By Adrak Hussain

The maritime security of the Indian Ocean region (IOR) has attracted increased attention due to the intensifying US-China rivalry. The IOR refers to the Indian Ocean (IO) and 38 states surrounding it. It stands at a crossroads of global trade and energy; hence, its security is vital amid geopolitical competition among the global and regional powers. As an established power, the US identifies China as a threat to regional and international order and seeks to counter it through its Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS). 

As an emerging power, China claims multilateralism as a replacement for the current world order and leverages its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to achieve its objectives. The US-China rivalry is reshaping the maritime security dynamics in IOR through militarisation. However, the two powers may not resort to an armed conflict due to underlying reasons that necessitate a peaceful coexistence.

The strategic importance of the IOR is paramount. It serves as a vital conduit for global maritime trade, connecting trade destinations across the globe, including the Asia Pacific, South Asia, West Asia, Africa, and Europe. Annually, over 100,000 ships transit the seven strategic straits of the Ocean, facilitating about 80% of the world’s trade. This underscores the critical role the IO plays in global trade and security. The pie chart represents the international average annual trade volume, while Table 1 reveals that 65-70% of global oil trade transits the straits as of mid-2023. The straits of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb, and Malacca remain pivotal, with 43% of China’s oil trade and 18% of the US oil trade passing through them as of September 2024.   

Various task forces of different states are active in the region for collective security against piracy, smuggling, and terrorism, which also serve strategic purposes like dominating the choke points. These forces include the Combined Maritime Force of 38 nations led by the US, which includes Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, CTF 152, CTF 153, and CTF 154; the US Fifth Fleet; EU Naval Force-Operation Atlanta; French Carrier Strike Group (CSG); Indian Navy Task Force; Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Task Force; Pakistan Navy Task Force, TF 86; Iran Navy, IRGC Naval Force; Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force and Littoral Response Group of United Kingdom. The region’s importance justifies the deployment of task forces and requires cooperation for collective security and governance, but the strategies of the US and China speak otherwise.

“Whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia. In the 21st century, the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters.”Alfred Thayer Mahan

In the maritime arena of IOR, the US strategy is to maintain its naval dominance, freedom of navigation and trade, control over choke points, and counter China’s rising influence. The US IPS views China as a primary threat seeking hegemony by displacing the US and rules-based international order through BRI and naval modernisation.  The US has increased its maritime presence and allied with India, a member of the QUAD alliance, empowering it as a counter-balancing power to China in IOR through agreements like the Logistic Exchange Memorandum of Exchange (LEMOA), Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA). 

In addition to the already established bases near the strategic straits, the US is seeking a naval base in Bangladesh’s Saint Martin Island in the Bay of Bengal to monitor the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).  In short, the primary goal of the US is to counter the so-called Chinese “String of Pearls Strategy”. This strategy, often attributed to China, involves establishing a military and commercial facilities network in the IOR, which could potentially be used to protect China’s maritime trade routes and project its influence in the region.

The maritime strategy of China has significantly evolved to include “Far Seas Protection” besides “Near Seas Defence”.  This concept of ‘Far Seas Protection’ refers to China’s strategy of extending its naval presence and influence beyond its immediate maritime borders, particularly in the IOR. However, its strategy in IOR lacks any reference in the 2019 defence white paper titled “China’s National Defense in the New Era”. China aims to secure a critical foothold in IOR through BRI by establishing ports and infrastructure across IOR, including ports in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. 

China has maintained a low naval presence to protect its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) with the help of a single PLAN Task Force and a military support base in Djibouti. However, it conducts naval exercises with regional powers like Pakistan and Iran and extra-regional powers like Russia in the IO, signalling its readiness to cooperate with other states while demonstrating its resolve to protect its maritime interests.  

The US-China rivalry and the consequent strategies seriously affect the region’s maritime security. Firstly, it led to the militarisation of the choke points, as indicated by increased surveillance, deployments of naval forces, and alliance building. It will lead to a struggle for a balance of power and nuclear deterrence. Secondly, the rivalry may threaten the freedom of trade in times of tension, which is not in their interest as both powers depend on IO for trade. In addition, the rivalry impacts the strategic calculus of regional states, which could cause an arms race in the IO.

