“A nation without a strategic vision has no future, only reflexes.”
— adaptation after Raymond Aron
By Lieutenant General Corneliu Pivariu (ret)
The Meaning of a Strategic Signal
The announcement regarding the withdrawal of part of the American troops from Romania[2] is not merely an operational adjustment of the U.S. presence on NATO’s eastern front. Rather, it is a strategic signal that must be read in the context of a world undergoing reconfiguration. At a time when the global balance of power is under multiple pressures — from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East to the emergence of a new Eurasian economic axis — any change in the U.S. military footprint in Eastern Europe carries major significance. It demonstrates the evolution toward a multipolar world in which the United States can no longer act as “the world’s policeman.”
Romania, situated “at the gate of storms,” in a buffer zone between Russia, the Balkans, and the Black Sea, is directly exposed to these shifts. This partial withdrawal should not be viewed through panic or conspiracy theories, but as a test of strategic maturity: does Romania have its own vision of its place in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture? Or does it continue to define its position merely through reflexes of loyalty to its partners?
Unable to properly assert its own interests and present its true strategic importance, Romania must escape the political stagnation in which it finds itself and act with strategic vision to preserve its future.
The Political Level – Between Loyalty and Lack of Vision
Politically, Washington constantly adjusts its global posture. If during 2022–2024 the focus was on consolidating the eastern flank, we are now witnessing a rebalancing — a redistribution of resources toward other areas of interest, including the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. This is not a withdrawal from NATO commitments, but a strategic optimization, in a world where the United States must carefully calibrate its military and financial presence.
Nevertheless, we cannot fail to observe that this rebalancing takes place in Romania and not in Poland, which is also on the eastern flank. Most likely, this is due to a certain political “de-synchronization” that Romania has demonstrated over the 35 years since the events of December 1989, during which it has had to live under the vision of the politicians who governed it[3].
The problem is not what the United States is doing, but what Romania is not doing. For more than three decades, Romania’s strategic discourse has been limited to formulas such as “strategic partnership”, “firm commitment”, “full support for allies.” Although diplomatically correct, these do not constitute a strategic narrative. Romania needs its own story about itself: about its role in the region, its national interests, the balance between security and development.
The absence of such a narrative results in dependence on the perceptions of others. Countries in the region offer contrasting models: Poland asserts itself as a regional leader through massive defense investments; Hungary cultivates its sovereign and mediator profile; Turkey plays the role of pivot between geopolitical blocs. Romania, by contrast, defines itself through strategic silence — it reacts, often belatedly, but rarely acts.
The Military Dimension – Between Presence and Relevance
From a military perspective, the partial withdrawal of U.S. troops does not signify abandonment, but rather a resilience test for Romania’s Armed Forces and national defense system. For years, Romania has relied on allied presence as a security guarantee. Yet external guarantees cannot substitute internal responsibility.
Without a realistic national defense strategy, grounded in its own priorities, Romania risks becoming merely a logistical territory, not a strategic actor. The military infrastructure developed with allied support (the Mihail Kogălniceanu base, the facilities at Câmpia Turzii or Deveselu) must be matched by a competitive national defense industry capable of ensuring minimal autonomy in times of crisis.
At present, Romania continues to lean on the symbolism of the “NATO umbrella” without building its own shield. In a multipolar world where alliances are increasingly flexible, real security is measured in internal capability, not in the number of joint declarations.
The current state of the Romanian Armed Forces unfortunately reflects a growing gap between political rhetoric and operational reality.
In terms of personnel, the army faces a chronic shortage of active troops and reservists. The average age exceeds 40, and voluntary recruitment fails to offset retirements and professional migration. Military education has been partially modernized, but tactical training and adaptation to new forms of warfare (hybrid, cyber, informational) remain insufficient, especially at unit level.
Regarding equipment, Romania has made specific advances (Patriot systems, HIMARS, Piranha armored vehicles, F-16 modernization), but without national industrial and logistical coherence. The absence of an integrated strategy leaves acquisitions largely dependent on imports and allied initiatives, with limited contribution to the domestic defense economy.
