Strategic Intelligence and Intelligence Diplomacy in the Sphere of Foreign Policy

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Strategic Intelligence and Intelligence Diplomacy in the Sphere of Foreign Policy

The drafting of this article included bibliographical research and also an exclusive interview with Walter Bruyère-Ostells, Director of the Master in Geostrategy, Defense and International Relations and co-Director of the Specialized Master in Intelligence at the Institute of Political Studies / Sciences Po Aix (France) / French Air and Space Force Academy (Specialised Master in Intelligence).

By Jorge Marinho, Júlio Ventura and Lourenço Ribeiro

International Relations scholars’ interest in intelligence-related issues should grow, together with the increasing presence of these subject matters in the public stage (Díaz May 2005, p. 2). For instance, in 2008, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service sought to improve relations between academic work and the intelligence sphere, via the Academic Outreach program (Kuosa 2014, p. 67). For this purpose, conferences, workshops and interviews were held, among other initiatives (Kuosa 2014, p. 68). For academics, researching the field of intelligence is difficult, owing to the secretive nature of intelligence activities. At times, it becomes necessary to wait until a few original documents are declassified (Wasielewski June 20, 2023). Many universities feel there is no point studying intelligence (Wasielewski June 20, 2023). However, there are even those who call for disclosing intelligence research to the general public, knowing that this is a challenge (Wai December 8, 2020).

From Walter Bruyère-Ostells’ standpoint, difficulties researchers face within the academic context, when they delve into intelligence services, are, to a large extent, due to a lack of knowledge and mutual prejudices in relation to each other’s backgrounds. Said expert adds that the sphere of intelligence in France is viewed in a manner that is too restricted and derogatory while often being associated with spies and spooks. Walter Bruyère-Ostells maintains that forums should be developed in order to make known what the world of intelligence actually consists of.

The way Walter Bruyère-Ostells sees it, a mutually beneficial cooperation can be established between intelligence-related university study programs and intelligence services. This scholar points out that, in France, at Sciences Po Aix, an Intelligence Chair is being developed which relies on recognition and backing from the National Coordination of Intelligence and Counter-terrorist Efforts and from the Intelligence Academy. Bruyère-Ostells adds that speakers working in intelligence services take part in courses and events of said Chair and that students can undergo internships and do works on topics that intelligence services take interest in.

According to Wasielewski (June 20, 2023), intelligence consists of knowledge and analysis designed for assisting action. Actually, intelligence is crucial for backing foreign policy. This occurs in several countries, such as the U.S. (National Intelligence Strategy 2023, p. 2), Switzerland (Federal Act of 25 September 2015 on the Intelligence Service (Intelligence Service Act, IntelSA)) and Israel (Golub July 3, 2021). Regarding the United Kingdom, William Hague (November 16, 2011), then serving as Foreign Secretary, stated that intelligence is present in many of the more relevant priorities of foreign policy. From the standpoint of Hague (November 16, 2011), intelligence needs to be regarded in light of the Government’s set of strategies and goals.

A country’s interests concerning foreign policy need to be taken into account when planning intelligence activities abroad (Special Report on the National Security and Intelligence Activities of Global Affairs Canada 2022, p. 19). It is vital for foreign policy to entail coherence (Special Report on the National Security and Intelligence Activities of Global Affairs Canada 2022, p. 19). Current Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Burns (January 30, 2023) understands that intelligence serves to predict in-depth changes on the international scene and, in this context, to lend support to policymakers. The latter have to realize that intelligence is an art, not a science that guarantees results (Wasielewski June 20, 2023). Intelligence consumers need to know the capabilities and limitations of intelligence services (Wasielewski June 20, 2023).

 

Strategic intelligence

According to Pareja (April 11, 2022), the process of data collection and analysis aimed at formulating information-based decisions and policies is known as strategic intelligence. This does not seek to solve present-day problems; rather, with a long-term perspective, it is intended to back national strategy (Díaz 2014, p. 34). Strategic intelligence, through its assessments, should contribute towards policymakers understanding a certain context, taking advantage of opportunities and managing risks (Simon-Tov, Hershkovitz June 2017, p. 87). 

Monitoring the international situation goes by way of strategic intelligence (Defense Primer: National and Defense Intelligence November 29, 2022). This enables leaders to grasp the geopolitical factors influencing international relations (Mandel, Barnes July 14, 2014). Strategic intelligence is essential for forming a Government’s foreign policy (Pareja April 11, 2022) and for upholding national interests (Silva, Ribeiro November 2018, p. 177). For policymakers of countries such as the United States, the Intelligence Community’s (IC) provision of strategic intelligence constitutes an advantage vis-à-vis rival powers (Katz April 17, 2020). Policymakers should be willing and able to think strategically (Hutchings, Treverton October 2018, p. 14).  

To intervene in the international sphere, experts’ in-depth knowledge becomes necessary, and this is what strategic intelligence provides (Heidenrich 2007). This sort of intelligence, somehow seeking to uncover the future, combines social, cultural, technological, economic, political, military and diplomatic domains (Alonso-Trabanco May 19, 2020). Strategic intelligence allows using data sources to understand the big picture (Neuman, et alii May 2006, p. 473). In William Hague’s view (November 16, 2011), cooperation between intelligence services is essential, given that intelligence is like a puzzle in relation to which, in most cases, an intelligence service per se does not comprise all the pieces needed to complete it.


