Geopolitical and Military Lessons from the Russia–Ukraine Conflict (II)

III. Military Lessons

By Major General (ret) Corneliu Pivariu

“Modern warfare is the ultimate test of a nation’s resilience — of its military, its economy, and its collective morale.”

The Russia–Ukraine war has produced a strategic shock in the contemporary military world. Initial forecasts, which anticipated a swift Russian victory through a concentrated “blitzkrieg” aimed at Kyiv, proved to be wrong. Instead, the conflict evolved into a war of attrition, with hybrid features but also numerous elements of classic conventional warfare.

This paradox — the coexistence of traditional methods (trenches, artillery barrages, fortified lines) with new technologies (drones, satellites, cyber warfare) — has offered an extremely complex picture of 21st-century warfare. Beyond the theatres of operations, the lessons drawn are relevant to all modern armed forces, including NATO and the states on the Eastern Front, among which Romania holds a central position.

The war in Ukraine has not triggered a military revolution comparable to the introduction of nuclear weapons or the appearance of blitzkrieg during the Second World War, but it has confirmed and accelerated already visible transformations. The large-scale use of drones, the integration of commercial satellites and OSINT, the precision of guided artillery, and the central role of critical infrastructure have turned the battlefield into a space where information and logistics are just as important as manoeuvre or brute force.

However, these innovations have not provided a decisive advantage, as each technological advance has rapidly generated a counter-response, maintaining a balance of attrition. The essential novelty therefore does not lie in a fundamental rupture, but in the entry into an era of hybrid and prolonged conflicts, where industrial resilience, external alliances, and continuous technological adaptation will decide the outcome more than any single weapon or doctrine. This does not exclude the possibility of surprise strikes (in various forms) that could decisively influence the course of the war.

Broadly speaking, the main military lessons are found on eight levels:

1. Strategy and military planning

• The surprises and initial errors of Russia (overestimating its own capacity, underestimating Ukrainian resistance).
• The need to align political objectives with available means.
• The lesson of the importance of long-term planning in a war of attrition.

2. Intelligence and information superiority

• The decisive role of fusing HUMINT, SIGINT, OSINT, and IMINT.
• The essential contribution of commercial satellites, drones, and social networks.
• Confirmation that Western intelligence support shifted the balance of power.
• The lesson on OSINT transparency: information can no longer be monopolized solely by states.

3. Land operations

• The rediscovery of positional warfare and trench systems.
• The importance of classical artillery combined with precision strikes (HIMARS, ATACMS).
• Doctrinal adaptation: combined-arms coordination and command decentralization.
• Russia’s logistical vulnerability versus Ukraine’s flexibility.

4. Air and anti-air warfare

• The limitations of aviation against modern air defence systems.
• Confirmation of the crucial role of multilayered air defence.
• Drones as a disruptive factor for both sides.

5. Naval warfare and maritime control

• The Black Sea as a secondary theatre with decisive strategic implications.
• The vulnerability of fleets to naval drones and coastal missiles.
• The lesson on securing maritime corridors for grain exports.

6. Technological and information warfare

• The rise of all types of drones (reconnaissance, strike, kamikaze).
• Satellites and commercial networks as game-changers on the battlefield.
• Electronic warfare as a critical dimension.
• Information as a strategic weapon — the narrative war and its impact on public opinion.

7. Mobilization and human resources

• The resilience of Ukrainian society and its mobilization capacity.
• Morale and training problems in the Russian army.
• The lesson on the enormous human costs of a prolonged war.
• The importance of reserve training and continuous instruction.

8. International support and transnational cooperation

• Lessons on NATO interoperability and the rapid integration of diverse systems.
• Transnational logistics as a decisive factor for Ukraine.
• The importance of the political, economic, and intelligence support of allies.

1. Strategy and military planning

a) The failure of the Russian blitzkrieg. The initial plan of the Russian Federation, launched on 24 February 2022, aimed at a lightning campaign (“blitzkrieg”) with the objective of quickly seizing Kyiv and installing a puppet government[1]. The operational concept was based on:

• a simultaneous attack on several axes (north, east, south)[2];
• massive use of mechanized units;
• paralysing Ukraine through air and cyber strikes on critical infrastructure.

This strategy collapsed after only a few weeks. Russia overestimated its own military capability and underestimated Ukrainian resistance, the population’s support for its armed forces, and the speed with which the West could deliver military assistance. The lack of coordination between ground and air forces, logistical shortcomings, and the low morale of Russian troops further amplified the failure.

b) Ukraine’s resilience. Ukraine, on the other hand, adopted an elastic defence strategy, combining:

• defence in depth of major cities (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv);
• use of mobility for rapid counterattacks;
• leveraging information advantages provided by Western satellites and intelligence networks.

The Ukrainian command demonstrated strong adaptability, shifting from territorial defence to counteroffensives (Kharkiv, Kherson – 2022). Although it later faced difficulties in maintaining strategic initiative (the 2023–2024 counteroffensive), Ukraine managed to compensate through creativity, societal resilience, and the integration of Western support.

A significant example of offensive planning was the Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region (August 2024 – August 2025), involving mixed units estimated at 8,000–12,000 troops. The core consisted of the newly created 22nd Assault Corps and of airmobile and mechanized brigades trained in the West, supported by volunteers and territorial units. The forces were equipped with modern armoured vehicles (MRAP, Humvee, Bradley, Leopard 2), made extensive use of drones for reconnaissance and strikes, and employed precision artillery (HIMARS).

The tactics focused on surprise and mobility, conducting rapid raids and occupying weakly defended localities, with the objective of creating a buffer zone and sending a strong political message. However, the lack of air support and logistical difficulties limited the sustainability of the gains, as Russia gradually recaptured most of the territory[3].

