By Jan Dop, employment lawyer at Russell Advocaten. Every Embassy and Consulate will at some point be confronted with ill employees. Since Dutch employment law regarding employee illness is quite complex, Russell Advocaten is often asked by Embassies and Consulates what to do in case of an ill employee. In general, Embassies and Consulates, as employers of local employees, are treated like any other employer in the Netherlands. In the following, Russell Advocaten will discuss frequently asked questions regarding employee illness in the Netherlands.

• How to report employee illness?

Just as any other employer in the Netherlands, Embassies and Consulates have the duty to call in the assistance of an occupational safety and health service (in Dutch: Arbodienst). There are various Arbodienst-companies in the Netherlands. It is possible to enter into a long-term agreement with an Arbodienst, but you can also decide to only hire an Arbodienst for certain tasks. If an employee has called in sick, the employer has to report the illness to the Arbodienst as soon as possible. The Arbodienst examines the medical condition of the employee. The Arbodienst reports to the employer whether or not the employee is capable to perform his job or any other suitable work within the organisation. Embassies and Consulates are not allowed to ask the employee about his medical situation or examine the employee themselves.

• What about the salary payment of an ill employee?

Embassies and Consulates are obliged to pay at least 70% of the employee’s salary during the first two years of illness. However, during the first year of illness, the payment may not be lower than the statutory minimum wage. This rule does not apply to the second year. Irrespective of the employee’s salary, Embassies and Consulates do not have to pay more than 70% of the statutory daily maximum wage. The obligation to pay the employee’s salary may be extended by one extra year in case the Institute for Execution of Employees’ Insurances (in Dutch: UWV WERKbedrijf) decides that the Embassy or Consulate did not put enough effort into the re-integration of the employee.

• How to meet the re-integration obligation?

In order to avoid such an extension of the obligation to pay salary, it is very important to make an active effort to keep the employee’s absence due to illness as short as possible. The reintegration should initially aim at the employee’s return to his job. However, if that is not successful, he has to be offered suitable work with his own employer or a different employer will have to be found (this is the so-called second track reintegration). It is important to make sure that an ill employee is being examined regularly by the Arbodienst (for instance every 4 – 6 weeks). Furthermore, during the first two years of illness there are several obligations for the employer to draw up reports regarding the illness of the employee and to report the employee illness to the UWV.

• Is it possible to terminate the employment contract with an ill employee?

During the first two years of illness it is not allowed to dismiss an employee, except when the employee refuses to comply with the legal obligations in case of illness without good reasons (only in exceptional situations). After two years of illness, Embassies and Consulates are in principle allowed to terminate the employment contract of the employee, once the UWV has granted permission to do so. Please be aware that in case the UWV is of the opinion that the employer did not put enough effort in the reintegration of the employee and extends the obligation to pay wages during illness by one extra year, the prohibition to dismiss the employee will also be extended by one extra year. An ill employee, whose employment contract is being terminated by the employer after two years of illness, is – just as in other dismissal cases – entitled to severance pay called ‘transition compensation’. The Dutch government intends to compensate employers who have to pay transition compensation to an employee with long-term ill health as of 2018. Advice Employee illness in the Netherlands requires adequate and precise guidance. Russell Advocaten offers Embassies and Consulates tailor-made advice and guidance to avoid timely and costly procedures.  