Intelligence diplomacy


Currently, intelligence services directors actively participate in the processes that determine foreign policy (Daricili January 7, 2022), among other aspects. In this regard, a variety of examples can be given. Recently, on the part of the U.S., the CIA Director met with the Director of Mossad, one of the Israeli intelligence services, and with the Prime Minister of Qatar, to address the possibility of an agreement between Israel and Hamas, a Palestinian organization, leading to an exchange of hostages and prisoners (Barnes December 18, 2023). When Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s current Foreign Minister, headed the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT), he was already regarded as highly influential in his country’s foreign policy (Yildiz June 4, 2023). As MIT leader, Fidan was considered to be someone who, having a vast network of international contacts, was noteworthy in steering Turkey through the complex arena of global politics (Yildiz June 4, 2023).

Walter Bruyère-Ostells feels that when intelligence service department heads are interested in research, even conducting it, they acquire a stringency and analysis capability that can be useful if they end up becoming rulers one day.

History records various instances of Governments that declassified and made use of data from intelligence services in order to influence or back policy decisions (Marleku November 1, 2023). However, particular attention needs to be paid to the role of intelligence in both the U.K. and the U.S., before and during the current Russia-Ukraine war, which broke out on February 24, 2022, disclosing information aimed at preventing the conflict and pressuring allied countries, especially France and Germany, into making decisions against Russia (Marleku November 1, 2023). All this constitutes a new milestone in the diplomatic and political use of intelligence in international affairs, while asserting itself as a foreign policy instrument (Marleku November 1, 2023). In this respect, Holmgren (October 8, 2023) speaks of intelligence diplomacy. This expert considers that, in the U.S., for a long time now, intelligence has comprised a strong suit for diplomats, when influence and persuasion are essential for achieving political outcomes (Holmgren October 8, 2023). 

Walter Bruyère-Ostells believes that, compared to conventional diplomacy, intelligence diplomacy’s advantage is that it’s invisible to public opinion. This enables discussions with a greater extent. Also regarding advantages, said scholar thinks that intelligence diplomacy presents realistic diplomatic options, given that, in principle, intelligence is less subject to an ideological discourse than conventional diplomacy. Bruyère-Ostells underscores that, in a democracy, final decisions should be made under the people’s sharp lookout.

Currently, in order to fulfill the State Department’s mission, the backing of intelligence is increasingly important (Holmgren October 8, 2023). According to William Burns (January 30, 2023), in certain cases, intelligence diplomacy can serve to elicit common interests as well as to discretely support U.S. diplomats and policymakers. Hague (November 16, 2011) states that the U.K.’s intelligence services have forged relations with government sectors of other countries, thus contributing toward supplementing and strengthening British diplomacy. 

When there is a high degree of trust in intelligence services, leaders tend to more readily consider intelligence diplomacy as a possibility for attaining their objectives (Taylor 2023, p. 6). This sort of diplomacy shows intelligence services’ multiple capabilities and should be carefully used, supplementing conventional diplomacy without replacing it altogether (Taylor 2023, pp. 8-9). 

Intelligence analysts and policymakers


For intelligence services, clearly knowing what they will be backing increases support efficacy (Fagersten October 2015, p. 11). Intelligence analysis differs from academic analysis, to the extent the former’s particular interest lies in underpinning the political process, whereas the latter chiefly aims to theorize (Ashraf March 8, 2015). Intelligence analysis is regarded as a critical phase of the intelligence process (Arslan 2021, p.1).

To a certain extent, Haas (2002) regards as positive the IC’s tradition of maintaining that its analyses need to remain separate from policymaking, so as to avoid their politicization. However, this expert believes that analysts need to be aware of what is of interest to policymakers; otherwise, their work risks being irrelevant (Haas 2002). Given that intelligence analysis serves to provide information needed by political decision-makers to arrive at their decisions, it is wise to engage in a mutually beneficial dialogue between rulers and the IC (Lieberthal September 15, 2009). Due to its closeness, this relationship could undesirably result in some tension between intelligence professionals and policymakers (Huminski 2023, p. 18). From Eisenfeld’s standpoint (2017, p. 96), intelligence will never be completely separate from politics or altogether immune to the effects of politicization.

The integrity of IC professionals is vital for the decision-making not to be defiled (Memorandum on Revitalizing America’s Foreign Policy and National Security Workforce, Institutions, and Partnerships February 4, 2021). In this context, the analyst’s professional ethics are highly important (Wald 2006, p. 259).


Wald (2006, p. 271) considers that intelligence services should provide some sort of training to analysts as concerns their relationship with policymakers. According to Lotta Lampela, then Intelligence Adviser to the Director of European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN), intelligence services should also show initiative in educating / training their customers (Kuosa 2014, p. 75). From Lampela’s standpoint, this enables creating understanding and trust among the parties concerned (Kuosa 2014, p. 75). In Wasielewski’s view (June 20, 2023), policymakers need to study intelligence, and this should not take place solely in on-the-job-training situations. 

Comunication


Communication constitutes the link between intelligence collection, analysts’ work and decision-making, which is why this is a key aspect of intelligence (Hammond-Errey February 9, 2023). Those wishing to communicate effectively in policymaking systems need to become aware of the policymakers’ environment (Cairney, Kwiatkowski November 28, 2017). Regarding challenges, in the field of communication, between intelligence services and policymakers, Lotta Lampela underscores the need for the message to be received in a timely manner, highlighting the importance of the present situation, and to be properly understood, to avoid instances where concepts comprise variable interpretations (Kuosa 2014, p. 76). Also concerning said field, Kaivo-oja maintains that planning communication channels needs to improve (Kuosa 2014, p. 76). As concerns the COVID-19 pandemic, regarding the U.S., several experts argue that, when dealing with matters of crucial importance for national security, efficient communication is critical between the IC and those holding the highest Government positions (Lankford, et alii December 3, 2020). The feedback that policymakers pass on to intelligence services is often insufficient (Mohr April 25, 2023). Analysts need detailed feedback in relation to what they produce (Mulligan, Schmitt September 18, 2020).

