Gaza / Israel: Fiscal de la Corte Penal Internacional reitera urgencia de la emisiĂłn de Ăłrdenes de arresto

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Gaza / Israel: Fiscal de la Corte Penal Internacional reitera urgencia de la emisiĂłn de Ăłrdenes de arresto

Por Nicolas Boeglin

En un documento remitido el pasado 23 de agosto a la Sala de lo Preliminar de la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI), el Fiscal de la CPI ha reiterado su solicitud de Ăłrdenes de arresto contra dirigentes israelĂ­es (su Primer Ministro y su Ministro de Defensa) y contra tres lĂ­deres del HamĂĄs. 

Este documento permite ademås al Fiscal de la CPI, responder a algunos de los escritos remitidos a la CPI por parte de Estados, organizaciones internacionales, ONG y académicos, entre los cuales algunos (muy pocos en lo que concierne a Estados) que cuestionaron su actuar desde el punto de vista jurídico, a partir de interpretaciones jurídicas antojadizas.

Como bien se sabe, la CPI fue establecida en 1998 mediante la adopciĂłn del Estatuto de Roma, un instrumento internacional que registra 124 Estados Partes (vĂ©ase estado oficial de firmas y de ratificaciones). En AmĂ©rica Latina, el Ășltimo Estado en haberlo ratificado fue Guatemala en el 2012, al tiempo que Cuba y Nicaragua persisten en no firmar este instrumento.

Como se puede observar mediante una breve bĂșsqueda en la red, es realmente muy poca la difusiĂłn que se ha hecho al contenido de este documento en los grandes medios de prensa internacionales desde el 23 de agosto pasado.

El drama indecible que se vive en Gaza

Se recomienda la lectura del Ășltimo informe de situaciĂłn elaborado por Naciones Unidas al 30 de agosto del 2024 (vĂ©ase enlace). 

En el penĂșltimo informe (al 26 de agosto de 2024, vĂ©ase enlace) se lee que el bombardeo incesante sobre la poblaciĂłn civil de Gaza por parte de Israel no ha sido interrumpido, con nuevos dramas vividos en Gaza en los Ășltimos dĂ­as de manera constante:

“Between the afternoons of 23 and 26 August, according to the Ministry of Health (MoH) in Gaza, 170 Palestinians were killed and 390 were injured. Between 7 October 2023 and 26 August 2024, at least 40,435 Palestinians were killed and 93,534 were injured, according to MoH in Gaza.

The following are some of the deadly incidents reported between 22 and 25 August:

On 22 August, five Palestinians were reportedly killed and others injured when a house was hit in the vicinity of Bani Suheila square, east of Khan Younis.

On 23 August, five Palestinians were reportedly killed when a vehicle was hit southeast of Khan Younis.

On 23 August, four Palestinians were reportedly killed and others injured when a house was hit in northwestern An Nuseirat Refugee Camp, Deir al Balah.

On 24 August, four Palestinians were reportedly killed and others injured when a house was hit in Maan area, east of Khan Younis.

On 24 August, 11 Palestinians, including women and children, were reportedly killed and 30 others injured when a house was hit in Al Amal neighborhood, west of Khan Younis.

On 24 August, at about 12:10, eight Palestinian men were reportedly killed when a vehicle (tuk-tuk) was hit in northwestern Rafah.

On 25 August, eight Palestinians were reportedly killed and others injured when a house was hit south of Deir al Balah”.

Es de notar que el saldo mortĂ­fero de mĂĄs de 40.000 personas en Gaza se sitĂșa, para algunos especialistas, muy por debajo de la realidad. En efecto, en un reciente artĂ­culo publicado por un renombrado especialista militar invitado en un sinnĂșmero de espacios informativos en Francia, y titulado “Guerres en Ukraine et en IsraĂ«l, (enfin) des voies de sortie en perspective?”, se lee que la cifra real podrĂ­a corresponder a unas 100.000 personas fallecidas en Gaza desde el 7 de octubre del 2023:

“les Ă©valuations des dĂ©gĂąts des bombardements montrent – mĂȘme en hypothĂšse basse – que le bilan projetĂ© se situe plutĂŽt autour de 100,000 morts et donc de 350,000 blessĂ©s (le ratio de 3,5 est la « norme Â»), soit 20% de la population palestinienne de Gaza Â« au bas mot Â» (450,000 / population initiale de 2,3 millions), blessĂ©e ou tuĂ©e par cette guerre dĂ©mesurĂ©e”.

La ausencia de datos verificables responde en gran parte a la ausencia de un personal de agencias humanitarias desplegado en toda Gaza, y a la ausencia de medios de prensa que puedan documentar e informar a la opiniĂłn pĂșblica internacional sobre la realidad que se vive en Gaza y sobre el alcance exacto de los bombardeos aĂ©reos a los que Israel somete a la poblaciĂłn civil de Gaza. A ese respecto, el asesinato deliberado por parte de Israel de periodistas, camarĂłgrafos, asistentes de medios de prensa llevĂł a unas 60 organizaciones que velan por la protecciĂłn de los periodistas  a elevar el tono y a exigir a la UniĂłn Europea (UE) tomar acciones (vĂ©ase carta colectiva con fecha del 22 de agosto del 2024). En dicha misiva, se lee que:

“Journalists play an indispensable role in documenting and reporting on war crimes and other human rights violations. The cumulative effect of these abuses is to create the conditions for an information void, as well as for propaganda and mis- and disinformation. While Israel contends that its actions are to keep its people safe, history shows that censorship and denial of the right to information is a flawed path to peace or security. We, therefore, write to you today to call for the suspension of the Israel / EU Association Agreement on the basis that it has violated international human rights and criminal law and for the adoption of targeted sanctions against IDF officials and others responsable”.

Al 23 de agosto del 2024, segĂșn el Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), el nĂșmero de periodistas asesinados en Gaza por las fuerzas militares de Israel desde el 7 de octubre del 2023, asciende a 116 profesionales de la comunicaciĂłn (vĂ©ase informe).

En cuanto al personal humanitario de Naciones Unidas en Gaza, el pasado 19 de agosto se conmemorĂł, en el DĂ­a Internacional de la AcciĂłn Humanitaria, la muerte de 280 funcionarios de Naciones en Gaza desde el 7 de octubre del 2023 (vĂ©ase comunicado): un saldo jamĂĄs alcanzado en ningĂșn teatro de operaciones en los que personal de Naciones Unidas ha estado presente.

En otro ĂĄmbito relacionado a las exacciones que se comete en Gaza, este 26 de agosto, fue la ONG Human Rights Watch la que publicĂł un detallado informe sobre la tortura a la que fueron sometidas personas trabajando en hospitales en Gaza, capturadas por Israel (vĂ©ase informe).

Tuvimos recientemente la oportunidad de detallar estos y algunos otros aspectos del drama indescriptible que se vive en Gaza, asĂ­ como de analizar la fracasada estrategia militar en Gaza en una emisiĂłn del programa Desayunos de Radio UCR (vĂ©ase enlace a emisiĂłn del 21 de agosto titulada “ÂżQuĂ© estĂĄ pasando en Gaza?“).

Si bien la atenciĂłn se ha centrado en la situaciĂłn en Gaza, el Ășltima informe de Naciones Unidas sobre la situaciĂłn en Cisjordania (vĂ©ase informe al 28 de agosto del 2024) revela el clima de impunidad ante las exacciones de todo tipo cometidas por colonos contra familias palestinas y sus bienes, ante la pasividad de las fuerzas de seguridad israelĂ­es, con un saldo de 622 personas fallecidas desde el 7 de octubre del 2023 en Cisjordania y en JerusalĂ©n Oriental.

Las conclusiones del Fiscal en breve

En un extenso documento de 49 pĂĄginas (vĂ©ase texto completo), el Fiscal de la CPI rechaza varias opiniones enviadas por algunos Estados y entidades a la CPI sobre algunas supuestas limitaciones que derivarĂ­a para la CPI de los acuerdos de Oslo, y concluye que:

“113. In addition to being manifestly out of time, Israel’s letter neither mentions article 18 nor satisfies the legal requirements of a deferral request under article 18. Merely asserting the capacity of the Israeli justice system and that some investigations are ongoing is not sufficient. The requesting State bears the burden of proof and must demonstrate that its proceedings sufficiently mirror the scope of the Prosecution’s intended investigation. It must provide information of a sufficient degree of specificity and probative value to demonstrate an advancing process of relevant domestic investigations or prosecutions, including patterns of criminality and high-ranking officials. Israel did not provide any such material that would meet this burden. Nor, as outlined above, does any such information appear to exist.