The main lesson is that demonstrative operations, even if tactically successful, cannot substitute for a coherent and sustainable territorial reconquest strategy — but they can have a disproportionate psychological and propaganda impact.

c) Lessons on assessing the adversary. A central element of the conflict is the strategic assessment error. The Kremlin overestimated its own military capacity and underestimated the Ukrainians’ will to resist. Western intelligence services correctly anticipated the invasion, yet even they underestimated Ukraine’s long-term resilience.

The key lesson: military planning must be based not only on technical or numerical superiority, but also on harder-to-quantify factors — troop morale, societal mobilization, political legitimacy, and international support.

d) Long-term strategic adaptation. As the war turned into a conflict of attrition, both sides recalibrated their strategies:

• Russia shifted from rapid offensive operations to positional warfare, relying on fortified lines and the attrition of the adversary;
• Ukraine sought to maintain initiative through precision strikes on Russian logistics and attempts to break the front, but resource constraints reduced its effectiveness.

Time thus became a strategic weapon: each additional month allowed Ukraine to receive military and financial support from the West, while bringing growing costs to Russia. Yet Russia continues its military pressure, betting on the difference in human and material resources between the two countries, as well as on the possible erosion of international support for Ukraine.

Partial conclusion. The strategy and military planning in the Russia–Ukraine war show that success on the battlefield depends not only on technology and numbers, but also on accurate anticipation, adaptability, and societal resilience. The Russian blitzkrieg failed, while the Ukrainian defence succeeded through flexibility and the integration of Western support.

The major lesson: any strategy must include alternative scenarios and a realistic long-term projection.

2. Intelligence and information superiority

a) The fusion of intelligence sources. One of the most striking aspects of the Russia–Ukraine conflict is the decisive role of intelligence fusion: HUMINT, SIGINT, OSINT, and IMINT.

• HUMINT (human intelligence) remained indispensable for understanding the adversary’s intentions[4] and identifying internal vulnerabilities[5].
• SIGINT (signals intelligence) and IMINT (imagery intelligence) provided a continuous picture of Russian troop movements and logistics.
• OSINT (open-source intelligence) gained unprecedented importance, as data from commercial or public sources (social networks, publicly available satellite imagery) contributed to monitoring the battlefield.

This fusion significantly reduced the “fog of war,” turning Ukraine into the first theatre of war where almost every movement was visible and documented.

b) Commercial satellites and civilian drones – a game changer

• Commercial satellite imagery (Maxar, Planet, BlackSky) became a constant source of information, available not only to the armed forces involved but also to the media, independent analysts, and the global public.
• Ukraine gained access to such imagery either through direct purchases or via Western partners’ support, obtaining a major strategic advantage.
• Adapted civilian drones (DJI and other low-cost models) complemented this picture, being used for reconnaissance, artillery fire adjustment, and pinpoint attacks.

Result: the battlefield became far more “transparent,” and achieving strategic surprise became nearly impossible.

c) Western support and information superiority

• The United States and NATO allies provided Ukraine with a constant flow of strategic and tactical intelligence, including real-time data on Russian troop movements, logistical infrastructure, and attack plans.
• This support enabled Ukraine to calibrate its defence, strike critical targets, and offset Russia’s numerical superiority.
• A significant example: intercepts and satellite data allowed Ukraine to anticipate attacks and even direct artillery fire with unprecedented accuracy.

d) The role of OSINT in the conflict. OSINT has fundamentally changed how wars are reported and analysed:

• Information from public sources (commercial satellite imagery, social media footage, open data) has been widely used to track and verify frontline events.
• Independent communities such as Bellingcat, the Institute for the Study of War, and numerous civilian analysts managed to document troop movements, equipment losses, and strikes — often in real time.
• This meant that states no longer hold a monopoly on strategic information: events can be monitored and analysed publicly, making it far harder to conceal reality or manipulate perceptions.
• An illustrative example of strategic importance is the use of the Starlink satellite network[6], provided by the private company SpaceX.
  This system allowed Ukraine to maintain strategic and tactical communications even when conventional infrastructure was heavily damaged by Russian strikes. It provided stable links for military command and control as well as secure internet access for authorities and civilians. Its integration demonstrates that in modern wars, global commercial infrastructures can become critical components of military resilience.

At the same time, dependence on a private actor raised questions about decision-making vulnerability: the continuity of a system vital to a state at war could depend on the will and interests of a single individual or company.

Partial conclusion. The war in Ukraine has once again confirmed that information superiority can compensate for numerical and technological inferiority. The fusion of HUMINT, SIGINT, OSINT, and IMINT, Western support, and access to satellites and drones have created an almost transparent battlefield.

The major lesson: in modern warfare, information is no longer merely an “auxiliary” to the armed forces, but a central domain that can decisively shape the outcome of operations.

 

 3. Land operations – the rediscovery of positional warfare

a) The rediscovery of positional warfare. One of the most surprising aspects of the Russia–Ukraine conflict has been the return to a pattern of fighting reminiscent of the First World War: trenches stretching for hundreds of kilometres, minefields, artillery barrages, and fortified lines.

The mobility of mechanized forces — long considered decisive in modern wars — was blunted by the density of defences and the effectiveness of portable anti-tank weapons (Javelin, NLAW, Panzerfaust).

This reality led to a stagnant front and a war of attrition, where territorial gains are measured in kilometres rather than decisive offensives.

b) The central role of artillery. Artillery proved once again to be the “queen of the battlefield,” returning to the forefront after decades in which air power and smart missiles were the focus. In the Ukraine conflict, artillery accounted for over 70% of total losses on both sides.

• Russia relied heavily on howitzers and multiple rocket launchers (Grad, Smerch, Uragan).
• Ukraine received advanced Western systems (M777, Caesar, PzH 2000, HIMARS), which enabled precision strikes deep into Russian positions.

