Nicaragua vs. Colombie : quelques réfléxions concernant la décision de la CIJ

Par Nicolas Boeglin, Professeur de Droit International Public, Faculté de Droit, Universidad de Costa Rica (UCR)

Dans sa dĂ©cision rendue publique le 21 avril dernier (voir texte intĂ©gral en anglais et en  français ), la Cour Internationale de Justice (CIJ) a ordonnĂ© Ă  la Colombie de cesser toute interfĂ©rence dans les zones correspondant au Nicaragua dans la mer des CaraĂŻbes depuis sa dĂ©cision de 2012, et de modifier les rĂ©gulations qu’elle avait pris, conformĂ©ment au contenu de son arrĂȘt du 19 novembre 2012 et au droit international coutumier.

Nous avions eu l’occasion d’analyser cette procĂ©dure contentieuse engagĂ©e par le Nicaragua contre la Colombie devant la justice internationale en novembre 2013, et de mentionner certains dĂ©tails passĂ©s sous silence par certains analystes et collĂšgues colombiens, notamment l’expĂ©rience de l’Ă©quipe juridique nicaraguayenne dans l’art du contentieux international par rapport Ă  celle de leurs homologues dĂ©fendant la Colombie (voir notre brĂšve note  en espagnol intitulĂ©e : ” Nicaragua / Colombia: a propĂłsito de la lectura de la sentencia de la CIJ  “).

Le jeu de cartes de cette note avec une premiĂšre carte illustrant les zones maritimes revendiquĂ©es par la Colombie avant 2012 et une seconde carte de la dĂ©cision de la CIJ de 2012 permet au lecteur non averti de mieux comprendre la portĂ©e de la dĂ©cision de 2012 pour le Nicaragua dans les CaraĂŻbes.

Il est Ă  noter que la plus haute autoritĂ© colombienne et lÂŽensemble de son cabinet ont dĂ©cidĂ© de se rendre sur l’Ăźle de San AndrĂ©s pour y entendre la lecture du jugement rendu Ă  La Haye le 21 avril dernier (voir note de presse dÂŽInfobae).

Le contenu de la décision en bref

Comme somme toute assez prĂ©visible, les arguments prĂ©sentĂ©s par la Colombie n’ont pas eu beaucoup d’effet, tandis que le Nicaragua a rĂ©ussi Ă  consolider et Ă  rĂ©affirmer ses droits sur ces zones maritimes, qui lui ont Ă©tĂ© accordĂ©s par la CIJ en 2012, grĂące Ă  cet arrĂȘt.  

Les attentes (fausses) créées ces derniers temps en Colombie, notamment Ă  l’Ă©gard des communautĂ©s insulaires des Raizales, devront maintenant ĂȘtre expliquĂ©es par ceux qui en sont responsables au sein de lÂŽopinion publique colombienne . Une situation trĂšs similaire avait dÂŽailleurs dĂ©jĂ  Ă©tĂ© observĂ©e en Colombie dans les semaines prĂ©cĂ©dant la lecture de l’arrĂȘt de la CIJ en novembre 2012.

Sur les sept paragraphes du dispositif final de l arrĂȘt, le tout dernier sur les lignes de base droites adoptĂ©es par le Nicaragua en 2013 et 2018 permet Ă  la Colombie d’Ă©viter un jugement qui la condamnerait sur lÂŽensemble du dispositif.

Le dernier point du dispositif final (paragraphe 261) est reproduit ci-dessous, dans lequel il est indiqué que la CIJ :

“1. Dit que la compĂ©tence qu’elle a, sur le fondement de l’article XXXI du pacte de BogotĂĄ, pour statuer sur le diffĂ©rend relatif Ă  des allĂ©gations de violations, par la RĂ©publique de Colombie, des droits de la RĂ©publique du Nicaragua dans les espaces maritimes que la Cour a reconnus Ă  cette derniĂšre dans son arrĂȘt de 2012, couvre les demandes fondĂ©es sur les Ă©vĂ©nements mentionnĂ©s par la RĂ©publique du Nicaragua survenus aprĂšs le 27 novembre 2013, date Ă  laquelle le pacte de BogotĂĄ a cessĂ© d’ĂȘtre en vigueur pour la RĂ©publique de Colombie ; 

2. Dit que, en entravant les activitĂ©s de pĂȘche et de recherche scientifique marine de navires battant pavillon nicaraguayen ou dĂ©tenteurs d’un permis nicaraguayen et les opĂ©rations de navires de la marine nicaraguayenne dans la zone Ă©conomique exclusive de la RĂ©publique du Nicaragua et en voulant faire appliquer des mesures de conservation dans cette zone, la RĂ©publique de Colombie a violĂ© les droits souverains et la juridiction de la RĂ©publique du Nicaragua dans cette zone maritime; 

3. Dit que, en autorisant des activitĂ©s de pĂȘche dans la zone Ă©conomique exclusive de la RĂ©publique du Nicaragua, la RĂ©publique de Colombie a violĂ© les droits souverains et la juridiction de la RĂ©publique du Nicaragua dans cette zone maritime 

4. Dit que la RĂ©publique de Colombie doit immĂ©diatement cesser le comportement visĂ© aux points 2) et 3) ci-dessus 

5. Dit que la «zone contiguĂ« unique» Ă©tablie par la RĂ©publique de Colombie par le dĂ©cret prĂ©sidentiel 1946 du 9 septembre 2013, tel que modifiĂ© par le dĂ©cret 1119 du 17 juin 2014, n’est pas conforme au droit international coutumier, ainsi qu’exposĂ© aux paragraphes 170 Ă  187 ci-dessus ; 

6. Dit que la RĂ©publique de Colombie doit, par les moyens de son choix, mettre les dispositions du dĂ©cret prĂ©sidentiel 1946 du 9 septembre 2013, tel que modifiĂ© par le dĂ©cret 1119 du 17 juin 2014, en conformitĂ© avec le droit international coutumier, en tant qu’elles ont trait aux espaces maritimes que la Cour a reconnus Ă  la RĂ©publique du Nicaragua dans son arrĂȘt de 2012 ; 

7. Dit que les lignes de base droites de la RĂ©publique du Nicaragua Ă©tablies par le dĂ©cret no 33-2013 du 19 aoĂ»t 2013, tel que modifiĂ© par le dĂ©cret no 17-2018 du 10 octobre 2018, ne sont pas conformes au droit international coutumier“.

Une lecture complĂšte de lÂŽensemble de lÂŽarrĂȘt est recommandĂ©e afin de mieux apprĂ©cier le raisonnement suivi par les juges de la CIJ, mais aussi de mieux comprendre la facilitĂ© avec laquelle le Nicaragua a rĂ©ussi Ă  les convaincre de la faiblesse des arguments prĂ©sentĂ©s par la Colombie.

Photo de la rencontre entre les prĂ©sidents colombien et nicaraguayen suite Ă  l’arrĂȘt de la CIJ de novembre 2012, qui s’est tenue au Mexique, lors de l’investiture du prĂ©sident Peña Nieto en dĂ©cembre 2012, extraite de ce communiquĂ© de presse d’Infobae intitulĂ© “Ortega y Santos se reunieron por el fallo de la CIJ”, Ă©dition du 1/12/2012.

De quelques points de détail

A noter que le seul juge de la CIJ originaire d’AmĂ©rique Latine (Antonio Cançado Trindade, BrĂ©sil) n’a pas pris part Ă  cette dĂ©cision, pour des raisons qui ne sont pas expliquĂ©es dans l’arrĂȘt. Le premier jour des audiences tenues en septembre 2021 (voir le verbatim), la PrĂ©sidente de la CIJ a indiquĂ© que: “For reasons duly made known to me, Judge Cançado Trindade is unable to sit with us in these oral proceedings, either in person or by video link” (page 12). Le fait qu’un juge en exercice Ă  la CIJ ne juge pas soulĂšve toujours quelques questions, que nous avons Ă©galement eu l’occasion de relever a lÂŽoccasion de la rĂ©cente ordonnance de la CIJ Ă  la Russie exigeant qu’elle cesse immĂ©diatement son agression militaire contre l’Ukraine en mars 2022 (Note 1).

Il convient de noter, en ce qui concerne le point 7 prĂ©citĂ©, que la Colombie n’a pas vraiment expliquĂ© comment cela affectait ses droits dans la zone Ă©conomique exclusive (ZEE), un dĂ©tail que le juge Mohamed Bennouna (Maroc) considĂšre comme suffisant pour que la CIJ rejette la demande de la Colombie ; et qui maintenant, selon lui, crĂ©e un dangereux prĂ©cĂ©dent pour la CIJ Ă  l’avenir, du fait de lÂŽexistence dans le monde d’innombrables dĂ©crets unilatĂ©raux fixant des lignes de base droites pour dĂ©limiter la mer territoriale (Note 2) qui ne respectent pas toujours les dispositions de la Convention sur le Droit de la Mer de 1982 (voir le texte de sa dĂ©claration).  Soit dit en passant, la Colombie n’a pas encore ratifiĂ© cet instrument universel (voir l’Ă©tat officiel des signatures et des ratifications) : en AmĂ©rique Latine, outre la Colombie, seul le Salvador partage cette situation, ainsi que le Venezuela (qui ne l’a mĂȘme pas signĂ©).

