Dritan Goxhaj has been arrested In Albania pursuant to arrest warrant of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers
On 31 July 2023, the authorities of Albania arrested Mr Dritan Goxhaj in Tirana. The KSC requested the cooperation and assistance of Albanian authorities in arresting Mr Goxhaj and surrendering him to the KSC, pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by a KSC Judge in relation to offences against the administration of justice involving intimidation and obstructing official persons in performing official duties.
Mr Goxhaj will be detained in Albania, pending a decision by the Albanian authorities on the transfer of Mr Goxhaj to the detention facilities of the KSC in The Hague.
These unduly restrictive policies have the secondary effect of encouraging discrimination at the societal level.”
These are the opening words of a new excellent report by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), published in July 2023. The USCIRF is an independent, bipartisan U.S. federal government commission created by the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). Its Commissioners are appointed by the President and by Congressional leaders of both political parties.
All European Union member states proclaim their support for religious liberty, the report notes, yet many do not respect it in practice, regarding it as a lesser right with respect to national security, the rights of certain non-religious minorities, a misguided notion of individual freedom, and some states’ idea that citizens should not create “separatist” communities whose values are different from those of the majority. While France is often quoted in the report as a typical example of these problems, other countries are mentioned as well.
Different religious minorities are targeted. Both Jews and Muslims suffer because of prohibitions to wear distinctive clothing such as the Islamic hijab and the Jewish yarmulke in public places (some states also target the Sikh turban). Also, “Animal rights activists and politicians, albeit for different reasons, often advocate for ritual or religious slaughter restrictions throughout the EU. These restrictions systematically exclude Jews and Muslims from European society by complicating their ability to comply with religious dietary laws, forcing individuals to abandon deeply held religious doctrine.”
The Jewish and Muslim practice of circumcision is also under attack, particularly in Scandinavian countries. “Children’s rights activists contend that circumcision violates the rights of children, while certain politicians consider circumcision an imported, ‘foreign’ practice. Yet, circumcision is a fundamental Jewish ritual and campaigns to ban this practice negatively impact Jewish life.”
In France, the so-called law against “separatism” denies Muslims the right to self-organize their communities according to their own values, the report notes, and also impacts negatively on other groups, including those stigmatized as “cults” (in French, “sectes”).
With respect to the latter groups, the report adds “Several governments in the EU have supported or facilitated the propagation of harmful information about certain religious groups. For example, the French government has funded the European Federation of Centres of Research and Information on Cults and Sects (FECRIS), a French non-profit created in 1994 that has pejoratively labeled some religious associations as ‘sects’ or ‘cults.’ Similarly, an official body under the French Ministry of the Interior…—the Inter-Ministerial Mission in the Vigilance and Combat against Sectarian Derivatives (MIVILUDES)—releases an annual report that regularly disparages groups including Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Church of Scientology.
The organization has partnered with government agencies, religious organizations, and civil society to inform them about so-called ‘cults’ and has generated largely positive reactions from French media outlets, which has in turn negatively impacted societal respect for those associated with religious organizations that MIVILUDES labels as sects or cults. MIVILUDES has also funded various NGOs that target religious organizations considered harmful ‘sects,’including the National Union of Associations in Defense of Families and Individual Victims of Sects (UNADFI) and the Centre Against Mental Manipulation (CCMM).”
Worse still, the report continues, “In January 2023, France passed a law, which, under Article 29, section 3.1.2., empowers authorities to use special techniques outlined in the criminal code to investigate ‘sects,’ including through the impersonation of a delivery person, remote access to electronic communications, and the installation of recording devices in private or public places or vehicles.”
Quoting “Bitter Winter,” the report also mentions the discriminatory effect of German campaigns against “cults” (“Sekten” in German). “In some regions of Germany, potential employees or the recipients of government grants must sign statements commonly referred to as ‘sect filters’ to prove they have no connection to the Church of Scientology. In one case, a man was fired from a long-held official position for his affiliation with the Church of Scientology.”
Blasphemy laws are still in force in various European countries, and they may affect the right of atheists to criticize religion. Both laws against blasphemy and against hate speech serve the legitimate purpose of protecting religious communities and other minorities, the report notes. However, “legislation is often too broad, criminalizing speech that does not amount to incitement to violence and thereby encompassing expression protected under international human rights standards, including the rights to freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression.”
Christians may thus be targeted for maintaining and propagating their traditional doctrines on family issues. “From a religious freedom perspective, over-broad hate speech laws are particularly concerning when used against individuals for peacefully sharing religious beliefs that others find offensive or controversial. In one such case, in Finland, state prosecutors are appealing a case against Finnish Member of Parliament Päivi Räsänen and Evangelical Lutheran Bishop Jhana Pohjola, who were acquitted of hate speech charges for tweets that expressed religious beliefs about LGBTQ+ issues.” Not surprisingly, official statutes and actions against religious minorities exposes them to hate crimes and private violence as well. “Despite official efforts to combat antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred, both forms of hatred continue to rise. Meanwhile, the EU has yet to take commensurate steps to address other forms of religious discrimination that are also prevalent throughout Europe.”
The report argues that it should be “possible to guarantee freedom of religion or belief while balancing other concerns, such as national security”. It concludes that “While European Union countries generally have in place constitutional and legal protections for freedom of religion or belief, some have also enacted laws and pursued policies that systematically violate religious freedom and have a serious and disproportionate impact on the ability of religious minorities to live in accordance with their beliefs. Importantly, the continuation of such policies at an official level likewise encourages discrimination at a societal level and contributes to an environment that has seen continued violent attacks on places of worship and members of religious minority communities, encouraging increased emigration from Europe.”
While the European Union commendably protests when religious liberty is violated outside its borders, it is now great time for it to put its own house in order. The European institutions’ own credibility is at stake.
About the author:
Massimo Introvigne (born June 14, 1955 in Rome) is an Italian sociologist of religions. He is the founder and managing director of the Center for Studies on New Religions (CESNUR), an international network of scholars who study new religious movements. Introvigne is the author of some 70 books and more than 100 articles in the field of sociology of religion. He was the main author of the Enciclopedia delle religioni in Italia (Encyclopedia of Religions in Italy). He is a member of the editorial board for the Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion and of the executive board of University of California Press’ Nova Religio. From January 5 to December 31, 2011, he has served as the “Representative on combating racism, xenophobia and discrimination, with a special focus on discrimination against Christians and members of other religions” of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). From 2012 to 2015 he served as chairperson of the Observatory of Religious Liberty, instituted by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to monitor problems of religious liberty on a worldwide scale.
Amidst the vibrant colors and warm atmosphere, a garden party like no other was hosted at the residence of Ambassador Chatri Archjananun and his wife Nataya. The event, aptly named “A Day in Thailand,” was dedicated to bidding farewell to fellow ambassadors and welcome friends of Thailand during the summer season. As the sun shone brightly, the garden transformed into a captivating Thai wonderland, showcasing every aspect of the country’s rich culture and traditions.
Ambassador Archjananun stood before the gathering of distinguished guests, expressing his heartfelt gratitude for the overwhelming support received during his tenure as the ambassador of Thailand in the Netherlands. He spoke about the strong bonds forged between the two nations and the lasting friendships that were created. With a touch of nostalgia in his voice, he announced his impending departure in a few weeks, leaving behind cherished memories of his time as an ambassador.
A Day in Thailand
Ambassador Archjananun declared:
“As the Coordinator of the Asia and Oceania Ambassadors’ Luncheon, I would like to express my appreciation to all the members who have actively contributed to the success of the luncheon’s talks. The Ambassadors’ Luncheon has proven an invaluable forum for open dialogue and fruitful discussions in a trusted environment. I encourage all my esteemed Asia and Oceania Ambassadors to continue this tradition.
