stop change, but we can choose to embrace it by investing in a new era of prosperity and improving our quality of life.[11]” In doing so, Von der Leyen indirectly acknowledged the mistake made in 2020 when the EU directly intervened in the Belarusian presidential election by supporting opposition candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and imposing sanctions on Belarus. This action isolated Belarus at a time when it might have been closest to the EU and pushed it into Russia’s embrace.
Analysts believe that the EU should avoid repeating past mistakes regarding Belarus and should return to the level of engagement it had after the signing of the Minsk I and Minsk II agreements. The EU needs to leverage Belarus’s role to achieve a viable peace solution for Ukraine, as peace will not materialize on its own without significant effort and activity. The withdrawal of Belarusian forces from the Ukrainian border is seen as a positive signal, indicating readiness to initiate negotiations between the warring parties with the involvement of the international community. As an organization initially founded as a peace project, the EU should not abandon its commitment to peace. It must ensure that Ukrainian neighbours, who may have their own particular interests and even candid aspirations towards Ukraine and Belarus, are excluded from the peace process. Tsikhanouskaya, as a product of both the EU and Belarusian neighbour’s interference, underscores this issue. Peace in Ukraine cannot be achieved unless the actors on the other side of the front lines demonstrate genuine interest. This time, the message coming through Belarus and Minsk could be a crucial step in that direction. The upcoming U.S. presidential elections should provide additional impetus for reaching a peace solution for Ukraine.
Published by IFIMES Ljubljana/Bruxelles/Washington/Minsk, 26 July 2024
Footnotes:
[1] IFIMES – International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal “European Perspectives.”
[2] The International Monetary Fund (IMF): World Economic Outlook database: April 2024, link: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/
[3] China and Belarus hold joint drills near Polish border ahead of NATO summit, link: www.politico.eu/article/china-bealrus-polish-border-nato-summit-drill-ukraine-russia-war-defense-aggression-fight-ministry/
[4] The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is a preferential tariff system that allows for reduced tariffs on various products. The concept of GSP differs significantly from the “Most-Favored-Nation” (MFN) principle. Available at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/belarus_en
[5] The Eastern Partnership (EaP) is a joint initiative of the European Union, its member states, and six Eastern European countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Available at: www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eap_factsheet_belarus_eng.pdf
[6] Anna Konopatskaya, of the United Civic party, won a district in Minsk, and Yelena Anisim, of the Belarusian Language Society, also won a seat. Available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/12/belarus-activists-unmoved-election-two-opposition-mps-lukashenko
[7] EU announces sanctions against Belarus over ‘violence’ on protesters and electoral ‘falsification’. Available at: www.euronews.com/2020/08/14/eu-announces-sanctions-against-belarus-over-violence-on-protesters-and-electoral-falsifica
[8] Pompeo says US can supply Belarus with 100% of oil, gas. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/863371d1353f29fb38b27fe0e5027b8e
[9] Opinion Trump’s strange silence on Belarus. Available at: www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trumps-strange-silence-on-belarus/2020/08/21/698cf4f0-e3d1-11ea-8dd2-d07812bf00f7_story.html
[10] Trump’s choice of Vance ‘terrible news’ for Ukraine. Available at: www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/jul/17/trump-jd-vance-vp-ukraine
[11] Statement at the European Parliament Plenary by President Ursula von der Leyen, candidate for a second mandate 2024-2029, Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_24_3871