Institutional fragmentation, as can occur in the case of the European Union (EU), hampers communication between analysts and diplomats (Ikani, Meyer November 11, 2022). Concerning the EU system, there are multiple origins, perspectives, formats and conclusions of intelligence, without comprising a single entity to bring them together, provide comparative analysis and forward such intelligence to senior leadership (Ikani, Meyer November 11, 2022). Under such circumstances, there can be too much information and senior officials can end up being confused (Ikani, Meyer November 11, 2022).

 

Conclusion

Research in the field of intelligence services constitutes a challenge, for starters given the difficulties related to the secretive nature of the various intelligence activities. It often becomes necessary to wait until certain documents are declassified. While many universities decide not to offer intelligence-related study programs, this topic is increasingly gaining a foothold in the public domain. However, the academic sphere contains examples of mutually beneficial cooperation between certain study programs and intelligence services.

Among several aspects, intelligence is highly important with regard to the backing given to policymakers, as part of foreign policy. With a global perspective and a long-term vision, strategic intelligence monitors the international situation, enabling politicians, in terms of the big picture, to gain an understanding of the multiple geopolitical factors influencing international relations. The complexity of intelligence is comparable to a puzzle relative to which the pieces needed to complete it might not be found with a single intelligence service and, hence, cooperation between intelligence services, domestically and internationally, take on particular relevance.

Currently, and in reality, intelligence services directors actively take part in the processes that determine foreign policy and, in certain cases, they even play a noteworthy role in international relations. This is part of what is known as intelligence diplomacy. This can be regarded as complementary to conventional diplomacy.
Intelligence analysis provides information that rulers need for making decisions, and so there has to be dialogue between the IC and political decision-makers. This relationship will be all the more positive with increasing mutual knowledge; this could result from training initiatives with intelligence services professionals, including analysts, and with rulers. Such rulers need to have a realistic idea of the intelligence services’ capabilities. 

While contacts between policymakers and the IC are a reality, a variety of experts consider that politicizing the operational department and analytical activities need to be avoided, maintaining their neutrality and professionalism, for the benefit of rulers’ decision-making quality. Within this context, the ethics of intelligence services professionals are important.

Regarding the domain of communication, intelligence services’ messages need to reach policymakers in a timely manner, via appropriate channels, and whose content has to be properly understood by the recipient. In this regard, policymakers’ feedback is vital.

This article was first published by Marinho Media Analysis, on May 9, 2024 – http://www.marinho-mediaanalysis.org/articles/strategic-intelligence-and-intelligence-diplomacy-in-the-sphere-of-foreign-policy

About the authors:

Jorge Marinho

Jorge Marinho: PhD in Communication Sciences, BA in International Journalism

Júlio Ventura

Júlio Ventura: MA in Political Science and International Relations, BA in Law, member of the European Parliament trainee (Brussels, Belgium)
 

Lourenço Ribeiro

Lourenço Ribeiro: BA in Sociology, MA student in Public Policy at Iscte – University Institute of Lisbon (Portugal)
 


 

E-mail: marinho.mediaanalysis@_nour

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Interview

*This interview was conducted, via email, on May 6, 2024

Photo by: Jorge Marinho


Published by Marinho Media Analysis / May 9, 2024

http://www.marinho-mediaanalysis.org/articles/strategic-intelligence-and-intelligence-diplomacy-in-the-sphere-of-foreign-policy

Making Peace and Justice Relevant in Everyday Life in The Hague

Diplomat Magazine
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Making Peace and Justice Relevant in Everyday Life in The Hague

By Jan van Zanen, Mayor of The Hague

The Hague has been the city of peace and justice for 125 years. From the first International Peace Conference back in 1899 and the construction of the Peace Palace to the conglomerate of international organisations and courts today. Many of these are concentrated in the International Zone near Scheveningen.

This zone is part of the coastal strip where the occupiers in the Second World War demolished all the buildings to make way for the construction of the Atlantic Wall and a clear line of fire. The symbolism that it is here and in the rest of The Hague that thousands of people work on peaceful conflict resolution and international law every day will appeal to everyone.

Yet this world of diplomacy and justice is very remote from the world of a large proportion of the population in The Hague. It is therefore important that we make peace, law and justice relevant to our residents in their daily lives.

And it’s not just about international law. National civil and criminal law also fail to engage many people. Until they are involved as a suspect or witness. That can make a big impression. Court buildings are often imposing or even intimidating. That commands respect but also creates distance.

It is sometimes better to bring justice closer. Occasionally, ‘ordinary’ judges in our country go to the scene of a crime or dispute. In long-running TV programmes like De Rijdende Rechter, for example, in which Judge John Reid solves disputes and conflicts between neighbours, this has been happening for years. Each episode always ends with an official legal judgement with which both parties are bound to comply.

In The Hague, we do things slightly differently. Last year, we started alternative dispute resolution in Moerwijk. This type of local arbitration has now been adopted in other places in the Netherlands and beyond where people live in densely populated areas, creating many complex situations. For example, disputes between families and neighbours, antisocial behaviour on the street or people causing problems to themselves and others due to the challenges they face. It is not primarily about who’s right and who’s wrong. It’s about how we ensure that people sort out their lives and are able to live together.

