Lebanon: Protracted Syrian refugees crisis and domestic stability

By Dr Elie Abouaoun / Co-author: Molly Gallagher

Strategy International (23.05.2024) – More than a decade after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the humanitarian toll of the war paints a bleak picture – for refugees and for the communities hosting them. Regardless of the metric used to determine the number of refugees in Lebanon[1], the country consistently ranks among the top five countries globally in terms of the greatest per capita refugee population[2].

Given the protracted nature of displacement and the lack of viable solutions, it is critical for Lebanon and its international partners to adopt effective durable solutions that uphold international law principles while also preserving domestic stability in Lebanon and the rights of Lebanese citizens.

Other than the estimated 135,000 migrant workers[3], the government estimates that nearly 1.5 million Syrian refugees[4] currently reside in Lebanon, alongside another 200,000 Palestinian refugees[5] and about 12,000 refugees of other origins. With a total population of around 5 million[6], Lebanon grapples with multi-faceted, compounding domestic crises. These stem from a demographic imbalance, total economic collapse (since October 2019), social unrest, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the aftermath of the Beirut port blast (August 2020). In this context, vulnerable Lebanese families struggling to make ends meet are most impacted by the government’s diversion of resources from basic services such as electricity, healthcare, and education.

The presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has significantly intensified intercommunal tensions, with an uptick in restrictive measures and anti-refugee rhetoric. Competition over access to services and goods has exacerbated tensions both between Lebanese and Syrians as well as among Lebanon’s constituencies. Nationwide, there is a heightened perception of insecurity and lack of safety reaching unprecedented levels. The ongoing violence in the South since October 2023 and the arrival of internally displaced families from this region have further strained resources, exacerbating the competition over housing, jobs, and aid. With pressure mounting on the Lebanese government from its overburdened citizens, and from the international community urging the country to adhere to international principles for refugee protection and to curb illegal migration, a new approach to the Syrian refugee crisis is needed.

The 1951 Refugee Convention[7] defines a refugee as “any person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”[8].

Although Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, it is bound to several other international instruments including the two International Covenants[9] as well as the Convention Against Torture, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their protocols, and several others, just to name a few. In this light, Lebanon is required to protect the human dignity and security of refugees by upholding the principle of non-refoulment, which, under international law, guarantees no one should be returned to a country where they may face torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading punishment, and other irreparable harm.

The international definition of a refugee pertains to individuals who have a legitimate fear of returning to their country and should not be applied broadly to an entire population. A generic assessment deeming an entire country unsafe does not justify a prolonged “prima facie” approach towards every Syrian in Lebanon. Refugee status cannot be given purely based on individuals’ claims or fears; it must be decided by authorities in destination countries following the established international legal system and procedures. These guidelines should be implemented for the caseload of Syrian refugees in Lebanon as well.

The core problem is that every Syrian in Lebanon is regarded as a “refugee” by action (UN agencies) and by omission (Lebanese authorities). 

Lebanon’s successive governments have not effectively and objectively dealt with the issue of Syrian refugees, causing serious challenges beyond the sheer numbers of refugees and strain on host communities. The challenges include a significant number of unregistered children born to Syrian parents, exploitation of Syrians by their employers, rising rates of illegal migration, and cases of fraudulent use of aid provided by international organizations.

Typically, refugee crises are resolved through the adoption of one of three durable solutions: repatriation to the country of origin once conditions have improved, resettlement in a third country, or integration into the host community. Due to a lack of international support, both repatriation and resettlement are nearly impossible. The integration of a refugee caseload that accounts for around thirty percent of the population in Lebanon constitutes an existential challenge for the country.

As the military confrontation in Syria winded down, more countries consider that the situation in Syria should be re-evaluated to allow for the voluntary return of Syrian refugees back to their homeland.[10] In July 2023, the European Parliament resolution on the situation in Lebanon (2023/2742) clearly stipulated that “conditions are not met for the voluntary, dignified return of refugees in conflict-prone areas in Syria”, thus laying the ground for a distinction between “conflict-prone” areas and other parts of Syria.

Countries like Denmark have updated their classification[11], allowing return for Syrians from now-designated “safe zones.”. Over the past decade, Lebanese authorities have consistently ignored calls to re-determine the status of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, failing to identify who is entitled to remain and who qualifies for return.

To distinguish between Syrian refugees and non-refugees, Lebanese authorities should form a joint committee comprised of officials from the Army Command and the General Directorate of Public Security. This committee will monitor conditions in Syria, keeping track of regions that have improved. Based on these public reports, the status of each Syrian refugee in Lebanon will be reviewed.

Refugees originally from areas now deemed safe must apply for temporary residency in accordance with Lebanon’s legislative procedures for migrants or return to Syria. Because Lebanon is committed to the concept of non-refoulement, Syrians who have legitimate safety concerns will have access to a quasi-judicial appeal committee, where cases will be examined individually, taking into account particular circumstances rather than a blanket assessment of Syria. If the applicant’s fear of harm is justified and confirmed, he or she will be granted complete legal protection in accordance with international norms.

While the possibility of returning Syrian refugees from areas of Syria that are not currently experiencing conflict ought to be given serious consideration, there are a number of obstacles that need to be overcome. Following Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement with the Assad regime, the foreign ministers of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt convened in Amman, Jordan, on May 1, 2023. The final communique, endorsed by all ministers, including Syria’s, emphasizes the need for the Syrian government to prioritize the voluntary and safe return of refugees and to take necessary steps to start implementing their return immediately. It also stipulates that the Syrian government and host countries will enhance their cooperation to organize voluntary and safe returns, clarifying measures to facilitate this process, including the inclusion of refugees in general amnesty decrees. The communique, as it is, uncovered the fact that the Assad regime continues to be a significant barrier to the repatriation of refugees. In the absence of an easing of sanctions and an influx of funds for reconstruction, Assad is unwilling to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees. His whimsical desire for diplomatic rehabilitation and financial support underlines his negative stance on the refugee issue.

Returning Syrian refugees who have lost personal or real estate paperwork as a result of looting or damage may find it difficult to prove their identity or property ownership, which will have a number of negative implications. They may be unable to return their homes or land, causing housing, land, and property (HLP) disputes. The lack of identification will also limit access to essential services, legal protection, and work prospects, aggravating their vulnerability and making reintegration into their communities extremely difficult. This situation highlights the need for comprehensive support mechanisms to assist refugees in reestablishing their legal identities and property rights upon return, which necessitates full cooperation from the Syrian bureaucracy—an effort that currently lacks political support in Damascus.

The decade-long Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon has strained the country’s resources and exacerbated social and economic hardships. Although Lebanon is bound by international law to protect refugees and uphold non-refoulement, the limited options to address the presence of the large Syrian population in Lebanon and the associated intercommunal tensions emphasizes the necessity for a novel approach.

By addressing the legal status of Syrians in Lebanon and distinguishing between refugees and migrants (non-refugees), Lebanon can ensure more efficient resource allocation, strengthen social cohesion, and provide the necessary legal protection that genuine refugees are entitled to.

(*) Molly Gallagher is a Program Developer for the MENA Region. Previously, Molly was a MENA Program Specialist at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) based in Tunis, Tunisia. She graduated from the American University’s School of International Service in Washington DC, with a degree in International Relations and a minor in Arabic Language.