This competition demonstrated that volume of fire matters[7], but that precision and integration with real-time intelligence can decisively influence the balance of power.

c) Fortifications and minefields. Ukraine’s 2023–2024 counteroffensive showed how difficult it is to penetrate layered defensive lines protected by dense minefields and artillery barrages.

Russia built a “defence wall” stretching hundreds of kilometres (the Surovikin Line), which turned each advance into a disproportionate cost for Kyiv.

Lesson: military engineering and territorial defence are returning to the forefront of strategic thinking.

d) Logistics and supply[8]. Land operations have highlighted the critical importance of logistics:

• Russia suffered heavy losses due to overextended and poorly protected supply lines (e.g., the 60 km convoy near Kyiv, March 2022).
• Ukraine, although far more modest in resources, benefited from Western support in ammunition, fuel, and spare parts, which enabled it to sustain resistance.

Logistics proved decisive: a shortage of ammunition or fuel can halt entire offensives, regardless of numerical or technological superiority.

e) Drone technology – transforming modern warfare. One of the most visible and innovative aspects of the Russia–Ukraine conflict has been the large-scale use of drones, which has profoundly changed the way military operations are conducted.

Proliferation and diversification of drones. Both sides have used a wide range of drones — from adapted commercial micro-UAVs to FPV kamikaze drones, heavy aerial vehicles, and autonomous naval drones. Their low cost, the availability of commercial components, and rapid adaptability enabled industrial-scale production and mass deployment, including in swarms.

Operational integration. Drones became an integral part of the kill chain: they detect targets, transmit coordinates in real time, and guide artillery or missile strikes. Their combined use with artillery systems has significantly increased the precision and reaction speed on the battlefield.

The rise of specialized formations. The escalating use of drones led both armies to create dedicated formations. As early as 2023, Ukraine launched the “Army of Drones” programme, which resulted in the creation of dedicated drone brigades and battalions with their own training, logistics, and command structures. Russia followed the same trend, forming by 2024 specialised UAV regiments and units within its ground and air forces. This marks the transition of drones from auxiliary means to stand-alone weapons with their own decision chains.

Countermeasures and anti-drone warfare. The mass use of drones has forced the development of specific countermeasures. Both sides have heavily invested in:

• electronic warfare (jamming, spoofing, disruption of command links and GPS/GLONASS signals);
• close-range air defence (automatic cannons, optically guided machine guns, programmable ammunition, MANPADS);
• improvised physical barriers (metal nets, cages, light armour on vehicles and fixed positions).

These measures target drones specifically and will be complemented by broader integrated air defence efforts addressed in the subchapter on air and anti-air warfare.

Doctrinal implications: Future conflicts will likely integrate drones as core components of armed forces rather than as mere support. The creation of dedicated units, specialized training, integration into operational planning, and adaptation of logistics are clear indicators of a major doctrinal shift.

f) Electronic warfare (EW). Both sides have invested massively in jamming communications, GPS, and drone control signals.

Electronic warfare has proven to be an “invisible weapon” with direct effects on coordination capability and the effectiveness of artillery or drones.
Ukrainians benefited from Western support, while Russians quickly adapted mobile jamming systems.

Lesson: no technological advantage is secure if the adversary possesses an effective electronic countermeasures capability.

g) The human factor – morale, discipline, and troop resilience. Although the Russia–Ukraine conflict has been marked by rapid technological advances, battlefield experience has shown that the human factor remains decisive in war, as in all major past conflicts.

Morale and will to fight. The war has become a psychological endurance test. Massive human losses, constant shelling, the lack of regular rotations, and uncertainty about the war’s duration have gradually eroded troop morale on both sides. Despite external support, the Ukrainian army faced physical and psychological exhaustion, while the Russian army struggled with motivation issues, especially among conscripts and forcibly mobilized troops. Maintaining the will to keep fighting proved essential to holding the front.

Discipline and unit cohesion. Units that maintained discipline, cohesion, and mutual trust between commanders and soldiers performed better, even under conditions of technical or numerical inferiority. Experience showed that small, well-trained, and motivated units can resist larger forces, especially in positional warfare.

Troop rotation and combat readiness recovery. The absence of regular rotations led to chronic fatigue and declining combat effectiveness. Ukraine gradually implemented stricter rotation policies, while Russia partly compensated for the lack of rotations by mobilizing additional personnel. The major lesson: physical and psychological recovery is indispensable for maintaining operational capacity, even in wars of attrition.

Psychological resilience and adaptation to stress. Daily survival in trenches under constant fire and in harsh living conditions required the development of individual and collective coping mechanisms. Psychological support, camaraderie, and close leadership became critical factors. Troops with command structures able to maintain communication and a sense of mission withstood pressure more effectively.

The ordinary infantry soldier — from improvisation to accelerated professionalization

Initial phase (Feb–Summer 2022): improvisation and major shortages

• The war broke out unexpectedly for most Ukrainian troops and for a significant part of the Russian forces.
• Many soldiers were reservists, volunteers, or conscripts with minimal or no training.
• Individual equipment was often poor: improvised or absent body armour, lack of modern helmets, outdated personal weapons (AKM, AK-74 from Soviet stocks), limited communications (personal cell phones), and no night-vision gear.
• Cohesion and discipline were weak in newly formed units, and tactical training was scarce, especially for urban combat or modern positional warfare.

Adaptation and accelerated training phase (Autumn 2022 – Summer 2023)

• Ukraine launched rapid training programmes in NATO countries (Poland, the UK, Germany), focused on infantry tactics, combined-arms warfare, and the use of Western weaponry.
• Soldiers began to receive standardized protective gear (Class IV ballistic vests, Kevlar helmets, multicam uniforms, tactical boots), encrypted communication systems, and NVG devices.
• Russian units also initiated accelerated training of new mobilized troops, though often insufficient and uneven; shortages in modern gear persisted more on the Russian side.
• Increased combat experience led to better psychological adaptation, improved tactical discipline, and the formation of veteran cores that bolstered unit cohesion.

