I perfectly remember when I saw her for the first time. It was in 2004, at the MAE CUP, an annual sports competition between diplomats from the various embassies accredited to Bucharest, which her husband, then the Foreign Minister of Romania, today the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, had initiated.
I was there supporting my soon to be husband, at that time a young diplomat at the beginning of his career, she was supporting hers, along with the couple’s two small children. That image stayed in my mind because I was impressed by a certain sophistication and style that she exuded, without being ostentatious in any way. Later, over the years, I found the same elegance in other great ladies, from all over the world, who initially became my mentors, and then my friends, in this diplomatic journey.
Mihaela Geoana, an architect with an MBA in Marketing, is certainly a woman that you can learn a lot from. She is a perfect example that you can do important things if you really want to, regardless of how life goes up or down. Tenacity and perseverance are the keys.
On a sunny winter morning we sat down over a cup of tea and she graciously took the time to tell me her life story…
She remembered about her first years of profession as an architect in Bucharest and then Paris. Little did she know that the life, how she thought it would be, would change completely when her husband was appointed ambassador to the US. ‘We moved to Washington when I was only 32, with a toddler and a baby in my arms. We were so young and had to learn a lot along the way. We tried to make ourselves known, as a family, but especially as diplomatic representatives of a country that, at the time, did not seem very interesting over the Atlantic’.
Mihaela Geoana
She shows me pictures with the family meeting president Clinton and I recognize the same attitude that had once impressed me. ‘In Washington, we hosted lots of events and charity galas and this was how we basically came to know many influential people. We opened the doors to our residence and supported different causes that we believed in but, in the meantime, we made the necessary connections for a successful diplomatic posting abroad’.
After returning to Bucharest, she wisely tried to replicate what she had learned overseas. She organized the first Charity International Christmas Bazaar in the Romanian capital (together with the International Women Association of Bucharest), she initiated recurring meetings with diplomatic spouses and started to think about what else she could do, as social involvement, in a Romania that was still emerging on its democratic path.
Inspired by a personal incident (which luckily turned out to be a false alarm), she founded ‘Renasterea’ (meaning ‘Renaissance’ in Romanian) in 2001, an NGO meant to bring to attention, for the first time in Romania, the major importance of breast cancer prevention actions.
‘The beginning was very hard because nobody talked about prevention, about cancer, this word was taboo. Many tried then to discourage me. But I knew I had to do it. Romania had only a 30 percent survival rate in breast cancer cases, totally opposite to the situation I had left in America’.
22 years later, countless humanitarian awareness campaigns and initiatives, a free phone line which provided answers to more than 100,000 calls, but also an intelligent communication strategy involving influential people from the media, business and the Romanian artistic sector, have brought unparalleled notoriety at national level. ‘Today, we have two diagnostic centers; we organize mobile medical units throughout the country, where we offer free of charge breast investigations and Pap Smear Tests to vulnerable women. Also, in partnership with Susan G. Komen US, which had launched in 1983 the Race for the Cure, world’s largest and most successful education and fundraising event regarding breast cancer, we initiated in 2015 our own national ‘Race for the cure’, a 5 km run event which gathers over 5000 participants each year and helps funding our campaigns. Also, on our initiative, October 1st was officially declared National Breast Cancer Day and on this day, each year, as it happens in more than other 80 countries, emblematic buildings are illuminated in pink, as a symbol of the fight against breast cancer’.
Starting in 2004, she has organized ‘Art for Life’, fundraising galas hosted by diplomatic residences in the city, where art was exhibited and then auctioned.
She was for 8 years president of the ‘Red Cross Romania’ and also the president of Brussels based ‘Think Pink Europe’. ‘During my tenure at Red Cross, I started, for the first time in Romania, the ‘Food Bank’ project and helped attract funds for the creation of regional centers to teach First Aid techniques’.
She tells me about these accomplishments in a soft and reserved voice, with the modesty and openness of a woman who knows well who she is and what she can do. She has nothing more to prove and the facts recommend her above her notorious name. She got here following her own path and ambitions. She tells me, also as an advice to all young diplomatic spouses out there, that regardless of whether or not you have to leave your career behind, you need to create a new universe for yourself, to put to work the knowledge you have acquired, to build a new identity, compatible with your partner’s status and diplomatic path. ‘Explore new options, learn from what is happening around you, get new ideas and use them to your advantage’, she says.
