Cyberwarfare and International Humanitarian Law

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Cyberwarfare and International Humanitarian Law

By Adrian Zienkiewicz and Eugene Matos De Lara

A virtual universe where assets and ideas are exchanged rapidly has become reality, and so too has the presence of a deep underbelly of the web that seeks to manipulate and steal valuable information.

Confidential information contained within complex computer networks is routinely targeted and cyberattacks are pervasive. Sometimes there are personal and financial motivations at play, but it becomes a uniquely geopolitical endeavor aimed at control and destabilization when backed by a State. Cyberwarfare is war in peacetime, and while not perceivable by ordinary citizens, it is ongoing daily through various retaliatory attacks. How is cyberwarfare constituted by international humanitarian law (IHL), and what are the legal voids?

Cyber warfare is a unique form of “force” enacted by a State, understood broadly through the lens of article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which a State must refrain from enacting and is irrespective of its duration or magnitude. Since government and financial institutions’ computer programs contain highly sensitive data, the breaching of these by a foreign entity are to be perceived as attacks on sovereignty. Even if not instigating a conflict, threats, coercion, or pressure applied through this manner are still discouraged.

The nature of the concept differs considerably with article 51; through this, cyberwarfare would have to be sufficiently coordinated, bearing enough evidence of its State involvement and motivations for it to be designated as an “armed attack”. The international community intends to keep cyberwarfare solely as a method of self-defense that must be considered through necessity, proportionality, distinction, and prevention of wrongful conduct before its occurrence. The notions must be considered with the heightened anticipation of the consequences of taking one path instead of the other. Thus, preemptively establishing virtual defense technologies would be appropriate. Still, for instance, it is not the case in harassing an opposing party’s networks to disrupt their military capabilities or disable entire power grids

Cyberspace shouldn’t be exploited as a frontier of conflict, although it often is. More than just protecting information, the promulgated objective is deterrence. Cyberwarfare could potentially provoke more open, conventional forms of armed conflict- an accumulation of consistent cyber attacks could be detrimental to a country’s progress- but it is, through jus in bello, itself a type of conflict. Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, through article 49(1), asserts that “[a]ttacks means acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence”, and cyberwarfare is precisely acts of hostility of a State against another.

Cyberwarfare indeed ascribes to the rules of IHL: civilians cannot intentionally be targeted, the same follows for essential infrastructure that provides basic resources, and so forth. That is why cyberwarfare, even through extensive operations, tends to be precise in its function and minimizes damage. A State wants to naturally lower the odds of having its operations intercepted, and a minor wrongdoing could simply be answered with an equal wrongdoing or condemnation. When done right, cyberspace is where anonymity and covertness commingle, therefore allowing a State to openly deny attacks even though they are the true perpetrators, further reducing accountability. While it’s a web of worlds within worlds and worlds apart from each other, it is possible to leave a trail in cyberspace and evidence could point to a State party committing some wrongdoing, although it’s oftentimes inferred.

Most attacks are committed by third party groups and even more are left unaccounted for. Also, attacks presenting patterns or targeting exceptionally specific programs can be proof of State sponsored actions, but liability is squashed or at the least greatly diminished when operating through an array of proxies. Cyber warfare is sophisticated, and despite occasional acts of overt sabotage, it is the subtle extraction of information that provides advantages without the other parties knowing it that is sought. Discovering facts that a State deliberately tried to keep secret could be used against them at the negotiation table, leaving them dumbfounded as to why its counterpart is adopting a particular stance.

All States that have the technological capacity, advanced or otherwise, participate in some form or another in this boundless warfare. It is incorporated by IHL, but is distinct enough for the international community to potentially advance a uniform regulatory body, a task that has not been envisioned yet. The Tallinn Manual serves as the most foremost study on cyber warfare, conducted at the behest of NATO, but it too demonstrates the difficulty of ascertaining the effects on objects that are both immaterial and intangible. There are constraints in quantifying losses when no visible damages are present, and when some attacks are negligible it is likewise difficult to find acceptable solutions. Some States such as the US, still the preeminent power in cyber warfare, have attempted to categorize cyberattacks according to their corresponding danger, increasing response efficacy all while weighing the notion of proportionality. The ICJ, as shown through Nicaragua v. United States, argues that peaceful countermeasures are a response to low level threat.

