As COVID-19 spread around the world, a question was asked: Can diplomacy work over a webcam?

By Vangelis Vitalis, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s Deputy Secretary, Trade and Economic. Through 2021 he is also APEC Senior Officials’ Meeting chair. 

New Zealand is hosting Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 2021. Three years of planning went into producing a physical event that would have brought 20,000 people to New Zealand.  

By mid-2020 it was anticipated the COVID-19 pandemic might stop a handful of economies from attending, and work began on introducing a virtual aspect to the meetings so economies that couldn’t travel could still take part. Those plans quickly became the foundation for the first ever fully virtual APEC, with New Zealand announcing in July that the entire year would take place virtually. 

COVID-19 forced our economy, APEC’s second-smallest by GDP, to rewrite our script and become one of the guinea pigs for digital diplomacy.  

Why not postpone APEC 2021 and wait for things to get better? The work facing our 21 economies was too important to shelve.  

Instead, New Zealand worked with Malaysia, which became the trailblazer for virtual APEC meetings when it made the shift online partway through its 2020 host year. They generously shared their lessons with New Zealand, and it has been up to us to build on them.  

Across the year, New Zealand will host hundreds of meetings with thousands of delegates. Many will be happening at the same time, and it is up to us as hosts to ensure the right people are in the right meetings, that they are engaged, that the process is seamless, and that they still get that sense of New Zealand. 

While physical APEC meetings tend to run for 2-3 days at six hours a day, and that can be hard going in a virtual environment. So a lot of work has gone into structuring our meetings, and bringing them down to manageable three-hour blocks. 

We’re using digital technology in innovative ways, aiming to replicate the experiences and personal connections that APEC delegates, Ministers and Leaders encounter in a physical hosting year.  This includes making time and virtual space available for in-person and small group discussions, and using digital content  to welcome, host and farewell our guests and to showcase Aotearoa’s landscape and dynamic economy. 

Hosting virtually has also allowed us to be more inclusive in our engagement – widening our reach to include a range of experts and stakeholders who might not ordinarily be able to travel and attend APEC meetings in an in-person host year. 

Despite the pressure of having less than 6 months to restructure, regroup and embark down a fully virtual path, there was a collective drive to make it work – because it had to work. APEC’s primary goal is to support sustainable economic growth and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific, to help turn policy initiatives into concrete results and tangible benefits for the region. This work is more important than ever as we respond to the challenges of COVID-19. 

This year APEC is working on a regional response to COVID-19; including measures to allow medical supplies and vaccines to be easily traded across borders, and to ensure key supply routes remain open.  

And as a forum, APEC must think about not only the short-term response to COVID-19, but also a sustained and sustainable long-term response.  

That long-term thinking is reflected in the work that will contribute to APEC’s agenda for the next two decades.  

Last year, APEC Leaders adopted the Putrajaya Vision 2040, which will become a 20-year roadmap – a living document that will change and evolve with the region. Officials from all 21 economies are now working on a plan that will bring it to life by outlining the concrete steps economies will take towards fulfilment of the Vision. It is crucial work that will help drive prosperity through innovation, sustainable and inclusive growth, and trade and investment.  

As APEC 2021 progresses, so will our work to improve what we do and how we do it.  

Can diplomacy take place through a webcam? Absolutely.  

Will virtual meetings replace physical meetings altogether? It’s unlikely – however, they open a door to the possibility of a hybrid physical-and-virtual model which is more inclusive, and more environmentally sustainable.  

As host of APEC 2021 it is on New Zealand to create an environment where people can join, work and grow together; to facilitate, build and advance relationships between economies, and turn policy initiatives into tangible results. 

This is a crucial moment for our region and this valuable institution that we all care about deeply. It is a driver of economic and trade growth, jobs, income, innovation, regional integration and cooperation.  

As host of APEC 2021 it is our job to not only support this important work, but to contribute to a long legacy in a way that makes APEC strong, more resilient, and even better prepared for whatever the future holds. 

For further information 

https://apec2021nz.org

APEC 2021 Senior Officials’ Meeting Chair, Vangelis Vitalis – Picture by OLLY COLEMAN-APEC

ISIS: How the Group is Getting Stronger

By Patricia Pazos.

The threat of ISIS is escalating worldwide, slowly but firmly. ISIS has proven effective and adaptable over the years, and while the pandemic has impacted the group, it has not deprived its capabilities: ISIS no longer controls territory, but still controls groups, inspires attacks and continues to radicalize. Along this article, we will assess how the ISIS machinery currently works and what to expect in the coming months.

Leadership

The actual leader or “Calif”  remains Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, who succeeded Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as leader in October 2019 following a raid by US special forces in Syria which led to al-Baghdadi’s death by suicide. Al-Qurashi is an ISIS veteran and while little is known about him, we can confirm that he is the mastermind of the Yazidi genocide in Iraq and he is behind major international operations. 

The core of the group remains strong and there are no internal fractures or leadership fights of power, showing a high level of coordination with no major defections. Currently, ISIS has an estimated number of 8,000 to 16,000 foreign fighters. This number is inferior in comparison to January 2020, reaching a total of 14,000 to 18,000 fighters. The geographic restrictions due to the pandemic and the group’s financial situations have impacted these high recruiting numbers. 

Capabilities

The group no longer holds territory in Iraq, where it once controlled 40 per cent of the country, or Syria, where a third of the country was under ISIS control. In addition, eight million people have been liberated from its control in these countries. This being said, ISIS is far from being eradicated: its growing affiliate branches are gaining power and supporters, and inspiring attacks. In conflict zones, the group operates as a low-level insurgency and its fighters are organized in small operative cells, controlling rural areas and using mainly small weapons and IEDs in its attacks. 

The number of attacks in Iraq and Syria have increased in the past months and have proven effective and sophisticated, targeting civil population, local leaders, and security forces. This increase is threefold: inconsistency in military operations due to the pandemic; reduced coordinated international actions (allocating adequate military and civilian resources); and lack of solid support to stabilize liberated areas. It is important to note that addressing the factors that make ISIS proliferate, such as lack of governance where the groups operate, lack of economic and employment opportunities, lack of basic infrastructure and services for the population, and sectarian division will help in the fight to combat the terrorist group. If the international community does not address those factors, ISIS will keep thriving. 