“I take this opportunity to extend my good wishes for continued success to our departing ambassadors. It is also with a mix of emotions that I have to announce my own and my wife’s departure at the end of September. Every one of you will be dearly missed.
Let me also take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to each of you for the kind cooperation and support I have received throughout my entire tenure as Ambassador. It has been an honour and privilege to work with all of you.”
Throughout the day, the guests were treated to a feast of Thai cultural delights, ensuring an authentic and immersive experience. The event boasted a wide range of activities that represented the heart and soul of Thailand.
Thai culture
Muay Thai (Thai Boxing) – The demonstrations of Muay Thai, Thailand’s traditional martial art, left the audience in awe. Ambassador Archjananun participated in a demo combat. Powerful kicks, swift punches, and well-choreographed moves showcased the sport’s grace and strength.Thai Cooking Demonstrations: Culinary enthusiasts gathered around as talented Thai chefs demonstrated the art of preparing delectable Thai dishes. From Pad Thai to Tom Yum soup, guests learned the secrets behind the country’s renowned cuisine.Traditional Thai Musicians: The air was filled with enchanting melodies as Thai musicians played traditional instruments. The serene tunes transported everyone to the heart of Thailand’s musical heritage.Craving Food Art: Skillful artists exhibited the art of carving intricate designs into fruits and vegetables, creating exquisite displays that were visually stunning.Thai Massage: For those seeking relaxation, professional Thai masseuses offered traditional Thai massages, renowned for their therapeutic benefits and rejuvenating effects.
Also Thai Products and Fashion: Numerous stalls displayed a diverse range of Thai products, including intricately woven bags, elegant dresses, and vibrant textiles, showcasing the country’s exceptional craftsmanship.
A Thai Beer Bar: As the day grew warmer, guests gathered at the Thai beer bar to savor refreshing beverages, relishing the distinct flavors of Thailand’s local brews.
Celebrity Appearance: The party was graced by the presence of a famous Thai top model and TV star, Dr Khemmanit Jamikorn, adding a touch of glamour and excitement to the event. Food and Fruit Stations: Attendees had the opportunity to indulge in an array of Thai delicacies and tropical fruits, savoring the exquisite flavors that define Thai cuisine.Traditional Thai Dancers: The rhythmic movements of skilled Thai dancers captivated the audience, leaving them mesmerized by the elegance and grace of Thai traditional dance forms.
“A Day in Thailand” was a resounding success, and its impact would undoubtedly resonate with all who attended. The event showcased the unique beauty of Thailand’s culture and demonstrated the power of diplomacy in fostering international camaraderie.
Through the captivating displays of Thai culture and the celebration of friendship, the event exemplified the essence of the Thai spirit and left a lasting impression on all who were fortunate enough to partake in the festivities.
Indeed, “A Day in Thailand” served as a delightful reminder that despite distances and different cultures, the bonds of friendship can transcend borders, leaving an indelible mark on the journey of life.
In a grand celebration of maritime heritage and diplomatic relations, and on the occasion of its XXXIII Annual Training Voyage and its participation of Sail Den Helder 2023, Uruguay’s Capitan Miranda Navy Training Tallship gracefully sailed into the Port of Den Helder in the Netherlands to participate in diverse events.
One of them, the reception hosted by H.E. Mr. Álvaro González Otero, the Ambassador of Uruguay in the Netherlands, together with the Captain Mario Vaucher Rivero on June 30th, 2023, was a true reflection of the ship’s historical importance and its connection to the own life story of the Uruguayan Ambassador.
In spite of the two hours distance that exists between The Hague and the Den Helder’s harbor, the event brought together a relevant number of distinguished international and national authorities, marking an exceptional display of camaraderie and cultural exchange.
H.E. Mr. Álvaro González Otero, the Ambassador of Uruguay in the Netherlands, together with the Captain Mario Vaucher Rivero and Ms. Anahi Aguirre Toni, Second Secretary, Embassy of Uruguay.
The Capitan Miranda: A Personal Journey
For Ambassador Álvaro González Otero, the Capitan Miranda Tallship carries sentimental personal significance. The ship’s history intertwines with his own life’s journey, forming an unbreakable bond that has spanned several generations of marine officials.
His first encounter with the vessel was in the company of his step uncle, who served as the Captain of the ship during his young years, leaving an indelible impression on the young Álvaro, shaping his passion for maritime affairs and the recognized spread of Uruguayan values and quality products that this school vessel transmits in each country its representative crew visits.
H.E. Mr. Arnoldo Brenes Castro, Ambassador of Costa Rica, H.E. Mr. Mario Oyarzabal, Ambassador of Argentina, H.E. Mr. Álvaro González Otero, the Ambassador of Uruguay, Captain Mario Vaucher Rivero, H.E. Mr. Andres Teran Parral, Ambassador of Ecuador and H.E. Mr. Jaime Moscoso Valenzuela, Ambassador of Chile.
As Ambassador González Otero embarked on a long and distinguished diplomatic career, during which he had the privilege of receiving the Capitan Miranda in various countries before, including Baltimore, USA, and Salvador de Bahia, Brazil.
In this opportunity, as he welcomed the tall ship to the Netherlands, his heart swelled with pride, knowing that the ship continues to represent Uruguay’s commitment to naval education, cultural exchange and social values that meaningfully characterized their own country.
Capitan Miranda Navy Training Tallship’s reception in Den Helder.
A Diplomatic Reception to Remember
The diplomatic reception was a splendid affair that echoed the importance of the Capitan Miranda itself. Held on board the event was attended by distinguished ambassadors from various nations, military attachés, Sail Den Helder 2023 authorities, eminent business figures, accomplished artists, high university officials, and kind friends of Uruguay. The gathering showcased the power of diplomacy in fostering friendships and strengthening international cooperation.
H.E. Mr. Arnoldo Brenes Castro, Ambassador of Costa Rica and H.E. Ms. Elizabeth Ward Neiman, Ambassador of Panama.
In an improvised and short presentation, the Ambassador of Uruguay stood before his distinguished guests, expressing his heartfelt gratitude for their presence and shared commitment to encouragement strong diplomatic ties. He highlighted the Capitan Miranda tall ship’s significance in bridging nations and nurturing cultural understanding, inspiring applause from the audience.
The Ambassador also highlighted the enjoyable food prepared by the vessel cuisine, the excellent Uruguayan wines served to the guests, and the finest attention, care and support coming from the Captain, Officers and the whole crew of the tall ship to all the people and visitors. He ended remembering the value and popularity of the Capitan Miranda worldwide and how much it is appreciated in his own country.
Capitan Miranda Navy Training Tallship’s reception in Den Helder,
Uruguay’s Capitan Miranda Training Tallship
The Commander, Captain Vaucher, also pronounced a speech emphasizing his gratitude to the Netherlands authorities and the special relation and cooperation that also exists between the ship and the Uruguayan diplomats all over the world.
As the sun set over the Dutch horizon, the Capitan Miranda buzzed with excitement and a sense of anticipation. Amidst the traditional music, wine and food of Uruguay, all the people engaged in animated conversations. The Capitan Miranda stood tall in the backdrop, an emblem of unity, evoking shared memories of maritime voyages and cross-cultural experiences.
Mr. Wilhen Diaz Lara, Charge d’affaires of Venezuela, the Ambassador of Angola, H.E. Ms. Maria Isabel Gomes de Resende Encoge and the Ambassador of Belarus, H.E. Mr. Andrei Yeudachenka.
