The Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS): A Promising Contribution?

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The Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS): A Promising Contribution?

By Prof. Caroline E. Foster

Professor Caroline E. Foster is based at the University of Auckland, New Zealand, and specialises in international law. She was formerly employed with the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

The impending Global Commodities Forum is a reminder of a core challenge presently confronting the global trade community: how to use international trade policy as a tool for climate and sustainability action? This is what the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS or the Agreement), concluded between Costa Rica, Fiji, Iceland, New Zealand and Switzerland  in July 2024, is all about.[1] The ACCTS’ overall aim is to give better effect to the commitment to sustainable development reflected in the preamble to the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and help States achieve ambitious outcomes under the Paris Agreement.  The Agreement is ahead of the game, reflecting the vital understanding that changing the international trade rules will be a critical pillar in making the Paris Agreement work effectively, alleviating the pollution crisis and making decent progress toward world biodiversity targets.[2]

Special Character of the ACCTS

It is clear that the Agreement is a unique and promising contribution in many ways, although the text of the ACCTS is not yet available for scrutiny at the time of writing. It is an “open plurilateral” agreement and also a dynamic or “living” agreement. The ACCTS is  open and plurilateral because only a small self-selected group of countries have come together to negotiate the initial agreement, in order to make progress fast in areas where the parties can see their way clear to achieving trade and sustainability gains, yet it is open to accession by other countries should they be ready to join. It is  a dynamic and  living agreement in that additional substance in new areas of trade policy can be added into it over time. While the current scope of the Agreement is limited, it provides flexibility to expand its application to other areas in the future.  This means that even though the Agreement addresses at present only three selected core areas, it has the potential to embrace both a wider membership and further substantive coverage over time.

These characteristics of the Agreement are a double-edged sword. They mark the Agreement’s significant potential as a trailblazer and yet its dependence for ultimate success in making further necessary gains, in membership especially. Although only Costa Rica, Fiji, Iceland, New Zealand and Switzerland were in a position to join as founding members, the UK, Canada and the EU are possible future parties. Norway may also be a contender, having been among the negotiating parties. In terms of coverage, as it stands the three core areas the ACCTS addresses are: increasing market access for environmental goods and services; reducing fossil fuel subsidies; and developing guidelines for voluntary eco-labelling schemes.

The ACCTS’  Three Core Areas

Market liberalisation in environmental goods and services couples with efforts to promote climate change mitigation and adaptation by making such goods and services more readily available and affordable, as well as incentivising investment in relevant technologies.  When the Agreement enters into force, the parties will eliminate tariffs on over 300 recognised environmental goods. An environmental good is a good benefiting the environment. Examples include solar panels, wind and hydraulic turbines, electric vehicles, wool fibre, recycled paper, electric static converters, and wood products.[3]  There is a special focus on “land-based” or natural renewable goods, obviously of economic interest to ACCTS parties.  The ACCTS will expand concepts of what may count as environmental services beyond previous instruments as well as listing over 100 environmentally related services subsectors.[4] An environmental service is a service benefiting the environment. Examples include waste management and remediation services.

Addressing fossil fuel subsidies is arguably the most essential of the three trade policy areas the ACCTS presently addresses. This sits within the broader global need to reduce inefficiency in the energy sector and to decouple energy security from reliance on carbon technologies. We are told that the Agreement defines “fossil fuel subsidies”, and introduces specific prohibitions on these subsidies along with certain exceptions for fundamental policy goals, including for energy security and disaster resilience. 

The third policy area is the ACCTS’ development of principles-based guidelines for voluntary eco-labelling mechanisms and their accompanying institutional mechanisms. Eco-labelling schemes help consumers to recognise environmentally more beneficial products by allowing accredited producers and traders to affix an eco-label to their product. Examples include eco-labels identifying the sustainable origins of fisheries products, or the energy usage of whiteware. Principles-based guidelines will help ensure that such schemes do not apply arbitrary or unfair criteria, and encourage trade in sustainable products.

Comparing the ACCTS With Regional and Bilateral Agreements

The ACCTS thus complements the more gradual, softer-edged processes underway through the commitments under the 2023 Indo Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF)’s Pillar III on a green and fair economy and more generally market-based “green regionalism”.[5]  At the same time, because the ACCTS embodies deep new commitments targeted to specific action areas, it also goes beyond the important new range of hard law commitments on environmental issues in the 2018 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).[6]  The CPTPP addressed liberalisation in environmental goods and services, and also a wide range of areas including marine capture fisheries, vessel source pollution, alien invasive species, trade and biodiversity, conservation and trade, and transition to a low emissions and resilient economy, as well as corporate social responsibility.

In the meantime, avant garde bilateral agreements have made important new strides into trade and sustainability.  Stand-out instruments include various EU agreements, particularly the EU-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (EU-NZ FTA),[7] with its environmental goods list, believed to be a first for the EU, though we find a longer list in the NZ-UK Free Trade Agreement (NZ-EU FTA).[8]  The Australia-Singapore Green Economy Agreement also merits a mention.[9] Though only provisionally in force, the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) also features progressive rules in a range of areas. CETA includes chapters on regulatory cooperation, sustainable development and the environment, considering sustainable development ‘for the welfare of present and future generations’ and asserting that trade should promote sustainable development.[10] CETA seeks facilitation of trade in environmental goods and services, as well as lifecycle management of goods including carbon accounting and recycling.