Footnotes

  1. Dyvik, Einar H, “Refugees – Major Hosting Countries Worldwide as of 2023” Statista. December 11, 2023, https://www.statista.com/statistics/263423/major-refugee-hosting-countries-worldwide/ ↑
  2. Diab, Jasmine Lilian, “Selective and Strategic Indifference: Lebanon’s Migration and Refugee Landscapes” Mixed Migration Centre. 25 January 2024 https://mixedmigration.org/lebanon-migration-and-refugee-landscapes/#:~:text=Lebanon%20hosts%20the%20highest%20per,12%2C000%20people%20from%20other%20countries. ↑
  3. “Migrant Workers are Abused and Ignored Under the Kafala System” ReliefWeb, May 3, 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/migrant-workers-are-abused-and-ignored-under-kafala-system-enar ↑
  4. “UNHCR Lebanon At a Glance” https://www.unhcr.org/lb/at-a-glance ↑
  5. As of March 2023, the total number of registered Palestine Refugees with UNRWA in Lebanon is 489,292 persons. However, the 2017 census by the Lebanese government estimated the total number of Palestinians still residing in Lebanon at slightly less than 200,000 persons https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Downloads/book2473.pdf
  6. “Lebanon Country Summary” CIA World Factbook 15 May 2024 https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/lebanon/summaries ↑
  7. “The 1951 Refugee Convention” UNHCR Global Website https://www.unhcr.org/about-unhcr/who-we-are/1951-refugee-conventio ↑↑
  8. International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). https://www.ohchr.org/en/what-are-human-rights/international-bill-human-rights#:~:text=In%20December%201966%2C%20the%20UN,and%20Political%20Rights%20(ICCPR). ↑
  9. Hadjicostis, M 8 EU Members Say Conditions in Syria Should Be Reassessed To Allow Voluntary Refugee Returns. The Washington Post https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/05/17/migrants-refugees-syria-eu-lebanon-safe-zones-returns/1a527914-1429-11ef-9d37-865890cc2670_story.html ↑
  10. “Board: Two More Regions of Syria are Safe to Return To”Berlingske https://www.berlingske.dk/politik/styrelse-yderligere-to-regioner-i-syrien-er-sikre-at-vende-tilbage-til

“All of us know more than one of us!”

The Hague and the NATO Summit 2025…

By Eelco H. Dykstra.

After a few years of mission-critical assignments elsewhere, Eelco H. Dykstra resumes his acclaimed column “A Thought and a Smile…” in Diplomat Magazine

All of us know more than one of us!is the slogan/tagline of one of the international programs I’m involved in, called “20/20 Vision”. It was selected as slogan because the  program is not about listening to information from a single source – never a good idea – , but about harvesting the collective wisdom of “the crowd”. As such, the program seeks to combine the lessons learned from ‘western’ science with those from more informal, ‘tribal’ experiences and lessons learned, also known as “indigenous knowledge”.  

I was reminded of the All of us know more than one of us!slogan when a student recently contacted me for an interview on ‘branding’ and communication in relation to  the NATO Summit that will take place in The Hague from June 24-27, 2025. 

Since the interview seemed a perfect follow-up to my previous column in Diplomat Magazine [“Branding cities, branding nations…”], I agreed to be interviewed and a meeting was arranged.

During the meeting, I learned that my interviewer belonged to a team of 25 students from The Hague University of Applied Sciences who are working with the City of The Hague on a project aimed at taking stock and studying what the challenges are of hosting the NATO Summit in 2025  – albeit from a ‘city-branding’ and communication point-of-view.

I was presented with twelve questions that were long and wordy, with a lot of overlap within and between questions. For the purpose of writing this column I looked into reducing the twelve questions into a single ‘meta’-question. See below what I came up with.

During the free-flowing discussion part of the interview, a number of challenges or concerns came up. Naturally they included the Summit’s security concerns and its cost (estimated to be €95 million!), but we also touched on other, deeper and rather poignant questions such as the relation between the United Nations and NATO, the potential friction between ‘militarism’ and ‘climate change’, and the increasing distance we see between ‘policy’ and ‘practice’. 

Alright then, you might ask, what does this has to do with me as a member of the Diplomatic Corps or as an international professional? Well, there is a lot of knowledge, experience and wisdom to be found within the readership of Diplomatic Magazine.

All of us know more than one of us!-remember?

 So here is what we, “all of us”,  can do:

  1. Answer this ‘meta’-question:

What do you see as the most important challenges when it comes to aligning the NATO Summit with The Hague as the city of Peace and Justice – and how do you recommend overcoming them?

  • By doing so, we can contribute to identifying challenges and developing intervention strategies that may help to minimize trouble and avoid  potential conflict.

We have one year until the NATO Summit in The Hague, so let’s get to work!  After all, as another saying goes: ‘The time to repair your roof is when the sun is shining’…

When you would like get involved in this survey project that looks into aligning the NATO Summit with The Hague as City of Peace and Justice, then do not hesitate to send a message expressing your interest to: 


About the author:

Eelco H. Dykstra. Photography by Tom Manning

Once dubbed a ‘Global Nomad’ in East Africa, Eelco H. Dykstra is a seasoned international crisis and emergency expert. As a true ‘Prac-Ademic’, he blends – also in his column “A Thought and a Smile” – his innate optimism with knowledge from his practical experience and rigorous fact-finding. 

Aside from being founder/chair of the Daily Impact Emergency Management (DIEM) network and a visiting professor in South Africa, he initiated the ’20/20 Vision’ program for the dual purpose of strengthening value-based resilience and overcoming the obstacles that stand in the way of implementing lessons (to  be) learned. Eelco has been a correspondent, written multiple books and articles and continues to work extensively with media, government, business, NGO’s and community-based initiatives. In short, Eelco is a transdisciplinary and trans-cultural multi-tasker – just like diplomats are.

Among his hobbies are cooking and playing the cello – see picture, taken by Tom Manning, during an impromptu performance with the Soweto Youth Orchestra.

Eelco H. Dykstra Professor (visiting), Adaptation and Resilience, University of South-Africa, UNISA. Chair, ’20/20 Vision’ Program: How do we go from ‘Risk’ to ‘Resilience”? Founder, Daily Impact Emergency Management (DIEM) Network 
www.diem.nu  www.20outof20.vision

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The women in our lives

By Alexandra Paucescu

Ever since I started this ‘Interview series’ I was constantly captivated by all the life stories that I discoved behind the ‘diplomatic spouse’ generic title that we bare.

Manuela Caramujo is my latest ‘discovery’ and she is certainly a woman that we all have a lot to learn from.

Born in a small village in Portugal, she says she has moved all her life. First for high school and college, later for her career and ultimately, for love. She is an International Relations graduate and also has a Master’s in International Politics. She worked for 5 years at the European Parliament in Brussels and had several other jobs along her life.

‘I think the job I liked the most was as a journalist, although I also love organizing events, especially international conferences, that’s what I have been doing these last years. But I have done quite a few different things in my life.’

After she met her husband in college, they got married and started moving abroad, as he is a Portuguese diplomat. For a few years at a time, they called Kinshasa, Mexico City, Buenos Aires and then Brussels ‘HOME’ and are now preparing for another adventure, to Hamburg in Germany.