En ce qui concerne les prĂ©tendus droits de pĂȘche artisanale de la communautĂ© des Raizales dĂ©fendus par la Colombie devant le juge, le paragraphe 231 du jugement est on ne peut plus clair :

“231. Pour ces motifs, la Cour conclut que la Colombie n’a pas Ă©tabli que les habitants de l’archipel de San AndrĂ©s, notamment les Raizals, jouissent de droits de pĂȘche artisanale dans les eaux situĂ©es Ă  prĂ©sent dans la zone Ă©conomique exclusive nicaraguayenne, ou que le Nicaragua a, par les dĂ©clarations unilatĂ©rales de son prĂ©sident, acceptĂ© ou reconnu l’existence de leurs droits de pĂȘche traditionnels, ou pris l’engagement juridique de respecter de tels droits. Au vu de cette conclusion, point n’est besoin pour elle d’examiner les arguments des Parties quant au point de savoir si et dans quelles circonstances les droits de pĂȘche traditionnels d’une communautĂ© donnĂ©e peuvent survivre Ă  la crĂ©ation de la zone Ă©conomique exclusive d’un autre Etat, non plus que les violations desdits droits que le Nicaragua, selon la Colombie, aurait commises du fait du comportement de ses forces navales“.

Les paragraphes 219 Ă  224 donnent un idĂ©e des diverses inconsistances provenant des autoritĂ©s colombiennes elles-mĂȘmes sapant le bien-fondĂ© des arguments avancĂ©s par leurs conseillers juridiques Ă  La Haye : des incohĂ©rences qui ont, bien entendu, Ă©tĂ© fort habilement exploitĂ©es par leurs homologues dĂ©fendant le Nicaragua.

Quelques perspectives aprĂšs cet arrĂȘt

La pratique enseigne qu’aprĂšs la lecture d’un arrĂȘt de la CIJ entre deux États, les chefs d’État des deux pays peuvent commencer Ă  explorer une sorte de rapprochement, arrĂȘt en main, afin de reconstruire progressivement leurs relations bilatĂ©rales, souvent fort dĂ©tĂ©riorĂ©es.  En AmĂ©rique latine, c’est ce qu’ont fait le Salvador et le Honduras en 1992 aprĂšs avoir entendu un jugement de la CIJ mettant fin Ă  leur long diffĂ©rend territorial (voir le texte de la dĂ©claration conjointe), l’Argentine et l’Uruguay aprĂšs une dĂ©cision de la CIJ rendue en 2010 (voir l’article de la BBC), le PĂ©rou et le Chili en janvier 2014 (voir l’article d’El Nuevo Siglo). MĂȘme les chefs dÂŽEtat du Chili et de la Bolivie se sont rĂ©unis – trĂšs briĂšvement – en septembre 2015 lorsque la CIJ s’est dĂ©clarĂ©e compĂ©tente en rejetant les exceptions prĂ©liminaires prĂ©sentĂ©es par le Chili (voir lÂŽarticle de La Tercera).

De maniĂšre gĂ©nĂ©rale, on peut considĂ©rer que la lecture d’un arrĂȘt de la CIJ sur le fond doit toujours ĂȘtre comprise comme le point dÂŽaboutissement d’un processus et le dĂ©but d’une nouvelle Ă©tape : en effet, pendant plusieurs annĂ©es, les conseillers politiques et juridiques Ă  La Haye des deux Etats ont construit une stratĂ©gie de confrontation, en Ă©laborant des griefs et des revendications devant le juge international, qu’ils ont Ă©voquĂ©es devant leurs opinions publiques respectives pour les convaincre de la dĂ©fense irrĂ©prochable des intĂ©rĂȘts nationaux  quÂŽils ont faite. Mais une fois le jugement rendu Ă  La Haye, toutes ces discussions juridiques font partie du passĂ© et en quelque sorte, sÂŽeffacent. Dans sa dĂ©cision, le juge international a donnĂ© gain de cause sur certains points de droit à un État et d’autres à l’autre Etat, rejetant certains des griefs de l’un mais aussi de l’autre. C’est donc le texte de sa dĂ©cision qui doit servir de base pour reconstruire leurs relations malmenĂ©es par des annĂ©es de procĂ©dure à La Haye.

CÂŽest dans cette perspective, qui explique lÂŽĂ©quilibre subtile que le juge de La Haye cherche toujours Ă  imprimer Ă  ses dĂ©cisions, que la reprise du dialogue au plus haut niveau constitue un espace politique naturel dĂ©coulant de la lecture d’un arrĂȘt de la CIJ entre deux Etats (exception faite – et assez remarquĂ©e – du Costa Rica et du Nicaragua). Ceci afin de tenter de normaliser progressivement leurs relations dĂ©tĂ©riorĂ©es aprĂšs plusieurs annĂ©es de joutes juridiques Ă  La Haye : comme tout espace politique, il est soumis aux alĂ©as de la vie politique ; et surtout, Ă  la capacitĂ© de saisir lÂŽoccasion quÂŽoffre le juge international Ă  deux Etats.

A cet Ă©gard, il convient de rappeler que peu aprĂšs la lecture de l’arrĂȘt du 19 novembre 2012, les chefs dÂŽEtat de la Colombie et du Nicaragua ont eu l’occasion de se rencontrer Ă  l’occasion de l’investiture du nouveau prĂ©sident du Mexique, Enrique Peña Nieto. 

La Colombie a ensuite choisi de hausser le ton et ses autoritĂ©s ont offert au monde un spectacle rarement vu : celui d’un État profondĂ©ment mĂ©content par le contenu d ÂŽune dĂ©cision de la CIJ et adoptant une attitude sans prĂ©cĂ©dent. Quelques semaines aprĂšs le jugement de novembre 2012, la Colombie a dĂ©cidĂ© de dĂ©noncer le Pacte de Bogota adoptĂ© en 1948 (voir communiquĂ© officiel), devenant ainsi le premier État au monde Ă  dĂ©noncer un instrument international emblĂ©matique portant le nom de … sa propre capitale.

Dans le cadre de cette attitude assez particuliĂšre, le PrĂ©sidente de la Colombie a dĂ©clarĂ© l’arrĂȘt de la CIJ de 2012 ” inapplicable ” en septembre 2013 (Note 3), tendant de maniĂšre prĂ©visible les relations avec le Nicaragua et conduisant les autoritĂ©s de ce dernier Ă  introduire deux nouvelles requĂȘtes contre la Colombie devant la CIJ. 

Sur ce dernier point, il convient de noter que lÂŽautre requĂȘte introduite par le Nicaragua en 2013 (voir les dĂ©tails de la procĂ©dure dans ce lien officiel de la CIJ), Ă©galement liĂ©e Ă  la mer des CaraĂŻbes, est toujours en attente de sa rĂ©solution. Des dates doivent encore ĂȘtre fixĂ©es pour les audiences orales entre les deux États Ă  La Haye, qui constituent la derniĂšre Ă©tape de la phase contradictoire de la procĂ©dure contentieuse : aprĂšs quoi, des dĂ©libĂ©rations auront lieu jusquÂŽ Ă  la lecture de lÂŽarrĂȘt. Il convient de noter que le dĂ©libĂ©rĂ© de la CIJ est gĂ©nĂ©ralement de 6 mois mais peut prendre jusqu’Ă  13 mois (c’est ce qui s’est passĂ© dans le cas de la dĂ©limitation maritime entre le PĂ©rou et le Chili en 2014). Dans la toute premiĂšre affaire opposant le Costa Rica au Nicaragua (voir dĂ©tails procĂ©duraux  et arrĂȘt du 13 juillet 2009), la CIJ a surpris de nombreux observateurs avec un dĂ©libĂ©rĂ© de seulement 4 mois.

L’existence de cette seconde affaire pendante entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie ne devrait pas servir de prĂ©texte pour ne pas initier une phase de rapprochement au plan bilatĂ©ral. Les deux États peuvent dĂ©sormais s’asseoir pour nĂ©gocier sur les diffĂ©rents aspects de l’arrĂȘt lu le 21 avril 2022. Il convient de rappeler que ce diffĂ©rend maritime entre la Colombie et le Nicaragua a dĂ©butĂ© en 1980.

En guise de conclusion

À notre avis, la lecture d’un arrĂȘt de la CIJ devrait toujours ĂȘtre cĂ©lĂ©brĂ©e, car elle consolide l’idĂ©e que la force du droit prĂ©vaut sur le droit de la force dans les relations entre deux États. Cette affirmation sÂŽavĂšre particuliĂšrement pertinente en 2022 (et en particulier depuis le 24 fĂ©vrier), annĂ©e dans laquelle le monde assiste Ă  une tentative de la Russie de faire prĂ©valoir en Ukraine le droit de la force sur la force du droit, la conduisant Ă  une vĂ©ritable impasse.

