Saturday, April 20, 2024

The Caspian 5 and Arctic 5 – Critical Similarities

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DIPLOMAT MAGAZINE “For diplomats, by diplomats” Reaching out the world from the European Union First diplomatic publication based in The Netherlands Founded by members of the diplomatic corps on June 19th, 2013. Diplomat Magazine is inspiring diplomats, civil servants and academics to contribute to a free flow of ideas through an extremely rich diplomatic life, full of exclusive events and cultural exchanges, as well as by exposing profound ideas and political debates in our printed and online editions.

Pictured Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic.

For couple of years, the world’s attention remains focused on Ukraine, with Crimea portrayed as its hotbed. No wonder as this peninsula is an absolutely pivotal portion of the Black Sea theatre for the very survival of the Black Sea fleet to both Russia and Ukraine.

What is the larger context of this call of ‘confrontational nostalgia’? It reveals a dust of the old chapters of history books full of overt and covert struggles between Atlantic–Central Europe (lately aided by the US) and Russophone Europe for the influence and strategic depth extension over a playground called Eastern Europe.

However, there are two other vital theatres for these same protagonists, both remaining underreported and less elaborated.

Author brings an interesting account on Caspian and Artic, by contrasting and comparing them. He claims that both water plateaus are of utmost geopolitical as well as of geo-economic (biota, energy, transport) importance, and that Caspian and Arctic will considerably influence passions and imperatives of any future mega geopolitical strategies – far more than Black Sea could have ever had.

 

The Caspian 5 and Arctic 5 – Critical Similarities / Between Inner Lake and Open Sea

By Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic.             

As the rapid melting of the Polar caps has unexpectedly turned distanced and dim economic possibilities into viable geo-economic and geopolitical probabilities, so it was with the unexpected and fast meltdown of Russia’s historic empire – the Soviet Union. Once considered as the Russian inner lake, the Caspian has presented itself as an open/high sea of opportunities literally overnight – not only for the (new, increased number of) riparian states, but also for the belt of (new and old) neighbouring, and other interested (overseas) states.

Interest of external players ranges from the symbolic or rather rhetorical, to the global geopolitical; from an antagonizing political conditionality and constrain to the pragmatic trade-off between (inflicting pain of) political influence and energy supply gain. Big consumers such as China, India or the European Union (EU) are additionally driven by its own energy imperative: to improve the energy security (including the reduction of external dependencies) as well as to diversify its supplies, modes and forms on a long run.

On a promise of allegedly vast oil and natural gas resources (most of which untapped), the Caspian is witnessing the “New Grand Game” – struggle for the domination and influence over the region and its resources as well as transportation routes. Notably, the Caspian is a large landlocked water plateau without any connection with the outer water systems. Moreover, 3 out of 5 riparian states are land-locking Caspian, but are themselves landlocked too. (Former Soviet republics of) Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have no direct access to any international waters. That means that pipelines remain the only mode of transportation and delivery of carbonic fuels, thus creating yet another segment for competition, and source of regional tension as the 3 raparian states do depend on their neighbours for export routes.

Finally, due to both the unsolved legal status of the Basin as well as the number of political and territorial disputes in Caucasus and on the Caspian, numerous new pipeline constructions and expansion projects have been proposed, but so far not operationalized. For the EU, the most important being the Nabucco pipeline, which, although not fully guaranteed, serves as the hope for reduced dependence on Russia.

The following lines will therefore consider the geopolitical, legal and economic (including the energy security for the final end–user, supplier and transiting countries) features of the Caspian theatre, complex interplays and possible future outlook.

To explain the long lasting Russian presence at Caspian and still prone interested in the region, two factors are at interplay: geopolitical and geo–economic.

Ever since Peter the Great, Russian geopolitical imperative is to extend the strategic depth. It naturally necessitated ensuring the security for its southwest and southern flanks of the Empire. Such a security imperative brought about bitter struggles for Russia over the domination of huge theatre: Eastern and Central Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus and Caspian basin. Russia was there contested by the Habsburg empire, by the Ottomans, Iran (and after collapse of the Ottomans by the Britons) all throughout the pre-modern and modern times.

Just a quick glance on the map of western and southwest Russia will be self-explanatory showing the geostrategic imperative; low laying areas of Russia were unprotectable without dominating the mountain chains at Caucasus, Carpathian – Black Sea – Caucasus – Caspian – Kopet Dag. Historically, the main fight of Russia was with the Ottomans over this line. When the Ottomans were eliminated from the historic scene, it was Britain on the Indian subcontinent and in Iran as a main contester – the fact that eventually led to effective splitting the basin into two spheres of influence – British and Russian.