This is the approach taken in Moerwijk, as well as at several secondary schools in The Hague. Students take on the roles involved in our legal system and tackle minor misdemeanours and disputes at school themselves. Not by imposing severe punishments but by solving problems. To ensure that everyone can coexist in the school environment.

In The Hague, city of peace and justice, there is more going on than just the world of the Peace Palace and International courts of justice. It’s also about experiencing law and justice in the neighbourhood and at school.

A Journey Through International Law: Retrospect and Reflections with Renan Villacis

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A Journey Through International Law: Retrospect and Reflections with Renan Villacis

Renan Villacis, Director Secretariat of the Assembly States Parties at the International Criminal Court, reflects on  35 years of a dynamic and impactful career in public international law. In this exclusive interview with Diplomat Magazine, from his early days as a diplomat in Ecuador to his instrumental role in the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Villacis offers a deeply personal account of his professional journey, sharing important moments, and offering invaluable perspectives on the evolution and challenges of international law.

How did you get involved in public international law?

After concluding studying law for six years, in 1989 I was able to take part in a competitive process to enter Ecuador’s Diplomatic Academy as a third Secretary of the Foreign Service. That allowed me a chance to embark on a diplomatic career. I worked in different posts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Quito. Some of those entailed a large component of international law, including the Treaty Section and the Legal Office, as well as our Sovereignty Office.

Where has your career path taken you?

After a few years in Quito, I obtained a Fulbright and OSA scholarship to study at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Then I joined the UN Office of Legal Affairs in New York as a P-2 associate legal officer. Shortly after the ICC started to be set up I was recruited by the first Director of the Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties in The Hague, Mr. Medard Rwelamira, to help him with that undertaking. I came to The Hague in 2004 for one year, but ended up staying for almost two decades.

What have been highlights or key moments of your career?

The joyous moments which stand out are the conclusion of the Rome Diplomatic Conference in July 1998, when the Rome Statute was adopted. The feeling of elation of the entire conference room after years of negotiations has no equal in my memory. Í was the youngest member of the UN Codification Division team in Rome, working with the Drafting Committee chaired by Cherif Bassiouni, one of the most eminent international criminal law lawyers of his era. The multi-year endeavour had been an intensive learning process as the most distinguished jurists from all States had taken part in the negotiations which had the challenge of establishing a new institution that would be part of the international system ushered in by the end of the Cold War. Hopes were so high with what could be achieved, it seemed like the sky was the limit, as the contagious enthusiasm of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan spread throughout the UN Secretariat and the UN in general. One might even say it was a thrilling process.

The other highlight was the successful outcome of the 2010 Kampala Review Conference of the Rome Statute. The review conference had been agreed to as part of the 1998 Rome Statute outcome in order to conclude what had been unfinished in Rome. Overcoming enormous challenges and contrary to the expectations of many, the outcome of the Review Conference was historic: an agreement by consensus of the international community to amendments to the Rome Statute which included a legal definition of the crime of aggression as well as the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court over the crime of aggression; the amendments allowed the Court to proceed in the absence of a decision by the United Nations Security Council after a period of six months.

There is also the painful and jarring memory of September 11, as I lived near UNHQ and watched the Twin Towers burn and fall. Working on the negotiations regarding new counter-terrorism conventions had been part of my duties as a legal officer before then; the horrendous attack added urgency and renewed political commitment to that endeavour. The memories of that day are seared into my mind forever.

Renan Villacis. Photography by Armin Taslaman.

What have been your most challenging time/moments?

At the personal level, organizing the two week 2010 Review Conference in Kampala, as there were numerous legal, technical and administrative challenges. We had indispensable support from the UN in Nairobi, but it was still a massive undertaking with a very small team from the Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties based in The Hague.

Organizing Assembly sessions during the Covid pandemic in 2020 and 2021, including resumed sessions in New York for the election of six judges and of the Prosecutor was also quite difficult, given the need to try to balance operational needs, openness and health risks.

As part of the ICC, the 2017 Assembly of States Parties session where the activation of the jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime of aggression was negotiated and agreed to by consensus.

The Assembly of States Parties is mandated to consider a review of the crime of aggression amendments in 2025, a matter which once more will pose some very complex challenges given the possible legal and political implications that may give rise to.

The period of when a US administration took measures against the Court and its officials and staff also comes to mind as being extremely challenging.

AEP President, Ambassador Christian Wenaweser and Renan Villacis, during the Review Conference of the Rome Statute, held in Kampala, Uganda, from 31 May to 11 June 2010. Photografy by Ester Luteranova.

How do you see the state of international law today?

My professional career began at the time when the Cold War ended and therefore a great deal of enthusiasm and conviction that an entirely new world order had dawned was prevalent. International law played a key role in that process. I worked as part of the UN Legal Office team with the International Law Commission in Geneva for a few years, assisting in the development and codification of international law. There were important achievements and progress on new counter-terrorism conventions.

The International Court of Justice was the forum which States resorted to with increased frequency. Along with the establishment of the ICC there was thus an enormous elan to the hope of a more peaceful world where the resources could be redirected to development and improving the lives of all. Yet, fissures appeared or re-appeared, non-State actors and technological innovations posed new risks, conflicts erupted anew, the global institutions set up to maintain peace and security and to find peaceful means to settle disputes were placed under stress or simply unable to reach agreements. A point of inflexion in that ascending process which international law was in has been reached. It is perhaps one of the most challenging times for the rule of law in general and international law in particular. A sincere and concerted effort by the international community to revitalize the role of international law is essential.