‘I always tried to make the most out of all the countries we lived in. Even though Kinshasa was a difficult city (the country was in the middle of an armed conflict, food shortages were common, and the health care services were poor), we met wonderful people that we will always cherish.  I think the fact of being, for the first time in my adult life, without a job and the feeling of dependence (financial and emotional) were quite difficult to accept at the beginning. Fortunately our first baby arrived and I started having other concerns. However, it was a time when I matured a lot as a person, I learned a lot about myself and I became aware of what life was giving me.

Mexico City was great! I worked pro-bono as Cultural and Press attaché at the Embassy, until my daughter was born. I was very proud of showing Portuguese culture to Mexican people. Everywhere I go I am always proud of being Portuguese, of our culture, the way we opened to other cultures and brought them to Europe.

Returning to Lisbon in 2006 was quite difficult. Our friends had changed, the country, the city had changed and, most importantly, I was a different person from the one who had left 6 years ago. Trying to fit in a place that was supposed to be my home was complicated. It was during that time that I joined the Portuguese Diplomatic Families Association, and eventually served as their president (2009-2010 and from 2022 on). I will always be grateful to the colleagues I met there, from different generations, and sometimes with different mother tongues.

In 2010 we moved to Buenos Aires and yes, we learned how to dance the Tango! How I enjoyed our Friday night classes! We loved Argentina! In fact, I think we love Latin America, because of the warmth of the people, the food, the natural beauties of the countries and also ancient history. From Argentina we moved to Brussels, a quite well-known city to me, so I felt quickly at home. Even my kids would say that, from all the cities they have lived in, Brussels is the one where they see themselves living again one day. But, from all the places I have lived so far, HOME is truely the small village where I was born and where I have my roots.

When in Buenos Aires, I enrolled in a Gastronomic School and I created a small events company, organizing kids’ parties and catering for cocktails and small corporate events. But what I enjoyed the most was giving cooking classes. I had three groups of “students”: the “mini-chefs”, the “ado-chefs” and the “cuisine pour épater”, mostly for expats. I always ended up giving classes in at least four different languages. These classes were culturally very rich and, in a world such as the diplomatic world, where loneliness and mental health can be a problem, people were excited to come to my house, to meet and talk and make new friends (not always so anxious to cook, though).

Manuela and family

Everywhere I lived, I always tried to do some ‘social work’, I always enrolled in the diplomatic associations, parents associations, etc. Bringing people together is one of my passions and something that I know I do well, despite of the educational or cultural differences. People do not like to talk about it but there is a lot of depression and mental health issues among diplomatic spouses. Putting people of different origins together and working for a common goal, raising funds for local NGOs , may seem superficial to some, but it is very important not only for the associations, but also for us, as we feel useful and valued.’

Manuela mentions that she believes that there is no other career that has such an impact in a spouse´s life and professional career. ‘Our constant changes make it almost impossible to maintain a stable professional career. And when we return to the country of origin we are so far behind that we can hardly find a job, although we all have very highly-educated profiles and life experiences that could enrich and benefit any company. That’s why so many spouses, nowadays, choose not to accompany their partners abroad, splitting the families, sometimes with dramatic consequences. On the other hand, we do a lot of work representing our countries, side by side with the diplomats whom we share our lives with, but almost nobody recognizes it, especially our countries authorities. A friend of mine uses this expression: ‘the Ministry gets 2 for the price of 1.’ I am grateful for my husband that always made me feel part of his role of representation of Portugal. He always acknowledged all the work I have done to support him and his diplomatic work.’

Manuela continues: ‘I think there’s a lot of depression among diplomatic spouses. People leave their job, lose their financial independence, leave their loved ones, their sometimes large families behind, and rely in only one person. It can be overwhelming. It requires a great amount of maturity, self-confidence, love and understanding from both partners to overcome these situations. Meanwhile, when it comes to our children, we all tend to see only the best part, that our kids are multilingual, open-minded to different cultures and people, but such changes, moving often, especially when there are very young, can be very stressful. Families must be aware of these situations; children need all the support possible.’

Divorce is also uniquely challenging for diplomatic spouses and often, a taboo. ‘If things go wrong and a divorce occurs, spouses are completely dependent on the diplomat’s good-will. And we all know very well that in a divorce, good-will, unfortunately, not always prevails. In the majority of countries, a diplomatic spouse doesn’t have a bank account, a house, a car, in hers/his name. If the divorce occurs while abroad, the situation is even more complicated as the Foreign Ministry does not repatriate spouses or their belongings. When minor children are involved and the spouse has a different nationality, I have seen situations where the parent who has to leave is prevented from seeing the children. Unfortunately people do not talk about it, nor about domestic violence for which, when it occurs on foreign postings, police cannot intervene, and situations can become dramatic.’

She is a strong minded woman who is determined to militate for the well-being and support of other fellow spouses, to know their stories and to improve their status according to 21st century needs and realities.

‘In EUFASA, the European Union Foreign Affairs Spouses/Families Association, we have worked a lot about these subjects. Our Research Department (ERD) recently published a study called “Dependency and divorce/separation in the Foreign Service: experiences, consequences, and recommendations”. This study highlights how partners’ and spouses’ limited work opportunities and legal status and the resulting dependence on the diplomat make it difficult to afford legal counsel, get a fair settlement, find help in cases of abuse, gain custody of minor children when abroad, and to support themselves after divorce/separation.’

‘At my first EUFASA annual conference in Madrid, in 2009, we also presented a study about the challenges of coming back home, with a practical guide for spouses and kids to prepare the return to the home country. In Lisbon, me and my colleague Veronika Arsénio (who is still today my Eufasa partner) transformed that study into a booklet that we called “Partir para regressar” (Go away to come back), with practical information and tips to our Portuguese families. I am very proud of that work. In 2018, the Conference took place in Tallinn. That year, “work and employment” of spouses was the big topic of discussion, but “mental health” issues were also gaining visibility. For the last 3 years, as Portugal’s representative, I have been co-chairing the working group “Children”. We produced a booklet about “Tips for the international transfer process for Foreign Service families with children with disabilities and different needs”, prepared a study about “diplomatic children mental health” and gave voice to our kids by presenting testimonials about “multilingualism/identity”. Already in 2020, Eufasa had produced a “Third Cultural Kids – Handbook” with tips for our nomadic families.’

Manuela is a woman of action. She makes things happen and is eagerly learning new things each day. She loves reading and travelling but her great passions are people and cultural diversity. She tells me she loves meeting new people and learning something from everyone. Each woman she meets throughout her diplomatic journey has a unique story to tell.

‘One of my future projects is to write a book: ‘The women of my life’, as I had the chance to meet so many fascinating women along the way… and I am still in the first part of my journey.’

Indeed, the adventure is just at the beginning. Cheers to new exciting times and captivating stories of the women around us!


About the author:

Alexandra Paucescu

Alexandra Paucescu- Author of “Just a Diplomatic Spouse” Romanian, management graduate with a Master in business, cultural diplomacy and international relations studies.

She speaks Romanian, English, French, German and Italian,  gives lectures on intercultural communication and is an active NGO volunteer.