Finally, it decreases the chances of cooperation among the rival powers. However, they have not resorted to a zero-sum game, in which the other party’s loss balances one party’s gain. They undermined the governance and collective security against piracy, smuggling, and terrorism by complicating maritime security. All these factors necessitate a peaceful coexistence for the two powers in IOR.

Since the US dominates the choke points of IOR, China needs to reduce its dependence on them to avoid the choke points dilemma, avoid militarisation, and maintain peace in the maritime domain of IOR. The Littoral States of IO, like Thailand, Myanmar, and Pakistan, can provide alternative paths for Chinese trade that bypass the Malacca Strait. However, Pakistan provides the best alternative as it will significantly reduce the time and cost of transportation for Chinese trade, providing the shortest route to reach the energy-rich Middle East and beyond.

The integration of Iran into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will provide an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz for energy trade between Iran and China. By including Iraq and Syria in BRI and establishing a land route from Pakistan to the Mediterranean, China can also avoid the Bab-el-Mandeb and Suez Canal. In short, Pakistan’s geographical position, better relations with China, and hosting the CPEC provide the best option for China to avoid the US-dominated choke points and reduce the threat to maritime security.

About the author:

Adrak Hussain, pursuing Mphil in strategic studies from national defence university.

Currently working as an intern at DSS branch ISSRA. strategic interests include defence, foreign policy, maritime security, great power strategies and warfare

In search of a lost Soul

TASHKENT, Dunyo IA. Thomas Fasbender, political observer and head of the geopolitics department of Berliner Zeitung, interviewed Uzbek political scientist Kudratilla Rafikov, reports Dunyo IA correspondent.

We present to your attention the full text of the interview, in which the Uzbek political scientist through the prism of history subtly reveals important factors that have influenced the modern development of Uzbekistan.

– Mr. Rafikov, I have long had the desire to write about Uzbekistan and to understand more deeply the processes taking place in this country. This country, located in the center of Eurasia, can rightfully be considered not only the geopolitical but also the civilization center of the continent.

In my opinion, the two great epochs that emerged on this land in the distant past – the Islamic Renaissance and the Timurid Renaissance – have contributed something incredibly important to world culture and science, not only for the peoples of the East or the Islamic world, but for the entire history of humankind. However, the land, which was the cradle of powerful empires and civilizations, remained at the mercy of social and political cataclysms for several centuries, experiencing the heavy burden of colonialism.

But my question is not about the distant past. I would like to talk about the present day of your country, how the state and society have coped with the difficulties of post-independence reconstruction. In particular, I am interested in why a dangerous stagnation, perhaps even deeper than in the Soviet period, still dominated the consciousness of the political elite, and society as a whole.

Why did this happen? Why, even after gaining sovereignty, did the country remain faithful to the old ideological attitudes for almost a quarter of a century, until today, when we are having this conversation? As far as I understand, society and the political elite still face difficulties in conceptualizing and renewing their own identity. What are the reasons for this? How have feelings of independence, nationwide identity, and nation-state relations evolved since the so-called “dawn of freedom”?

Another point: why, more than a quarter of a century after independence, is the characteristic of “New” added to the name of the state of Uzbekistan? What was the reason for this necessity?

–It is very difficult to answer it in a few words. That’s because the subject is complex: It’s highly controversial – the subject of metropolises and colonies.

The truth, however unpleasant, is that this vast region, at the crossroads of South and North, West and East, has for many years been classified as a ‘periphery’ (unfortunately, there are still those who think so). But did it really deserve such a characterisation? That, of course, is another matter.

Let’s not get distracted from your question. I can’t remember who said it, but someone once said: “The history of mankind is the history of wars.” I am deeply struck by this sentence, not only by its elegant construction, but also by the poetics of its meaning. The idea behind it is clear: Since wars and invasions are an integral part of history, there will always be rulers and oppressed.