What would you say to the new generation interested in working in international relations/law?

I would say that they are fortunate to be entering a career which can be quite fulfilling, that the complications of today will give way to solutions that allow the international community to continue its journey of progress. Despite the gloomy outlook one has when reading the news, they should not be discouraged. They can contribute to finding those solutions. That is valid  for anyone, even those who may come from a geographically small State, there are ways to contribute to making the world better, as a diplomat, international civil servant, academic, member of non-governmental organization, lawyer, journalist, etc.

Any advice for students interested in a career in public international law?

Besides your studies, learn languages that may be helpful in the field you seek to enter, do internships and acquire experience at the national or international level, be disciplined, tech savy, patient and remember that being able to work well as a member of a team is essential. If possible, get some experience living/working abroad, outside your comfort zone/bubble. You should enjoy the work, which is most rewarding from the perspective of being part of an undertaking of many.

Are you optimistic then about what lies ahead for international law?

Absolutely, there are successes and sometimes some regressions, but the progress attained in every decade we live through is undeniable. I can for example still vividly recall my first year of international law studies when we were impressed about the discussion on reform of the UN Security Council; over 40 years later, those discussions continue. But if one considers all the other advances in treaty-making, in creating new institutions, in improving the legal regimes which allow our globalized world to function and to improve peoples lives, we can indeed be optimistic. We owe it to future generations.

Network of luxury car thieves dismantled with support of Eurojust

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Network of luxury car thieves dismantled with support of Eurojust

A large-scale ring of luxury car thieves has been dismantled with the support of Eurojust and Europol. Using straw men and underprivileged people, the criminals hired or leased luxury vehicles, which they later registered in their own names through corrupt connections in official institutions.

The cars were resold outside the EU, including in the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates. In a series of recent coordinated actions in Spain, France, Germany, Latvia, Poland and Ukraine, 13 suspects were arrested for fraud, forgery and money laundering.

Through a coordination centre at Eurojust, over sixty places were also searched by national authorities. Several luxury vehicles, communication equipment and documents were seized, as well as over EUR 100 000 in cash.

The Spanish authorities launched their investigation in 2022 following reports of luxury cars going missing from legitimately operating car rental and lease companies in and around Malaga. These investigations revealed that dozens of vehicles were ultimately stolen across Europe by a network of linked criminals. They exploited around fifty vulnerable and underprivileged people by using their documents, such as driving licences and passports, to hire or lease luxury cars.

Through corrupt contacts in official institutions, they managed to register the hired vehicles on to their personal documents, so they could sell them in the European Union and beyond, including Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates. Some of the stolen vehicles were transported in containers to conceal the cars.

Investigations were later also started in France, Poland and Ukraine, which revealed links between different criminal groups using the same modus operandi. In March of this year, with the support and funding of Eurojust, authorities in France, Spain and Ukraine set up a joint investigation team into the car thefts. Eurojust also organised two preparatory coordination meetings to prepare for the recent action day week and set up the coordination centre.

Europol assisted the operations against the criminal network by producing criminal intelligence packages. It also provided an operational coordination centre to support the actions at police level.

Operations on the ground were carried out at the request of and by the following authorities:

  • Spain: Investigative Court no. 1, Málaga; Public Prosecutor’s Office, Málaga; Spanish National Police
  • France: Judiciary Tribunal, Grasse; National Gendarmerie, Central Office against Roving Crime (OCDLI)
  • Germany: Public Prosecutor’s Offices Essen and Osnabrück; Police Departments of Essen and Osnabrück
  • Latvia: 3rd Unit International Cooperation Department State Police
  • Poland: Public Prosecutor’s Office, Warsaw
  • Ukraine: Prosecutor General’s Office; Main Investigation Department and Department of Strategic Investigations of National Police

Discover Brazilian Cinema: “Pureza” Premieres in the Netherlands at the 2nd Latin American FilmFest

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Discover Brazilian Cinema: “Pureza” Premieres in the Netherlands at the 2nd Latin American FilmFest

The Embassy of Brazil in The Hague proudly announces the Netherlands’ premiere screening of the acclaimed Brazilian film “Pureza,” directed by Renato Barbieri. This special presentation will take place at Filmhuis Lumen in Delft on Saturday, June 15, at 16:10, as part of the 2nd Latin American FilmFest.

Event Details:

  • Date: Saturday, June 15
  • Time: 16:10
  • Location: Filmhuis Lumen, Doelenplein 5, 2611 BP Delft
  • Entry: Tickets are available here
  • Language: Portuguese audio with English subtitles

Film Synopsis:

“Pureza” tells the powerful story of Pureza Lopes Loyola, a mother on a relentless quest to find her missing son in the vast expanse of the Amazon. Her journey takes a harrowing turn when she secures a job on a farm, only to discover the cruel and inhumane treatment of enslaved workers. Confronted with these brutal realities, Pureza faces the daunting challenge of not only finding her son but also escaping to alert the authorities to the atrocities she has witnessed.

Based on true events, the film masterfully highlights the complex issues of deforestation, crime, and modern-day slavery through the deeply personal and inspiring narrative of a mother’s love and resilience. Pureza Lopes Loyola has since become an emblematic figure in the fight against forced labor, symbolizing hope and justice in the face of adversity.

A Collaborative Effort

This event is presented in collaboration between the Brazilian Embassy in The Hague, Gaya Filmes, and Filmhuis Lumen. Their joint efforts aim to bring the richness and diversity of Brazilian cinema to a wider audience in the Netherlands.