Financing

ISIS financing system is solid and well structured – according to the US Treasury Department, ISIS accumulates 100 million dollars in cash in Iraq and Syria alone. The resources come from extortion, intimidation, smuggling, kidnapping and taxing the population. The money flows easily from Iraq and Syria, and the transfers are often made using the hawala system (underground banking system that is traceless, and based on trust). 

Outside of conflict zones, ISIS is still relying on crime, private donors, and funds generated under the cover of legal business or charities, which are then transferred to the group using cash, money services or hawala, or a combination of all. And what about terrorist attacks with low-level of preparation and logistics? Terrorists inspired by ISIS with no direct links to the core, as well as small cells, are often able to fund their activities through legitimate sources of income, fraud or petty crime. 

Pentagon terrorist attack

Radicalization

ISIS is still radicalizing in conflict zones, in third countries, and online. The pandemic has slowed down more traditional -in person- radicalization processes, but in Europe the pandemic has led to an increase in radicalization content online (both salafi-jihadi and far right). Combined with socio economic drivers of terrorism, this creates the perfect cocktail for a resurgence in terrorist attacks once the physical restrictions relax and larger in-person gatherings are back. We can affirm that more terrorist attacks with low level preparation are expected in the West, specially in France, the UK, and Germany. 

In Iraq and Syria, ISIS still indoctrinates, radicalizes, and recruits the local population. Prisons and refugee camps are a hot spot for radicalization, and refugee camps like al-Hol in Syria, which currently has a population of more than 60,000, are at risk of forming small caliphates due to the increasing radicalization of refugees. ISIS has one objective in mind: to re-establish the power of the organization and to create a new generation of leaders and fighters. 

ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates are gaining control and expanding their influence throughout sub-Saharan Africa, successfully recruiting and even capturing territory in the worst cases. These groups exploit political transitions, lack of economic opportunities and security, creating a perfect breeding ground for terrorism and radicalization in unstable countries. 

Conclusions

  • ISIS’s capabilities have been reduced but the threat is mutating and adapting to the new societies during the pandemic.
  • Addressing lack of economic and employment opportunities, lack of basic infrastructure and services for the population, and sectarian division is key to reduce the groups success.
  • When geographical restrictions ease and we slowly return to life as it was pre-pandemic, we will witness an increase in terrorist attacks worldwide, a majority of them being by lone wolves or small cells linked to ISIS. 

About the author:

Patricia Pazos

Patricia Pazos, Ph.D., is the founder of Talking About Terrorism, a platform offering research and training on counter-terrorism (Washington DC) and  US delegate of CISEG, a community of intelligence and security on terrorism (Spain). 

Anticipating water hot spots in the world will help prevent conflict

By Susanne Schmeier.

Water insecurity is rising worldwide. This affects people’s, communities’ and entire countries’ livelihoods, food and energy security as well as overall economic development. Moreover, it challenges relations between people, communities or entire countries as they compete over perceived scarce water resources.

Media as well as international organizations, including the United Nations and the World Economic Forum, have already warned of water-related threats escalating and possibly affecting stability and peace in entire countries or regions. Examples from Syria to Central Asia and from the Horn of Africa to Iraq demonstrate this.

The Water, Peace and Security (WPS) partnership was established in 2018 to address these challenges. Funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it brings together a group of renowned organizations from the water, security and peacebuilding sectors, led by IHE Delft Institute for Water Education. Together, they are developing innovative tools and approaches to prevent, mitigate and resolve water-related insecurity and tensions before they turn into full-fledged security threats.

In this context, WPS has developed a global early warning tool which tracks places around the world that are at risk of emerging or intensifying water-related insecurity and conflict. It does so on the basis of artificial intelligence, using a machine learning model to digest numerous indicators determining such risks – such as drought onsets, decreasing crop productivity, sudden population growth or existing instability. The tool will help to raise awareness among high-level policy makers of the urgency to act on water-related conflict risks. It has already been presented to the UN Security Council, other UN actors, as well as various national governments.

Acknowledging that solutions for water related risks can only be found on site, WPS has also developed a set of local tools that allow decision-makers to understand the current and future water resources situation and the impacts of development plans (such as new dams or irrigation schemes) as well as the human responses to those, possibly ranging from migration and displacement to local people deprived of their livelihoods joining illicit or terrorist groups.

In combination with intensive capacity development and dialogue support, WPS and its partners hope to turn vicious cycles of water insecurity and conflict into virtuous cycles of climate and conflict sensitive water management and cooperation.

About the author:

Susanne Schmeier is an Associate Professor in Water Law and Diplomacy at IHE Delft Institute for Water Education

www.un-ihe.org

A Bicentennial Celebration in Costa Rica: The Case of a Singular Democracy

By Rodolfo Solano Quirós, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Republic of Costa Rica.

Costa Rica is celebrating its Bicentenary of Independence in 2021. After signing the 1821 Act of Independence, our country has been characterized from the start for its clear institutional vocation.

From its foundation, a guideline for conduct was expressly established in the developing Costa Rican State, a rule that is still current in both internal and international relationships. This standard determines that Costa Rica “recognizes and respects civil liberties, property, and other legitimate national rights of every person and any state or nation.”

Today, two hundred years later, this small but ambitious Central American country effectively proves to the world that even with scarce economic resources and facing important threats and challenges, it is possible to live in peace, freely and democratically, while respecting the environment

Throughout its independent existence, Costa Rica has placed singular value on peace and harmony. This vocation for peace was confirmed in 1949 when the national army was constitutionally abolished. Another fundamental Costa Rican characteristic is its commitment to the rule of law. The country always seeks resolution in International Law as the only valid mechanism for promoting and defending universal values that should be accepted by the entire international community. We firmly believe in negotiation, arbitration and jurisdictional processes, and we have unrestrainedly supported the cause of disarmament, particularly in the nuclear context.

Respect for human rights was clearly stated in 1821 and characterizes our country’s very existence, as is proven by early milestones such as the 1869 declaration of primary education as free and obligatory and the constitutionally recognized abolition of the death penalty in 1882. Costa Rica proposed creation of the Central American Court of Justice, the first permanent international court of Public International Law and the first international Human Rights Court in history, which was inaugurated in the City of Cartago in 1908. Costa Rica was among the countries unconditionally adopting the Universal declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and is party to the principal international instruments on this matter. The American Convention on Human Rights was signed in our capital city of San José and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has its seat there. Costa Rica has staunchly defended the cause for fundamental rights and liberties and actively promoted creation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Our Constitutional Court has even ruled that international human rights agreements are hierarchically above our own National Constitution.