‘Regardless of conditions, status, financial possibilities, you must have the right attitude, know your own value and try to assert yourself, to create your own, unique profile. Be smart! Be creative; do good, help yourself and others!’
Judicial and law enforcement authorities in France, the Netherlands, Spain and Romania have carried out a coordinated action against an organised crime group (OCG) suspected of trafficking cocaine and cannabis and laundering the proceeds of this crime. During a joint action, 22 suspects were arrested. Eurojust assisted the authorities in setting up and funding a joint investigation team (JIT) into the case.
Information obtained by the French authorities from two encrypted communication systems used by the criminals, EncroChat and SkyECC, proved the existence of a major drug trafficking and importation operation, as well as a money laundering network spanning several European countries, notably between France, the Netherlands and Spain. The suspects allegedly used vehicles with fitted hiding places to commit the crimes.
The OCG is believed to have used underground banking to launder the proceeds from the drug trafficking. With this method, large amounts of cash can be moved or converted into cryptocurrencies within a network of underground bankers. A payment can be made anywhere in the world without the money having to physically cross the border.
During a joint action day on 28 March, 22 suspects were detained in France, the Netherlands and Spain. Searches led to the discovery of more than EUR 2 million in cash, dozens of kilograms of cocaine and firearms. Luxury vehicles and watches were also seized.
300 law enforcement officers were deployed across Europe for this operation.
The case was opened by the French authorities in January 2021. A JIT was set up between the French and Dutch authorities with the support of Eurojust in March 2022. Five coordination meetings were hosted by the Agency to facilitate judicial cooperation and provide support for the coordinated investigative efforts. During the action day, Eurojust set up a coordination centre to facilitate rapid cooperation between the judicial authorities.
The following authorities took part in this operation:
The Netherlands: Public Prosecutors Office Oost-Nederland; National Public Prosecutors Office for Economic and Environmental Offences; Police Oost-Nederland; Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service
Romania: Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism; Directorate for Countering Organized Crime – Antidrug Service and Financial Investigations Service; Services for Combating Organized Crime Neamt and Vrancea
Spain: Investigative Courts in Marbella (num 1), Fuengirola (num 1) and Benidorm (num 2), and Central Court num 3 at Audiencia Nacional; and International Cooperation Sections of the Spanish Prosecution Service in Málaga and Alicante and at the Antidrug PPO; Policía Nacional
With the support of Eurojust and Europol, the Romanian and Moldovan authorities have taken action against an organised crime group (OCG) suspected of trafficking high-risk doping substances. During a joint action, 11 suspects were arrested, and raw materials intended for the production of more than one million doses of anabolic steroids were seized. Eurojust assisted the authorities in setting up and funding a joint investigation team (JIT) into the case.
Anabolic steroids are synthetic substances that mimic the action of male sex hormones, such as testosterone, and are commonly used to increase muscle mass, strength and athletic performance. However, their use can lead to various serious cardiovascular side effects, including liver and kidney problems, as well as psychological disorders and cancer risks. Improper use or abuse of anabolic steroids can also lead to overdose, which can sometimes be fatal.
According to the investigation, the raw material used for the preparation of the doping substances was brought from China disguised as imported pharmaceutical substances. The packaging indications and the import prices were false.
The final production of the anabolic substances took place in a clandestine laboratory established in Romania. The equipment and storage facilities did not comply with any sanitary hygiene standards.
The final product was distributed in many European Union countries. To secure as many customers as possible, the OCG used labels of well-known brands in the field.
The purchase of the active substances and the distribution of the finished products were undertaken through markets on the darknet. The transactions were also partly undertaken in cryptocurrencies to make them more difficult to trace.
Initial estimates show that the OCG obtained over EUR 1 million through this criminal activity, which was used for luxurious living and invested in luxury items and real estate in the Republic of Moldova.
In a joint action on 29 March, 11 suspects were detained. A total of 37 searches were carried out, including 15 in Romania and 22 in Moldova. Active substances and other raw materials for the production of more than one million doses of anabolic steroids were seized, together with cash and luxury items.
Eurojust supported the authorities involved in setting up and funding a JIT in November 2022.
Europol also provided operational support to the national authorities involved.