Celebrating Cultural Exchange Uruguay / Netherlands
During the reception, a sample dance performance of tango and candombe by the crew, brought elements of Uruguay captivating the audience with blend of tradition and innovation.
The crew’s genuine openness and willingness to explain their experiences aboard the tall ship created an atmosphere of camaraderie and friendship. Attendees left the reception not only with unforgettable memories of the Capitan Miranda’s mission — a floating ambassador of goodwill that transcends borders and brings nations together.
A sample dance performance of candombe by the Capitan Miranda’s crew.
The Uruguayan school vessel has already been invited by Dutch authorities to participate in the 10th Sail Amsterdam 2025, which is an impressive nautical event, that takes place every five years since 1975.
In 2025, the city of Amsterdam will be 750 years old, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands will celebrate this in grand style.
After Washington, the Israeli government has also decided to “recognize Morocco’s sovereignty” in the disputed region of Western Sahara, as announced by the government in Rabat a week ago. The geopolitical background in the region is particularly tense.
The palace government stated in a press release, “With this letter, the Israeli Prime Minister brought to the attention of his majesty the King Mohammed V the decision of the State of Israel to recognize the national sovereignty of Morocco in the region of Western Sahara.”
According to the same source, in his letter, Mr. Netanyahu clarified that his country’s position will now be “reflected in all the actions and documents of the Israeli government” related to the issue.
The Israeli prime minister added that this decision would be “transmitted to the United Nations, regional and international organizations of which Israel is a member, as well as all countries with which Israel maintains diplomatic relations,” as cited in excerpts of the letter by the kingdom’s government.
Israel is considering opening a consulate in Dakhila
Moreover, Mr. Netanyahu informed the Moroccan monarch that Israel is positively considering “opening a consulate in the city of Dakhila,” in the part of the Western Sahara controlled by the kingdom.
Rabat is seeking allies to open diplomatic missions in Western Sahara in recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the vast region, as a sign of its support for the kingdom.
In a televised speech, the Moroccan monarch Mohammed V emphasized, “The issue of the Sahara is the prism through which Morocco sees its international environment.”
A senior Moroccan official told AFP on condition of anonymity, “This decision is part of the dynamics of recent months, with the recognition by the US of the kingdom’s national sovereignty in the southern provinces of [s.s. in Western Sahara], the support of about fifteen European countries in the autonomy plan, and the opening of about thirty consulates in Laayoune and Dakhila.”
The recognition by Benjamin Netanyahu’s government “strengthens this momentum,” according to the same source.
Tensions with Algeria
Western Sahara, once a Spanish colony, is considered a “non-self-governing region” by the UN, in the absence of a definitive settlement of its status. For nearly fifty years, the Moroccan army and the separatists of the Polisario Front, supported by Algeria, have been at war in this region.
Rabat has proposed an autonomy plan without challenging Moroccan national sovereignty, while the Polisario is demanding a UN-sponsored referendum on self-determination.
In Jerusalem, the Israeli foreign minister praised the decision. “This measure will strengthen relations between states and peoples and continue cooperation to strengthen peace and stability in the region,” said Eli Cohen.
The Israeli decision, which was widely expected, is announced in a climate of increasing rivalry between Rabat and Algiers. The two neighboring countries severed diplomatic relations in 2021, by Algeria’s decision.
Morocco and Israel normalized diplomatic relations in December 2020, as part of the so-called Abraham Accords, a process of rapprochement between the Jewish state and Arab countries with the strong support of the US.
King Mohammed V of Morocco.
Accelerated collaboration Morocco and Israel
After normalizing their diplomatic relations, Morocco and Israel have seen an acceleration of their cooperation in various fields — at the level of the armed forces, security, trade, and tourism. A week ago, the chief of the general staff of national defense said that for the first time, a military attaché will be appointed in Morocco. He will take up his duties in the coming months, an army spokesman said.
The Israeli liaison office in Rabat will be promoted to embassy level, while Morocco is preparing to do the same in Tel Aviv.
Since the end of May, three Israeli ministers, the speaker of the Knesset (the Israeli parliament), the national security adviser, and members of a special forces unit of the ground army – something unprecedented – traveled to Morocco.
However, the process of tightening relations is not exactly unanimously welcomed in Morocco, especially because, at the beginning of the year, the most right-wing government in Israel’s history took over. Despite the noticeable decrease in mobilization for it in the kingdom, the Palestinian cause continues to be viewed with great sympathy by a large part of the Moroccan population.
H.E. Ambassador Chatri Archjananun gladly invites you and your spouse to “A Day in Thailand” on 7 July 2023 at the Thai Residence.
It is a special journey where you fully immerse yourself in the vibrant Thai culture and indulge in captivating experiences. Arts and crafts, Thai food, Thai performances, Thai boxing, Thai massage, tourism information, and much more await you.
We eagerly wait to share this unique experience with you! What a marvellous invitation, one you can’t resist!
The Ambassador of Thailand, H.E. Chatri Archjananun during his speech.
Remarks by the Ambassador: “A very warm welcome to “A Day in Thailand“! Thank you all for being here on this special occasion, which is perfectly timed as the summer holidays are just around the corner.
The sun is shining. This good weather is such a rarity in The Hague. So please enjoy the glorious sunshine with the clear sky.
An ambassadors family’s picture. H.E. Mr. Choe Hyoung-chan, Ambassador of Korea, H.E. Mgr Paul Tschang In-Nam, Apostolic Nuncio, H.E. Mr. Veaceslav Dobîndă, Ambassador of Moldova, H.E. Mr. Arnoldo Brenes Castro, Ambassador of Costa Rica, HE. Mr. Pham Viet Anh, Ambassador fo Vietnam, H.E. Ms. Salima Abdelhak, Ambassador of Algeria, H.E. Mr. Riaz Hanidullah, Ambassador of Bangladesh, H.E. Mr. Chatri Archjananun, the Ambassador of Thailand, H.E. Mr. Almir Šahović, Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina, H.E. Mr. Mohamed Basri, Ambassador of Morocco, H.E. Mr. Mark Anthony Pace, Ambassador of Malta, H.E. Ms Sahar Ghanem, Ambassador of Yemen, H.E. Mr. Hatem Kamaleldin, H.E. Mr. François Alabrune, Ambassador of France and H.E. Mr. Jose Eduardo Malaya, Ambassador of the Philippines.
As just said, the summer holidays are around the corner, and we are bidding farewell to dear friends whose term of office in the Netherlands is ending due to a new assignment or retirement. I take this opportunity to extend my good wishes for continued success to our departing ambassadors. It is also with a mix of emotions that I also have to announce my own and my wife’s departure at the end of September. Every one of you will be dearly missed.
Let me also take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to each of you for the kind cooperation and support I have received throughout my entire tenure as Ambassador. It has been an honour and privilege to work with all of you.
H.E. Ms. Aruni Ranaraja, Ambassador of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Archjananun and the Ambassador of Bangladesh, H.E. Mr. Riaz Hamidullah.
Further, as the Coordinator of the Asia and Oceania Ambassadors’ Luncheon, I would like to express my appreciation to all the members who have actively contributed to the success of the luncheon’s talks.
The Ambassadors’ Luncheon has proven an invaluable forum for open dialogue and fruitful discussions in a trusted environment. I encourage all my esteemed Asia and Oceania Ambassadors to continue this tradition.
Nataya Archjananun and the Ambassador of Malaysia, H.E. Ms. Nadzirah Osman.
Today we have a wonderful opportunity to bid farewell and for all of you to get a glimpse of Thailand, particularly our cuisine, beverages, and martial arts. I could invite every one of you to dine at the Thai residence, our dining table can only accommodate 10 persons. I have devised a way to treat everyone simultaneously, and thus, came this event.”