In recent decades and as host to great biological diversity, Costa Rica has also undertaken a serious commitment to protect the environment. National parks and protected areas constitute an important part of our national territory and the country places great importance on the fight against climate change and environmental deterioration.  The High Ambition Coalition (HAC) for Nature and People was recently officially launched, with the goal of conserving 30% of the world’s land and marine areas by 2030, stemming massive species loss, and protecting ecosystems that are key to human welfare and that of nature as a whole.

All of the above have provided a solid foundation for Costa Rica’s foreign policy as a singular case of a demilitarized democracy, with strong institutions, and respect for the environment, a pioneer in human rights and an internationally active proponent thereof, unique in the world.

Currently, the country is facing a special opportunity for projection of its values and principles that have served as a basis for its internal conduct and foreign policy. Costa Rica is head of two important examples for regional cooperation. It currently holds the rotational presidency of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the Central American Integration System (SICA, Spanish acronym).

At ECLAC, the Costa Rican presidency began in August of 2020. Since then, it has focused on the principles of international cooperation, solidarity and promotion of human rights, as well as concentrating on regional policy coordination and cooperation, cooperation with international financial institutions, support for the United Nations System, and protection of International Law and Human Rights.

For the SICA presidency, Costa Rica has determined that its priority actions will pivot around gender equality and human rights, particularly for the most vulnerable populations; economic and social post-pandemic recovery for the region, health and food security; and promotion of science and technology, creativity and innovation, with special emphasis on integrated risk management and the fight against climate change. Furthermore, Costa Rica considers that a greater and more effective integration among SICA Member States will harness substantial benefits. Additionally, efforts are being made to revitalize the steps Costa Rica has taken with SICA observer countries and cooperative partners to promote creation of a special fund for regional recovery.

In these and other international organizations in which Costa Rica participates, the country has consistently adhered to the principles that have given a unique identity to its foreign policy. Convinced of the importance of multilateralism for peace and cooperative development to prosper among nations, the country has been very active in the multilateral scenario, proposing implementation of the World Health Organization (WHO) C-TAP (Covid-Technology Access Pool) initiative. This consists of a common repository for rights to technologies that countries have developed and that are useful for the detection, control and treatment of the COVID-19 pandemic, in order to ensure equitable access to respond to the crisis.

Costa Rica proposes undertaking its third century of independent life contributing towards new initiatives that reflect these same values and also responding to the changing needs of our world and the importance of resolving those challenges that await us with enthusiasm, responsibility, and a sense of innovation.

Leonardo’s Faces – Bas Massink

Celebrating Leonardo Royal Hotel Den Haag Promenade – 50 years of diplomatic mission

Behind the logo of the Vitruvian man, multiple employees ensure that the Leonardo Royal Hotel Den Haag Promenade provides excellent, customized, hospitality services to all.

Name: Bas Massink

Nationality: Dutch

Function: First respondent Food and Beverage Employee

Department: Food and Beverage (F&B)

When did you start working at the Promenade Hotel?

I started working here in the summer of 2019, after completing my education “Manager in the Hospitality industry”. That year, I was looking for a full-time job in a hotel and so I applied for a job at Leonardo Royal Hotel Den Haag Promenade. Now, I enjoy going to work every day in one of the most beautiful hotels of Apollo & Leonardo Hotels!

Have you always worked in the same department?

Technically yes, I was hired as a F&B employee. After more than a year I’ve made a promotion to First Respondent F&B Employee, which is now my current position. During my career at Leonardo Royal Hotel Den Haag Promenade, I supported various departments in all of their activities. Every now and then I also work as a (night) receptionist and I am always available to fill in at any other hotel in the chain that needs an extra hand.

What was the most remarkable diplomatic event you experienced?

I have not attended many of the Diplomat Magazine’s events, so if I had to choose, I think last year’s event because, it took place during COVID-19. Besides the Diplomat Magazine events. This was the Diplomat After Summer Drinks event 2020. I have also attended many other events. The national remembrance of the Dutch East Indies on August 15 is also an event that I will always remember.

Why was this so remarkable?

The Diplomat After Summer Drinks event of 2020 was remarkable because we needed to improvise because of the COVID-19 measures; especially the social distancing and guests having to sit down at fixed seats.

The National Remembrance Day for all the victims that died in the former Dutch East Indies is also very remarkable because it’s terrible what happened during the Second World War and it’s just wonderful to see how everyone is looking for comfort and support and getting it from other people.

What international habit, tradition or event that you have observed, appeals to you?

Why?

A country I visited many times is England. This is a country that has many traditions and habits that we do not have in the Netherlands. Such as driving on the left of the road, where we drive on the right and the typical English breakfast. Two habits that I’m not a fan of either. A tradition that I am a fan of is the High Tea. A tradition that I embrace every time I travel back to England.

What do you consider interesting about the international guests and events organized at the hotel?

What I find interesting is simply to see how the international guest live and what their experiences are in life. I also find it interesting to see what is important for that country during international events. Where their interests lie and to learn from their experiences.

What is a(n) (international) habit that you find interesting? The habits that I find the most interesting are the Dutch habits. I love my country and their crazy habits. Such as going by bike everywhere you need to be and mash our food and poor loads of gravy over it. Home sweet Home

Diplomacy and the concept of National Security

By Dr. Saifaldin Z. Al-Darraji.

“Diplomacy is the art of telling people to go to hell in such a way that they ask for directions.”.” Winston Churchill.

The post-Cold War era witnessed a remarkable development in the form of international relations, especially with regard to the affairs of the global defense system and its traditional constants, which imposed a new vision of national security strategies as a main factor of countries’ foreign policies to manage conflicts, support interests, expand influence and make decisions at the international and regional levels.

There has been a need to formulate broader definitions of the concept of national security that include economic, diplomatic, political, geostrategic, social and other concepts. This is what a number of Copenhagen School pioneers and thinkers such as Barry Bozan and Oli Weaver have argued regarding expanding security studies to subjects other than military ones.