Par Nicolas Boeglin. La résolution 2334 (2016) du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies condamnant la politique de colonisation israélienne: brève mise en perspective. Pour la première fois depuis l´année 1980, le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies a pu adopter, le 23 décembre 2016, une résolution condamnant en des termes extrêmement fermes, les implantations israéliennes en territoire palestinien. Les projets de résolution sur celles-ci présentés pendant ces dernières decennies étaient systématiquement l´objet d´un véto nord américain, permettant ainsi aux autorités israéliennes, en toute impunité, de continuer la construction de nouvelles implantations et de procéder à la destruction de maisons habitées par des familles palestiniennes, tant en Cisjordanie que dans les quartiers de Jérusalem-Est. Colonisation israélienne et Conseil de Sécurité: brefs rappels et quelques chiffres Les dernières résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité condamnant ces actions israéliennes datent de l´année 1980 (voir le texte des résolutions 476 et 478). La première fois que l´administration du Président Barack Obama a fait usage de son droit de véto en la matière fut lors de la séance du 18 février 2011: le projet de résolution S/2011/24 contenait dans son dispositif deux paragraphes (1 et 2) condamnant fermement les implantations israéliennes. On lit dans le communiqué de presse des Nations Unies que ce projet de résolution comptait avec l´appui de plus de deux tiers des Etats membres des Nations Unies. La lecture de l´acte de la séance du Conseil de Sécurité S/PV/6484 indique le résultat suivant du vote (voir page 4): 14 votes pour et un contre (Etats Unis). A noter que lorsque l´actuel Premier Ministre israélien ordonna, comme à son habitude, la construction de 3000 nouveaux logements en Cisjordanie et notamment à Jérusalem-Est au mois de novembre 2012, la délégation des États-Unis procéda à une véritable innovation technique au sein du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies: le « veto implicite » (Note 1). Dans un rapport récent daté du 29 décembre 2016, on lit que durant l´année 2016, plus de mille maisons de familles palestiniennes ont été démolies ou saisies: “Le Bureau de la coordination des affaires humanitaires (OCHA) des Nations Unies a annoncé jeudi que 1.089 structures appartenant à des Palestiniens en Cisjordanie, y compris à Jérusalem-Est, ont été démolies ou saisies par les autorités israéliennes durant l’année 2016” (voir note de presse des Nations Unies). Concernant les chiffres de cette colonisation et ses effets pendant plus de 35 ans, lors d´une séance spéciale organisée au mois d´octobre 2016 devant les membres du Conseil de Sécurité (voir note de What´s in Blue), l´activiste nord américaine / israélienne Lara Friedman de l´ONG Americans for Peace Now (APN), entité soeur de l´ONG israélienne Peace Now (voir site officiel) declara haut et fort que: “Twenty-three years ago, in 1993, Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles, also known as the Oslo Accords. Back then, the settler population in the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, was around 116,000. At the end of 2015, that number was nearly 390,000. Looking just at East Jerusalem, in 1993 the Jewish Israeli population was approximately 146,000. Today it is over 210,000. This population explosion could not have occurred without Israeli government support and encouragement, including, most obviously, the approval and construction of new housing. And that is exactly what happened. During this same period, 1993 to today, over 50,000 settlement units were built in the West Bank, and plus thousands more in East Jerusalem. What about settlement construction just under Prime Minister Netanyahu 2016 figures are still not complete, but looking at 2009 to 2015 – which included the so-called “moratorium” – more than 11,000 settlement units were established in the West Bank with the approval of Israeli authorities. And in 2015 alone, we are talking about almost 2000 new units in West Bank settlements” (voir texte de son allocution du 14 Octobre 2016 à Nueva York). Afin de visualiser ces données, nous renvoyons à la carte interactive élaborée et constamment actualisée par les membres de APN et de PeaceNow, ainsi qu´aux graphiques interactifs inclus dans cet article du Monde intitulé “Colonies israéliennes en Cisjordanie : près d’un demi-siècle d’installations illégales“. La résolution 2334 (2016): remarques sur certaines de ses dispositions Le texte de la résolution 2334 (2016) (voir texte complet en Français reproduit à la fin de cette note), précise, entre autres, que le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies: ” 1. Réaffirme que la création par Israël de colonies de peuplement dans le Territoire palestinien occupé depuis 1967, y compris Jérusalem-Est, n’a aucun fondement en droit et constitue une violation flagrante du droit international et un obstacle majeur à la réalisation de la solution des deux États et à l’instauration d’une paix globale, juste et durable; 2. Exige de nouveau d’Israël qu’il arrête immédiatement et complètement toutes ses activités de peuplement dans le Territoire palestinien occupé, y compris Jérusalem-Est, et respecte pleinement toutes les obligations juridiques qui lui incombent à cet égard; 3. Souligne qu’il ne reconnaîtra aucune modification aux frontières du 4 juin 1967, y compris en ce qui concerne Jérusalem, autres que celles convenues par les parties par la voie de négociations”. Le point 11 du dispositif indique que le Conseil de Sécurité n´est pas dupe, et connaît fort bien l´attitude des autorités israéliennes au regard du droit international et des résolutions émanant des Nations Unies. On notera que pendant ces dernières années, chaque victoire diplomatique palestinienne a été répondue par de nouvelles implantations israéliennes: parmi une liste d´exemples, on peut citer le fait qu´au lendemain du vote du 29 novembre 2012 de l´Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies reconnaissant à la Palestine le statut d´”Etat Non Membre Observateur“. (Note 2) les autorités israéliennes répliquaient avec la construction de 3000 nouveaux logements (voir note de la BBC); la ratification par la Palestine de 20 traités internationaux au mois d´avril 2014 signifia la contruction de 708 nouveaux logements et la destruction de 32 maisons habitées par des familles palestiniennes (voir note de Human Rights Watch). Prévoyant, on lit que le Conseil de Sécurité: “11. Réaffirme qu’il est résolu à examiner les moyens concrets de faire pleinement appliquer ses résolutions sur la question“. On fera noter qu´une résolution du Conseil de Sécurité indiquant qu´il est cette fois “résolu” à la faire appliquer devrait freiner les autorités israéliennes si celles-ci comprennent le ton du message. A ce propos, nous invitons nos lecteurs-chercheurs à partir à la recherche de toute autre résolution du Conseil de Sécurité utilisant l´expression du point 11 du dispositif de la résolution 2334 (2016): une recherche rapide sur la toile renvoit constamment à cette seule résolution, mais le doute est permis. On notera également au passage le considérant 5 de la résolution 2334 mentionnant les diverses formes et stratégies de la colonisation israélienne, réalisée en dépit des résolutions adoptées par le Conseil de Sécurité dans les années 70 et 80, et des normes internationales en vigueur, et notamment celles prévues par le droit international humanitaire concernant les obligations qui incombent à toute puissance occupante. Il s´agit d´un chapitre du droit international public qu´Israël souhaiterait ne pas à avoir à appliquer dans les territoires palestiniens occupés, et qui fut, fin 2014, l´objet de vives tensions avec la Suisse (Note 3). Ce considérant 5 se lit comme suit: “Condamnant toutes les mesures visant à modifier la composition démographique, le caractère et le statut du Territoire palestinien occupé depuis 1967, y compris Jérusalem-Est, notamment la construction et l’expansion de colonies de peuplement, le transfert de colons israéliens, la confiscation de terres, la destruction de maisons et le déplacement de civils palestiniens, en violation du droit international humanitaire et des résolutions pertinentes“. Enfin, dans une étude récente d´un fin observateur sur les mots utilisés dans cette résolution, on lit que l´absence d´un “s” est particulièrement significative par rapport aux résolutions antérieures adoptées: ” What is also particularly striking is that Security Council resolution 2334 (2016), when addressing the legal status of the West Bank and East-Jerusalem, does not refer anymore to the occupied “Palestinian territories” in the plural but, like other organs of the United Nations beforehand, instead now also rather refers to the occupied “Palestinian territory” in the singular (“du territoire Palestinien” respectivly ‘le territoire palestinien” in the French text). This in turn presupposes that, while obviously not amounting to a recognition of a state, the Security Council hereby has taken the position that there exists at least a Palestinian entity with a defined ‘territory’ rather than merely some ‘Palestinian territories’ ” (cf. ZIMMERMANN A., “Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016) and its Legal Repercussions Revisited“, EJIL Talk, 20/01/2017, article disponible ici). Une résolution à bien des égards historique On peut dire que ce texte est historique, dans la mesure où l´application du droit international en Cisjordanie et à Jérusalem-Est est réaffirmé par le Conseil de Sécurité: depuis de trop longues decennies, une impunité totale était garantie aux autorités israéliennes, en raison d´un véto américain placé en mode automatique sur tout projet de résolution condamnant cette colonisation. La mise en garde que traduit le paragraphe 11 du dispositif devrait en outre calmer les appétits de certains décideurs politiques israéliens. Conscient du caractère unique de cette résolution durant sa gestion aux Nations Unies et bien avant, le Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies sortant, quelques minutes après le vote du texte, affirma dans un communiqué de presse que: “ The Secretary-General welcomes the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2334 (2016) on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question. The resolution is a significant step, demonstrating the Council’s much needed leadership and the international community’s collective efforts to reconfirm that the vision of two States is still achievable. The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to encourage Israeli and Palestinian leaders to work with the international community to create a conducive environment for a return to meaningful negotiations. The United Nations stands ready to support all concerned parties in achieving this goal“. Lors de l´explication de son vote (voir texte complet), le représentant de la France a précisement commencé son allocution en indiquant que: “L’adoption de la résolution 2334 marque un jour important et à bien des égards historique dans l’histoire récente du Conseil de sécurité. Il s’agit en effet de la première résolution adoptée par ce Conseil sur le règlement du conflit israélo-palestinien depuis huit ans. Et c’est la première fois que le Conseil de sécurité s’exprime ainsi, de manière aussi claire, pour constater ce qui est en réalité une évidence : la colonisation israélienne remet en cause, petit à petit, les chances de voir bâtir un Etat palestinien viable et indépendant, vivant côte à côte dans la paix et la sécurité avec l’Etat d’Israël“. De quelques détails concernant les jours antérieurs au vote L´adoption de cette résolution se doit à l´abstention des Etats-Unis, qui cette fois, ont renoncé à faire usage de leur droit de véto, et le résultat final du vote est de 14 votes pour et une abstention (Etats-Unis). A noter le volte-face de l´Egypte qui, suite à des appels téléphoniques personnels pressants de Donald Trump sur demande d´Israël, retira le texte, sans prévoir que quatre autres Etats Membres, à savoir la Malaisie, la Nouvelle Zélande, le Sénégal et le Vénézuela, étaient prêts (et fort décidés) à présenter le même texte quelques heures plus tard en vue de son adoption définitive. Ce tour de passe-passe imprévu laisse évidemment l´Egypte dans une situation quelque peu embarassante au sein de la communauté des Etats arabes: comme on le sait, Donald Trump avait proposé de transférer à Jérusalem l´Ambassade des Etats Unis (voir sur ce point l´analyse publiée récemment dans Foreign Policy intitulée: “Want a third Intifada ? Go ahead and move the US Embassy to Jerusalem“). Dans un discours du 6 janvier 2017 donné par les autorités palestiniennes (voir note de presse), il est fait mention de ce tranfert comme une véritable “ligne rouge”. Plus généralement, on peut dire que le fait d´accéder aux demandes d´un Président élu place le Chef d´Etat égyptien dans une situation singulière vis-à-vis de la communauté internationale en tant que telle: rarement un Etat a cédé aux appels et aux exigences d´un Président élu. Au plan international, celui-ci ne bénéficie d´aucun statut particulier et n´engage rien d´autre que sa personne. On peut même avancer l´idée qu´il s´agit d´une véritable première mondiale de la part des diplomates israéliens et de leurs homologues égyptiens. Photo publiée dans cet article, Le Monde On a pu lire dans Le Monde (voir note) que: “A l’origine, le texte avait été présenté mercredi soir par l’Egypte, à la surprise générale. Mais Donald Trump est intervenu pour peser de tout son poids de président élu auprès d’Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi. Il a demandé au président égyptien de renoncer à son initiative. Son interlocuteur n’a pas voulu compromettre ses futures relations avec le président américain, et a donc retiré son texte. Mais le volte-face de l’Egypte n’a pas condamné son initiative. Quatre membres non permanents du Conseil de sécurité – la Nouvelle-Zélande, la Malaisie, le Sénégal et le Venezuela – ont pris le relais du Caire, pour promouvoir la résolution dans une version identique. Vendredi dans l’après-midi, des responsables israéliens sous couvert d’anonymat exprimaient leur amertume – et une certaine panique – dans les médias, en affirmant que Barack Obama et John Kerry se trouvaient derrière ce « coup honteux » et qu’ils « abandonnaient » Israël”. Des autorités israéliennes un brin exaspérées A peine adoptée la résolution 2334, les autorités israéliennes ont déclaré par la voix de leur Premier Ministre (et sans jamais faire référence aux implantations illégales) qu´un accord tacite avec les Etats-Unis avait été violé par le Président Barack Obama: ” Tous les présidents américains depuis Carter ont respecté l’engagement américain d’essayer de ne pas dicter les termes d’un accord permanent à Israël devant le Conseil de sécurité. Et hier [vendredi], en opposition totale avec cet engagement, et avec une déclaration explicite du président [Barack] Obama lui-même en 2011, l’administration Obama a mené un complot anti-Israël honteux aux Nations Unies” (voir note du Times of Israel reproduisant le texte de la déclaration). On ignore si le fait de consentir à des implantations illégales dans les territoires palestiniens occupés faisait également partie dudit accord. Comme prévu, depuis l´adoption de la résolution 2334 (2016), les représailles israéliennes vont bon train (rappel d´ambassadeurs, déclarations officielles tous azimuts contre les Nations Unies et les membres du Conseil de Sécurité, suspension de programmes de coopération bilatéraux, etc). Le Sénégal a simplement “pris note” de la notification officielle israélienne en date du 27 décembre (voir note de presse) et le texte du communiqué officiel sénégalais reproduit