By Habib Ullah
The Government of Pakistan announced the Illegal Foreigners’ Repatriation Plan (IFRP) on September 26, 2023. This plan aims to regulate the presence of foreigners in the country and ensure the repatriation of individuals who reside illegally or have overstayed their visa validity. It does not, ipso facto, discriminate based on nationality or country of origin, and extends to all the illegal foreigners residing in Pakistan. However, as Afghans form the most significant foreign population in Pakistan, they are the most substantially covered under the scope of the IFRP. Nonetheless, all legally registered foreign nationals, including Afghans, residing in Pakistan, remain exempt from the provision of this IFRP.
Many international organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have criticised Pakistan for targeting Afghans under the IFRP and allegedly in violation of its international obligations. However, such criticism takes a simplistic view of a complex issue. For over four decades, Pakistan has demonstrated exceptional generosity by hosting millions of refugees, mostly Afghans, earning global recognition as one of the largest refugee-hosting countries. In recent years, however, changing circumstances have compelled Pakistan to reassess its policy regarding foreign nationals, in the light of its national interests. This insight analyses the legality of Pakistan’s decision to repatriate Afghans vis-à-vis its international obligations.
The Afghan refugees influx into Pakistan occurred in four distinct waves, each linked to significant political developments in Afghanistan. The First Wave occurred from 1978 to 1981, on the eve of the end of Daoud Khan’s government and the Soviet invasion. The Second Wave came in the 1990s after the Soviet withdrawal and the Taliban’s rise. Third Wave began in 2001, post 9/11 attacks, and the subsequent United States (US)-led NATO invasion. The Fourth Wave occurred in 2021, following the US withdrawal and the Taliban’s return to power.
During the fourth wave alone, approximately 600,000 Afghans arrived, many of whom hoped to relocate to Western nations eventually. However, to date, only a small fraction have been relocated, while the vast majority remain in Pakistan, awaiting their turn for years. This situation was further exacerbated when President Trump, after assuming office in January 2025, suspended the United States Refugee Admissions Programme (USRAP), leaving thousands of Afghans in uncertainty.
| The decision of Pakistan to repatriate Afghans, pursuant to IFRP, is grounded in both domestic and international law. |
The Afghan population currently residing in Pakistan holds varying legal statuses, depending on the type of documents they possess. Broadly, they fall into three categories: Proof of Registration (PoR) cardholders, Afghan Citizen Card (ACC) holders, and unregistered Afghans. The IFRP outlines a three-phase repatriation process based on this categorisation. Phase one aims to cover illegal or unregistered foreigners and those with expired visas or a period of unauthorised stay. Phase two covers the ACC holders. While Phase Three, set to begin after 30 June 2025, will address PoR cardholders. Phase one started in October 2023, and phase two is currently underway.
The Government of Pakistan’s implementation of IFRP reflects a broader effort to address security challenges, regulate the presence of foreigners, and manage limited resources. A resurgence in militant activity, particularly by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, also known as Fitna al-Khawarij (TTP/FK), has heightened regional tensions. Some incidents, including suicide attacks in 2023, have involved Afghans, further complicating the security landscape. Additionally, with political stability gradually returning to Afghanistan, since the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021, Pakistan considers the conditions increasingly conducive for the return of illegal Afghans.
Given these circumstances, the decision of Pakistan to repatriate Afghans, under IFRP, is not without legal basis—both under domestic and international law. The regulation of foreign nationals residing within a state’s territory has, prima facie, been recognised as falling within the domaine réservé—that is, the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of the state. In Pakistan’s domestic legal framework, the IFRP finds its basis in the Foreigners Act, 1946. Specifically, section 3 of the Act empowers the federal government to control foreigners’ entry, stay, and departure, while section 3(2)(g) allows for their arrest or detention when necessary for national security.
Under international law, the status of refugees is primarily governed by the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. Pakistan is neither a party to the convention nor the protocol; hence, it is not legally bound by their specific provisions.
However, the cornerstone of the Convention—the principle of nonrefoulement—has evolved into a norm of customary international law. Although articulated in Article 33 of the Convention, this principle is now binding on all states, including non-signatories such as Pakistan.
The principle of non-refoulement obliges a state not to expel a refugee to a country where they may face persecution. However, it is not absolute and permits exceptions when individuals threaten the host state’s security. The determination of such a threat lies primarily with the host state itself, in this case, Pakistan. As noted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), if certain individuals act on behalf of foreign powers against the host country, the host state is entitled to invoke this exception among a mass of refugees. While IFRP mainly addresses Pakistan’s resource constraints and evolving situation in Afghanistan, both of which are justifiable under international law, security concerns posed by TTP/FK further reinforce the applicability of this exception. Therefore, despite not being a signatory to the Refugee Convention, Pakistan is still upholding its spirit. Nonetheless, the IFRP constitutes repatriation rather than refoulement.
Furthermore, Pakistan’s actions are neither unprecedented nor isolated; instead, they align with the practices of several Western nations, some of which have adopted far stricter measures, arguably violating international law. For instance, in April 2025, the US listed thousands of temporary immigrants as deceased to pressurise them into ‘self-deportation’. Similarly, in February 2025, the United Kingdom expelled nearly 19,000 undocumented migrants who had no legal right to remain in the country.
In March 2025, the European Union (EU) also proposed sending migrants without legal status to “return hubs” in third countries, from where they will be deported to their countries of origin.
This move is rooted in the controversial ‘EU-Turkey Deal,’ signed in March 2016. Under this deal, Türkiye was to curb illegal migration to Greece in exchange for €6 billion to support refugees.
This underscores the West’s dual standards—criticising Pakistan’s legal repatriation efforts while pursuing harsh policies themselves.
Therefore, while humanitarian concerns remain valid, Pakistan’s repatriation decision is grounded in domestic and international law. Given the serious security threats and the state’s sovereign right to regulate foreign nationals, the repatriation effort reflects a measured response to a complex challenge. Like many states, Pakistan strives to balance security needs with humanitarian responsibilities.
Written by: Habib Ullah
Email: habibullah05987@gmail.com