A Day in Thailand event also underlines the cherished longstanding diplomatic relations between the two Kingdoms of Thailand and the Netherlands for more than hundreds of years. Ambassador Chatri takes pride that during his tenure he has boosted the cooperation between the two nations in all facets, particularly in economic and people-to-people relations. He is confident that a new chapter of collaboration between Thailand and the Netherlands will be fostered by his successor.
Dr Khemmanit Jamikorn, a Thai movie star enjoying Thai food. Dr Mayelinne De Lara, Diplomat Magazine’s publisher and H.E. Mr. Philippe Couvreur, Judge ad hoc at International Court of Justice.
“Lastly, I would like to say thank you to Dr Mayelinne De Lara from Diplomat Magazine for co-taking the initiative of this event, Dr Khemmanit Jamikorn, a Thai movie star and her family, our sponsor and everyone who has contributed to the event, all the staff at the Royal Thai Embassy, my dear wife for their invaluable support in making this mini-Thai festival happen.”
One day in Thailand, there are numerous attractions, sights seeing, shopping, restaurants, and shows, too much to mention. Not possible to experience them all. It is fabulous how the coordinators narrow the activities to a sublime two hours itinerary and make it look real.
The clothing boutique, the artist, craftsman,massage, cooking demonstration, boxing demo, you name it. I felt like I was on holiday in Thailand, strolling along the streets, delightful.
H.E. Ambassador Suljuk Mustansar Tarar of Pakistan delivered a lecture to students of the TUDelft, Department of Architecture and The Built Environment on Pakistan’s architecture.
The BKTUDelft students are working on an assignment on building in extreme environments and designing low-cost sustainable residential units in Pakistan.
Ambassador Suljuk Mustansar Tarar is himself an architect. The students held a presentation on their housing design in extreme weather projects in Pakistan.
The Embassy of Burundi in the Netherlands hosted an event at the Ambassador’s residence to celebrate Burundi’s 61st Independence Day on 8 July 2023.
The event started with H.E. Ambassador Gamaliel Nkurunziza, inviting the audience to sing the National anthem of Burundi “Burundi Bwacu” and the Netherlands.
Ambassador Gamaliel Nkurunziza further stated, “this is a unique and great day for Burundians. We have listened to the song of our Independence, and we must take the lyrics of our National Anthem as our guidance because it is full of inspiration and a lot of teachings.”
Ambassador Nkurunziza and guests.
Addressing the many guests the Ambassador stated, “I would like to thank the Ambassadors of Rwanda, South Africa, China, Kenya, Morocco, Tanzania, Uganda, Algeria, Angola, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, the Deputy Mayor of Wassenaar, representatives of the diplomatic missions as well as the friends of Burundi for having responded to our invitation and accompanying the Burundians to the celebration of the 61st anniversary of the Independence of Burundi.”
Back in Bujumbura, the Government has been receiving congratulations in connection with its 61 years of Independence.
Burundi receives praise for the crucial role that Burundi has been playing in promoting peace and stability throughout Africa. Particularly to be underscored are the invaluable contributions of Burundi towards peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Central Africa, praising the nation’s dedication to fostering peace in the region.
The Ambassador of Rwanda, H.E. Mr. Olivier J.P. Nduhungirehe and the Ambassador of China, H.E. Mr. Jian Tan.
Burundi 61 years of Independence – Congratulations from abroad
The US, Secretry of State Mr Anthony Blinken: “On behalf of the United States of America, I send my congratulations to the people of the Republic of Burundi as you celebrate 61 years of independence. We commend Burundi’s continuing political and economic reforms and welcome Burundi’s positive engagement with international financial institutions. We also appreciate the leadership role Burundi has played in regional peace and security as Chair of the East African Community and through its active participation in peacekeeping operations. The United States looks forward to working together over the next year to improve regional security.”
H.E. President Sahle-Work Zewde of Ethiopia extended her congratulatory message to President Evariste Ndayishimiye and the people of Burundi on their National Day.
Praises also came from Ambassador Mohamed El-Amine Souef, who currently serves as the head of the African Union Transition Mission, highlighting the crucial role that Burundi has been playing in promoting peace and stability throughout Africa. The Ambassador particularly underscored the invaluable contributions of Burundi towards peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Central Africa, praising the nation’s dedication to fostering peace in the region.
Other world leaders have also sent their best wishes to Burundians on their National Day.
Ambassador Gamaliel Nkurunziza continued his welcome remarks by stating, “today is an important day for our country and for Burundians living here in the Netherlands. This is the time to make up our minds.” Ambassador Gamaliel Nkurunziza continued his welcome remarks by stating, “because our Independence Day is a good opportunity to take a look at where we come from and where we are going especially in following steps for people who guided us in the process of fighting for our independence The Prince Rudoviko Rwagasore who sacrificed his life so that Burundian can be independent, he will always be our Hero.
Burundian Ladies in national dress.
The motto of our Independence hero, Prince Louis Rwagasore, was Progress!
It is in that view I invite every Burundian living in the Netherlands to come and work together. Nothing should separate us.
I noticed all Burundians are here to celebrate our Independence Day. I encourage everyone to support our independence, especially in the angle of developing our country, to feel free and join me as your servant. There is no place like home, we have a beautiful country.
As Burundians, we need to be proud of our country because we are going to have a better future. In order to strengthen that love, I would like to emphasize the speech of our President H.E General Major Evariste Ndayishimiye, which he delivered on the event of the commemoration of the 61st anniversary of the independence of Burundi, we are commemorating today.
The President called on all of us to be united in contributing to the development of our country Burundi. Our government has given a strong signal that when we are united, we become strong. It is time we turned the page of our history because our differences are our strengths.
Our President has become the chief Commander of our country’s Development and urged us to follow his commandment.
As Ambassador of Burundi, I am urging all Burundians to contribute to our country’s development. I also request you to stop slandering your country. No matter what, your country will always be your country. You will never get another one. You can get as many citizenships as you like Burundi will always be your first country and will always welcome you as a mother.
Burundi is our motherland, whatever we will become, we will remain bound to Burundi, our country. Burundi will always be our motherland.
This takes my mind back to the lyrics of A Calypso by Lord Kitchener, Grandmaster of Calypso, “I can always get a wife, but I can never get another mother in my life”.(ed.)
Recently some Burundians tried to smear the image of Burundi.
This is an unpatriotic act and not compatible with our values.
Our country is like our mother not customary to maltreat your mother or father. A Burundian who dares to ill-treat parents and smear the image of the country is considered someone who lost his identity, his culture, and values. Has become as cursed person.
Let us change positively and join the call of our President to rebuild the image of our beloved country.
Since my arrival in the Netherlands, you responded positively and massively. There is a bright tomorrow, and the future holds many good surprises.
I thank you all so much for your sacrifices. Let us remain united, contribute to the promotion of the image of our country and remain focused on the development of Burundi.
Enjoy this celebration of our 61st Independence Day. And May God Bless you all.”
Le 13 juillet, la Cour internationale de justice (CIJ) a annoncé sa décision portant sur les prétentions du Nicaragua face a la Colombie dans la mer des Caraïbes, qui lui demandait d’étendre ses droits sur son plateau continental au-delà de 200 milles nautiques (voir le texte de l’arrêt en français et en anglais).
