By Corneliu Pivariu, CEO INGEPO Consulting, MG (two stars general – ret.) A fulminant ascent of the French political stage of this young men, 39 years old, the founder and the candidate of En Marche! movement, established on April the 6th, 2016 only who won the first round of the French presidential elections and who is designated by all public opinion polls as winner of the second round (May the 7th) at a great distance from the second place, Marine Le Pen – the candidate of the National Front. At the second round, he won with 66,9% against 33,1%, becoming the 8th President of France during the Fifth Republic. A graduate of the National School of Administration (ENA) in 2004, he worked as inspector of taxes with the French ministry of finances (where he met Jaques Attali – with whom he maintains verry good relations), then for a period (2008-2012) in the banking system (Rothschild&Cie -Investments), from where his fortune originated. In 2012 he was appointed by the president François Hollande (both of them fellows at ENA and who knew each other since 2006) as the latter’s economic advisor and deputy general secretary at Élysée, and, in 2014, the prime minister Walls appointed him as minister of economy and industry, a position he resigned from in August 2016. In November the same year, he declared he will run for the presidency as candidate of the movement he established, En Marche!, (a movement which, according to recent declarations, numbers already more that 200,000 members). Macron declares he belongs to the centre and there are enough voces reproaching him of betraying François Hollande when he saw the latter has no chances for a second mandate. Emmanuel Macron is a product of the System (we consider that under this denomination there is a group of interests, mainly of economic and financial nature having objectives that differ from those of the existing political parties and that brings together personalities of the most important fields of the economic, banking, defense and security system and media life as well as of other important fields), who found a candidate able to coalesce the options of the electorate dissatisfied with the entire spectre of the political class and wins the position of France’s president. Macron’s platform has six main elements: upholding culture and education as a condition for achieving national cohesion; modernizing the economy; job creation; reinforcing security; strengthening the democratic principles and institutions and defending France’s interests abroad as a major orientation of the foreign policy. Here are some of the most concrete elements of the center candidate Macron’s program: cutting public expenditures by 60 bill. € yearly during the next 5 years; cutting corporate tax from 33% to 25%, a drop in unemployment from 10% to 7% and savings of 10 bill. € in unemployment benefits; increasing the defense budget to 2% of the GDP – according to NATO’s decision; reducing the number of parliamentarians by a third. In order to reinforce the national security Macron stressed the importance of developping the European defense system by setting up a 5,000 strong military force for defending the European Union’s borders. The program provides as well for a 50 bill. € investment plan for 5 years, programes for the agriculture – for encouraging the local producers, the development of renewable energy sources, the development of the control mechanisms of the investments and orienting them towards the country’s strategic sectors. As far as migration is concerned, it proposes reducing the time of asylum granting to six months and all who are rejected must be immediately deported under escort, thus reducing the risk of the presence of foreigners without staying documents in France. Emmanuel Macron is an opponent of the post-Brexit populists – and the vote in The Netherlands calmed the spirits in Europe, and is a proponent of France’s appurtenance and contribution to the European Union. Being approved by the banking system, Macron will enjoy its support if he continues the policies promised in this field. How will Macron govern after the parliamentary elections of this year when, most probably, his formation will not succeed in obtaining the majority in parliament? How will he succeed in recovering France’s economy relegated to the 28th place globally as per GDP, with a continuously increase of the public debt since 2006 (64.3% of the GDP) and that reached 96% in 2016 (2,150 bill. €)? These are some questions only to which Emmanel (the God’s son in Hebrew), will have to find not only answers but to implement them too. —- About the author: Corneliu Pivariu, former first deputy for military intelligence (two stars general) in the Romanian MoD, retired 2003. Member of IISS – London, alumni of Harvard – Kennedy School Executive Education and others international organizations. Founder of INGEPO Consulting, and bimonthly Bulletin, Geostrategic Pulse”. Main areas of expertise – geopolitics, intelligence and security.