There is no end to sight of cyber warfare, as there is a functional contradiction between discouraging its perpetuation and its actual practice. The ability to gain an upper hand in any desired sector with insignificant consequences doesn’t act as a deterrent but rather an incitement. A State that doesn’t keep pace in cyberspace is bound to get left behind in the material world and is susceptible to foreign pressure. International resolutions can be adopted alongside diplomatic sanctions, but they will ultimately yield no change to the modus operandi of cyberspace activities.

There is an assortment of definitions for cyberattacks and there is no definitive way of attributing responsibility of a cyberattack to a State. The effective control test posited in the Nicaragua case contrasts with the looser overall control in Prosecutor v. Tadic. Other responsibility thresholds have been conceptualized, but international jurisprudence on cyber warfare is nonexistent. Obtaining remedies through international institutions is a tough challenge for States even when citing precedence due to legal knowledge on cyber warfare constantly morphing. Time will tell how the law can follow the practice when cyberspace continues to expand.

About the authors:

Adrian Zienkiewicz

Author Adrian Zienkiewicz (LL.B., J.D.) is a law student at Université de Montréal. He has a marked interest for all spheres of public international law. Environmental and Energy Law are his real passions.

Co-Author Eugene Matos De Lara (MA, MBA, LL.L, JD, LLB, BA.pol.pad, BA.dvm, BA.sc PMP) is currently working for the International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan studies, based in Ljubljana, and the Geneva Desk for Cooperation. Multilingual internationally published legal graduate with an extensive corporate legal background, and exposure to private international law, international relations, politics, public administration and public affairs.

International Law and Diplomatic Covert Intelligence

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International Law and Diplomatic Covert Intelligence

By Eugene Matos and Adrian Zienkiewicz

Most discussion around diplomacy is usually about how they go about representation, however little is discussed about the equally important duty of observing and reporting. It takes big events such as the Raymond Allen Davis case. A contractor with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) shot two men killing both in Lahore, Pakistan. In the aftermath, the U.S. government contended that Davis was protected by diplomatic immunity because of his CIA employment with the American consulate in Lahore. The event highlighted a question on the scope of immunities given to consular and diplomatic staff, and more precisely, the role and protections awarded to diplomats working as undercover intelligence agents.

Diplomacy and its legal protection, practices and communication cables, diplomatic bags, have partially, if in theory alone, institutionalized aspects of espionage. Where does diplomacy end and spying begin? Where must one draw the line between official diplomacy and the murky world of espionage? “Every embassy in the world has spies,” says University of Buckingham’s Prof Anthony Glees during an interview, director of the Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies. Because it is common practice, there’s an unwritten understanding that governments are prepared to turn a blind eye to what occurs within embassies. It is a fragile quid pro quo between nation-states that has substantial political ramifications.

Most contemporary intelligence officers aren’t deeply embedded undercover; these agents are posted as either low or mid-level workers in foreign embassies and monitor affairs from there. The host countries are aware of their actual identities and the types of duties they carry out. They are generally disregarded until they become threats – easier to track the spies you know about than the ones you don’t.

In the nuclear, technology and cyberspace era, international law requires constant reinterpretation or reassertion to challenge new problems and adapt to developments in the global system. There are various elements to espionage concerning its purpose, methods, and practices that include these innovative arenas. Excluding armed conflicts, espionage is never explicitly addressed in law; the question is left virtually unanswered. Needless to say, there is a varying consensus by legal scholars regarding its limitations.

What is Diplomatic Espionage?

With the advent of technology, the practices vary immensely; albeit, it can be defined as a tool for the execution of policy as well as a tool to inform policy, dividing it into two categories: covert operations, which is the tool for the execution of policy, and intelligence, the tool to inform policy. There are two types of espionage in law: covert operations and covert intelligence. Both occur in secrecy to avoid detection, and therefore require significant consideration and preparation.