The following authorities took part in this investigation:
Romania: Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism Iasi, Brigades for Countering Organized Crime Iasi, București, Constanța, Sibiu,
Republic of Moldova: Prosecutor’s Office for Combatting Organized Crime and for Special Cases
Monday, 27 March 2023, Warsaw, Republic of Poland: The President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda welcomed for a ceremony of accreditation the non-resident Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Dr. Yousef Radwan Ali Bataineh, who is resident in Berlin, Germany and accredited there since 18 July 2022. The ceremony wherein Ambassador Yousef Bataineh handed in his letters of credence and the ones of recall of his predecessor took place at Belweder Palace.
Dr. Bataineh had been serving in the capacity as the Secretary-General, Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates from October 2020 through June 2022. Before that he was Head of Mission of Jordan to the European Union, NATO as well as Belgium, Luxembourg and Norway (2015-2017) between 2015 and up to October 2020.
Yousef Bataineh began his diplomatic career back in 1991 as a Diplomatic Attaché at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Amman. Since then, Dr. Bataineh has held a number of posts abroad; for instance, he served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the Jordanian embassies in The Netherlands, Germany and Greece. Whilst serving in headquarters, Dr. Bataineh held various positions, serving as Chief of Cabinet of the Minister; Director for European Affairs, the EU, UfM & NATO; as well as Head of the Disarmament Desk.
Ambassador Yousef Bataineh & President Andrzej Duda Yousef. Picture by Przemysław Keler, KPRP
Dr. Bataineh holds a Bachelor’s degree in English Language & Literature, a Master’s Degree in Political Translation & Linguistics, and a Ph.D. in Political Science. He has been awarded the Grand Cordon of the Order of Independence. Ambassador Bataineh speaks his native Arabic in addition to the English and German languages.
Based in Berlin, Germany Dr. Bataineh is also accredited to the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Finland. In the latter country he presented credentials to President Sauli Niinistö on Wednesday, 15 February 2022.
Eurojust and OLAF (European Anti-Fraud Office) have concluded a new Working Arrangement to enhance their cooperation in the fight against fraud, corruption, environmental crime, intellectual property crime and other crimes affecting the EU’s financial interests. The Working Arrangement was signed today by Eurojust President Mr Ladislav Hamran and OLAF Director-General Mr Ville Itälä during their high-level meeting in The Hague.
Eurojust President Mr Ladislav Hamran said: ‘This new Working Arrangement reinforces our existing close partnership and will help both Eurojust and OLAF to better tackle those crime areas that have a devastating impact on the EU’s financial interests. It paves the way for a more practical and operational cooperation, enabling us to offer the strongest possible protection of taxpayers’ money.’
OLAF Director-General Mr Ville Itälä stated: ‘Institutional and legal changes have called for adaptations in the way that OLAF and Eurojust work together, while maintaining our strong ties and good collaboration. The new Working Arrangement formalises our cooperation, with the aim of making the fight against fraud and other illegal activities affecting EU financial interests as efficient as possible.’
The new Working Arrangement outlines the practical details of the institutional, strategic and operational cooperation between Eurojust and OLAF. It builds on the work of dedicated liaison teams and foresees the preparation of action plans on common cooperation priorities.
Eurojust and OLAF have agreed on several concrete ways in which they can cooperate, including mutual advice and assistance, participation in each other’s operational meetings and joint investigation teams. This practical approach will create optimal synergies between the work of both organisations, while allowing them to benefit from each other’s unique expertise.
Background
The Working Arrangement replaces the 2008 Practical Agreement, which had become largely outdated as a result of the significant changes in the institutional and legal landscape over the past 15 years, particularly the revisions of OLAF’s and Eurojust’s respective Regulations. The new Working Arrangement will enter into force tomorrow with immediate effect, and can be accessed here.
Eurojust, the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation, is a unique hub based in The Hague, the Netherlands, where national judicial authorities work closely together to fight serious organised cross-border crime.
The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) conducts independent administrative investigations into fraud, corruption and irregularities affecting the EU’s financial interests, investigates serious misconduct by staff and members of EU institutions, and develops policies to counter fraud.
For further information:
For more on EU actors for criminal justice across borders, click here.