Il s’agit de la réponse du juge international à la demande formulée par le Nicaragua en septembre 2013 (voir texte intégral de sa requête). Les 10 ans qui séparent les deux textes s’expliquent en grande partie par les exceptions préliminaires soulevées par la Colombie en 2014, afin de soustraire la discussion sur le fond à la compétence de la CIJ (voir la décision de la CIJ sur les exceptions préliminaires de mars 2016, rejetant les allégations d’incompétence de la Colombie).
Un long différend soumis en partie à la CIJ depuis 2001
Cette décision de 2016 sur les exceptions préliminaires rappelle aussi celle de 2007 dans laquelle, lors de la première affaire, la CIJ avait égalemente rejeté en partie les griefs d´incompétence soulevés par la Colombie (voir décision).
Il convient de noter que, par une étrange coïncidence, quelques jours avant cette décision de mars 2016, la Colombie avait demandé à la Cour interaméricaine des droits de l’homme un avis consultatif concernant les dommages environnementaux marins transfrontaliers, et ce sans jamais mentionner le Nicaragua : cette demande (voir texte en espagnol et en francais) a donné lieu à l’avis consultatif OC-23 publié par la Cour de San José en 2018 (voir le texte intégral en espagnol).
Lorsqu´un Etat ne soulève pas d´exceptions préliminaires, une affaire est résolue en quatre ou cinq ans par le juge international. C´est le cas, par exemple, des affaires a répétition opposant le Costa Rica et le Nicaragua entre 2005 et 2018 :
– Costa Rica c. Nicaragua : décision de juillet 2009 de la CIJ (voir texte) sur les droits de navigation du Costa Rica sur le fleuve San Juan;
– Costa Rica c. Nicaragua et Nicaragua c. Costa Rica: décision de décembre 2015 de la CIJ (voir texte) concernant le dragage du fleuve San Juan par le Nicaragua ainsi que la construction de la “trocha fronteriza” par le Costa Rica le long d´une partie du San Juan;
– Costa Rica c. Nicaragua: décision de février 2018 (voir texte) concernant la délimitation martime dans le Pacifique et dans les Caraïbes (Note 1);
– Costa Rica c. Nicaragua: décision de février 2018 (voir texte) concernant l´emplacement exact du point de départ de la frontiere terrestre.
Il faudrait ajouter également (deux ans et deux mois de procédure) la décision de la CIJ de février 2018 (voir texte) concernant le montant de l´indemnisation pour dommages environnementaux causés par le Nicaragua dans la région d´Isla Portillos (Note 2).
Le contenu de l’arrêt du 13 juillet 2023 en bref
Dans le dispositif (point 104) de l’arrêt entendu le 13 juillet 2023 entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie, la Cour indique que :
1) Par treize voix contre quatre,
Rejette la demande par laquelle la République du Nicaragua la prie de dire et juger que sa frontière maritime avec la République de Colombie, dans les zones du plateau continental qui, selon la République du Nicaragua, reviennent à chacune au-delà de la frontière fixée par la Cour dans son arrêt du 19 novembre 2012, suit des lignes géodésiques reliant les points 1 à 8 dont les coordonnées figurent au paragraphe 19 ci-dessus ; /…/
2) Par treize voix contre quatre,
Rejette la demande par laquelle la République du Nicaragua la prie de dire et juger que les îles de San Andrés et Providencia ont droit à un plateau continental jusqu’à une ligne constituée d’arcs de 200 milles marins partant des lignes de base à partir desquelles est mesurée la largeur de sa mer territoriale et reliant les points A, C et B dont les coordonnées figurent au paragraphe 19 ci-dessus ; /…/
3) Par douze voix contre cinq,
Rejette la demande de la République du Nicaragua portant sur les droits à des espaces maritimes générés par Serranilla et Bajo Nuevo. /…/
(1) By thirteen votes to four,
Rejects the request made by the Republic of Nicaragua that the Court adjudge and declare that the maritime boundary between the Republic of Nicaragua and the Republic of Colombia in the areas of the continental shelf which, according to the Republic of Nicaragua, appertain to each of them beyond the boundary determined by the Court in its Judgment of 19 November 2012 follows geodetic lines connecting the points 1 to 8, the co-ordinates of which are referred to in paragraph 19 above; /…/
(2) By thirteen votes to four,
Rejects the request made by the Republic of Nicaragua that the Court adjudge and declare that the islands of San Andrés and Providencia are entitled to a continental shelf up to a line consisting of 200-nautical-mile arcs from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Nicaragua is measured connecting the points A, C and B, the co-ordinates of which are referred to in paragraph 19 above; /…/
(3) By twelve votes to five,
Rejects the request made by the Republic of Nicaragua with respect to the maritime entitlements of Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo” /…/
Deux questions auxquelles il est répondu par la négative
Comme nous avons eu l’occasion de le souligner (voir notre précédente note en espagnol), la CIJ avait ordonné en octobre 2022 aux deux États de consacrer leurs plaidoiries à répondre à deux questions très précises relatives à une prétendue coutume internationale invoquée par le Nicaragua pour revendiquer ses droits sur son plateau continental au-delà des 200 milles marins.
Les audiences finales ont eu lieu en décembre 2022 et les deux États ont concentré leurs plaidoiries sur ces deux questions.
Dans sa décision du 13 juillet 2023, la CIJ répond par la négative à la première question en indiquant au paragraphe 79 que :
“79. Au vu de ce qui précède, la Cour conclut que, en droit international coutumier, le droit d’un État à un plateau continental au-delà de 200 milles marins des lignes de base à partir desquelles est mesurée la largeur de sa mer territoriale ne peut pas s’étendre à des espaces maritimes en deçà de 200 milles marins des lignes de base d’un autre État.”
79. In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that, under customary international law, a State’s entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured may not extend within 200 nautical miles from the baselines of another State“.
D’autre part, en ce qui concerne la deuxième question, au paragraphe 82, nous lisons ce qui suit :
“82. Il résulte de la réponse donnée par la Cour à la première question que, quels que soient les critères selon lesquels est établie la limite extérieure du plateau continental étendu auquel un État a droit, ce plateau continental étendu ne peut pas chevaucher la zone du plateau continental qui est située en deçà de 200 milles marins des lignes de base d’un autre État. En l’absence de droits concurrents sur les mêmes espaces maritimes, la Cour ne peut procéder à une délimitation maritime (voir le paragraphe 42 ci-dessus). Dès lors, point n’est besoin pour elle de se prononcer sur la seconde question.
82. It follows from the Court’s answer to the first question that, regardless of the criteria that determine the outer limit of the extended continental shelf to which a State is entitled, its extended continental shelf cannot overlap with the area of continental shelf within 200 nautical miles from the baselines of another State. In the absence of overlapping entitlements over the same maritime areas, the Court cannot proceed to a maritime delimitation (see paragraph 42 above). Consequently, there is no need for the Court to address the second question”.
Il convient de noter que cet arrêt est accompagné de plusieurs opinions individuelles distinctes (trois au total), d’opinions dissidentes (quatre) et d’une déclaration, ce qui témoigne de l’intense débat intra muros qui a eu lieu entre les membres de la CIJ. Compte tenu du fait que l’arrêt de la CIJ en tant que tel ne dépasse pas les 35 pages, il est intéressant de lire l’opinion dissidente fort détaillée du juge slovaque (voir texte) et celle de la juge australienne (disponible ici), ainsi que l’opinion séparée rédigée par la juge chinoise (voir texte).
On notera aussi qu’après la publication de l’ordonnance de la CIJ du 4 octobre 2022 (voir le texte en français et en anglais), la Colombie a procédé au changement d’une partie de son équipe (voir cette note de presse de Semana du 25/10/2022). Au sein de l’équipe juridique du Nicaragua, depuis mars 2022, et après plus de trois decennies en tant que conseiller juridique du Nicaragua à La Haye, l’un de ses juristes les plus expérimentés, le nord-américain Paul Reichler, a démissionné (Note 3).
