Between Interdependence and Competition for Influence

“For Europe, the Middle East is not a distant region, but its extended strategic neighbourhood.”

By Major General (Two Stars) (retd) Corneliu Pivariu

This article examines the evolution of relations between Europe and the Middle East in the context of the profound transformations generated by the emergence of a multipolar world. Starting from the energy, economic, and security interdependencies that link the two regions, the study highlights how the redistribution of power at the global level influences regional dynamics and the behaviour of the principal actors involved.

The article analyses the competition for influence among the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union, as well as the growing strategic autonomy of regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. It also highlights the roles played by other regional actors relevant to the stability and security of the Middle East.

The final section evaluates the main challenges Europe is likely to face by 2035—energy security, migration, and geopolitical influence—and draws conclusions regarding the future of Europe–Middle East relations within an international system undergoing an accelerated process of power rebalancing.

The analysis is conducted through the lens of the concept of asymmetric multipolarity, illustrating how the uneven redistribution of power affects relations between Europe and the Middle East and contributes to shaping the emerging international order.

Why Does the Middle East Matter to Europe?

Few regions of the world have had as profound an impact on Europe’s security and prosperity as the Middle East. Located at the intersection of Europe, Asia, and Africa, the region represents both a major source of energy resources, a crucial hub of global trade routes, and a geopolitical arena where the interests of the world’s major powers converge.

For Europe[1], the importance of the Middle East extends far beyond geography. The region’s stability or instability directly affects European energy security, migration flows, counterterrorism efforts, maritime security, and the functioning of global supply chains. The successive crises in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Gaza have demonstrated that developments in the Middle East generate immediate consequences for the European continent, whether economic, political, or security-related.

At the same time, relations between Europe and the Middle East are undergoing a period of profound transformation. While during the final decades of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century interactions between the two regions were shaped primarily by Western strategic predominance, today’s context is markedly different. The rise of China, Russia’s return as a significant geopolitical actor, the growing influence of regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, and the broader trend toward a more dispersed distribution of power are fundamentally reshaping the architecture of international relations.

In this new environment, Europe views the Middle East primarily through the lens of regional stability, whereas Middle Eastern actors increasingly define their strategies in relation to the competition for influence among the world’s major centres of power. This difference in perspective constitutes one of the keys to understanding the evolution of relations between the two regions.

Consequently, Europe–Middle East relations can no longer be analysed solely through the prism of economic cooperation or traditional security concerns. They must be understood within a broader framework marked by the emergence of a multipolar world in which influence, strategic autonomy, and diplomatic flexibility have become decisive factors.

1. The End of the Unipolar Order and the Emergence of a New Strategic Game

More than three decades after the end of the Cold War, the international system is experiencing one of the most significant periods of transformation in recent history. The unipolar moment that characterised the 1990s and the early 2000s, dominated by the political, economic, and military supremacy of the United States, is gradually giving way to a more complex and fragmented distribution of power at the global level.

The financial crisis of 2008 represented one of the earliest signals of this transformation. It exposed the vulnerabilities of the Western economic model and accelerated the transfer of influence toward other centres of power. Simultaneously, China consolidated its position as the principal strategic competitor of the United States, Russia reasserted its geopolitical ambitions, and numerous regional powers began pursuing their interests with a greater degree of autonomy.

The Middle East perhaps reflects this transformation more clearly than any other region. For decades, most states in the region built their foreign policies around privileged relations with Washington. Today, however, this dependence is increasingly being replaced by a far more flexible and pragmatic approach.

Saudi Arabia simultaneously develops strategic relations with the United States, China, and Russia. Türkiye increasingly asserts its strategic autonomy, seeking to maintain a balance between its NATO membership and cooperation with Moscow in areas of mutual interest. Iran continues to deepen its partnerships with Russia and China, while the United Arab Emirates and Qatar constantly diversify their diplomatic and economic options.