IV. RELIEF REQUESTED

114. The Prosecution respectfully requests the Pre-Trial Chamber to:

– dismiss in limine the observations unrelated to the Oslo Accords; and

– urgently render its decisions under article 58, on the basis of the Prosecution’s Applications, these submissions, and the Article 19(3) Decision“.

En la parte inicial de su opiniĂłn, se lee que para el Fiscal de la CPI, los argumentos segĂșn los cuales Israel ha procedido a investigar las exacciones de sus fuerzas militares en Gaza no son de recibo:

” 8. (…) As the Prosecution has concluded, and as is evident from the public record, there are no domestic proceedings at present which deal with substantially the same conduct and the same persons as the cases presented to the Chamber pursuant to article 58 of the Statute. There is no information indicating that Benjamin NETANYAHU or Yoav GALLANT, Israel’s Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, respectively, are being criminally investigated or prosecuted, and indeed the core allegations against them have simply been rejected by Israeli authorities“.

En otra parte de su escrito, se indica que para el Fiscal de la CPI:

“93. In any case, and additionally, the available information does not show that Israel is investigating substantially the same conduct as the ICC. For instance, the information available does not suggest that the above inquiries relate to the conduct underlying the war crime of starvation and/or related crimes. Likewise, the available information does not suggest any inquiry into patterns of criminality, or the potential responsibility of high-ranking officials, which may among other considerations signify the investigation of contextual elements of crimes against humanity. Indeed, significantly, on 28 May 2024 the MAG categorically rejected the commission of these crimes without any indication or implication that such conclusions resulted from a full and rigorous investigation, or indeed any investigation at all”.

Breve contexto procesal

De esta manera, el plazo otorgado por la Sala de lo Preliminar de la CPI para la recepciĂłn de opiniones legales llega a su fin, debiendo ahora la Sala de lo Preliminar tomar una decisiĂłn definitiva sobre la solicitud de arresto que recibiĂł desde el 20 de mayo del 2024 por parte del mismo Fiscal de la CPI.

Este plazo adicional de tiempo se debe a una maniobra inicial del Reino Unido de carĂĄcter dilatorio registrada en junio del 2024, que abriĂł un compĂĄs de espera para que los jueces de la CPI recibieran opiniones jurĂ­dicas variadas enviadas por Estados, organizaciones internacionales, ONGs y acadĂ©micos.  En razĂłn del resultado de las elecciones en el Reino Unido del 4 de julio del 2024, sus nuevas autoridades consideraron innecesario continuar la gestiĂłn, y no remitieron ninguna opiniĂłn jurĂ­dica a la CPI en nombre del Reino Unido.

Con relaciĂłn  a AmĂ©rica Latina, habĂ­amos tenido la oportunidad de referir a las opiniones jurĂ­dicas enviadas por Estados de AmĂ©rica Latina a la CPI en una nota anterior editada el 6 de agosto del 2024, y titulada “AmĂ©rica Latina ante el drama en Gaza: a propĂłsito de las observaciones enviadas por Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia y MĂ©xico a la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI)“. 

Si algunos de nuestros estimables lectores no encuentran enlistado a su paĂ­s de origen, es muy vĂĄlida la interrogante sobre el punto de saber a quĂ© puede estar obedeciendo semejante omisiĂłn e inacciĂłn por parte de sus autoridades nacionales. Hacemos a un lado el caso particular de nuestros lectores argentinos, como se explicarĂĄ a continuaciĂłn. 

En el caso especĂ­fico de Ecuador, el reciente acuerdo con Israel (abril del 2024) denota un acercamiento – bastante insĂłlito – de un Estado de AmĂ©rica Latina con las actuales autoridades de Israel (vĂ©anse comunicado oficial de Ecuador y  nota de prensa de El TelĂ©grafo, de abril del 2024). 

En el caso de Paraguay, un reciente anuncio oficial sobre la idea de trasladar nuevamente su Embajada de Tel Aviv a JerusalĂ©n evidencia la cercanĂ­a actual de sus autoridades con las de Israel (vĂ©ase nota de MercoPress de julio del 2024). Cabe recordar que en mayo del 2018, Paraguay anunciĂł trasladar a JerusalĂ©n su Embajada (vĂ©ase comunicado oficial del 9 de mayo del 2018), decisiĂłn revertida unos meses despuĂ©s por las nuevas autoridades guaranĂ­es (Nota 1).

Es de señalar que la comunicaciĂłn remitida por Colombia a la CPI fue precedida por las de España (vĂ©ase documento), Irlanda (vĂ©ase documento), asĂ­ como de Noruega, presentada el 5 de agosto (vĂ©ase documento completo) que apuntan en la misma direcciĂłn, asĂ­ como por la remitida por Palestina (vĂ©ase documento): la justicia penal internacional estĂĄ jurĂ­dicamente plenamente habilitada para aplicarse en el territorio palestino ocupado, sin limitaciĂłn de algĂșn tipo.

Como dato de interés, pasado por alto por la gran mayoría de artículos de prensa y de comentarios firmados por analistas, editorialistas y especialistas, Israel optó por no remitir ninguna opinión escrita a la CPI.

TambiĂ©n cabe mencionar la opiniĂłn jurĂ­dica remitida a la CPI por los 30 expertos de derechos humanos de Naciones Unidas que enviaron una opiniĂłn conjunta a los jueces de la CPI (vĂ©ase documento, cuya lectura completa se recomienda), y que concluyen señalando de manera enfĂĄtica que:

“23. The Mandate Holders recognize the Court’s role in ensuring international justice as a critical component of preserving international order through the protection of the interests of victims of international crimes. People around the world, especially youth, advocating for the application of international law, are watching closely, hoping the promises of international peace are not devoid of meaning.

24. In light of the expert opinions shared in this document, the Mandate Holders urge the Court not to further delay the delivery of justice in the occupied Palestinian territory, through the prosecution of alleged criminals. The significant effects of this failure would be felt far beyond the tormented land of Palestine”.

Pese a no haber continuado la gestiĂłn iniciada por las autoridades del Reino Unido en junio del 2024, el carĂĄcter dilatorio de la maniobra britĂĄnica explica que desde la solicitud de emisiĂłn de Ăłrdenes de arresto con fecha del 20 de mayo por parte del Fiscal, la CPI todavĂ­a estĂ© analizando dicha solicitud. 

El plazo de tiempo puede ser comparado con la Ăłrden de arresto contra dos altos funcionarios en Rusia (incluyendo a su Presidente) emitida por una Sala de lo Preliminar de la CPI el 17 de marzo del 2023 (vĂ©ase comunicado oficial de la CPI), precedida por una solicitud del Fiscal con fecha del 22 de febrero del 2023. 

El caso particular de Estados Unidos

Alegando una supuesta limitaciĂłn a la jurisdicciĂłn de la CPI, Israel ha podido contar con un documento oficial remitido por Estados Unidos (vĂ©ase documento). La particularidad consiste en que este documento proviene de un Estado que no es Estado Parte al Estatuto de Roma de 1998 que crea la CPI.

TambiĂ©n remitieron un documento que intenta restringir la jurisdicciĂłn penal internacional en Gaza de la CPI los siguientes Estados europeos, que sĂ­ son Estados Partes al Estatuto de Roma: Alemania (vĂ©ase documento), HungrĂ­a (vĂ©ase documento) asĂ­ como  la RepĂșblica Checa (vĂ©ase documento). 

Esta vez, no remitieron ninguna opiniĂłn favorable a Israel a los jueces de la CPI Estados que, usualmente, son muy solĂ­citos cuando se trata de Israel y de la justicia penal internacional: Australia, Austria, CanadĂĄ, Guatemala, Uganda y Reino Unido asĂ­ como algunas de las islas del PacĂ­fico (Islas Marshall, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau y PapĂșa Nueva Guinea). Se trata de un pequeño grupo de Estados que usualmente aparece votando con Israel y con Estados Unidos en Naciones Unidas y que tampoco apareciĂł en diciembre del 2023 al votarse una resoluciĂłn en el seno de la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas sobre el derecho a la autodeterminaciĂłn del pueblo palestino: vĂ©ase resoluciĂłn A/Res/78/192), que registrĂł 172 votos a favor, 10 abstenciones y Ășnicamente 4 votos en contra (Estados Unidos, Israel, Micronesia y Nauru).