China-Taiwan: War Drums for China and Taiwan – Their Disagreements are Huge

By Eleni Vasiliki Bampaliouta

The situation between China and Taiwan remains explosive. Last January, the advocate of Taiwanese independence, Lai Ching-te, won the presidential election. He celebrated his victory by making clear points against Beijing, which he presented as “authoritarian” and accused of “attempting to influence the election result”. On May 20, he officially assumed his duties. The Chinese embassy in Athens, in a press release issued to the media, criticized his political stance on “Taiwan Independence” and his party representing the separatist forces. The embassy emphasized that the inauguration of Lai Ching-te would have a negative impact on the “One China” Policy and the stability of the Taiwan Strait. The embassy’s announcement stated the following:

“China and Greece respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We understand and support each other on issues of our core interests and major concerns, which are the foundation for the continued development of bilateral relations. The Greek government recognizes the government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China, recognizes that Taiwan is part of China, and adheres to the one-China principle. China recognizes Greece’s constructive role in maintaining stability, security, and prosperity in Southeast Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Balkans. Such statements have been recorded repeatedly in bilateral documents. Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory. Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times. This statement has a sound basis in history and jurisprudence. The return of Taiwan to China is an important part of the international order established after World War II, which has a firm basis in international law. Many important documents, including the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration, clearly affirm that Taiwan’s sovereignty belongs to China.

At its 26th session in October 1971, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758. This resolution clarified that China has a single seat in the UN, so there is no such thing as “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan”, which once again reiterated the principle of one China.

The one-China principle represents the universal consensus of the international community and is consistent with the basic rules of international relations. At present, 183 countries, including Greece, have established diplomatic relations with the PRC based on the one-China principle. The actual status quo of the Taiwan issue is that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to the same China and Taiwan has never been an independent country.

Although the two sides have not yet been reunited, China’s sovereignty and territory have never been cut off, and the fact that the mainland and Taiwan belong to the same China has never changed. The Chinese government’s position of supporting the one-China principle and opposing the separatism of “Taiwan independence”, “two Chinas”, and “one China, one Taiwan” will not change. The prevailing consensus of the international community to uphold the one-China principle and the long-standing adherence to this principle will not change.

Recently, some have claimed that “the use of force to change the status quo in the Taiwan Straits is unacceptable.” This claim confuses cause and effect. The root cause of the tensions in the Taiwan Straits lies in the separatist position of the Taiwan DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) authorities and the joint challenge by the authorities of the DPP and some countries.

The DPP authorities refuse to recognize the one-China principle, constantly push for “defibrillation” and promote “incremental independence”. They are deceiving the Taiwanese people, inciting hostility against the mainland, and hindering and undermining cross-strait exchanges, cooperation, and comprehensive development. They are joining with outside forces in trying to sow the seeds of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan”. The elections of the regional leader and legislature of the Taiwan region held in January this year showed that the DPP does not represent the mainstream public opinion (the DPP won about 40% of the votes). The so-called “the use of force to change the status quo in the Taiwan Straits is unacceptable” is actually a reward for “Taiwan independence” under the guise of “anti-war” and angers “peaceful separatism” under the guise of peace”.

If one really wants to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, then one should firmly support the one-China principle and oppose “Taiwan independence”. US authorities have said they remain committed to the one-China principle and do not support “Taiwan independence”. Since the adoption of the resolution, the one-China principle has been upheld by the UN and its specialized agencies on the Taiwan issue. Taiwan is referred to as “Taiwan, Province of China” in all official UN documents. It was clearly stated in the official legal opinions of the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat that “the United Nations regards ‘Taiwan’ as a province of China without separate status” and the “authorities” in “Taipei” are not considered to enjoy any form of governmental capacity.

The participation of the Taiwan region in the activities of international organizations must and can only be handled according to the one-China principle. The United Nations is an intergovernmental international organization composed of sovereign states. Taiwan, a province of China, has no basis, reason, or right to join the UN or its relevant agencies. This is set out in the UN Charter and is the principle that all UN member states must follow and an obligation that they must fulfill.

As an important country and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the US is supposed to take the lead in upholding UN General Assembly resolutions and upholding international law and basic rules in international relations, but it is doing just the opposite. The US deliberately distorted UNGA Resolution 2758 and propagated the narrative of so-called “Taiwan’s substantive participation in the UN system”.

Strategic Intelligence and Intelligence Diplomacy in the Sphere of Foreign Policy

The drafting of this article included bibliographical research and also an exclusive interview with Walter Bruyère-Ostells, Director of the Master in Geostrategy, Defense and International Relations and co-Director of the Specialized Master in Intelligence at the Institute of Political Studies / Sciences Po Aix (France) / French Air and Space Force Academy (Specialised Master in Intelligence).

By Jorge Marinho, Júlio Ventura and Lourenço Ribeiro

International Relations scholars’ interest in intelligence-related issues should grow, together with the increasing presence of these subject matters in the public stage (Díaz May 2005, p. 2). For instance, in 2008, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service sought to improve relations between academic work and the intelligence sphere, via the Academic Outreach program (Kuosa 2014, p. 67). For this purpose, conferences, workshops and interviews were held, among other initiatives (Kuosa 2014, p. 68). For academics, researching the field of intelligence is difficult, owing to the secretive nature of intelligence activities. At times, it becomes necessary to wait until a few original documents are declassified (Wasielewski June 20, 2023). Many universities feel there is no point studying intelligence (Wasielewski June 20, 2023). However, there are even those who call for disclosing intelligence research to the general public, knowing that this is a challenge (Wai December 8, 2020).

From Walter Bruyère-Ostells’ standpoint, difficulties researchers face within the academic context, when they delve into intelligence services, are, to a large extent, due to a lack of knowledge and mutual prejudices in relation to each other’s backgrounds. Said expert adds that the sphere of intelligence in France is viewed in a manner that is too restricted and derogatory while often being associated with spies and spooks. Walter Bruyère-Ostells maintains that forums should be developed in order to make known what the world of intelligence actually consists of.

The way Walter Bruyère-Ostells sees it, a mutually beneficial cooperation can be established between intelligence-related university study programs and intelligence services. This scholar points out that, in France, at Sciences Po Aix, an Intelligence Chair is being developed which relies on recognition and backing from the National Coordination of Intelligence and Counter-terrorist Efforts and from the Intelligence Academy. Bruyère-Ostells adds that speakers working in intelligence services take part in courses and events of said Chair and that students can undergo internships and do works on topics that intelligence services take interest in.

According to Wasielewski (June 20, 2023), intelligence consists of knowledge and analysis designed for assisting action. Actually, intelligence is crucial for backing foreign policy. This occurs in several countries, such as the U.S. (National Intelligence Strategy 2023, p. 2), Switzerland (Federal Act of 25 September 2015 on the Intelligence Service (Intelligence Service Act, IntelSA)) and Israel (Golub July 3, 2021). Regarding the United Kingdom, William Hague (November 16, 2011), then serving as Foreign Secretary, stated that intelligence is present in many of the more relevant priorities of foreign policy. From the standpoint of Hague (November 16, 2011), intelligence needs to be regarded in light of the Government’s set of strategies and goals.