ici. En ce qui concerne la Nouvelle Zélande, la “déclaration de guerre” mentionnée par le Premier Ministre israélien lors d´un entretien téléphonique avec le ministre des Affaires étrangères néo-zélandais, Murray Mccully (entretien antérieur au vote) ne semble pas avoir grandement ému ses autorités (voir note de Haaretz). L´Angola pour sa part, attend une note verbale israélienne (voir note de presse) et on ignore si l´Egypte (ayant finalement voté en faveur du texte) fera l´objet d´un traitement similaire de la part de la diplomatie israélienne. Pour ce qui est de l´Espagne, qui présidait la séance du Conseil de Sécurité lors de l´adoption du texte (et qui n´a pas accédé aux demandes pressantes d´ajourner le vote), on apprend qu´elle ne subira aucune mesure de rétorsion (voir note de presse). On laisse aux spécialistes le soin d´expliquer la raison exacte pour laquelle l´Espagne, qui fut le premier Etat à célébrer l´adoption de cette résolution, avant même sa date (voir communiqué officiel en date du … 22 décembre 2016) ne fait l´objet d´aucune mesure de rétorsion de la part d´Israël. Ce traitement différencié pour l´Espagne avait déjà été vérifié lors du vote de son Congrès exigeant au Pouvoir Exécutif la reconnaissance de la Palestine comme Etat, au mois de novembre 2014. (Note 4): notons au passage que, malgré un vote sans appel (319 votes pour, une abstention et deux votes contre), l Exécutif espagnol n´a toujours pas procédé à cette reconnaissance. Sur ces détails de forme et quelques autres, tels que les vétos nord-américains antérieurs, la véritable course contre la montre de Donald Trump agissant en tant qu´émissaire israélien, la réaction israélienne une fois adoptée la résolution 2334, et les déclarations tonitruantes habituelles de ses diplomates, nous renvoyons à notre analyse intitulée “Consejo de Seguridad condena colonización israelí en Cisjordania y en Jerusalén Oriental“(Note 5). Remarques finales en guise de conclusion Il va sans dire que ce texte est historique, car, d’une certaine façon, il réconcilie le Conseil de Sécurité avec le droit international et son application en Cisjordanie et à Jérusalem-Est: il l´est aussi pour ceux qui enseignent le droit international depuis longtemps, et qui peinent souvent à expliquer qu´un Etat semble placé au dessus des normes juridiques internationales, bénéficiant, et ce depuis de longues decennies, d´une impunité totale au sein du Conseil de Sécurité en raison d´un véto automatique américain tout à fait légal. Plus de 35 ans après sa publication, et après bien d’autres actions menées depuis 1981 par Israël, la conclusion du Professeur Georges Fischer reste toujours d´une surprenante actualité: « /… / on demeure surpris qu’un petit pays puisse régulièrement et avec impunité défier la communauté internationale et les règles du droit des gens » (Note 6). Signe de temps difficiles pour Israël? Il semblerait que l´idée, somme toute hardie, de recourrir à Donald Trump exhibe d´abord une certaine panique de la part de la diplomatie israélienne. Ce premier faux-pas peut expliquer que les autorités israéliennes agissent en ce moment quelque peu angoissées (conscientes de la distance qu´elles ont créé avec l´administration sortante du Président Obama, mais peut-être aussi du fait que leurs déclarations officielles fracassantes ne semblent plus impressionner outre mesure). Comme on le sait, ce type de résolution peut intéresser bien des organes aux Nations Unies, que ce soit la Cour Internationale de Justice (CIJ), l´Assemblée Générale, le Conseil de Sécurité, ou encore la Cour Pénale Internationale (CPI) que la Palestine a rejoint en 2015 en ratifiant le Statut de Rome, parmi bien d´autres entités onusiennes. La France, qui prépare pour le 15 janvier 2017 une nouvelle conférence internationale sur le Moyen Orient, devra également inclure cette nouvelle donne que représente la résolution 2334 dans les discussions. Autre difficulté à l´horizon ? A partir de ce premier janvier 2017, la Suède, seul Etat membre à avoir défier l´Union Européenne en 2014 en reconnaissant la Palestine comme Etat (Note 7), a pris les rênes de la Présidence du Conseil de Sécurité aux Nations Unies (alors que Donald Trump ne prend les siens à Washington que 20 jours plus tard). ——-Notes—– Note 1: Dans une analyse du Professeur Weckel publiée dans le Bulletin Sentinelle de janvier 2013, on lit que « Le Conseil de sécurité a consacré une réunion informelle le 19 décembre 2012 aux mesures de relance massive de la colonisation prises par Israël. En quittant inopinément la salle, Madame Susan Rice, Ambassadrice des États-Unis, a fait obstacle à l’adoption d’une résolution ou, du moins, d’une déclaration présidentielle condamnant le comportement d’Israël. Néanmoins, tous les autres 14 membres du Conseil ont fait des déclarations à la presse critiquant la reprise de la colonisation. Même si l’absence d’un membre permanent n’équivaut pas à un veto, ce départ de la représentante américaine a bloqué l’issue de la réunion. Seuls en face des autres membres du Conseil, les États-Unis ne voulaient se prononcer au sein de cet organe, ni pour une condamnation d’Israël, ni contre, ni même s’abstenir. Les autres membres n’ont visiblement pas l’intention de les laisser sur la touche et le résultat est bien là : le Conseil de sécurité est paralysé, comme l’est d’ailleurs aussi le Quatuor. Les États-Unis ont donc inventé le veto implicite sinon de poche au Conseil de sécurité ». Cf. WECKEL Ph., « Israël, les États-Unis inventent le veto implicite au Conseil de Sécurité », Sentinelle, Société Française pour le Droit International (SFDI), janvier 2013. Texte diponible ici. Note 2: Sur la portée de ce vote, cf. SALMON J., “La qualité d’État de la Palestine“, Revue Belge de Droit International, 2012-1. Article complet disponible ici. Pour une analyse depuis la perspective latinoaméricaine, cf. BOEGLIN N., “Le nouveau Statut de membre la Palestine: une perspective latinoaméricaine“, publiée par l´Observatoire Politique de l’Amérique latine et des Caraïbes (OPALC), Sciences-Po /Paris, décembre 2012. Texte disponible ici. Note 3: Cf. notre analyse, BOEGLIN N., “Pressions et menaces récentes d´Israël sur la Suisse : brève mise en perspective“, Bulletin Sentinelle, Société Française pour le Droit International (SFDI), janvier 2015. Texte diponible ici. Note 4: “Por su parte, la reacción de Israel ha sido extremadamente cauta con las autoridades de España. Es posible que Israel esté ponderando el efecto que puedan tener sus declaraciones en la dinámica muy peculiar que generan los círculos parlamentarios en Europa (con incluso posibles ramificaciones fuera del viejo continente)“: cf. notre analyse, BOEGLIN N., “El Congreso de España y el reconocimiento de Palestina como Estado: balance y perspectivas“, Debate Global, Academia Colombiana de Derecho Internacional, décembre 2014. Texte disponible ici. Note 5: Celle-ci a été publiée sur divers sites en espagnol, tels que Ius360 le 28 décembre 2016 (texte en disponible ici). Une version préliminaire a aussi été publiée le 26 décembre dans Middle East Monitor, disponible ici. Note 6: Cf. FISCHER G., “Le bombardement par Israël d’un réacteur nucléaire irakien“, Vol. 27 Annuaire Français de Droit International (AFDI), 1981, pp. 147-167, et en particulier pp. 162-166. Article complet disponible ici. Note 7: Cf. notre étude: BOEGLIN N., “Le défi lancé par la Suède concernant la reconnaissance de la Palestine“, Grotius International, janvier 2015. Texte disponible ici. Afin de donner un idée des suites données aux gesticulations israéliennes, nous nous permettons de reproduire la conclusion: “Le défi lancé par la Suède a relancé de manière notoire le débat dans plusieurs États européens : durant ces derniers jours, la discussion en France sur la reconnaissance de la Palestine s’est considérablement intensifiée et elle s’est étendue à bien d’autres membres de l’Union Européenne, tels la Belgique, le Luxembourg, le Danemark pour ne citer que quelques pays. Cette discussion devrait tenir compte, parmi d’autres éléments, de l’absence de réaction significative israélienne au geste suédois: l’ambassadeur israélien rappelé par ses supérieurs le 30 octobre est de retour dans son bureau depuis le vendredi 28 novembre, selon une note de presse. Ce retour s’est fait sans que l’on comprenne bien quel fut le geste hostile ou offensif de la Suède l’obligeant à quitter la capitale suédoise pour y revenir officiellement en « signe de paix ». Texte de la Résolution 2334 (2016) Adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité à sa 7853e séance, le 23 décembre 2016 Le Conseil de sécurité, Rappelant ses résolutions sur la question, notamment les résolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 446 (1979), 452 (1979), 465 (1980), 476 (1980), 478 (1980), 1397 (2002), 1515 (2003) et 1850 (2008), Guidé par les buts et principes énoncés dans la Charte des Nations Unies et rappelant notamment que l’acquisition de territoire par la force est inadmissible, Réaffirmant qu’Israël, Puissance occupante, est tenu de respecter scrupuleusement ses obligations et responsabilités juridiques découlant de la quatrième Convention de Genève relative à la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre, en date du 12 août 1949, et rappelant l’avis consultatif rendu le 9 juillet 2004 par la Cour internationale de Justice, Condamnant toutes les mesures visant à modifier la composition démographique, le caractère et le statut du Territoire palestinien occupé depuis 1967, y compris Jérusalem-Est, notamment la construction et l’expansion de colonies de peuplement, le transfert de colons israéliens, la confiscation de terres, la destruction de maisons et le déplacement de civils palestiniens, en violation du droit international humanitaire et des résolutions pertinentes, Constatant avec une vive préoccupation que la poursuite des activités de peuplement israéliennes met gravement en péril la viabilité de la solution des deux États fondée sur les frontières de 1967, Rappelant l’obligation faite à Israël dans la Feuille de route du Quatuor et approuvée par sa résolution 1515 (2003) de geler toutes ses activités de peuplement, y compris par « croissance naturelle », et de démanteler tous les avant-postes de colonie établis depuis mars 2001, Rappelant également l’obligation faite aux forces de sécurité de l’Autorité palestinienne dans la Feuille de route du Quatuor de continuer de mener des opérations efficaces en vue de s’attaquer à tous ceux qui se livrent à des activités terroristes et de démanteler les moyens des terroristes, notamment en confisquant les armes illégales, Condamnant tous les actes de violence visant des civils, y compris les actes de terreur, ainsi que tous les actes de provocation, d’incitation à la violence et de destruction, Réitérant sa vision d’une région où deux États démocratiques, Israël et la Palestine, vivent côte à côte, en paix, à l’intérieur de frontières sûres et reconnues, Soulignant que le statu quo n’est pas viable et que des mesures importantes,compatibles avec le processus de transition prévu dans les accords antérieurs, doivent être prises de toute urgence en vue de i) stabiliser la situation et inverser les tendances négatives sur le terrain, qui ne cessent de fragiliser la solution des deux États et d’imposer dans les faits la réalité d’un seul État, et de ii) créer les conditions qui permettraient d’assurer le succès des négociations sur le statut final et de faire progresser la solution des deux États par la voie de négociations et sur le terrain, 1. Réaffirme que la création par Israël de colonies de peuplement dans le Territoire palestinien occupé depuis 1967, y compris Jérusalem-Est, n’a aucun fondement en droit et constitue une violation flagrante du droit international et un obstacle majeur à la réalisation de la solution des deux États et à l’instauration d’une paix globale, juste et durable; 2. Exige de nouveau d’Israël qu’il arrête immédiatement et complètement toutes ses activités de peuplement dans le Territoire palestinien occupé, y compris Jérusalem-Est, et respecte pleinement toutes les obligations juridiques qui lui incombent à cet égard; 3. Souligne qu’il ne reconnaîtra aucune modification aux frontières du 4 juin 1967, y compris en ce qui concerne Jérusalem, autres que celles convenues par les parties par la voie de négociations; 4. Souligne qu’il est essentiel qu’Israël mette un terme à toutes ses activités de peuplement pour préserver la solution des deux États, et demande l’adoption immédiate de mesures énergiques afin d’inverser les tendances négatives sur le terrain, qui mettent en péril la solution des deux États; 5. Demande à tous les États, compte tenu du paragraphe 1 de la présente résolution, de faire une distinction, dans leurs échanges en la matière, entre le territoire de l’État d’Israël et les territoires occupés depuis 1967; 6. Demande que des mesures immédiates soient prises pour prévenir tous les actes de violence visant des civils, y compris les actes de terreur, ainsi que tous les actes de provocation et de destruction, demande que les auteurs de tels actes en répondent, et appelle au respect des obligations qu’impose le droit international de renforcer l’action menée pour lutter contre le terrorisme, notamment par la coordination en matière de sécurité, et de condamner sans équivoque tous les actes de terrorisme; 7. Demande aux deux parties d’agir dans le respect du droit international, notamment du droit international humanitaire, et des accords et des obligations qu’elles ont précédemment contractés, de faire preuve de calme et de retenue et de s’abstenir de tout acte de provocation et d’incitation à la violence et de toute déclaration incendiaire, dans le but, notamment, de désamorcer la situation sur le terrain, de rétablir la confiance, de montrer, par leurs politiques et leurs actes, un véritable attachement à la solution des deux États et de créer les conditions nécessaires à la promotion de la paix; 8. Invite toutes les parties à continuer, dans l’intérêt de la promotion de la paix et de la sécurité, de déployer collectivement des efforts pour engager des négociations crédibles sur toutes les questions relatives au statut final dans le cadre du processus de paix au Moyen-Orient et selon le calendrier établi par le Quatuor dans sa déclaration du 21 septembre 2010; 9. Préconise vivement à cet égard l’intensification et l’accélération des efforts diplomatiques entrepris et de l’appui apporté aux niveaux international et régional en vue de parvenir sans tarder à une paix globale, juste et durable au Moyen-Orient, sur la base des résolutions pertinentes de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, du mandat de la conférence de Madrid, y compris le principe de l’échange de territoires contre la paix, de l’Initiative de paix arabe et de la Feuille de route du Quatuor, et de mettre fin à l’occupation israélienne qui a commencé en 1967, et souligne à cet égard l’importance que revêtent les efforts déployés pour faire avancer l’Initiative de paix arabe, l’initiative prise par la France de convoquer une conférence de paix internationale, les efforts récemment entrepris par le Quatuor ainsi que ceux déployés par l’Égypte et la Fédération de Russie; 10. Rappelle qu’il est déterminé à apporter son appui aux parties tout au long des négociations et dans la mise en œuvre d’un accord; 11. Réaffirme qu’il est résolu à examiner les moyens concrets de faire pleinement appliquer ses résolutions sur la question; 12. Prie le Secrétaire général de lui faire rapport tous les trois mois sur la mise en œuvre des dispositions de la présente résolution; 13. Décide de demeurer saisi de la question. ———— Publicado por Curso de Derecho Internacional. Costa Rica en 14:47 Nicolas Boeglin is a Professor of International Law, Law Faculty, University of Costa Rica.  