The first type- covert operations- consists of active and cyberspace operations. States conduct such actions to influence a foreign state. Covert operations remain very classified, which put them in the deep end of espionage. These can be of a coercive nature, and may include, but not be limited to, sabotage, theft, covert political action, and propaganda.

The second type is covert intelligence, the subject of this present analysis and the more obscure strand of diplomatic espionage. It is divided further into two categories: collection of information and analysis of that information. With respect to international law, the initial collection of information raises considerable legal questions, making it highly contested, especially for diplomats whose primary function is to listen and report. Accordingly, both mandates, covert intelligence and diplomacy, are interested in gathering vital and classified foreign information through different techniques, of private and public nature, for strategic policy goals. Usually, the distinction is perceived through the methods used and the targets in mind, is where the line of malpractice in diplomacy is drawn.

Why is it Important?

Foreign data collection itself has several variants and they are used to guide foreign policy and apprehend the future behaviour of its constituents not only in military applications, but also in trade and investments, as well as general regional politics. Thus, intelligence gathering is a crucial practice towards the greater ambitions of a state, and its secrecy further implies that intelligence is integral in the state decision-making process.

A question of diplomatic practice

The issue is rightfully not whether diplomats can spy or not; rather, one should understand the limitations. Espionage, economic and industrial intelligence remains a missing dimension of international affairs, diplomatic history and its study. Diplomatic espionage is also practiced between friendly states, ‘friendly’ economic espionage is seen as a covert activity between competing foreign states to acquire economic intelligence used to interfere with certain states’ economic opportunities. These are popular variables in trade negotiations. The USA has successfully used macroeconomic, microeconomic and economic counterintelligence against its allies. In fact the New York Times confirmed that the United States has expanded the role of American diplomats in collecting intelligence overseas. Case in point, United States diplomats were directly instructed to spy on United Nations, and EU leaders, as confirmed by Wikileaks, a 2009 confidential directive from the United States Department of State.

Is Diplomatic Covert Intelligence Legal?

Diplomatic immunity is a form of legal immunity that ensures diplomats are given safe passage in the host country. Diplomats are unsusceptible to lawsuits or prosecution under the host country’s laws. Although the practice of espionage is technically illegal, it is forgivable by law for diplomats, yet the line between ethical practice does affect contemporary diplomatic relations when crossed arbitrarily. In certain cases, states knowingly cross this line despite high geopolitical stakes, with considerable aftermath as seen with the Snowden leak in Venezuela/Germany/USA relations.

A diplomat has the conventional duty, by nature and mandate, to observe the receiving state. However, some diplomats have lurked away from the light and gone into endeavours that are incompatible with their official plan, such as infiltration, development of cover identities, or by monitoring the behaviours of individuals or groups to gather information and persuade political disenchantment. In correlation, we accord an interest to the instructive case of legal resident spies operating in a foreign state with an official cover and protection of a member of a diplomatic mission, which is yes protected by law. However, the law creates a clear distinction if the member is a consular or diplomat.

Consular staff

Immunity is a product of the Vienna Convention on Consular/Diplomatic Relations, 1963/61, and the International Law Commission. To begin with consular agents, they are accountable to all state laws except for a few functional circumstances. In addition, a consular officer’s protection is limited to reporting and performing intelligence functions by all lawful means and can only report on the conditions and developments of the receiving State’s commercial, economic, cultural and scientific life.

Moreover, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963 (VCCR) art 43 ss. 1 states that consular staff are “not amenable to the jurisdiction of the judicial or administrative authorities of the receiving State in respect of acts performed in the exercise of consular functions” and that they should only be liable to arrest, according to article 41, “in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a decision by the competent judicial authority”.

In other words, the law has given us parameters for consular agents to respect these: intelligence from resident accredited consular staff is legal under the VCCR 1963 insofar that, the consular mission respects the laws of the receiving State, that the activities do not include illegal covert operations, that the activities are restricted to observe and report (intelligence) in matters within the function of the consulate and that the intelligence is restricted to only the socio-economic development of the host state.