The structure of the state is closely related to the ability of its institutions to manage its resources and implement the functions in a manner that ensures its steadfastness against change processes due to unexpected internal or external shocks that threaten its security, stability and the well-being of its people.

Diplomacy is one of the most important elements of national power that states follow to formulate their foreign policies and expand their scope of influence by using the principles and foundations of directed dialogue and effective negotiation strategies, tactics and methods, to contribute to achieving their national and political goals, and to finalize an international and regional public opinion that supports and back their positions aimed at protecting their interests and those of their subjects in the other countries.

Diplomacy is defined – from the writer’s point of view – as “one of the elements of national power that states use to achieve the goals of their foreign policies, in accordance with a set of rules, customs and laws that regulate their relations within the international environment.”

The role of diplomacy in facing the challenges and threats to which the state may be exposed is no less than the role of the security and military system. Rather, it may be considered the first phase to prevent the growth of armed conflicts and the risk of direct confrontation, as a result of the conflicts of its interests with the interests of other countries, in addition to what may result from security, political, economic and demographic repercussions.

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 defined the procedures and instructions for diplomatic action among states, as well as the rights and duties of members of diplomatic missions.

Strengthening the bilateral and multi-part diplomatic role to assume the responsibility of defending the interests of supreme states and their national security requires a team with a high level of capacity, competence and integrity, equipped with basic political directives, and the necessary visions and information, for a broader understanding of the shape of the global order and the nature of international relations, including an evaluation of Risks, analysis of situations, and exploration of issues that affect, in one way or another, the position of the state within its international and regional surroundings.

In light of the foregoing, and in order to achieve this, members of this team, especially diplomatic personnel, must possess special skills, which are considered professional principles for diplomatic work, including:

  1. The ability to understand, analyze and evaluate situations and challenges.
  2. Skill and good planning in gathering information from its various sources.
  3. Accuracy and objectivity in presenting opinions, ideas and proposals, and telling the truth to the authority without bias, favoritism or weakness, taking into account the etiquette of dialogue and the responsibilities of the job hierarchy.
  4. The ability to create and innovate in solving problems, managing crises, and making decisions under pressure and in difficult situations.
  5. Extensive knowledge and comprehensive understanding of international affairs, taking into account cultural and social norms, in addition to full knowledge of the customs and traditions of the host country.
  6. The ability to form and manage cohesive teams to accomplish the assigned tasks, with the assurance that within these teams there is someone who plays the role of critic and determinant of failures and weaknesses, or the so-called (red team).
  7. Firmness, listening, decency, tact, calm and good looking. With good negotiation skills and the ability to learn languages, communicate effectively, build relationships and form alliances in times of peace and war.
  8. Accuracy of observation, quick wit and caution against falling into the trap of the intelligence services that usually put diplomatic personnel as a target for them, especially in dictatorial regimes. Some studies have indicated the need to develop security and intelligence skills for employees working in diplomatic missions.

In addition to what has been mentioned above, belief in the essence of the democratic political system, sincerity and competence, are the criteria for the success of the person entrusted with any responsibility, whether within or outside the geographical borders of the country. However, representing the state abroad and contributing to the implementation of its foreign policy places on the missionary or diplomat a double responsibility, as he is required to work to present the best conduct and create strong ties with countries at all levels and in the most difficult circumstances.

Diplomats should be influential leaders around them, able to formulate visions, set goals, expand networks of communication, mobilize supportive positions, and build alliances according to theories of mutual gain.

The ability of states to maneuver and create opportunities and avoid the largest possible losses, and not to enter into conflicts that are useless but drain energies, requires an active and influential diplomatic role in the production of an active foreign policy, based on a strategy that bears costs and distributes benefits, through cooperation and non-interference in Internal affairs of states, contributing to solving problems and giving priority to dialogue and negotiation to support the foundations of national security, as well as strengthening the role of mediation in settling conflicts in conflict areas, in a way that is reflected in the strengthening of the state’s position in its international and regional surroundings.

About the author: Dr. Saifaldin Z. Al-Darraji is an Iraqi Diplomat, Member at the UK Royal College of Defence Studies RCDS

Covid 19 – There is no vaccine for domestic violence

By Justice Pranita A. Deshpande.

It is said that there are many doors which can take one to the death and if we start counting them, our imagination stops.  Causes such as aging, accidents, victims, crime, illness, attacks, suicides.  One more reason has now been added. That is “Covid 19”.

As the corona virus has been spreading rapidly, most countries in the world resorted to lockdown. Strict adherence to the rules of lockdown is the message of ‘Stay home – Stay safe’.  But then a confusing question suddenly arises – ‘What if home is not a safe place for some of us?’

The most vulnerable elements in society are women and children – have always had to face or have to go through oppression. Violence against women and children has doubled or tripled in the wake of the Emergency, the financial crisis and the pandemic.

The United Nations (UN) branch, which works for global women’s empowerment, gender equality and the prevention of violence against women and girls, has condemned the escalating domestic violence in Covid Lockdown as ‘Shadow Pandemic’.  It is said that the pandemic , which comes on foot, but is just as fierce.

Violence against women remains devastatingly pervasive and starts alarmingly young, shows new data from WHO and partners. Across their lifetime, 1 in 3 women, around 736 million, are subjected to physical or sexual violence by an intimate partner or sexual violence from a non-partner – a number that has remained largely unchanged over the past decade.

“But unlike COVID-19, violence against women cannot be stopped with a vaccine. We can only fight it with deep-rooted and sustained efforts – by governments, communities and individuals – to change harmful attitudes, improve access to opportunities and services for women and girls, and foster healthy and mutually respectful relationships.”

WHO and partners warn that the COVID-19 pandemic has further increased women’s exposure to violence, as a result of measures such as lockdowns and disruptions to vital support services.

Violence disproportionately affects women living in low- and lower-middle-income countries.  An estimated 37% of women living in the poorest countries have experienced physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence in their life, with some of these countries having a prevalence as high as 1 in 2.   

The regions of Oceania, Southern Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa have the highest prevalence rates of intimate partner violence among women aged 15-49, ranging from 33% – 51%.  The lowest rates are found in Europe (16–23%), Central Asia (18%), Eastern Asia (20%) and South-Eastern Asia (21%).