By Dr. Huub Ruël. Diplomacy is about dialogue and acknowledging the other as a partner. It is the lifeline of peaceful co-existence between nations, cities, regions, friends or foes. In today’s international order, diplomats are working hard because nationalism is spreading in many countries, beyond the nations and regions that are well-known for it. For example, the governments of countries such as Russia, China or Turkey have been feeding their citizens nationalist rhetoric via state-owned media for a long time. But recently, nationalism has been on the rise in the Western world, Europe, Australia and North America. Nationalism feeds the antipathy for neighbouring countries and that can be responsible for creating a tense relationship between them. Examples of this are all around and can be most easily observed between major powers such as the United States and Russia or between the United States and China, but also between the Netherlands or Germany and Turkey. Diplomats have a hard job to interpret and soften the language politicians and heads of state use towards their host countries. Much diplomatic communication is associated with etiquette, with explicit but also many implicit rules. The ‘traditional’ diplomat is usually raised and educated in an environment where these rules are paramount. But despite ‘traditional’ diplomatic skills still being key in diplomacy, there is an emerging trend that requires more than them, and that is hospitality.  The ‘traditional’ diplomat mostly communicates with fellow diplomats. In the current and future international arena, a diplomat needs to be much more than just the eyes and the ears of her or his home country’s government in a foreign nation. The new diplomats need to be service-oriented and interact with a wide range of actors, such as the business community, citizens, traditional and social media, NGOs and interest groups. They need to be able to be pro-active, always on the alert, a qualified expert with a service orientation towards the different actors. All this comes together in a key competence for the new diplomat, namely hospitality. Having the right knowledge and being aware of the diplomatic interaction etiquette is one thing, having a hospitable attitude is another. Hospitality as a competence is about being able to be open minded, welcoming, serving and truly interested in people. It is about being able to give others that comfortable feeling that you can be trusted, that integrity is the highest value, and service a natural part of life. It opens doors that otherwise will stay closed or even unnoticed. It grants authority and is essentially the most powerful skill in interpersonal relationship building. It builds bridges to overcome differences in views and opinions. The successful new diplomat needs to able to operate in an international arena with many different stakeholders, which is extremely politically sensitive. But the new diplomat is able to understand how hospitality is key above all. The web of stakes in the international arena is becoming more and more complex. Rather than relying on the assumption that authority comes with the status of being a diplomat, it is the competence to truly connect with people and stakeholders of all sorts and minds that makes the new diplomat more successful. Hospitality as a competence can be trained to a certain extent, which is the good news. When combined with personality traits like open-mindedness and feeling comfortable in the presence of others who are different from yourself, it makes it easier to become the truly hospitable new diplomat. ——- About the author: Dr. Huub Ruël, Phd, is a Professor of International Hospitality Business at Hotelschool The Hague/The Hague Hospitality Business School.