On se doit de saluer la persĂ©vĂ©rance et la confiance du Nicaragua depuis 2001 dans la justice internationale face aux actions (plutĂŽt inhabituelles) observĂ©es, notamment depuis novembre 2012, des autoritĂ©s colombiennes : ces derniĂšres devraient ĂȘtre en mesure de revoir leur stratĂ©gie, Ă©valuer les rĂ©sultats obtenus et adopter des mesures qui soient plus conformes avec ce qui a Ă©tĂ© clairement Ă©tabli depuis 2012 par le juge de La Haye et rĂ©itĂ©rĂ© une nouvelle fois en 2022.

EspĂ©rons que les plus hautes autoritĂ©s des deux États chercheront un moyen de rĂ©orienter leurs relations vers des eaux moins turbulentes : en effet, le Nicaragua et la Colombie sont engagĂ©s depuis 21 ans dans des batailles juridiques complexes mais aussi fort coĂ»teuses (Note 4) Ă  La Haye relative Ă  un diffĂ©rend que, d’ordinaire, deux États voisins en mer ayant la volontĂ© de le rĂ©soudre, peuvent parfaitement rĂ©gler par la voie de la nĂ©gociation. 

Au passage, le Costa Rica (Note 5), mais aussi la JamaĂŻque et le Panama, qui avaient des traitĂ©s bilatĂ©raux de dĂ©limitation maritime avec la Colombie dans la Mer des CaraĂŻbes (Note 6) devraient commencer Ă  penser Ă  adapter leurs traitĂ©s de dĂ©limitation Ă  une nouvelle rĂ©alitĂ© cartographique : en effet, depuis le mois de novembre 2012, (et malgrĂ© l’enthousiasme prononcĂ© de la PrĂ©sidente du Costa Rica en 2013 pour sÂŽassocier aux rĂ©clamations de la Colombie – voir article d’El Espectador), l’un de leurs voisins maritimes dans la mer des CaraĂŻbes s’appelle le Nicaragua.

________________________

– – Notes  – –

Note 1:  Cf. BOEGLIN N., “Ucrania-Rusia: Corte Internacional de Justicia (CIJ) ordena medidas provisionales a Rusia“, DIPĂșblico, Ă©dition du 16/03/2022, disponible ici

Note 2 : Voir, par exemple, le cas du DĂ©cret ExĂ©cutif 18851-RE adoptĂ© par le Costa Rica en 1988 sur les lignes de base droites dans le Pacifique, qui a fait l’objet d’une note de protestation officielle des États-Unis en 1989  (les deux textes sont disponibles dans ce numĂ©ro de Limits in the Seas, une publication fort utile du DĂ©partement d’État nord amĂ©ricain).

Nota 3: Cf. BOEGLIN N., “La dĂ©cision de la Colombie de dĂ©clarer “non-applicable” lÂŽarrĂȘt de la CIJ: breves rĂ©flexions“, UniversitĂ© Laval (Canada), document disponible ici, ainsi que sur le site juridique spĂ©cialisĂ©  en droit international en France Sentinelle (voir hyperlien).

Note 4 : Le coĂ»t exact d’une demande de La Haye, que ce soit pour l ÂŽEtat demandeur ou pour l’État dĂ©fendeur, est gĂ©nĂ©ralement une zone grise sur laquelle les États restent quelque peu imprĂ©cis.  Pour ce qui est de lÂŽAmĂ©rique Latine, une presse un peu plus aguerrie et curieuse que la presse nicaraguayenne (ou costaricienne, ou hondurienne), comme la presse colombienne, a rĂ©ussi Ă  obtenir des chiffres sur les seuls honoraires perçus par les conseillers internationaux et nationaux pour dĂ©finir la meilleure stratĂ©gie aprĂšs l’arrĂȘt Nicaragua-Colombie de 2012 (voir article de Semana) ; concernant les actions antĂ©rieures Ă  2012, le mĂȘme mĂ©dia colombien a accĂ©dĂ© Ă  la liste des honoraires perçus par la vingtaine de juristes engagĂ©s par la Colombie (voir article). En AmĂ©rique latine, certaines informations ont circulĂ© sporadiquement dans quelques mĂ©dias : il est assez surprenant que ni les salles de rĂ©daction, ni les organes chargĂ©s des finances publiques, ni les commentateurs, ni les partis d’opposition n’aient manifestĂ© de curiositĂ© sur ce sujet prĂ©cis. Ainsi, en Argentine, il a Ă©tĂ© possible d’avoir accĂšs au ” taux horaire ” des conseillers internationaux engagĂ©s pour traiter la demande uruguayenne (voir note de presse 2010). Dans le cas du Chili, en 2015, le Pouvoir ExĂ©cutif a dĂ» reconnaĂźtre (contre sa volontĂ©) avoir dĂ©pensĂ© 20,3 millions de dollars pour faire face Ă  la seule requĂȘte introduite par le PĂ©rou devant la CIJ (voir note de presse). Une dĂ©cision de la Cour suprĂȘme du Chili en janvier 2014 (voir texte) a annulĂ© la dĂ©cision judiciaire prĂ©cĂ©dente ordonnant la divulgation de ces donnĂ©es, mettant ainsi en Ă©vidence la rĂ©sistance de l’appareil judiciaire chilien Ă  rendre certaines choses vraiment transparentes. Dans le cas de la Colombie, afin d’obtenir le retrait de la requĂȘte introduite par l’Équateur devant la CIJ relative aux Ă©pandages chimiques aĂ©riens en 2008, elle a choisi de dĂ©poser auprĂšs de l’Équateur en 2013 la somme de 15 millions de dollars (qui comprend notamment les frais de l’Équateur dans la procĂ©dure devant la CIJ – voir le point 9 de l’accord entre la Colombie et l’Équateur du 9/09/2013). Le montant extrĂȘmement prĂ©cis indiquĂ© par le contrĂŽleur gĂ©nĂ©ral de la RĂ©publique du Nicaragua de 6 169 029 dollars pour faire face Ă  l’unique requĂȘte introduite alors par le Costa Rica en mai 2011 (voir l’article d’El Nuevo Diario) est, Ă  notre avis, un indicateur Ă  prendre en considĂ©ration qui devrait ĂȘtre affinĂ© et complĂ©tĂ©. Nous serions reconnaissants Ă  nos chers lecteurs de nous envoyer le rapport dĂ©taillĂ© concernant ce montant sur cette affaire prĂ©cise qui s’est conclue en 2015, afin d’examiner les diffĂ©rends Ă©lĂ©ments contenus pour parvenir Ă  ce chiffre (courriel : cursodicr(a)gmail.com) ; ou plus gĂ©nĂ©ralement, tout autre rapport officiel dĂ©taillĂ© qu’ils pourraient avoir en leur possession concernant un autre État ayant plaidĂ© Ă  La Haye. En ce qui concerne le Costa Rica, le montant dĂ©pensĂ© par l’État costaricien pour couvrir les frais de dĂ©fense de ce que lÂŽon peut appeler “instances Ă  rĂ©pĂ©titions” contre le Nicaragua en 2005, 2010, 2014 et 2017, ainsi que pour faire face Ă  la requĂȘte introduite par le Nicaragua contre le Costa Rica en 2011 en raison de la construction de la fameuse ” trocha fronteriza ” par le Costa Rica, reste inconnu. L’incapacitĂ© dĂ©montrĂ©e par le Costa Rica pour nĂ©gocier le montant des dommages environnementaux causĂ©s par le Nicaragua sur l’Ăźle de Portillos que la CIJ avait retenu dans son arrĂȘt de dĂ©cembre 2015 (voir texte), invitant expressĂ©ment les deux États Ă  s’entendre sur le montant (paragraphe 142), a nĂ©cessitĂ© une deuxiĂšme Ă©tape procĂ©durale : celle-ci ne sÂŽest achevĂ©e quÂŽen fĂ©vrier 2018 par un nouvel arrĂȘt de la CIJ (voir texte), fixant un montant 15 fois infĂ©rieur Ă  celui demandĂ© par le Costa Rica (378.000 US$ contre les 6,7 millions de US$ rĂ©clamĂ©s par le Costa Rica). Nous renvoyons nos chers lecteurs Ă  cette article en espagnol que nous avons rĂ©digĂ© sur cet arrĂȘt de 2018 de la CIJ, intitulĂ© ” Costa Rica- Nicaragua: apuntes sobre la compensaciĂłn por daño ambiental en Isla Portillos fijada por la CIJ” publiĂ© sur le site de HablandoClaro (Costa Rica) et  Ă  une analyse prĂ©cĂ©dente Ă©galement en espagnol publiĂ©e sur le site de lÂŽOPALC de SciencesPo/Paris intitulĂ©e “Monto por daño causado en Isla Portillos oficializado por Costa Rica “.

Note 5 : Dans le cas du Costa Rica, il a Ă©tĂ© jugĂ© plus opportun de profiter de l Ă©lan produit par les “instances Ă  rĂ©pĂ©tition” contre le Nicaragua concernant le fleuve San Juan caractĂ©risant la pĂ©riode 2005-2017 pour demander Ă  la CIJ en 2014 de dĂ©terminer la frontiĂšre maritime entre les deux (Costa Rica et Nicaragua) et ce dans les deux ocĂ©ans, affaire qui a Ă©tĂ© rĂ©glĂ© par le juge international en fĂ©vrier 2018 (voir lÂŽarrĂȘt de la CIJ).