Current phase (2024–2025): professionalization and specialization

• The Ukrainian infantryman is now generally well equipped, with modern weapons (M4 carbines, AK-12, portable anti-tank systems, personal FPV drones, tactical tablets), secure communications, and full personal protection.
• Russian troops from elite units and some newly created formations (e.g., “Storm-Z”) have also been better equipped, though quality remains uneven between units.
• Continuous training, rotations, and frontline experience have transformed the average infantryman from an improvised fighter into a relatively well-prepared, networked, and adaptable combatant for high-intensity, long-duration warfare.

Implications

• The evolution of the infantry soldier shows that high-intensity warfare cannot be sustained in the long term without continuous investment in training and individual equipment.
• It also underscores that technological progress does not eliminate the need for well-trained and motivated soldiers capable of acting autonomously and with discipline under extreme conditions.

Doctrinal implications. The conflict has confirmed that regardless of the level of technology and automation, war remains a collective human endeavour. Morale, discipline, and troop resilience must be treated as central elements in planning and conducting operations, at the same level as logistics, intelligence, and firepower.

h) Lessons for the future

• Modern war does not exclude the return to “classic” forms of fighting when technology faces well-organized defences.
• Artillery and anti-tank weapons reaffirm their central role.
• Logistics and infrastructure (roads, railways, depots) are major vulnerabilities.
• Territorial defence based on fortifications and mines remains a force multiplier.
• The transparency of the battlefield through drones and satellites makes large-scale force concentrations impossible without major risks.
• Electronic and cyber warfare complement the classical arsenal, sometimes neutralizing the adversary’s technological advantages.
• The cheap attack drone is becoming a central actor, comparable to traditional artillery, but dependent on continuous logistical and informational flows.

Partial conclusion. Land operations in Ukraine demonstrate that advanced technology and modern reconnaissance methods have not eliminated the static and bloody nature of positional warfare.

Artillery, fortifications, and logistics dominate the battlefield, and success depends on integrating mobility with precision strikes and doctrinal adaptation to an extremely “transparent” environment.

The current conflict illustrates the emergence of a form of hybrid warfare in which trenches and artillery barrages coexist with drones, electronic jamming, and real-time intelligence — and where tactical improvisation is just as important as strategic planning.

 

4. Air and anti-air warfare

a) Limitations of Russian aviation. Although the Russian Federation possesses one of the largest air forces in the world, the conflict in Ukraine has revealed Moscow’s inability to achieve air supremacy. The main reasons were:

• Underestimating Ukrainian air defences, especially the S-300 and Buk systems, which remained operational from the first days.
• Lack of integration between combat aviation and ground forces, which reduced the effectiveness of close air support.
• Doctrinal weaknesses — an excessive focus on massive bombing rather than precision missions.

Consequence: Russian aircraft were forced to operate from a distance, using long-range missiles but without being able to dominate the airspace.

b) Ukraine’s resilience and adaptation. Ukraine managed to maintain an integrated air defence system through:

• Dispersal and mobility of launchers to avoid destruction on the ground.
• Gradual integration of Western systems: NASAMS, IRIS-T, Patriot, SAMP/T.
• Use of radar and satellite data provided by the US and NATO.

This adaptation has turned Ukraine into a textbook case of how a state with limited resources can prevent a superior adversary from controlling its airspace.

c) Drones – the new decisive factor. An innovative element of the conflict has been the massive use of reconnaissance and strike drones:

• Iranian-supplied Shahed-136 kamikaze drones were used by Russia to hit Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
• Bayraktar TB2 drones and later Western UAVs gave Ukraine inexpensive and effective means to strike tactical targets.
• Both sides developed domestic production of FPV drones for precision tactical missions.

Drones have shifted the balance through low costs and disproportionate impact, turning the battlefield into a permanently monitored and contested space.

d) Air defence systems – a pillar of defence. The war has confirmed that integrated air defence is the key to the survival of a state attacked by a superior air power. Patriot and IRIS-T systems intercepted ballistic and cruise missiles, drastically reducing the effectiveness of the Russian air campaign.

Main lesson: no air force can dominate without neutralizing the adversary’s air defences.

e) Lessons for the future

• Air supremacy can no longer be taken for granted, even for major powers.
• Drones and anti-drone systems are becoming mandatory components of military architecture.
• Integrated air defence systems (with layered short-, medium- and long-range capabilities) are vital for protecting critical infrastructure and urban centres.

5. Naval warfare

a) The Black Sea Fleet – from dominance to vulnerability. At the beginning of the war, Russia held naval supremacy in the Black Sea, relying on its fleet based in Sevastopol. Its objectives included:

• controlling the Ukrainian coastline,
• blockading the ports (Odesa, Mykolaiv),
• supporting ground operations in the south.

However, the sinking of the cruiser Moskva (April 2022) by Ukrainian Neptune missiles was a turning point, proving the vulnerability of surface ships to modern weaponry and asymmetric warfare.

b) Maritime drones – a tactical innovation. Ukraine introduced explosive naval drones capable of striking Russian vessels even in ports or at sea. These attacks reduced the Russian fleet’s freedom of manoeuvre and forced Moscow to relocate part of its ships to ports in eastern Crimea or to Novorossiysk.

This innovation shows that even a state without a comparable navy can challenge maritime dominance through cheap and adaptable technologies.

c) The grain blockade and economic warfare. Russia used the Black Sea to block Ukrainian grain exports, attempting to exert economic and political pressure on Kyiv and on the states dependent on these deliveries. The intervention of Turkey and the UN led to the signing of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (July 2022), which operated intermittently until 2023, when Moscow withdrew.