By Nicola Bilotta. Due to Donald Trump’s victory in the Presidential election this November North American foreign policy will experience radical changes. The new government creates hopes and fears. On the one hand, there is hope cooperation with Russia will be improved. On the other hand, peace dialogues with Iran are expected to worsen. However, international geopolitical equilibrium will have a different settlement. The US has always influenced South American political history due to its geographical proximity and its economic interests. So how will Latin America be affected by Trump’s foreign policy? Hilary Clinton was supposed to continue Obama’s political strategy in the continent. But which heritage did Obama leave in South America? Obama’s inheritance During the 2008 Presidential campaign, Barack Obama became famous worldwide because of his charm and great oratory skills. In his electoral platform there was a message of cooperation and peace to all Latin American governments. Obama’s victory thus was celebrated by leftist Presidents in the entire continent. Lula – the former Brazilian President from 2002 to 2011 – said that Barack’s election was a historical moment for the world, “In the same way that Brazil elected a metalworker (Lula himself), Bolivia an aboriginal (Evo Morales), Venezuela a (Hugo) Chavez and Paraguay a bishop (Fernando Lugo), I believe it will be an extraordinary thing if in the biggest economy in the world a black person (Barack Obama) is elected president.” Also Chavez was optimistic about improving Venezuelan cooperation with the US. Obama promised to improve North American partnership with South America based on multilateralism. But the opportunity to repair the relationship between Latin American countries and the US was already lost in 2009. In June 2009, the elected President of Honduras Manuel Zaleya was overthrown by a military coup. The US foreign office considered Zaleya as a dangerous leftist leader. Even though the OAS (Organization of American States) expelled Honduras after their break of constitutional order, Hilary Clinton, secretary state at the time, and President Obama pushed for new elections rather than asking for the return of Zaleya, the democratically elected President. US government immediately recognized the legitimacy of the new Lobio government in Honduras and it pressured other Latin countries to do the same. Clinton, when talking about Honduras coup, said “Now I didn’t like the way it looked or the way they did it, but they had a strong argument that they had followed the constitution and the legal precedents.”[1] However, Hugo Llorens, the US ambassador in Honduras stated “Zelaya may have committed illegalities but there is no doubt that the military, supreme court and National Congress conspired on June 28 in what constituted an illegal and unconstitutional coup against the executive branch.”[2] Obama’s strategy in Honduras thus worsened the US relationship with Brazil and with all leftist parties in South America. Furthermore, the Colombian and US government signed an agreement on military cooperation in 2009 without consulting any other Latin American countries. American and Colombian economic and military alliance finds its roots since the 1990 with Plan for Colombia establishment. Former President Bill Clinton approved a massive military and economic aid initiative to fund Colombian struggle against drug cartels and left-wing insurgent groups. The aim of the plan was to supply Colombia with military training and military technologies to contrast violence in the country. The flow of money from the US government to Colombia has not stopped since then. Former President G.W. Bush and Obama maintained Plan for Colombia. According to the US Foreign Office, in 2012 the US allocated 644.304.766$ in Colombia. Breaking down the aid, we discover that 446.552.148$ were funds for military and security help. The tight relationship between the two countries is confirmed by the trade deal signed in 2011. Besides chief architect and broker that of Cuba, Obama was a strong sponsor of the peace dialogue between the FARC and Santos government. He even promised to increase American economic aid to Colombia totalling 450 million of dollars. Even though Obama was not personally involved in the discussion of the peace agreement in Colombia, he has started a process of normalization with Cuba. The US and Cuba has not had diplomatic relations since the 1960s. After the communist revolution in the country, the US imposed a trade embargo against Cuba. Obama’s plan was to improve Cuban and American relations by reviewing Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism and by ending the economic embargo. After formal talks, American Congress will be called to vote for the official revocation of the embargo. The new course, however, was not just due to Obama’s effort. The role of the former Pope Benedict XVI and Pope Francis was fundamental to foster peace between the two countries. Regardless the fact that it was a multilateral effort, the improvement of Cuban and American relations has been the most considerable heritage of Obama’s presidency in South America. Obama has not been able to improve the precarious diplomatic relationship whit Venezuela and Ecuador. Even if the US is the largest trading partner of Venezuela, US governments have not sent Ambassadors to this Latin Am country since 2006. Their diplomatic relations are now extremely tense. Maduro accused US governments of imperialism and of trying to defeat his government in Venezuela, while American diplomacy denounced human rights violations against Maduro’s adversaries. The latter, instead, declared US Ambassador Persona non-grata in 2011 in response to the release of secret documents in which US diplomatists accused Ecuadorian President Correa to be corrupted. In the last months of 2015 Ecuador and the US re-established diplomatic relations. However, there is still a considerable tension between them. Guillaume Long, Ecuadorian foreign minister, said that he wanted to cooperate with the US but American governments needed to not interfere with internal political decisions in South America. In the last eight years Brazilian and American relations have been problematic. After the disclosure of NSA secret reports on Brazil, former Brazilian President Dilma cancelled her official state visit in 2014. NSA was spying the conversations of top Brazilian managers and politics, even Dilma was recorded during her private calls. It appears, at least, unusual that US secret services were spying the establishment of a country which is a stable democracy and an American ally for the last thirty years. Obama’s presidency had tense diplomatic relations also with Argentina and her former President Kirchner. Specifically, their conflict was about Argentinian default in 2014. American hedge funds, which bought cheap Argentinian bonds in 2001, were asking for a full pay out that Kirchner refused to provide. Interestingly, both, Dilma and Kirchner, found themselves at the centre of scandals the last year. The former was indirectly involved in Petrobas investigation, the latter was accused to have covered Iranian responsibility on the terroristic attack which killed 84 people in Buenos Aires in 1994. With their defeat, Latin America is going through the end of the leftist season. The new Argentinian President, Mauricio Macri, has already endorsed his priority to mend relations with investors and big foreign groups. The new Brazilian President, Michel Temer, has already approved liberalizations on natural resources exploitation which will attract foreign investors in Brazil. The new courses in Brazil and Argentina seem to find North American support. Actually, Macri and Temer will be aiming to improve Argentinian and Brazilian economic and diplomatic cooperation with the US. Eight years of Obama’s presidency has left lights and shadows. On the one hand, he fostered normalization with Cuba and he played an important role in FARC’s and the Colombian government’s peace agreement. On the other hand, he was not able to radically change American relations with Latin countries. Obama promised to establish multilateral relations with South American countries failed. It cannot be identified a turning point in how Obama’s governments interfere with internal political affairs of Latin countries. Trump, uncertainty of US future Trump has promised to radically change US foreign policy. However, it is unclear how he will do so. During his presidential campaign, he contradicted himself several times. Trump said that he would reduce America’s intervention in the world. First of all, Trump’s disengagement will alter US commitment to international organizations. NATO and the defence agreements with Japan and South Korea could experience a decrease of US military and financial dedication. In addition, the relationships with China and Iran seem to be critical factors in the international equilibrium. Trump criticized Obama’s the Nuclear Deal with Iran, he could run away from the agreement and re-impose sanctions. His proposal to impose a 45% tariff on Chinese import would start an economic conflict with the Chinese government. The South American continent does not seem to be a priority in the new President’s agenda. Three main topics on Latin America dominated his electoral campaign:

• According to Pew Hispanic Center, in 2014 there were 11. 7 million Mexican immigrants residing in the US and 6.5 million of them would be illegally living in the country. So when he promised that 11 million illegal immigrants would be deported, it was clear whom he was referring to. Trump even claimed that he would force the Mexican government to build a wall on the border between the US and Mexico. His economic plan for “making America great again” claimed to bring back manufacturing factories to the US. Trump said he would overtax North American companies which produce in Mexico. After having described Mexican immigrants as drug dealers, criminals and rapists, in August 2016 Trump officially met Mexican President Nieto. But there were no significant results from their conversation. Actually, while Trump said Niento agreed to pay for a wall on the border, the Mexican President posted a tweet to contradict Trump’s claim

 

• Trump is one of the few Republican leaders that support the process of normalizing relations between Cuba and the US. The President-elected is said to agree with the “Cuban Thaw”, however, he argues that the US could have made a better deal. In this case, uncertainty about the future of Cuba-US relations is driven by the fact that the majority of the Republic party does not support the normalization of Cuban and North American relations.

 

• Even thought Nicholas Maduro, President of Venezuela, recently stated to hope for improving his relations with the US in Trump presidency, few days ago he called Trump a bandit. During his campaign, Trump was not friendly to Maduro, he said that “Venezuelans are good people, but they have been horribly damaged by the socialists in Venezuela and the next president of the United States must show solidarity with all the oppressed people in the hemisphere.”[3] Even if Trump does not believe in “exporting democracy”, it is unclear how he will work to improve US relations with Venezuela.

It is not clear what Trump’s presidency will mean for American and Latin countries relations, Trump is still a mystery. Obama’s presidency instead was an unsuccessful hope that the US would have been able to establish multilateral forms of cooperation with Latin American countries. ————————– Nicola Bilotta has a BA and a MA in History from Università degli Studi di Milano and a MSc in Economic History from the London School of Economics. He works as a Global Finance Research Assistant at The Banker (Financial Times) and collaborates as an external researcher at ISAG (Istituto di Alti Studi di Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliari). N.bilotta@lse.ac.uk [1] N. Lakhani, Did Hillary Clinton stand by as Honduras coup ushered in era of violence?, The Guardian 31/08/2016 [2] N. Lakhani, Did Hillary Clinton stand by as Honduras coup ushered in era of violence?, The Guardian 31/08/2016 [3] [3] M. E. Jorge, Venezuela expectant as to how Trump will address Chavismo and country’s crisis, Fow New Latino 18/11/2016  

By Mirko Zambelli, Minister, Embassy of Switzerland in the Netherlands. As a newcomer to the Netherlands, I was immediately struck by Dutch architecture (in fact, it was when I first saw the Gemeentemuseum in The Hague). This got me thinking about the Swiss architectural tradition, and how Switzerland has always been fertile ground for this art form. My country has produced several famous architects, such as Le Corbusier and, more recently, Peter Zumthor, Herzog & de Meuron and Mario Botta. It has also attracted foreign big names, such as Jean Nouvel, Renzo Piano and Daniel Liebeskind. To link our subject back to the Netherlands: did you know that the father of modern Dutch architecture, Hendrik Petrus Berlage, studied his craft at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich from 1875 to 1878? And the connection continues – the Swissôtel in Amsterdam is located in a building designed by Berlage! The Italian-speaking region I come from – Canton Ticino and partly Canton Grigioni – has greatly contributed to the Swiss architectural tradition. Even long before modern urbanization and industrial growth, Swiss Italian émigré architects, builders and craftsmen (stuccatori) were working for monasteries and courts across Europe (mainly in Italy, Germany, Austria, Poland and the Czech Republic) and into Russia, thus directly contributing to the early export of this cultural savoir-faire. Prominent early figures also include the maestri of the late Renaissance and Baroque period in Rome. Major works by these architects include the church of San Carlo alle Quatro Fontane/San Carlino and the Re Magi chapel (by Francesco Borromini), the façade of the St. Peter’s Basilica and the church of Sant’Anna della Valle (by Carlo Maderno), and the finalization of the dome, originally designed by Michelangelo, of the St. Peter’s Basilica (by Domenico Fontana, who also erected the 327-ton obelisk in St. Peter’s Square). All three men were born in Ticino. Another Ticino native, Domenico Trezzini, was influential in Russia, where he elaborated on the Petrine Baroque style of Russian architecture. Peter I of Russia commissioned him (among other architects) to design buildings for the new Russian capital of St. Petersburg. Among his most celebrated achievements are the Peter and Paul Fortress (including the Cathedral) and the Summer Palace. Trezzini even developed a personal relationship with the Czar, who became godfather to his son (who was, by the way, named Pietro). Building on this long tradition, today’s “Ticino Tendency” represents a globally recognized architectural style. Perhaps its most famous representative is Mario Botta, whose masterpieces spread across at least three continents. His landmarks include the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, the Cathedral of Evry in France, the Cymbalista Synagogue in Tel Aviv, and the Watari Museum in Tokyo. Closer to home, Botta also renovated Milan’s famous La Scala Opera House. In 1996, Botta and Aurelio Galfetti – another famous contemporary Swiss-Italian architect – founded the Academy of Architecure in Botta’s native city of Mendrisio. This Accademia is a testimonial to the longstanding and prestigious architectural tradition from the Italian-speaking region of Switzerland, linking the venerable Renaissance and Baroque maestri with the currently vibrant Ticinese school, as well as providing a laboratory with a strong international vocation for the future. Joining the Swiss and Dutch architectural traditions today is an agreement between the Accademia in Mendrisio and the TU Delft school of architecture, the European Mobility Program (students exchange). And finally, it is worth mentioning that another globally famous architect from Ticino (also from Mendrisio), Luigi Snozzi, designed the Stoa residence in Maastricht.    

By Corneliu Pivariu, CEO INGEPO Consulting, MG (two stars general – ret.) The relations between Turkey and Iran witnessed a tempestuous evolution during the history as a result of their many times diverging interests in the Near and the Middle East and even in Asia. However, during the last century and in spite of the competition between the two countries, peace remained a major coordinate of their relationship as the commercial and energy relations developed with some intermissions and the two cooperated regionally whenever their interests converged. The so-called Arab spring, Turkey’s participation to the missile shield and the civil war in Syria were dissenting elements between the two countries that seemed to soften after the aborted coup in Turkey and the reinforcement of Erdogan’s political system. However, it should be noted that both Ankara and Tehran backed local partners and the groups close to each of them during the last fights in Mossul, Aleppo and Raqa and tried to position themselves as well as possible in the event of an evolution towards a long expected peace particularly by the civil population in Syria and Iraq. The possibility that an Iranian drone (UAV) caused the death of four Turkish military on November 24th in the area of al-Bab town in Syria represented an element of dangerous escalation. We noticed the visit of the Turkish foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu (although he formally denied that the subject of the drone was discussed in Tehran) together with Hakan Fidan – the head of MIT to the Iranian capital on November 26th as well as the phone talks of president Erdogan with president Putin on the subject. Russia said that the troops loyalist to Bashar al Assad do not have such drones and that the only plausible alternatives are the Iranian Al Quds forces, the Lebanese Hezbollah or other Shia militias. Aleppo’s control by the coallition backing Bashar al-Assad (and Russia played a major role in that) to which Tehran’s participation with important forces should be added represent another element of discontent for for president Erdogan. Nevertheless, the reality showing that Turkey imports around 10 billion cu.m. of gas from Iran (the second partner after Russia) and that the economic relations between the two countries were continuously developing from 1 billion dollar in 2000 to 4.2 billion dollar in 2005 and to 21.9 billion dollar in 2012 cannot be ignored. Despite their long time relations, there is a mutual distrust between Turkey and Iran including in the field of economic relations, but the distrust is more visible as far as the regional situation is concerned. Iran does not agree on Turkey’s support for the anti-Assad opposition and on the support it grants to the Sunni jihadist groups as all that jeopardizes its strategic interests in Syria, its bonds to the Lebanese Hebollah and condemns Ankara for allowing the flow of jihadists into Syria and for granting them logistic and financial support. Turkey is worried of the support Iran is granting to some Kurdish formations, PKK included, of creating an autonomous zone at the frontier with Syria and of the actions of some Iraqi Shia militias backed by Tehran in the Mosul region, erstwhile an Ottoman province. The Middle East’s conflicts are not leading us towards a positive evolution, quite on the contrary, as future appears less predictible in an area where estimations were anyway difficult to foresee. None of the players acting at the moment is spared of possible future failures. Contacts at different political levels from minister to the highest level between Ankara and Tehran were much more intense during the last six months and that makes us believe a strategic understanding between the two countries is possible. The role the USA and Russia might play in this context should not be neglected since a conflict between Ankara and Tehran is neither in the USA’s or Russia’s interest. We noticed the recent understanding among Russia, Turkey and Iran (initialled in Moscow on December 21st, 2016) for convening an international conference in Astana, Kazakhstan, during January (probably in the second part of the month) on Syria at the foreign ministers’ level. The USA didn’t attend Moscow’s negotiations SUA and probably will not participate at Astana’s conference according to the State Department spokesman: we were not excluded but we are not part of it either. That reflects in fact Obama Administration’s policy of not investing important political and military capital in Syria while president Putin made a strategic investment after which so far at least he got the expected results. Ankara wants that the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, the Syrian opposition (but without the Kurdish formation) participate at Astana while the High Committe for Negotiations (grouping the Syrian opposition’s political and military organisations) declares it doesn’t know yet anything about this initiative. Besides, we cannot speak of an united Syrian opposition with an unitary voice. We do not think, in this context, that this last Moscow’s initiative together with Ankara and Tehran has any chance (as it happened) and an eventual participation of Saudi Arabia and of other Gulf states is unlikely. Turkey and Iran will continue positioning themselves as better as possible in the Middle East’s geopolitical equation. ——- About the author: Corneliu Pivariu, former first deputy for military intelligence (two stars general) in the Romanian MoD, retired 2003. Member of IISS – London, alumni of Harvard – Kennedy School Executive Education and others international organizations. Founder of INGEPO Consulting, and bimonthly Bulletin, Geostrategic Pulse”. Main areas of expertise – geopolitics, intelligence and security. Photographer: Ionus Paraschiv.  