 In fact, as I mentioned earlier, many scholars have thought about and researched this particular part of history. One of them was Edward Wadie Said, a professor at Columbia University, an American scholar of Palestinian (Arab Christian). In his most famous work Orientalism, he quotes Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: “They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented.” 

According to Said’s Orientalism, the West presumes the East cannot talk about itself, cannot introduce itself, cannot present itself, but needs others to talk about it, to present it, and therefore needs the help of European scholarship. Orientalism was a scientific movement whose analogue in the world of politics was the Orient’s colonial accumulation and acquisition by Europe. The Orient was, therefore, not Europe’s interlocutor, but its silent Other’, explains Said. In a broad sense, when discussing the colonial and post-colonial period, it would be fair to say that this study deservedly characterizes our socio-political history to the present day, as far as possible.

Speaking more broadly about the colonial and postcolonial periods, research in this area helps to understand our social and political history as well as the current state of society. Although our region, located in the center of Eurasia, is not at the epicenter of the topic, such as the Arab East, about which Said writes, it has nevertheless been “orientalized” to a significant extent. This is due to the fact that for a century and a half our land lost its independence twice. Moreover, others have spoken for us in presenting us to the world, and we have long remained the “silent other” in the face of the dominant powers.

Let’s look at the first part of your question: Why did this happen?

The reasons for this can be divided into objective and subjective. Perhaps that is why many researchers argue that the process of nation-state and nation-building in our region, particularly in Uzbekistan, is still ongoing. We can partially agree with this opinion.

Formally, the Uzbek political nation created in the first half of the last century was presented to the world as a nation with history, culture, language and other identification codes. However, this nation was never able to overcome colonial boundaries. Soviet ideology sought to subordinate all signs of national identity in the republics to a common “Soviet” concept. The concept of “Soviet man,” which reached its peak in the 1970s and 1980s, deepened the incorporation of Central Asian national societies into Soviet cosmopolitanism.

As you rightly noted, even almost 25 years after independence, we have not been able to get out from under the influence of this concept. Why? Because perestroika, which began at the end of the Soviet period, as well as the socio-political changes of the 1990s were perceived by the state as a serious threat. When the social environment pushed for a rethinking of political and ethnic identity, the state suppressed any manifestations of national, religious and political sentiments. It became the only rigid “player” in the socio-ideological sphere, as in Soviet times, but without ideology.

Communist ideology, which was abandoned in the early 1990s, was replaced by fear of any new ideas and thoughts. A peculiar, even more conservative concept than the Soviet one – a cautious and even fearful view of religion, national identity, and history – was formed in society. Its crudest form manifested itself in an insistent denial of society’s connection to the Turkic and Islamic heritage.

In a country where almost 90% of the population is ethnic Uzbek and practicing Islam, identity has begun to be reflected in the image of a citizen realizing abstract ideas, such as: “Uzbekistan is a state with a great future”. However, these ideas failed to take root in society due to their utopianism, like communist ideals, and failure both ethnically and ideologically.

This peculiar conservative way of building a nation-state and society after independence led not only to internal political isolation, but also to alienation from neighbors and economic and social protectionism, which physically isolated us and in a sense weakened us. The policies pursued towards our neighbors slowed down the process of nation-state and nation building. As the life of the region changed, the refusal to renew showed the state’s penchant for the legacy of colonial ideology.

During the first 25 years of independence, the issues of nation-state building and nation formation did not receive due attention. That is why many analysts, assessing the transition period that ended by 2016, concluded: “Mirziyoyev inherited a heavy political and economic legacy”. This opinion is quite fair.

The saddest thing, as you said, is that the most important geopolitical point in Eurasia – the largest and most influential country in the region – has become somewhat isolated and detached from the world. The orthodox tendency that kept Uzbekistan within the Soviet concept of the nation-state and nation affected not only the domestic situation but also regional interaction. This tendency in the region inspired ethnic nationalism, which contributed to the alienation of the new republics from each other.

–Are you saying that after independence, instead of rapprochement, a paradoxical process of alienation began between the states in the region? Did I understand that correctly?