An Invitation to Experience

We warmly invite the diplomatic community, cinephiles, and the general public to attend this exclusive screening. “Pureza” a cinematic masterpiece and a stirring call to action and awareness about significant social issues affecting many communities today. This event offers a unique opportunity to engage with Brazilian culture and cinema, promising an afternoon of profound storytelling and reflection.

For more information and to secure your tickets, please visit Filmhuis Lumen’s website.

Indonesia-the Netherlands Trade, Tourism, and Investment Forum 2024: A Step Towards Concrete Business and Investment Outcomes

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Indonesia-the Netherlands Trade, Tourism, and Investment Forum 2024: A Step Towards Concrete Business and Investment Outcomes

Amsterdam, 29 May 2024 – The Indonesia-the Netherlands Trade, Tourism, and Investment (TTI) Forum was successfully convened on 28-29 May 2024 in Amsterdam, marking a significant milestone in the bilateral relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands. This event, organized by the Embassy of Indonesia in the Netherlands, the Indonesia Investment Promotion Center (IIPC) London, and Bank Indonesia London, sought to enhance market penetration in Europe and foster trade and investment in strategic sectors.

Signing Ceremony Indonesia-the Netherlands Trade, Tourism, and Investment Forum 2024.

The TTI Forum provided a valuable platform for engagement at both government-to-government (G-to-G) and business-to-business (B-to-B) levels, aimed at exploring untapped potentials and boosting economic cooperation between the two nations.

Trade Business Matching / Indonesia – Netherlands

Pre-Event Activities

On 27 May 2024, a precursor to the main event, the Trade Business Matching, was held at the newly renovated Indonesia House Amsterdam. This venue is set to serve as a hub for promoting Indonesia in Europe. The event witnessed the signing of 11 business Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) and 1 Letter of Intent (LoI), officiated by the Indonesian Ambassador, the Deputy-Governor of Bank Indonesia, and several senior officials from the Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy. Concurrently, a TTI exhibition showcased products from 25 Indonesian exporters, featuring a diverse array of items such as health and cosmetics products, fashion, furniture, home decorations, agro-products, spices, coffee, food, and beverages.

Main Forum Activities

The high-level forum was inaugurated on 28 May 2024 by the Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, H.E. Mr. Mayerfas, and saw active participation from more than 150 registered delegates. The morning session was highlighted by keynote addresses from the Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation of the Netherlands, H.E. Ms. Liesje Schreinemacher, and the Minister of Cooperatives and SMEs of Indonesia, H.E. Mr. Teten Masduki. Both ministers lauded the strengthened economic ties and underscored the vast untapped potential for further cooperation.

H.E. Ms. Liesje Schreinemacher, Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation of the Netherlands.

Subsequent keynote addresses by Mr. Juda Agung, Deputy-Governor of Bank Indonesia, and Mr. Olaf Sleijpen, Deputy-Governor of De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), provided insights into the economic outlooks of both countries in both bilateral and global contexts. A panel discussion titled “Indonesia-Netherlands Economic Relations: How to Move Forward?” followed, offering deep dives into future economic collaboration.

Parallel to the forum, targeted meetings were conducted among stakeholders, including:

  • – O3M Hydroelectric Power Plant with Ampowr and Asia Value Partner
  • – O3M Solar PV Plant – Energyworld with FundsUp and Caus Holding BV
  • – OTM with Solar PV Plant

Bilateral Investment Forum

The forum continued on 29 May 2024 with a bilateral investment forum that explored investment strategies and performance enhancement for both countries. Notably, a meeting between the Indonesian Ministry of National Planning and Invest International, representing the Dutch Government, focused on finalizing a draft agreement on Dutch financing for public infrastructure development in Indonesia, valued at 300 million euros. This agreement will facilitate Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects, enabling the identification and implementation of national priority projects.

Exhibition Indonesia producs

During the TTI Forum 2024, eight significant projects were proposed, with an estimated total investment value of USD 1132.31 million, including:

  • Renewable Energy Infrastructure (Waste) for the Chemical Industry in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan (USD 68.75 million)
  • Water Supply and Management Infrastructure in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan (USD 30.11 million)
  • Bioethanol Industry in Bojonegoro, East Java (USD 173.75 million)
  • Tumpak Sewu Leisure Park in Lumajang, East Java (USD 60.36 million)
  • Nusantara Convention Centre in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan (USD 79.38 million)
  • Health Special Economic Zone in Sanur, Bali (USD 600 million)
  • Hydroelectric Power Plant in South Kalimantan (USD 100-200 million)
  • Solar PV Plant in West Nusa Tenggara (USD 20-30 million)

The Indonesia-the Netherlands Trade, Tourism, and Investment Forum 2024 exemplified the robust and growing partnership between Indonesia and the Netherlands, with a shared vision for sustainable and mutually beneficial economic growth.

Migrant smuggling operation taken down by Romanian and Moldovan authorities

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Migrant smuggling operation taken down by Romanian and Moldovan authorities

A migrant smuggling operation has been dismantled by Romanian and Moldovan authorities, with the support of Eurojust. From 2019 until now, an organised crime group (OCG) smuggled over 100 migrants to the Schengen Area, demanding up to EUR 5 000 for the transport. On 27 May, authorities searched 11 houses and carried out multiple interrogations in Romania, and on 16 May another eight searches were conducted in Moldova, followed by the arrest of four drivers and their leader.