This is a zoom / hybrid lecture in the Warenar Cultural Center (Wassenaar)
Join us for a very special lecture given by Doug Gillen on ‘Hidden Canvasses: Street Art and the City’ in the Warenar on Tuesday, 11th April 2023 at 20.00 hours.This will be a Zoom lecture also shown in the Warenar theatre and we are hoping that members and guests will take the opportunity to come to the Warenar.
Doug is heavily involved in documenting the street art scene in London and abroad through his project Fifth Wall TV, and can offer a genuine insight into this world. Having previously lectured for London Art and More, when not filming, he is also an East End tour guide for Alternative London, specialising in culture and art.
There is more to the world of street art than Banksy, Hidden Canvasses is a beginners guide to the biggest art movement since pop art. From train writing in New York to interactive technology that brings murals to life, the concept of un-commissioned public art is a very different beast to that which it once was. Hidden Canvasses explores the key stages in street art growth examining the different elements and styles that comprise the scene with no rules. From the international superstars to the local underground heroes you are guaranteed to leave knowing your Invader from your Aryz and who knows you might even start looking at the world a little differently.
To register for the online lecture go to https://theartssociety.org/the-hague Please note that you have to register before Monday 10th April, 2023. The lecture starts on Tuesday 11th April at 20.00 pm. Fee (non-members): € 13,-. A membership (8 lectures and other activities) is € 65,- per year and € 120,- for a couple. A half-year membership (4 lectures and other activities) is € 32,50 per year and € 60,- for a couple
Monday, 27 March 2023, Belweder Palace, Warsaw, Republic of Poland: The President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda received the letters of credence of the Princely Ambassador of Monaco (non-resident) Lorenzo Ravano. The Polish head of state was accompanied by the Head of the International Policy Office, Marcin Przydacz.
Lorenzo Livio Maria Ravano is well-acquainted to Poland, a country he has visited in several occasions. Ambassador Ravano speaks the German, French, Italian, English and Spanish languages, and served previously in the capacity as Minister-Counsellor-Deputy Head of Mission of the Princely Monégasque Embassy to Germany, Poland and Austria as well as Deputy Permanent Representative of the Principality of Monaco to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and International Organizations based in Vienna from 2017, and up to his first ambassadorship. He is resident in Germany, wherein he was accredited before Federal President Dr. Steinmeier on 21 June 2022. In Austria, he presented credentials to Federal President Alexander van der Bellen on 3 November 2022.
The President of the Republic of Poland, Andrzej Duda and the Ambassador of Monaco Lorenzo Ravano.
Before arriving in Germany, Ambassador Ravano served in the capacity as Counsellor, subsequently First Counsellor (from 2016) and Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy of Monaco in the United States of America and Canada, Deputy Permanent Observer of the Principality of Monaco to the Organization of American States (from 2011). Serving in Washington D.C. from 2008 through 2017.
The Ambassador holds a Bachelor Degree in Business Administration from the International University of Monaco, summa cum laude. Moreover, a Postgraduate European Education and Diploma in International Marketing issued by the Academy of Brussels.
President Gatti Santana meets with His Excellency Hon. Dr. Damas D. Ndumbaro, and other high-level Government officials
Dodoma, 28 March 2023– Today the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Graciela Gatti Santana, met with His Excellency Hon. Dr. Damas D. Ndumbaro, Minister of Constitutional and Legal Affairs of the Republic of Tanzania (Tanzania), at the seat of the Tanzanian Government in Dodoma. Minister Ndumbaro was accompanied by several senior members of his Ministry, as well as Government officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, the Parliamentary Committee on Governance, Constitution and Legal Affairs, and the National Prosecutions Services.
On behalf of the Mechanism, President Gatti Santana expressed profound appreciation for the invaluable role played by Tanzania as Host State of the Mechanism’s Arusha branch since 2012, as well as of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) until its closure in 2015. In this regard, President Gatti Santana praised the strong support that Tanzania provides to the Mechanism and its Judges, Principals, and staff. She then briefed the delegation on the Mechanism’s most recent developments and shared plans of important events that will be held at the Arusha premises in 2024.