– Yes, that’s about right. The peoples of the once united region of Turkestan had to face numerous misunderstandings after gaining freedom. In some cases, grievances and resentments escalated into bloody conflicts. These tensions arose over disputes over borders, water, and ethnic supremacy. Most complex, however, was the politicization of what the states had come to regard as part of their national ideology. The history and cultural heritage of the region was monopolized. It was once ironically observed: the history and cultural heritage of the region became a language of mutual hatred.

Unfortunately, today the five states of the region have completely different and sometimes contradictory versions of history taught in schools, although their pasts are unified. For a long time, the processes of nation-state and nation-building in the region developed according to the Soviet method – through denial, confrontation and confrontation.

However, I have somewhat deviated from the topic. We have been discussing the issues of identity, ideology and national thinking. In my opinion, the basis of identity is language, culture, history and historical memory. Naturally, religion also plays an important role. If we consider the situation as a whole, an ideological vacuum is dangerous for both society and the state. In the first years of independence, elements of individualism began to appear in Uzbekistan. The relationship between the state and society weakened: ensuring life and well-being in the Bolsheviks and the rest of the population is not only a matter of the state, but also a matter of the society.

During this period, the Soviet concept of equality disappeared and the standard of living began to depend on everyone’s abilities. Attention to traditions, language, identity, history and national values increased. All this in itself became a kind of ideology – an ideology that the society itself created for itself.

Unfortunately, however, this social impulse – be it economic liberalism, individualism or traditionalism – has not been accepted, revised or supported. On the contrary, it was rejected. As I have said, the political elite of the time feared these processes.

In the first years of independence, the state, distrustful of a society that was searching for its identity, actually hindered this process. National identity, recourse to history and traditions were perceived as a potential threat. Instead, importance was given to Soviet humanistic concepts such as “friendship of peoples,” “internationalism,” and “multinational people,” which were actually borrowed from the old system.

This policy was a conscious and logically justified step. The state was trying to shield a society that was searching for itself amidst the ruins of a collapsed ideology from returning to its historical origins, including family values and ethnicity, which were perceived as a threat of “radical nationalism.” This fear, alas, became not only a permanent element of state policy, but also its hallmark.

A strange idea has begun to take root in society: we deny communist ideology, but at the same time we do not consider it important to address ethnogenesis, culture and values that could tell us who we are. We are not completely conservative, but we are not liberal either. We exist, we are independent. We have a coat of arms, a flag and other symbols of nationhood….

Is it possible to imagine such a contradictory symbiosis in society? The dichotomy that emerged was extremely difficult to understand. Do we aspire to a liberal society or a conservative one? Are we going to live with memories of the Soviet past or turn to a national identity? What stage are we at now? Who are we, what place do we occupy in the region and the world, and what is important in how we are perceived by others? Are we building a nation-state, and how is the question of nation being addressed?

These questions remained unanswered, creating uncertainty in both society and public policy. It was this uncertainty that fueled the negative state protectionism that manifested itself in the economy, domestic and foreign policy, spiritual and ideological life, and in people’s daily lives.

The attempt to close the country from all “influences” in a globalized world was absurd. However, these factors, alas, did not remain mere theory or elitist discourse – they have determined the socio-political life of Uzbekistan for a long time. Identity, traditions, ethnicity, nation and nation-state, attitudes towards historical figures – all this was determined by the dominant regime. And, paradoxically, this policy became a kind of alternative to socialist ideology, which it formally rejected.

The situation was that in the official absence of ideology, its traces were felt everywhere. These elements and other aspects that were left out became the main reason for the stagnation of public consciousness.

In my opinion today, many people who talk about nation, nation-state and identity perceive these issues from a romantic point of view. What is most disturbing, however, is that these topics have not yet been scientifically analyzed.

What does the concept of nation mean in the context of contemporary globalization? Should a nation-state belong to one ethnicity or be an association of citizens of different ethnicities? These questions remain unanswered.

The same applies to the official ideology of the State. Over the previous 25 years of independence, Uzbekistan has not formed clear views on this subject. The reason seems to be that during the years of independence a political culture was not formed – moreover, it was not given the opportunity to develop.