A country’s interests concerning foreign policy need to be taken into account when planning intelligence activities abroad (Special Report on the National Security and Intelligence Activities of Global Affairs Canada 2022, p. 19). It is vital for foreign policy to entail coherence (Special Report on the National Security and Intelligence Activities of Global Affairs Canada 2022, p. 19). Current Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Burns (January 30, 2023) understands that intelligence serves to predict in-depth changes on the international scene and, in this context, to lend support to policymakers. The latter have to realize that intelligence is an art, not a science that guarantees results (Wasielewski June 20, 2023). Intelligence consumers need to know the capabilities and limitations of intelligence services (Wasielewski June 20, 2023).

 

Strategic intelligence

According to Pareja (April 11, 2022), the process of data collection and analysis aimed at formulating information-based decisions and policies is known as strategic intelligence. This does not seek to solve present-day problems; rather, with a long-term perspective, it is intended to back national strategy (Díaz 2014, p. 34). Strategic intelligence, through its assessments, should contribute towards policymakers understanding a certain context, taking advantage of opportunities and managing risks (Simon-Tov, Hershkovitz June 2017, p. 87). 

Monitoring the international situation goes by way of strategic intelligence (Defense Primer: National and Defense Intelligence November 29, 2022). This enables leaders to grasp the geopolitical factors influencing international relations (Mandel, Barnes July 14, 2014). Strategic intelligence is essential for forming a Government’s foreign policy (Pareja April 11, 2022) and for upholding national interests (Silva, Ribeiro November 2018, p. 177). For policymakers of countries such as the United States, the Intelligence Community’s (IC) provision of strategic intelligence constitutes an advantage vis-à-vis rival powers (Katz April 17, 2020). Policymakers should be willing and able to think strategically (Hutchings, Treverton October 2018, p. 14).  

To intervene in the international sphere, experts’ in-depth knowledge becomes necessary, and this is what strategic intelligence provides (Heidenrich 2007). This sort of intelligence, somehow seeking to uncover the future, combines social, cultural, technological, economic, political, military and diplomatic domains (Alonso-Trabanco May 19, 2020). Strategic intelligence allows using data sources to understand the big picture (Neuman, et alii May 2006, p. 473). In William Hague’s view (November 16, 2011), cooperation between intelligence services is essential, given that intelligence is like a puzzle in relation to which, in most cases, an intelligence service per se does not comprise all the pieces needed to complete it.


Intelligence diplomacy


Currently, intelligence services directors actively participate in the processes that determine foreign policy (Daricili January 7, 2022), among other aspects. In this regard, a variety of examples can be given. Recently, on the part of the U.S., the CIA Director met with the Director of Mossad, one of the Israeli intelligence services, and with the Prime Minister of Qatar, to address the possibility of an agreement between Israel and Hamas, a Palestinian organization, leading to an exchange of hostages and prisoners (Barnes December 18, 2023). When Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s current Foreign Minister, headed the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT), he was already regarded as highly influential in his country’s foreign policy (Yildiz June 4, 2023). As MIT leader, Fidan was considered to be someone who, having a vast network of international contacts, was noteworthy in steering Turkey through the complex arena of global politics (Yildiz June 4, 2023).

Walter Bruyère-Ostells feels that when intelligence service department heads are interested in research, even conducting it, they acquire a stringency and analysis capability that can be useful if they end up becoming rulers one day.

History records various instances of Governments that declassified and made use of data from intelligence services in order to influence or back policy decisions (Marleku November 1, 2023). However, particular attention needs to be paid to the role of intelligence in both the U.K. and the U.S., before and during the current Russia-Ukraine war, which broke out on February 24, 2022, disclosing information aimed at preventing the conflict and pressuring allied countries, especially France and Germany, into making decisions against Russia (Marleku November 1, 2023). All this constitutes a new milestone in the diplomatic and political use of intelligence in international affairs, while asserting itself as a foreign policy instrument (Marleku November 1, 2023). In this respect, Holmgren (October 8, 2023) speaks of intelligence diplomacy. This expert considers that, in the U.S., for a long time now, intelligence has comprised a strong suit for diplomats, when influence and persuasion are essential for achieving political outcomes (Holmgren October 8, 2023). 

Walter Bruyère-Ostells believes that, compared to conventional diplomacy, intelligence diplomacy’s advantage is that it’s invisible to public opinion. This enables discussions with a greater extent. Also regarding advantages, said scholar thinks that intelligence diplomacy presents realistic diplomatic options, given that, in principle, intelligence is less subject to an ideological discourse than conventional diplomacy. Bruyère-Ostells underscores that, in a democracy, final decisions should be made under the people’s sharp lookout.

Currently, in order to fulfill the State Department’s mission, the backing of intelligence is increasingly important (Holmgren October 8, 2023). According to William Burns (January 30, 2023), in certain cases, intelligence diplomacy can serve to elicit common interests as well as to discretely support U.S. diplomats and policymakers. Hague (November 16, 2011) states that the U.K.’s intelligence services have forged relations with government sectors of other countries, thus contributing toward supplementing and strengthening British diplomacy. 

When there is a high degree of trust in intelligence services, leaders tend to more readily consider intelligence diplomacy as a possibility for attaining their objectives (Taylor 2023, p. 6). This sort of diplomacy shows intelligence services’ multiple capabilities and should be carefully used, supplementing conventional diplomacy without replacing it altogether (Taylor 2023, pp. 8-9). 

Intelligence analysts and policymakers


For intelligence services, clearly knowing what they will be backing increases support efficacy (Fagersten October 2015, p. 11). Intelligence analysis differs from academic analysis, to the extent the former’s particular interest lies in underpinning the political process, whereas the latter chiefly aims to theorize (Ashraf March 8, 2015). Intelligence analysis is regarded as a critical phase of the intelligence process (Arslan 2021, p.1).

To a certain extent, Haas (2002) regards as positive the IC’s tradition of maintaining that its analyses need to remain separate from policymaking, so as to avoid their politicization. However, this expert believes that analysts need to be aware of what is of interest to policymakers; otherwise, their work risks being irrelevant (Haas 2002). Given that intelligence analysis serves to provide information needed by political decision-makers to arrive at their decisions, it is wise to engage in a mutually beneficial dialogue between rulers and the IC (Lieberthal September 15, 2009). Due to its closeness, this relationship could undesirably result in some tension between intelligence professionals and policymakers (Huminski 2023, p. 18). From Eisenfeld’s standpoint (2017, p. 96), intelligence will never be completely separate from politics or altogether immune to the effects of politicization.

The integrity of IC professionals is vital for the decision-making not to be defiled (Memorandum on Revitalizing America’s Foreign Policy and National Security Workforce, Institutions, and Partnerships February 4, 2021). In this context, the analyst’s professional ethics are highly important (Wald 2006, p. 259).


Wald (2006, p. 271) considers that intelligence services should provide some sort of training to analysts as concerns their relationship with policymakers. According to Lotta Lampela, then Intelligence Adviser to the Director of European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN), intelligence services should also show initiative in educating / training their customers (Kuosa 2014, p. 75). From Lampela’s standpoint, this enables creating understanding and trust among the parties concerned (Kuosa 2014, p. 75). In Wasielewski’s view (June 20, 2023), policymakers need to study intelligence, and this should not take place solely in on-the-job-training situations. 