The blockade demonstrated that global food security can be used as a geopolitical weapon, particularly affecting vulnerable states in Africa and the Middle East. Romania and Poland became alternative corridors, but with higher logistical costs.

d) Lessons on naval power

• Dominating a maritime theatre is no longer guaranteed even for a major naval power.
• Anti-ship missiles and maritime drones can neutralize the traditional advantages of a large fleet.
• Controlling commercial routes and ports has a strategic impact comparable to ground operations.
• The Black Sea has proven to be a space of critical regional security, where Romania holds an enhanced geostrategic role.

6. Technological and information warfare

The war in Ukraine has proved to be the first high-intensity conflict in which cutting-edge technology and information played a decisive role, almost as important as classic land, air, and naval forces.

a) Drones — from tactics to strategy. Drones have fundamentally transformed the battlefield:

• Informational reconstruction: adapted commercial UAVs (DJI, FPV) provided tactical units with permanent surveillance capability, reducing the element of surprise.
• Attack drones: Ukraine employed Bayraktar TB2s in the early phases, and later developed inexpensive FPV drones to strike armour and fortifications. Russia responded with Iranian Shahed-136 kamikaze drones designed to exhaust Ukrainian air defences.
• Maritime drones opened a new chapter in naval engagements, challenging Russian dominance in the Black Sea.

Drones demonstrated that technological asymmetry can compensate for the lack of modern aviation or a large navy.

b) Satellites and the information domain. Western support gave Ukraine access to near-real-time satellite imagery, indispensable for operational planning. Private companies (such as Maxar and Planet Labs) and commercial constellations (Starlink) complemented governmental resources, democratizing access to space-based information.

• Starlink ensured resilient communications for Ukrainian command and control.
• Satellites enabled rapid identification of Russian movements and the correction of artillery fire.

This integration confirms that outer space is becoming a vital dimension of modern warfare.

c) Electronic warfare (EW). Both sides deployed extensive jamming and countermeasure capabilities:

• Russia used EW systems to disrupt drones and communications.
• Ukraine, supported by Western technology, developed systems to neutralize drones and protect critical infrastructure.

Result: the battlefield is a permanent electromagnetic competition space, where survival depends on continuous technological adaptation.

d) Cyber warfare. Cyberattacks targeted critical infrastructure (energy, communications, government institutions). Nevertheless, thanks to Western support, Ukraine withstood these attacks, while Russia failed to cause a collapse of Ukraine’s information systems. Lesson: cyber-resilience is a pillar of national security, and international alliances can be decisive.

e) Propaganda and the information war. The conflict has also been a war of narratives:

• Russia sought to justify the invasion through “denazification” and the defence of Russian minorities — a message accepted mainly domestically and in parts of the Global South.
• Ukraine succeeded in imposing the narrative of heroic resistance, winning Western public support.
• Social networks became tools of mobilization and propaganda, where the battle for perception was as intense as the fighting at the front.

f) Lessons for the future

• Commercial technologies (drones, satellites, digital platforms) can become decisive in a high-intensity conflict.
• Control of information and the narrative is an integral part of military strategy.
• The integration of drones, satellites, electronic warfare, and cyber operations defines the new hybrid-warfare model, where victory is not won solely on the physical battlefield.

7. Mobilization and human resources

a) Russia — between partial mobilization and social constraints. Russia began the war under the illusion that it could achieve strategic objectives through a rapid campaign without mobilizing society at large. After the initial failure, the Kremlin was forced to declare a partial mobilization in September 2022, the first of its kind since 1945.

• Around 300,000 reservists were called up, but inadequate training and equipment reduced their effectiveness.
• Mobilization triggered social discontent and a significant exodus of young Russians to other countries (Georgia, Kazakhstan, Finland).
• The Kremlin relied on recruiting from peripheral regions and on the use of mercenaries (Wagner), which eased pressure on major urban centres but generated internal tensions.

b) Ukraine — total mobilization and societal resilience. Ukraine adopted a strategy of general mobilization, turning society as a whole into a national resistance effort.

• The territorial defence network absorbed volunteers and reservists, creating a critical mass of combatants.
• Public morale, sustained by political leadership and Western support, became a force multiplier.
• As the conflict dragged on, however, Ukraine faced human exhaustion, difficulties in recruiting new cohorts, and significant losses among younger generations.

c) Human losses and their impact. Although exact figures are contested and often classified, both sides have suffered huge losses — hundreds of thousands of soldiers killed or wounded.

• Russia tried to compensate through quantity, mobilizing new waves of recruits.
• Ukraine relied on quality and Western training, but losses among experienced personnel are hard to replace.

Social impact is devastating: millions of families affected, a generation marked by trauma, and a prospect of accelerated depopulation, especially in Ukraine[9].

d) Lessons for mobilization

• Poorly prepared partial mobilization can fuel internal tensions and weaken national cohesion.
• Societal resilience and popular support are decisive for sustaining fighting capacity.
• Massive human losses turn war into an existential test, where political will must intertwine with the ability to regenerate human resources.

Partial conclusion. The Russia–Ukraine conflict shows that in high-intensity wars the human factor remains decisive, despite technological advances. Armies may field modern equipment, but without coherent mobilization, high morale, and societal resilience, victory is impossible.

1. The role of logistics and the defence industry — Ukraine depends on the West, while Russia relies on long-term production capacity; the tempo of production becomes determinant.
2. Testing national resilience — modern war is no longer fought by the military alone, but by the entire society (mobilization, morale, economic endurance).

8. International support and transnational cooperation

The Russia–Ukraine conflict has demonstrated that, in modern wars, no country of Ukraine’s size can sustain a high-intensity war over the long term without consistent, coordinated, and durable external support. Ukraine’s survival and fighting capacity have relied to a large extent on mobilizing and maintaining this support.