Note 6 :  La carte indiquĂ©e dans cet article permet de mettre en lumiĂšre quelques aspects concernant la dĂ©limitation maritime de la Mer des CaraĂŻbes en AmĂ©rique Centrale.  Dans le cas du Panama, il s’agit d’un traitĂ© signĂ© avec la Colombie en 1976 (voir texte et carte disponibles dans ce numĂ©ro de Limits in the Seas). Dans le cas du Costa Rica, il s’agit d’un traitĂ© similaire de 1977 qui n’a jamais Ă©tĂ© ratifiĂ© par le Costa Rica (voir le texte et la carte disponibles dans ce numĂ©ro de Limits in the Seas) : les deux traitĂ©s nĂ©gociĂ©s par la Colombie ont Ă©tĂ© signĂ©s avant que la notion de zone Ă©conomique exclusive (ZEE) ne soit consacrĂ©e en tant que telle dans la Convention sur le Droit de la Mer de 1982. Dans le cas de la JamaĂŻque, le traitĂ© signĂ© avec la Colombie date de 1993 (voir texte) et les cartes (voir cartes et texte en annexe 2 – pp.12-15 de ce numĂ©ro de Limits in the Seas).

Uzbekistan on the path of digitalization: achievements and plans

The coronavirus pandemic has revealed all the benefits and accelerated the processes of digitalization around the world. On how to build an effective digitalization policy, and what steps are being taken in Uzbekistan in this direction, “Dunyo” IA correspondent talked with Farrukh Khakimov, Head of Department at the Development Strategy Center.

– For developing countries and for Uzbekistan, in particular, digital transformation has a potential to further modernize society and integrate national economy into the global processes, – says the expert. – In this vein, in the framework of the ongoing reforms and in the new Development Strategy of Uzbekistan for the coming five years special attention is being paid to digitalization of major spheres and to build a true information society in the country.

Uzbekistan prioritized digitalization and development of information-communication technologies (ICT) yet in early 2000s. For instance, Uzbekistan has been implementing an integrated program of National Information and Communication System Development 2013-2020, the National Action Strategy on Five Priority Development Areas 2017-2021, the “Digital Uzbekistan – 2030” Strategy and the latest the Development Strategy of New Uzbekistan for 2022-2026 to implement digital transformation in national economy, industry and society in general.

Consequently, in a relatively short period of time, Uzbekistan has achieved visible results in the sphere of digitalization and ICT development. In particular, substantial progress has been observed in introducing e-government and ICT in public sector for the last few years, when in 2013 was launched “Single portal of interactive government services” – central e-government service of the country.

Moreover, digital and IT infrastructure of the country has remarkably improved, considerable amount of resources were invested which built solid foundations for better ecosystem of the ICT.

As a result, in the country, according to the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Statistics, in the field of Information and communication during 2017-2021, the gross value added increased more than 2 times and reached 11.8 trillion UZS (more than 1 billion US dollars) in 2021.

In addition, since the creation of IT parks in Uzbekistan, the industry’s export volume has grown 50 times and reached 46 million US dollars. The number of park residents increased from 147 to 500, more than 300 new companies were opened and 8,500 highly paid jobs have been created. Currently more than 11 thousand young people work in IT parks.

The total length of fiber-optic communication lines in the country has been remarkably expanding since 2017. For instance, during 2017-2022 it has increased almost 6 times and reached 118 thousand kilometers as of January 2022.

Since 2017, the overall bandwidth speed of the international networks has been increased more than 28-fold – from 64.2 to 1800 Gbit/s in January 2022.

As of January 2022, in Uzbekistan following the public administration reforms and digitalization of the sphere 56% public services provided through the portal of interactive public services (e-government portal). The number of public services on the e-government platform of the country (my.gov.uz) reached 307 and 1.3 million citizens are actively using such electronic public services. Whereas, the total number of Internet users in Uzbekistan reached  27.2 million.

At the same time following the revealed vulnerabilities and challenges in the sphere, the government has revised and upgraded its national digitalization strategy under the impact of the global pandemic.

Meanwhile Uzbekistan recognized the power of digitalization in transforming society, whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has made that transformation essential.

In this vein, the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s Decree on October 5, 2020 has approved countries Strategy “Digital Uzbekistan – 2030” and “Roadmap” for its implementation. According to the document from all state obligatory payments such as fees and fines are being made through provided online payment-services. Furthermore, in line with the Strategy “Digital Uzbekistan – 2030” more than 400 information systems, electronic services and other software products in various areas of socio-economic development are being carried out automatically.

Among expected results of “Digital Uzbekistan – 2030” Strategy are high-quality and inexpensive Internet and mobile communications, the reduce of the digital divide between cities and villages.

Adoption of the “Digital Uzbekistan – 2030” Strategy and the “road map” for its implementation in 2020-2022 creates, first of all, a legal basis for the transition to a digital economy. The document includes such priority areas as the development of digital infrastructure, e-government, the national digital technology market, education and advanced training in the field of information technology.

The strategy considers approval of two programs: digitalization of regions and digitalization of industries. Thus, two approaches are considered as territorial and industrial. Undoubtedly it will provide the most comprehensive coverage and effective implementation of the document.

The most important conditions and guarantees for the successful implementation of the Strategy is to ensure funding and increase the digital literacy of the population. So, according to the document, the Ministry for Development of Information Technologies and Communications of the Republic of Uzbekistan, together with other relevant governmental bodies will take measures to complete the digitalization of preschool education, health care and secondary schools by the end of first stage of the implementation period.

The implementation of the Strategy will ensure the provision of high-quality digital services to the population, reduce corruption, increase the level of citizen involvement in government decision-making processes, modernize the system of higher and secondary education in order to ensure the competitiveness of citizens not only within the country, but also in the regional and global labour markets.

The Strategy contributes the implementation of other national strategic documents and programs and, first of all will be important for achieving the national goals and objectives in the field of the UN Sustainable Development Goals for the period up to 2030, as well as the Development Strategy of New Uzbekistan for 2022-2026.

The Development Strategy of New Uzbekistan for 2022-2026 which has been adopted on January 28, 2022 covers seven priority areas of further reforms regarding a good governance, public administration, the rule of law, economic development, social policy, spiritual enlightenment, security as well as an open, pragmatic and active foreign policy. In turn, the seven priority areas identify hundred target goals to be achieved by 2026.

Digitalization of several important spheres such as public services both at central and local levels by improving “e-government”; the judicial system; law enforcement; the traffic control system; healthcare system; social services as well as social protection, banking and agriculture sectors and other main spheres of the national economy have been targeted in the new Development Strategy.

In particular, improvement of the e-government of Uzbekistan and bringing the share of electronic public services to 100 %, implementation of “Mobile ID-identification” system of a person in the provision of public services, introduction of “digital passport of citizens” and “digital authority” project have been prioritized to digitalize public administration and optimize administrative procedures at central and local levels.

By maintaining stable growth rates of it is planned to reach 4,000 US dollars GDP per capita and join the group of countries with “upper-middle income” by 2030. In this regard, the development of the digital economy is also defined as the main “driver” with an increase in its share by at least 2.5 times by the end of 2026. Moreover, it is planned to expand the volume of the software products industry 5 times, and software export – 10 times, up to 500 million US dollars, the level of digitalization of production and operational processes in the real sector of the economy, in the financial and banking sectors to 70% by the end of 2026. Moreover, digitalization of urban planning and construction, development of cities in accordance with the concept of “Smart City” has been prioritized.

Certainly, in the context of the global pandemic and in general digital technology and services play a central role in recovering from the pandemic and also building resilient economies. Therefore, expanded digitalization and digital transformation should be the main priorities for developing countries, like Uzbekistan. For the last decade, Uzbekistan has achieved remarkable results in the sphere of digitalization and ICT development, especially, in provision of digital public services. Meanwhile, along with ongoing cooperation with South Korea, Russia, Estonia, China it is necessary to attract more technologically advanced countries such as Germany, United Kingdom, United States, Singapore, Japan and others to ICT sector of the country by diversifying geography of international partners. Investing in digital eco-system, ICT infrastructure and qualified IT services will further facilitate modernization of national economy and accelerate inclusive growth in all spheres.

Support for entrepreneurs increases and the burden on business is reduced in Uzbekistan

By Mukhsinjon Kholmukhamedov, Deputy director of the Center for Economic Research and Reforms under the Administration of the President of Uzbekistan

The video conference held on April 15, 2022 under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev was devoted to the issues of ensuring price stability in markets by increasing food production within the framework of food supply security of the country, as well as additional support for entrepreneurs.

It should be noted that during the reforms in the country, the business sector has traditionally been given increased attention. This is evidenced by the dynamics of growth of registered small business enterprises in Uzbekistan, when in 2021 there were 503 thousand companies (in 2016 – 278 thousand), and now there are about 1.5 million entrepreneurs who have created about 5 million jobs.

On August 20, 2021, during the first open dialogue with entrepreneurs, a large number of issues were raised in the sphere of taxation, land use, business facilitation, support for exports and other issues of concern to entrepreneurs. At that time, more than 15,000 appeals, questions and proposals from business were received in such areas as: financing and crediting of business, taxation, allocation of land, accessibility of infrastructure, obtaining licenses and permits. Then, following the results of the meeting, appropriate instructions were given and specific tasks were set.