En ce qui concerne les coûts exacts pour chaque Etat du recours à une instance telle que La Haye pendant plusieurs longues années de procédure, la zone grise demeure: nous avions eu l´occasion de l´évoquer lors de notre analyse (en espagnol) de l’arrêt d’avril 2022 entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie (avec quelques montants officiels divulgués dans la note 4 de l´analyse précitée). Nonobstant, les pays andins semblent plus transparents sur le sujet: dans le cas du Chili, le Pouvoir Exécutif a dû reconnaître en 2015 (et ce, contre son gré) avoir dépensé 20,3 millions de dollars pour faire face à la seule requête déposée par le Pérou en janvier 2008 devant la CIJ (voir note de presse) et résolue en janvier 2014 par le juge de La Haye; la Bolivie pour sa part a reconnu en 2018 avoir dépensé plus de 14 millions de dollars dans l´affaire l´opposant au Chili devant le juge de La Haye (voir note de presse), pendant que le Chili a reconnu avoir dépensé plus de 24 millions de dollars (voir note de presse).
En guise de conclusion
Les prétentions du Nicaragua sur son plateau continental ayant été freinées, les deux États vont maintenant devoir trouver un moyen de négocier conjointement les divers aspects relevant de leur frontière maritime, sur la base de ce qui est indiqué dans l’arrêt de novembre 2012 (voir le texte intégral de l’arrêt).
Une négociation que, ni le ton provocateur de la Colombie à partir de novembre 2012, avec la dénonciation du Pacte de Bogota (Note 4) et la déclaration d’ ” inapplicabilité “de l’arrêt de 2012 en 2013 (Note 5), ni les deux nouvelles requêtes présentées contre elle par le Nicaragua devant le juge international en 2013, n´avaient permis. Concernant la déclaration présidentielle d´”inapplicabilité” de la décision de 2012, nous avions indiqué que:
“Les spécialistes du langage corporel s´intéresseront sûrement aux deux poings présidentiels pointés vers la caméra lorsque le Président Santos prononce le mot « indignados » au début de son intervention filmée du 10 septembre 2013.Ce geste, l´attitude du Président et celle des autorités de la Colombie depuis le 19 novembre 2012 semblent en effet correspondre davantage à un acte politique face à une opinion publique colombienne en plein désarroi depuis cette date” (Note 6).
Nous avons eu l ‘occasion d’analyser l´arrêt d´avril 2022 par lequel la CIJ a condamné la Colombie (voir communiqué officiel de l’ONU) : nous renvoyons nos lecteurs à notre article sur cet arrêt (en espagnol), précédé dans les jours précédents l’arrêt 2022, d’un article un peu plus complet publié sur le site juridique spécialisé – en espagnol – de Ius360 mettant en garde nos lecteurs face au déséquilibre apparent (mais seulement apparent…) entre les deux délégations présentes lors des audiences orales (Note 7).
Carte extraite de la note de presse intitulé “Nicaragua pierde disputa marítima contra Colombia ante Corte de La Haya”, émission de radio Amelia Rueda (Costa Rica), édition du 13/07/2023.
Il faut espérer que les appareils diplomatiques de ces deux Etats parviendront, à partir du 13 juillet 2023, à créer un climat propice au rapprochement, au dialogue et à l’entente. Pour ce faire, les déclarations officielles des prochains jours seront d’une grande importance, tout comme la retenue et la modération qu’elles contiendront. En effet, depuis 1980, le différend entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie a affecté de manière significative plusieurs États appartenant à la mer des Caraïbes : une mer semi-fermée avec un grand nombre de zones maritimes qui se chevauchent et qui doivent faire l’objet de négociations entre les États voisins (Note 8). Pour exemple, le traité entre la Colombie et le Costa Rica de 1977 dans les Caraïbes (non ratifié par le Costa Rica) – voir texte et carte aux pages 154-156 de ce recueil de traités de délimitation maritime des Nations Unies – aurait dû faire l´objet d´une renégociation dès 2012, sans que pour l´heure le Costa Rica ait déclaré officiellement ce texte comme nul et non avenu (Note 9).
L’incertitude générée par ce long contentieux, porté devant la justice internationale en 2001, devrait être considérée comme surmontée, et ce, afin de parvenir progressivement à une gestion commune plus harmonieuse de ces espaces maritimes.
L’auteur – Nicolas Boeglin est Professeur de Droit International Public, Faculté de Droit, Université du Costa Rica (UCR) / Contact : nboeglin@gmail.com
– Notes –
Note 1 : Cf. RASPAIL H., “La fonction juridictionnelle à l’épreuve de la délimitation territoriale : l’arrêt du 2 février 2018 dans les affaires Délimitation maritime dans la mer des Caraïbes et l’océan Pacifique et Frontière terrestre dans la partie septentrionale d’Isla Portillos (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua)”, Annuaire Français de Droit International (AFDI) 2018, Volume 64, pp. 241-276. Texte complet disponible ici.
Note 2 : Cf. HAJJAMI N., “CIJ, Certaines activités menées par le Nicaragua dans la région frontalière (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua) – Arrêt du 2 février 2018 (Indemnisation)“, Annuaire Français de Droit International (AFDI), 2017, Vol. 63 pp. 163-176. Texte dipsonible ici.
Note 3 : Cf. BOEGLIN N., “A propósito de la renuncia de uno de los artífices de los logros de Nicaragua ante la justicia internacional“, publiée dans Confidencial (Nicaragua), édition du 6/04/2022. Texte disponible ici. Pour une analyse de la décision de la CIJ de 2012, cf. DELABIE L., “Le fragile équilibre entre prévisibilité juridique et opportunité judiciaire en matière de délimitation maritime : l’arrêt de la Cour internationale de Justice du 19 novembre 2012 dans l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie)“, Annuaire Français de Droit International (AFDI), 2012, Vol. 58, pp. 223-252. Texte diponible ici.
Note 4 : Cf. BOEGLIN N. « Le retrait du Pacte de Bogota par la Colombie », publié sur le site Le Monde du Droit (France), édition du 7/12/2012. Texte disponible ici. Cf. aussi (en espagnol) BOEGLIN N., “La denuncia por Colombia del Pacto de Bogotá“, La Nación (Costa Rica), édition du 8/12/2012, disponible pour les souscripteurs ici.
Note 5 : Cf. BOEGLIN N., “La décision de la Colombie de déclarer l´arrêt de la CIJ “non applicable”: breves refléxions” Bulletin de Sentinelle (Société Francaise pour le Droit International – SFDI /France), édition du 23/09/2013. Texte disponible ici. Cf. aussi (en espagnol) BOEGLIN N., “El anuncio de Colombia de no aplicar el fallo de la CIJ“, Alainet, édition du 23/09/2013, article disponible ici.
Note 6 : Cf. BOEGLIN N., “La décision de la Colombie de déclarer l´arrêt de la CIJ “non applicable”: breves refléxions” Bulletin de Sentinelle (Société Francaise pour le Droit International – SFDI /France), édition du 23/09/2013. Texte disponible ici.
Note 7 : Cf. BOEGLIN N., “Nicaragua/Colombia: a propósito de la lectura de la sentenca de la CIJ“, Ius360 (Pérou), édition du 20/04/2022. Texte disponible ici.