Comparing the ACCTS with Developments in the WTO

The value of the ACCTS can be understood best when we consider the Agreement in the context of such broader initiatives, as well as developments in the WTO.  In the WTO, trade and sustainability developments are still in their infancy. The Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD) have given birth to four differently composed Working Groups, each with different numbers and combinations of WTO Members.

The Working Groups deal respectively with (a) Environmental Goods and Services, (b) Subsidies, (c) Trade-related Climate Measures, and (d) the Circular Economy. The two TESSD Working Groups overlapping with the ACCTS are the Working Group on Environmental Goods and Services and potentially the Working Group on Subsidies.  All four working groups will be important loci for developments on the environment-trade connection. Certainly the launch of the WTO Secretariat’s Trade Policy Tools for Climate Action at UNFCCC COP28 communicates an institutional awareness of the need for concrete action.[11] However it must be recalled that participation in the TESSD Working Groups is voluntary and not all WTO members are choosing to participate. 

The Working Group on Environmental Goods and Services has been focusing initially on how to liberalise trade in goods and services that are key for the renewable energy sector, including solar, wind and hydropower. The Working Group on Subsidies deals with one of the most challenging aspects of traditional international trade policy. WTO law disciplines subsidies heavily because they are generally considered inconsistent with maintaining a level playing field for open competition and can give industries in one country a market lead over industries in another country.  Yet, as an economic tool, subsidies can be used to promote environmental policies enabling trade to work for the environment.[12] Current disputes over countervailing duties on electric vehicles from China illustrate the tensions. 

In parallel, certain subsidies need to be reduced and eliminated in order to protect the environment. As seen in the ACCTS, fossil fuel subsidies are a clear target, and multilateral disciplines are long overdue.[13] The sums involved are substantial. Fossil fuel subsidies were estimated by the OECD and the International Energy Agency (IEA) at a figure of  USD 1,481.3 billion in 2022, doubling from 2021.[14]  Given the entrenched interests in play at all levels, we can expect slow progress for a little longer on fossil fuel subsidies in the global  arena. So far, attempts to address fossil fuel subsidies in the WTO have  been dismally disappointing, despite longtime efforts by the WTO Members belonging to what is now the Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFSR) Initiative. Gaining transparency through increased reporting of energy subsidies will be an important first step. The 2024 WTO Ministerial Statement included an annex on planned work, including working together on roadmaps for fossil fuel subsidy elimination.[15] Some bilateral agreements address fossil fuel subsidy reform, with, for instance, stronger wording in the NZ–UK FTA and weaker language in the EU–NZ FTA. Yet, as we will see in the ACCTS, energy subsidies are a complex matter, with people around the world reliant on government interventions to help deal with energy poverty. 

Thus, we can see that the ACCTS is indeed highly distinctive Progress in aligning trade and climate policy globally is still expected to be slow. The EU and New Zealand have led the way towards an inclusive Coalition of Trade Ministers on Climate manifesting a commitment to ensuring that progress is made, joined by Kenya, Ecuador and the United Kingdom. However, generating the necessary momentum on trade and sustainability in the WTO is challenging.  Multilateral action will be powerful, but as an open plurilateral the ACCTS is able to achieve more, faster, among its adherents.

Putting the ACCTS into Perspective

The appearance on the scene of instruments such as the ACCTS is no accident. Government strategists’ and certain international relations’ scholarship work converges in seeing considerable promise in smaller, deeper international agreements that can be expanded over time. The ACCTS is a key initiative and it’s highly likely that it will be efficiently implemented, setting a new tone and manifesting the commitment to bring sustainability increasingly and effectively into the trade policy.

Yet globally there remains much work to be done. High quality dedicated statecraft is needed to revolutionise the world economy, and day-to-day living, in ways that will truly address the current, critical sustainability crisis. International trade law is a vital part of the fabric of international law, and only with change in international trade law can 21st century sustainability and climate challenges adequately be confronted.

As to criticism of the ACCTS, critics are not wrong when they point out that, in a carbon-based economy, trade agreements can be expected to increase trade and that increased trade and economic growth are drivers of rising greenhouse gas emissions. Neither are they wrong in highlighting the need to equip developing countries with capacities and technologies for green production, which is not a focus of the ACCTS. Further, the progress that is evident in the ACCTS has occurred because there are certain areas where trade and environmental interests coincide.  For instance, the ACCTS was hailed in the New Zealand media as the agreement on wood and wool. When trade and environmental interests are in competition, as they often are, it will not be so easy to secure outcomes.  Social pressure and the fuller realisation of what is at stake will play an important part, but the road is uphill and will be steep and hard for governments to climb.

However, as the transition to a global carbon economy goes forward, new areas of complementarity between trade and environmental policy can be expected to emerge.  The nurturing of a circular economy is just one example: a model of production and consumption which involves reusing, repairing and recycling existing materials and products as long as possible in order to make better use of the enormous volumes of resources presently funnelled through economies and discarded. Ultimately, change will have to be transformational to turn present realities into new ways of living, and, with the vision and the will, the extent of the contribution that can be made by strategic initiatives within the international trading system is vast.

Conclusion

Governments and citizens are coming to understand the overwhelming need to develop international economic policy in ways that help address environmental and sustainability objectives. As is widely recognised, it will be important to bear in mind the many integrated  aspects of sustainability that go beyond the environmental, including labour standards, economic development, and concerns including gender equality and animal welfare.[16]    The ACCTS makes a valuable and timely contribution to this important agenda.