During the video conference on April 15, 2022, additional measures to support entrepreneurs were also discussed. The President put forward a number of initiatives aimed at reducing the tax burden, inspections and requirements for entrepreneurs, simplifying the issuance of permits, supporting exporters, refunding VAT and increasing the attractiveness of credit, as well as critical comments on the work of state bodies at the local level to solve existing problems in the sphere of development of entrepreneurship and specified deadlines for their solution.

Taxes, inspections and authorizations

It is noteworthy that in the past three years the number of taxes in the country has been reduced from 16 to 9, and the rates of property, income and social taxes have been reduced by half. The meeting announced the simplification of the tax administration and inspection system for entrepreneurs from June 1, 2022. Thus, with the conversion of the property tax system to market principles, the practice of applying additional high tax rates to inefficient facilities will be abolished. In addition, innovations have also affected VAT, namely, enterprises with a turnover of more than 1 billion sum will automatically – without prior analysis and verification – be assigned the status of VAT payer, and taxpayers in the high-risk zone will be notified of this prior to the suspension of the VAT certificate.

Moreover, 22 types of audits would now be conducted only with the permission of the business ombudsman to prevent undue interference with business activities. In the same time, the task was foreseen to simplify the requirements for the issuance of various permits. For example, if we analyze the 200 sanitary standards in force today, it turns out that it is simply impossible to comply with 20. This is especially true for sanitary requirements for catering establishments, as well as for delivery services. Thus, as the main problems related to catering, attention was paid to the outdated legislation, a large tax burden (catering pays 7-9 types of taxes), which is why part of this business goes into «shadow», as well as numerous inspections, that create an enabling environment for corruption. To solve these problems, approaches will be revised, and outdated points and requirements in the legislation will be canceled.

In support of exporters

Support for exporters will be strengthened, in particular, by solving the problem of VAT refunds. Thus, for exporters, a simplified mechanism will now be used, namely, when 80% of VAT will be paid back within 7 days without additional checks (previously 60 days and the 7-day fast refund was available only for some categories of exporters). The last year’s open dialogue with entrepreneurs set a task to introduce the procedure of VAT refund without additional documents, which will greatly facilitate the provision of reports for more than 14 thousand entrepreneurs. Obviously, the task will finally be accomplished this year.

Also in addition to this innovation should be recalled the Presidential Decree «On additional measures to support participants in foreign trade activities», signed on April 6, 2022, according to which until April 1, 2023 local enterprises, High value-added exporters will receive subsidies for transport costs, where they will account for 50% of transport costs for exports to the near abroad and 70% for exports to the EU. This will reduce logistics costs, increase the volume of exported products with high added value and increase its competitiveness in foreign markets. In addition, the meeting mandated the establishment of a permanent headquarters to liaise with exporters to address emerging issues immediately and in a timely manner. There will be a call center at the headquarters where you can reach the short number 1094.

Access to land and credit

At the meetings in the regions, entrepreneurs voiced more than a thousand problematic issues, among which the most often related to affordable credit, tax administration, as well as land allocation. Separately focus was on the issue of sale of land plots from e-auctions. Despite the fact that 35,000 plots of land were included in the electronic system, not a single land plot in Navoi, Syrdarya, Tashkent regions and the city of Tashkent was put up for auction. Khokims have been instructed to treat this issue with all seriousness and responsibility.

Last year the President instructed to auction objects of state property together with the land on which they are located as a single property complex, and entrepreneurs who bought the building, will also be able to own the land adjacent to it on the right of private property. A working group has already been established under the Cabinet of Ministers, which will coordinate the identification of vacant areas in the context of makhallas, the formation of projects involving professional organizations and the implementation of land plots.

In addition, the Head of State instructed to allocate additional funds to the State Fund for Support of Entrepreneurship and to increase the effectiveness of financial assistance. Thus, in the services sector, the National Bank of Uzbekistan will attract $200 million, which will be directed to entrepreneurs. The amount of the loan will be up to 5 billion sums, and the loan rate will not exceed 18% taking into account compensation from the fund. At the same time, $300 million will be allocated to finance small and medium-sized business projects in the regions. These funds will be placed in national currency at a 10% rate for a period of 7 years in banks offering the best conditions for entrepreneurs. At the same time, the rate of the credit provided to the entrepreneur will not exceed 14%. Non-bank financial institutions will also be given opportunities to finance business – this will be provided for in the new law. Mechanisms for crediting entrepreneurs in national currency are also being introduced, regardless of the currency in which banks attract resources, and tax benefits for entrepreneurs registered in economic zones will also remain. Special attention will be paid to the necessity of rational use of funds and only to the projects that will pay off, increase incomes and create jobs.

Business activity indicators continue to grow

It should be noted that over the years of the reforms, about 2 thousand laws, decrees and resolutions aimed at supporting the development of private business have been adopted. Special attention was paid to the elimination of numerous administrative barriers to business. 114 licenses and permits for 33 types of activities were canceled, procedures for obtaining permits were simplified and the terms of their issuance were reduced by an average of 2 times. Unnecessary checks have also been canceled, restrictions related to the turnover of cash, currency and raw materials have been lifted. The positive effects of these reforms can be clearly seen in various economic indicators calculated monthly by the Center for Economic Research and Reforms, such as the Business Activity Index (IDA) and the Business Climate Index, implemented according to the methodology of the analog of the Business Climate Index of the IFO Institute in Germany (IFO Institut). Thus, in March 2022, IDA in the regions and the capital increased by 2.6% compared to the previous month, and the consolidated indicator of the business climate in February 2022 was 60 points, which assesses the state of the business climate in the country as positive.

Speaking about key business indicators in the regions and the capital, the volume of tax revenues in the period from January 1 to March 31, 2022 increased by 17.4% compared to the same period last year. This growth was achieved due to positive changes in the economy, the conjuncture of prices on the world gold market, improvement of the tax administration system, including the introduction of new administrative tools, digitalization and automation of processes, legalization of business activities and simplification of the procedure for compliance with the requirements of tax legislation. As for the receipts of customs payments for this period, they increased by 45.7%. This increase is due to an increase in the volume of taxable imports and the exchange rate, measures taken by customs authorities to simplify customs procedures, accelerate the release of goods into free circulation and the introduction of new methods of customs administration.

The volume of exports of goods has increased by 12.2% since the beginning of the year compared to the same period last year. It is due to the growing growth rates of exports of industrial goods, food products, chemicals and agri-food products. Not to forget about the volume of loans issued by commercial banks during this period, which increased by 8.5% compared to the same period last year due to lending to large projects in the real sector of the economy. It is also worth noting an increase in the volume of transactions on the Uzbek Republican Commodity Exchange by 43.8%, due to an increase in sales of such goods as gasoline, diesel fuel, rolled ferrous metals, cotton fiber, construction materials, etc.

Khokimiyats and public councils are given tasks

A large number of unjustified inspections of the activities of entrepreneurs by some khokimiyats were critically evaluated. Thus, 11,000 checks were carried out in Tashkent, 8,000 in Tashkent region, 7,000 in Fergana region and 6,000 in Surkhandarya region. Khokims were instructed to hold meetings with entrepreneurs within a week and solve their problems. Also, despite the measures taken, there are still a number of complex and important tax administration and burden sharing issues that require careful and constructive consideration. Therefore, a Public Council shall be established under the State Tax Committee, where regular meetings will be held with members of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Chamber of Tax Advisers, the Chamber of Auditors and the National Association of Accountants and Auditors, as well as scientists, entrepreneurs and public figures. In addition, in order to continue the dialogue with the business on the measures taken and on new software products, the Ministry of Finance and the State Tax Committee together with the professional organizations will hold regular meetings with entrepreneurs, as well as discuss their proposals and issues, including those coming through telegram channels to tax authorities.

***

Transformations aimed at eliminating numerous administrative barriers to business, non-interference in entrepreneurial activity and, in general, improving the business climate, will lead to significant positive changes both in the country’s economy and in business development. Active implementation will allow accelerated achievement of the large-scale goals set in the “Development Strategy of New Uzbekistan for 2022-2026”.

ICC Prosecutor concludes first official visit to Nigeria

Mr Karim A.A. Khan QC, ICC Prosecutor

This week I conducted my first official visit to Nigeria, on the invitation of the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice.

I wish to thank the Nigerian authorities for hosting me and my delegation, and for their expressed commitment to ensuring justice for Rome Statute crimes in partnership with the International Criminal Court.  My message was clear: accountability for atrocity crimes is essential.  Impunity cannot be an option, and my Office will continue to fulfil its statutory obligations in relation to the situation in Nigeria, in cooperation with relevant national authorities.

This visit was driven by the need to continue my Office’s engagement with the Nigerian authorities and clarify the status of the situation in Nigeria following the conclusion of its preliminary examination by my predecessor in December 2020.