– Could you please tell us what has changed in the country and the region since 2016? Can we talk about the exit from the state of “submission” that you mentioned, referring to Said? And one more thing: you seem to have forgotten to answer the second part of my previous question – where did this unusual epithet “New Uzbekistan” come from in public and political life?

– Indeed, there was a need for this expression, both spiritually and politically. Society and the state began to realize that life could not go on like this. The epithet “New Uzbekistan” became a kind of a call to mobilization, a pointer to the upcoming renewal.

I think it would be right to start with the circumstances in which Shavkat Mirziyoyev found himself when he assumed his duties as head of state. This will help to better understand the essence of the changes that have taken place.

What was the situation at that moment?

To be honest, it was far from enviable. Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s rise to power coincided with a period of global, regional and local crises. Withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, pandemic, consequences of the global economic crisis, regional interstate and cross-border conflicts, socio-economic problems accumulated in the society for many years….

All these challenges coincided as if on purpose with the beginning of Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s presidency. For example, you yourself remember how things were between neighbors in the region 7-8 years ago. Events in Afghanistan, the outcome of which was uncertain, caused serious concern. In addition, the disunity of the countries of the region made even the discussion of a common agenda almost unattainable.

At that time, integration seemed so far away that it was pointless to talk about it. Rather, one had to speculate where and when the next conflict between neighbors would break out. Naturally, such instability in relations met the interests of major external players. The lack of cohesion kept the region in a state of vulnerability and stagnation.

– Let me interrupt you. Listening to your analysis, I had a thought. The term “Eurasian Balkans” often appears in international political literature. You probably know that it is your region we are talking about?

– Yes, if I am not mistaken, this term was first used by Zbigniew Brzezinski. In his famous book “The Grand Chessboard” he explains it in detail. Although his theses are often perceived today as political speculation, the assertion is not unfounded.

Our situation was indeed reminiscent of the Balkans in Europe – with their political and ethnic conflicts, mutual grievances and various contradictions. Recall, for example, Uzbekistan’s relations with its neighbors – Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – at that time. Tajik leader Emomali Rahmon had not visited Uzbekistan for almost twenty years. Relations with Kyrgyzstan, where political changes were frequent, also left much to be desired.

This disunity hindered the development of the region, exacerbated conflicts and deprived the countries of the opportunity to jointly seek solutions to pressing problems. During the first period of independence, Uzbekistan’s relations with neighboring countries, including Kyrgyzstan, were never sincere. This also applies to Kazakhstan, with which there were hidden contradictions. Such relations resembled useless disputes about leadership in the region: “Are you better?” or “Am I better?” An atmosphere prevailed in which even the hope of unification seemed unattainable.

It was in such a period of social and political depression, mistrust and disunity that Shavkat Mirziyoyev was elected head of Uzbekistan.

What was to be done in such a situation? Of course, it required a sober assessment of the state of affairs and, if necessary, a readiness to “get off the horse”. Shavkat Mirziyoyev did just that. He began to actively work on restoring friendly relations with neighbors and settling old conflicts.

The result of these efforts was the creation of the Advisory Council of Heads of State of Central Asia in 2018. Although this structure was semi-institutional in nature, it became an important platform for mutual understanding and joining forces after a long period of disunity. Cultural, humanitarian, economic and political ties have been restored between the countries of the region. Most importantly, a positive atmosphere has been created in the region, contributing to the strengthening of its status as a single international entity.

In this context, I can confidently say that Mr. Brzezinski’s predictions, which you mentioned, have not come true. Moreover, I believe that Shavkat Mirziyoyev has “edited” his concept to a certain extent. Today, cooperation dominates in Central Asia instead of competition, and friendship and brotherhood are emerging instead of resentment and enmity.

Let me give you a simple example. This year we all witnessed the Summer Olympic Games held in Paris. Our country’s athletes won outstanding victories. It was especially gratifying to see how our athletes, who climbed the podium, were sincerely welcomed by our brothers from neighboring countries. Social networks were filled with comments and congratulations like: “Long live our brothers! Central Asia – the children of Turkestan – are not inferior to others in anything, we are a great nation!”