Note 8 : Cf. par exemple TAGLIONI F., “Les revendications frontalieres maritimes dans le bassin Caraïbe : état des lieux et perspectives“, Norios, 1998, Tome 45, Núm. 180, pp. 617-630. Texte complet disponible ici. La Colombie a signé des traités de délimitation dans les Caraïbes avec le Costa Rica en 1977 (voir texte disponible – dans la collection Limits in the Seas publié par le Dértament d´Etat nord-américain – ici), avec le Panama en 1978 (texte disponible ici) et avec la Jamaïque en 1993 (texte aux pages 12-15 de ce número de Limits in th Seas).
Note 9 : Lors d´une demande d´intervention présentée par le Costa Rica en 2010 (et rejettée par la CIJ en 2011 – voir texte de l´arrêt), l´un des conseillers juridiques du Nicaragua, l´espagnol Antonio Remiro Brotons, a indiqué aux juges de la CIJ que:
” 14. Le Costa Rica prétend avoir un intérêt juridique à ce que soient respectées les limites acceptées par son gouvernement, dans un traité signé, mais non ratifié, comme celui de 1977 avec la Colombie ; mais, en même temps, il situe ces intérêts au-delà de cette limite conventionnelle. Bref, on dirait que son désir est de tuer ce traité sans tirer un seul coup, ce qui serait d’ailleurs conforme à sa tradition pacifiste“
(cf. verbatim disponible ici, audience du 13 octobre 2010, page 22).
Politicians from a given country can be the targets of influence operations directly or indirectly conducted by adversary states, by turning to various instruments such as the media and lobbying firms, for instance. This article highlights the influence on lawmakers, within the context of lawfare. Since all this could entail repercussion in the sphere of security, this piece includes exclusive interviews with Andres Munoz Mosquera, Director of Allied Command Operations (ACO) Office of Legal Affairs – Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) / NATO, and with Adélio Neiva da Cruz, Director of the Portuguese Internal Intelligence Service.
Foreign influence on political affairs can be regarded as normal and legitimate in the area of international relations (Jones January 2023, p. 21). This is often observed when a government, in the pursuit of its interests, seeks to influence the affairs and decisions of (an)other government(s) (Jones January 2023, p. 21). Foreign influence activities comprise public communications, lobbying and diplomacy (Jones January 2023, p. 21). Illegitimate interference from one government in the politics of another State can be called foreign interference (Jones January 2023, p. 7). Unlike foreign influence, this is deceptive / covert, including, for example, corruption and espionage (Jones January 2023, p. 21). In this context, there are hostile activities (Public Safety Canada August 20, 2021).
In this piece, given that differences fade away (Mansted February 2021, p. 1), it is considered that the terms foreign influence and foreign interference can also be used as synonyms (Foreign Interference and You, p. 2 / Homeland Security Advisory Council Interim Report of the Countering ForeignInfluence Subcommittee May 21, 2019, p. 11).
Mediainfluence
Currently, various state and non-state actors take part in influence operations, in which multiple instruments are used, most notably, in this article, traditional and social media. To this end, we need to pay attention to communication not only from abroad, but also from domestic and local media that can serve foreign interests (McFarland, Somerville October 29, 2020 / Milosevich February 1, 2021). We should point out the possibility of infiltration in the latter two media. Proxies and accomplices can also take part in wielding foreign influence (2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, p. 75 / Kalniete February 8, 2022 / Tenove January 17, 2018).
A number of studies carried out in countries such as Australia, Bulgaria and Canada emphasize that, in the sphere of foreign interferences, the political system is targeted via various types of media (Enhancing Foreign Influence Transparency: Exploring Measures to Strengthen Canada’s Approach March 10, 2023 / Foreign Interference throughSocial Media March 13, 2020 / Vladimirov, Velcheva 2021). This problem can actually be countered by means of laws, as addressed, for instance, by Douek (July 11, 2018) in Lawfare. However, within the context of lobbying, the media could be used to pressure politicians, leaders and lawmakers (Mykkanen 2023 / Oleshchuk 2020, pp. 49-50). This, latu sensu, is also lawfare (Pinus, Hau 2023), in the sphere of a domestic confrontation, with foreign influences / interferences, between those wishing legal conditions favorable to certain interests, such as few, if any, constraints to the free circulation of information, including that which is broadcast by international media, and those pushing for the contrary.
When referring to Europe, according to Karaskova and Simalcik (June 2020, p. 3), public discourse can be effectively changed by hostile foreign influence, since this is something that, to a large extent, is overlooked by European governments and society in general. To offset said influence, Karaskova and Simalcik (June 2020, p. 3) propose the following aspects, among others: restrictions to foreign ownership of the media; limits to support given by the government to media owners; prohibiting cross ownership of the media; enforcing regulations for tracking investments; and depoliticizing broadcasting councils that oversee the media. On March 10, 2023, after several days of public protests in Tbilisi, Georgia’s Parliament rejected a foreign agent registration bill that would be enforced on all media outlets, civil society organizations and individuals receiving over 20% of their funding from abroad, which would have subjected them to monitoring and to possible sanctions (Treisman March 10, 2023s.).
Lawmakers and other politicians
Lawmakers can be the targets of various types of foreign influences, as is the case with covert operations (Schaffer May 23, 2022 / Tromblay July 13, 2017). To the foreign influencer, among a variety of aspects, it is vital to get to know the climate in which decision-making takes place and to come up with ways of introducing information that underpins their objectives (Tromblay July 13, 2017). In international relations, the use of lawfare tends to increase in the short / medium term; this is why we need to stress the importance of legal intelligence, whose purpose is to identify vulnerabilities, hazards, opportunities and hostile activities in the legal sphere (Férey April 2022, p. 7 / 32). Lawfare comprises aspects of an offensive and defensive nature (Férey April 2022, pp. 34-35).
The Government of New Zealand warns members of Parliament of the possibility of being the targets of espionage and influence / interference operations conducted by organizations from other countries (Espionage and Foreign Interference Threats June 2020, p. 3). All this can be orchestrated and carried out by foreign intelligence services with contributions from other actors, such as: academics; business people; community organizations; diplomats; media organizations; military personnel; online actors; proxies (Espionage and Foreign Interference Threats June 2020, p. 3).
Foreign interferences are also present in various central and local governments, weakening national sovereignty and favoring other countries’ interests (Consultation on aForeign Influence Transparency Registry March 3, 2023 / Countering Foreign Interference February 16, 2023 / Foreign Interference: Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process July 2021, p.3). These interferences concern not only leaders, but also administrative personnel of government institutions (Foreign Interference: Threats to Canada’sDemocratic Process July 2021, p. 9). For instance, in 2017, an agent-of-influence of a foreign country was identified and subsequently expelled from Singapore, on the grounds that he was collaborating with foreign intelligence agents, in order to influence senior decision makers of the Singapore government (Hostile Information Campaignsand Foreign Interference).
Elections are moments in a country’s political life that other governments take advantage of to pursue their goals (Foreign Interference: Threats to Canada’s DemocraticProcess July 2021, p. 6). A foreign power can recruit a certain politician and, over time, develop a relationship, seeking to benefit from that person’s possible election, to the extent that person will take part in government debates and decisions (Foreign Interference: Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process July 2021, p. 9). For example, in 2022, Mike Burgess, Director-General of Australia’s Intelligence Services (ASIO), revealed that a person directly linked to a foreign government and its intelligence agencies planned to make donations and promote some politicians in the media, in the context of elections (Fildes February 10, 2022). Foreign interference in political parties warrants particular attention (Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections March 10, 2021 / Jones January 2023 / Kalniete February 8, 2022). In reality, the previously referred aspects are somehow part of political warfare (Pronk / Rahman September 3, 2019 / Robinson, et alii 2018, p. 7).