During my visit I was pleased to meet with their Excellencies Mr Muhammadu Buhari, President of the Federation, Prof. Oluyemi Oluleke Osinbajo, Vice President of the Federation, Hon. Geoffrey Jideofor Kwusike Onyeama, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr Benjamin Ogu Okolo, Acting Solicitor General of the Federation and Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Justice in the absence of Hon. Abubakar Malami SAN, Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice.

In these discussions, I recalled that the legal criteria to open an investigation into the Situation in Nigeria were met in relation to allegations of crimes committed in the course of the non-international armed conflict between the Nigerian security forces and Boko Haram.  We were in agreement that the principle of complementarity enshrined in the Rome Statue required such crimes to be addressed through domestic proceedings, or failing that, by my Office.  We explored in this context different avenues to close the impunity gap and deliver on the legitimate expectations of justice from victims and survivors on all sides. 

We also discussed ways in which crimes committed by non-State armed groups associated with Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”), Al-Qaida, including Boko Haram, could be effectively addressed through joint efforts by the numerous affected States within the regions of West Africa, the Sahel and beyond.   It is clear that the actions of such entities do not respect geographic borders.  International cooperation, collective action are therefore essential in ensuring those responsible for atrocities are held to account in accordance with the rule of law.

During my visit I have furthermore shared with the Nigerian authorities my vision on the role regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the African Union could play in the global fight against impunity for serious international crimes in partnership with my Office.

In all discussions, I reminded Nigerian authorities of their legal obligations under the Rome Statute to conduct effective, genuine and meaningful national investigations and prosecutions with respect to the potential cases identified by my Office, particularly in relation to members of the Nigerian security forces.  I have pledged in this regard to provide Nigerian judicial authorities with the necessary technical assistance and knowledge transfer within the available means of my Office.  As I have repeatedly stated, the meaningful realisation of the vision set out in the Statute can only be achieved by deepening cooperation and by finding common ground wherever possible, even in difficult circumstances.  I will therefore continue to look for ways and means to engage in dialogue to promote complementarity, whether at the current threshold where we stand or in the context of an opened situation.

We have furthermore agreed with Nigerian authorities on the next immediate steps to inform any future decision I will be making on the situation. I have proposed clear timelines in this respect and welcome Nigeria’s commitment to conclude a formal agreement with my Office on these issues in the near future.

I trust that this visit opens a new chapter of enhanced collaboration and cooperation between Nigeria and my Office that will serve the interests of the victims of alleged crimes committed in Nigeria and beyond.  After over a decade of communications and exchanges between my Office and Nigerian authorities we need to now move with urgency to deliver on our joint commitments to justice and translate these into concrete actions.

Iraq’s Water Challenges Underline Need for Capacity, Water Resource Minister Al-Hamdani Says

By Bhavna Bhasin

IHE Delft Interview with Mr. Al-Hamdani, Alumnus & Water Resources Minister of Iraq.

Iraq needs to develop capacity so that it can handle water-related challenges arising from climate change and the absence of agreements with upstream countries, Iraqi Water Resource Minister Mahdi Rashid Al-Hamdani said during a visit this week to IHE Delft – his alma mater.

The visit by Minister Al-Hamdani and a delegation from the Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) focused an ongoing capacity development project and explored opportunities to further strengthen collaboration between MoWR and IHE Delft as well as other institutions in the Dutch water sector.

“Iraq is an arid country, located downstream from two main rivers – Tigris and Euphrates. This means that more than 80% of our water comes from upper-basin countries like Turkey, Syria and Iran. However, currently there is no international agreement to manage and share water, between these riparian countries,” the minister said at a livestreamed seminar at IHE Delft.

Droughts resulting from climate change has worsened the situation, he said, noting that the country needs capacity to ensure equitable water access for all parts of Iraq, including those south of Baghdad.

Collaboration Needed

IHE Delft, the MoWR and other partners are working together to enhance the capacity of the water sector in Iraq through tailor-made trainings and research initiatives. The project, initiated in 2019, is funded by the Dutch Foreign Ministry under IHE Delft’s Water and Development Partnership programme.

IHE Delft Rector Eddy Moors said Iraq’s situation underlined the need for different sectors to collaborate: the water needs of the country’s agriculture sector, which is working hard to improve food security, must be balanced with needs to reduce water use. “I admire the ambition of Iraq to improve water use efficiency by more than 30 percent in the coming decade,” he added

Since graduating from IHE Delft in 2007 with an MSc in Water Management, Minister Al-Hamdani has fostered close collaboration with the Institute. “Since I’m an IHE alumni, I have a good understanding of what IHE can do for our country. The cooperation with IHE is central to our efforts,” he said. Currently, 18 IHE Delft alumni work at MoWR.

Slovenia between Brussels and Budapest

In Slovenia, the year of 2022 has been dubbed “super election year” because parliamentary, local and presidential elections will be held in it. 

Ninth parliamentary elections since the declaration of independence of the Republic of Slovenia will he held on 24 April 2022. The elections will be organized according to the proportional electoral system in eight constituencies, comprising of 11 election districts. The total number of eligible votes if 1,699,433. 

Each constituency is assigned 11 representative mandates (one per district), which will subsequently be divided at the level of the constituency and the state level among political parties proportionally to the share of votes won. In addition to 88 representatives, separate elections are organized for two representatives of ethnic communities (Italian and Hungarian), which will be elected according to the majority system in two separate electoral units (so called ethnic community electoral units). Hence, members of ethnic communities will vote two times at the elections for the Slovenian parliament, which amounts to positive discrimination. The election threshold is 4%.

All political parties whose lists get supported with signatures of three representatives or 100 voters at the state level and 50 at the constituency level, can run at the elections. The requirement for nonpartisan election lists is 1000 signatures of voters in each of the 8 constituencies. 

The following political parties, coalitions and lists will participate in the parliamentary elections: ● DeSUS – Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia  /Demokratična stranka upokojencev Slovenije/ ● Homeland League /Domovinska liga – Dom/ ● Resni.ca Movement /Gibanje Resni.ca/ ● Freedom Movement /Gibanje svoboda/ ● The Left /Levica/ ● Boris Popovič’s List – /Digitalizirajmo Slovenijo/ ● Marjan Ć arec’s List – LMĆ  /Lista Marjana Ć arca/ ● Dr. Aleksandra Pivec’s Party – Our Country /NaĆĄa deĆŸela/ ● Our Future and Good State /NaĆĄa prihodnost in Dobra drĆŸava/ ● Nonpartisan People’s List Movement for a Sound Society / Nestrankarska ljudska lista Gibanja zdrava druĆŸba/ ● New Slovenia- Christian Democrats /Nova Slovenija – krơčanski demokrati/ ● Pirate Party of Slovenia /Piratska stranka Slovenije/ ● Let’s Unite Slovenia /PoveĆŸimo Slovenijo/ (Concretely /Konkretno/, Green /Zeleni/, SLS, NLS, NS) ● Slovenian Democratic Party  / Slovenska demokratska stranka (SDS)/ ● Slovenian National Party /Slovenska nacionalna stranka (SNS)/ ● Social Democrats – SD /Socialnidemokrati/ ● Alenka BratuĆĄek’s Party – SAB /Stranka Alenke BratuĆĄek/● Vesna – Green Party /Zelena stranka/ ● For People of Slovenia /Za ljudstvo Slovenije (ZLS)/ ● Alliance “Lets Liberate Slovenia /ZavezniĆĄtvo osvobodimo Slovenijo â€“ ZOS/United Slovenia Movement/Gibanje zedinjena Slovenija (ZSI)/ and Party of Slovenian People /Stranka slovenskega naroda (SSN)/.

Complicated situation on Slovenian political scene 

After the 2018 parliamentary elections, a minority government headed by Marjan Ơarec (LMƠ) was established. Ơarec made a strategic mistake when on 27 January 2020 he stepped down from the position of the president of the government. He calculated that his resignation could lead to early parliamentary elections, after which he would once again come to the position of the president of the government. Such a reckless move enabled Janez Janƥa (SDS) to come to power and form a right-center government, together with the Modern Centre Party /Stranka modernega centra/ (now Concretely /Konkretno/), New Slovenia /Nova Slovenija/ (NSi) and Party of Pensioners /Stranka upokojencev DeSUS/.

At the very beginning of the mandate, JanĆĄa’s government faced the challenges of the Covid-19 pandemic and attributed its unreadiness to cope with the pandemic the government to Ć arec’s government. Slovenia undertook rigorous measures in the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic. However, majority of the measures proved to be excessive, some even unnecessary, while many were illegal and unconstitutional. Furthermore, questionable and dubious spending, that is misuse of public money was also recorded during the pandemic. 

Despite the promises made that the government would unify the citizens and the announcements that the coalition parties will act as a corrective to the government headed by Janez JanĆĄa and his Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS), the practice was completely different. Janez JanĆĄa is regarded as an ally and satellite of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban (Fidesz), who is Putin’s key satellite in the European Union and NATO. This connection quickly became evident on the Slovenian political scene, particularly through the actions undertaken by JanĆĄa’s government and creation of an atmosphere in the society that had earlier also been typical of JanĆĄa’s rule. Analysts believe that this needs to be understood in the context of the fact that Budapest had become a center of “The Internationale of Crime”, while key actors in these financial (Russian) transactions have been identified as “Putinians”.