As for the national defense industry, it survives more through inertia than vision[4]. Many capacities are unused or technologically outdated, and the production chain no longer covers even basic needs in ammunition, maintenance, and individual equipment. Recent attempts at revitalization (such as reopening powder production in Făgăraș[5]) are welcome, but cannot replace the lack of a coherent defense industrial policy coordinated between the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of National Defense.
Overall, Romania’s military system operates under a structural imbalance: insufficient and partially unprepared personnel, modern equipment but poorly integrated, an inert defense industry, and growing reliance on allied infrastructure. Without a long-term national program reconnecting training, procurement, and domestic production, Romania risks remaining a military transit corridor, not a source of strategic regional resilience.
Romania Between Globalism and Strategic Sovereignty
The absence of a national strategic narrative is visible in Romania’s relation to major global trends. In the context of the confrontation between globalism and sovereignty, Romania has failed to define its own position. The country oscillates between full attachment to Western structures and a latent, content-less sovereigntism.
A state that does not know its priorities cannot claim a regional leadership role. A strategic narrative is not merely a communication exercise, but a national thinking framework: it links foreign policy objectives to economic, energy, defense, and cultural goals.
Without such a framework, Romania risks becoming a transit gate for the interests of others — a buffer zone between spheres of influence, but without true decision-making power. In the absence of a coherent strategy, even the best partnerships become dependencies, and allied presence risks being perceived more as a substitute for internal vision than as the result of conscious planning.
The Need for a Strategic Compass
The partial withdrawal of American troops from Romania is a test of geopolitical clarity. It is not a loss of protection, but an opportunity for reflection. It shows that Romania needs, more than ever, its own strategic compass — an integrated vision of defense, economy, and diplomacy.
A state that aspires to stability and respect must speak through initiative, not reflex. Romania has the resources, geographic position, and historical experience to become a pillar of regional balance, but this cannot be achieved without a coherent internal vision. Yet, the politicians who have led the country for the past 35 years are preoccupied with petty interests, eager to please one side or another to preserve their privileges, and lack strategic vision.
A national strategic research center, a politically educated elite in geopolitics, and an informed society are the minimum conditions for formulating a credible national narrative.
Without it, Romania risks remaining what it has gradually become: a gate open to storms, but without a lighthouse to foresee them. Yet Romania is not condemned to be a gate to storms — it can become the lighthouse that signals them. The choice lies entirely with us.
Brașov, 29 October 2025
[1] An expression inspired by the title of Eusebiu Camilar’s book “Poarta furtunilor” (The Gate of Storms), published by Editura Militară in 1955, which recounts episodes from medieval history, when Romania stood at the crossroads of three empires: Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg.
[2] The decision to suspend the rotation of a U.S. brigade — which was to be deployed across several allied countries, including Romania — was communicated by Romania’s Ministry of National Defense on 29 October 2025. It was specified that approximately 1,000 U.S. troops will remain on Romanian territory, and that the modification concerns primarily the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base (the only location where the rotation of the brigade will no longer take place).
[3] Immediately after 1989, Romania missed the opportunity to unite with the Republic of Moldova, and even concluded a treaty with the USSR, which was already on the verge of collapse. Romania’s integration into the European Union and NATO was achieved with a delay of 5–6 years, after other Eastern European states had already been accepted. This was due to internal reasons: the absence of a consistent political elite, economic fragmentation, and delayed reforms.
Although the political leadership in the United States changed, Romania remained attached to the political orientation of the Obama and Biden administrations, without adapting to the strong conservative shift that occurred in 2024–2025. This is also illustrated by the presence in the Bucharest government, in positions of primary importance, of personalities well-known for their political preferences and public statements openly opposed to the current administration in Washington, including recently through the nomination of a new Deputy Prime Minister and the continued posting in Washington of an underperforming ambassador.
[4] According to data available from September–October 2025, a significant number of enterprises within the National Company Romarm S.A. and its network of military-profile subsidiaries (Uzina Mecanică Cugir, Plopeni, Dragomirești, Sadu, Mija, Carfil, Moreni, Metrom, etc.) do not have their revenue and expenditure budgets approved for the current year.
[5] In December 2005, powder production at the Făgăraș Powder Plant was largely halted. It was only on 27 August 2025 that the Romanian state signed a contract with Rheinmetall — Germany for the construction of a new strategic powder production facility for ammunition, more than three years after the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine.