Of course, this event did not go unnoticed by people interested in the history and modernity of the region, as well as by specialists. For example, Sergei Abashin, a well-known Russian anthropologist and researcher of Central Asia, noted: “The 2024 Olympics is a landmark event. Not so much by discussing the topics of gender and art, but by the impressive performance of athletes from Central Asian countries, especially Uzbekistan, which won 8 gold medals and came 13th in the overall world rankings (I remind you that in addition to their Olympic achievements, Uzbek chess players have also reached the top positions in the world ratings in recent years). We are witnessing how Central Asian countries are becoming visible, recognizable and important players, to use sports language, on a universal scale and are becoming aware of their own subjectivity. This is a real historical shift in the world and in the former post-Soviet space, which is long-term and not accidental at all.

In this context, it is worth mentioning another remarkable survey conducted by Kyrgyz experts. According to its data, in 2016, even before Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power in Uzbekistan, the majority of respondents in Kyrgyzstan perceived your country as one of the most unfriendly. However, already in 2017, just a year later, the results of a similar survey showed a sharp turnaround: Uzbekistan was among the countries that Kyrgyz residents consider to be the closest and friendliest.

Economic statistics are also eloquent. At the end of 2016, mutual trade between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan totaled just over 200 million dollars. By 2022, this figure has increased several times and reached 1.3 billion dollars.

We should not forget about the past: during the period of independence, bloody conflicts repeatedly took place between citizens of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan amid disputes over water, borders and ethnicity. Today, however, we see dramatic changes.

An example is the statement of the Kyrgyz president in an interview with Radio Liberty: “The way the Uzbek side will take water, which already flows to Uzbekistan, makes no difference to us. It doesn’t matter whether it is by pipeline, aryk route or air. The main thing is that every action is agreed between the parties. From now on, Kyrgyz-Uzbek friendship will be strong. No one can spoil our ties of friendship except God”.

These changes clearly demonstrate that Uzbekistan has moved from a policy of isolation to strengthening friendly and constructive relations with its neighbors.

Where do you think such sincerity and determined political will came from, both among the political elites of the region’s countries and ordinary people?

In my opinion, even these brief examples demonstrate quite clearly what happened in the region after 2016. Moreover, today Uzbekistan does not have a single border dispute with its neighbors. It has built friendly relations with neighboring states both at the bilateral level and within the framework of various structures.

– But it should be taken into account that many of these structures are traditional, such as the SCO, CIS, CSTO, and Uzbekistan has never been a stranger in these organizations….

– I understand you. If you pay attention, in the past, the processes in the political and economic structures of the region were determined mainly by external forces. The influence of their ideological and geopolitical goals was constantly felt. But in the new period, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy vectors have become more diverse.

Formats such as the consultative meetings of Central Asian heads of state or the 5+1 platform emerged due to changes in Uzbekistani politics. These updates have contributed to the emergence of a new practice of joint discussion and common ground in the region.

Today, the concept of regional identity is increasingly heard in the speeches of politicians and leaders of our countries. I consider this a historic achievement. In fact, it is a symbolic reflection of the idea of Turkestan, which was promoted by the Jadids in the 1920s, but which was lost then.

Another important step was Uzbekistan’s joining the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in 2019. This event changed the organization’s agenda and raised its status. For the first time in a century, Uzbekistan officially declared its belonging to the Turkic ethnos. This fact can also be considered an answer to your question about the “search for identity” of the state and society.

– That is true, most of the steps you mentioned do strengthen integration sentiments. However, as you said yourself, there are exceptions to the concept of regional or Turkic identity. For example, Tajikistan, where Persian is spoken, does not participate in the OTS. Why?

– This is indeed a pressing issue. The reasons are well known. Undoubtedly, common history and culture is an important basis for integration. But members of the organization understand that in today’s global world, activities cannot be built solely on ethnic bases or narrow nationalism.