A step further was made. A period of divisions and radicalization of the Slovenian society, establishment of Orban’s model of rule and introduction of some different and alleged European values into the Slovenian social space begun. The suitable and obedient, but inexperienced, got appointed to positions. Pressure was put on the judiciary, while appointment of EU-delegated prosecutors was avoided. Pressuring and subordination of the media also became evident (most prominent cases include the RTV Slovenia broadcaster and the Slovenian News Agency – STA), as well sa untransparent use of budget funds and creation of a new social elite on the basis of personal criteria and preference of Janez JanĆĄa. In fact, JanĆĄa introduced in Slovenia an autocratic, chancellor-model of government in which all decisions are made by one single person – Janez JanĆĄa. The abuse of the repressive police apparatus and security-intelligence services, which keeps surveillance on opposition politicians, reporters and civil society, has also become evident. On many occasions Slovenian and foreign organizations dealing with human rights and status of democracy warned about the developments in the Slovenian society. Drops in ratings of Slovenia were also recorded in a number of areas. At the same time, during the rule of Janez JanĆĄa, the speaker of the parliament, who is a member of an opposition party, served a major part of his mandate. This indicates that there is no clear parliamentary majority. 

Slovenia between Brussels and Budapest

The close connection between the current Janez JanĆĄa’s government and the Visegrad group of states (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia), particularly Hungary and its Prime Minister Viktor Orban, is of no surprise. The credit for this connection can be attributed to the former Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski (VMRO-DPMNE), to whom Viktor Orban has been providing refuge in Hungary for several years already, despite the international arrest warrant. What is typical for the Visegrad Group is that all member states are net receivers of European funds and, generally, as a rule, oppose the official Brussels on important issues, where it is necessary to demonstrate unity within the EU and adopt decisions on the future of the EU. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party, who had already left the largest political group in the European Parliament, the European People’s Party (EPP), are the most prominent actors in such activities.

Viktor Orban is known as the main man of Russian President Vladimir Putin in the EU and NATO-u. Early last year, the so-called “non-papers” attributable to the Slovenian Prime Minister Janez JanĆĄa were leaked to the public, which further deteriorated the very tense situation in the Western Balkans. The existence of the “non-paper” was confirmed also by the President of the European Council Charles Michel. Subsequent developments and tensions in the Western Balkans were in line with the contents of the respective “non-papers.” It is also worth noting that Slovenia, together with Hungary and Croatia, blocked the decision on EU sanctions to Milorad Dodik (SNSD), Member of the BiH Presidency, who is also known as Putin’s satellite in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hence, it is obvious that Putin had launched his satellites into the orbit of European and Balkan politics. 

All the activities clearly show that the Slovenian foreign policy has directly or indirectly been in the function of Putin’s policy within the EU and on the West Balkans, which is aimed at destruction of the unity within the EU and destabilization. Hence, it has been successful in completing the task so far. Therefore, the recent “excursion” of the Slovenian Prime Minister Janez JanĆĄa to Kyiv is regarded in international circles with caution and suspicions. As a result of such a policy, Slovenia has lost the position it had enjoyed in the West Balkans, and due to the close connections with Victor Orban, as Putin’s satellite, international circles regard Slovenia with major reservations and utmost caution. In this context, it is important to understand that JanĆĄa’s engagement in Ukraine and the attempt to include Ukraine in the Slovenian election campaign is an experiment of improvision and unseriousness. It is crystal clear that a country of the size and stature in international relations, such as Slovenia, currently cannot resolve the burning global problem – as is the Russian invasion on Ukraine. Furthermore, several years ago Slovenian Prime Minister Janez JanĆĄa “slipped” and insulted the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, as well as US President Joseph Biden.

JanĆĄa’s adventurism in foreign policy reflected also on his relations with China because of his solo stances on Taiwan, which triggered strong response by the Chinese authorities. Nevertheless, in such circumstances JanĆĄa nominated Slovenia for the position of a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the 2024-2025 period, which is an act of foreign-policy amateurism. One should also not neglect the fact that in the past Slovenia had already unsuccessfully applied for the position of a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council for the 2012-2013 period.

A state that is a full-fledged member of the EU and NATO, as well as aspires to become a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council should pursue a more appropriate foreign policy engagement. 

Analysts believe that at the upcoming parliamentary elections the citizens of the Republic of Slovenia will decide on the future of their country. Specifically, will the future of their country be directed towards the very core of the EU and cooperation within EU institutions or towards Budapest and Victor Orban.

Change of mindset of Slovenians 

The revision of Slovenian history by the current Slovenian government is aimed to present the defeated forces from World War II as the winners. This is a twisted act. Awakening of the defeated fascist ideologies has become a constant of the current government and it triggers strong reactions at social and political level. Slovenians as a nation are profound antifascists and very sensitive when it comes to falsification of history. 

Features of the autocratization process[2] are also apparent through the intensive attacks on the civil society, attacks on the reporters and censorship in the media. According to the report on the status of democracy by the University in Gothenborg, the states[3] with increased media censorship by the government are Mauritius, Poland and Slovenia. The countries that are most rapidly plunging into autocracy include Afghanistan, Ivory Coast, Tunisia, Myanmar and Slovenia. According to the global Human Freedom Index, Slovenia has dropped to the 36th position, which indicates a descending trend. Furthermore, according to Gallup, Slovenia is among the top ten countries when it comes to anti-American sentiments. 

Analysts believe that just as he himself had announced, Slovenian Prime Minister Janez JanĆĄa needs five years for the experiment of “liberation” of Slovenia. In this context, he naturally plans to change the mindset of Slovenians as a profoundly antifascist nation into something diametrically opposite. Slovenians need a vision for the future, not falsification of history. 

Slovenian mistrust in established political parties

In Slovenia, in the fourth election cycle the voters showed mistrust in established political parties. This is a consequence of their actions so far, because they did not offer innovative political programs, new faces and a more certain future to the citizens. It needs to be emphasized that while in 2004, when it became an EU member, Slovenia was the leading country in the group of 10 newly integrated countries by all indicators, it is now in the middle of the rankings. As a politician and president of a political party, Janez Janƥa is the only one in the EU with an almost 30-year mandate, which is a novum in democratic societies. This is an indicator of incapacitated democracy and leads to autocracy. 

Analysts believe that Slovenia is faced with a serious crisis of political elites, which commenced with the departure of prime minister and president of many years, Janez DrnovĆĄek, from the political scene. As a result of such a situation, in each election cycle the voters seek new trustworthy individuals. At the current elections, they see Robert Golob as such an individual and his recently established Freedom Movement is the favorite in the parliamentary elections.

Slovenia to face political changes

The data presented by the Chair of the Commission for Prevention of Corruption (KPK) Robert Ơumi[4] , according to which Slovenia is at major loss because of corruption and loses up to 3.5 billion Euros per year (which practically is the entire budget of the Republic of North Macedonia) offers an illustration of the situation in Slovenia. 

Public opinion polls indicate that the Freedom Movement has a lead, and is followed by the Slovenian Democratic Party. Namely, the parliamentary elections will factually be a contest between two main political contestants. Specifically, Golob’s Freedom Movement and JanĆĄa’s SDS, which diminishes the chances of smaller parties to pass the election threshold.

Analysts believe that Slovenia needs competent politicians with democratic capacity to achieve the much needed social consensus on the future. Slovenia needs a higher level of political culture, as in the current mandate of JanĆĄa’s government it had reached the lowest level since it gained independence. After the elections, Slovenia will need a “conclave” of key actors of the Slovenian state and society to decide on how is Slovenia to stop its further regression and ensure its future. The announced political changes in Slovenia also open the possibility of repetition of “Trump’s syndrome” in the transfer of authority. It is possible that the current government will not recognize the results of the elections and bring into question the legality and legitimacy of the election process and in such a way try to justify the defeat at the elections to its voters. Parliamentary elections will also have a direct impact on the local and presidential elections scheduled to take place in the second half of 2022. 

Published by IFIMESThe International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) from Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyzes developments in the Middle East, the Balkans and around the world. In the eve of the regular parliamentary elections, scheduled to take on 24 April 2022 in the Republic of Slovenia, IFIMES made an analysis of the pre-election situation in the country.        

Footnotes:
[1IFIMES â€“ The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) from Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)/UN since 2018.
[2] Interview with Prime Minister Janez JanĆĄa: Slovenia will be liberated in five years!, link: https://nova24tv.si/slovenija/intervju-s-predsednikom-vlade-janezom-janso-slovenija-bo-cez-pet-let-osvobojena/
[3] Democracy report 2022 Autocratization Changing Nature?, link: https://v-dem.net/media/publications/dr_2022.pdf
[4] Ć umi: Due to corruption we are at a major loss of up to 3.5 billion Euros per year link: https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/sumi-zaradi-korupcije-izgubljamo-veliko-morda-3-5-milijarde-evrov-letno/604017

Venezuela request to defer ICC Prosecutor Investigation

ICC Prosecutor, Mr Karim A.A. Khan QC, notifies Pre-Trial Chamber I of a request from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to defer his investigation under article 18(2) of the Rome Statute and confirms intention to apply for authority to resume investigations


On 16 April 2022, I received a request from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (“Venezuela”) to defer my Office’s investigations with respect to the Situation in Venezuela I, in favour of the actions carried out by the national authorities of Venezuela. Specifically, Venezuela has triggered the procedure under article 18 of the Rome Statute whereby a State may inform the Court that it is investigating or has investigated its nationals or others within its jurisdiction with respect to criminal acts which may constitute crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and may formally request that the ICC Prosecutor defer to the State’s investigation of those persons. The Statute requires that I either accept the deferral request or that I make an application to the Pre-Trial Chamber requesting authorisation to resume my own investigations.  