These developments indicate that Middle Eastern states no longer accept the traditional role of allies dependent on a single power. Instead, they seek to maximise advantages through the development of simultaneous relationships with multiple international actors, thereby reducing the risks associated with excessive dependence.

In essence, we are witnessing a shift from a logic of alignment to a logic of balancing. Rather than choosing between East and West, most regional actors seek to benefit from the opportunities offered by each major centre of power. This strategy reflects not only the changes taking place within the international system but also the geopolitical maturation of states that today possess considerably greater economic, financial, and political resources than in the past.

For Europe, this transformation creates both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, it opens new prospects for economic and diplomatic cooperation. On the other hand, it compels European states to compete in a far more complex strategic environment, where influence can no longer be taken for granted but must be constantly reaffirmed and consolidated.

2. Europe–Middle East Relations: From Energy to Security

Despite the major transformations that have taken place within the international system, relations between Europe and the Middle East continue to be characterised by a high degree of interdependence. This relationship extends well beyond the economic sphere, encompassing energy, trade, demographic, and security dimensions that directly affect the stability of both regions.

For a long time, energy constituted the foundation of this relationship. Europe’s economic development after the Second World War was supported to a significant extent by access to Middle Eastern energy resources. Oil from the Gulf states and, subsequently, natural gas exported by various regional producers contributed to sustaining one of the world’s most advanced economic areas.

The energy crisis triggered by the outbreak of the war in Ukraine demonstrated, however, that European energy security cannot be analysed solely through the prism of its relationship with Russia. In an effort to diversify its sources of supply, Europe intensified cooperation with countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and other regional partners. At the same time, joint investments in renewable energy and the emerging hydrogen economy have begun to create new forms of strategic cooperation.

Yet energy represents only one dimension of this interdependence. Trade between the two regions has expanded steadily, while Middle Eastern states have become increasingly important investors in European economies. Sovereign wealth funds from the Gulf countries manage assets worth trillions of dollars and are actively involved in sectors ranging from infrastructure and energy to technology and financial services.

For its part, Europe remains one of the most important commercial and technological partners of the region. European expertise in fields such as infrastructure development, transportation, green energy, education, and healthcare continues to be highly valued by Middle Eastern countries seeking economic diversification and modernization.

Beyond economics, security constitutes the second major pillar of Europe–Middle East relations.

The experience of the past two decades has demonstrated that instability in the Middle East generates direct consequences for Europe. Migration flows resulting from conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Libya have profoundly influenced domestic politics in many European states, fuelling debates on identity, integration, and border security. At the same time, terrorist organisations operating in the region have demonstrated their ability to project threats onto European territory.

Another area of shared concern is maritime security. A significant portion of global trade and energy flows destined for Europe transit strategic chokepoints such as the Suez Canal, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Strait of Hormuz. Any disruption of traffic through these routes has immediate economic repercussions on a global scale.

Attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea, escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf, and risks associated with regional conflicts have once again highlighted the vulnerability of maritime routes that are essential to the European economy. Consequently, maritime security has become an increasingly important component of cooperation between Europe and the states of the Middle East.

This cooperation also extends to the protection of critical infrastructure, the fight against transnational crime, cybersecurity, and the management of risks associated with emerging technologies. All these areas require a high degree of coordination and collaboration between the two regions.

Therefore, although Europe’s political influence in the Middle East may be relatively more limited today than in previous decades, the degree of interdependence between the two regions remains extremely high. In reality, neither Europe nor the Middle East can ensure its security and prosperity while ignoring the interests and developments of the other.

This reality explains why relations between the two regions continue to represent one of the most important components of the Eurasian and Mediterranean geopolitical architecture.

3. Competition for Influence: Europe, the United States, China, and Russia

While in the immediate post-Cold War period Western influence in the Middle East appeared almost uncontested, the strategic reality of 2026 is far more complex. The region has become one of the clearest arenas in which competition among the world’s major centres of power is unfolding and where the characteristics of the emerging international order are taking shape.

