“The greatest enemy of knowledge is not ignorance, but the illusion of knowledge.”
— Daniel J. Boorstin
By Major General (Two Stars) (retd) Corneliu Pivariu
In the current context, characterized by strategic complexity and narrative competition, the role of intelligence can no longer be assessed exclusively through the lens of information collection, but through its capacity to support decision-making based on an unaltered evaluation of reality.
The relationship between the politico-military elite and the intelligence community represents one of the critical nodes of state functioning in the security domain. Within this space, not only is information produced, but what may be called strategic truth is constructed—a form of knowledge that is inherently incomplete, probabilistic, and permanently subjected to political and narrative pressure.
Intelligence does not provide certainties, and the politico-military elite (PME) is not merely a passive recipient. Between the two lies an essential process: the transformation of information into strategic courses of action. The quality of this process ultimately determines the quality of political decision-making.
Intelligence as the Raw Material of Decision-Making
The fundamental function of intelligence is to reduce uncertainty, not eliminate it. No intelligence community, regardless of available resources, can provide a complete and definitive picture of strategic reality. Assessments are probabilistic, scenarios are conditional, and warnings are often uncomfortable.
Within this framework, the PME occupies a critical intermediary position. It must interpret information, correlate it with political, military, economic, and alliance dimensions, and transform it into intelligible courses of action. This process is not mechanical; it requires professional judgment, experience, and risk assumption.
In most cases, the problem does not arise from a lack of information, but from how it is used. When intelligence becomes a justificatory backdrop or, conversely, is perceived as a threat to a pre-existing political agenda, the decision-making process degrades and strategic truth becomes distorted.
Strategic Truth: Nature and Limits
Strategic truth is not an objective truth in the classical sense, but an operational construct resulting from the aggregation of incomplete information, competing interpretations, and political and institutional constraints.
It is neither fixed nor definitive. It is dynamic, revisable, and dependent on the institutional capacity to integrate information and to correct initial assumptions. The difference between a high-performing state and a vulnerable one lies not in access to information, but in the ability to construct and maintain a strategic truth as close to reality as possible.
In this sense, strategic truth is not given—it is produced. And the process through which it is produced becomes itself a critical variable of national security.
The Political Filtering of Information
One of the most frequent failures of the strategic decision-making process is not the absence of information, but its biased selection.
In most cases, relevant information exists, but it is filtered: data that confirms already assumed political options is privileged, while contradictory information is marginalized or reinterpreted. This is not necessarily falsification, but a subtle and systematic distortion.
This process may be defined as a form of politicization of strategic truth, in which the evaluation of reality is adapted to the decision objective, rather than the reverse.
Under these conditions, intelligence loses its warning function, and strategic decision-making becomes an exercise in validation, not orientation.
At this point, the PME becomes the critical link. It can function either as a protective filter of strategic truth or as a mechanism for adapting it to the political preferences of the moment.
Its role is not merely to organize information, but to decide what reaches the level of political decision and in what form. Responsibility thus becomes structural, not merely technical.
PME: Beneficiary or Obstacle to Strategic Truth
The quality of a politico-military elite is reflected in its relationship with strategic truth.
A mature PME treats intelligence as a critical resource, encourages analytical pluralism, and accepts professional disagreement as a normal component of the decision-making process. It understands that repeated warnings, even if they do not immediately materialize, are not failures, but expressions of strategic prudence.
By contrast, a defensive or politicized PME tends to penalize analysis that contradicts the dominant line. In such contexts, analytical self-censorship emerges: analysts avoid uncomfortable scenarios in order not to be perceived as alarmist or disloyal.
A PME that penalizes uncomfortable analysis not only reduces its performance but loses its fundamental strategic function. Instead of protecting the state from surprise, it becomes a mechanism of self-confirmation.
Lessons from Recent Failures
The experience of recent conflicts and crises[1] reveals a constant pattern: strategic surprise does not occur because intelligence has completely failed, but because warnings were not integrated into the decision-making process. The problem is not the absence of signals, but the inability to transform them into decisions.
Early warning signals exist, but they are ignored, reinterpreted as improbable, or adapted to an already established narrative.