Next, President Gatti Santana and Minister Ndumbaro turned to the future of the Mechanism, following the completion of its judicial caseload in due course, and in particular the plans for its Arusha premises, including its Library and the archives of the ICTR and the Mechanism. Referring to Arusha as the judicial capital of Africa, Minister Ndumbaro recalled some of the landmark decisions handed down by the ICTR, as well as the contribution of other international and regional courts located there. His Excellency described the Mechanism’s Arusha premises as a global investment of the United Nations that must continue to benefit the international community, and underscored that the Library is of special significance to Tanzania as it enriches the country’s long-standing tradition of attracting top lawyers and researchers from the region. Separately, Minister Ndumbaro reiterated Tanzania’s strong interest in the preservation of the archives of the ICTR and the Mechanism and their historic legacy.
The ensuing discussion with members of the delegation concerned, among other matters, finding ways in which cooperation could be strengthened between the Mechanism and Tanzania. President Gatti Santana also extended an open invitation to the Minister and his delegation to visit the Mechanism’s premises. In closing, Minister Ndumbaro pledged his Government’s commitment to continuing to fully support the Mechanism.
The Mechanism was established by the United Nations Security Council on 22 December 2010, and is mandated to perform a number of essential functions previously carried out by the ICTR and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Its branch in Arusha, Tanzania, started operating on 1 July 2012. President Gatti Santana is the Mechanism’s third President and assumed her functions on 1 July 2022.
While the war in Ukraine continues, and both sides are not showing any signs of stepping back from the conflict, China has launched a Peace Plan.
China considers itself as an independent party, ready to offer its good offices to bring the warring parties to the table. This Chinese plan consists of 12 rather generally formulated points. It is reported that the plan was discussed at length during the visit of the Chinese President Xi Jinpin to President Putin of Russia (13-14 March) . At the conclusion of the visit, Putin stated somewhat frugally that the Chinese plan could serve as the basis for a solution in the current conflict. He was ready to talk “once Kyiv and its western partners were ready to do the same”.
That in itself might be an interesting development, although in the camp of Ukraine nothing much has been said about the efforts by China. Comments are that there can be no peace talks as long as Russia has not withdrawn or been pushed back from Ukraine.
Any peace talks at this point in time would merely serve to sort of “ratify” the Russian conquests so far achieved. How could one start thinking about peace when Ukraine has not signalled that it is ready? And Ukraine wants all Russian troops out of its territory, nothing less.
I looked carefully at the Chinese document of one page (available on the Internet) and found one or two good reasons to take some time to reflect on its content, and not push it off the table because it comes from a friend of Russia. The first of these good reasons is that the Chinese position on the political settlement for Ukraine is written fully in line with the Charter of the UN. As a starting point it mentions that “universally recognized international law, including the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, must be strictly observed”. This is the first element of the text under the heading “Respecting the sovereignty of all countries”. So respect for international law, and for the UN is at its basis.
We all know that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was against the fundamental principle of the UN of non-aggression (or as it is called in art 2-4 of the UN Charter, the prohibition to use force), so this sentence makes an important statement. A statement coming from a powerful permanent member of the Security Council, which could have leverage over Russia.. The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries must be effectively upheld, is the next phrase. Seems to work well for Ukraine, which has pleaded strongly that the attack violated its territorial integrity. Most if not all of the comments we have heard or seen went in the same direction. The invasion was and is a blatant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.
The second point in the 12-point Chinese plan sounds a bit like a press conference by the Russian foreign minister Lavrov: the security of a country should not be pursued at the expense of others. The security of a region should not be achieved by strengthening or expanding military blocks. Clearly, the idea of Ukraine becoming part of NATO is not embedded in this concept. On the contrary, in this view Ukraine must never be part of NATO. And that sounds logical to me. It follows a bit later “all parties should oppose the pursuit of one’s own security at the cost of other’s security, prevent bloc confrontation, and work together for peace and stability on the Eurasian Continent”. Here we have the Russian concerns about the threats from the West. Threats that we find difficult to imagine – as all we do is helping a country to defend itself against an aggressor. But we know such is not the assessment of the situation in Moscow, we heard this language many times.
The plan calls for a cease fire (point 3: Ceasing hostilities) and that is where the criticism is most obvious. A cease fire now would leave Russia for the time being with the territorial gains so far, and allows for a rebuilding of its military strength. But which peace plan would ever leave the element of a cease fire aside? The Chinese text calls for all parties to support Russia and Ukraine in working in the same direction and resuming direct dialogue as quickly as possible, so as to gradually deescalate the situation and ultimately reach a comprehensive ceasefire. China says that it wants to play a constructive role in the conduct of such peace talks.