Los pĂĄrrafos 16-26 del escrito remitido por Estados Unidos  (vĂ©ase documento)  constituyen un intento para desacreditar la solicitud del Fiscal de la CPI con base en una interpretaciĂłn de las disposiciones del Estatuto de Roma al que Estados Unidos… no es Estado Parte.

Un Estado no Parte a un instrumento internacional emblemático como el Estatuto de Roma
 ¿explicando cómo se deben de interpretar sus disposiciones a los jueces de la CPI? ¿Cómo así? Como se lee.

La profunda soledad de Argentina

Por parte de AmĂ©rica Latina, como gesto notorio en apoyo a las tesis jurĂ­dicas favorables a Israel sobre una supuesta limitaciĂłn a la jurisdicciĂłn de la CPI derivada de los acuerdos de Oslo de 1993, encontramos el Ășnico escrito remitido por Argentina (vĂ©ase documento): como detalle de cierto interĂ©s, el documento viene firmado por la titular de la diplomacia argentina, a diferencia de los demĂĄs escritos remitidos por Estados a la CPI, firmados ya sea por un funcionario diplomĂĄtico subalterno de relevancia relativa (caso de Alemania, Estados Unidos, HungrĂ­a, Irlanda, Noruega, RepĂșblica Checa), por el ChargĂ© dÂŽAffaires de turno en la legaciĂłn diplomĂĄtica en La Haya (Colombia, Brasil) o bien por el representante diplomĂĄtico en La Haya: es el caso de Bolivia, España, asĂ­ como del documento suscrito conjuntamente por Chile y MĂ©xico (vĂ©ase texto). 

En el caso de RepĂșblica del Congo, el texto remitido viene tambiĂ©n firmado por un ministro: el Ministro de Justicia.

SerĂ­a de interĂ©s conocer las razones exactas por las que la diplomacia argentina y la congolesa optaron por enviar un documento de esta naturaleza firmado de puño y letra por un funcionario con rango de ministro. 

Con relaciĂłn al “aporte” de Argentina en favor de las tesis jurĂ­dicas favorables a Israel en este mes de agosto del 2024 (vĂ©ase documento), es de notar que, en el marco de un ejercicio similar, fue Brasil en el 2020 el que explicĂł que la CPI no podĂ­a ejercer su jurisdicciĂłn con relaciĂłn a las exacciones cometidas por Israel en el territorio palestino ocupado (vĂ©ase el documento suscrito por un funcionario subalterno): una “coĂŻncidencia” entre el Brasil de Bolsonaro y la actual Argentina de Milei que merece ser mencionada. 

Cabe precisar que recientemente en Brasil se descubriĂł la existencia de una “nube” electrĂłnica albergada en Israel con los datos personales de mĂĄs de 30.000 brasileños (vĂ©ase nota de prensa de PĂĄgina12 de enero del 2024): al parecer, el programa Pegasus y otros programas informĂĄticos que Israel ha obsequiado a los Estados ĂĄrabes que aceptaron normalizar sus relaciones en el marco de los denominados “Acuerdos de Abraham” del 2020 (y que permiten espiar y vigilar conversaciones de opositores polĂ­ticos)  – vĂ©ase artĂ­culo del New York Times del 2022 y  vĂ©ase nota del MERP del 2023 – tambiĂ©n fue obsequiado al Brasil del Presidente Jair Bolsonaro. Desde una perspectiva de derechos humanos, este informe de la ONG AmnistĂ­a Internacional analiza el riesgo que significa, para opositores polĂ­ticos, sindicalistas, periodistas crĂ­ticos y activistas en general u organizaciones sociales, el programa Pegasus. En el 2022, la misma Human Rights Watch denunciĂł que su personal fue objeto de vigilancia recurriendo a este programa informatĂ­co israelĂ­ (vĂ©ase nota).

Volviendo a la CPI, en aquella ocasiĂłn (2020), la argumentaciĂłn jurĂ­dica de Brasil, al igual que la de Alemania, Austria, HungrĂ­a, RepĂșblica Checa y Uganda fue rechazada por la Sala de lo Preliminar en una histĂłrica decisiĂłn del 5 de febrero del 2021, que tuvimos la oportunidad de analizar en su momento (Nota 2). 

En este mes de agosto del 2024, Argentina es el Ășnico Estado de AmĂ©rica Latina en haber hecho llegar a la CPI un escrito para intentar favorecer a Israel ante los jueces de la CPI.

No estĂĄ demĂĄs señalar que al votarse en la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas una resoluciĂłn en mayo del 2024 sobre los derechos de Palestina como futuro Estado Miembro de Naciones Unidas, Argentina volviĂł a “destacarse” en AmĂ©rica Latina al ser el Ășnico Estado de la regiĂłn en votar en contra, conjuntamente con 8 Estados mĂĄs: Estados Unidos, HungrĂ­a, Israel, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, PapĂșa Nueva Guinea y RepĂșblica Checa (vĂ©ase al respecto nuestra nota titulada” Palestina: a propĂłsito de la reciente resoluciĂłn sobre derechos de Palestina como  futuro Estado Miembro de Naciones Unidas” editada el 10 de mayo del 2024).

CPI e Israel: una vigilancia extrema

NĂłtese que en mayo del 2024 un grupo de periodistas en Israel dieron a conocer un programa especĂ­fico de escuchas e intercepciĂłn de los servicios de inteligencia israelĂ­es dedicado Ășnicamente al personal de la CPI y al contenido de sus computadoras: el artĂ­culo titulado “Surveillance and interference: Israel covert war on the ICC exposed” publicado por el medio Magazine+972 el 28 de mayo del 2024 constituye un reportaje de lectura muy recomendada, en el que se puede saber cĂłmo desde casi 10 años Israel ha estado vigilando constantemente a la CPI y a su personal.

Entre otros detalles, se lee que:

“The former prosecutor was far from the only target. Dozens of other international officials related to the probe were similarly surveilled. One of the sources said there was a large whiteboard with the names of around 60 people who were under surveillance — half of them Palestinians and half from other countries, including UN officials and ICC personnel in The Hague”.

TambiĂ©n se indica que por cada caso llevado a conocimiento de la CPI “interceptado“, Israel preparaba informaciĂłn detallada en aras de hacer valer sus propias investigaciones internas llevadas a cabo, todo ello en aras de poder invocar ante el Fiscal y los jueces de la CPI el principio de complementariedad:

“If materials were transferred to the ICC, it had to be understood exactly what they were, to ensure that the IDF investigated them independently and sufficiently so that they could claim complementarity,” one of the sources explained. “The claim of complementarity was very, very significant”.

Ante la reprobaciĂłn general y la falta de transparencia de las mismas autoridades de los PaĂ­ses Bajos (vĂ©ase nota de The Guardian del 31 de mayo del 2024 informando de una iniciativa de un legislador), finalmente, las autoridades de los PaĂ­ses Bajos convocaron a los representantes de Israel en la capital holandesa para solicitarles aclaraciones y manifestarles su profunda indignaciĂłn ante semejante actuar (vĂ©ase nota de The Guardian, del 24 de junio del 2024): este programa de escuchas e intercepciones israelĂ­ viola las reglas mĂĄs elementales que protegen a las organizaciones internacionales y a sus funcionarios, vigentes en el ordenamiento jurĂ­dico internacional. 

A modo de conclusiĂłn

Pese a la gravedad de las revelaciones hechas desde Israel por periodistas israelĂ­es extremadamente bien informados que tambiĂ©n dieron a conocer la existencia del programa de inteligencia artificial “Lavender” (Nota 3), el tiempo tomado por las autoridades de los PaĂ­ses Bajos para proceder a convocar a los diplomĂĄticos de Israel evidencia algĂșn tipo de resistencia en el seno de su aparato estatal.