(Refeudalisation of Europe – I Part)

By Professor Anis H. Bajrektarevic. The lonely superpower (US) vs. the bear of the permafrost (Russia), with the world’s last cosmopolite (EU) in between. Is the ongoing calamity at the eastern flank of the EU a conflict, recalibration, imperialism in hurry, exaggerated anti-Russian xenophobia or last gasp of confrontational nostalgia? Just 20 years ago, the distance between Moscow and NATO troops stationed in Central Europe (e.g., Berlin) was more than 1.600 km. Today, it is only 120 km from St. Petersburg. Is this a time to sleep or to worry? ‘Russia no longer represents anything that appeals to anyone other than ethnic Russians, and as a result, the geopolitical troubles it can cause will remain on Europe’s periphery, without touching the continent’s core’ – was the line of argumentation recently used by Richard N. Haass, President of the US Council of Foreign Relations. Is it really so? Is there any intellectually appealing call originating from Russia? Russia is a legal, not an ideological, successor of the late Soviet Union. Many in Greece, Latin America and elsewhere in the world mingled the two. Does it still today represent a lonely champion of antifascism and (pan-)Slavism? Is the Slavism, identity, secularism and antifascism, while abandoned in Eastern Europe, confused perhaps by the mixed signals from the austerity-tired Atlantic Europe and über-performing Central Europe? For the EU, Ukraine is (though important) an item of the Neighborhood Policy and for the US it is a geopolitical pivot. However, for Russia, it is all this plus emotional attachment. Without Ukraine, to what extent is Russia Christian and European? Is the EU a subject or a hostage (like Ukraine) of the mega-geopolitical drama whose main and final stage is in the Asia-Pacific theater? What is the objective here – the ultimate score (territorial gain) or an altered style of the game (new emotional charge of confrontation added to the international relations)? What is a road map, an exit, a future perspective – relaxation or escalation? Hegemony, hegemoney, or a global (post-dollar) honeymoon? New religionism: Powerful self-imposed deterrent Without a socio-political cohesion via integralism, it is rather impossible to reverse the socio-economic decomposition of Russophone and Eastern Europe. Unity for cohesion does not mean a (rigid communist) unanimity. But, Europe’s East is still mixing the two. Consequently, all three cohesive forces of Eastern Europe have disappeared: (i) atheistic elites (irrespectively from their ethnic, religious, social and linguistic background); (ii) antifascism; and (iii) Slavism. How to reinvigorate overall societal passions and drives for the enhancement of nation without unifying ideological narrative? While the secularism of Atlantists increases the intellectual appeal of their indigenous ideology – that of neoliberalism, transcontinentally; the newly discovered neo-clericalism of Eastern and Russophone Europe plays, not an emancipating, but a powerful self-restraining role. At home, it only polarizes, fragments and undermines vital social consensus, and for abroad it serves as a powerful self-deterrent. Simply, beyond its narrow ethnic frames or national borders such neo-religionism motivates none to nothing. In the 21^st century, dominated by the socially mobilized, secularized and knowledge-based nations across the world, religionism of East (static and rigid like its retrograde MENA sibling) only further alienates, isolates and marginalizes that region. It easily ends up in ethno-chauvinistic overtones that are not only isolating its proprietor, but also antagonizing or radically mobilizing its neighbors. Globally, it means that while East remains entrenched in its ‘newly discovered’ religionism, only one ideology remains unchallenged and uncontested – that of Atlantist neoliberalism. Logically, East neither controls its own narrative nor (interpretation of) history: Due to a massive penetration of Central Europe, East grossly relativized, trivialized and silenced its own past and present anti-fascism. Additionally, this region does not effectively control its media space. Media there (of too-often dubious orientation and unspecified ownership) is distracting vital public debates: discouraging, disorienting and silencing any sense of national pride, influence over destiny direction and to it related calls for self-(re) assessment. Today, Eastern Europe is not even sure, if its anti-fascism should be a question of choice or a matter of pure survival. Its mental de-territorialisation is corrosive and deep. Pauperised masses – empowered lumpen proletariat In a combination with above, the speed and dimensions of criminal redistribution of national wealth and cruel pauperisation of masses (euphemistically called ‘western style privatisation’ of 1990s) deeply transformed the East, turning many into a re-feudalized society. By the end of Yeltsin dizzy rule, even the biggest critics of the Soviet era were horrified by the post-Soviet destruction of Eastern Europe. In 2000, much quoted Alexander Solzhenitsyn screamed out loudly: “Will we continue looting and destroying Russia until nothing is left? … God forbid these ‘reforms’ should continue.” For that, he was of course, silenced and marginalized, and never quoted. Indeed, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the severity, frequency and tempo of that social re-engineering via criminal redistribution of national wealth had no parallel historic example. Seems as if the region was left to choose between genocide (ex-YU) and its evil twin – social apartheid (elsewhere in the East)? Where were the famous dissidents from East? Why didn’t the academia of Eastern Europe debate about it? And, while famous East intelligentsia remains mute, answers are streaming from the dominant narrative, that of West. Moreover, describing who these new elites of the East are, western authors are breaking another Eastern taboo – quoting Karl Marx. Number of quotation of Karl Marx in e.g. the New York Times, FAM, Economist, Wall Street Journal or other western neoliberal opinion-makers per annum is higher than all cumulative quotations of Karl Marx in Eastern Europe for the past two decades. Thinkers of the East expulsed Marx and Engels to (intellectual) Gulag indefinitely. Hence, discussing the new emerging class on both sides of Atlantic (also Useful Idiots of Euro-Med theatre – a power-base of the so-called Arab Spring), Daniel Henninger does not hesitate to consider them a retrograde force of ‘lumpen proletariat’, outcasts turned professional dissidents, a fake class of ‘social scam’. Writing in the WSJ (Trumpen Proletariat, July 06 2016), to support his argument, he states: “Karl Marx, in a particularly dyspeptic moment, offered this description of what he dismissed as the lumpen proletariat: ‘Alongside decayed roués with dubious means of subsistence and of dubious origin, alongside ruined and adventurous offshoots of the bourgeoisie, were vagabonds, discharged soldiers, discharged jailbirds, escaped galley slaves, swindlers, mountebanks, lazzaroni, pickpockets, tricksters, gamblers, pimps, brothel keepers, porters, literati, organ grinders, ragpickers, knife grinders, tinkers, beggars—in short, the whole indefinite, disintegrated mass, thrown hither and thither, which the French call la bohème.’” New elites of neo-feudalism?! European dream refeudalised … ————- Author: Professor Anis H. Bajrektarevic Vienna, 31 March 2017/ anis@corpsdiplomatique.cd    The author is chairperson and professor in international law and global political studies, Vienna, Austria. He authored three books: FB – Geopolitics of Technology (published by the New York’s Addleton Academic Publishers); Geopolitics – Europe 100 years later (DB, Europe), and the just released Geopolitics – Energy – Technology by the German publisher LAP. No Asian century is his forthcoming book, scheduled for later this year.