Look at the map. The Turkic world and the countries of the region are located in the central zone of Eurasia. Our ancestors historically played the role of a link between peoples and states. The Great Silk Road passed through these lands, connecting Western Europe with China, the North with the South. Tajikistan is undoubtedly part of this heritage.

Although the language of Tajikistan is Persian, in a cultural and historical sense it is inextricably linked to the peoples of the region. Moreover, in terms of cultural and spiritual heritage, values, including religious motifs, Tajikistan is closer to us than to Iran.

If we talk about the basis for membership, it is worth remembering that Hungary, which actively participates in the activities of the UTG as an observer, speaks the language of the Finno-Ugric group, not Turkic.

I am confident that if Tajikistan is invited to the Organization at least as an observer, this will only strengthen regional solidarity. Of course, this is my personal opinion.

– Doesn’t Uzbekistan’s southern neighbor, Afghanistan, with its geographical location, ethnic and cultural components, have the right to participate in regional processes?

– Of course, by modern geopolitical standards, Afghanistan is part of the region. In addition to its geographical affiliation, this country is home to a large Turkic population. Moreover, a certain part of this country (northern Afghanistan) was called South Turkestan in history. From this point of view, as well as for determining the multi-vector foreign policy of the region, the southern neighbor is extremely important, since its territories are crossed by routes leading us to global seaports.

I think I have spoken about the region in sufficient detail. Now, if you allow me, I will move on to the changes in the social, political and cultural life of Uzbekistan. After all, it is these changes that reveal the essence of the epithet “New” in the name of the country, which you have mentioned more than once.

First of all, it is worth noting that after 2016, the political rhetoric of Uzbekistan changed. This was the beginning of what I call the awareness of one’s own identity, the search for one’s “I”. Think about it: the state has all the attributes that confirm its sovereignty – a flag, a coat of arms, an anthem, money, an army, borders. But, in addition to this, there was always a sense of incompleteness. Imagine that you have everything, but it is not enough. This was the case with us. This suppressed atmosphere, in its essence, resembled Said’s theory (Orientalism). Yes, Uzbekistan as a state had everything except a national identity. It lacked its soul – the very identity that was torn out of it more than a century ago. Without it, the country felt insecure and vulnerable. Now I understand the cry of the soul of our great poet, Jadid and victim of Stalin’s repressions Abdurauf Fitrat: “Oh great Turan, land of lions, what has become of you?..” He cried out in despair to his homeland and his people, regretting their lost heart. A nation without its soul, without identity – does it remain independent or does it become “the other” in the circle of masters? That is why I mentioned Said and his theory of “Orientalism” from the very beginning.

In my opinion, Shavkat Mirziyoyev was deeply aware of this problem from the very beginning. Having become president, he raised topics that had not been discussed in 25 years of independence, and were sometimes even taboo.

An example is the quotes from the inscriptions of Bilge Kagan, which began to sound in political texts. At the Independence Day celebrations, the poem “Guzal Turkiston”, taboo since its writing, was read. Fitrat’s name began to sound more and more often. Hundreds of national figures repressed in Soviet times, including members of the national movement, who were previously called “basmachi”, were rehabilitated by the Supreme Court.

An international conference dedicated to the scientific heritage of the Jadids was held in Tashkent. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev spoke at the UN tribune in the Uzbek language for the first time in the history of Uzbekistan.

The country lifted bans on religious, political and freedom of speech. “Blacklists” were abolished. The use of forced labor, including child labor, in the cotton industry, which had tarnished the country’s image for many years, has been stopped. The “Jaslyk” prison in Karakalpakstan, which had become a symbol of political and religious repression, has been closed. 

These steps rightly distinguish today’s Uzbekistan from its past. From an academic perspective, these changes can be characterized as the desire of the state and society for national identity, a departure from colonial and neocolonial pressure.

In my opinion, during the era of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, significant work was done to renew society and abandon the Soviet systems. Let me give you another example that has important socio-political significance.