Por lo pronto, finalizado el plazo de recepciĂłn de opiniones jurĂ­dicas, son los tres jueces de la Sala de lo Preliminar de la CPI los que deberĂĄn anunciar en los prĂłximos dĂ­as (o semanas) su decisiĂłn final con respecto a la solicitud hecha el 20 de mayo por parte del Fiscal de la CPI, con relaciĂłn a dos altas autoridades en Israel (su Primer Ministro y su Ministro de Defensa) y a tres dirigentes del HamĂĄs (de los cuales uno fue asesinado en TeherĂĄn por Israel el pasado 31 de julio).

Sobre el autor:

Dr. Nicolas Boeglin.

Nicolas Boeglin, es Profesor de Derecho Internacional PĂșblico, en la Facultad de Derecho, de la Universidad de Costa Rica (UCR). Contacto: nboeglin(a)gmail.com

– -Notas – –

Nota 1: sobre la decisiĂłn de trasladar la embajada de Tel Aviv a JerusalĂ©n por parte del Presidente Cartes en Paraguay en mayo del 2018, y luego la decisiĂłn del nuevo Presidente Mario Abdo Benitez de regresarla a JerusalĂ©n unos meses despuĂ©s, vĂ©ase nuestra nota: BOEGLIN N., ” La valiente decisiĂłn de Paraguay de restablecer su Embajada en Tel Aviv: una breve puesta en perspectiva“, editada el 11 de septiembre del 2018.

Nota 2: VĂ©ase nuestra nota BOEGLIN N., “Corte Penal Internacional (CPI) / Palestina: Âżel fin de la impunidad para los autores de crĂ­menes de guerra cometidos en Palestina?“, editada el 5 de febrero del 2021.

Nota 3: Este mismo grupo de periodistas de investigaciĂłn israelĂ­es dieron a conocer al mundo la existencia del programa de inteligencia artificial “Lavender” mediante el cual Israel procede a escoger a las personas que elimina en Gaza: vĂ©ase artĂ­culo publicado el 3 de abril del 2024 en el medio digital Magazine +972, titulado ” â€˜Lavender’: The AI machine directing Israel’s bombing spree in Gaza“, cuya lectura completa se recomienda. En Francia, la ONG denominada AURDIP tuvo la generosa idea de traducir este artĂ­culo al francĂ©s, cuyop texto estĂĄ disponible en este enlace. 

Calendar Alert!: Embassy Festival 2024 – Immerse Yourself in a World of Culture

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Calendar Alert!: Embassy Festival 2024 – Immerse Yourself in a World of Culture

Step into a Celebration of Unity, Heritage, and Cultural Diversity  

Prepare to be transported across the globe as the Embassy Festival returns for its 12th edition on September 7th, 2024. The historic Lange Voorhout in The Hague will come alive with the sights, sounds, and flavours of diverse cultures, all coming together to create a unique celebration of unity and heritage. With 47 cultures participating, this festival offers a rare opportunity to experience the entire world in a single day! 

Feel the Beat, Taste the Flavours 

This year, we’re bringing you closer to the heart of the performances with more intimate and personal experiences. In both the Creative Arena and Performance Space, audiences will enjoy a closer connection with the artists. Surrounding these stages, more than 47 countries will showcase their rich heritage through unique culinary tastings and cultural displays at the International Market. 

Explore the Festival with the Activity Passport  

This interactive and educational passport is free for everybody, inviting both young and old to engage with different cultures through various activities. As you explore the festival and collect stamps in your passport, you will not only learn about the diverse traditions and heritage of the participating cultures, but you will also have the chance to win special prizes. 

Experience the Culture Parade  

A highlight of the festival, the Culture Parade will take place at 15:05. This vibrant parade will see participants proudly displaying their traditional costumes, colours, and flags, creating a special experience that resonates with both young and old. Make sure you do not miss this captivating celebration of global unity.  

Event Details  

  • ·        Embassy Festival 2024:  
  • ·        Date: September 7th, 2024  
  • ·        Time: 12:00 – 20:00  
  • ·        Location: Lange Voorhout, The Hague  
  • ·        Entry: Free for everyone  
  • ·        Website: www.embassyfestival.com  
           Join us for a day of cultural discovery, unity, and celebration at the Embassy Festival 2024!  

US Indo-Pacific Strategy: Implications For Pakistan

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US Indo-Pacific Strategy: Implications For Pakistan

By Fatima Saleem

The region comprising East Asia, South Asia, Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean hosts more than half of the world’s population, nearly two-thirds of the world’s economy, and seven of the world’s largest militaries. Seeing the region as the epicentre of global geopolitics, the US launched its Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) in February 2022 intending to “firmly anchor” in the region. Rekindling the spirit of previous administrations, the strategy  is premised on the principles of:

  • free and open Indo-Pacific
  • Build connections within and beyond the region
  • Drive regional prosperity
  • Bolster Indo-Pacific security
  • Build regional resilience to transnational threats

The rebranding of the region from Asia-Pacific (APAC) to Indo-Pacific shows that it remains central to Washington’s foreign. The new framework aims to form a consortium of like-minded countries to promote a US-led rule-based order. The strategy emphasizes successfully “defending US’ interests” through the “containment” of China via militarization of the region, transfer of critical technologies and forging alliances and regional partnerships. In its action plan, it discusses the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) as a counterweight to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), strengthening ASEAN, supporting India’s rise, delivering on the Quad and expanding US-Japan-Korea cooperation while promoting accountability in the region.

Even though Beijing still hasn’t produced a documented response to the IPS, in its diplomatic and academic discourse, China deliberately avoids use of the term Indo-Pacific and instead uses Asia-Pacific to describe the region. It has termed the IPS as a ‘fantasy targeting China’.

India appears several times in the IPS and is referred to as “strong India”, “India as a net security provider” and “Leading India in South Asia”. Its key role in the region has paved the way for its military ascendancy, increased diplomatic outreach and a growing economic clout which has inculcated amongst Indians an exaggerated sense of superiority.

The Japanese have labelled the region as a “Confluence of the two Seas”. Its strategy for the region is known as “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) and views Washington as its “security guarantor”

Following a policy of integrated deterrence, by the early 2030s, Australia will be provided with three Virginia class submarines thus showing that the US holds a central position in Australia’s defence capabilities and force structure.

As ASEAN nations find it increasingly difficult to remain neutral, the economic bloc launched its ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) to promote regional integration and meaningful cooperation with partners.

 202020212022
ASEAN-USUS $362.2 billionUS$ 441.7 billionUS$ 520.3 billion
ASEAN-China$685.28 billionUS$ 878.2 billionUS $975.3 billion

China has not only become ASEAN’s largest trading partner but also a significant contributor to its GDP growth, therefore, there will be a varying degree of commitment by ASEAN nations to the IPS as many of these states are within Beijing’s economic grasp. This will ultimately impact its long-term viability. One can therefore say that considering the varying national interests of each state, the strategy is perceived differently by all key players.

   Probability  Rationale
LowMediumHigh
Polarization of Indo-Pacificxx✓Indo-Pacific will therefore be divided into two blocs; led by China and the US
Nuclearization of the regionx✓xThrough arrangements like AUKUS, vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation in the region might occur
De-dollarizationxx✓In May 2023, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in its 42nd Summit decided to promote trade in regional currencies. These moves depict an attempt by APAC to decrease their reliance on the US dollar
AUKUS+x✓xTo enhance the defence capabilities of its allies,   Japan, South Korea and India might join
QUAD+x✓xTo enhance diplomatic outreach, South Korea and Vietnam might be included
US-China war✓xxIncreased incidents of cyber-attacks and proxy warfare should be expected

Source: Author

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has become the theatre of strategic competition and is being increasingly weaponized with states competing for access to resources and control over maritime routes. This has led to the emergence of new frameworks within an emerging multipolar system with several countries introducing their version of IPS.

Australia’s Indo-Pacific policies are a result of its defence and foreign policy white papers which aim to enhance its defence capabilities. ASEAN outlook on Indo-Pacific was published in 2019 where states have collectively adopted a calibrated approach to ensure neutrality and put ASEAN’s interests first. India’s Maritime Security Strategy of 2015, its Act East policy and its National Security Strategy of 2019 reflect its stance in the IOR, centred primarily on the containment of China.

The IOR lies in the South of Pakistan and as of now, the country has limited stakes in the region. However, its geographical position has made it impossible for us to remain insulated from the effects of unfolding great power rivalry.