Several measures can be taken to counteract foreign influence. These are currently being adopted and debated by various organizations and governments. By way of example, since 2022, in Singapore, provisions have gone into effect for the purpose of tackling foreign interference by hostile information operations and, thus, protecting the following Politically Significant Persons (organizations and individuals with direct participation in political processes): central executive committee members of political parties; election candidates and their election agents; leader of the House; leader of the Opposition; members of Parliament; political office holders; political parties [Introduction toForeign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA)]. A competent body appointed by Singapore’s Minister of Home Affairs can determine that other Politically Significant Persons be protected [Introduction to Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA)]. In relation to Politically Significant Persons, the Government of Singapore enforces countermeasures on other aspects of foreign influence: affiliations; donations; leadership and membership; volunteers [Introduction to Foreign Interference (Countermeasures)Act (FICA)].
Siman (February 2022) points out the weakness of the European Union (EU) and of its member-states concerning countermeasures intended to offset influence operations. However, institutionally speaking, in the EU, there are reflections as to how foreign interferences affect the EU’s political system, including members of the European Parliament (Jones January 2023 / Kalniete February 8, 2022). As part of the EU, the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on a Mandatory Transparency Register, in accordance with article 3, applies to activities conducted by interest representatives with the purpose of influencing the formulating or implementing of policy / legislation and decision-making processes of EU institutions. Even though registration is not mandatory for individuals and organizations whose objective comprises the aforementioned influence, it is encouraged, to the extent it is requested for certain activities such as invitations to speak at hearings or public events, meetings with politicians, senior officials, as well as entry in certain premises (Jones January 2023, p. 25). The Transparency Register could be improved in relation to foreign influence (Jones January 2023, p. 25).
In the U.S., certain agents should periodically disclose their relations with their foreign principals, their activities, revenues and expenditures linked to supporting those activities (Foreign Agents Registration Act). These aspects fall within the remit of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) Unit of the Counterintelligence and Export Control Section in the National Security Division (Foreign Agents Registration Act). The FARA encompasses, for instance, lobbyists who, while working for foreign governments, aim to influence Congress, U.S. branches of foreign parties and state-owned media (Schaffer May 23, 2022). As per Brandon Van Grack, FARA needs to be updated, considering the Internet and social media (Schaffer May 23, 2022).
According to Linvill and Warren (October 23, 2020), it is preferable to focus too much on problems related to foreign influence than to be negligent.
NATO
In an exclusive interview, Andres Munoz Mosquera, as a NATO expert, elaborates on various reflections surrounding the central topic of this article. In relation to the field of Security / Defense, Munoz Mosquera considers that, without legal cohesion among member-states, NATO would have disintegrated long ago. This interviewee points out that the Preamble and articles 3, 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and article 51 of the United Nations Charter have greatly contributed to such cohesion.
NATO symbol
Regarding influence on members of the Parliaments of NATO member-states, Munoz Mosquera acknowledges that the adversaries of said organization can try to sway decisions, by turning to lobbying firms. This expert feels that it is up to each government, and not to NATO, to determine whether legislation needs to be created in order to control lobbying firms’ activities.
Munoz Mosquera considers that most people don’t have the faintest idea of the influence that the NATO Parliamentary Assembly wields over both current members and those wishing to become part of said Alliance. This interviewee stresses that this Assembly enables characterizing NATO as a democratic political organization, comprising an intergovernmental nature, and with security and defense matters at its center of attention.
Counterintelligence
As concerns counterintelligence measures that NATO member-states’ governments could take to prevent their Parliament members to be the subject of foreign influence operations by NATO’s adversary states, Munoz Mosquera believes there are advantages in revealing to operators what is going on in the legal battlefield both in peacetime and in times of crisis. According to Andres Munoz Mosquera, this will broaden operators’ horizons regarding the impact of legal matters in the current strategic competition.
Munoz Mosquera clarifies that the only NATO body with legal operations capacity (the designation given to lawfare at this organization) is SHAPE. This expert explains that, as part of SHAPE, said operations include the following aspects:
-legal vigilance or legal intelligence, that is, monitoring and assessing adversaries’ legal moves
-obtaining open-source information from adversaries
-creating awareness and providing training in relation to legal, intelligence, hybrid and strategic communications staff.
Munoz Mosquera underlines that all this seeks to back NATO leadership with information aimed at decision-making. This interviewee adds that adversaries have seriously undertaken actions that break the Rule-of-Law under the guise of false legality and legitimacy.
Portuguese Internal Intelligence Service (PIIS)
According to PIIS Director Adélio Neiva da Cruz, this body’s mission includes understanding and examining the phenomena matching various types of threats, such as foreign interference, with negative effects on economic sovereignty and national security. The PIIS Director maintains that, in fulfilling its missions, the organization that he heads cooperates with NATO and the EU in a variety of areas, namely interference from hostile States. Portugal is a member-state of both organizations.
Neiva da Cruz asserts that there is a relationship between Portugal’s domestic security and European domestic security, as part of a common space comprising freedom, security and justice. In this regard, the PIIS Director makes reference to a document which was recently approved with an outlook for the EU’s next decade: A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence. Nevertheless, this interviewee stresses that, as part of the EU, article 4(2) of the Treaty of Lisbon (May 9, 2008) sets forth that each member-state is solely responsible for its own national security.
Portuguese Internal Intelligence Service symbol
Neiva da Cruz adds that the PIIS comprises activities that raise various private and public bodies’ awareness to counterespionage, warning them of issues related to influence and interference in Portugal, so as to protect classified and / or sensitive information. In terms of counterintelligence, Neiva da Cruz exposes that, within the current context of war economy and changes in world geopolitics, one of PIIS’ main objectives includes developing operational cooperation and exchanging information among the various authorities in outlining a common legal basis, using more effective methodologies, by turning to new tech tools and applications.
Adélio Neiva da Cruz considers that PIIS remains attentive to diverse situations where national security is called into question, inter alia:
covert operations aimed at recruiting Portuguese nationals with access to relevant information, chiefly information that is protected with security measures, in the political, economic, diplomatic and military spheres;
electronic access to communication networks and databases where valuable information is found.
Conclusion
This article addresses hostile foreign influence / interference activities in relation to political affairs of a given country. Said activities can be conducted through a variety of means, with this piece highlighting lobbying firms and the media. Targets include politicians and political organizations. Private or public bodies from another Government, including intelligence services, could be behind hostile foreign influence / interference exerted over a certain country. From the outset, this can be politically countered by creating laws, when this becomes necessary. Several countries have been regulating influence activities geared to politicians and political organizations.
Lawfare and legal intelligence
This way, lawmakers are particularly important, thereby making them the targets of hostile foreign influence / interference. This falls under lawfare and legal intelligence, both of which are increasingly relevant in the sphere of international relations. In this regard, a number of issues are raised regarding sovereignty, security and national defense.
The previously referred matters concern diverse national and international organizations, as seen with PIIS and NATO, respectively. The latter undertakes several activities as part of legal operations, such as legal vigilance or legal intelligence in relation to adversaries.
Concerning Portugal, PIIS remains attentive to possible covert operations in the political, economic, diplomatic and military spheres. PIIS cooperates with NATO and the EU, since Portugal is a member-state of both international organizations. However, the missions conducted by PIIS as a domestic body are vital to Portugal’s security.
About the authors:
Jorge Marinho
Jorge Marinho PhD in Communication Sciences, BA in International Journalism.
Júlio Ventura
Júlio Ventura BA in Law, MA student in Political Science and International Relations at the Portuguese. Catholic University (Lisbon, Portugal), member of the European Parliament trainee (Brussels, Belgium).