The Caspian water plateau – a unique basin

The Caspian (Azerbaijani: Xəzər dənizi, Persian: دریای خزر or دریای مازندران, Russian: Каспийское море, Kazakh: Каспий теңізі, Turkmen: Hazar deňzi) is the world’s largest enclosed or landlocked body of (salty) water – approximately of the size of Germany and the Netherlands combined. Geographical literature refers to this water plateau as the sea, or world’s largest lake that covers an area of 386,400 km² (a total length of 1,200 km from north to south, and a width ranging from a minimum of 196 km to a maximum of 435 km), with the mean depth of about 170 meters (maximum southern depth is at 1025 m). At present, the Caspian water line is some 28 meters below sea level (median measure of the first decade of 21st century)[1]. The total Caspian coastline measures to nearly 7,000 km, being shared by five riparian (or littoral) states.

Caspian picture1

Figure 1: The Caspian Sea and its hydrogeology

Sources: WorldAtlas (n.d.a.), n.p.a.; EVS (2011), n.p.a

The very legal status of this unique body of water is still unsolved: Sea or lake? As international law defers lakes from seas, the Caspian should be referred as the water plateau or the Caspian basin. Interestingly enough, the Caspian is indeed both sea and lake: northern portions of the Caspian display characteristics of a freshwater lake (e.g. due to influx of the largest European river – Volga, river Ural and other relatively smaller river systems from Russia’s north), and in the southern portions where waters are considerably deeper but without major river inflows, salinity of waters is evident and the Caspian appears as a sea. (Median salinity of the Caspian is approximately 1/3 relative to the oceanic waters average).

Caspian picture2

The geomorphology of the Caspian is unique and many authors have referred to the formation similarities of the Black Sea–Caspian–Aral and their interconnectivity back to Pleistocene. Most probably, some 5,5 million years ago two factors landlocked the Caspian: the tectonic uplift of the basin and the dramatic fall of the earth’s oceanic levels which literally trapped the Caspian to the present shores. Due to its unique formation and present water composition variations, the Caspian hosts rare biodiversity and many endemic species of flora and fauna (presently, threatened by rising exploration and exploitation of vast oil and gas reserves).

The Inner Circle – Similarities

The so-called “Inner Circle” of the Caspian Basin consists of the five littoral (riparian) states, namely Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, sharing the common coastline.

As much as the geographically distant as well as different by their distinctive geomorphology and hydrology, the Arctic and Caspian – when contrasted and compared – however resemble several critical similarities.

Both theaters are grand bodies of water surrounded by 5 riparian/littoral states. (Meaning both are water surrounded by landmass, while Antarctica represents landmass surrounded by water.) Both of them are of huge and largely unexplored natural resources and marine biota. Both the Artic and Caspian have numerous territorial disputes and are of absolute geopolitical importance for their respective littoral states, and well beyond. Finally, both theaters are also of unsolved legal status – drifting between an external quest for creation of special international regime and the existing Law of Sea Convention system (UNCLOS).

Ergo, in both theaters, the dynamic of the littoral states displays the following:

Dismissive: Erode the efforts of international community/external interested parties for creation of the Antarctica-like treaty (by keeping the UNCLOS referential);

Assertive: Maximize the shares of the spoils of partition – extend the EEZ and continental shelf as to divide most if not the entire body of water only among the Five;

Reconciliatory: Prevent any direct confrontation among the riparian states over the spoils – resolve the claims without arbitration of the III parties. (preferably CLCS).

One of the most important differentiating elements of the two theatres is the composition of littoral states. The constellation of the Arctic Five, we can consider as being symmetric – each of the Five has an open sea access (as the Arctic itself has wide connection with the oceanic systems of Atlantic and Pacific). On contrary, the Caspian Five are of asymmetric constellation. The Caspian Five could be roughly divided on the old/traditional two (Russia and Iran), and the three newcomers (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). This division corresponds also with the following characteristic: only Iran and Russia have an open sea access, other three countries are landlocked – as the Caspian itself is a landlocked body of water.