From this perspective, the Middle East can be viewed as a relevant example of what I have described in previous analyses as asymmetric multipolarity[2]—an international system in which multiple centres of power coexist, but possess different capabilities and exercise influence through distinct instruments.

The United States remains the principal military actor and the primary security guarantor in the region. Its network of military bases, naval presence in the Persian Gulf, strategic partnerships with Israel and the Arab Gulf states, and unmatched global power-projection capabilities provide Washington with advantages that no other actor can currently equal.

Nevertheless, American influence is no longer perceived as exclusive. Military interventions over the past two decades, shifting strategic priorities, and Washington’s growing focus on competition with China in the Indo-Pacific have encouraged many regional states to diversify their external partnerships.

China is perhaps the greatest beneficiary of this evolution. Unlike the United States, Beijing has built its influence primarily through economic and commercial instruments. The Belt and Road Initiative, investments in infrastructure, technology, logistics, and energy have transformed China into an indispensable partner for many Middle Eastern countries.

For regional leaders, relations with China offer clear advantages. Beijing possesses substantial financial resources, avoids the political conditionality often associated with Western partners, and favours a pragmatic approach to cooperation. Furthermore, China is now one of the largest importers of Middle Eastern energy, giving it a direct strategic interest in regional stability.

Russia occupies a different but nonetheless significant position. Although its economic resources are considerably more limited than those of China or the collective West, Moscow continues to be perceived as an important security actor. Its military intervention in Syria demonstrated both its willingness and capability to use force in defence of its interests and allies.

Moreover, Russia’s ties with Iran, its energy cooperation within the OPEC+ framework[3], and its sustained contacts with numerous Arab states enable Moscow to preserve a meaningful degree of influence in the region, even amid the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions.

Europe occupies a distinct position within this complex competition. The European Union is one of the region’s most important economic partners, one of the principal providers of investment and development assistance, and a respected diplomatic actor in numerous Middle Eastern capitals.

Nevertheless, European influence is often constrained by the lack of a sufficiently coherent foreign and security policy. This structural challenge has, at certain times, been compounded by the absence of political and diplomatic authority comparable to that exercised by the chief foreign policy officials of the major global powers.[4] While the United States can rapidly mobilize military instruments and China can deploy vast economic resources in a centralized manner, Europe frequently operates through complex compromises among the interests of its member states.

It is therefore no coincidence that, in recent years, the debate surrounding European strategic autonomy[5] has returned to the forefront. Many political leaders and analysts regard it as a necessary condition for strengthening the European Union’s geopolitical role in a world increasingly defined by competition among major centres of power.

This situation creates a strategic paradox. Europe possesses impressive economic strength and deep historical ties with the region, yet it continues to face difficulties in transforming these advantages into geopolitical influence comparable to that exercised by other major actors.

For Middle Eastern states, competition among these centres of power represents more of an opportunity than a threat. Most regional actors seek to simultaneously leverage their relationships with Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and Brussels, while avoiding excessive dependence on any single partner.

The result is the emergence of a regional system that is more flexible and more autonomous than in the past, one in which influence is constantly negotiated and alliances are increasingly shaped by concrete interests rather than rigid ideological alignments.

From this perspective, the Middle East is no longer merely the object of competition among major powers but an active participant in that competition. The ability of regional states to balance their relationships with different external partners constitutes one of the defining characteristics of the new geopolitical reality.

4. New Centres of Influence and Strategic Actors in the Middle East

One of the most significant geopolitical developments of the early twenty-first century has been the growing degree of strategic autonomy achieved by several Middle Eastern states. Whereas the region was once analysed primarily through the prism of intervention and influence by external powers, an increasing number of states now define their own strategic agendas and act as regional centres of power.

This process does not imply the disappearance of external influence, but rather a reduction in dependence upon it. Regional states seek to maximize their freedom of action, diversify their partnerships, and promote their national interests within an increasingly fluid international environment.