Younger women are at highest risk for recent violence. Among those who have been in a relationship, the highest rates (16%) of intimate partner violence in the past 12 months occurred among young women aged between 15 and 24.

Domestic violence is on the rise across the globe during pandemic.This conclusion is drawn from the statistics of women who could be contacted for help via  helplines, police, and other service providers during lockdowns. But the number of women whose calls do not reach us is also huge.  Lack of phone facility, lack of patience, fear of being caught, etc., many obstacles prevent them from reporting.

In India, complaints of domestic violence are made to the National Commission for Women.  According to the latest figures from the National Commission for Women, the number of complaints received during the lockdown has more than doubled compared to the normal period.  The cases of domestic violence are more prevalent in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab, Delhi and Maharashtra.

The  National Commission for Women has launched a special WhatsApp helpline number: +91 7217735372, which will act as an exclusive helpline for domestic violence complaints during the period of lockdown.

This will be in addition to the emails, online complaints links, and helpline numbers

The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare has also collaborated with the National Institute of Mental Health and Neurosciences to provide psychological support to women facing domestic violence through the helpline number.

Along with this partnership with different NGOs  may assist government efforts to combat this shadow pandemic.

Global measures:

French Government to House Domestic Abuse Victims in Hotels as Cases Rise During Coronavirus Lockdown. France introduced a separate initiative  to encourage women to report domestic abuse in pharmacies.They also decided to set up a counselling center in the shops to help the women who came to the shops to buy goods.

The move follows a similar one in Spain where women can go to their pharmacy and request a “Mask 19” – a code word that will alert the pharmacist to contact the authorities.

If a woman victim of domestic violence in the United States calls 999 and dials 55, the police will receive a silent call.This is one of the ways you can urgently get in touch with police if you’re stuck inside with an abuser.The police are also raising awareness for women to make maximum use of this facility.

The Council of Australian Governments endorsed the Fourth Action Plan of the National Plan to Reduce Violence against Women and their Children 2010-2022, agreeing on five national priorities to reduce family, domestic and sexual violence   Against Women and their Children 2010-2022.

The Stop it at the Start campaign encourages adults to “unmute” themselves and empowers them to take actions that will have a positive influence on the attitudes and behaviors of young people. A suite of tools and resources will be available online at www.respect.gov.au to parents and young people about respectful relationships.

When it comes to the Netherlands,The government wants to tackle and prevent domestic abuse. Measures include public information campaigns, domestic exclusion orders and protection for victims. If there is an immediate threat, call 112 and ask for the police.There is also a service called ‘Veilig Thuis‘(Safe at home),which is a state-run advice and reporting point for any domestic violence or child abuse. You can always call it (for free), 24 hours per day, on 0800 2000.The service also runs shelters, gives advice, and provides support.

In many countries people are living with their extended families which has, sometimes, more than ten people in one house and also with their abusers (more than one).

 Coronavirus has shown us the importance of local community and how volunteering shall strengthen the bond that comes from looking after each other’s.

Art is a Mirror of the Magnitude of Human Achievement

But also a Message of How Fragile Those Achievements Are

In the picture Dr. Sofija Bajrektarevic, Culture for peace to culture of peace (left); Reine Hirano, Artist (right).

The ‘From Culture for Peace to Culture of Peace’ (known also as the Culture for Peace – Unifying Potentials for the Future) Initiative was once again participating in the ‘Vienna Processes’ conference series program by wishing to emphasize the importance of cultural diplomacy in the processes of creating and maintaining dialogue and the well-being of society.

On the historic date of March 08th – International Women’s Day, a large number of international affairs specialists gathered for the second consecutive summit in Vienna, Austria. This leg of the Vienna Process event titled: “Europe – Future – Neighbourhood at 75: Disruptions Recalibration Continuity”. The conference, jointly organized by four different entities (the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies IFIMES, Media Platform Modern Diplomacy, Scientific Journal European Perspectives, and Action Platform Culture for Peace) with the support of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, was aimed at discussing the future of Europe and its neighbourhood in the wake of its old and new challenges.

This highly anticipated conference gathered over twenty high ranking speakers from three continents, and the viewers from Australia to Canada and from Chile to Far East. The day was filled by three panels focusing on the rethinking and revisiting Europe and its three equally important neighbourhoods: Euro-Med, Eastern and trans-Atlantic (or as the Romano Prodi’s EU Commission coined it back in 2000s – “from Morocco to Russia – everything but the institutions”); the socio-political and economic greening; as well as the legacy of WWII, Nuremberg Trials and Code, the European Human Rights Charter and their relevance in the 21st century.

The event was probably the largest gathering since the beginning of 2021 for this part of Europe.

For this occasion, the selected work of artist Alem Korkut is on the Conference poster. This artist work with the motto/message: ‘Sustainable Future – Quo Vadis?’ is a standing part of the Initiative project. This previously launched initiative refers to the visual arts and the engagement of artists in the field of ‘culture for peace and culture of peace’.

“Europe Future Neighborhood” Conference poster

In addition to the artistic visualization of the theme and message of the conference (same as it was a case with the first conference in the series ‘Vienna Process’), this Conference leg was closed in the big hall of the Austrian Diplomatic Academy with a well-chosen artistic musical performance.

This time, conference participants and attendees were able to listen to the selected parts of Suite No. 1 in G major for solo cello from J.S. Bach, performed by Japanese artist Reine Hirano. As a solo and chamber musician she performs in concert halls worldwide, including the Konzerthaus in Vienna and the Suntory Hall in Tokyo.

“Europe Future Neighborhood” Conference poster.

It was to emphasize the importance of culture, science and arts as essential binding and effective tool of cultural diplomacy. Utilized to support dialogue, these types of interventions of the Culture for Peace Unifying Potentials for the Future Platform already became a regular accompanying part of the ‘Vienna Process’, which makes it special – quite different from the usual conference forms of geopolitical, legal and economic contents.

Conclusively, art – indeed – is a mirror of the magnitude of human achievement, but also a message of how fragile those achievements are.

About the author:

Anastasiia Pachina

Anastasiia Pachina, Sociologist – Charles University, Prague. She is a Program manager – with the Culture for Peace Action Platform, and a marketing researcher in IPSOS CZ.