Diplomatic Staff

If a diplomatic member assigned to an embassy is caught crossing the line in espionage , the host authorities would have to admit the principle of diplomatic immunity, by which diplomatic officials are not subject to the jurisdiction of local courts and other authorities for both their official and, to a large extent, their personal activities. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961, offers broader protections than the consulate. For example, the archives and documents of a diplomatic mission are inviolable and shall not be seized or opened by the host government (Article 24).

The host country must permit and protect free communication between the diplomats of the mission and their home country. A diplomatic bag must never be opened, even on suspicion of abuse, and a diplomatic courier must never be arrested or detained (Article 27). Diplomats must not be liable to any form of arrest or detention, and the receiving state must make all efforts to protect their person and dignity (Article 29). Diplomats are immune from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the host state, with exceptions for professional activities outside the diplomat’s official functions (Article 31). Therefore, the only clear path to prosecution offered is Article 32, permitting sending states to waive this immunity.

It is safe to assume that the repercussions vary enormously giving us a plethora of options if a diplomat gets caught crossing the line. Detention, interrogation and the possibility of a trial in a public venue are not usually possible for diplomats. Again, the factors depend on the government in question, who the diplomat is working for, their citizenship, and what information they may have received or transferred. Thus we switch to the political context.

If a diplomat gets caught crossing the line of what’s acceptable, but they’re not causing noteworthy harm, usually they’ll just get kicked out of the country and sent back home; these actions are swift. Getting caught red handed is the genesis of a wave of political humiliation and negative diplomatic relations. In the case of diplomatic immunity, an intelligence operator would be, in general, only answerable to the jurisdiction of the host state if the sending state waives off the diplomatic immunity.

Repercussions for non diplomats?

However, once a spy crosses the line and they do not carry or diplomatic immunity is waived, it’s game on. If it’s an ally that has compromised defenses, an exchange or kicked out of the country, and if it’s a citizen to the host country a lengthy jail term is likely in store. The ally, too embarrassed about getting caught, no one wants to cause an international diplomatic incident over something they were trying to keep hush-hush in the first place. Enemy spies are slightly different, and their fates largely depend on the relationship between the two nations. They also make good bargaining chips – even bitter enemies have been known to trade captured spies. Whenever an enemy spy gets sent back to his home country, it’s usually because someone wanted to keep the peace.

Espionage is just war and politics played out on a smaller scale by unelected officials and political appointees. Accordingly, the fate of any one agent is largely determined by negotiations, the political environment and of course diplomacy. Spying is illegal as per the national law of almost every state, but some foreigners can be protected or immune to those laws, insofar that the method of covert intelligence fits in the parameters of the principles of diplomatic or functions of the consular immunity.

About the authors:

Author Eugene Matos De Lara (MA, MBA, LL.L, JD, LLB, BA.pol.pad, BA.dvm, BA.sc PMP) is currently working for the International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan studies, based in Ljubljana, and the Geneva Desk for Cooperation. Multilingual internationally published legal graduate with an extensive corporate legal background, and exposure to private international law, international relations, politics, public administration and public affairs.

Adrian Zienkiewicz

Co-author Adrian Zienkiewicz (LL.L JD) is a law student at Université de Montréal. He has a marked interest for all spheres of public international law. Environmental and Energy Law are his real passions.

The Persian Gulf and Red Sea to be connected

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The Persian Gulf and Red Sea to be connected

By  Eleni-Vasiliki Bampaliouta

The Persian Gulf and Red Sea are to be connected by one of the largest railways in the world, at a cost of $250 billion

One of the largest and most expensive projects in the world is being built in the Arabian Peninsula. The Gulf Cooperation Council, made up of six extremely rich Arab countries, is building a 2,000 kilometer railway to connect the region’s states in the best possible way. Crossing the Arabian Desert and creating tunnels in the mountains, the challenges of this project are enormous and perfectly match its cost.

The countries that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman. The idea for the magnificent project was born in 2009, while its construction costs will be shared between the countries and will range from 100 to 250 billion dollars.

A key element of this new railway network is the existing modern Etihad railway. It is a $ 1,200 km, $ 11 billion passenger and commercial freight rail line that runs across the Emirates and connects the Gulf of Oman with the Persian Gulf.