About the author:

Professor Caroline E. Foster is based at the University of Auckland, New Zealand, and specialises in international law. She was formerly employed with the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

[1] Foster, C.E. (2021) ‘The Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability’ in P. Delimatsis and L. Reins (eds) Encyclopedia on Trade and Environmental Law 479-482 Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, UK/Northhampton MA USA; see also Foster, C.E. (2025), ‘Trade and Environment’ in V. Vadi and D. Collins (eds), Routledge Handbook on International Economic Law Routledge: forthcoming (open access).

[2] Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework 2022, UN Doc CBD/COP/15/L25, available at https://www.cbd.int/article/cop15-final-text-kunming-montreal-gbf-221222

[3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of New Zealand, “What is the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS)?” available at

https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-concluded-but-not-in-force/agreement-on-climate-change-trade-and-sustainability-accts/what-is-the-agreement-on-climate-change-trade-and-sustainability-accts

[4] Idem.

[5] P. L. Hsieh, (2024) ‘Shaping Green Regionalism: New Trade Law Approaches to Environmental Sustainability’  Review of European Community and International Environmental Law’ (33) 172-182. On developments in the APEC context see also Foster, C.E. (2025).

[6] Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 2018 UNTS 3346.

[7] New Zealand–European Union Free Trade Agreement 2023, available at https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/new-zealand/eu-new-zealand-agreement/text-agreement_en, Annex 19.

[8] New Zealand-United Kingdom Free Trade Agreement 2022, available at https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/new-zealand-united-kingdom-free-trade-agreement/resources, Annex 22A.

[9] Australia-Singapore Green Economy Agreement 2022 available at  https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/singapore/singapore-australia-green-economy-agreement#:~:text

[10] EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 2014, available at https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc

[11] WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Tools for Climate Action (WTO 2023) available at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/publications_e.htm

[12] See R. Ismer et al (2023)  ‘Supporting the Transition to Climate-Neutral Production: An Evaluation Under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’  Journal of International Economic Law  (26) 216-232.

[13] See A. Marhold, ‘SCM: Fossil Fuel Subsidies’ in P. Delimatsis and L. Reins (eds) Encyclopedia on Trade and Environmental Law 479-482 Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, UK/Northhampton MA USA, 347-352 at 347.

[14] ‘Cost of Support Measures for Fossil Fuels almost Doubled in 2022 in Response to Soaring Energy Prices’, 1 December 2023, available at https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/cost-of-support-measures-for-fossil-fuels-almost-doubled-in-2022-in-response-to-soaring-energy-prices.htm

[15] Ministerial Statement on Fossil Fuel Subsidies, MC13, Abu Dhabi, WT/MIN(24)/19, 26 February 2024, available at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN24/19.pdf&Open=True

[16] G. Vidigal and K. Claussen (2024) The Sustainability Revolution in International Trade Agreements Oxford: Oxford University Press. See also Villars Framework for a Sustainable Trading System 2023, available at https://remakingtradeproject.org/villars-framework

Rwanda Showcases Premier Floral Offerings at the IFTF Trade Fair

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Rwanda Showcases Premier Floral Offerings at the IFTF Trade Fair

From November 5th to 7th, Rwanda’s finest floriculture will be on display at the International Floriculture Trade Fair (IFTF) in the Netherlands, held at stand C5.06 under the esteemed Rwandafresh brand. This year’s participation marks another milestone as Rwanda takes the global stage, showcasing its floral excellence to an international audience. Represented by Bella Flowers and supported by the National Agriculture Export Development Board (NAEB), Rwanda’s delegation aims to captivate the global market, enhance its brand visibility, and attract a broader clientele.

“IFTF 2024 is a fantastic opportunity for Rwanda to establish meaningful connections with buyers worldwide,” says Ms. Janet Basiima, Division Manager of Export Markets Development & Innovation at NAEB. “It’s a chance to elevate our industry on a global scale and highlight the quality of Rwandan flowers.”

Mr. Gedion Demissie, Senior Advisor from Bella Flowers, echoes this sentiment sharing that the IFTF is a strategic platform to build relationships with new clients across Europe and Asia, positioning Rwandan flowers as a distinguished choice globally. “Our goal is to make Rwandan Roses a symbol of excellence in the global flower market.

By embracing eco-friendly practices and empowering our local communities, we are building an export model that not only meets market demand but also enhance Rwanda’s reputation as a sustainable and innovative player in agriculture. The international community can now enjoy premium sustainable-grown Rwandan roses, backed by a dedicated industry that embodies Rwanda’s values of quality, integrity, and environmental stewardship.”

With Rwanda’s presence at IFTF, the nation’s floriculture sector is set to thrive as new market opportunities are explored, increasing flower exports and fueling growth. Rwanda’s participation will strengthen its industry by enhancing production strategies and showcasing the potential of Rwandan flowers to an international audience.

About IFTF

The 2024 International Floriculture Trade Fair (IFTF) is shaping up to be the biggest yet, spotlighting 151 premier flower growers from around the world—a remarkable 10% increase from last year’s lineup of 137. With exhibitors representing 13 nations, this year’s event marks a milestone: for the first time ever, flower growers will comprise over half of all participants, rising from 47% to an impressive 53%. This historic turnout underscores the IFTF’s growing influence as a global hub for floral excellence and innovation.


Climate Objectives of COP29 May Remain Unmet

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Climate Objectives of COP29 May Remain Unmet

By Ms. Yi Wang

The 29th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP29) will be held from November 11 to 22, 2024, in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan. Over 100 heads of state and government are expected to attend the conference. The primary goal of COP29 is for wealthy countries to fund poorer nations in their efforts to combat climate change. To this end, participants are seeking to establish a climate action fund aimed at raising trillions of dollars, with voluntary contributions from fossil fuel-producing countries and companies.