The OCG smuggled migrants from Asia or Africa for sums ranging from EUR 3 000 to EUR 5 000. The migrants were smuggled in special spaces created to disguise the transport. The suspects used multiple routes for the smuggling, passing through Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Türkiye. As part of their operation, the OCG recruited victims from countries that did not require a visa to travel to the European Union to transport the migrants undetected.

With the support of Eurojust, the Romanian and Moldovan authorities set up a joint investigation team (JIT) to expose the OCG. The suspects include over 20 Romanian and Moldovan citizens. In April, multiple house searches, interrogations and asset seizures were carried out in Moldova. Currently, four drivers from Moldova and their organiser have been officially charged with organising illegal immigration.

The JIT resulted in action days on 16 May in Moldova and on 27 May in Romania. Authorities were able to conduct 19 house searches and perform multiple interrogations of suspects. Of the five members of the OCG from Moldova, two have made a full confession. Eurojust facilitated cooperation between the Romanian and Moldovan authorities. Eurojust’s assistance in setting up a JIT ensured that the Romanian and Moldovan authorities were able to cooperate faster and more efficiently during the investigation.

The following authorities were involved in the operation:

Romania:

  •    – Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism – Galați Territorial Service
  •     – Bureau for Combating Organized Crime Galați
  •     – Service for Combating Organized Crime Dâmbovița
  •     – Special Operations Directorate of the Romanian Police

Moldova:

  •     – Prosecutor’s Office for Combating Organized Crimes and Special Cases
  •     -National Investigative Inspectorate of the General Police InspectorateEXT (Calibri 11)

Saxony-Anhalt’s Premier Haseloff welcomed François Delattre

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Saxony-Anhalt’s Premier Haseloff welcomed François Delattre

Ambassador Delattre is a graduate of the École Nationale d’Administration (National School of Administration, ENA). He earned a German language diploma from the University of Munich, a license degree in law and a final diploma from the Institut d’études politiques. Ambassador Delattre was, among other things, Consul General in New York (2004 to 2008), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States between 2011 and 2014, French Ambassador and Permanent Representative of to the United Nations in New York City (2014 to 2019), and has been Ambassador to Germany since 29 September 2022.

France is one of Saxony-Anhalt’s most important partner countries on various levels. The bilateral cooperation takes place predominantly – but not only – within the framework of the regional partnership between Saxony-Anhalt and the French region of Centre-Val de Loire. The Magdeburg-based Institut français Sachsen-Anhalt celebrated its 20th anniversary last year. The conversation was primarily about deepening bilateral cooperation between France and Saxony-Anhalt. 

Following the inaugural visit, Ambassador Delattre partook in the ceremony in the State Chancellery on the occasion of the awarding of the State Order of Merit to President of Centre-Val de Loire, François Bonneau.

For further information 

Government of Saxony-Anhalt: https://europa.sachsen-anhalt.de/internationales/aktuelle-meldungen/aktuelle-meldungen/franzoesischer-botschafter-zu-antrittsbesuch-in-sachsen-anhalt

Award ceremony for the President of Centre-Val de Loire: https://europa.sachsen-anhalt.de/internationales/aktuelle-meldungen/aktuelle-meldungen/besuch-einer-delegation-aus-centre-val-de-loire-in-sachsen-anhalt

What is happening to conscientious objectors in Europe?

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What is happening to conscientious objectors in Europe?

HRWF (24.05.2024) – On May 15, the International Conscientious Objection Day, the European Bureau for Conscientious Objection (EBCO) published its Annual Report “Conscientious Objection to Military Service in Europe 2023/24” covering all the member states of the Council of Europe.

Every year, EBCO produces its Annual Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe, gathering input from member states’ governments, national human rights institutions, as well as international and national non-governmental organisations and solidarity groups. The culmination of this work comes with its presentation to the European Parliament, to the Parliamentary Assembly and the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, and to various State authorities. In each case EBCO accompanies its report with a set of targeted recommendations.

Executive summary (slightly shortened by HRWF)

EBCO-BEOC (15.05.2024) – For the second year, this report is necessarily dominated by the war in Ukraine, with a large part of the space being taken up with reports of developments in Ukraine, Russia and Belarus and the situation of refugees from these countries.

EBCO continues working on the #ObjectWarCampaign, which was jointly launched by Connection e.V., War Resisters’ International (WRI), International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR), and European Bureau for Conscientious Objection (EBCO).

Within Europe, the clouds of war are gathering. It is not just in the belligerent countries, and Belarus which seems poised to join directly in support of Russia; elsewhere there is talk of preparedness for war, of increasing military spending, recruitment (e.g. Denmark), of bringing back conscription (e.g. Latvia) or extending it to women. The very right of conscientious objection to military service is coming under threat.

Last year EBCO reported on the case of Tetlianikov v Lithuania in which the European Court of Human Rights found that the alternative service which had been made available since the reinstatement of conscription in 2014 was in effect unarmed military service.

In other countries, too, notably Latvia and Sweden, and under proposals which keep being revived in Switzerland, there is talk of integrating alternative service for conscientious objectors more closely with civil defence, and thus into the system of national preparedness for war.

Programmes of military training within the secondary school system are being introduced and expanded, usually with no provision for conscientious objection. So are voluntary − or in the case of France, potentially compulsory programmes for youth which prepare for and encourage military recruitment (Service National Universel).

The whole justification for conscientious objection in time of peace is that the raison d’être of armed forces is to prepare for war. It is therefore paradoxical that as war looms, the right of conscientious objection should come under threat. With a view to the actual and potential risks in this regard, we introduce in this year’s report an important new section on “Conscientious objection in time of war or other national emergency“.