I have yesterday notified Venezuela’s deferral request to the Pre-Trial Chamber, as well as my intention to apply, as soon as possible, for authority to resume my investigations. In my notification I communicated this determination because, having reviewed the basis of the deferral request, I have concluded that no new information had been submitted that would warrant a revision of my earlier complementarity assessment that relevant potential cases that would arise from an investigation into the situation would be admissible.   

It will be for the Pre-Trial Chamber to decide on the procedure to be followed once I have submitted my application to proceed with the investigation, including any responses from Venezuela, as well as relevant observations by victims, their legal representatives, and other interested parties.  

Pending a ruling from the Pre-Trial Chamber on my application, my Office may also seek authority to execute specific investigative measures pursuant to article 18(6), where necessary.

I wish to recall that the effective implementation of the Rome Statute is a responsibility shared between the ICC and State Parties to the Rome Statute, such as the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.  Since taking office, I have been clear that the meaningful realisation of the vision set out in the Statute can only be achieved by deepening cooperation and by finding common ground wherever possible, even in complex and challenging circumstances. Reflecting that view, during my engagement with the Venezuelan authorities I have demonstrated  my willingness to cooperate with the national authorities in their efforts to seek justice, while also making it clear that I will not hesitate to move forward when I believe the provisions of the Rome Statute are satisfied.  It is on the basis of this two-track approach that I announced the opening of my investigation during my first visit to Caracas in 3 November 2021 while simultaneously concluding a Memorandum of understanding with Venezuela regarding the promotion of cooperation and complementarity.

While the Venezuelan authorities did not agree with my decision to open an investigation, I considered it to their credit that they nevertheless sought to engage with my Office so as to develop stronger cooperation and to identify ways in which we may be able to support domestic accountability processes.  In this respect, I welcome the willingness of Venezuela to continue cooperating with the OTP notwithstanding its request that I defer my investigation.  In the same spirit, I will also continue working with Venezuela in order to advance implementation of all aspects of the Memorandum of Understanding while clearly meeting the statutory obligations of my Office with respect to our independent investigations.

Migrant smuggling network in Moldova and Romania dismantled

The Hague, 20 April 2022

Eurojust has assisted the Moldovan and Romanian authorities in dismantling an organised crime group (OCG) that was involved in migrant smuggling. During an action day, nine suspects were detained and 66 locations were searched in the Republic of Moldova. Eurojust provided financial support and assisted the authorities in setting up a joint investigation team (JIT).

It is suspected that a cross-border OCG set up in the Republic of Moldova had been illegally transferring migrants, mainly of Asian origin, to Austria and Germany via the Republic of Moldova and Romania since the summer of 2021.

The OCG was organised in clusters, part of which was assigned to Turkey where its members identified and recruited most of the migrants destined for Western Europe. After being provided with transport to the Republic of Moldova, the migrants were brought into the country by other members of the OCG, who subsequently ensured their fraudulent border crossing into Romanian territory and finally into Austria or Germany.

The migrants were transported in small groups of six to ten people in modified vans with hidden compartments specially arranged for their concealment. The criminal group often used additional automobiles as forerunners, to prevent the transports from being discovered.

The price paid by migrants for the trafficking activity varied between EUR 5 000 and EUR 8 000 per person, depending on the distance and the nature of the transport offered.

The proceeds from this activity were invested by the members of the OCG in luxury items, cars and real estate.

During an action day carried out in the Republic of Moldova on 19 April, nine suspects were detained. A total of 66 search warrants for homes and cars used by members of the OGG were executed in Chisinau and in the southern part of the country.

In addition to supporting the establishment of the JIT and providing it with funding, Eurojust actively facilitated the cross-border judicial cooperation between the national authorities involved and organised a coordination meeting to agree upon the best way forward in the national cases.

Europol provided additional analytical support to the investigation, facilitated the exchange of information and supported the law enforcement authorities.

The following authorities took part in this investigation:

  • Romania: Directorate for the Investigation of Organized Crime and Terrorism – Galati Territorial Service, Police Directorate for Combatting Organized Crime, Galati Police Brigade of Countering Organized Crime
  • Republic of Moldova: Prosecutor’s Office for Combating Organized Crime and Special Cases

Call Centres Involved in Online Investment Fraud

Takedown of infrastructure of call centres involved in online investment fraud responsible for losses of at least EUR 20 million

The Hague, 21 April 2022

At the request of the Estonian authorities, Eurojust and Europol have assisted the takedown of an online investment fraud scheme, which defrauded victims of at least EUR 20 million. Authorities in Finland, the Netherlands, Latvia, France, Germany and Ukraine supported the operation, taking place today, during which more than fifty servers and services were seized in six countries.

The perpetrators allegedly belong to an internationally organised crime group (OCG) that contacted victims by telephone and via the internet. They presented themselves as brokers of online trading platforms dealing in cryptocurrencies, to convince victims to make investments. In addition to the fraudulent offers, the perpetrators installed remote access programmes that allowed them to illegally access the victims’ computers and steal their banking credentials (bank card data, cryptocurrency wallet access information).

Once the victims joined the platform and made a payment, they were unable to withdraw any money. The web pages were eventually taken offline, or additional payments were requested in order to retrieve the original investment.

It is believed that more than 30 000 people from at least 71 different countries – at least 522 victims are registered in Estonia alone – have fallen victim to the criminal network.

The OCG used a large-scale IT infrastructure that included tens of virtual servers. The members of the network used computers in call centres to connect to the servers. Additionally, the OCG used several sophisticated, self-developed databases that included the overall digital footprint of the victims and anonymising services. This was necessary for the upkeep of the large-scale criminal activities and for hiding the criminal business model from law enforcement.

Eurojust facilitated judicial cooperation in this case by setting up and funding a joint investigation team (JIT). Two coordination meetings were organised to coordinate the national investigations and prepare for the action day. Europol provided analytical support to the investigations.

To support the action day on 21 April 2022, Eurojust set up a coordination centre to enable rapid cooperation between the involved judicial authorities. The purpose of the operation was to disrupt and paralyse the criminal activities of the OCG.

As a result, more than 50 servers were seized (taken down and data copied), in Finland, the Netherlands, Latvia, France and Germany.

The following authorities took part in this investigation:

  • Estonia: North District Prosecutors’ Office and North Prefecture of the Police and Border Guard Board.
  • Finland: National Bureau of Investigation
  • The Netherlands: National Police Unit The Hague
  • Latvia: International Cooperation Department of the Central Criminal Police Department of the State Police of Latvia
  • France: Investigative judge from JIRS Lille (Interregional Specialized Jurisdiction); LION (Operational Investigative Laboratory for cybercrime) of the National Police DZPJ
  • Germany: Prosecutor General’s Office Frankfurt am Main – Cyber Crime Center –, State Criminal Police Office Hessen
  • Ukraine: National Police of Ukraine and Prosecutor General’s Office.

ICC President visits Guinea-Bissau to encourage ratification of the Rome Statute

On 19 and 20 April 2022, the President of the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “the Court”), Judge Piotr HofmaƄski, visited Guinea-Bissau where he met with the country’s highest authorities to encourage ratification of the Rome Statute, the Court’s founding treaty.

President HofmaƄski held productive discussions with H.E. Umaro Sissoco EmbalĂł, President of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau; H.E. Cipriano CassamĂĄ, President of the National Assembly; H.E. JosĂ© Pedro SambĂș, President of the Supreme Court of Justice; H.E. Soares SambĂș, Deputy Prime Minister; H.E. Suzi Barbosa, Minister of Foreign Affairs; H.E. Teresa Alexandrina da Silva, Minister of Justice; and leaders of parliamentary groups.

In his conversations with the national authorities, President HofmaƄski emphasised that by ratifying the Rome Statute, countries show their commitment to the rule of law, peace and security. He underlined that joining the ICC is crucial for the prevention of the most serious crimes under international law – genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. He further stressed that by joining the ICC, Guinea Bissau would contribute to making the system of international criminal justice more universal and thereby strengthen the fight against impunity and victims’ access to justice on every continent of the world.

During his visit, President HofmaƄski also met with H.E. Anthony Ohemeng-Boamah, United Nations Resident Coordinator in Guinea-Bissau; H.E. Sónia Neto, Head of the European Union delegation in Guinea-Bissau; as well as other members of the diplomatic corps based in Bissau.  

The Rome Statute, ICC’s founding treaty of the ICC, was adopted on 17 July 1998 and entered into force on 1 July 2002. 123 States are parties to the Statute. Guinea-Bissau signed the Statute on 12 September 2000 but has not ratified it. 


The visit was financially supported by the European Commission.