However, many leaders from the world’s major economies will be absent from this important event. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, U.S. President Joe Biden, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba have all canceled their plans to attend. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, French President Emmanuel Macron, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese have also stated they will not participate. Neither Mexico nor China has been included in the agenda for leaders’ speeches at the UN climate summit. Whether due to domestic political developments or personal reasons, their absence signals that COP29 negotiations are unlikely to yield a new climate action agreement, making it difficult to secure additional financial resources. This hesitation among developed countries in fulfilling their climate commitments suggests uncertainty about the outcomes of the conference.

Western countries, particularly in Europe and the U.S., have notably downplayed the issue of moving away from fossil fuels.” For them, the more pressing concerns are energy security, price stability, and inflation reduction. Following the U.S. presidential election, after the victory of Donald Trump, it is expected that oil and gas production will increase to lower electricity costs. South Korean officials are considering increasing imports of U.S. oil and natural gas. Changes in Germany’s coalition government also highlight the challenges of balancing economic transformation with key measures for emissions reduction, pointing to significant political divisions in decision-making.

Global investors are increasingly dissatisfied with environmental, social, and governance (ESG) regulatory requirements and, in the pursuit of higher returns, are willing to abandon their green commitments. British oil giant BP has announced plans to abandon its restrictions on fossil fuel production, with its new strategy focusing on investing in oil and gas in the Middle East and the Gulf of Mexico. Shell had earlier indicated it might slow down its emissions reduction efforts, and its latest energy transition strategy has lowered its targets.

Moving away from fossil fuels is proving to be a difficult task. Amid various disruptions and obstacles, momentum seems to be waning. Hence, the expectations for climate financing at COP29 are likely to fall short this year.

1.  Localized military conflicts and their increased intensity are generating the most carbon emissions. Parties have failed to reach agreements on ceasefires, and negotiations on military withdrawals are unlikely to form any substantial agreements. Military activities are consuming vast amounts of resources, placing a greater burden of responsibility for global climate change and damage. In developed Western countries, military spending continues to rise, while domestic economic growth slows, making it difficult to quickly deliver on climate financing commitments.

2. Due to the Russia-Ukraine war, armed conflicts in the Red Sea, and other tense situations, flights have been rerouted, and commercial ships have altered their paths, further complicating efforts to reduce carbon emissions. Many air routes have been forced to change, leading to increased greenhouse gas emissions on both land and sea. Emissions reductions in aviation have a long way to go, especially in terms of reducing the use of traditional aviation fuel. Transportation costs have already risen sharply in many countries, and prioritizing survival has become more important than other concerns. The loss of enthusiasm for climate action may be unavoidable.

3. The explosive growth of artificial intelligence applications has led to a rapid expansion in electricity demand. The production of chips, the construction of cloud data centers, and cryptocurrency mining all consume vast amounts of electricity. In the short term, addressing power shortages is more urgent than the source to generate electricity, and most countries are unable to complete a full transition to clean energy in time.

This year is expected to be the hottest one on record, with an increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events such as droughts, torrential rainfall, and typhoons, alongside the proliferation of infectious diseases and declines in agricultural yields. These trends are largely driven by climate change and its far-reaching effects. As the full scope of these risks becomes increasingly apparent, it is of utmost importance to critically assess the intricate interplay between economic and social development and climate change. This is not a concern limited to a select few or political leaders. Rather, the climate agenda is inextricably linked to the collective well-being, resilience, and long-term sustainability of societies and individuals across the globe.

About the author:

Yi Wang is Head of Global Development Program and Senior Researcher at ANBOUND.

My World in Singer Laren

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My World in Singer Laren

By John Dunkelgrün

Laren, a friendly town at half an hour’s drive Southeast of Amsterdam, used to be a romantic, bucolic village much beloved by artists. Early in the last century, a wealthy art-loving couple, William and Anna Singer, visited it on a tour of Europe. They liked it so much that they bought a piece of land and built a large villa to house and display their growing art collection. In 1956, Anna Singer donated the villa and its collection to the town as an art museum.

The museum houses impressionistic Dutch artwork, paintings from the Barbizon school, and 19th-century works by American painters, including William Singer.

Tal R Adieu Interessant (red) (2005) Gemengde techniek op doek 250 x 250,5 x 4,4 cm Particuliere collectie © Paradis/Tal R – Copenhagen Fotocredit: Jochen Littkemann

Singer Laren, as it has become known, has a very active program of great modern classic exhibitions, drawing visitors from all over the country and abroad.

The main current exhibition, My World, shows works from three top private Dutch collections. It is special not only because the works are more contemporary than those normally associated with Singer Laren but mainly because they showcase the best contemporary art worldwide. Rudolph de Lorm, the museum’s director, is proud to host one of the finest expositions of contemporary art in the Netherlands and calls it ‘art that makes you drool’.

Marlene Dumas The Pilgrim (2006) Olieverf op doek 100 x 90 cm Particuliere collectie © Marlene Dumas Met dank aan Studio Dumas Fotocredit: Peter Cox, Eindhoven

This fabulous overview includes works by iconic artists such as Ai Weiwei, Charles Avery, Rineke Dijkstra, Marlene Dumas, Anselm Kiefer, and Antonio Obá.