US-India Joint Statement of June 2023 reaffirms that Washington will continue to give preferential treatment to India in the information, political and economic domains. This will unhinge stability in the South Asian region. As political volatility and economic vulnerability continue to plague Pakistan, the security situation along CPEC routes will likely deteriorate. Under such circumstances, it is high time Pakistan comes out of the Cold War thinking and views the regional and global strategic realignments with an open mind so that it is better equipped to deal with the storm brewing in the Asia-Pacific.

To contact the writer Fatima Saleem, Email: fatimasaleemraza@gmail.com

The Success of “Made in India” Is Not in Rivalling China, but Surpassing Itself

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The Success of “Made in India” Is Not in Rivalling China, but Surpassing Itself

By Ms.Yi Wang

India faces immense pressure to increase employment and eliminate poverty domestically, and the policies introduced during Prime Minister Modi’s third term are expected to be “not too radical”.

According to United Nations estimates for 2023, India’s population has surpassed 1.42 billion, making it the most populous country in the world. More than 40% of the population is under 25 years old, and two-thirds of Indians were born after the economic liberalization in the early 1990s. Each year, India adds about 7-8 million new young workers to its labor force, and as journalist Amitabh Tiwari noted, these individuals require “jobs not only in terms of quantity but also in terms of quality”.

Unemployment, as a significant issue in Indian elections, will be a major challenge for the new government. Data released by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) shows that India’s unemployment rate reached 9.2% in June 2024, up from 8.5% in the same month last year. The India Employment Report 2024 published by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Institute of Human Development (IHD) notes that nearly 83% of the unemployed labor force in India are young people. Among unemployed youth, the proportion with secondary or higher education has increased from 35.2% in 2000 to 65.7% in 2022, nearly doubling. This indicates a pressing need for India to address issues related to insufficient youth employment and skill development.

Women’s economic empowerment has also become a hotly discussed social topic in recent years. With economic development and the digital transformation of society, Indian women are spending less time on childbearing and child-rearing, and there is an increased willingness among women of working age to pursue career development, along with a rise in flexible employment. In 2023, India’s female labor participation rate reached 37% (compared to 60.5% for women in China), an increase of 4.2 percentage points from the previous year. Oded Galor, the founder of the Unified Growth Theory and an economist at Brown University, emphasizes that “since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, every instance of economic progress – the crux of which is sustained productivity growth – has been associated with investments in human capital and higher female workforce participation”.

In the past, India’s economic growth primarily relied on the expansion of the service sector, making it a major exporter of software engineers and financial professionals. However, the employment opportunities provided by the service sector were limited, and were unable to absorb a large amount of work force, which hindered the rapid acceleration of India’s economy. To achieve the goal of a “Developed India” more quickly, the Modi government has prioritized the development of the manufacturing sector.

According to a recent report by the NITI Aayog, India should target USD 500 billion in electronics manufacturing by the fiscal year 2029-30 (FY30). The government public policy think tank also projects that this goal will lead to the creation of 5.5 million to 6 million direct jobs in the country by the end of that fiscal year.

That being said, India’s industrial base is relatively weak, and in key manufacturing areas such as electricals, electronics, and specialty steels, there is a shortage of qualified skilled personnel. This necessitates the recruitment of high-quality technical experts from abroad to drive the upgrade of the country’s manufacturing industry. According to media reports, in 2019, India issued around 200,000 visas to Chinese citizens; by 2024, this number had dropped sharply to 2,000. Due to the tense relations between India and China, the Indian electronics manufacturing sector has suffered losses of up to USD 15 billion over the past four years, with up to 100,000 jobs lost. In July this year, an Indian official stated that the government is considering policy adjustments (PLI Scheme) to expedite visa issuance for Chinese technical personnel. This indicates that the Indian government must balance its policy shift carefully, ensuring that efforts of “de-sinicization” do not stifle India’s economic progress and neglect the livelihoods of its people.

Under the influence of geopolitical forces, global industrial clusters are undergoing significant shifts, global capital flows are changing, and the international division of labor continues to adjust. The Asian economy is increasingly leading global development in more areas. For emerging industrialized Asian countries, exporting to Europe and the United States is not the only path. With increasing national wealth, technological advancements, urbanization, and rising per capita income in Asia, regional consumption demand is growing rapidly in areas such as finance, education, tourism, healthcare, and elder care. Asian enterprises will play a more dominant role in these sectors. China and India, as the two major global economies and developing countries should actively contribute to providing solutions, driving industrial integration within Asia, and creating a positive cycle in the supply chain.

Future economic policy design in India should focus on diversity and promote a sustainable, inclusive, and equitable society. The recommendations below are with the hope that the business communities of India and China can enhance cooperation to expand the space for equitable development by leveraging their respective resources.

1、The Critical Need for India-China Collaboration in Skills Education

Basic education has historically provided numerous entry-level jobs and assembly line workers for the manufacturing sector. However, global technological innovation is increasingly driving rapid adjustments in industrial sectors. In the development process of manufacturing, characteristics such as intelligence, digitization, and network technologies are becoming prominent. Consequently, the labor market is changing, and there is a rising demand from employers for new and high-skilled talent. A university diploma does not necessarily translate into economic value in the market and does not ensure lifelong skills and career qualifications. Therefore, India’s manufacturing sector needs context-specific policies, addressing the most urgent needs and advancing overall progress from the ground up.

India’s policy-making must address two key areas: first, resolving the issues faced by current unemployed individuals; and second, enhancing foresight by improving the weaknesses in skills education and vocational training systems to adapt to emerging industries and future societal development. Both the government and businesses should continually invest in human capital. Long-term improvements in national employment and income levels are crucial, with skill development being especially important to prevent the accumulation of employment issues that could lead to social crises.

In his book Migration and Culture, American economist and social theorist Thomas Sowell points out that different ethnic groups, nations, regions, or civilizations have demonstrated a simple fact: skills are never distributed uniformly or randomly. This phenomenon may be due to cultural differences or the influence of individuals in the workplace. The skill endowments of each ethnicity play a crucial role in the evolution of human civilization and history at different times and places.

India needs to build a robust domestic technology workforce by creating an open skill ecosystem that strongly supports the enhancement of its manufacturing capabilities from an institutional level. Chinese engineers and technicians can cooperate with their Indian counterparts by assisting Indian companies in increasing productivity, not only within specific industries but also by teaching workers how to install, operate, and maintain machinery, or through technology transfer. When Indian technical institutions, universities, research organizations, business associations, and local communities organize skill education and training programs or provide career counseling opportunities, they can consider hiring and encouraging more Chinese technical talent to participate, fostering the exchange of applied knowledge and practical experience.

The overall enhancement of labor skills and the release of talent potential are closely linked to future economic and social prosperity. As such, India and China will need to expand their collaboration in skills education.

2. India Needs to Effectively Promote Sustainable Agricultural Practices

According to the latest economic survey report released by the Indian government, over 45% of India’s labor force (nearly 565 million people) is employed in agriculture. However, the contribution of the agricultural sector to India’s GDP is less than one-fifth, indicating a severe mismatch between economic output and labor input in Indian agriculture.

Agricultural production is particularly vulnerable to climate change and risk events. As the severity of climate change increases, the planting progress in major global agricultural producers has slowed, leading to significant crop failures. In recent years, many regions in India have experienced high temperatures, with heatwaves occurring more frequently than before. Several cities have had to contend with severe issues such as floods and droughts, resulting in a decline in crop yields. The Russia-Ukraine war and disruptions in Red Sea shipping are also threatening global food stocks and trade. These adverse impacts, combined with the “threat multipliers” such as the vulnerability of global supply chains, have heightened food security risks and driven up food prices. Both developed and developing countries continue to face inflationary pressures.

Industrialization is not the only path for India’s economy to maintain appropriate growth rates, and there is no need for it to replicate China’s model. As the world’s second-largest producer and net exporter of wheat and rice, India influences global agricultural markets. The agricultural sector is not only the primary source of livelihood for nearly half of India’s population but also bears significant responsibility for ensuring food security. The importance of Indian agriculture in the political arena is self-evident.

India’s agricultural policy needs more thoughtful consideration and should actively promote green and sustainable agriculture to facilitate a comprehensive upgrade of the agricultural system. Strengthening multilateral cooperation, including with China, is essential. Lessons should be learned from different agricultural practices. Emphasis should be placed on agricultural productivity services, such as crop innovation research, agricultural machinery automation, improving risk management in crop production, and enhancing agricultural price elasticity. At the same time, India will need its agricultural commodities exchanges to enhance their global competitiveness, so as to protect domestic agricultural products, and shield against severe fluctuations in the international market.

