“The greatest enemy of intelligence analysis is not deception, but the assumptions we fail to question.”
Richard J. Heuer Jr.
By Lieutenant General (ret) Corneliu Pivariu
The accelerated transformations of the international environment in recent years — the prolonged conflict in Ukraine, geopolitical volatility in the Middle East, the intensification of hybrid operations, and the proliferation of external interference in democratic processes — have brought back to the forefront an old structural problem of the European Union: the absence of a coherent capacity for strategic assessment and risk anticipation. Although the EU benefits from complex institutions, diverse analytical tools, and a broad network of specialized agencies, it does not possess an integrated intelligence architecture comparable to that of major powers.
In this context, the European Commission has begun exploring the creation of an analytical intelligence cell — a body placed under the authority of the Commission’s Secretariat-General, designed to provide an internal capacity for strategic analysis. The initiative became public through reports from the Financial Times, Reuters, Euronews, and DefenseNews, triggering a complex wave of interpretations, debates, and institutional reactions.
Although the international press has speculated about the emergence of “a European spy agency,” the project has no connection with expanding the EU’s operative competences. It does not seek to collect classified information, conduct surveillance, engage in espionage[1], or run clandestine operations — activities that remain strictly within the remit of the Member States. The real objective is the consolidation of EU capacity to integrate, interpret, and anticipate information in ways that reduce vulnerability and strategic dependence in the field of informational security.
This analysis examines, from a professional and academic perspective, the potential of this initiative to shape how the EU understands threats, manages risks, and develops strategic autonomy. It also explores the implications for Romania — a state located on the Union’s eastern frontier, in a region marked by conflict, hybrid risks, informational competition, and rapid geopolitical developments.
Legal and Institutional Framework
The creation of an intelligence cell within the European Commission must be understood within the strict parameters of the EU’s legal framework, which defines the Union’s institutional possibilities and constraints. Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union is explicit: “national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.”
This provision constitutes the foundation of the entire European security architecture and firmly limits any institutional ambition to expand competences in the field of operative intelligence. Consequently:
- *The European Union cannot obligatorily collect classified information from Member States;
- *it cannot conduct clandestine operations;
- *it cannot coordinate espionage activities;
- *it cannot establish an operative structure similar to national intelligence services.
Within this restrictive framework, the only available room for manoeuvre is the development of analytical, not collection, capacity.
This explains why the project focuses on the least sensitive yet essential segment: the integration and interpretation of available information.
At EU level, the existing analytical structure is EU INTCEN, part of the European External Action Service (EEAS). INTCEN operates under an intergovernmental logic, based on voluntary information exchange — primarily OSINT and limited classified contributions from Member States. Its mandate is predominantly focused on supporting EU foreign policy and crisis management, while also producing assessments of threats that may affect the Union’s internal security. However, it does not hold operative competences nor functions comparable to national intelligence services.
In this context, the idea of a new analytical cell under the Commission has emerged — not as a replica of INTCEN, but as a complementary mechanism focused on strengthening the Union’s internal resilience: monitoring foreign interference, analysing systemic vulnerabilities, supporting cybersecurity policies, and integrating data from the Commission’s numerous directorates-general. The new structure would have a predominantly analytical and coordinative role, without operative competences or functions associated with national intelligence services.
Probable Architecture and Functional Logic
The structure taking shape under the concept of an “EU Intelligence Cell” can best be described as an integrated hub for strategic analysis, meant to provide EU political leadership with faster, more coherent, and more in-depth understanding of the risks facing the Union. In the absence of operative competences, the added value of this cell would lie in:
- its capacity to integrate multiple sources of information, both internal and open-source;
- cross-sectoral risk analysis, connecting energy, digital, democratic, and economic security;
- anticipation of hybrid risks;
- delivery of coherent, data-driven briefings directly to the Commission’s leadership.
This architecture would remain fully dependent on cooperation with Member States, with INTCEN, and with the EU’s technical networks (CERT-EU, Joint Research Centre).
The fundamental difference compared to INTCEN lies in its mandate and institutional positioning: INTCEN primarily supports EU foreign policy and intergovernmental intelligence cooperation, while the new cell would play an analytical role focused on the Union’s internal dimension — namely democratic resilience, protection of digital infrastructure, and integration of information originating from the Commission’s technical structures. This does not imply operative competences, but rather an enhanced analytical and coordinative capacity in emerging domains of internal vulnerability.
Recent developments in Brussels suggest tensions regarding the delineation of competences: the EEAS fears a diminution of its role, while Member States are concerned with maintaining control over sensitive information. At the same time, the Commission benefits from favourable terrain, as the domains of democratic resilience and digital security already fall under its supranational competences.
Extending INTCEN’s mandate is not feasible, not only because of the EEAS’s institutional limitations, but also due to the EU’s political configuration. France wants INTCEN to remain an instrument of foreign policy aligned with its own vision of strategic autonomy, while Germany favours a decentralised architecture and is wary of any centralisation of intelligence at European level. Nordic and Central-Eastern European states are concerned with transparency, institutional balance, and preventing excessive concentration of analytical power within the EEAS. In this context, placing a new analytical cell under the Commission is perceived as the least politically sensitive option and the one most compatible with its existing competences: internal resilience, cybersecurity, combating foreign interference, and analysing systemic vulnerabilities of the EU.
Thus, the future architecture will depend on the institutional balance that will be negotiated in 2025–2026 between the Commission, the Council, the EEAS, and the Member States. Ultimately, it will reflect not only this institutional balance, but also the level of strategic ambition that Member States are willing to allow the Commission in the field of internal resilience.