Comunication


Communication constitutes the link between intelligence collection, analysts’ work and decision-making, which is why this is a key aspect of intelligence (Hammond-Errey February 9, 2023). Those wishing to communicate effectively in policymaking systems need to become aware of the policymakers’ environment (Cairney, Kwiatkowski November 28, 2017). Regarding challenges, in the field of communication, between intelligence services and policymakers, Lotta Lampela underscores the need for the message to be received in a timely manner, highlighting the importance of the present situation, and to be properly understood, to avoid instances where concepts comprise variable interpretations (Kuosa 2014, p. 76). Also concerning said field, Kaivo-oja maintains that planning communication channels needs to improve (Kuosa 2014, p. 76). As concerns the COVID-19 pandemic, regarding the U.S., several experts argue that, when dealing with matters of crucial importance for national security, efficient communication is critical between the IC and those holding the highest Government positions (Lankford, et alii December 3, 2020). The feedback that policymakers pass on to intelligence services is often insufficient (Mohr April 25, 2023). Analysts need detailed feedback in relation to what they produce (Mulligan, Schmitt September 18, 2020).

Institutional fragmentation, as can occur in the case of the European Union (EU), hampers communication between analysts and diplomats (Ikani, Meyer November 11, 2022). Concerning the EU system, there are multiple origins, perspectives, formats and conclusions of intelligence, without comprising a single entity to bring them together, provide comparative analysis and forward such intelligence to senior leadership (Ikani, Meyer November 11, 2022). Under such circumstances, there can be too much information and senior officials can end up being confused (Ikani, Meyer November 11, 2022).

 

Conclusion

Research in the field of intelligence services constitutes a challenge, for starters given the difficulties related to the secretive nature of the various intelligence activities. It often becomes necessary to wait until certain documents are declassified. While many universities decide not to offer intelligence-related study programs, this topic is increasingly gaining a foothold in the public domain. However, the academic sphere contains examples of mutually beneficial cooperation between certain study programs and intelligence services.

Among several aspects, intelligence is highly important with regard to the backing given to policymakers, as part of foreign policy. With a global perspective and a long-term vision, strategic intelligence monitors the international situation, enabling politicians, in terms of the big picture, to gain an understanding of the multiple geopolitical factors influencing international relations. The complexity of intelligence is comparable to a puzzle relative to which the pieces needed to complete it might not be found with a single intelligence service and, hence, cooperation between intelligence services, domestically and internationally, take on particular relevance.

Currently, and in reality, intelligence services directors actively take part in the processes that determine foreign policy and, in certain cases, they even play a noteworthy role in international relations. This is part of what is known as intelligence diplomacy. This can be regarded as complementary to conventional diplomacy.
Intelligence analysis provides information that rulers need for making decisions, and so there has to be dialogue between the IC and political decision-makers. This relationship will be all the more positive with increasing mutual knowledge; this could result from training initiatives with intelligence services professionals, including analysts, and with rulers. Such rulers need to have a realistic idea of the intelligence services’ capabilities. 

While contacts between policymakers and the IC are a reality, a variety of experts consider that politicizing the operational department and analytical activities need to be avoided, maintaining their neutrality and professionalism, for the benefit of rulers’ decision-making quality. Within this context, the ethics of intelligence services professionals are important.

Regarding the domain of communication, intelligence services’ messages need to reach policymakers in a timely manner, via appropriate channels, and whose content has to be properly understood by the recipient. In this regard, policymakers’ feedback is vital.

This article was first published by Marinho Media Analysis, on May 9, 2024 – http://www.marinho-mediaanalysis.org/articles/strategic-intelligence-and-intelligence-diplomacy-in-the-sphere-of-foreign-policy

About the authors:

Jorge Marinho

Jorge Marinho: PhD in Communication Sciences, BA in International Journalism

Júlio Ventura

Júlio Ventura: MA in Political Science and International Relations, BA in Law, member of the European Parliament trainee (Brussels, Belgium)
 

Lourenço Ribeiro

Lourenço Ribeiro: BA in Sociology, MA student in Public Policy at Iscte – University Institute of Lisbon (Portugal)
 


 

E-mail: marinho.mediaanalysis@_nour

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Interview

*This interview was conducted, via email, on May 6, 2024

Photo by: Jorge Marinho


Published by Marinho Media Analysis / May 9, 2024

http://www.marinho-mediaanalysis.org/articles/strategic-intelligence-and-intelligence-diplomacy-in-the-sphere-of-foreign-policy

Making Peace and Justice Relevant in Everyday Life in The Hague

By Jan van Zanen, Mayor of The Hague

The Hague has been the city of peace and justice for 125 years. From the first International Peace Conference back in 1899 and the construction of the Peace Palace to the conglomerate of international organisations and courts today. Many of these are concentrated in the International Zone near Scheveningen.

This zone is part of the coastal strip where the occupiers in the Second World War demolished all the buildings to make way for the construction of the Atlantic Wall and a clear line of fire. The symbolism that it is here and in the rest of The Hague that thousands of people work on peaceful conflict resolution and international law every day will appeal to everyone.

Yet this world of diplomacy and justice is very remote from the world of a large proportion of the population in The Hague. It is therefore important that we make peace, law and justice relevant to our residents in their daily lives.

And it’s not just about international law. National civil and criminal law also fail to engage many people. Until they are involved as a suspect or witness. That can make a big impression. Court buildings are often imposing or even intimidating. That commands respect but also creates distance.

It is sometimes better to bring justice closer. Occasionally, ‘ordinary’ judges in our country go to the scene of a crime or dispute. In long-running TV programmes like De Rijdende Rechter, for example, in which Judge John Reid solves disputes and conflicts between neighbours, this has been happening for years. Each episode always ends with an official legal judgement with which both parties are bound to comply.

In The Hague, we do things slightly differently. Last year, we started alternative dispute resolution in Moerwijk. This type of local arbitration has now been adopted in other places in the Netherlands and beyond where people live in densely populated areas, creating many complex situations. For example, disputes between families and neighbours, antisocial behaviour on the street or people causing problems to themselves and others due to the challenges they face. It is not primarily about who’s right and who’s wrong. It’s about how we ensure that people sort out their lives and are able to live together.

This is the approach taken in Moerwijk, as well as at several secondary schools in The Hague. Students take on the roles involved in our legal system and tackle minor misdemeanours and disputes at school themselves. Not by imposing severe punishments but by solving problems. To ensure that everyone can coexist in the school environment.

In The Hague, city of peace and justice, there is more going on than just the world of the Peace Palace and International courts of justice. It’s also about experiencing law and justice in the neighbourhood and at school.

A Journey Through International Law: Retrospect and Reflections with Renan Villacis

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Renan Villacis, Director Secretariat of the Assembly States Parties at the International Criminal Court, reflects on  35 years of a dynamic and impactful career in public international law. In this exclusive interview with Diplomat Magazine, from his early days as a diplomat in Ecuador to his instrumental role in the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Villacis offers a deeply personal account of his professional journey, sharing important moments, and offering invaluable perspectives on the evolution and challenges of international law.

How did you get involved in public international law?