Vienna Process: Reinvigorating the Spirit of Helsinki for Mediterranean

On the historic date of March 08th – International Women’s Day, a large number of international affairs specialists gathered for the second consecutive summit in Vienna, Austria. This leg of the Vienna Process event titled: “Europe – Future – Neighbourhood at 75: Disruptions Recalibration Continuity”. The conference, jointly organized by four different entities (the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies IFIMES, Media Platform Modern Diplomacy, Scientific Journal European Perspectives, and Action Platform Culture for Peace) with the support of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, was aimed at discussing the future of Europe and its neighbourhood in the wake of its old and new challenges.

This highly anticipated conference gathered over twenty high ranking speakers from three continents, and the viewers from Australia to Canada and from Chile to Far East. The day was filled by three panels focusing on the rethinking and revisiting Europe and its three equally important neighbourhoods: Euro-Med, Eastern and trans-Atlantic (or as the Romano Prodi’s EU Commission coined it back in 2000s – “from Morocco to Russia – everything but the institutions”); the socio-political and economic greening; as well as the legacy of WWII, Nuremberg Trials and Code, the European Human Rights Charter and their relevance in the 21st century.

The event was probably the largest gathering since the beginning of 2021 for this part of Europe.

Along with the two acting State Presidents, the event was endorsed by the keynote of the EU Commissioner for European Neighbourhood and Enlargement, Excellency Olivér Várhelyi. The first, of the three-panel conference, was brilliantly conducted by the OSCE Sec-General (2011-2017), current IFIMES Euro-Med Director, Ambassador Lamberto Zannier. Among his speakers was Emiliano Alessandri, OSCE Senior External Co-operation Officer. Following lines are his contribution to this highly successful Vienna Process event.

Unfulfilled Mediterranean Visions

After the Cold War, it was widely believed that the unevenly developed, conflict-torn Mediterranean region could finally stabilize around a rapidly integrating Europe, the gap between the Southern and Northern economies reducing through greater access to the European common market, and a truly “Euro-Mediterranean” region emerging as a more coherent space in economic, security as well as human connections terms.

A decade later, after 9/11, the region was singled out again as an epicenter of global insecurity. The Euro-Mediterranean vision largely unfulfilled, the region’s dysfunctions came under renewed scrutiny. While most of them had obvious socio-economic roots, international attention focused almost exclusively on the spread of radical ideologies propounded by various groups advocating anti-modern, anti-Western agendas. Instead of articulating an inclusive and equitable model of socio-economic development, the defeat of terrorism took over the agenda. Repression was often prioritized over reform. 

Unleashing long-standing grievances, the ill-named and ill-fated Arab Spring of 2010-2011 was prematurely welcomed as a region-wide movement towards democracy, portending the demise of an alleged Arab “exception”. Attention focused once again on transnational groups and movements, signally a civically engaged youth defying the authoritarian order to demand greater social justice. As protest movements gradually subsided, leading to what many have perhaps too harshly defined as a new “Arab winter”, views of the region have turned markedly negative again. Although wholesale cynicism is misplaced, the present realities call for a correction of the overly optimistic visions that had prevailed after the Cold War.

A more interconnected but no less conflict-prone Mediterranean

For one, the Mediterranean appears less and less a coherent space. The region is for sure interconnected in economic, security as well as human terms. But growing interdependence between Europe and the Mediterranean on the one hand, and the Mediterranean and Africa on the other, has not translated into convergence, let alone triggered a drive towards integration. When connections have expanded, they are not necessarily of the positive kind. The region is currently linked up through its proliferating smuggling routes and fast-expanding organized crime networks. Euro-Mediterranean exchanges coalescing around education, production, and employment opportunities are catching up too slowly and unevenly.

Contrary to what Europeans had envisaged, moreover, the Mediterranean region is also less and less a European “neighborhood”– a role that would have never done full justice of the region’s inherent diversity, multi-layered cultural identity, and wide-ranging international connections and influences. Europe undoubtedly remains a strong reference for some countries – economically as well as culturally. But the region increasingly looks in other directions – towards both Asia and Africa. For their part, a number of resourceful non-Western regional actors are bent on exert a growing influence on local dynamics. With China investing heavily in the region (including with a view to post-pandemic recovery), Turkey and Russia playing key roles in regional conflicts, the Gulf States and Iran expanding their clout either directly or through proxies, the region increasingly is a global chessboard (a role it intermittently held throughout its complicated history) rather than a European “inland sea”.

Contrary to what many have argued, finally, the Mediterranean state system has proved unexpectedly resilient. The region is certainly fragmented and transnational groups continue to erode the fragile foundations of the existing order. The prospect of failed states remains very concrete and Libya is still characterized by divisive internal dynamics that create a dangerous vacuum of governance. But overall local regimes have recovered from the wave of protests of 2010-2011, either by adapting or fighting back. The region is now characterized as much by dysfunctional governance as by regime survivalism and renewed state assertiveness. Inter-state competition remains a key factor of regional instability, compounded with (rather than in alternative to) the challenge posed by terrorism and other transnational threats.

A Mediterranean dialogue fit for the new realities

Against this backdrop, Mediterranean regional dialogue is more important than ever, especially in the security realm. Yet, it is also elusive. Recent breakthroughs towards the normalization of Arab-Israeli relations testify to a possible revival of regional diplomacy. But region’s central conflict remains unsolved and no illusion should be entertained about it being liquidated by the emergence of other pressing priorities. In any event, moving from a dynamic of conflict to a paradigm of peace would require a level of trust – and a focus on a common positive agenda – that is far from apparent at the moment.

For their part, the rise of China, Russia’s re-engagement in the region after a post-Cold War hiatus, the Gulf States’ growing influence open up opportunities for the region, diversifying the region’s international portfolio. But these dynamics also create new risks and tradeoffs, the net effect of which is not necessarily increased stability.

What, therefore, can support and advance a new Mediterranean dialogue that is reflective of the new realities as well as in tune with the region’s evolving challenges and needs?

As dialogue continues to be in short supply, no available platform should be discarded. Many of the traditional ones can continue playing an important role in their respective domains, from the Barcelona process/ Union for the Mediterranean to the dialogue formats provided by the EU and NATO. A less known venue that can be more strategically leveraged in the present circumstances is the one provided by the Mediterranean Partnership of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

The CSCE/OSCE process has traditionally addressed East-West relations, with a focus on European security. But from the start and before many others did the same, the CSCE/OSCE built ties across the Mediterranean basin in an attempt to foster regional security and promote an Helsinki-like “method” or “model” for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts. The OSCE Mediterranean Partners now include all of the North African countries with the exception of Libya (which, however, has repeatedly expressed interest in joining), as well as Jordan and Israel in the Middle East.