The agricultural sector not only impacts the welfare improvement of India’s vast number of farmers and the gradual enhancement of the quality of life for its citizens, but also holds the potential to create more high-tech job opportunities for ordinary Indians, meeting the expectations of the well-educated new generation of young workers.

  • Indian Industrial Organizations Play a Crucial Role in Attracting Foreign Investment

The Indian government is formulating various policies to guide foreign investment into the country and vigorously promote domestic industry upgrading. However, the complexity of Indian politics and legal systems, along with cultural differences continue to cause concerns for foreign investors, adding to the hidden costs of business operations.

Industry organizations can address the deficiencies in public services and market supply and play a role in improving the business environment. Typically, these organizations understand the needs of businesses and the workforce. They serve as bridges for equitable dialogue, free discussion, and broad consultation, aiming to minimize labor conflicts, balance the interests of various stakeholders, promote responsible business practices, enhance employment, and strengthen international cooperation.

Chinese enterprises and other foreign investors are currently underrepresented in Indian industry organizations, lacking institutionalized and regular channels for participating in policy dialogue and exchanges. Industry associations and chambers of commerce in India should expand their membership base to include more businesses and make their voices heard in policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation. From the perspective of aligning social development with industrial demands, Indian policymakers should be willing to listen to industry organizations and consider the scientific evidence, viewpoints, reform plans, and policy recommendations they provide. Collective consultation and exchange of opinions can boost the confidence of foreign investors in investing in India.

The new Indian government needs to seize the opportunity to shape a new economy, inspire the next generation, and accelerate the realization of the “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (Self-Reliant India) vision. Comparisons between India and China will be ongoing, but the cooperation and interactions between the two countries remain essential and will mutually benefit each other.

About the author:

Ms. Yi Wang, Head of Global Development Program and Senior Researcher at ANBOUND.

Ms.Yi Wang, is the Head of Global Development Program and Senior Researcher at the Beijing-based ANBOUND Think Tank.

June Crespo solo exhibition in The Hague

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June Crespo solo exhibition in The Hague

After her exhibition at the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, world-renowned sculptor June Crespo will open her latest solo exhibition at 1646 in The Hague on the 6th of September, including new work and site-specific installations.  

June Crespo is a sculptor with a strong connection to everyday objects, the physical body and the spaces we inhabit. For her, these all become materials to work with, to think from. In an intuitive way, she explores these materials’ physical qualities, what is visible and what we can’t see. The way they relate to each other and how they can be transformed.

For the exhibition, the artist poetically explores the connection between our bodies and architecture, between our insides and the place we find ourselves in. With this focus, the large interventions and sculptures could be seen as abstract architectural organs, pushing and piercing the walls used as limits between what is inside and outside of them.

The exhibition is part of 1646’s long-term collaboration with the CA2M Museum in Madrid.

Training Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Training Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

ASSER Institute – Centre for International & European Law / Final Call for Registration

The ASSER Institute, in collaboration with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), is offering a specialized training programme on disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, scheduled from 30 September to 4 October 2024 in The Hague.

This programme is specifically tailored for diplomats, providing a unique opportunity for embassy staff in The Hague to deepen their understanding of contemporary disarmament and non-proliferation issues while expanding their professional networks.

The global threat posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons has become increasingly pressing. International treaties, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), are vital components in the global effort to mitigate these dangers.

A key partner in this training programme is the OPCW, the body responsible for implementing the CWC. Through the OPCW’s efforts and the commitment of its 193 State Parties, nearly 98% of the world’s population is now protected by the CWC, and 99% of declared chemical weapons stockpiles have been verifiably destroyed.

Other significant contributors to global peace and security include the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established under the NPT, which plays a critical role in maintaining nuclear safety, particularly in conflict zones. The IAEA has deployed safety and security experts to every Ukrainian nuclear site, including the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, which is currently on the front lines of the war. As the need for expertise in legal, technical, and policy aspects of disarmament and non-proliferation grows, this programme offers an essential foundation for professionals in the field.

Participants of the programme, including those involved in treaty implementation and national authorities, have consistently praised the experience:

“As a participant in this training programme, I connected with diplomats, experts, and practitioners from around the world. I expanded my network, built new relationships, and gained access to the latest research and insights, helping me stay abreast of key issues and trends in my field.” — Embassy staff alumna, 2022

Beyond the extensive knowledge provided, the programme offers valuable opportunities for interaction with senior officials and fellow participants, facilitating unique networking opportunities with key figures in disarmament in The Hague and beyond. High-level speakers include the Deputy Director-General of the OPCW, senior officials from the IAEA, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Annual Training Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction The Hague, The Netherlands

30 September – 4 October, 2024

Asser Instituut – R.J. Schimmelpennincklaan 20-22, 2517 JN Den Haag, Netherlands

For more information and to register, please visit our website. Should you require additional details, feel free to contact the ASSER education team at educationtraining@asser.nl.

The Bangladeshi-Bengal Saree Lecture

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The Bangladeshi-Bengal Saree Lecture

By  Roy Lie Atjam

Dr Shahana Siddiqui from the University of Amsterdam and BRAC University delivered a comprehensive lecture on the saree at the Embassy of Bangladesh in The Hague on July 18, 2024. She emphasized that the saree is a women’s garment, consisting of unstitched fabric of about 6 yards or more. The beauty of ancient India was that of a woman’s small waist, large bust, and hips. The saree seems to be the perfect dress to accentuate those proportions. Here are excerpts of Dr Shahana Siddiqui’s extensive lecture.

Dr Shahana Siddiqui, a Medical Anthropologist is affiliated with the University of Amsterdam and the BRAC James P. Grant School of Public Health, BRAC University.

Dr Shahana Siddiqui

Saree, this  ancient clothing practice that has survived the test of time, is rich with history of the different regions, their unique design, fabric, handloom, and craftsmanship.

“Poro poro chaitali shaaje

Kushmi shari

Aaji tomar rooper shathe

Cha(n)der aari”

The national poet of Bangladesh, Kazi Nazrul Islam, known for his passionate prose and poems, in this song, invokes sensual imageries of his lover draped in soft yellow summer saree, in which her beauty overshadows the brilliance of the moon. Like Nazrul, Tagore, Shorotchindro, Jibanandu, Buddhadev, and many other writers, poets, musicians, filmmakers, have immortalized the saree and all that it represents as feminine beauty and grace in their art and expressions.

To think that a single continuous fabric, a long cloth if you will, tells countless stories of people and places, their pasts, present, and possible futures, all weaved together in intricate designs and motifs. And when draped around the female form, this single cloth transforms into the site of engendered identity, sensuality, beauty, strength, resistance, empowerment, history, and politics.

Dr Shahana Siddiqui during her lecture.

Thanks to popular culture, especially Bollywood and its extensive reach, the saree is almost always associated with India. While there is much truth in that association, saree is worn in various ways across the South Asian region, namely, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and of course, Bangladesh. As Indian sari historian Rta Kapur Chisti wrote in her seminal book, “Sari: Tradition and Beyond”, there are 108 known ways to wear the fabric, and that in India alone. One can imagine how many different types of draping there are in other countries. Again, to quote Rta Kapur Chisti, there is just no one saree. And like the saree, there is no one South Asia, but a region of multiples and multiplicities. 

Designers, weavers, and of course the consumers, have kept sarees alive and thriving, from simple affordable cotton ones to elaborate embroidered, bejeweled bespoke ones – sarees are worn and celebrated by millions of women across the Indian sub-continent and the diaspora alike. Sarees are not some remnants of the yesteryears but worn regularly in both urban and rural areas, with some styles retaining their age-old motifs and draping techniques, while others are constantly changing with the fast world of fashion and glamor.

How to wear a saree!, by Dr Shahana Siddiqui

Bangladeshi saree

While many of our Indian, Pakistani, and Sri Lankan friends have curated the histories of the different forms of sarees found in the region, the history and evolution of Bangladeshi sarees, while well curated, remain widely unknown.

Yet, undivided Bengal and later on, Bangladesh, was the original home of the jamdani saree, the only existing weaving craftsmanship of the muslin. Layers of Bengal’s history, its upheavals, struggles, survival, resistance, and resilience are weaved into jamdani.