Given a free hand, the well-known art critic and writer Hans den Hartog Jager curated a selection of works from the three private collections that are rarely seen by the general public. His expertise and discerning eye ensure that the exhibition is a true gem for art enthusiasts. He was given the Herculean task of choosing 150 works from collections totaling thousands.

Antonio Obá Fata Morgana I (2022) Olieverf op doek 150 x 120 cm Particuliere collectie Met dank aan de kunstenaar en Mendes Wood DM, São Paulo, Brussel, Parijs, New York Fotocredit: Bruno Leão

It was a true tour de force to build a coherent exposition of works in many techniques, works by artists from all over the world, and works with entirely different sorts of messages. Den Hartog Jager divided the exposition into seven themes, which were shown in seven big rooms.

Nicholas Party Still Life (2017) Pastel op doek 110 x 95 cm Particuliere collectie Met dank aan de kunstenaar en Xavier Hufkens, Brussel Fotocredit: Isabelle Arthuis

An artist creates his own world with his creations. By carefully choosing art, often from all corners of the world, a collector builds his or her own world. From the three worlds of these private collections, Den Hartog Jager, in turn, built his world. Finally, in absorbing this galaxy of often mesmerizing collections, you, the viewer, make it into your own world.

Robert Zandvliet z.t. (2022) Tempera op linnen 190 x 168 cm Particuliere collectie © Robert Zandvliet Met dank aan Galerie Onrust, Amsterdam Fotocredit: Henk Geraedts

“My World” at the Singer Museum is an inspiring tribute to the diversity of artistic expression. Whether you are an art aficionado or a casual visitor, this exhibition offers a profound experience, encouraging a deeper understanding of how artists perceive the world today and, in turn, how we perceive ourselves. It’s an invitation to explore your own ‘world’ through the vivid stories encapsulated in the artwork. An absolute must-visit for anyone looking to reconnect with the transformative power of art.

Anna Bjerger In the Wild (2011) Olieverf op aluminium 90 x 75 cm Particuliere collectie © Anna Bjerger Met dank aan de kunstenaar en Galleri Bo Bjerggaard Fotocredit: Michiel Elsevier Stokmans

Singer Museum, Oude Drift 1, Laren.

Until January 12th, 2025

World Waternet and Water Footprint Implementation Unite to Drive Water Footprint Compensation Initiative

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World Waternet and Water Footprint Implementation Unite to Drive Water Footprint Compensation Initiative

Amsterdam, 4 November 2024 – World Waternet is pleased to announce a strategic partnership with Water Footprint Implementation (WFI) to develop the Water Footprint Compensation Initiative, a program designed to replenish and restore freshwater resources in areas significantly impacted by water use.

Advancing Sustainable Water Management

The initiative aims to mobilize private capital for water restoration projects, advancing sustainable water management at scale. “We are proud to partner with WFI on this innovative initiative,” said Frank Tibben, CIO of World Waternet. “By connecting companies to water restoration projects, we’re creating a powerful mechanism to restore our freshwater systems and ensure sustainable water management.”

Water Footprint Compensation Overview

“World Waternet has been part of the pioneering group from the beginning, and it’s an honor to partner with them on this initiative. Their local project expertise is invaluable for achieving impactful, targeted outcomes,” shared Jaap Feil, Managing Partner of WFI. “We believe this partnership will inspire more NGOs to join the coalition, expanding the reach of water footprint compensation. This collaboration also provides companies with opportunities to engage in meaningful, locally focused compensation projects.”

The Water Footprint Compensation Initiative enables companies to offset the negative effects of their water consumption by funding water replenishment and restoration activities. These efforts are concentrated on the basins where their operations and supply chains are based, ensuring that water restoration happens where it is most needed. The partnership will accelerate the initiative’s development, aiming for a formal launch at the 3rd United Nations Water Conference in 2026.

Key Elements of the Partnership

World Waternet and WFI will identify 5 to 10 potential compensation projects for inclusion in the Water Footprint Compensation platform by the 3rd UN Water Conference. These projects align with World Waternet’s Collective Water Action Agenda as outlined in the new Impact Plan 2030.

Jean-Daniel Ruch – Crimes, hate and tremors

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Jean-Daniel Ruch – Crimes, hate and tremors


From one Cold War to another, in pursuit of Peace and Justice

Jean-Daniel Ruch tells his story, from the middle of the issues facing the world today. From the democratisation of the Balkans in the 1990s to Turkey’s attempts at mediation between Russia and Ukraine in 2022, a panorama of the history of the last thirty years unfolds before our eyes.

The journey begins in the Jura region of Switzerland during the most heated period of the Jura conflict that agitated that part of Switzerland until recently. The childhood experience contributed to the author’s political education: there he discovers verbal and physical violence, the battles of narratives and propaganda, and the tearing apart of identities.

Almost naturally, it was followed by his involvement in conflict zones in Europe and the Middle East. Either to right wrongs – the prosecution of Balkan war criminals – or to prevent further violence or point the way to peace – his work in the Israeli-Palestinian context. A leitmotif recurs throughout the text: the desire to understand people, individuals.

How can a young man become a war criminal? What drives people to hatred? What arouses fear? Violence? Rejection of others? The keys are to be found, of course, in the individual and collective history of peoples. We are in the habit of reacting emotionally to everything the news channels broadcast. Jean-Daniel Ruch, in contrast, says that good decisions and policies must be the fruit of knowledge and reflection. He offers us some clues as to how to get to the root of today’s conflicts.