What distinguishes this platform from others is above all its diverse membership, which includes many of the extra-regional actors that are currently active in the MENA, starting with Russia and Turkey. In fact, the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership offers a unique multilateral forum in which NATO, the EU, and all of the post-Soviet states can develop a security dialogue addressing the nexus between multipolarity and stability, which is so central to the current Mediterranean security equation. This dialogue can build on the long-standing OSCE experience with managing inter-state tensions in the European space, as well as aim at sharing best practices among countries that have undertaken complex political and economic transitions, from Eastern Europe to the Western Balkans.

Over the years, the OSCE Mediterranean dialogue has come to look at the Southern countries as an actor rather than an object of security. Successive OSCE Chairmanships have focused on outlining a positive agenda for Mediterranean security, that countries from the North and the South can advance together to tackle a growing set of shared concerns, from countering transnational organized crime to addressing environmental threats.

The OSCE Mediterranean dialogue has two key features that may make it particularly fitting for addressing the specific challenges of the Mediterranean of the 21st century. The OSCE was designed to address international conflict and, despite a growing focus on transnational threats, the organization still relies on a security toolkit that is particularly tailored to preventing or mitigating inter-state tensions. This double focus on the inter-state and transnational aspects of security is extremely relevant for the current Mediterranean security environment.

From the outset, moreover, the CSCE/OSCE process has propounded a “comprehensive” notion of security spanning politico-military, environmental-economic, as well as human dimension aspects. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act – the CSCE founding document – was among the first international texts to elevate human rights and fundamental freedoms to the rank of international norms. Through its Office on Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE has developed a solid track record of supporting free and fair elections, promoting democratic governance, and ensuring the protection of human rights. At various turning points, most recently in the wake of the Arab Spring, this wealth of experience was successfully shared with the OSCE Mediterranean Partners. The notion that states are as secure as their citizens is most relevant in a region where too often the interests of states have been defined against those of the peoples.

Rediscovering the OSCE added value

Although the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership has gained traction in recent years, including by offering a growing menu of capacity-building projects of cooperation in security-relevant policy areas, the future of the OSCE Mediterranean dialogue would greatly benefit from a sharper focus on some key goals.

First, conflict-cycle related issues should once again be put at the center of the OSCE Mediterranean dialogue, as this is the area in which the OSCE experience is the most encompassing. This would include a discussion on whether and in which form confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) initially  developed for the European context could be adjusted to fit the realities of the MENA region. Next to traditional areas such as arms control and military activities CSBMs could also address new domains, from energy to cyber security.

Second, the OSCE Mediterranean dialogue should not shy away from difficult topics, even if this means addressing relevant aspects of ongoing international conflicts. Over the years, the quest for a positive agenda has led to eluding some of the region’s key challenges to concentrate on less controversial topics, for instance how to promote economic cooperation or how to foster youth participation in decision making processes. The OSCE has traditionally offered a venue where international or regional crises can be de-conflicted and tensions de-escalated. A serious positive agenda is one that turns challenges into opportunities for cooperation, not one that systematically tries to avoid controversial or divisive issues.

Third, the door should be kept open to other Southern countries to join the dialogue. This should apply to Libya in North Africa as well as to countries of the Sahel that are already part of other interregional formats. In line with its vocation as an inclusive multilateral platform, countries from the Levant and the Gulf could also be brought into an expanded dialogue format in the future. Were conditions ripe for constructive diplomatic exchanges, the OSCE platform could even promote a new dialogue between Iran, the Gulf States, and other key international actors, with a view to mitigating current patterns of competition and rivalry.

Fourth and finally, the OSCE could step up its engagement with other regional and international organizations, including some that are yet to develop a Mediterranean profile, such as the African Union (which, however, has a focus on conflict resolution). As the largest regional arrangement under the UN Charter, the OSCE is well placed to promote cross-regional connections. This would anchor the new Mediterranean dialogue to a revival of multilateralism, one based on the recognition that a more global and multipolar Mediterranean needs inter-locking institutions to support the creation of a stable and effective security regional order.

*the views expressed in this article are strictly personal and do not represent those of any organization

About the author:

Emiliano Alessandri, Senior External Co-operation Officer, OSCE; Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS) since 2012; a scholar with the Middle East Institute (MEI) since 2019; and a Research Associate with the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) since 2017. He is also a Scientific Board Member of the NATO Defense College Foundation; Advisory Board Member of the US-Italy Global Affairs Forum and Editorial Board Member of The International Spectator.

Trinity for Scrutiny: Council of Europe, Human Rights instruments and Citizens

In the picture Commissioner Dunja Mijatovic.

By Nora Wolf.

Building on the tasteful piece written recently by Commissioner Dunja Mijatovic, this article will endeavour to explore further why the Tromsø Convention (Norwegian International Convention on Access to Official Documents)[1], although adopted more than a decade ago, is in fact deserving of much more credit and fuss than it appears to have mustered so far.

To briefly catch everyone up, the Council of Europe (CoE) adopted in 2009 a Convention on Access to Official Documents foreseeing a general and minimal right for all to access public authorities’ official documents. Having entered into force last December, this convention pioneers a uniformed standardised right to obtain official documents and thereby information from official sources.  Evidently, the treaty draws on the pillar values of any and all healthy democracies that are transparency, pluralism and self-development of the individuals making up our civil societies.

Freedom of information, within which the right to access official documents is encompassed, is indeed crucial for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is essential from a somewhat ‘hostile perspective’ in order to oversee public bodies’ conducts and uncover behaviours who clash with Human Rights and might otherwise be sanitized precisely when these call for remediation, sanction and reparation. Secondly, in a ‘friendlier’ outlook, it is indispensable for the purpose of feeding the public debate and thus, allowing for militant democracies, but also to strengthen legitimacy, foster public trust and endorsement of their elected government.