By Burak Haylamaz.   “Does presidential system enshrine in your heart?” This question was asked by foremost journalist Mehmet Ali Birand to the former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who currently holds the seat of head of state, on 05.06.2011 in the TV programme 32.Gun (32^th day). Mr. Erdogan confirmed his wishes towards a presidential system but preceded his sentence by stating that he had no intent to insist, that he merely wanted to discuss it and refer to the will of people. [1] From that day on, Turkey has politically discussed the advantages and disadvantages of a presidential system in Turkey. Moreover, a transition from the parliamentary system to a presidential system had already been taken into practice under the ruling of Justice and Development Party (hereinafter JDP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan through the constitutional amendments of 2007 which provided that the head of state would be elected by popular votes.[2] Therefore, Turkey could be considered as a semi-presidential system since 2007 where the head of state is directly elected and have a mandate of his own, thus being not accountable to parliament meanwhile the head of government is elected by parliament and accountable to it with regards to confidence rule.[3] However, the system has still been outweighed parliamentary system as the Constitution of Turkey vested the head of state with merely ceremonial powers. Therefore, although executive power is shared between the President and the government, many executive functions are predominantly exercised by the government, such as introducing a bill[4] and bearing responsibility for the implementation of the general policy[5]. Furthermore, almost all presidential decrees need a countersignature of the Prime Minister and the ministers concerned, thus they are held responsible for these decrees instead of the President himself. [6] The first popular elections for head of state were held in 2014 and Mr. Erdogan became the first directly elected president of the Republic of Turkey. Nevertheless, the reality of possessing merely ceremonial powers has not been welcomed by Mr. Erdogan as it did not suit his own book. Consequently, he has acted as a president of a presidential system, hiding behind the fact that he was directly elected by popular will and that he therefore had a responsibility towards the nation. Besides, he claimed that the executive system had practically changed whether this reality was admitted or not. According to his statements, the only thing that had to be done was to put pen to paper and to promote this reality within the legal framework.[7] For this purpose, Mr. Erdogan has consistently encouraged his former party JDP, holding a single-party government, to initiate the process for necessary constitutional amendments related to the establishment of the presidential system. Recently, it appears that the preliminary will and subsequently, de facto actions of Mr. Erdogan are very likely to be materialized since JDP, with the support of one opposition party NMP (Nationalist Movement Party), submitted proposals for constitutional amendment, which are predominantly concerned with the regulation of executive branch, to the National Assembly on 10/12/2016[8]. Furthermore, on January 21,2017, the Turkish Parliament approved the constitutional amendments.[9] However, since the law on the amendments to the Constitution was adopted by less than two-thirds majority of the parliament, it will be submitted to popular referendum.[10] In case affirmative answers will superior in referendum, these proposed amendments will enter into force. This paper aims to touch on the contents of the constitutional amendments and whether these amendments comply with the features of a presidential system. In that point, the proposed amendments will be compared with a world-renowned presidential system, namely United States. Thereafter, a legal-based prediction and the concerns of the author pursuant to the course of events in Turkey will be touched upon prior to the conclusion. 1.Constitutional Amendments Constitutional amendments package consists of 18 articles, which mostly aim to switch Turkey to a presidential system. This section is dedicated to examine noticeable articles. Article 4 of the proposed constitutional amendments regulates the parliamentary terms and election of both the president and the parliament.[11] According to this article, the term of parliament is increased from 4 to 5 years and both parliamentary and presidential elections will be held on the same day, every five years. The latter, also known as concurrent elections[12] may jeopardise the principle of separation of powers that is one of the essential feature in a presidential system. Since both elections manifest the will of constituents in a certain time, it is very likely that both the President and the majority party in parliament will be composed of the same political colour throughout the term. At first glance, it can be seen as an advantage considering it provides stability due to the conciliation between separated branches. Nevertheless, it may cause two severe problems. First, since the elections of two separated branches are held on the same day, the coattail effect will probably occur. The coattail effect is the correlation between presidential vote and legislative vote where the popular political party leader can attract votes for the same party’s candidates in the legislative race.[13] For instance, the presidential candidate of the party will get the attention of media and have significant finance for the campaign[14], creating an opportunity for legislative candidates of the same party to easily get a seat in parliament by making use of the popularity of the candidate running for head of executive.[15] Therefore, the competition for parliamentary seats will not be actualized on the basis of equal grounds. Secondly, this election method prevents constituents from reflecting their wills throughout the five years term. It is possible for voters to become uncomfortable from the actions of the powerholders and change their political preferences. However, they have to wait until the next elections to reflect their new preferences. In the United States, for instance, the constituents’ preferences are better reflected because both chambers of parliament’s seats are re-elected at least once during the term of the presidency. The lower chamber, House of Representatives, is elected for a two years term[16], and one-third of the upper chamber, the Senate, is re-elected every two years.[17] Therefore, the constituents have a chance to show their political choices more frequently. In case they do not approve the political policies of the President, they may cast a vote for a different political colour than the President’s in parliamentary elections and indicate to the President that the voters do not approve his actions. However, the proposed constitutional amendments in Turkey completely disregard this reality. It hinders to reflect wills of people for five years and eventually oblige them to put up with the possible dissatisfactory actions of powerholders. Article 6 of the proposed constitutional amendments is related to abolishment of parliamentary scrutiny over the executive branch. Hereunder, parliament will not have the competence to oversight ministers and hold the government accountable anymore. Besides, the obligation of ministers to answer oral questions in parliament is abolished.[18] These can be seen as some main features of the presidential system with the aim to provide a strict separation of powers between different branches, particularly between the executive and the legislature.[19] Both branches are no longer accountable to each other just like in the United States. However, in the United States even if the executive is not accountable to parliament, Congress can exercise parliamentary oversight by scrutinizing policies and public hearings.[20] Furthermore, the Congress not only exercises the power of confirmation hearings, e.g. power of President to make treaties can only be exercised by and with the advice of the Senate[21], but also has the power of the purse that is an important tool to have control over the executive branch.[22] Therefore, the parliament can curb the power of the President constitutionally which is a feature not foreseen in the proposed constitutional amendments in Turkey. First of all, although it might seem crucial to abolish the accountability of executive to provide for a presidential system, closing the door on checks and balances is not acceptable in any system since it may lead to despotism.[23] However, respective articles in proposed amendments jeopardise the checks and balances acutely by abolishing the oral questions. Because oral questions ensure that each government official is conscious of the possibility of facing the oversight of the parliament in case he has exceeded the power conferred to him by the constitution. Secondly, even further threatened, Article 15 of the proposed amendments states that the President will also be competent to draw up the annual budget and will submit it to the parliament for approval.[24]If the annual budget statute does not enter into force on the determined time period, hence the parliament does not approve it, the budget of the previous year will remain by being augmented. Although the parliament will possess, as the last instance, the power to determine whether the annual budget enters into force or not, the main check and balance tool of parliament, namely the power of the purse, will be undermined. Thus, the head of the executive, besides his executive functions, will hold the spending power. Even if he will have to submit it to the approval of the parliament, it can be considered like the general conditions to be accepted to download the software for your iPhone. While the President drafts the annual budget, he puts the parliament in a position of “take-it-or-leave it.” Therefore, these articles might lead to the despotism of the executive since an excessive power is provided, without checks and balances with the legislative. Article 7 and 8 of the proposed constitutional amendments regulate the election system, terms and tasks of the President, being some of the most controversial areas in the amendments. According to Article 7, the President is directly and popularly elected for a term of five years. The term is also renewable only once meaning that one candidate can only be President for a maximum of ten years. However, this period can be exceeded in cases the parliament decides to the renewal of elections by three-fifths of majority during the second term of the presidency. In that situation, both parliamentary and presidential elections will be held on the same day as mentioned above[25] and the incumbent President will be able to re-become a candidate for the new elections.[26] Therefore, the President may remain in office for a tenure of 15 years (3 terms). This kind of power holding for a long time is the prognostication of the words of Lord Acton[27] and can trigger a single-party dictatorship by a professionalized party, especially when the parliament and the President have the same political colour during this long-time period.[28] Furthermore, the preamble of Article 7 also indicates one of the desired outcomes of the proposed article, making it possible for the President to be a member of the political party of his own instead of the principle of neutrality of the presidential seat which was adopted in the current constitution.[29] Even though the drafters of the proposed amendments have the intention to switch Turkey to a presidential system by strictly preserving the separation of powers, this article lays down the groundwork for a fusion of powers. It can be considered that it also endures in the United States where, for instance, the new President Donald Trump is a republican candidate. However, this argument is rebuttable. Since the United States has a federal system, it hinders the smooth-working party system because this system focuses on the localism[30] and contributes to partisan fragmentation and lack of cohesiveness.[31] Therefore, several types of Republicans can be seen domestically and some of them can possibly have more in common with the opponent political party. For instance, conservative Republicans can find more common grounds with conservative Democrats than with liberal Republicans and liberal Democrats. Thus, even if the President represents a sole political colour, it is not guaranteed that he/she will be constantly supported by the political party of this political colour. Consequently, it is not possible to define the President as a leader of the party that he stands for. However, things are different in Turkey. The constitutional amendments preserve the unitary origin of Turkey. Thus, both the political party in parliament and the President whose bounds with that political party are protected, are met on the same line. Furthermore, as mentioned before it will be quite possible for the President and the majority party in parliament to have the same political colour since both presidential and parliamentary elections will be held on the same day.[32] It is not an unpredictable scenario that the President, exercising executive functions, will remain faithful to his political party that controls the majority of the seats in parliament, thus controlling the legislative branch. In that situation, it is evident that it will cause to undermine the idea of trias politica ascribed by the political philosopher Montesquieu. Additionally, Article 8 regulates the field of the power of the President who will both control the seat of head of state and of head of government. Therefore, the Prime Minister position will be abolished and the President will occupy the latter’s position. According to this article, the President will have the power to issue a presidential decree on matters related to executive powers, except the matters related to basic rights, personal rights and duties, and political rights and duties. In that point, the article gives an important authority to the head of state, pursuant to the feature of the presidential system, by empowering him with the power to issue executive orders. However, the article includes some tasks of the President that may severely jeopardize the mechanism of checks and balances. The President will have the power to appoint the ministers without the advice or consent of the parliament. This regulation is diametrically opposed to the presidential system of United States where the Senate approves the appointment of the President.[33] Furthermore, the power to control the military, which is restricted to the authorization of the parliament in the current constitution[34], will be granted to the President. Even though the power to declare war is still under the tasks of the parliament, vesting the President with the powers to use military power without any checks and balances has to be questioned. In the United States, even if the President has the power to use military, War Powers Resolution Act provides a parliamentary check on the presidential power.[35] Furthermore, the power of the purse of the Congress curbs the President from discretionary actions. However, the proposed constitutional amendments in Turkey do not include any checks and balances mechanism over the power of the President. The parliament has neither a say over the task of the President while using the military, nor holds the excessive power of the purse as mentioned above.[36] Therefore, it might lead to the seat of the head of executive to use an excessive amount of discretionary power. Article 11 of the proposed constitutional amendments regulates the renewal of the elections. According to the article, the President decides for the renewal of the elections, namely both parliamentary and presidential elections. In that case, both parliamentary and presidential elections are held on the same day. Therefore, the President can dissolve the parliament himself with the presidential decree with the condition to also renew the presidential elections. On the other hand, the parliament has a power to decide on the renewal of the elections by a three-fifths majority. Again, in that case, parliamentary and presidential elections are held jointly. This article is antipodal to the main philosophy of the presidential system that adopts a strict separation of powers. It is a sine qua non feature of the presidential system that neither the President nor the legislature can dismiss each other[37] because neither of them is constitutionally subordinated by the other.[38] Instead of a switch to the presidential system, this article clearly aims a fusion of executive and legislative powers, particularly in favour of the executive-holder. Indeed, if we compare the domain of the dismissal power of each branch, it is clear that the President may decide to discharge the parliament and call for early elections in an easier way than the parliament since it is not that facile for the parliament to provide a three-fifths super majority to call for new elections. In addition to that, in case the parliament is formed by the opposition-majority against the President[39], the President can dissolve the parliament as he pleases and may take the office with the support of a friendly majority after the new elections. This scenario is politically difficult to be actualized. Thus, it is apparent that this article provides the presidential seat to pool and concentrate more power by undermining the separation of powers and moving away from a presidential system. Article 14 of the proposed constitutional amendments has also eroded the separation of powers by providing considerable influence of executive over the judiciary branch. The article mentions that the head of the executive appoints half (6) of the member of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors, an institution charged with the dismissal and appointment of the civil and administrative judiciary judges and prosecutors.[40] Since, again, the appointments from the President does not require the consent or advice of any institution, it is possible for one of the uppermost institution of judiciary branch to be formed as an executive-shaped branch. Correspondingly, it is possible for judges to be appointed politically in accordance with the view of the executive. Moreover, it threatens the judicial independence since courts cannot decide freely because of the fear of undue influence from the executive branch. 2. Pres(s)idential System This section of the article aims to point out whether the proposed constitutional amendments comply with the presidential system or not. In order to reach an accurate conclusion, it is beneficial to emphasise on the essential features of the presidential system. Apart from the other government systems, in the presidential system, the head of executive is directly elected by mandate of his own, therefore neither accountable to the parliament nor owes commencement or continuation of his seat to the tolerance of the parliament.[41] In response, the parliament can correspondingly not be dissolved by the executive.[42] Therefore, the executive and the legislative powers are exercised independently from each other, adopting a strict separation of powers.[43] The main purpose of the separation of powers is to curb powerholders of any branch to obtain highly concentrated power.[44] In order to ensure that, separation of powers is supplemented with a system of checks and balances where each branch has the power to watch over the other branches to check on them for the purpose of preventing an abuse of power. For instance, in the United States both branches are regulated respectively in the first three articles of US Constitution. The check and balances are also provided by the Constitution; judges check the legislative branch whether it remains within the limits of power that conferred to it[45], the legislature has the power of the purse[46] and the power of approval on the appointments of the executive[47]-including the President’s nominations for federal judges- and finally the President is involved in the law-making process by his suspensive veto power[48]. The proposed constitutional amendments in Turkey do not provide such a presidential system since both legislature and executive may boot out each other on the condition to subsequently discharge themselves.[49] Therefore, it is possible to deduce that the proposed system is an interpretation of parliamentary system where the head of the executive can dissolve the parliament while the parliament can oust the head of the executive. We used the notion of interpretation because the proposed system has also some deviations from the parliamentary system. First of all, in a parliamentary system, there is a Prime Minister near to the head of state under the roof of the executive branch. However, the position of the Prime Minister is abolished in the proposed constitutional amendments.[50] Therefore, prominent constitutional law scholar Kemal Gozler qualifies this system as “non-Prime Ministerial Parliamentary System.”[51] Secondly, in the proposed system, it is difficult for the legislative to oust the executive, as it requires a three-fifths majority. If we compare it with the other parliamentary systems, this distinction will be apparent. For instance, in Germany, the Chancellor who has a significant influence on the implementation of the executive power, can be ousted by constructive vote, namely with an absolute majority of the parliament.[52] Therefore, the proposed system apparently strengthens the hand of the executive by making it difficult to oust the seat of presidency. The actual intention of these articles should be questioned if the proposed constitutional amendments do not stipulate a switch to a presidential system. What is then the purpose behind all these constitutional amendments? This question can be answered by examining what these articles bring on the field of separation of powers and checks and balances. In the upcoming explanation, the conclusion that the proposed constitutional amendments secure a fusion of power in favour of the executive branch will be reached. Since both parliamentary and presidential elections will be held on the same day, it is desired by the drafters to provide that the same political line will hold both powers. This argument can also be supported by the article 8 of the amendments that the President can furthermore be a member of the political party he stood for. And, in case the parliament is formed by the opposition-majority, the President has a strong political tool, compared with what the parliament holds, since he can easily dissolve the parliament with a presidential decree and may take the seat with the support of a friendly majority in parliament. On the other hand, the proposed amendments serve the fusion of powers by undermining the system of checks and balances as well. First of all, appointments of the President and using military are not checked by any institution. Since these powers are totally under the discretionary power of the President, it leads the accumulation of too much power in the hands of the executive. Secondly, the executive conserves too much influence on the formation of the judicial branch. The President has the competence to appoint six members of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) again without any approval or advice of any institution. Therefore, in case the constitutional amendments will enter into force, not only the legislative but also the judicial branch will be shaped under the influence of the executive. Furthermore, it should be noted that there is no restriction over the power of central authority in Turkey. In federal systems, most executive power is under the competence of the federal entities.[53] Thus, the federal government can be balanced in this way. However, the unitary formation of the Turkey is preserved in those constitutional amendments. Therefore, all powers are used from the central authority without any restrictions by any entity which may also encourage the executive to use highly concentrated power. Clearly, the fusion of powers in the hands of the executive without any restriction is the desired goal of the proposed constitutional amendments. Furthermore, it is crystal-clear that this desire may undermine the liberty and the democracy. In his best-known work The Spirits of the Laws Montesquieu illustrates this point by stating; “When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and the liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression. There would be end of everything, were the same man or same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, (…)”[54] Therefore, the drafters of the constitutional amendments in Turkey may have made a huge mistake by assisting the possibility of a fusion of power in the hands of the executive since it will pave the way for tyranny and threatening liberties and freedoms. Thus, I would like to call the desired system as a pres(s)idential system as a system which has not the characteristics of a presidential system, undermines the systems of both separation of powers and checks and balances, and correspondingly sets a severe pressure on liberty. 3. Quo Vadis, Turkey? [55] There is a noticeable link between the current president Mr Erdogan and the majority party in parliament, namely Justice and Development Party that forms the government either since Mr Erdogan is the founder chairperson of the JDP[56] and has acted in the same line with that party on the way of ‘new Turkey’.[57] Therefore, it can be considered that both legislative and executive functions are under the influence of the same body, JDP. According to Montesquieu, there can be no liberty in that situation. It is also supported by the report of the Freedom of House where the trend arrow showing the freedom status in Turkey has been scrolled down gradually.[58] The Human Rights Watch’s 2015 World Report also stated that both JDP and Mr Erdogan has undermined human rights and rule of law in Turkey by demonstrating intolerance to the freedom of media, through the harassment of the opposition and by bringing the police, prosecutors and judges under greater executive control.[59] Furthermore, if we look at the actions of the executive-shaped authority only within a year; there are more than 100,000 people -including judges, teachers, police officers, military officers- are suspended[60], 146 journalists[61] and 9 opposition party members are arrested, 130 media business is closed, more than 32,000 people is remanded in custody[62] in the course of witch-hunted process. These anti-democratic actions have been taken under the practically changed executive system -without having the legal framework- as Mr Erdogan claims.[63] The question is what will happen if this executive system is supported by a legal framework as the proposed constitutional amendments aim to reach? Where does Turkey go from here? I would like to answer it by using an argument from the best-known work of the classical Greek philosopher Plato, ‘The Republic’. Plato mentions five types of regimes in Book VIII of The Republic, namely aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny. Each regime is represented by a man and possesses significant virtues such as freedom, as an outstanding feature of democracy (democratic man). Freedom initially makes democracy the best form of government where it is even possible for philosophers to live under the roof of it.[64] However, this freedom must be established based on necessities. Otherwise, it would have inevitable consequences where the democratic man will become a slave of his unnecessary desires. In that situation, the son of the democratic man will become a tyrant due to degeneration. The ruling of the tyrannical man is the worst form of government, where a tyrant would deny any restriction by law and act discretionarily in order to satisfy his insatiable appetite.[65] Hence, it is possible to say that democracy opens the gates for tyranny, a potential dictatorship, if the freedom corrupts. In that point, it is important to distinguish what is an unnecessary desire that corrupts the virtue of freedom. Plato makes the distinction between necessary and unnecessary desires by revealing that; “(…) Will not the desire of eating, that is, of simple food and condiments, in so far as they are required for health and strength, be of the necessary class? That is what I should suppose. The pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways; it does us good and it is essential to the continuance of life? Yes. But the condiments are only necessary in so far as they are good for health. Certainly. (…) ”[66] As it can be seen supra paragraphs, the proposed constitutional amendments are not good condiments for the “health” of Turkey because they may contribute to the strengthening of the executive in an excessive way while destroying the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances. Thus, the proposed articles pave the way for a powerholder to actualize the unnecessary desires of him, eventually causing the corruption of freedom and prompt to a tyranny or dictatorship. In that point, the legal-based predictions and concerns may be perceived as too unrealistic. However, it should be known that history repeats itself. A prominent example in history, Alexander Lukashenko took the seat of presidency in 1994 in Belarus and obtained an overwhelming victory (70.5%) in a referendum for constitutional amendments in 1996.[67] The constitutional amendments aimed to secure the presidency at the expense of the legislative and judiciary, meaning that undermining the system of separation of powers.[68] Lukashenko’s administration still governs Belarus. However, Lukashenko has transformed his presidency into a de facto dictatorship. Therefore, the country is known as “the last dictatorship in Europe”[69] and sanctioned by the European Union because of the lack of protection for human rights, democracy and rule of law.[70] Hence, it is not an unrealistic prediction that the executive leader of Turkey will take the same steps as Lukashenko did, on the way for dictatorship. 4.Conclusion If the proposed constitutional amendments enter into force, Turkey will not only have an ambiguous governmental system but will also welcome significant violations to the doctrine of separation of powers in favor of the executive branch at the expense of an independent legislature and judiciary. These changes will inherently bring several consequences. First, liberty can be damaged by the actions of a strengthened executive power. The one holding the power is not essential in this issue. As Lord Acton said, “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”[71]Therefore, no matter who is the holder of the power, the power solely tends to corrupt. Moreover, in case the power is not restricted but absolute, it will in turn corrupt absolutely. Secondly, the democratic formation of Turkey will be threatened due to these changes. The state may naturally preserve democracy under the constitution. Nevertheless, democracy is not a de jure but a de facto phenomenon. It should be known that both constitutions of Belarus and Syria guarantee the democratic formation of their countries. However, both countries are ruled under a dictatorship. Even today, Turkey has started to be associated with dictatorship, thus any legal endorsement will provide the way to legitimize and uphold it. Consequently, it is essential for Turkey to retreat on the way to dictatorship. BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources

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Revised edition, Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1992   [1] Ibrahim Sari, Baskanlik Sistemi: Bol-Parcala-Tut (1^st edition, Net Medya Yayincilik, Antalya 2016) pp33 [2] Constitution of The Republic of Turkey 1982, Article 101 [3] Aalt Willem Heringa, Constitutions Compared an Introduction to Comparative Constitutional Law (4th edition, Intersentia, 2016) pp201 [4] Constitution of The Republic of Turkey 1982, Article 88 [5] Constitution of The Republic of Turkey 1982, Article 112 [6] Constitution of The Republic of Turkey 1982, Article 105 [7] Erdinc Celikkan, ‘Erdogan urges change in charter due to the de facto change in president’s new role’ (2015) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-urges-change-in-charter-due-to-de-facto-change-in-presidents-new-role.aspx?pageID=238&nID=86992&NewsCatID=338> accessed 08 January 2017 [8] The proposal and preamble of the constitutional amendments [10/12/2016] TBMMB No: 97045 [9] Law on changing the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [21/07/2017] TBMMB No: 6771 [10] Constitution of The Republic of Turkey 1982, Article 175 [11] Law on changing the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [21/07/2017] TBMMB No: 6771, Article 4 [12]David J.Samuels and Matthew S. Shugart, Presidents, Parties and Prime Ministers; How to Seperation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behaviour ( 1^st edition, Cambridge University Press, 2010) pp129 [13] Paul Allen Beck, Party Politics in America, (8th edition, New York, Longman, 1997), pp. 251. [14] David Samuels, ‘Concurrent Elections, Discordant Results: Presidentialism, Federalism, and Governance in Brazil’ in David Samuels (eds), Comparative Politics ( Vol. 33, No.1, City University of New York, 2000) pp.3 [15] Kenneth L. Hill, An Essential Guide To American Politics And The American Political System (Bloomington, Author House, 2012), pp.81 [16] The Constitution of the United States 1787 (USA) Article 1/2 [17] Ibid. 3, pp.117 [18] Law on changing the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [21/07/2017] TBMMB No: 6771, Article 6 [19] Raymond A. Smith, The American Anomaly: US Politics and Government in Comparative Perspective (3^rd edition, United Kingdom, Routledge, 2014) pp.40 [20] Ibid.3, pp.187 [21] The Constitution of the United States 1787 (USA) Article 2/2 [22] The Constitution of the United States 1787 (USA) Article 1/8 and Article. 1/9 [23] James L. Sundquist, Constitutional Reform and Effective Government (Revised edition, Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1992), pp.278 [24] Law on changing the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [21/07/2017] TBMMB No: 6771, Article 15 [25] Law on changing the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [21/07/2017] TBMMB No: 6771, Article 4 [26] Law on changing the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [21/07/2017] TBMMB No: 6771, Article 11 [27] “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely” [28] Natasha Ezrow and Erica Frantz, Dictators and Dictatorships; Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and Their Leaders ( New York, Continuum, 2011) pp.34 [29] Constitution of The Republic of Turkey 1982, Article 101 [30] E. Allen Helms, ‘The President and Party Politics’ [1949] TJP pp.42-43 [31] David Samuels, ‘Concurrent Elections, Discordant Results: Presidentialism, Federalism, and Governance in Brazil’ in David Samuels (eds), Comparative Politics ( Vol. 33, No.1, City University of New York, 2000) pp.2 [32] ibid. 11 [33] The Constitution of the United States 1787 (USA) Article 2/2 [34] Constitution of The Republic of Turkey 1982, Article 92 [35] Eric Talbot Jensen, ‘Future War and the War Powers Resolution’ (2013) 29(3) EILR <http://law.emory.edu/eilr/content/volume-29/issue-3/article/war-powers-resolution.html > accessed 08 January 2017 [36] Ibid. 24 [37] Herman Schwarts, ‘Buildings Blocks for a Constitution’, in: Constitutionalism and Emerging Democracies (EJUSDS 2004) pp.14 [38] Ibid.3, pp182 [39] ^{Since Article 4 of the proposed constitutional amendments provides that both parliamentary and presidential elections is held on same day, political contradiction between the presidency and majority of parliament may probably not occur since constituents vote for a political party they preferred in a certain time for two separated powers jointly. Therefore, voters are apt to choose party and correspondingly candidate of presidency of the same party at the time of election.} [40] High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, http://www.hcjp.gov.tr/About.aspx [41] Ibid.3, pp.26 [42] Ibid.3, pp.182 [43] Kemal Gozler, ‘Elveda Kuvvetler Ayriligi, Elveda Anayasa: 10 Aralik 2016 Tarihli Anayasa Degisikligi Teklifi Hakkinda Bir Elestiri’ (2016) <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/elveda-anayasa-v2.htm> accessed 08 January 2017 [44] Julia Hargrove, Judicial Branch of Government (Teaching and Learning Company, 2000) pp.8 [45] The Constitution of the United States 1787 (USA) Article 3 [46] The Constitution of the United States 1787 (USA) Article 1/8 [47] The Constitution of the United States 1787 (USA) Article 2/2 [48] The Constitution of the United States 1787 (USA) Article 1/7 [49] Law on changing the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [21/07/2017] TBMMB No: 6771, Article 11 [50] Law on changing the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [21/07/2017] TBMMB No: 6771, Article 8 [51] Ibid.41 [52] Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 1949 (FRG) Article 67 [53] Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (translated by Anders Wedberg, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1945) pp.321   [54] Baron De Montesquieu, The Sprits of the Laws (translated by Thomas Nugent, Complete Edition, New York, Cosimo Classics, 1914, translated by Thomas Nugent in 2011) pp.151 [55]Latin phrase that meaning “Where are you going?” This question was asked by Miriam Goldschmitt in The Diplomat magazine by UNSA, thus I would like to answer the question by following legal steps. [56] Founding Members of Justice and Development Party http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/yonetim/kurucu-uyeler [57] Nebi Mis and Ali Aslan, Erdogan Siyaseti ve Kurucu Cumhurbaskanligi Misyonu (Seta, 2014) pp.25 [58] Freedom in the World (2016), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/turkey accessed 08 January 2017 [59] World Report 2015: Turkey, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/turkey accessed 08 January 2017 [60]Tim Arango, Ceylan Yeginsu and Safak Timur,” Turks see purge as Witch Haunt of ‘Medieval’ Darkness” (2016) TNYT http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/world/europe/turkey-erdogan-gulen-purge.html?_r=0 accessed 08 January 2017 [61] Name of the arrested journalists, http://tutuklugazeteciler.blogspot.nl/ accessed 08 January 2017 [62] News Agencies, Turkey: 32,000 jailed for links to group ‘behind’ coup http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/turkey-32000-jailed-links-group-coup-160928090832760.html accessed 08 January 2017 [63] Ibid.7 [64] Geoffrey Allan Plauche, The Cycle of Decline of Regimes in Plato’s Republic, http://gaplauche.com/blog/2011/04/13/the-cycle-of-decline-of-regimes-in-platos-republic/?utm_source=wordtwit&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=wordtwit accessed 08 January 2017 [65] Plato, The Republic (Book VIII), (translated and introduction by R.E. Allen, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2006,) [66] Ibid.62 [67] Michael R. Gordon, ‘President of Belarus Wins Referandum on Expanding His Power’ (1996) TNYT http://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/26/world/president-of-belarus-wins-referendum-on-expanding-his-power.html accessed 08 January 2017 [68] Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution, ‘Country Reports: Belarus 1996’ https://www.princeton.edu/~pcwcr/reports/belarus1996.html accessed 08 January 2017 [69] Brian Bennett, ‘The Last Dictatorship in Europe: Belarus Under Lukashenko’ ( 1^st edition, United Kingdom, Hurst & Company, 2011) [70] The Council of the European Union, 15 October 2012, Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Belarus [71] Lionel S. Lewis, ‘When Power Corrupts: Academic Governing Boards in the Shadow of the Adelphi Case’ (New Jersey, Transaction Publishers, 2000)