In Soviet times, as in all the capitals of the union republics, Tashkent had a central square – “Lenin Square”. In this place stood a monumental monument to the “leader of the world proletariat”. After gaining independence, the bronze figure of Lenin was removed, but the square remained almost the same. In place of the pedestal, a globe appeared, in the center of which the word “Uzbekistan” was written in barely noticeable font. The square was renamed, removing Lenin’s name and adding the word “independence”. This is how “Independence Square” appeared.

The meaning of independence, as you can understand, was reduced only to this symbolic change.

In the new conditions, this matter was approached more deeply and seriously. Without denying the significance of this square, the “New Uzbekistan” park was created in the eastern part of the capital. Some people wondered: “Why another complex if we already have Independence Square?” This misunderstanding is due to a lack of understanding of the very essence of the idea.

As I have already mentioned, Independence Square appeared on the site of the former Lenin Square. Its architectural appearance and artistic design remained without a clearly expressed national specificity. This space, in terms of content, was extremely limited. In the center of the square stood a globe with the inscription “Uzbekistan”, symbolizing the emergence of a new state. However, it seems to me that this symbol expressed not so much independence as modesty and even caution in demonstrating it.

But the national identity of our people, with a thousand-year history, is not limited to the period of dependence. We have a glorious past, great heroes, outstanding achievements of science and culture, which are admired by the peoples of the world.

President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, when conceiving the park project, proceeded from these very motives. Today, the New Uzbekistan Park with its grandiose monument is a place where guests and tourists from all over the world, politicians and government leaders come. Its exhibitions cover not only the history of our country, but also the common heritage of the entire region.

Defining regional identity and understanding how people living in this region perceive themselves and their place in the world play a huge role. From this point of view, the rapprochement that is taking place today not only in the economic and political, but also in the cultural and humanitarian spheres, is of paramount importance for mutual understanding between peoples who have lived side by side for centuries.

Especially projects such as the New Uzbekistan Park, due to their content and significance, can become a point of unification of the history of the peoples of the region. Such large-scale ideas are extremely necessary for us today.

I think none of your questions remained unanswered.

– Thank you! I have one more question. Everyone sees that today the geopolitical situation around Central Asia is changing. This also means the emergence of new actors in the region. Naturally, such a situation can create certain inconveniences for the domestic and foreign policies of the two locomotive states – Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. For example, one force can exert pressure, pursuing economic interests, while the other one can strive to maintain these countries in the status of a geopolitical object from an ideological or political point of view. What do you think, if such pressure is exerted on Uzbekistan, what position can the current government – President Mirziyoyev – take?

– A very interesting question. It seems that the President foresaw such questions, since he has repeatedly given a clear and concise answer to this question in his speeches. For example, on December 22, 2023, at a meeting of the Republican Council for Spirituality and Education, Shavkat Mirziyoyev said: “We are all witnessing how powerful centers of the world, which previously defended their goals and interests mainly through diplomacy and politics, have now openly embarked on the path of pressure, confrontation and clashes. Unfortunately, the influence of such large-scale and extremely contradictory processes does not bypass the Central Asian region and our country, which is an integral part of it.” 

The same year, during a meeting in the Surkhandarya region, the President gave an answer that directly relates to your question. This is what the head of state said: “These are very difficult times now. Large countries are now saying: “Uzbekistan, whose side are you on? Stop being neutral, go to this side or that side.” They talk about it quite persistently… They themselves say it, and their representatives also call for it, declaring: “We need Uzbekistan in Central Asia. The population of which has reached 36 million people, in three or four years it will be 40 million.” They ask: “Whose side are you on?” How should one answer such a difficult question? There is only one answer – I am only on one side, I am ready to die for my nation, people, the interests of the great future of Uzbekistan.” 

Is it possible to give a clearer and more precise answer to your question?

– Thank you. I sincerely enjoyed our conversation very much. I learned a lot about the country that interests me, about its past and present. I especially liked your thoughts about the “lost soul”. Indeed, I had never thought before that the loss of the soul is a direct manifestation of spiritual dependence and slavery. From what I heard, I concluded that today Uzbekistan is finding its identity, its “I” or, as you put it, its “soul”. I think I understood your thoughts correctly. 

– Yes, absolutely right! Thank you very much again!