By Xiaoyang Zhang
Presently, China and Russia are very close. As far back as 2001, Beijing and Moscow entered into their Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation. And the Treaty was timely renewed in 2021. Perhaps for fear of being accused of being too close with Russia, Beijing has articulated on a string of occasions that the Treaty per se is not of an alliance character, but plainly parrying bilateral conflicts, and more momentously, not aiming at any third party outside the agreement. In 2022, just a few days prior to Russia launching its invasion into Ukraine, Beijing and Moscow announced that their present close ties would have no relationship ceiling. In 2025, China and Russia issued a new statement, claiming to further prop up the two countries’ no-limits strategic partnership.
In this respect, North Korea and Russia are also highly close, but far more consistently so throughout the contemporary history as well as at present, if comparing with what happens to the-China-and-Russia case. In truth, it is no exaggeration to say that previously, China’s determination to have its army forwarded to the Korean Peninsular engaging in the Korean War in the 1950s, fighting side by side with North Korean military forces, was to a massive extent an outcome of the influence engendered by Joseph Stalin, the paramount leader of the Soviet Union. Stalin’s schemes and instructions were known to be the bellwether orchestrating the post-World War II communist camp where China and North Korea were among those established members in the Far East. Several decades later, a bilateral Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was signed between Pyongyang and Moscow in 2024, though the Soviet Union as a global communist superpower had long ceased to remain. But dissimilar to the current China-Russia bond mentioned above, this North Korea-Russia pact is of an ostensible military coalition nature, and may serve as a basis on which North Korea started to send its troops to join the ongoing Russia and Ukraine war in 2024, taking on a risk of sacrificing lives and also supporting Russia by supplying the required ammunition and weaponry paraphernalia.
Different to North Korea’s direct military involvement, China’s stance appears quite cautious this time. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council besides France, Russia, the UK and the US, China is simply calling for an expeditious halt on the Russia-Ukraine war and a peaceful settlement on any prickly squabbles between Russia and Ukraine vis-à-vis the suspected NATO’s eastward expansion plan. China neither condemns Russia’s preemptive military operations trespassing over Ukraine’s sovereignty in violation of the UN Charter, nor politically or economically asserts to stand for Ukraine’s striking back as a justifiable wrestle against alien encroachment. This is so in spite of the fact that a number of western heavyweights such as the EU, Australia, Canada, Japan, the UK and the US had thrown various forms of sanctions against Russia which is supposed to have a heavy price to pay for an unlawful foray into its adjacent neighbor.
While China now is on fairly intimate terms with Russia, containing the US in the interests of China and Russia against the backdrop of the China-Russia-America trio relationships is China and Russia’s main consideration in common. Harking back to the tumultuous history shared by China and Russia (and by China and the Soviet Union as well), it is not difficult to discover that the China and Russia relationship has rarely been a non-confrontational one for any longevity. On the minds of Chinese people, their feelings towards Russia are too complicated to scope out. This is because of the many different roles which Russia has played in China that spanned various eras, either as a military assailant, a revolutionary mentor, an economic and technological advisor, a political contender, or as a geopolitical stakeholder at the present moment.
Geographically speaking, China and Russia’s land border is more than 4000 km. From a historic standpoint, a key feature of conventional China-Russia relationship is their endless border disagreements which could trace back to the Tsarist period in Russia. A series of border concordats had been enacted at various points in time, e.g. Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), Treaty of Kyakhta (1727), Treaty of Aigun (1858), Treaty of Tientsin (1858), Beijing Protocol (1860), Treaty of St. Petersburg (1881), Qiqihar Treaty (1911), Agreement on the Border’s Eastern Portion (1991), Agreement on the Border’s Western Portion (1994), etc. China and Russia signed the Complementary Agreement on the Border’s Eastern Portion in 2004. It was not until one year later in 2005 after the two countries’ supreme legislative bodies endorsed this Complementary Agreement that the dust eventually settled after centuries’ disputes and clashes over boundary matters. However, people may still wonder whether it is China or Russia which got the short end of the stick at last. This surely could constitute a good, thought-provoking debate topic for future generations to dwell on.
Politically, China and Russia’s closeness in today’s time may count as the second honeymoon period enjoyed by the two giants. Historically, the Soviet Union was the first state in the world instantly recognizing the legitimacy of the current China (i.e. the People’s Republic of China founded by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949). The Soviet and Chinese originally shared the same ideological doctrines. And their first romantic adventure as a special couple was mainly undertaken in the 1950s, in particular during the years when Stalin was still alive. The Soviet Union readily rolled out a welcome mat for the establishment of China as a new socialist companion. And the ensuing development of China’s institutional frameworks and economic paradigms owed a great deal to the Soviet support. Nonetheless, with Stalin’s passing, the relationship between the two communist parties turned sour step by step, culminating in China and the Soviet Union becoming adversaries in a largely diplomatic and even military sense throughout the 1960s to most of the 1980s. It was only after the breakthrough submit meeting held in Beijing in 1989 between Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev that the normalization of the bilateral relations was ultimately restored after nearly three decades of animosity sustained by the two old pals.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia as the successor state no longer opts for having its state policy based on the Marxist-Leninist planks. But its impact on global affairs could be no less stunning. On the other hand, China is still sticking to its socialist pursuit, trying to leverage the achievements of its forty-odd years’ reform and opening-up campaign to run a more successful economy where the market dictates and the government intervenes when necessary. In a figurative sense, the no-limits partnership forged between China and Russia sounds pretty appealing. But from a more pragmatic perspective, it is in effect no more than a utilitarian philosophy packaged in a way afresh. Simply put, China likely eyes on Russia’s cheap energy and Russia’s useful influence on the world stage exerted by its current strong leadership. By the same token, Russia seems inclined to treat China as one of its indispensable sources of economic strength and a reliable partner with more or less an identical way of thinking and doing things.
But all in all, there is a catch to heed. So long as the current equilibrium between China, Russia and the US (along with its allies around the globe) is not badly twisted, China and Russia can choose to be close as far as they are willing to do so. Otherwise, a question mark will be cast as to the essence of their closeness in the interests of both countries. History tells and cycles.
About the author: Xiaoyang Zhang, is a Professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University School of Law.