A large railway is being prepared in Egypt for a total cost of $ 4.5 billion.

It is expected that the majority of the order will be accounted for in 2022 after the financial agreements have been signed. The approved contract covers the initial 660 km of the planned 1800 km railway network. The railway will also include the Suez Canal.

The 660-kilometer line will connect the port city of Ain Sokhna on the Red Sea with the port city of Marsa Matrouh and Alexandria in the Mediterranean, connecting two cities, including the the Suez Canal. The Egyptian government has an ambitious plan to invest heavily in a state-of-the-art, reliable and sustainable 1,800-kilometer high-speed rail network that will provide efficient, safe and affordable transportation for all Egyptians, as well as freight, across the country.

The two additional railways will connect the Greater Cairo area from the city on October 6 along the Nile River with Aswan and Luxor via Hurghada to Safaga. The entire network will make Egypt a regional leader in transportation, will influence different economic sectors giving an overall boost to the country’s economy. The consortium will immediately create more than 15,000 jobs in Egypt and an additional 3,800, which will be covered by Egyptian suppliers and the wider Egyptian economy.

Arabian railway.

The connection will carry more than 30 million passengers annually and save up to 50% travel time, a fact which will significantly increase labor productivity, while also connecting Cairo with emerging urban communities. Cairo’s population has doubled in size since 1980 and today some 20 million people call Cairo their home. To alleviate traffic congestion, new cities are currently being developed around the Cairo metropolis.

Arabian railway

From Austria to Greece, via Serbia by train.

A state-of-the-art railway is being built in the Eastern Mediterranean. This project will start in Salzburg, Austria and will end in Thessaloniki and Piraeus in Greece; a distance of about 1,600 kilometers. The pan-European highway Corridor X connects central with southern Europe, via Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and North Macedonia.

The Serbian section was completed two years ago at a cost of 400 million euros. The big bet now is to build the railway at the same time. The first modern section of this network will start next month with a train that will reach speeds of 200 kilometers per hour. Serbia is in the phase of complete renewal of its infrastructure, a fact that also benefits Greece, as it facilitates thousands of visitors from all over Europe.

Northern Macedonia and Greece are moving forward on their own part. Investment in trains and railways is the future, not only for transport and traffic management, but also for environmental reasons. 

President of Colombia visits International Criminal Court

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President of Colombia visits International Criminal Court

On 17 February 2022, H.E. Mr Iván Duque Márquez, President of the Republic of Colombia, visited the International Criminal Court (ICC), where he met the President of the Court, Judge Piotr Hofmański, the Court’s First Vice President, Judge Luz del Carmen Ibáñez Carranza, Second Vice President Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua, Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan QC and Registrar Peter Lewis. 

In his remarks at the meeting, President Hofmański thanked President Duque for honouring the Court with his visit and stated: “The commitment and full cooperation of States is essential for the ICC to be able to discharge its mandate independently and effectively. In this context, Colombia’s continued support for the Court is of vital importance and much appreciated.”

President Duque reiterated Colombia’s commitment to the guiding principles of the Rome Statute and manifested President Piotr Hofmański and Registrar Peter Lewis his “admiration for the International Criminal Court and the work it has been carrying out, particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic”. He expressed his appreciation for “the efforts that the Court is doing to ensure that victims of the most heinous crimes can obtain justice, even during these difficult circumstances”.

Additionally, President Duque recalled that “the Cooperation Agreement between the government of Colombia and the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, signed in Bogotá in October 2021, marks a milestone in the relationship between his country and the ICC”, and affirmed that his encounter with Prosecutor Karim Khan was a propitious opportunity to further develop it.

He highlighted that “Colombia has an enormous experience in the field of ​​transitional justice” and stressed the importance of said agreement, as “it opens new ways to share that know-how with the ICC and its States Parties, always looking towards the compliance of the objectives of the Rome Statute”.