Saudi Arabia is perhaps the most relevant example of this transformation. Under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Kingdom has embarked upon an ambitious programme of economic and social modernization through Vision 2030[6]. At the same time, Riyadh has adopted a more flexible and independent foreign policy than in previous decades.

Its strategic relationship with the United States remains essential, yet Saudi Arabia has simultaneously expanded its economic and political ties with China, maintained channels of dialogue with Russia, and actively participated in emerging Global South frameworks, including BRICS[7]. This approach reflects the Saudi leadership’s determination to avoid excessive dependence and to benefit from opportunities offered by every major centre of power.

Türkiye constitutes another significant example of strategic autonomy. A member of NATO for more than seven decades, Ankara simultaneously pursues an independent foreign policy tailored to its regional and global interests. Its geographical position, military capabilities, expanding industrial base, and role as a bridge between Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia provide it with considerable influence.

In recent years, Türkiye has demonstrated its ability to cooperate simultaneously with its Western allies and with actors such as Russia and the states of Central Asia, without abandoning its own strategic objectives. This diplomatic flexibility represents one of the defining characteristics of the emerging multipolar world.

Iran follows a different, yet equally significant trajectory. Confronted for decades with sanctions and external pressure, Tehran has been compelled to develop its own mechanisms of resilience and adaptation. Its strengthening ties with China and Russia, expansion of regional influence, and development of indigenous military capabilities reflect Iran’s determination to preserve its status as a relevant strategic actor.

Despite economic difficulties and internal tensions, Iran continues to exert substantial influence on the regional balance of power and remains one of the actors that no viable regional security architecture can afford to ignore.

The United Arab Emirates presents a particularly distinctive case. Benefiting from pragmatic leadership and significant financial resources, the UAE has successfully transformed itself into a global hub for finance, logistics, technology, and investment. Its influence now extends far beyond its geographical size and demographic weight.

Through strategic investments, active diplomacy, and forward-looking economic policies, the Emirates have become a respected regional and international actor capable of shaping economic and political developments well beyond the Gulf region.

To these examples may be added Qatar, which has developed a distinctive diplomatic profile, as well as other states seeking to capitalize on their geographical, economic, or political advantages within a changing international environment.

Beyond the regional actors with ambitions of strategic projection, there are also states and territories whose importance derives less from their autonomous capacity to influence events and more from their geopolitical position, internal vulnerabilities, and the role they play in maintaining—or disrupting—the regional balance.

Syria, although deeply affected by more than a decade of conflict, remains an area of strategic interest for Russia, Türkiye, Iran, and the Arab states. The country’s reconstruction process will influence regional dynamics for many years to come.

Iraq continues to play an important role due to its geographical position, energy resources, and function as a zone of interaction among Arab, Iranian, and Western influences. The country’s future trajectory will remain an important factor in determining the stability of the wider region.

Lebanon, trapped in a prolonged economic and political crisis, illustrates the difficulties of maintaining stability in a context shaped by competition among regional actors and the fragility of state institutions.

Jordan continues to serve as a factor of stability and a credible interlocutor for both regional and Western actors, benefiting from a balanced diplomatic posture and strong relations with its external partners.

Kuwait, although less visible geopolitically than some of its Gulf neighbours, continues to play a significant role through its energy resources, domestic stability, and prudent diplomacy.

Yemen remains one of the principal sources of instability in the region. The prolonged conflict has direct implications for maritime security in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most important strategic chokepoints.

Palestine (Gaza and the West Bank) continues to represent one of the most sensitive issues in the Middle East, with political, humanitarian, and security implications that extend far beyond the boundaries of the local conflict.

Israel remains one of the central actors in the region due to its economic, technological, and military capabilities, as well as its privileged relationship with the United States and its growing ties with an increasing number of Arab states.