This article cannot be a full commentary on the total plan, which contains several more elements like solving the humanitarian crisis, keeping nuclear power-plants safe, facilitating grain exports, and stopping unilateral sanctions: China opposes unilateral sanctions unauthorized by the UN Security Council (point 10) . I just wanted to highlight some elements that should be taken seriously. A permanent member of the UN, seeking a solution to this horrifying conflict, a solution which is expressly in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Charter of the UN. Looks like rather helpful to me.
Precarious Conflict Trajectory – Russia and Ukraine are preparing for a spring offensive with higher levels of military involvement. Spill-over into the region has been avoided so far, despite several drone attacks on Russian bases in occupied Crimea and in western Russia as well as the bombing of Kerch Bridge that connects Crimea with Russia’s Taman peninsula in October 2022, one day after President Putin’s 70th birthday. It is not excluded that intensifying conflict or a costly prolonged stalemate can lead to escalation and actively involve NATO or one of the front-line states with Ukraine.
Prospects for peace talks between the conflict parties are remote after two initiatives from Türkiye in spring 2022. A credible, neutral intermediary with convening power is lacking, although there have been two larger prisoner exchanges between Ukraine and Russia in February, and another swap of over 200 prisoners of war occurred on 7 March 2023. The Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) brokered by the UN and Türkiye is still operational (UNCTAD, 2023), albeit at a relatively slow pace. Its extension from 18 March onwards is uncertain beyond 60 days after a recent meeting of UN and the conflict parties in Geneva.
Global South Actors on the Side-lines – Influential countries such as Brazil, India and Indonesia in the Global South have generally avoided taking sides in the conflict and stayed away from polarization. 32 countries chose to abstain from the 23 February UN General Assembly Resolution on Ukraine that demanded Russian troop withdrawal and condemned the aggression against Ukraine. Powerful G20 members India and South Africa were among them. India blocked a final statement mentioning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine at the 25 February meeting of G20 foreign ministers that it hosted.
Considering failings in traditional diplomacy and conflict resolution for Ukraine, the contribution from Global South actors becomes more pressing and relevant, especially since they continue to be affected by global effects from the war. The UN Global Crisis Response Group (GCRG) has tracked cumulative shocks in food security, energy prices and inflation since March 2022 (UNSDG, 2022). In particular, the lagged effect from spiking fertilizer costs which rose by 199% from May 2020 to the end of 2022 has been a constraint on global food production, including rice growing in many developing countries and emerging economies of the Global South (Broom, 2023). Russia is a major fertilizer producer and exporter. Eminent academics and advisers such as Prof. Jeffrey Sachs and former German diplomat and previous director of the Munich Security Conference (MSC) Wolfgang Ischinger have argued that the Global South and China can play a constructive role in helping to bring peace to Ukraine. Countries with populist leanings such as Brazil, Mexico and South Africa also have legacy relationships with China dating from the Soviet Union era (Brown, 2013). The recent agreement facilitated in Beijing between Saudi Arabia and Iran with major repercussions for the Middle East (Turak, 2023) makes it necessary to take a closer look at potentials in the Chinese 12-Point Position on Ukraine.
China’s Significance and Reactions from Key Stakeholders
China officially presented its 12-Point Position on peace in Ukraine on 24 February 2023, the anniversary of Russia’s invasion. The Position is China’s first public step in favour of peace in Ukraine after a period of half neutrality where much attention was given to strategic ties with Russia. China had declared its “no-limits partnership” with Russia just before the outbreak of the war and refrained from condemning the invasion. Bilateral economic ties deepened through more oil imports from Russia that replaced Saudi Arabia as main oil provider to China. Bilateral trade reached a record USD 190 billion in 2022 and Yuan-denominated transactions increased significantly on the Russian market in efforts to evade western sanctions. Beijing kept Moscow apprised of the 12 Points prior to their release and its top foreign policy official Wang Yi was received not only by his counterpart Lavrov but also by President Vladimir Putin. On 22 February, Russia stated it welcomed China taking a more active role in efforts to resolve the conflict in Ukraine and said it valued China’s “balanced approach”.