About the Author:

Born in Moutier in 1963, Jean-Daniel Ruch studied international relations in Geneva. After four years in the Department of Defence, he joined the Swiss diplomatic service in 1992. He worked for the OSCE in Vienna from 1994 to 1997 and in Warsaw from 1998 to 2000. He continued his career in the Balkans, first at the Swiss embassy in Belgrade (2000-2003), then as political adviser to the prosecutor of the Yugoslavia war crimes tribunal (ICTY) from 2003 to 2007.

From 2008, he led Swiss policy in the Middle East as the Confederation became involved in the search for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Jean-Daniel Ruch was Switzerland’s ambassador to Serbia and to Montenegro (2012-2016), to Israel (2016-2021) and to Turkey (2021-2023).

“Reads like a thriller. And our quest for international justice was also a thriller”

— Carla Del Ponte, former procurator ICTY

Foreword by Micheline Calmy-Rey, former President of the Swiss Confederation.

Kindle edition and paperback (176 pages)

Uzbekistan Elections A Triumph of the Democratic Process

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Uzbekistan Elections A Triumph of the Democratic Process

By Roy Lie Atjam

The highly anticipated elections for the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis and local councils Kengashes in Uzbekistan took place as planned on Sunday, 27 October 2024. This election was a crucial event for the legislative body known as the Oliy Majlis councils.

The Central Election Commission (MSK) effectively executed its responsibilities in strict accordance with the Constitution, the Election Code, and the prevailing legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Their meticulous adherence to legal and constitutional procedures ensured a fair and transparent electoral process.

On polling day, it was a remarkable autumn day in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, which proudly earns its reputation as a garden city.

All requirements were successfully met, and polling stations were strategically located in venues prominently displaying the State flag outside and inside the building. Furthermore, polling stations were numbered, and there were designated booths for confidential voting and secure ballot boxes.

Voting commenced promptly at 8 AM and concluded at 8 PM, achieving an impressive turnout that exceeded 74%. After playing the national anthem, ballot papers were efficiently distributed to all eligible voters.

The MSK conducted regular press conferences and briefings to inform the public about the electoral process. Polling stations exemplified a welcoming, transparent atmosphere. Observers could navigate freely, with transportation and interpreters readily available to support them.

By Article 14 of the Election Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Central Election Commission officially invited International Observers, engaging vital international organisations, electoral bodies, and foreign representatives in the oversight of the election. International observation is an indispensable pillar of democratic elections, ensuring the integrity and transparency vital to the electoral process.

These observers played an active role, monitoring the voting on election day and overseeing the counting of votes and protocols. Their presence underscored Uzbekistan’s commitment to upholding international standards of transparency and fairness in its electoral process.

The election campaign was carried out effectively across various media channels, including telecom networks, the internet, printed materials, and eye- catching visual and audio tools such as posters and leaflets. A gala concert featuring the State Symphony Orchestra of Uzbekistan took place at the Palace of International Forums, alongside engaging in-person meetings with voters.

This comprehensive approach ensured that all citizens were well-informed and actively involved in the electoral process.

High-profile interviews were conducted with leading party members, including Prof. Dr. Dubek Akhmedov of the UzLiDeP party, who expertly articulated the mixed electoral system integrating majoritarian and proportional representation.

The government proactively organised numerous promotional meetings to galvanise support for the election at home and abroad. A critical conference held in Brussels on September 26, 2024, titled On the Road to a Democratic Future demonstrated this commitment. Domestically, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spearheaded The International Partnership Initiatives Week, which featured a significant roundtable discussion in Tashkent entitled Foreign Policy of Uzbekistan: Openness and Prosperity for Peace. This event drew considerable attendance from the Diplomatic Corps in Uzbekistan, including prominent ambassadors from India, France, and other nations.

One international observer appreciated participating in this critical event, stating, “I am glad to be here. I have visited Uzbekistan many times and taken part in various international events. These elections are being conducted completely differently from what I am used to. During my visits to the polling stations, I witnessed extensive preparations for the elections. Everything was carried out according to democratic principles. What caught my attention was integrating the election process with information technology.

Electronic voting systems have been implemented, and almost all tasks are handled electronically. This starkly contrasts my country, where elections are conducted on paper rather than electronically. This significant political process will play a crucial role in the ongoing development of New Uzbekistan.”

Diplomats attending Uzbekistan Elections 2024. The International Partnership Initiatives Week.

Regarding the preliminary election results, the Liberal Democratic Party, currently in power, has received 64 mandates out of 150 in the lower house of parliament:The Democratic Party “Milliy Tiklanish” secured 29 mandates, the “Ecological Party of Uzbekistan” received 16, the “People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan” obtained 20, and the Social Democratic Party “Adolat” garnered 21. Final outcomes will be published within ten days.

Uzbekistan undoubtedly has the potential to build a prosperous and inclusive New Uzbekistan.

Prabowo Subianto, the new President of Indonesia

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Prabowo Subianto, the new President of Indonesia

By Anton Lutter

On the 20th of last October the 8th president of the Republic of Indonesia was inaugurated at Parliament in Jakarta. Prabowo Subianto and his vice-presidential candidate Gibran Rakabuming, the son of the 7th president Joko Widodo, won the presidential election with almost 60% of the vote. Previously Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusomo – his full name – was minister of Defense in the cabinet of his predecessor since 2019.