Taken together, these developments indicate that the Middle East can no longer be analysed solely through the prism of rivalry among external great powers. The region increasingly generates its own centres of influence, diplomatic initiatives, and frameworks of cooperation.

Consequently, one of the defining characteristics of the emerging multipolar world is the rise of regional poles capable of influencing local, regional, and global dynamics simultaneously. The Middle East today offers one of the clearest examples of this phenomenon.

For Europe, this transformation requires a more nuanced and flexible approach. Relations with the region can no longer be built exclusively through dialogue with traditional actors or through historical alliances. They must be adapted to a reality in which power is more widely dispersed and influence is shared among an increasing number of relevant actors.

5. Three Challenges for Europe by 2035

The geopolitical transformations currently underway suggest that Europe–Middle East relations will continue to represent one of the essential dimensions of the European continent’s security and prosperity. However, Europe’s success in managing this relationship will depend on its ability to respond to several major challenges already emerging on the horizon of 2035.

Energy: Between Diversification and the Green Transition

The first challenge concerns energy security.

The war in Ukraine demonstrated how vulnerable modern economies can become when they depend excessively on a single supplier or a limited number of supply routes. Consequently, Europe accelerated its efforts to diversify energy sources, while Middle Eastern states became even more important partners in this process.

Over the next decade, cooperation will not be limited to oil and natural gas. The development of renewable energy, green hydrogen production, and new technologies for energy storage and transportation will create new forms of interdependence between the two regions.

Paradoxically, although Europe seeks to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels, the strategic importance of the Middle East may not diminish but rather evolve. States that currently export hydrocarbons are already seeking to position themselves as key actors in the energy economy of the future.

For Europe, the challenge lies not only in securing access to resources but also in maintaining stable relationships with those actors who will control the emerging global energy value chains.

Migration: Demographic Pressures and Regional Instability

The second challenge concerns migration.

Demographic differences between the two regions are substantial. While many European countries are confronted with ageing populations and labour shortages, numerous states in the Middle East and its broader neighbourhood continue to experience rapid growth among younger age groups.

Under normal circumstances, these trends could generate opportunities for economic cooperation and controlled labour mobility. However, regional conflicts, political instability, climate change, and economic difficulties may transform migration into a major source of tension.

The experience of the past decade has shown that large-scale migration flows can have profound political consequences in Europe, influencing electoral outcomes, debates concerning national identity, and social cohesion.

Consequently, migration management cannot be separated from the stability of the Middle East. The more stable and prosperous the region becomes, the easier it will be to manage migratory pressures affecting Europe.

Geopolitical Influence: Can Europe Speak with One Voice?

The third—and arguably most important—challenge is geopolitical.

In the emerging multipolar world, influence is no longer determined solely by economic power. It also depends on the ability to formulate clear strategic objectives, mobilize resources, and act coherently over the long term.

From this perspective, Europe finds itself at a crossroads. Although it possesses one of the world’s largest economies, significant technological resources, and considerable commercial power, its external influence remains constrained by the fragmentation of its decision-making processes.

In the Middle East, this reality becomes even more apparent. Regional actors simultaneously engage with Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and Brussels, while Europe’s ability to defend and promote its interests increasingly depends on the degree of coordination among its member states.

The fundamental question is not whether Europe will remain present in the Middle East. Its economic, commercial, and cultural presence is already firmly established. The real question is whether that presence will be accompanied by strategic influence commensurate with its interests.

In essence, Europe’s principal challenge is not a lack of resources but rather the difficulty of transforming economic power into geopolitical influence.

Conclusions

Relations between Europe and the Middle East reflect one of the fundamental transformations of the contemporary international system. The emerging multipolar order is altering traditional balances of power and compelling both European and Middle Eastern actors to adapt their strategies to a reality far more complex than that of the post-Cold War era.

First, we are witnessing an unprecedented diversification of the external partnerships pursued by states in the region. Most regional actors seek to avoid exclusive dependence on a single power and instead strive to capitalize simultaneously on opportunities offered by the United States, China, Russia, and Europe.

