By Adrak Hussain
The maritime security of the Indian Ocean region (IOR) has attracted increased attention due to the intensifying US-China rivalry. The IOR refers to the Indian Ocean (IO) and 38 states surrounding it. It stands at a crossroads of global trade and energy; hence, its security is vital amid geopolitical competition among the global and regional powers. As an established power, the US identifies China as a threat to regional and international order and seeks to counter it through its Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS).
As an emerging power, China claims multilateralism as a replacement for the current world order and leverages its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to achieve its objectives. The US-China rivalry is reshaping the maritime security dynamics in IOR through militarisation. However, the two powers may not resort to an armed conflict due to underlying reasons that necessitate a peaceful coexistence.
The strategic importance of the IOR is paramount. It serves as a vital conduit for global maritime trade, connecting trade destinations across the globe, including the Asia Pacific, South Asia, West Asia, Africa, and Europe. Annually, over 100,000 ships transit the seven strategic straits of the Ocean, facilitating about 80% of the world’s trade. This underscores the critical role the IO plays in global trade and security. The pie chart represents the international average annual trade volume, while Table 1 reveals that 65-70% of global oil trade transits the straits as of mid-2023. The straits of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb, and Malacca remain pivotal, with 43% of China’s oil trade and 18% of the US oil trade passing through them as of September 2024.
Various task forces of different states are active in the region for collective security against piracy, smuggling, and terrorism, which also serve strategic purposes like dominating the choke points. These forces include the Combined Maritime Force of 38 nations led by the US, which includes Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, CTF 152, CTF 153, and CTF 154; the US Fifth Fleet; EU Naval Force-Operation Atlanta; French Carrier Strike Group (CSG); Indian Navy Task Force; Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Task Force; Pakistan Navy Task Force, TF 86; Iran Navy, IRGC Naval Force; Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force and Littoral Response Group of United Kingdom. The region’s importance justifies the deployment of task forces and requires cooperation for collective security and governance, but the strategies of the US and China speak otherwise.
“Whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia. In the 21st century, the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters.”Alfred Thayer Mahan
In the maritime arena of IOR, the US strategy is to maintain its naval dominance, freedom of navigation and trade, control over choke points, and counter China’s rising influence. The US IPS views China as a primary threat seeking hegemony by displacing the US and rules-based international order through BRI and naval modernisation. The US has increased its maritime presence and allied with India, a member of the QUAD alliance, empowering it as a counter-balancing power to China in IOR through agreements like the Logistic Exchange Memorandum of Exchange (LEMOA), Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA).
In addition to the already established bases near the strategic straits, the US is seeking a naval base in Bangladesh’s Saint Martin Island in the Bay of Bengal to monitor the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). In short, the primary goal of the US is to counter the so-called Chinese “String of Pearls Strategy”. This strategy, often attributed to China, involves establishing a military and commercial facilities network in the IOR, which could potentially be used to protect China’s maritime trade routes and project its influence in the region.
The maritime strategy of China has significantly evolved to include “Far Seas Protection” besides “Near Seas Defence”. This concept of ‘Far Seas Protection’ refers to China’s strategy of extending its naval presence and influence beyond its immediate maritime borders, particularly in the IOR. However, its strategy in IOR lacks any reference in the 2019 defence white paper titled “China’s National Defense in the New Era”. China aims to secure a critical foothold in IOR through BRI by establishing ports and infrastructure across IOR, including ports in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan.
China has maintained a low naval presence to protect its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) with the help of a single PLAN Task Force and a military support base in Djibouti. However, it conducts naval exercises with regional powers like Pakistan and Iran and extra-regional powers like Russia in the IO, signalling its readiness to cooperate with other states while demonstrating its resolve to protect its maritime interests.
The US-China rivalry and the consequent strategies seriously affect the region’s maritime security. Firstly, it led to the militarisation of the choke points, as indicated by increased surveillance, deployments of naval forces, and alliance building. It will lead to a struggle for a balance of power and nuclear deterrence. Secondly, the rivalry may threaten the freedom of trade in times of tension, which is not in their interest as both powers depend on IO for trade. In addition, the rivalry impacts the strategic calculus of regional states, which could cause an arms race in the IO.
Finally, it decreases the chances of cooperation among the rival powers. However, they have not resorted to a zero-sum game, in which the other party’s loss balances one party’s gain. They undermined the governance and collective security against piracy, smuggling, and terrorism by complicating maritime security. All these factors necessitate a peaceful coexistence for the two powers in IOR.
Since the US dominates the choke points of IOR, China needs to reduce its dependence on them to avoid the choke points dilemma, avoid militarisation, and maintain peace in the maritime domain of IOR. The Littoral States of IO, like Thailand, Myanmar, and Pakistan, can provide alternative paths for Chinese trade that bypass the Malacca Strait. However, Pakistan provides the best alternative as it will significantly reduce the time and cost of transportation for Chinese trade, providing the shortest route to reach the energy-rich Middle East and beyond.
The integration of Iran into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will provide an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz for energy trade between Iran and China. By including Iraq and Syria in BRI and establishing a land route from Pakistan to the Mediterranean, China can also avoid the Bab-el-Mandeb and Suez Canal. In short, Pakistan’s geographical position, better relations with China, and hosting the CPEC provide the best option for China to avoid the US-dominated choke points and reduce the threat to maritime security.
About the author:
Adrak Hussain, pursuing Mphil in strategic studies from national defence university.
Currently working as an intern at DSS branch ISSRA. strategic interests include defence, foreign policy, maritime security, great power strategies and warfare