Born in Jakarta 1951 as the son of prominent Indonesian economist and – amongst others – minister of Finance Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (1917-2001), who studied in Rotterdam and was actually the first Indonesian student to obtain a doctorate there. His grandfather Margono Djojohadikusumo (1894-1978) was of an aristocratic background but more important he was the founder of the Bank Negara Indonesia and its first president.

Briefly he worked as an official in the Dutch Ministry of Colonies in The Hague and participated in the Round Table Conference with the Netherlands preparing for Indonesia’s independence, he was later replaced by his son Sumitro. Unlike his father and grandfather before him his career was not in academics. He entered the National Military Academy in Magelang (Central Java) in 1970 and graduated in 1974, in 1985 he attended the Advanced Infantry Course at Fort Benning in Georgia (USA).

Prabowo Subianto made a fast career in the army, becoming the commandant of Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) in 1998. Shortly after President Suharto stepped down as president of Indonesia that same year, Prabowo Subianto, who was married to the one of the president’s daughters, was honorably discharged thus ending a 24-year military career. He then joined the business operations of his family at the same time founding the Gerindra Party in 2008. For this party he was both presidential candidate in the 2014 and 2019 elections, which he both lost to Joko Widodo, who thus served 2 terms as president.

During the latter 2nd term Prabowo Subianto was appointed minister of Defense as Gerindra Party being part of Joko Widodo’s Onward Indonesia Coalition government. As the popular president was not able to run in the 2024 election (maximum of two terms) Prabowo Subianto became the foremost candidate and won presidential election convincingly with the son of Joko Widodo as his running mate.

In February 2024 president Joko Widodo awarded Prabowo Subianto the title of honorary four-star general. The president was married to Titiek Hediati Haryadi, the second daughter of long time president Suharto, she is a member of the People’s Representative Council (parliament) since 2014. They have one son Didit Prabowo who is a prominent Indonesian fashion designer.

The Inside and Outside of New Progressive Economics

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The Inside and Outside of New Progressive Economics

By Chen Li

In March 2021, less than two months after taking office, President Joe Biden signed a USD 1.9 trillion relief package into law, with a series of other trillion-dollar bills waiting to be passed and implemented. This gave the world a glimpse of the so-called “Bidenomics”. Looking at Biden’s predecessors, from Ronald Reagan to Barrack Obama, they were all seen as proponents of neoliberalism, firmly believing in the market’s role in regulating the economy. However, under Biden’s leadership, a structural shift has occurred.

In the 1980s, then-President Ronald introduced “Reaganomics”, which was based on the economic philosophy of building a “small government”, reducing spending, cutting taxes, and avoiding wealth redistribution. Although the rich would become wealthier as a result, they would increase consumption and investment, causing wealth to trickle down from the top, ultimately benefiting all social classes. In this sense, Bidenomics can be seen as a full rejection of Reaganomics. In his 2022 budget proposal, Biden indicated that the budget reflected the fact that the “trickle-down theory” had never worked.

Bidenomics is actually rooted in the rise of new progressive economics, which became mainstream within the Democratic Party. New progressive economics emerged after the 2008 financial crisis as a critique of traditional neoliberal economics, emphasizing the active role of government in the economy. This “big government” approach differs somewhat from Keynesianism. Keynesianism stresses that demand is the key driver of economic growth, with the government needing to intervene through fiscal policy to stimulate demand and promote employment.

In contrast, new progressive economics emphasizes the government’s role in fostering long-term economic growth and stability. It argues that the government should not only intervene during crises but also promote structural reforms to address issues like inequality and economic instability. This school of thought advocates for social spending, anti-monopoly measures, industrial policy, and the promotion of social welfare, i.e., policies that lean heavily on the “big government” approach and downplay the role of the free market in economic development.

In a strict sense, it is difficult to classify new progressive economics as a fully formed school of economics because it is essentially a rebellion against traditional liberal economics. It represents a political application of economic ideas rather than a theoretical discipline. Although it has developed a coherent framework, it has considerable political elements. To fully understand this, it is necessary to review how new progressivism gained popularity within the Democratic Party.

The shift toward new progressivism within the Democratic Party occurred during Obama’s second term, when disappointment and dissatisfaction among the party’s progressive wing reached a peak. Progressives believed that Obama, constrained by traditional neoliberal economic ideas, was too sympathetic toward the financial industry and that his economic stimulus measures were insufficiently bold, thus calling for more thorough reforms. Inspired by the Occupy Wall Street movement and the We Are the 99% campaign, progressives began focusing their political donations on issues of inequality.

At the same time, the influence of new progressive ideas expanded under the advocacy of Harvard Law School professor and consumer rights expert Elizabeth Warren. Warren not only launched fierce critiques against Wall Street but also worked to combat the excessive concentration of power among tech giants and large corporations. After Trump’s election in 2016, elites within the Democratic Party began questioning the traditional ways of political operation. Organizations such as the Hewlett Foundation and the Ford Foundation began to promote the critique of neoliberalism as a new intellectual paradigm, while Omidyar Network began pushing the movement to “reimagine capitalism”.

Under the influence of new progressivism, left-wing figures within the Democratic Party began to push for antitrust movements against big corporations, populist policies, and new industrial policies. Regarding the Democratic Party’s shift to the left, Jake Sullivan wrote that the U.S. was at a “turning point”, disillusioned with the excesses of the free market and open to bold new policies. After taking office, President Biden also embraced new progressive ideas. For a long time, his administration had maintained close ties with labor unions and remained skeptical of the elite economists from top universities. With the emergence of the economic crisis caused by the pandemic, Biden appeared eager to position himself as a “Roosevelt-style President”, with Jake Sullivan, a lawyer by training, serving as his chief policy advisor during the campaign.