Western military assistance

• The United States, the United Kingdom, and EU/NATO countries have provided massive amounts of weaponry, ammunition, military equipment, drones, and air defence systems.
• The US has contributed packages worth over USD 75 billion (military, humanitarian, and financial assistance), the UK and Germany have each provided multibillion packages, while Poland, France, and the Baltic States have offered proportionally significant support.
• Transfers included both Soviet-era weapons from former Warsaw Pact stocks and modern Western systems (HIMARS, Leopard 2, Patriot, F-16 in preparation).
• Assistance evolved from emergency deliveries (2022) to coordinated, multiannual programmes (2023–2025).

Intelligence and technological support

• Western intelligence services (US, UK, NATO) have provided Ukraine with real-time data on Russian troop dispositions and movements, including commercial and military satellite imagery.
• Commercial satellite networks (e.g., Starlink) have ensured stable, jam-resistant communications.
• Western private companies have cooperated with the Ukrainian military in developing targeting software, fire coordination systems, and drone integration solutions.
• This information flow created a decision-making and rapid-reaction advantage on the battlefield, compensating for Ukraine’s numerical inferiority.

Logistical and economic support

• Neighbouring countries (Poland, Romania, Slovakia) became critical logistical corridors for the delivery of weapons, fuel, equipment, and humanitarian aid.
• Railway and road infrastructure was adapted for the rapid transport of heavy equipment.
• Economic support (grants, loans, budgetary assistance) enabled the Ukrainian state to pay its military, administration, and essential services despite the internal economic collapse.

Transnational cooperation and institutional integration

• Ukraine has been gradually included in Western military coordination mechanisms, participating in planning and intelligence-sharing with NATO.
• The EU created the EUMAM Ukraine mission, which has trained tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers in member states.
• The G7 states and the European Union have formed joint working groups for the long-term reconstruction and modernization of Ukraine’s armed forces.
• Multinational coordination formats have been established (the Ukraine Defence Contact Group — “Ramstein” format), which plan monthly deliveries and training.

Implications

• The conflict has shown that in an age of interdependence, coordinated external support can partially compensate for major internal shortcomings and can sustain the fighting capacity of a smaller state against a numerically superior adversary.
• Transnational cooperation has reduced reaction time, accelerated technological adaptation, and integrated Ukraine into a de facto Western military network, even without formal NATO membership.

For inspiration, truthfulness, and expressive power, I will end by quoting a lesser-known publicist: “War is not just a succession of battles. It is a psychological machine that sanctifies, exalts, disappoints, brutalizes — and then leaves scars that are passed on. If you do not understand the mechanisms, the traumas, the hatred, and the myths, they become fuel for the next blaze.”[10]

General conclusions — the military lessons of the Russia–Ukraine war

• The Russia–Ukraine war has shown that in modern conflicts technology does not replace human will and resilience — it only amplifies them where they already exist. Success does not depend on a single weapon, but on the ability to rapidly integrate information, logistics, morale, and initiative into a coherent system.
• In an era of prolonged and hybrid conflicts, war is no longer won by the strongest, but by the most adaptable — those able to combine innovation with discipline and to regenerate their forces under extreme pressure.

Specific conclusions

For NATO: The conflict validated the need for forward presence and real — not merely declarative — interoperability. Rapid reaction capability, logistical integration, and the readiness of conventional land forces are again major priorities, alongside support for non-member partners under pressure.

For the European Union: The EU has shown it can mobilize massive military, economic, and humanitarian resources, but it has also revealed the slowness of its decision-making process. The essential lesson is the need to build a coherent and sustainable common security and defence policy able to support a high-intensity war at the Union’s borders.

For Romania: The conflict confirms Romania’s vulnerable yet strategic position on NATO’s Eastern Flank. The main lesson is that national military and industrial resilience must be urgently rebuilt, and that territorial defence, reserve mobilization, and military logistics must be treated as matters of national security priority, not optional budget items.

Correlation with the geopolitical lessons

The military experience in Ukraine shows that brute force does not guarantee victory unless it is supported by alliances, economic resilience, and political legitimacy.

The military and geopolitical lessons converge on the same idea: the survival and success of a state in the 21st century depend on its ability to integrate national resources with international support networks.

The Russia–Ukraine war fits into the broader framework of the conflict between the older trend of globalization with its postmodernist dimension (including its DEI, “Cancel”, #MeToo, “Black Lives Matter” components, etc.) and multipolarity, represented mainly by the Global South and sovereigntism.

The way this war ends will significantly influence the future course of human society. And let us not forget China.

Brașov, 15 September 2025

 

Selective Bibliography

(Geopolitical Lessons from the Russia–Ukraine Conflict)

Borrell, J. (2022–2024). EU Foreign and Security Policy Speeches and Briefings on the War in Ukraine. Brussels: European External Action Service (EEAS).
Brzezinski, Z. (1997). The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. New York: Basic Books.
Chatham House. (2022–2025). Russia, Ukraine and the Future of European Security. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). (2023–2025). Geopolitical Implications of the Ukraine War. New York: CFR.
Eurasia Group. (2023–2025). Global Geopolitical Risk Outlook. New York.
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). (2022–2025). Ukraine and the Future of Europe. Berlin.
International Crisis Group (ICG). (2022–2025). Crisis Watch: Ukraine and Russia. Brussels.
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). (2023–2025). Strategic Survey. London: Routledge/IISS.
Kissinger, H. (2014). World Order. New York: Penguin Press.
Mead, W. R. (2023). The Return of Geopolitics. Foreign Affairs, New York.
NATO. (2022–2025). Strategic Concepts and Communiqués (Madrid 2022, Vilnius 2023, Washington 2024). Brussels.
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). (2022–2024). Reports on the Impact of the War in Ukraine on European Security Architecture. Vienna.
RAND Corporation. (2022–2025). Russia, Ukraine, and the Future of the Global Order. Santa Monica, CA.
The Economist. (2022–2025). Geopolitics and Global Order after Ukraine. Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), London.
Wilson Center – Kennan Institute. (2023–2025). Russia, Ukraine, and the Post-Soviet Space. Washington DC.