Each time, the PME stands at the center of this process. It decides which information is considered relevant, how it is framed, and what options are built around it. Responsibility is both strategic and moral, even when it is not formally sanctioned.
The Tension Between Loyalty and Honesty
The relationship between PME and intelligence is marked by a structural tension between institutional loyalty and analytical honesty.
Loyalty to the state and to political leadership is essential. But when loyalty is reinterpreted as the obligation to confirm political expectations, it becomes a form of strategic irresponsibility.
Institutional loyalty must not be confused with analytical conformism.
When critical analysis is discouraged or penalized, intelligence loses its warning function, and the PME becomes an instrument of validation rather than strategic protection. The ability to uphold uncomfortable truths becomes, in this context, a strategic resource in itself.
Strategic Truth in the Era of Narrative Competition
In the current context, strategic truth is subject to an additional pressure: global narrative competition.
Information is no longer only evaluated internally but is integrated into a space of perception confrontation, where legitimacy, morality, and credibility become strategic weapons. The PME must distinguish between the need to protect sensitive information and the temptation to adapt reality to a desired public narrative.
The greatest risk is not external manipulation, but strategic self-deception.
When narrative becomes more important than realistic assessment, the state begins to operate on the basis of a constructed reality rather than an existing one. Under such conditions, strategic error is no longer accidental, but inevitable.
The role of the PME is to maintain a functional separation between communication and analysis, between public messaging and internal assessment. Confusion between the two inevitably degrades decision quality.
Conclusion
The relationship between the politico-military elite and the intelligence community is not merely technical, but fundamental to the functioning of the state.
States do not fail because they lack information, but because they are unable to accept the truth contained within it.
A mature PME leverages warnings, protects analytical pluralism, and accepts uncertainty as a structural element of decision-making. A PME that filters, sanitizes, or instrumentalizes information dramatically reduces its strategic relevance.
Ultimately, the quality of a politico-military elite is measured not only by professional competence, but by its ability to protect strategic truth—even when it contradicts the interests, perceptions, or political comfort of the moment.
The fundamental issue is not whether states possess sufficient information, but whether they are capable of using it without distorting it. In this sense, strategic truth becomes not only a product of intelligence, but a condition for the functioning of the state.
Brașov, March 19, 2026
[1] Recent examples of dysfunctions in the relationship between intelligence, the politico-military elite, and political decision-making illustrate the structural nature of the problem:
In the case of the intervention in Iraq (2003), intelligence regarding the existence of weapons of mass destruction was profoundly distorted in the decision-making process. Subsequent investigations showed that intelligence assessments were selectively used, reinterpreted, and, in some cases, presented in a manner that supported an already formed political option. The problem was not merely one of analytical error, but of the deliberate adaptation of information to a political objective, which compromised the integrity of the strategic decision-making process.
In the context of Afghanistan (2021), numerous intelligence community assessments signaled the institutional fragility of the Afghan state and its dependence on external support. Nevertheless, the pace and form of the withdrawal indicated a discrepancy between existing assessments and the way they were integrated into political decision-making, leading to the rapid collapse of the previously supported system.
In the case of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022), warnings regarding the imminence of the conflict existed and were communicated, including publicly, by certain Western states. However, at the European level, part of the political and analytical elites assessed the risk as low or unlikely, highlighting the difficulty of integrating scenarios perceived as having low probability but high strategic impact.
These examples indicate that strategic failures do not predominantly derive from the absence of information, but from the way in which it is filtered, reinterpreted, or adapted within the decision-making process.
Recent developments in Iran (2026) provide an additional example of these dysfunctions, still in the process of clarification. The sequence of precision strikes against sensitive objectives and command levels suggests the existence of significant vulnerabilities in information protection and risk assessment. In this case, the issue does not appear to be the absence of signals, but the difficulty of correctly assessing the extent of adversarial penetration and integrating these assessments into the decision-making process. Thus, the distortion of strategic truth does not necessarily arise as the result of deliberate intervention, but as an effect of limitations in the capacity for interpretation and anticipation.
These examples, drawn from different strategic contexts, indicate that strategic failures do not predominantly derive from the absence of information, but from the way in which it is filtered, reinterpreted, or adapted within the decision-making process.