Guided by New Progressive thinking, the Biden administration introduced a USD 1.9 trillion pandemic recovery stimulus package. Traditional economists, such as Larry Summers, voiced complaints, arguing that the size of the stimulus was too large and far exceeded what economic analysis deemed necessary, warning that it would inevitably lead to inflation. As it turned out, these economists were not wrong. In the first two years of Biden’s presidency, U.S. prices surged, reaching a peak of 9.1% inflation in June 2022, marking the highest inflation rate in 40 years. At the same time, the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS Act provided billions of dollars in tax credits and subsidies for industrial policies. This even led to criticism from left-wing figures within the Democratic Party, such as Elizabeth Warren, who questioned whether the U.S. Department of Commerce was too hasty in distributing funds without adequate oversight. To date, U.S. factory construction spending has doubled, but no one knows what the long-term return on these investments will be.

Under the new progressive ideas, the policy staff of the Biden administration also displayed characteristics that were different from those of the Obama administration, reflecting a trend of diminishing influence of economics at both the intellectual and political levels. New York Times columnist Ezra Klein noted that the influence of economists and financiers during Biden’s tenure was far weaker compared to the Obama administration, while the influence of nonprofit organizations, labor leaders, and progressive elite lawyers continued to grow. Biden’s policy team consists largely of graduates from Yale Law School, including Jake Sullivan, Jennifer Harris, and Lina Khan, among others.

The agenda of new progressivism has been largely realized, marking a victory for left-wing Democrats focused on gaining support from middle and lower-income groups, addressing national security concerns, and opposing corporate monopolies. However, the resulting damage to the free market and the economy has sparked public dissatisfaction. Polling data shows that many American voters are dissatisfied with the Biden administration’s economic policies, believing it has failed to effectively control rising prices. According to Gallup, the approval rating for the Biden administration’s economic policies stands at just 37%.

As Kamala Harris replaces Joe Biden as the Democratic presidential candidate, predicting whether she will carry on Biden’s legacy and continue to advance new progressive ideas becomes especially important. Some signs suggest that Harris may continue Biden’s approach. In August of this year, Harris’s campaign team announced that her economic advisory team would include Brian Deese, Biden’s former Director of the National Economic Council, and Bharat Ramamurti, who had previously worked as an aide to Elizabeth Warren. In a recent economic policy speech, Harris presented a progressive agenda centered on narrowing income inequality and expanding opportunities for marginalized groups. She advocated for strengthening union power, increasing taxes on the wealthy, and bolstering the social safety net for middle- and low-income families, positions that align with new progressive ideals. However, for now, winning the presidential election is Harris’s top priority, which means she is working to balance the interests of both her New Progressive supporters and her critics. She has sent signals to all factions. As Harris and her team continue to adjust their policy positions, observers remain cautious about whether she will fully adhere to the core principles of new progressive economics.

New progressive economics is gaining traction in the United States, but it is not so much a traditional economic theory as it is a political economy for a new era, deeply intertwined with political agendas. It represents a direct challenge to classical liberal economic thought, with the goal of reshaping capitalism. In the policy practices of the Biden administration, new progressive economics has been characterized by a strong political drive, seeking to expand the role of government in the economy to address inequality and secure support from middle- and low-income voters. However, these policies have also led to soaring inflation and have had negative consequences for the free market. Kamala Harris’s campaign suggests she may continue to champion the new progressive agenda. However, given the deep political polarization among voters, she is currently attempting to balance the interests of progressives with those of their critics. Whether the new progressive movement can maintain its influence within the Democratic Party and whether it will have a lasting global impact remain important questions to watch.

About the author:

Chen Li, Economic Research Fellow at ANBOUND

Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction ASSER Training Programme: Another Successful Edition in The Hague

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Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction ASSER Training Programme: Another Successful Edition in The Hague

By Pietro Proglio

The recent edition of the Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Training Programme marked another successful chapter in equipping professionals with vital expertise on WMD control and security. Organized by the Asser Instituut in partnership with the OPCW, this year’s program once again brought together a remarkable group of diplomats, military personnel, and academics, each committed to enhancing their understanding of one of the most critical issues facing global security.

For five engaging days, we dove deep into the complex worlds of nuclear, biological, and chemical arms control, with discussions ranging from foundational treaties like the NPT and BWC to the latest developments involving Artificial Intelligence in arms control. The course featured lectures on topics ranging from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) to contemporary issues like emerging threats linked to the use of Artificial Intelligence.

A significant highlight of the program was the opportunity to visit key sites such as the TU Delft Nuclear Research Reactor, where participants observed nuclear safety protocols firsthand, and the OPCW ChemTech Centre, providing practical insights into chemical weapons detection and disposal. These field trips were eye-opening, providing us with a rare, firsthand look into nuclear safety and the latest chemical weapons detection and disposal technologies. Touring these facilities brought theoretical concepts to life in the most powerful way.

The highlight of the course was the interactive simulation exercise, where the participants assumed roles of state representatives, negotiating and drafting agreements on non-proliferation issues. This immersive experience gave us an authentic taste of the intricacies involved in international diplomacy—no easy feat but immensely rewarding.

Beyond technical learning, the course encouraged invaluable networking, connecting professionals across sectors and regions. As WMD issues remain at the forefront of global security, programs like this one are indispensable in shaping knowledgeable, motivated leaders in the field.

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