 (Military Lessons from the Russia–Ukraine Conflict)

BBC News. (2022–2025). Ukraine War – Analysis and Special Reports. BBC. Available at: https://www.bbc.com
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). (2023). Technology and Modern Warfare: Implications from Ukraine. Washington DC. Available at: https://www.csis.org
Chatham House. (2023). Ukraine: Lessons for the Future of Warfare. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
European Commission – Eurostat. (2022–2025). Temporary protection for persons fleeing Ukraine – Monthly statistics. Brussels. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat
Financial Times. (2022–2025). Ukraine conflict coverage and defence industry analysis. FT Group.
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). (2023–2025). The Military Balance. London: Routledge/IISS.
Institute for the Study of War (ISW). (2022–2025). Russia–Ukraine War: Daily Campaign Assessments. Washington DC. Available at: https://www.understandingwar.org
Kyiv Independent. (2022–2025). Field Reports and Military Situation Updates. Kyiv. Available at: https://kyivindependent.com
Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom (UK MOD). (2022–2025). Defence Intelligence Daily Updates on Ukraine. London. Available at: https://x.com/DefenceHQ
NATO Defence College (NDC). (2022–2024). Ukraine: Lessons for NATO Defence and Deterrence Posture. Rome: NATO NDC.
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). (2023). Cyber Operations in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Tallinn.
RAND Corporation. (2023). Adapting Operational Planning for High-Intensity Warfare: Lessons from Ukraine. Santa Monica, CA.
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). (2022–2025). Watling, J. & Reynolds, N. Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Ukraine. London: RUSI.
UNHCR. (2022–2025). Ukraine Situation – Operational Data Portal. Geneva. Available at: https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine
Ukrainska Pravda. (2022–2025). Reports and Military Coverage. Kyiv. Available at: https://www.pravda.com.ua

 

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[1]  Russian initial plan and early failures
Some Western sources have suggested that Russia counted on the “rapid collapse” of Ukraine’s political leadership in Kyiv, either through internal pressure or possible infiltration. The Kremlin seemed convinced that Zelensky would not withstand the psychological and political pressure and that he would either flee or capitulate in the first days. Reality turned out to be the opposite: Zelensky’s decision to remain in Kyiv — “I need ammunition, not a ride” — galvanized resistance.

Failed command operations. In the first 48 hours, Russia launched a spectacular airborne operation on Hostomel Airport on the outskirts of Kyiv. The goal was to quickly bring in elite units (VDV) to capture the capital and likely the political leadership. The operation failed due to Ukrainian resistance and lack of coordination, leading to significant losses among Russian paratroopers.

Support from clandestine networks. It is likely that Moscow also counted on the support of agent networks and collaborators infiltrated into Ukrainian security structures. These failed to achieve their objectives, and the SBU (Ukrainian Security Service) rapidly initiated purges and arrests.

In conclusion, the Russian plan was not merely a conventional blitzkrieg, but also an attempt to “decapitate” the Ukrainian state through a combination of: direct military pressure; special operations to seize the capital; and the expectation of a quick “capitulation” or betrayal at the top. The failure of these components forced Russia to shift to a prolonged war of attrition.

² Simultaneous multi-axis attack as a strategic error. Another strategic error was the simultaneous attack on multiple axes, most likely based on incomplete and faulty intelligence.
By doing so, Russia abandoned the principle of concentrating forces on a main axis (and at most 1–2 secondary axes), betting that a broad-front, multi-directional assault would overstretch Ukrainian defences and reduce resistance — which did not happen.

 

[3] Russian response to the Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region. The Russian reaction to the Ukrainian penetration into the Kursk region highlighted both Moscow’s vulnerabilities and its resilience.

In the initial phase, border troops and National Guard (Rosgvardia) units were deployed, although they were poorly prepared for conventional combat, followed by mobilized reserves and local volunteers. Only after several weeks were regular army units — mechanized brigades and airborne formations — concentrated,  supported by artillery and tactical aviation.Strategic surprise, insufficient border defences, mobilization difficulties, and competing priorities on the Donbas front meant that eliminating the penetration took months.

The main lesson is that although an adversary with massive resources can be surprised and slowed down in the short term, it has the ability to gradually retake territory once it concentrates its forces — confirming the importance of planning a long-term strategy, not just demonstrative actions.

Exceptional use of North Korean troops. Russia exceptionally resorted to troops from North Korea to bolster efforts to counter the Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region. In autumn 2024, about 10,000–12,000 North Korean soldiers were trained in Russia and deployed to the front, operating under Russian uniforms and command — and this was publicly confirmed by Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un in April 2025.

In parallel, construction brigades (5,000 workers) and demining units (1,000 engineers) were mobilized to restore territorial infrastructure.

This measure reflects not only the need to supplement Russian forces, but also the political and military solidarity mechanisms between Moscow and Pyongyang — and for North Korea it provided an opportunity to gain operational experience.

Despite their loyalty, the North Korean troops suffered heavy losses — recent estimates indicate about 600 killed and several thousand wounded by the summer of 2025 — underscoring the military and moral cost of such cooperation.

[4] HUMINT sources and early warning before the invasion. In the months preceding the invasion (autumn 2021 – January 2022), the United States and the United Kingdom managed to obtain human intelligence from inside Russian decision-making circles.

HUMINT sources provided concrete details about the Kremlin’s intention to launch a large-scale invasion, including the planned axes of attack and the approximate timeline.

This data was corroborated with SIGINT and IMINT information and enabled Washington and London to publicly warn Ukraine and NATO allies — including through the selective declassification of intelligence (a rare move).

Impact: Ukraine managed to disperse part of its forces and critical infrastructure in advance, while the West imposed an early framework of sanctions and military support.