Iván Duque, at the Seat of the Court in The Hague

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Iván Duque, at the Seat of the Court in The Hague

ICC Prosecutor, Mr Karim A. A. Khan QC, meets with the President of Colombia, H.E. Mr Iván Duque, at the Seat of the Court in The Hague

Today, I was delighted to receive H.E. Mr Iván Duque, President of Colombia and his delegation at the Seat of the International Criminal Court, in The Hague.

This visit follows our productive discussions held in Bogota in October 2021, providing a valuable opportunity to further discuss and make progress, particularly with respect to the implementation of the ground breaking Cooperation Agreement I signed with the President during that visit, and to explore avenues for my Office to continue supporting national accountability efforts within the framework of this Agreement.

The establishment of the Cooperation Agreement represented a collective commitment to strengthen and accelerate accountability efforts in Colombia. During our meeting, President Duque reaffirmed his commitment and that of his Government to implement every provision of the Cooperation Agreement. I also informed him that my Office remains firmly committed to supporting this work, including through continued dialogue with the national authorities and other key stakeholders.

I was also pleased to accept the gracious invitation extended to me by President Duque to return to Bogota in July of this year to continue my discussions with relevant authorities to exchange on concrete steps adopted to advance genuine domestic proceedings. I equally welcomed his proposal to hold a high-level regional summit focused on complementarity and judicial cooperation during my visit. I very much look forward to my participation in that timely event and to the anticipated rich discussions on these critically important issues.

I take this opportunity to convey my sincere appreciation to President Duque for his assurances that accountability remains a priority for Colombia and to renew my support to the valuable work of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (“SJP”), the Attorney’s General Office, and that of the other national institutions in their endeavour to end impunity for Rome Statute crimes in Colombia. It is of paramount importance that progress is sustained and that the Government of Colombia continues to give the space to the competent state entities and transitional justice mechanisms to carry out with the work that remains to be done.

The path ahead requires a great deal of stamina on the part of the national authorities, and, in particular, of its judicial institutions. My Office will continue to be a partner of Colombia in its quest for accountability until it is finally and fully achieved.

Crackdown on Albanian-speaking criminals flooding Europe with cocaine

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Crackdown on Albanian-speaking criminals flooding Europe with cocaine

45 arrests in crackdown on criminals flooding Europe with cocaine

Support to actions across Europe against large-scale importers and wholesalers of drugs from Latin America

The Hague, 15 February 2022

An international operation involving judicial and law enforcement authorities in seven countries has resulted in the takedown of one of Europe’s most active Albanian-speaking cocaine trafficking networks in Europe. Today, Eurojust and Europol supported a series of actions carried out in Belgium and Spain, during which over 80 places were searched and 45 suspects arrested. These include a number of high-value targets, investigated in multiple high-profile cases in different jurisdictions.

The suspects allegedly imported cocaine from Latin America to various European ports, organising the transport via planes, vessels, cars and lorries and running the wholesale trade.  Spain and other EU Member States were used, to launder the proceedings of their trade.

During the action day, over 600 law enforcement officers in close cooperation with prosecutors and investigative officers carried out raids against the members of this network in Spain and Belgium. A number of parallel actions also took place in Croatia, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.

Eurojust set up a coordination centre to enable rapid cooperation between the judicial authorities involved. Europol organized the intensive exchange of information and evidence needed to prepare for the final phase of the investigation. Two experts were deployed to facilitate the transnational police operations, using mobile offices on the spot.

Today’s operation, coordinated at the international level by Europol and Eurojust, was the culmination of many months of meticulous planning between law enforcement and judicial authorities in preparation for the action.

A joint investigation team (JIT) was set up between Belgium and Spain last year, with active assistance of Eurojust and Europol. Investigations in Spain started in 2018, with the arrest of a high-ranking member of the organised crime group, who is currently in pre-trial detention. In addition, an Operation Taskforce (OTF) was set up at Europol to pool investigative resources and expertise and develop the investigation internationally.

In Belgium, investigations commenced following the seizure in September 2020 of drugs and large quantities  of chemicals, used to transform and preserve cocaine for trading purposes. Large quantities of cocaine seized during various searches all over Europe over the last years are to be linked to the suspects.