After concluding studying law for six years, in 1989 I was able to take part in a competitive process to enter Ecuador’s Diplomatic Academy as a third Secretary of the Foreign Service. That allowed me a chance to embark on a diplomatic career. I worked in different posts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Quito. Some of those entailed a large component of international law, including the Treaty Section and the Legal Office, as well as our Sovereignty Office.

Where has your career path taken you?

After a few years in Quito, I obtained a Fulbright and OSA scholarship to study at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Then I joined the UN Office of Legal Affairs in New York as a P-2 associate legal officer. Shortly after the ICC started to be set up I was recruited by the first Director of the Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties in The Hague, Mr. Medard Rwelamira, to help him with that undertaking. I came to The Hague in 2004 for one year, but ended up staying for almost two decades.

What have been highlights or key moments of your career?

The joyous moments which stand out are the conclusion of the Rome Diplomatic Conference in July 1998, when the Rome Statute was adopted. The feeling of elation of the entire conference room after years of negotiations has no equal in my memory. Í was the youngest member of the UN Codification Division team in Rome, working with the Drafting Committee chaired by Cherif Bassiouni, one of the most eminent international criminal law lawyers of his era. The multi-year endeavour had been an intensive learning process as the most distinguished jurists from all States had taken part in the negotiations which had the challenge of establishing a new institution that would be part of the international system ushered in by the end of the Cold War. Hopes were so high with what could be achieved, it seemed like the sky was the limit, as the contagious enthusiasm of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan spread throughout the UN Secretariat and the UN in general. One might even say it was a thrilling process.

The other highlight was the successful outcome of the 2010 Kampala Review Conference of the Rome Statute. The review conference had been agreed to as part of the 1998 Rome Statute outcome in order to conclude what had been unfinished in Rome. Overcoming enormous challenges and contrary to the expectations of many, the outcome of the Review Conference was historic: an agreement by consensus of the international community to amendments to the Rome Statute which included a legal definition of the crime of aggression as well as the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court over the crime of aggression; the amendments allowed the Court to proceed in the absence of a decision by the United Nations Security Council after a period of six months.

There is also the painful and jarring memory of September 11, as I lived near UNHQ and watched the Twin Towers burn and fall. Working on the negotiations regarding new counter-terrorism conventions had been part of my duties as a legal officer before then; the horrendous attack added urgency and renewed political commitment to that endeavour. The memories of that day are seared into my mind forever.

Renan Villacis. Photography by Armin Taslaman.

What have been your most challenging time/moments?

At the personal level, organizing the two week 2010 Review Conference in Kampala, as there were numerous legal, technical and administrative challenges. We had indispensable support from the UN in Nairobi, but it was still a massive undertaking with a very small team from the Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties based in The Hague.

Organizing Assembly sessions during the Covid pandemic in 2020 and 2021, including resumed sessions in New York for the election of six judges and of the Prosecutor was also quite difficult, given the need to try to balance operational needs, openness and health risks.

As part of the ICC, the 2017 Assembly of States Parties session where the activation of the jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime of aggression was negotiated and agreed to by consensus.

The Assembly of States Parties is mandated to consider a review of the crime of aggression amendments in 2025, a matter which once more will pose some very complex challenges given the possible legal and political implications that may give rise to.

The period of when a US administration took measures against the Court and its officials and staff also comes to mind as being extremely challenging.

AEP President, Ambassador Christian Wenaweser and Renan Villacis, during the Review Conference of the Rome Statute, held in Kampala, Uganda, from 31 May to 11 June 2010. Photografy by Ester Luteranova.

How do you see the state of international law today?

My professional career began at the time when the Cold War ended and therefore a great deal of enthusiasm and conviction that an entirely new world order had dawned was prevalent. International law played a key role in that process. I worked as part of the UN Legal Office team with the International Law Commission in Geneva for a few years, assisting in the development and codification of international law. There were important achievements and progress on new counter-terrorism conventions.

The International Court of Justice was the forum which States resorted to with increased frequency. Along with the establishment of the ICC there was thus an enormous elan to the hope of a more peaceful world where the resources could be redirected to development and improving the lives of all. Yet, fissures appeared or re-appeared, non-State actors and technological innovations posed new risks, conflicts erupted anew, the global institutions set up to maintain peace and security and to find peaceful means to settle disputes were placed under stress or simply unable to reach agreements. A point of inflexion in that ascending process which international law was in has been reached. It is perhaps one of the most challenging times for the rule of law in general and international law in particular. A sincere and concerted effort by the international community to revitalize the role of international law is essential.

What would you say to the new generation interested in working in international relations/law?

I would say that they are fortunate to be entering a career which can be quite fulfilling, that the complications of today will give way to solutions that allow the international community to continue its journey of progress. Despite the gloomy outlook one has when reading the news, they should not be discouraged. They can contribute to finding those solutions. That is valid  for anyone, even those who may come from a geographically small State, there are ways to contribute to making the world better, as a diplomat, international civil servant, academic, member of non-governmental organization, lawyer, journalist, etc.

Any advice for students interested in a career in public international law?

Besides your studies, learn languages that may be helpful in the field you seek to enter, do internships and acquire experience at the national or international level, be disciplined, tech savy, patient and remember that being able to work well as a member of a team is essential. If possible, get some experience living/working abroad, outside your comfort zone/bubble. You should enjoy the work, which is most rewarding from the perspective of being part of an undertaking of many.

Are you optimistic then about what lies ahead for international law?

Absolutely, there are successes and sometimes some regressions, but the progress attained in every decade we live through is undeniable. I can for example still vividly recall my first year of international law studies when we were impressed about the discussion on reform of the UN Security Council; over 40 years later, those discussions continue. But if one considers all the other advances in treaty-making, in creating new institutions, in improving the legal regimes which allow our globalized world to function and to improve peoples lives, we can indeed be optimistic. We owe it to future generations.

Network of luxury car thieves dismantled with support of Eurojust

A large-scale ring of luxury car thieves has been dismantled with the support of Eurojust and Europol. Using straw men and underprivileged people, the criminals hired or leased luxury vehicles, which they later registered in their own names through corrupt connections in official institutions.

The cars were resold outside the EU, including in the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates. In a series of recent coordinated actions in Spain, France, Germany, Latvia, Poland and Ukraine, 13 suspects were arrested for fraud, forgery and money laundering.

Through a coordination centre at Eurojust, over sixty places were also searched by national authorities. Several luxury vehicles, communication equipment and documents were seized, as well as over EUR 100 000 in cash.

The Spanish authorities launched their investigation in 2022 following reports of luxury cars going missing from legitimately operating car rental and lease companies in and around Malaga. These investigations revealed that dozens of vehicles were ultimately stolen across Europe by a network of linked criminals. They exploited around fifty vulnerable and underprivileged people by using their documents, such as driving licences and passports, to hire or lease luxury cars.

Through corrupt contacts in official institutions, they managed to register the hired vehicles on to their personal documents, so they could sell them in the European Union and beyond, including Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates. Some of the stolen vehicles were transported in containers to conceal the cars.

Investigations were later also started in France, Poland and Ukraine, which revealed links between different criminal groups using the same modus operandi. In March of this year, with the support and funding of Eurojust, authorities in France, Spain and Ukraine set up a joint investigation team into the car thefts. Eurojust also organised two preparatory coordination meetings to prepare for the recent action day week and set up the coordination centre.