The Strategic Rationale of the Initiative
The creation of an analytical cell within the European Commission is not a spectacular innovation, but rather a response to three major developments:
Lessons from the War in Ukraine
The EU was profoundly dependent on American and British intelligence. The absence of an internal anticipatory capacity meant that institutional reactions were at times slow, fragmented, or reactive. This dependency triggered broad debates on the Union’s analytical — not operative — autonomy.
Intensification of Hybrid Risks
Russian and Chinese interference, cyberattacks, information manipulation, the instrumentalization of diaspora communities, and delegitimization campaigns have reached unprecedented levels. The EU has realized that it cannot manage these risks exclusively through dispersed technical structures.
The Need for a Common Culture of Anticipation
Member States possess different institutional cultures and divergent analytical standards. In the absence of a shared framework, the EU remains vulnerable to fragmentation and delayed reactions.
In essence, the initiative does not aim to create a European intelligence service, but to obtain a minimal degree of analytical autonomy — without which the EU remains dependent on the assessments of major powers.
Reactions, Sensitivities, and Risks
Member States view the initiative through the prism of their own interests and concerns. Nordic and Benelux countries are the most open, considering that a common architecture strengthens collective resilience. France and Germany are cautious but inclined to offer support, provided that control over sensitive data is preserved.
Eastern frontier states, including Romania, perceive the initiative as both an opportunity and a potential source of tension with national intelligence services. The most significant risks include:
- *overlap between the Commission and EEAS;
- *lack of clarity in the mandate;
- *politicization of analysis;
- *resistance from national intelligence services;
- *insufficient definition of information flows and caveats[2].
Implications for Romania
For Romania, the project presents a dual opportunity. On one hand, it can actively contribute to shaping the new European analytical architecture, strengthening its profile as an eastern-flank state with meaningful expertise in managing hybrid risks and Russian interference. On the other hand, it must strictly protect the sovereignty of operative information, maintaining a clear distinction between European-level analysis and sensitive national intelligence flows.
Romania can benefit through:
- *seconding experts specialized in hybrid risk analysis;
- *promoting strategic issues related to the Black Sea;
- *establishing a national interinstitutional liaison point;
- *strengthening its own OSINT capacities;
- *rapid access to integrated European assessments.
At the same time, Bucharest must articulate a clear set of caveats regarding data that may be shared. Any sharing of operative information should be avoided.
The Commission’s initiative to develop its own analytical capacity does not represent an attempt to centralize European espionage, but an effort to modernize the Union’s culture of strategic anticipation. In an era of hybrid threats, information manipulation, and cyberattacks, the ability to rapidly understand and integrate data from multiple sources becomes a fundamental component of European resilience.
Europe cannot afford to remain without a common architecture for strategic assessment. Without it, the continent remains dependent, fragmented, and vulnerable to pressures from state and non-state actors.
For Romania, the moment is favourable: it can influence the direction of the project, promote the priorities of the eastern frontier, and strengthen its profile within the European security architecture — provided that it firmly protects its informational sovereignty.
Brașov, November, 17, 2025
Selective Bibliography
Journalistic and Institutional Sources
- Financial Times. “EU to set up new intelligence unit under Ursula von der Leyen.” 11 Nov. 2025. Financial Times+.
- Reuters. “EU to set up new intelligence unit under Ursula von der Leyen – FT reports.” 11 Nov. 2025.
- Höller, Linus. “The European Union wants its own intelligence branch.” DefenseNews, 12 Nov. 2025.
- Euronews. “Is the EU spy unit about to become reality? Von der Leyen wants her own secret service.” 11 Nov. 2025.
- Moutseras, Efthymios. INTCEN’s Strategic Role in a New Security Era. Research Paper No. 109, KEDISA, Nov. 2024.
- European External Action Service (EEAS). Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence. July 2024.
- European External Action Service (EEAS). A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence. 2022.
- European External Action Service (EEAS). “The Diplomatic Service of the European Union.” [Website]. Accessed 2025.
- European Union. EU INTCEN Factsheet. 5 Feb. 2015. Statewatch.org.
- European Parliament – Research Service (EPRS). The EU’s Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN): State of Play. Briefing Paper, Oct. 2023.
Foundational Theoretical Works
- Kent, Sherman. Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. Princeton University Press, 1949.
Heuer, Richards J. Jr. Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999.
Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. CQ Press, 2019.
Omand, David. Securing the State. Hurst Publishers, 2010.
Rid, Thomas. Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020.
[1] The term “espionage” is used here in its operative sense — referring to clandestine information-gathering activities (undercover HUMINT, covert operations, infiltration). The press often employs this term metaphorically when describing European analytical structures; however, the EU does not conduct and cannot conduct such actions, as it lacks any operative competences comparable to those of national intelligence services.
[2] In NATO, EU, and wider Western intelligence documentation, “caveats” represent additional restrictions applied on top of the classification level (SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, etc.), determining how information may be handled and disseminated. Common examples include: NOFORN (prohibits dissemination to foreign nationals), ORCON (redistribution permitted only with the originator’s consent), REL TO EU/NATO (release limited to designated partners), LIMDIS (limited distribution to a restricted group), or EU-specific markings such as EU RESTRICTED, EU CONFIDENTIAL, and LIMITE. These caveats serve to protect the source, operational context, and integrity of the information within a multinational environment.