To an extent far greater than ever before, we have to report the harassment of EBCO members and contributors to this report for their work associated with EBCO.

In Ukraine, Yurii Sheliazhenko, Executive Secretary of the Ukrainian Pacifist Movement and EBCO Board member, has been placed under continually extended house arrest and suffered the seizure of his computer and smartphone while investigated by the state security service, seemingly on ridiculous charges of “justifying Russian aggression”, and the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine initiated prohibition of the Ukrainian Pacifist Movement.

In Russia, the Movement of Conscientious Objectors to military service in Russia and its Director and EBCO Board member Saša Belik, have been declared a “foreign agent”, severely hampering their ability to raise funds and to operate in support of conscientious objectors.

And Olga Karatch, Director of the Belarusian organisation “Our House” and EBCO Board member, who already faces long imprisonment should she return to Belarus on charges springing from her overt anti-regime activism, is finding her sanctuary in Lithuania threatened by the authorities’ refusal to grant her asylum, seemingly because of her tireless advocacy for Belarusians fleeing the possibility of military mobilisation.

Amid these new and growing threats, we must also not forget the continuing denial of the right of conscientious objection to military service in Azerbaijan and Türkiye, where those who have not performed military service continue to live in an indefinite state of civil death.

However, let us end on a positive note with our report of yet another European Court of Human Rights judgement in a conscientious objection case against Türkiye, this time for the activities of the self-styled “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus“, which also denies the right of conscientious objection in a case concerning Murat Kanatlı, EBCO Board member and Co-coordinator of the Initiative for Conscientious Objection in Cyprus. This is a case which broke new grounds in international jurisprudence, firmly confirming that the right of conscientious objection to military service applies equally to reserve mobilisation as to first-time call-up. 

Published by Human Rights without Frontiers

Indonesia – Netherlands Trade, Tourism, and Investment Forum

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Indonesia – Netherlands Trade, Tourism, and Investment Forum

Amsterdam, 28-29 May 2024

The Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in The Hague, in partnership with the Indonesia Investment Promotion Centre (IIPC) London and the Bank Indonesia Representative Office London, will host the Indonesia – the Netherlands Trade, Tourism, and Investment (TTI) Forum on 28-29 May 2024 in Amsterdam. This significant event aims to foster a cross-stakeholder dialogue and business networking opportunities between Indonesia and the Netherlands, enhancing investment, trade, and tourism cooperation between the two nations.

Forum Agenda and Highlights

The TTI Forum will officially commence on 28 May 2024, at Hotel Okura, Ferdinand Bolstraat 333, 1072LH Amsterdam. The event will begin with an inaugural address by H.E. Mayerfas the Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Following the opening, a High-level/Ministerial Forum will take place to discuss the current outlook of Indonesia’s economy. A panel discussion will follow, focusing on enhancing bilateral cooperation between Indonesia and the Netherlands in the dynamic global context.

On 29 May 2024, the forum will shift to the Indonesia House Amsterdam, Brachthuijzerstraat 4, 1075EN Amsterdam, where a bilateral investment forum will be held. This segment will delve into strategies for boosting bilateral investment performance, particularly in three priority sectors: sustainable infrastructure and transport, renewable energy, and sustainable tourism.

Attendees and Side Events

The Forum is set to attract a distinguished array of participants, including ministers, ambassadors, senior officials, experts, and business leaders from both Indonesia and the Netherlands. In addition to the main forum events, several side activities are planned. These include Trade Business Matching sessions between Indonesian sellers and Dutch buyers, dialogues with Indonesian MSMEs, one-on-one and one-to-many investment project meetings, and TTI exhibitions at the Indonesia House Amsterdam.

Economic Resilience and Investment Opportunities

Despite global economic uncertainties, Indonesia has demonstrated strong economic resilience. The country’s economy is projected to grow between 4.7% and 5.5% in 2024, buoyed by robust domestic demand and substantial investment in infrastructure and private sector development. In the first quarter of 2024, Indonesia’s goods trade balance maintained a surplus, contributing to a healthy current account. The manufacturing and construction sectors are expected to sustain solid growth, supported by strategic national projects and favorable government incentives that have spurred significant growth in building investment and household consumption.

Inflation, as monitored by Bank Indonesia, has been effectively managed within the target range of 2.5%±1%, with the Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation at 3.00% as of April 2024. Looking forward, Indonesia is confident that CPI inflation will remain under control and within the target corridor for 2024.

The Netherlands has consistently ranked among the top 10 sources of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) entering Indonesia globally. Over the past five years, it has been the European country with the highest investment realization value in Indonesia. Known as a trade hub to greater Europe and a global advocate for the green and circular economy, the Netherlands presents a strategic partner for Indonesia.

Investment Projects and Opportunities

Indonesia has developed Investment Projects Ready-to-Offer (IPRO) with a potential investment value of USD 16 billion, inviting Dutch and European investors to collaborate and invest in key sectors. These sectors include manufacturing, infrastructure, renewable energy, industrial estates, food, and agriculture. More than half of these projects are situated in East Kalimantan, supporting the development of the new capital city, Ibu Kota Nusantara (IKN).

To bolster foreign reserves and stabilize the Rupiah, Indonesia is committed to supporting its MSMEs in accessing international markets, including Europe. A dedicated side event will showcase premier products from Indonesian MSMEs, highlighting their potential to international buyers.

The Indonesia-the Netherlands Trade, Tourism, and Investment Forum promises to be a very important event in strengthening the economic and business ties between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

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