Like no other country, the Persian proper is uniquely situated by connecting the Euro-Med/MENA with Central and South, well to the East Asia landmass. Additionally, it solely bridges the two key Euro-Asian energy plateaus: the Gulf and Caspian. This gives Iran an absolutely pivotal geopolitical and geo-economic posture over the larger region – an opportunity but also an exposure! No wonder that Teheran needs Moscow for its own regime survival, as the impressive US physical presence in the Gulf represents a double threat to Iran – geopolitically and geo-economically.

The author: Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic anis@corpsdiplomatique.cd

 Addendum

Besides the fact that the two poles are permafrost encircling the geographic and magnetic poles of the planet, nearly everything else is different with the two polar regions; morphological, climatic, anthropo-biological, political and legal standing. The Southern pole-Antarctica is the region governed by a treaty, which is fully accepted by the entire international community (that includes all of the neighboring and interested states), however, of a limited timeline (50 years).

In the North-Arctic, on the contrary, the setup of the special legal framework is still under discussion. Due to the current global warming, vast perennial ice sheets are melting – a clear environmental threat but also an economic opportunity (like: the alternative shipping routes as well as the large biota and mineral deposits at hand). A question would arise when the absence of a definite legal setting in the Arctic and the increased focus on national (geoeconomic and geopolitical) interests of the circumpolar states might trigger border tensions, domestic unrest, an open armed conflict and hence, endanger the global security.

Among the Five there is a lot: two are P-5 members and both of them (former) superpowers, four are the NATO members facing Russia on the other edge, three European versus two American, one in the EU, three of the G-8, and all of them the OSCE members. Is it a change or is it the maintenance of the Arctic and Antarctic status quo to preserve the power balance? The following lines are a brief geopolitical overview on the Arctic and Antarctica, including their characteristics and environmental factors.

The Arctic is one of the world’s regions most affected by climate change: average temperatures are rising as twice as fast as at any other spot of the planet. 2 The perennial ice sheets are melting with an unexpected speed coupled with the ever-shorter winter snow season. With the shrinking snow-cover area (deglaciation), less sunlight is refracted back to the atmosphere – a pattern that further accelerates a temperature rise (due to increased sun-radiation, the absorption by the less refractable and more absorptive, dark-coloured ocean). The WMO/IPCC expect an increase of about 6 to 7°C in the course of this century (surely with some microclimatic variances).

Although there is no scientific consensus on the cause/s, the effects are undisputed – the Arctic (being more vulnerable than any other region on earth) is responding rather fast to the climate change.

The thinned and holed ozone layer will further accelerate warming in this area. In addition to the fact that the polar caps are the main stabilizers and regulators of the plant’s climate (with all weather patterns), there are also the biggest reserves of fresh water. Through the rapid de-glaciation of Greenland and Antarctic, and the melting of the Arctic ice sheets, a spill of fresh water is released, seriously affecting: oceanic volumes (a sea level rise), their temperatures density and salinity which finally through the oceanic conveyor belt affects the oceans’ circulation system and consequently the climate all over the world.

It remains unclear what (sort, severity and frequency of) consequences this might have to Europe’s climate and general weather conditions. The future scenarios are ranging from a substantial warming (coupled with severe droughts and extreme weather conditions), up to a subsequent cooling.

Another consequence affecting the Arctic is the thawing of permafrost (permanently frozen land). Through the thawing of the soil, methane that was trapped for centuries is released into the atmosphere, which further contributes to the greenhouse gas effect. In addition to a dangerous methane release, the very defrosting of permafrost will cause the destruction of buildings, communicational infrastructure such as roads and airports, as well as deviations of industrial facilities and oil/gas pipelines within the Arctic Circle. Flora and fauna will definitely undergo significant changes.

Oceanic and terrestrial species will move further north, some of them already under stress of extinction as their natural habitats of vegetation zones are affected too. The Arctic region is experiencing a profound change and has to face severe challenges, which are to be felt far beyond its polar parameters. Climate change in polar regions and the subsequent geopolitical adjustments to meet them, are expected to be among the largest and most rapid of any region on the Earth. They will undeniably cause major physical, ecological, socio-economic (incl. transportation-distribution channels), socio-economic and politico-military shifts, especially in the Arctic theatre.

The Arctic (on the contrary to Antarctica and same as Caspian) is not a subject to any specific international legal provisions. The only exception is the island of Svalbard which has (though imperfect) the clearly defined, restraining (semi-ATS like) legal framework. The Five littoral, circumpolar states of Arctic have a desire and legal opportunity (thought the UNCLOS stipulated CLCS machinery) to lodge the territorial claims over the Arctic. That is something that none of the Five would like to see changed for a new restraining international instrument whose scope would be negotiated by large number of states beyond the polar parameter.