By Anton Lutter, MA. More then ever the international press has focused on the Dutch parliamentary elections last April. The reason: the surge of populist influence in Europe. After the Brexit referendum in Great Britain the elections in The Netherlands would be the first parliamentary elections in Europe, before the much awaited presidential election in France on April 23 and second round in may, parliamentary elections in Germany on the 24th of September this year and quite unexpectedly general elections June 8 in Great Britain. Europe was obviously relieved that the populist PVV (Party for Freedom) under its well-known leader Mr. Geert Wilders, although gaining 4 seats ending up a total of 20, didn’t become the largest party in parliament. What didn’t hit the international press was that beforehand most parties had excluded forming a government coalition with PVV, so in reality even if the PVV had become ultimate winner, they would never had obtained cabinet positions. If populism has been defeated is of course another question. Elections don’t solve problems good government does, so it is up to the new government to address the issues which underlie the existence of populism. The march 15 elections with a record setting 81,9% turnout and 28 parties contending 150 parliamentary seats, have brought some significant changes in the political landscape. The government party VVD (Peoples party for Freedom and Democracy), with its leader prime minister Mr. Mark Rutte lost 8 seats in parliament, though with 33 seats still remains the largest group in parliament. Traditionally the largest party will take the lead in forming a new government, VVD minister of health, welfare and sport has been chosen to act as the so-called informateur, whose role is to explore possible governing alliances. The second government party the PVDA (Labour party) has taken the biggest loss in seats of any party in Dutch history. They went from 38 to 9 seats losing more then 1.7 million popular votes, meaning their participation in a new government is highly unlikely. Thus the combined government parties lost a total of 37 seats, the biggest loss since the elections of 2002. Minister Schippers has chosen to look into alliances which include the most significant winners, being CDA, D’66 and GL. CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal) with 19 seats has ended being the third party in parliament. Under its current leader Mr. Sybrand van Haersma Buma the CDA gained 6 seats. Without doubt they will enter government again, being excluded in 2012 due to heavy losses. Since the founding of the CDA in 1977 they have been in opposition only three times and delivered the prime ministers up until 1994 and lastly between 2002-2010. The fourth party D’66 (Democrats 66) gained 7 seats also having 19 seats. Their party leader Mr. Alexander Pechtold, also a former minister of government reform and kingdom relations (2005-2006) is expected to enter the cabinet again. The “big win” has been GL (Green Left). The youthful leadership of Jesse Klaver has won the party 10 seats ending with 14 seats being the fourth largest party in parliament. GL, which has never been in government, have a strong left-green program which will make it a challenge to form a coalition with the previously mentioned parties. Also remarkable of this election is the fact that parliament has to divide its seats amongst 13 parties, whereby DENK and Forum for Democracy have entered as new parties obtaining 3 and 2 seats respectively. DENK was founded in 2015 by two former PVDA members of parliament of Turkish descent who broke away forming Group Tunahan/Öztürk. They attracted mostly voters with a migrant background winning strongly in cities with large migrant inhabitants like Rotterdam, Amsterdam and The Hague, beating the PVDA in all instances. Strictly speaking Forum for Democracy is the sole new party in parliament, obtaining two seats in parliament, an impressive accomplishment considering that on the right site of politics many parties contended. This party campaigned on themes like ending political clique forming and the introduction of a binding referendum. PvdD (animal welfare party), 50+ (party for the elderly) and CU (Christian Union) also won extra seats in parliament, the latter having entered government for the first and only time in 2007could be considered so again. The conclusion of the Dutch 2017 parliamentary elections is that although a more right-wing oriented tendency has increased, straightforward populism has not, also the loss of the PVDA has made the left-wing block smaller then ever. The Dutch electorate voted in varied way, but the end result makes a stable middle of the road government possible. More then likely Mr. Mark Rutte will return as prime minister, with parties like D’66 and CDA returning to power again. A coalition with GL would then make up a majority of 85 seats, although more scenarios are possible including forming a minority cabinet with changing support from different parties.

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About the author: Anton Lutter, MA. is a Consultant in Protocol and Public Diplomacy, former City Councillor of The Hague.