Lastly but perhaps most importantly, it should be pointed out that in a similar manner as the right to life, the freedom of information is in fact a key that opens, if not all, many doors embodied by other ECHR rights such as the freedom of expression and that of thought, procedural guarantees or even the freedom of assembly and association. In effect, without being adequately informed, how could one be aware of their rights and exercise them diligently? Without receiving quality information, how could one forge their convictions and gather with others to share affiliations and work towards a common goal? And without access to verified information, could one really form an educated opinion meant to be expressed freely subsequently?

In addition to being a prerequisite to the proper exercise and enjoyment of other fundamental rights, it also echoes directly with the first article of the ECHR providing for the Contracting Parties’ duty to respect Human Rights – and in reality, render them available to all persons under their jurisdiction. In that sense, the CETS 205 can and should be looked at as a practical example of States fulfilling Human Rights and hence as falling squarely within the same scheme.

Another link certainly worthy of some emphasis is the one that can be made between the advent of such a Treaty and the recent recognition and growing establishment of the right to truth. The right to truth, as devised by Special Rapporteur Louis Joinet in 1996, is made up of several dimensions amongst which there is the right to know. The latter, in turn, involves a right to access archives and historical official documents in order to shed light on past events – and ultimately heal a society. Thus, just like we – the civil society – have a right to know our past so as to reconcile and repair wrongdoings, we also have a right to get acquainted with our present and perhaps prevent wrongdoings at all. Both instruments’ emergence form part of a single reactive movement: the reinforcement and extension of human dignity and a renewed appreciation of individuals through greater access and involvement.

Whilst keeping these elements in mind, let us say a few words about the Convention’s content and characteristics. The project is said to have been guided by the concern of identifying and generalising a core of basic compulsory provisions in a way that will “encourage the Parties to equip themselves with, maintain and reinforce domestic provisions that allow a more extensive right of access, provided that the minimum core is nonetheless implemented.” Hence, this instrument does not purport to be a binding ‘best practice’ guide, but is rather the fruits of a (well-known) compromise resulting in the establishment of a minimum threshold likely to be accepted by the largest majority.

Say we embrace the path taken by the consultative committees and concede that realistic (aka lower) standards will amass more signatures and spread wider its application, what then of an equally realistic rapid examination of the outcome? Indeed, since its adoption in 2009, only ten countries have ratified the Convention whilst the instrument is said to merely reassert what already exists in most internal frameworks of the CoE countries.

The puzzlement does not end there: when looking closer at the contracting parties, one cannot help but notice that the ‘star students’ are MIA. European countries that ranked in 2018 in the top 10 of the world-wide Human Freedom Index[2] such as Switzerland (2nd), Germany (9th), Denmark (4th), or Ireland (7th) are nowhere to be found on the ratification addendum of the Convention. It is hard to imagine why such States that are already doing so well in that area would not want to lead the example and reaffirm principles that match their internal policies.

Commissioner Dunja, for her part, had highlighted that although the majority of CoE’s members have already adopted freedom of information laws on the domestic level, some definite issues remain with regard to their practical enforcement. This referred to disparities in degrees of transparency depending on the public body as well as failures to meet requirements set for proactive disclosure. We may then wonder, provided those trends are correct, if – ironically – there could exist a lack of transparency on those regulations. In other words, if national laws on freedom of information already exist almost everywhere in Europe but they do not satisfy the thresholds put forward by the Convention in practice, civil society should know about it to remedy the situation.

Still, you may wonder: why is it so important that we enquire about, and ensure that, a smooth implementation is possible on the domestic or – if need be – regional level? Because although this article has managed to avoid bringing up COVID-19 so far, the current pandemic only enhances the stakes surrounding an effective freedom of information. As we all know by now, in times of emergency, rapid and impactful decisions have to be taken. These decisions are then in that sense less prone to gather strong consensus and yet more likely to concern the public given the serious nature of the decisions’ object.

The year 2020 has shown that misinformation and somewhat tendentious media coverage of the pandemic’s evolution was damaging enough in terms of civil discontentment and eroding our trust in the Government. But adding to that the withholding of some facts and a lack of transparency on the part of public officials is simply a recipe for disaster.

This can perhaps be better grasped when looking at the cases of France versus Sweden. Civil unrest and vocal dissents have been taking place last year against the French government, said to be lacking transparency on several issues such as shortages of equipment, rationale for measures chosen, allocation of vaccines or even the number of vaccinations. In the fall of last year, a local survey recorded that two-third of the French citizens did not trust their leaders to fight COVID efficiently. The handling of the crisis tainted with obscurity and ambiguities resulted in an unfortunate loss of popularity for President Macron and civil disobedience.

In contrast, the Sweden government remained consistent with its strong stand on, and reputation for, transparency towards its population taking roots notably in a national law favouring public scrutiny adopted in 1766. Their tradition of ‘ultra-transparency’ as is sometimes called is closely related to the country’s culture of shared responsibility and mutual respect between State and citizens. With the national Agency for Public Health taking the lead on the crisis management by remaining very open on the data available and reasons for pursuing collective immunity survey showed in Spring 2020 that nearly 80% of the population entrusted both their health system and the national Agency. Moreover, this ought to be placed against a backdrop where even the King of Sweden did publicly air his reservations regarding the confinement-sceptic management.

Now whatever anyone thinks of the Swedish strategy a posteriori, it must be acknowledged that not only did their information and transparency handling maintain its citizens, numbers show it even did as much as increase the legitimacy of their prime minister. To top it off, Sweden is one of the first to have ratified the CETS 205.

To put it plainly: some countries’ tendencies to filter information, strive to maintain composure and showcase confidence in uncertain times simply proves to be more detrimental than an approach where full transparency and efficient dissemination of available information is endorsed at the risk of revealing some inconsistencies or displaying dubiety in the process.

It is hoped that this can serve as a support for reflection around the understatement of international agreements we may take for granted such as the one 2009 Convention on Access to Official Information and the realisation that in our case, having ratified such a document could be a real game-changer in the second phase of our pandemic and rehabilitate good governance where it has been shattered.

About the author :

Nora Wolf, of the Kingston and of University of Geneva is an International Politics & Economics specialist. Her expertise includes Human Rights, Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law in an inter-disciplinary fashion for the EU and the UN-related think-tanks and FORAs. Currently is attached with the IFIMES Permanent Mission to the UN Geneva as the second alternate.