Second, competition for influence in the Middle East is becoming increasingly intense, yet this does not automatically lead to confrontation. On the contrary, it generates new forms of cooperation, flexible alignments, and mechanisms for balancing interests.

Third, regional states are asserting their strategic autonomy and their capacity to influence both regional and global developments. The Middle East is no longer merely a space upon which influence is exercised; it has become a centre of power actively contributing to the shaping of the emerging international order.

For Europe, the principal challenge lies in adapting to this new reality. Historical ties, economic strength, and geographical proximity provide important advantages, yet they do not automatically guarantee political and strategic influence.

Ultimately, the future of Europe–Middle East relations will not be defined by the dominance of one actor over another, but by the ability of both regions to manage interdependence, competition, and cooperation within an international system undergoing an accelerated process of rebalancing.

Developments in Europe–Middle East relations confirm that the world is not moving toward a symmetrical multipolarity, but rather toward an asymmetrical multipolarity, in which influence is distributed among actors possessing different resources, capabilities, and instruments of power.

In the multipolar world now taking shape, the Middle East no longer represents merely Europe’s strategic periphery; it has become one of the key arenas in which the new global balance of power is being shaped.

Brașov, 25 June 2026

Paper prepared for participation in the International Conference organized by the Middle East Political and Economic Institute (MEPEI), InterContinental Hotel, Bucharest.

[1]  In this article, the term “Europe” is used primarily with reference to the European Union, which constitutes the principal institutional European actor in the fields of foreign policy, trade, and international economic relations. This distinction is important because Europe, as a geographical space, comprises more than forty sovereign states, whereas the European Union consists of twenty-seven member states. Depending on the methodology used, the EU accounts for approximately 14% of global GDP measured at purchasing power parity and a higher share in nominal terms, confirming its status as a major economic actor, though not always an equivalent geopolitical one.

[2]  A concept used by the author to describe an international system characterised by the existence of multiple centres of power possessing different resources, capabilities, and instruments of influence, resulting in an uneven distribution of power at the global level. The concept highlights both the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of power.

[3] Cooperation within OPEC+ has contributed to a strategic rapprochement between Russia and the principal oil-exporting states of the Gulf, demonstrating that energy interests can generate pragmatic forms of cooperation even among actors positioned differently on other geopolitical issues.

[4] The position of High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy reflects both the ambitions and the limitations of European foreign policy. Catherine Ashton (2009–2014), Federica Mogherini (2014–2019), Josep Borrell (2019–2024), and Kaja Kallas (since 2024) have come from different political and professional backgrounds; however, none of them has possessed the political authority, institutional instruments, and decision-making capacity typically associated with a U.S. Secretary of State or senior foreign policy leaders of the major powers. This reality partly explains the European Union’s difficulty in transforming its economic power into unified geopolitical influence, particularly in an international environment dominated by state actors capable of making and implementing decisions rapidly.

[5] The concept of European strategic autonomy refers to the European Union’s ability to define and advance its interests independently in the fields of foreign policy, security, defence, energy, and critical technologies, while maintaining the transatlantic partnership. The debate gained renewed momentum after 2017, particularly at the initiative of France, and acquired greater relevance in the context of the war in Ukraine and the ongoing reconfiguration of global power relations.

[6] A strategic programme launched by Saudi Arabia in 2016 with the objective of reducing the country’s dependence on hydrocarbons while developing sectors such as industry, technology, tourism, and services. The programme represents Riyadh’s effort to transform a rentier state dependent on oil revenues into a diversified economic actor of the post-oil era.

[7] BRICS represents one of the most visible institutional expressions of the ongoing redistribution of economic and political influence toward the Global South. The interest shown by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Iran in this framework reflects the desire of Middle Eastern states to diversify their strategic options beyond the traditional Western-dominated order.