The Position serves to position China as a peace-loving country and reminds Russia and the US as fellow UN Security Council members about their obligations to pursue peaceful courses of action. It also deflects criticism that China has ignored the Ukraine conflict. China had released principles for global peace in its Global Security Initiative (GSI) ahead of its Position on Ukraine. The intention was to communicate China’s vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, according to the Chinese MFA. Notably, the 12 Points balance respect for territorial integrity with legitimate security interests of countries, rejection of Cold War mentality and military alliances as well as criticizing the use of non-UN sanctions. While this is directed at NATO and the US, China’s Position not only rejects the use of nuclear arms but also the threat of doing so, which is aimed at Russia.
Reactions from the West to the 12 Points were largely sceptical, with the US showing the most consistent and adverse reactions from the moment the Chinese Peace Plan was first mentioned at the Munich Security Conference. US mistrust and competition with China for global dominance coloured the US view, compounded by fears that China might exploit the US distraction in Ukraine for advancing against Taiwan. The US State Secretary spoke repeatedly of alleged Chinese military support being readied for Russia and senior US officials including President Joseph Biden pursued this line, questioning the basic credibility of China’s Position on Ukraine. Experts at the leading bi-partisan US Institute of Peace (USIP) agreed that the Chinese Position was unlikely to advance the cause of peace (Freeman and Glantz, 2023). Conservative commentators in the US saw Washington outflanked by the Chinese peace proposal which is designed to highlight US unreliability in a multipolar era (Brown, 2023).
In Europe, reactions from Germany and the EU were slightly more nuanced between disappointment and caution but seemed at least to give consideration to China’s Position on Ukraine. China’s top foreign policy official undertook a regional diplomatic tour to Germany, Italy, France, Hungary and Belarus ahead of the 12-Point launch. Germany’s Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock stated in New York that China as a member of the UN Security Council had an obligation to come out in favour of peace and a UN umbrella would have been preferable for the Chinese Position. German expert commentators saw an attempt by China to divide the EU and the US (Legarda, 2023). The EU was guarded in its reaction while looking at the 12 Points from the perspective that China had taken sides, according to EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. She also commented that China had not shared a peace plan but some principles. Further EU reactions aligned themselves closer with the US position.
EU member state Hungary openly welcomed the Chinese Position on Ukraine. Despite misgivings about the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative in the European neighbourhood (Bastian, 2022), the EU is in principle interested in reducing economic and trade disruptions from the conflict in Ukraine. Points 11 and 12 of China’s Ukraine Position speak to this shared interest including for reconstruction of Ukraine. The USD 349 billion estimated reconstruction cost[2] requires a broad global effort where China could also engage. Eurasian rail transport links are still functioning for shipments of critical rare metals that are now even more in demand in EU defence industries (Tirone and Nardelli, 2023). Interlinked with the broader Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) network of trans-continental transport infrastructures, only part of the traffic has switched from the Northern Corridor through Russia to the Middle Corridor through Central Asia and the Caucasus to Türkiye and onward destinations in Europe (Standish, 2022). These freight links are important for speeding up substantial reconstruction efforts and reliable functioning of supply chains. Before the 2022 Russian invasion, Ukraine took an interest in the BRI and became a critical piece of the Initiative (Brown, 2023).
Accelerating Diplomatic Impacts – Following the release of China’s 12 Points, there has been a perceptible shift in diplomatic activity surrounding the conflict, most clearly in the European theatre nearer to Ukraine. The President of Ukraine expressed interest in meeting with his Chinese counterpart. He also stated that it was generally good that China started talking about Ukraine. Ukraine tabled its own 10-Point Peace Plan at the G20 Summit in Indonesia last November. The President of Belarus accepted an invitation for a state visit to Beijing where he met with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping on 1 March. Canada’s Foreign Minister stated to media on 10 March that Canada had approached China about speaking also with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and not only with Russia during the recent G20 meeting. President Macron of France announced that he was planning to visit China in early April. These leaders’ visits are far from deliberately sequenced and offer no guarantee against possible military escalation. Yet they foster an environment that is more conducive to dialogue and discourage excessive steps in the conflict.
In media comments on 7 March, the Kremlin’s spokesman explained that a big, powerful and authoritative country like China could not fail to have its own voice on problems high on the world agenda. He added that Moscow paid great attention to all the ideas from their colleagues in Beijing. President Xi Jinping’s first state visit after his re-election for an unprecedented third term in office was confirmed for Moscow from 20 to 22 March, following an invitation from President Putin. In the context of this visit, China’s Foreign Minister spoke with his counterpart in Ukraine and urged Kyiv and Moscow to restart peace talks as soon as possible, while the importance of Ukraine’s territorial integrity reportedly featured in this exchange, in reference to the very first Point of the Chinese Position.