Today, I wanted to bring to you the story of Bengal or Bangladeshi sarees or shari, as we pronounce the word in Bengali. I am no historian but an amateur enthusiast who has been in love with sarees since the age of three, and have been regularly wearing and collecting sarees since 18. As a friend said the other day, one cannot imagine Shahana in anything other than a saree in Dhaka.

Sazia Ahmed, Bangladesh spouse organizer of the Bangladesh saree conference as spectator.

History of Bengali Saree

Historians have well established that the origins of drape-like clothing in the Indian subcontinent can be traced back to the Indus Valley civilization, dating to that of 2800 – 1800 BCE. Given the rich waterways of the Indian sub-continent, wild cotton and silk were found in abundance with weaving techniques dating back to ancient times.

In general, the saree is a three-or four-part ensemble, including a skirt, and a blouse, and one long cloth or two pieces of shorter cloth. As Indian researcher Kaamya Sharma stated, that “the sari’s elemental structure is considered to be determined by its woven form” which consists of the body or in Bengali, jomin, borders or paar running along the length, and the end part, called pallu or a(n)chal.

The historical trajectory and come to that of the Mughal era of the Indian subcontinent. It is important to note that, much of what we understand as undivided India, started to come into shape or coherence during the time of the Mughal empire which expanded from the borders of what is now Afghanistan to the borderlands of Bengal and what was then called Burma.

It would be in these times that the jamdani motif would start appearing on muslin cloths. Along with the Mughals came their architectural and design motifs which can be found across South Asia from mosques, to gardens, to administrative buildings, and of course clothes and carpets. Jam, Persian for flowers, and dani, for vase, together, Jamdani, became a much-loved weaving technique by the Mughals, with the weavers moving with their patrons across Bengal.

Sari Politics, Political Saree. The saree therefore, especially in the region of Bengal, becomes a site for national politics and freedom movements. It also becomes a fusion of ancient Indian handloom with Mughal motifs, and British blouse and petticoat.

A group of ladies enjoying saree draping during a conference at the Embassy of Bangladesh.

Pre and post-Independence Bangladesh

Much of the saree wearing traditions I personally learnt were from my grandmother, my Nani, and my mother. My Nani were four sisters and three brothers who were born in various parts of Bengal but grew up mainly in the Hooghly and Kolkata areas of what is now known as West Bengal of India. To me, personally, my three Nanis were the epitome of Bengali Muslim propriety and grace. They always wore sarees, with long sleeved blouses, and when in front of unknown men (or even women), they would quietly pull their a(n)chol over their heads.

By March of 1971,after months of political unrest between the central government in West Pakistan and political uprisings in East Pakistan, a full-fledged war broke out.

Politics and nation building happened on women’s bodies, with images of the war heroines, or Birongonas as they were called, becoming a part of our national imagery.

A group of ladies enjoying saree draping during a conference at the Embassy of Bangladesh.

I heard stories from my mother and paternal aunts who all had to stop their education and flee to various parts of the country, that after independence, once they resumed college and university, there was a national rejection of outfits such as Shalwar Kameez. It was viewed as a Pakistani attire and with fervent nationalism, the kameez went away for some time.

Other sarees, but there are so many other sarees in Bangladesh. The nakshikantha or designed quilt, sarees that are found across the Bengals. Nakshikatha stitch can be traced back to indigenous rural women’s craftsmanship where they would stitch together old sarees into a quilt. And in that stitch, they told stories of their everyday lives. Sometimes they are just animals or trees or people and sometimes simple design motifs, and at other times, they are intricate flowers. Nakshikantha is both a patchwork and a story in its entirety.

Dayana Perez Fernandez, Minister Counsellor of the Dominican Republic and Matilde Simas MagalhĂŁes, spouse of the Ambassador of Brazil, attended Bangladesh saree conference.
Attending the Bangladeshi-Bengal Saree Lecture.

In conclusion, the sarees of Bangladesh are as much a display of local crafting excellence, they are also the continuing narratives of the manifold histories of the Bengal region. I always find it to be fascinating that in this drive for hyper capitalistic ways of living, that South Asia has held on to its saree wearing ways, not only to retain a connection with the past, but as a way of reinventing, reimagining a future of fusions and colours. In the case of jamdani, like its people, it is a testament to resistance and resilience. A simple one continuous cloth, yet draped with centuries of epics and sagas and so much more in the future.

The informative morning culminated in an engaging question-and-answer session, followed by a delightful buffet lunch.

The Ambassador of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, H.E. Mr. Tareque Muhammad

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The Ambassador of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, H.E. Mr. Tareque Muhammad

His Excellency Ambassador Tareque Muhammad, the Ambassador of Bangladesh presented his credentials to His Majesty King Willem-Alexander of the Netherlands on August 28, 2024.

Ambassador Tareque Muhammad joined the Bangladesh Foreign Service in 1999. Over nearly three decades, he has served in various capacities within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh and at several Bangladesh missions. The Netherlands is his seventh posting; he has previously served in Madrid, New Delhi, Kathmandu, Yangon, Los Angeles, and Nairobi. In his last two positions, he served as Head of Mission, first as High Commissioner in Nairobi and then as Consul General in Los Angeles.

His professional experience spans both bilateral and multilateral settings. As the Director (Bangladesh) for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Kathmandu, Nepal (2011-2014), he contributed to fostering better collaboration within the regional organization. He has also worked at the Bangladesh missions in Delhi and Yangon and has served as Director General for South Asia and Southeast Asia, providing him with a comprehensive understanding of diplomacy in the region.

Throughout his career, he has been deeply involved in negotiations with two of Bangladesh’s crucial neighbors, India and Myanmar, addressing a variety of bilateral issues, including the Rohingya crisis. As a career diplomat, he is interested in history, anthropology, environmental issues, connectivity, and human rights. He believes that the aim of diplomacy is to create a better and more peaceful world for future generations.

Ambassador Tareque Muhammad obtained a Master’s degree in International Studies from Leeds University, UK, as a Chevening Scholar in 2001. He previously earned an MBA from the Institute of Business Administration at Dhaka University in 1995. His bachelor’s degree is in Forestry and Environmental Science from Chittagong University in Bangladesh (1992). After a brief career in the Forest Department of Bangladesh (1995-1999), he joined the Bangladesh Foreign Service.

Ambassador Tareque Muhammad is married and has two daughters. In his spare time, he enjoys reading, traveling, and spending time with his family.

“United by Waves” Kick-off for SAIL Amsterdam 2025

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“United by Waves” Kick-off for SAIL Amsterdam 2025

France, Germany, the Netherlands, Peru, Spain, and Uruguay confirm participation

In 2025, the Netherlands will celebrate the 750th anniversary of its capital, the 50th anniversary of SAIL, and the 10th edition of SAIL Amsterdam, which first began in 1975. Thousands of ships, crew members, and visitors from around the world will gather to celebrate nautical history from Wednesday, August 20, to Sunday, August 25, 2025. During the last edition of SAIL in 2015, 2.3 million visitors attended, and a similar or even larger turnout is expected next year.

The kickoff of SAIL Amsterdam was celebrated at the historic Maritime Museum of the city, one year before the official start of the iconic five-day regatta, which will be held under the motto “United by Waves.”

SAIL Amsterdam 2025 kick-off event.

The core of the SAIL Foundation—Mr. Arie Jan de Waard, President; Ms. Mitra van Raalten, Director General; and Mr. Robert Visser, Business Director—welcomed the guests. Among the attendees were Prince Maurits van Oranje, the Ambassador of Uruguay, H.E. Mr. Álvaro GonzĂĄlez Otero, the Consul General of Peru in Amsterdam, Mr. Sergio Ávila Traverso, and representatives of the main sponsors, including the Municipality of Amsterdam, the Port of Amsterdam, Heineken, Booking.com, Royal Netherlands Navy, The National Maritime Museum, ROC van Amsterdam & Flevoland, Inholland University of Applied Sciences, KPN, Heren2, Tommy Hilfiger and Sligro, among others. So far, The Peruvian B.A.P. UniĂČn, the German Alexander Von Humboldt II, the French Belem, the Uruguayan CapitĂĄn Miranda, and the flagship, Clipper Stad Amsterdam, have confirmed their participation. In the coming days, organizers expect additional confirmations from Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.