Lesson: HUMINT sometimes remains the only way to uncover real political intentions, which cannot be deduced solely from satellite imagery or intercepts.

[5] The network of Ukrainian agents in the occupied territories (Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donbas). After the rapid occupation of Kherson city (March 2022), the Ukrainian SBU and GUR services reactivated and expanded local clandestine HUMINT networks, composed of civil servants, former military personnel, and co-opted civilians. These networks provided critical information on the locations of Russian command posts, ammunition depots, and troop movements. The data collected by these human agents enabled highly precise strikes by Ukrainian artillery and HIMARS systems on Russian targets, thereby paving the way for the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the autumn of 2022. In parallel, HUMINT contributed to identifying local Russian collaborators and to secretly disseminating pro-Ukrainian propaganda materials aimed at sustaining the morale of the population in the occupied areas.
Lesson: In contested environments where surveillance infrastructure is limited, HUMINT is essential both for precise targeting and for maintaining local resilience.

[6] The use of the Starlink system has been accompanied by controversies regarding its control and costs. Decisions made by SpaceX and Elon Musk on limiting or expanding the service in certain areas have directly influenced Ukrainian military operations. Moreover, after a period during which several Western states contributed to covering the costs, Poland announced that it would no longer bear the expenses for Starlink services provided to Ukraine, highlighting the fragility of arrangements based on private infrastructure in the context of a prolonged conflict. This funding will be discontinued as a result of the Polish president’s veto, which is set to take effect on 1 October 2025 unless the decision is reversed before then. Between 2022 and 2024, Poland paid approximately €77 million for this service. The EU is currently seeking a solution to this issue, which would amount to roughly €30–35 million per year, to be provided either by the EU or by a consortium of allied states.

[7] 2022 (the invasion and initial phase)
Frequent estimates: Russia fired 20,000–60,000 shells per day; Ukraine around 5,000–7,000 per day (sometimes less). Commonly cited ratio: approximately 3:1 to 6:1 in Russia’s favor (context consolidated from NATO/AP reporting and later analyses).

2023
Ukraine’s estimated requirement to sustain defensive fighting: 75,000–90,000 shells per month (≈2.5–3 thousand/day), and well above this level for major offensive operations. Russia accelerated domestic production.
Actual transfers to Ukraine: about 1.6 million shells (2023).

2024–2025 (war of attrition, large-scale influx of North Korean ammunition)
Ukraine at times had to ration fire to about 2,000 shells/day amid supply delays; in other months it reached up to ~110,000 shells/month (improved capacity) but still below strategic requirements. Russia fired on average ~300,000 shells/month (≈10,000/day) and sustained this pace through domestic production (~250,000/month at peak estimates in 2024) plus imports from the DPRK. Some Russian units relied on 50–100% North Korean ammunition in certain periods; Ukrainian/Western assessments estimate DPRK’s contribution at ~40–60% of Russia’s total consumption in 2024–2025.
Actual transfers to Ukraine: about 1.5 million shells (2024).

Operational conclusion:
Quantity vs. quality: Russia maintained a quantitative advantage in both the number of artillery pieces and the overall volume of fire (decisively supported by North Korean ammunition). Ukraine partly compensated through precision, ISR from drones, and counter-battery strikes, but the fire ratio often remained ≥3:1 in Russia’s favor (and even higher on some sectors in 2024). Industry and logistics dictate tempo: without a flow of about 2.4 million 155 mm shells per year just to “hold the line” (RUSI estimate), Ukraine remains constrained to fire economy.

[8] Example — Russia: Collapse of the Kyiv offensive (February–March 2022)
In the initial phase of the invasion, Russian forces advanced rapidly toward Kyiv from Belarus with very long armored columns (60–70 km), relying on a blitzkrieg-style operation.
However, logistics failed to keep pace with the advance: supply lines became overstretched, dirt roads turned into mud, and convoys were vulnerable to ambushes.
Russian units ran out of fuel, ammunition, and food, were forced to abandon vehicles, and had to halt the offensive.
The lack of a flexible logistical structure and of convoy protection was a decisive factor in the strategic failure to capture Kyiv, forcing Russia to fully withdraw from northern Ukraine.
Lesson: Even a numerically superior force can be neutralized if its logistical chain is overstretched or disrupted—especially in a contested and extended battlespace.

Example — Ukraine: Maintaining the “Dnipro–Bakhmut” logistics corridor in 2023
During the attritional battle for Bakhmut (January–May 2023), Ukraine continued to defend the city despite intense Russian pressure.
The key factor was the organization of a constant and redundant logistics corridor between Dnipro–Kramatorsk–Bakhmut, which allowed: frequent rotation of units (every 7–10 days); continuous supply of artillery ammunition, anti-tank weapons, and medical provisions; and rapid evacuation of wounded personnel (using armored ambulances and reconnaissance drones to guide safe routes).
Although the Russians almost completely controlled the flanks and targeted the roads with artillery and Lancet drones, the Ukrainians maintained 3–4 active logistics routes in parallel, with daily repairs and demining operations, sustaining a functional “logistics lifeline” under fire.
This logistical infrastructure enabled them to hold out in Bakhmut for over eight months, consuming and fixing a massive volume of Russian forces—even though they were ultimately forced to withdraw from the city center.

[9] Top host countries for Ukrainian refugees — latest officially available figures (ranked in descending order by number of Ukrainians with temporary protection or equivalent status): Germany – 1,203,715; Poland – 993,665; Czechia – 380,680; Spain – 242,090; Romania – 190,491; United Kingdom – ~227,000; Netherlands – ~120,000; Bulgaria – ≈75,250.
In total, there are about 4,340,000 Ukrainian refugees worldwide. Among them, approximately 800,000–1,000,000 are estimated to be fit for military service.

[10] Răzvan Bibire — Editor-in-Chief at Deșteptarea.ro — Cum va fi războiul (“What the War Will Be Like”).