Global South Confidence Building Outlook
Apart from the accelerated general diplomatic tempo, China’s Position also provides an impulse to non-aligned countries in the Global South about becoming more engaged for peace in Ukraine. While political apace remains severely constrained to act as mediators, these countries can rally in new ways to build confidence between Russia and Ukraine. Brazilian President Lula da Silva already conveyed Brazil’s desire to talk with other countries and participate in any initiative related to building peace and dialogue when speaking with his Ukrainian counterpart in early March. He is scheduled to visit China and Russia and is on record as proposing the involvement of more neutral global players to end the war in Ukraine.
It remains to be seen if the Global South will configure diplomacy as peace positive engagement, e.g. in the format of a consultative contact group, or agree to China as convener for initial confidence building steps. For instance, China’s Ukraine Position is explicit specific about implementing the Black Sea Grain Initiative (Point 9), which has resulted in the export of 25 million tons of food and agricultural produce as of 15 March 2023, according to UN data. Ukraine recently declared readiness for scaling up the BSGI by adding new ports, after criticizing lack of Russian cooperation in ship inspections.
There is space for further non-traditional confidence building measures and scaling them. Facilitation of Russian fertilizer exports, including with UN guarantees about fair trade practices, or environmental war damages reduction and clean-up in the heavily industrialized Donbass region are possible areas. Environmental Peacebuilding (EP) approaches are already tested and available (Barnhoorn and Krampe, 2022). Using labour-intensive methods and skills development with modern technology from China as enabler, human capital in Ukraine and Russia can be jointly strengthened and pave the way for gradual normalization and recovery. These non-traditional confidence building measures are useful for creating a conducive environment to bilateral military talks and lessening fighting in certain front-line sectors ahead of a general cease fire. Starting to move the dial back from warfare to gradual conflict reduction is within reach but the time window for bringing meaningful Global South contributions to the table may be rapidly closing.
Bibliography: Barnhoorn, Anniek, Krampe, Florian et al., Environment of Peace: Security in a New Era of Risk. (SIPRI Stockholm, 2022) Bastian, Jens, “The Dragon Reaches the Eastern Mediterranean: Why the Region Matters to China”. CSES (70/3 2022) Broom, Douglas, “This is How War in Europe is Disrupting Fertilizer Supplies and Threatening Global Food Security”. World Economic Forum (1 March 2023) Brown, Kevin, “China’s Peace Plan is About More than Ukraine”. The National Interest, 16 March 2023 Freeman, Carla and Mary Glantz, What China’s ‘Peace Plan’ Reveals about its Stance on Russia’s War on Ukraine. USIP (2 March 2023) Legarda, Helena, “The Peace Plan that Wasn’t”. MERICS Short Analysis (28 February 2023). Standish, Reid, “China’s Belt and Road Focuses on New Eurasian Trade Routes Due to Ukraine War”. RFE/RL (18 July 2022) Tirone, Jonathan and Alberto Nardelli, “How Europe Needs Freight Trains to Cross Russia from China”. Bloomberg News, 22 January 2023 Turak, Natasha, “The China-brokered Saudi-Iran Deal has Big Repercussions for the Middle East — and the U.S.”. CNBC (15 March 2023) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), A Trade Hope. The Impact of the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Geneva, March 2023 United Nations Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG), Global Impact of War in Ukraine on Food, Energy and Finance Systems. Brief No. 1 (April 2022)
About the author:
Matthias E. Leitner – Picture by IFIMES
Matthias E. Leitner currently serves as Analyst and Knowledge Management Lead in the Crises and Fragility Team of OECD GPP Directorate (Development Cooperation Division). His professional background is in peacebuilding, stabilization and transition to development, mainly through UN and OSCE regional peace assignments in Europe and the Africa/Middle East Region and in Southeast Asia. He takes an active interest in mediation and confidence building processes for innovative conflict resolution in the era of multi-crisis. His academic background from Bonn and Oxford Universities is in languages and history.
Published by IFIMES / Ljubljana/Washington/Berlin, 25 March 2023