Europol assisted the operations against the criminal network by producing criminal intelligence packages. It also provided an operational coordination centre to support the actions at police level.

Operations on the ground were carried out at the request of and by the following authorities:

  • Spain: Investigative Court no. 1, Málaga; Public Prosecutor’s Office, Málaga; Spanish National Police
  • France: Judiciary Tribunal, Grasse; National Gendarmerie, Central Office against Roving Crime (OCDLI)
  • Germany: Public Prosecutor’s Offices Essen and Osnabrück; Police Departments of Essen and Osnabrück
  • Latvia: 3rd Unit International Cooperation Department State Police
  • Poland: Public Prosecutor’s Office, Warsaw
  • Ukraine: Prosecutor General’s Office; Main Investigation Department and Department of Strategic Investigations of National Police

Discover Brazilian Cinema: “Pureza” Premieres in the Netherlands at the 2nd Latin American FilmFest

The Embassy of Brazil in The Hague proudly announces the Netherlands’ premiere screening of the acclaimed Brazilian film “Pureza,” directed by Renato Barbieri. This special presentation will take place at Filmhuis Lumen in Delft on Saturday, June 15, at 16:10, as part of the 2nd Latin American FilmFest.

Event Details:

  • Date: Saturday, June 15
  • Time: 16:10
  • Location: Filmhuis Lumen, Doelenplein 5, 2611 BP Delft
  • Entry: Tickets are available here
  • Language: Portuguese audio with English subtitles

Film Synopsis:

“Pureza” tells the powerful story of Pureza Lopes Loyola, a mother on a relentless quest to find her missing son in the vast expanse of the Amazon. Her journey takes a harrowing turn when she secures a job on a farm, only to discover the cruel and inhumane treatment of enslaved workers. Confronted with these brutal realities, Pureza faces the daunting challenge of not only finding her son but also escaping to alert the authorities to the atrocities she has witnessed.

Based on true events, the film masterfully highlights the complex issues of deforestation, crime, and modern-day slavery through the deeply personal and inspiring narrative of a mother’s love and resilience. Pureza Lopes Loyola has since become an emblematic figure in the fight against forced labor, symbolizing hope and justice in the face of adversity.

A Collaborative Effort

This event is presented in collaboration between the Brazilian Embassy in The Hague, Gaya Filmes, and Filmhuis Lumen. Their joint efforts aim to bring the richness and diversity of Brazilian cinema to a wider audience in the Netherlands.

An Invitation to Experience

We warmly invite the diplomatic community, cinephiles, and the general public to attend this exclusive screening. “Pureza” a cinematic masterpiece and a stirring call to action and awareness about significant social issues affecting many communities today. This event offers a unique opportunity to engage with Brazilian culture and cinema, promising an afternoon of profound storytelling and reflection.

For more information and to secure your tickets, please visit Filmhuis Lumen’s website.

Indonesia-the Netherlands Trade, Tourism, and Investment Forum 2024: A Step Towards Concrete Business and Investment Outcomes

Amsterdam, 29 May 2024 – The Indonesia-the Netherlands Trade, Tourism, and Investment (TTI) Forum was successfully convened on 28-29 May 2024 in Amsterdam, marking a significant milestone in the bilateral relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands. This event, organized by the Embassy of Indonesia in the Netherlands, the Indonesia Investment Promotion Center (IIPC) London, and Bank Indonesia London, sought to enhance market penetration in Europe and foster trade and investment in strategic sectors.

Signing Ceremony Indonesia-the Netherlands Trade, Tourism, and Investment Forum 2024.

The TTI Forum provided a valuable platform for engagement at both government-to-government (G-to-G) and business-to-business (B-to-B) levels, aimed at exploring untapped potentials and boosting economic cooperation between the two nations.

Trade Business Matching / Indonesia – Netherlands

Pre-Event Activities

On 27 May 2024, a precursor to the main event, the Trade Business Matching, was held at the newly renovated Indonesia House Amsterdam. This venue is set to serve as a hub for promoting Indonesia in Europe. The event witnessed the signing of 11 business Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) and 1 Letter of Intent (LoI), officiated by the Indonesian Ambassador, the Deputy-Governor of Bank Indonesia, and several senior officials from the Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy. Concurrently, a TTI exhibition showcased products from 25 Indonesian exporters, featuring a diverse array of items such as health and cosmetics products, fashion, furniture, home decorations, agro-products, spices, coffee, food, and beverages.

Main Forum Activities

The high-level forum was inaugurated on 28 May 2024 by the Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, H.E. Mr. Mayerfas, and saw active participation from more than 150 registered delegates. The morning session was highlighted by keynote addresses from the Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation of the Netherlands, H.E. Ms. Liesje Schreinemacher, and the Minister of Cooperatives and SMEs of Indonesia, H.E. Mr. Teten Masduki. Both ministers lauded the strengthened economic ties and underscored the vast untapped potential for further cooperation.

H.E. Ms. Liesje Schreinemacher, Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation of the Netherlands.

Subsequent keynote addresses by Mr. Juda Agung, Deputy-Governor of Bank Indonesia, and Mr. Olaf Sleijpen, Deputy-Governor of De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), provided insights into the economic outlooks of both countries in both bilateral and global contexts. A panel discussion titled “Indonesia-Netherlands Economic Relations: How to Move Forward?” followed, offering deep dives into future economic collaboration.

Parallel to the forum, targeted meetings were conducted among stakeholders, including:

  • – O3M Hydroelectric Power Plant with Ampowr and Asia Value Partner
  • – O3M Solar PV Plant – Energyworld with FundsUp and Caus Holding BV
  • – OTM with Solar PV Plant

Bilateral Investment Forum

The forum continued on 29 May 2024 with a bilateral investment forum that explored investment strategies and performance enhancement for both countries. Notably, a meeting between the Indonesian Ministry of National Planning and Invest International, representing the Dutch Government, focused on finalizing a draft agreement on Dutch financing for public infrastructure development in Indonesia, valued at 300 million euros. This agreement will facilitate Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects, enabling the identification and implementation of national priority projects.

Exhibition Indonesia producs

During the TTI Forum 2024, eight significant projects were proposed, with an estimated total investment value of USD 1132.31 million, including:

  • Renewable Energy Infrastructure (Waste) for the Chemical Industry in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan (USD 68.75 million)
  • Water Supply and Management Infrastructure in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan (USD 30.11 million)
  • Bioethanol Industry in Bojonegoro, East Java (USD 173.75 million)
  • Tumpak Sewu Leisure Park in Lumajang, East Java (USD 60.36 million)
  • Nusantara Convention Centre in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan (USD 79.38 million)
  • Health Special Economic Zone in Sanur, Bali (USD 600 million)
  • Hydroelectric Power Plant in South Kalimantan (USD 100-200 million)
  • Solar PV Plant in West Nusa Tenggara (USD 20-30 million)

The Indonesia-the Netherlands Trade, Tourism, and Investment Forum 2024 exemplified the robust and growing partnership between Indonesia and the Netherlands, with a shared vision for sustainable and mutually beneficial economic growth.