Out of the twelve original parties to the Antarctica treaty, three are among the Arctic Five (Norway, Russia/SU and the US). Out of the Arctic Five, we can consider only three as real polar states. Irrespectively of the size, might and the degree of technological advancement, no country can close a specific polar-knowledge gap within few decades. It took Denmark, Norway and Russia several centuries to master the ice.

Although the US portraits itself as a “fish of high seas” – a supreme ruler of the world oceans, it is primarily a “fish” of warm seas. The US suffers from territorial discontinuity with its Alaska proper. After all, the Alaska gives relatively modest share of the Arctic theatre. The US presence in the Antarctica is less substantive and more symbolic – to confirm the prestige and to observe the activities of others. Likewise, the main Arctic concern for the US is to deter Russia – for the time being there is no indication of the bolder Arctic presence. Finally, by not ratifying the UNCLOS, the U.S. cannot lodge the claim, but also (equally, if not more importantly) cannot decide on claims of others.

Canada, on its own end, is neither a typical polar state nor considerable naval power. Its, second longest, Arctic border so far is more of a burden than of an advantage for the government in Ottawa. Canada is one of the most disproportionate states: huge territory with the tiny population centered at the far south of the country – of the exposed, unexplored and literally empty central and northern territory. Long green and blue borders as well as the lack of substantive Arctic expertise will keep the US close to Canada in their security and geoeconomic considerations, still not without frictions.

If the US is a “fish of warm seas” than Denmark and Norway are the “fish of cold seas” and Russia is a “polar bear” of permafrost. Russia clearly has very strong position as it owns not only the longest Arctic coastline but it also holds a long history of Arctic presence. Traditionally, the High North has been a constant geopolitical imperative since the Peter the Great times. Parallel and well-established geoeconomic drive is getting a new vigor with the Putin and Medvedev’s administrations. The bold (sometimes noisy) Russian Arctic policy is another signal that the Federation is not going to disappear into the second row of the global politics and economy, but will increase its (non-territorial leverage and geopolitical) projection as a major energy supplier of the world throughout the 21st century. It is hard to imagine any relevant Arctic issue to be resolved (even discussed) without an explicit Russian consent.

Norway, the small state with the large pool of historical knowledge and advanced technologies is a loner in the political environment, a nation between the EU and the Russian Federation, and the key northern flank NATO member. It takes a friendly but firm position in international relations and Arctic matters. Close proximity coupled with unresolved Arctic territorial disputes and lucrative economic prospects of joint ventures will keep Russia and Norway out of open confrontational course.

Canada’s neighbour Greenland connects the EU to the Arctic. The largest world’s island and its tiny population will be contested with the environmental, economic and political challenges in the up- coming decades. Greenland’s road-map is gradual but decisive independence, less home grown and more Danish induced. However, at the moment Greenland is still highly dependent on Danish subsidies, including diplomatic one. It is still Danish signature that holds the biggest NATO Arctic base on the very Greenland’s soil.

Clearly, no instrument comparable to the Antarctic Treaty System will be established in the Arctic, even if there are several advocates demanding it. Each and every of the Arctic Five will continue to keep any external party far away from substantive participation in the polar matters.

However, it is not a guaranty for the frictionless relations among the Five: the North Pole was the most militarized region of the world at the peaks of Cold War (and still holds huge military arsenal), while at the same time the South Pole was (and still is) the only demilitarized continent of the planet. In the Antarctica, a sudden change of the current legal regime is very unlikely. The Artic and Caspian region will try to preserve de facto regime – without mayor external interferences, as long as their fragile equilibrium remains. Further on, the Southern Pole is far from the prime centres of the world gravity: the US, the EU, Russia and Japan – all four of them are situated well on the northern hemisphere – closer to Arctic, and some even connected by pipelines with Caspian.

The Polar Regions, although inhabitable, of harsh and hostile weather conditions, and distant from any prominent center of human activity, will certainly have major influence on a climatic and environmental, socio-economic, politico-military and overall security matters throughout the 21st century, and therefore require a closer consideration as well as the careful and constant observation

[1] The Caspian basin records gradual and cyclical water level variations that are basically synchronized with the volume discharge of the Volga river system and co-related to the complex North Atlantic oscillations (amount of North Atlantic depressions that reaches the Eurasian land mass interior).

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