During the presentation, Director van Raalten invited the Ambassador of Uruguay to highlight the arrival of the V/E Capitán Miranda in August next year. Ambassador González Otero remarked: “I’m honoured to confirm today that Uruguay will be represented at Sail Amsterdam 2025 by our tall ship, V/E Capitán Miranda. This Uruguayan cherished vessel will join the impressive array of ships participating in the event, celebrating our maritime heritage and the spirit of international friendship. We look forward to showcasing our ship and sharing in the excitement of this remarkable event. Thank you very much for your kind invitation, and see you all at Sail Amsterdam!”

Uruguay’s Capitán Miranda Tall Ship visited the Netherlands last year during its XXXIII Annual Training Voyage and its participation in Sail Den Helder 2023.

Kick-off event for SAIL -Amsterdam 2025 at the National Maritime Museum

The Chairman of SAIL, Arie Jan de Waard, declared: “SAIL Amsterdam 2025 will be the most special SAIL ever. Not only is it the 10th edition of SAIL-Amsterdam, but we are also celebrating 50 years of SAIL and the 750th anniversary of our beautiful city of Amsterdam. Together with our most committed partners, the SAIL family, the advisory committee, and the board of the SAIL Amsterdam Foundation, we have kicked off the preparations for SAIL Amsterdam 2025.”

He thanked all partners, sponsors, and students of the SAIL Academy who have already come on board in the run-up to SAIL 2025 or have been part of SAIL for several editions. SAIL Amsterdam has become the largest open-access event in the Netherlands. The organizers also promoted the new SAIL app, which allows visitors to purchase tickets, review the program, watch videos, and more.

Once the presentations concluded, all the authorities were invited to take a tour on special boats along the canals, where the various participating vessels will be arranged.

Highlighting Uruguay’s participation at SAIL-Amsterdam 2025

Sail Along!

Starting now, individual visitors can book their tickets for a boat tour at SAIL 2025. This is a chance to experience this unique anniversary edition from the water together with friends, family, and loved ones. Tickets can be booked via sail.nl. Step on board & make a wave!

The SAIL Amsterdam App

For the first time, SAIL is launching an o>icial event app, ‘Sail Amsterdam.’ Now available for download in all app stores. In the app, you can follow your favourite ships, view the event program, listen to the SAIL Playlist, and of course, purchase and store your sailing tickets in your wallet. Stay updated and sail always from the front row!

The 57th ASEAN Day Celebrated Internationally

Diplomat Magazine
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The 57th ASEAN Day Celebrated Internationally

Motto, Connected & Resilient Community

By Roy Lie Atjam

On 8 August 2024, H.E. Mr. Asi Mamanee, the Ambassador of Thailand, alongside the Ambassadors of Indonesia, H.E. Mr. Mayerfas, Malaysia, H.E. Mr. Roseli Abdul, Vietnam, H.E. Huong Nam Ngo,

 the Philippines, H.E. Mr. Jose Eduardo III Malaya,  Lao People’s Democratic Republic, H.E. Mr. Kingphokeo Phommahaxay and the Sultanate of Brunei Darussalam, H.E. Mr. Adnan Mohd Ja’afar

 celebrated the 57th ASEAN Day in The Hague.

The event was attended by members of the diplomatic corps accredited to the Netherlands, academics, and senior officials of the Netherlands Foreign Ministry.

In Jakarta, the 57th ASEAN Day celebration began with Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi officiating the event alongside ASEAN Secretary-General Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, in front of Jakarta’s diplomatic corps.

Minister Retno Marsudi confidently began her speech by posing a thought-provoking question: “Amidst global uncertainty, which region is relatively the most stable?” She asserted that Southeast Asia is the answer, emphasizing ASEAN’s crucial role in maintaining peace, stability, and prosperity. The Minister went on, “indeed, stories of peace are less frequently told than stories of conflicts and wars. By looking at the different parts of the world, we need to be grateful to have ASEAN. Our region maintains a steady economic growth of 4.5%, higher than the global average. But, we must not be complacent. One miscalculation may undo our achievements for almost six decades.”

The ASEAN Day celebrations occurred globally, with Melbourne-Australia hosting diplomats, students, and business community leaders. The ASEAN Committee in Buenos Aires, Argentina, partnered with the Museum of Argentine Diplomacy to organize the ASEAN Exhibition, which was inaugurated by Foreign Minister Diana Mondino.

H.E. Mr. Asi Mamanee Ambassador of Thailand

The festivities in Wassenaar-the Netherlands began with the ASEAN Flag Raising Ceremony and the playing of the ASEAN anthem.

H.E. Ambassador Asi Mamanee of the Kingdom of Thailand, then delivered the following statement. “As the current Chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN Committee in The Hague, I welcome you. Today, we gather to commemorate the 57th anniversary of ASEAN. This remarkable milestone is a testament to the enduring spirit of cooperation, unity, and progress that has defined our region for over half a century. From its modest beginnings in 1967 with five founding members, ASEAN has evolved into a vibrant community of ten nations, collectively shaping not only the destiny of Southeast Asia, but also playing an increasingly pivotal role on the global stage.

As a region, we represent a population of over 650 million people, a combined GDP of $3 trillion, and serve as a crucial hub in global supply chains. Our strategic location, bridging the Indian and Pacific Oceans, places us at the heart of the Indo-Pacific region, making ASEAN indispensable to global trade, security, and diplomacy.

We have become a model for regional cooperation, demonstrating how diverse nations can work together to promote peace, stability, and economic growth. Our approach to consensus-building and peaceful dispute resolution has earned us respect on the international stage and positioned ASEAN as a key player in regional architecture. We recognize the importance of our global partnerships.

Today, I would like to highlight our relations with the Netherlands, our Development Partner. This partnership was further solidified at the First ASEAN-Netherlands Development Partnership Committee Meeting held just a few months ago, on 17 May 2024, at the ASEAN Headquarters in Jakarta. The Netherlands, with its rich history of global engagement, recognizes ASEAN’s strategic importance in world affairs. They value our region not only as a gateway to Asia’s dynamic markets but also as a crucially in addressing global challenges. We have seen fruitful collaborations in areas such as the circular economy, smart cities, and climate change mitigation.

The Dutch expertise in these fields has been instrumental in driving innovation and growth across our region. As discussed in our recent meeting, ASEAN-Netherlands are now working together to develop Practical Cooperation Areas or PCA, which will set out the overall framework and priorities of our partnership.

As we look to the future through the development of Practical Cooperation Areas, we see great potential for enhanced collaboration in emerging fields such as green economy, water management, sustainable agriculture, connectivity, cyber security, and possibility of the Netherlands’ cooperation with various ASEAN Centres.

Together, we can leverage Dutch innovation and ASEAN’s dynamic markets to create solutions that benefit not just our regions, but the world at large. I also like to take this opportunity to commend Lao PDR in her successful chairmanship of ASEAN this year. ASEAN’s role as a stabilizing force in the region and a convening power among major powers is essential to global peace. Our commitment to maintaining Southeast Asia as a nuclear-free zone, along with our efforts in addressing transnational crime, significantly contributes to global security.

Together  with our dialogue and development partners, we will work towards a more prosperous, sustainable, and interconnected future for ASEAN and the world as we count down to the year 2030 aiming to achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals.”

Mr Joost Flamand, Deputy Director-General of the Dutch MFA.

The Deputy Director-General of the Dutch MFA and Guest of Honour Mr Joost Flamand, also deliver his remarks. In brief he said “Today is a significant anniversary as we celebrate unity, cooperation, and shared aspirations among the members of ASEAN and their partners.

The vision of ASEAN, which is encapsulated in its motto “One Vision, One Identity, One Community,” continues to resonate strongly despite both positive and challenging global developments.

The Netherlands highly values its deepening relationship with ASEAN and became an ASEAN Development Partner in September 2023. ASEAN remains a focal point for the Netherlands, even under the new government with our cooperation spanning multiple dimensions – political, economic, socio-cultural, and security.

As we mark ASEAN Day, let’s reaffirm our commitment to working together as reliable friends and partners to support ASEAN’s vision of an integrated, resilient, and prosperous community. Together, we can navigate the complexities of the modern world, leveraging our collective strengths to address common challenges and seize shared opportunities.”

The ASEAN Day 2024 celebration in the Netherlands came to an exciting close with a delightful interactive cultural presentation and lunch.

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