This high-level criminal network had set up a string of enterprises in various countries to launder the profits, including Croatia and Spain, often using strawmen. Its members travelled regularly to Dubai, Mexico and Colombia to arrange their illegal business and used encrypted communication tools to coordinate activities.

The following authorities took part in this investigation:

  • Belgium: Federal Prosecutor’s Office (Parquet Fédéral, Federaal Parket); Investigative Judge of Brussels (Juge d’Instruction Bruxelles, Onderzoeksrechter Brussel);  Federal Judicial Police (Federale Gerechtelijke Politie, Police Judiciaire Fédérale)
  • Croatia: County State Attorney’s Office  Zagreb; Police Office for the Suppression of Organised Crime and Corruption (Policijski nacionalni ured za suzbijanje korupcije)
  • Germany: Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt), State Criminal Police Office of Hamburg (Landeskriminalamt Hamburg)
  • Italy: District Anti-mafia Directorate  of Florence (Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia di Firenze); Anti-mafia Investigation Department (Direzione Investigativa Antimafia); Carabinieri (Arma dei Carabinieri)
  • Spain: Investigative Court no. 2 (Jugado de Instrucción no. 2) of Palma de Mallorca; Public Prosecutor’s Office of Balearic Islands (Fiscalía de Islas Baleares); Public Prosecutor Office against Corruption and Organised Crime (Fiscalía Especial contra la Corrupción y la Criminalidad Organizada);Civil Guard (Guardia Civil); National Police (Policía Nacional)
  • The Netherlands: National Prosecutor’s Office (Landelijk Parket): National Police (Politie)
  • United States: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

The investigations and the action day itself have been supported by the @ON network with the use of funding granted by the ISF project nr. 101052683 ISF4@ON.

Polish Ambassador Czepelak is the new SG at the Permanent Court of Arbitration

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Polish Ambassador Czepelak is the new SG at the Permanent Court of Arbitration

The Hague Monday February 14 – The Ambassador of Poland to the Netherlands H.E. Prof. Marcin Czepelak, has been elected to a five-year term as the new Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague.

Ambassador Czepelak was elected in a secret ballot of the PCA’s Administrative Council, composed of diplomatic representatives of all 122 signatory states of the Hague conventions. He was been chosen over candidates nominated by the Netherlands and Mauritius. For the last 123 years the PCA’s Secretary General has always been of Dutch nationality. Diplomat Magazine wish Ambassador Czepelak wisdom and success in fulfilling this commitment.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration is the world’s oldest international tribunal, established by the Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, concluded at the Hague in 1899 and 1907, during the two Hague Peace Conferences. Its purpose is to facilitate arbitration and other forms of resolving disputes between states, private companies and international organizations. The Secretary-General directs the PCA’s International Office, which provides support for the Court, including legal and administrative assistance, during dispute resolution procedures.

ICC concludes the preliminary examination of the Situation in Bolivia

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ICC concludes the preliminary examination of the Situation in Bolivia

ICC Prosecutor, Mr Karim A. A. Khan QC, concludes the preliminary examination of the Situation in Bolivia and determines that an investigation is not warranted

Today, I wish to announce the completion of the preliminary examination into the Situation in the Plurinational State of Bolivia (“Bolivia”). After a thorough and independent assessment of the information available to my Office, I have determined that the criteria set out in the Rome Statute for opening an investigation have not been met.

The Situation in Bolivia was referred to my Office by the Government of Bolivia on 4 September 2020. In the Referral, it was alleged that during the course of nationwide road blockades held for several days in August 2020, those involved in the blockades deliberately impeded the Bolivian population’s access to vital medical supplies and services. It is alleged that this caused the deaths of over 40 individuals in need of medical oxygen and/or access to hospital care due to Covid-19 and inflicted serious physical and/or mental harm on such persons as well as the rest of Bolivian population more generally. In the Referral, it is alleged that such conduct amounts to the crimes against humanity of murder under article 7(1)(a) and other inhumane acts under article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute. Moreover, it is alleged that the organisers and participants in the blockades – through their acts – deliberately targeted the Bolivian population with the purpose of inflicting death, intimidation and suffering in order to achieve their political demands.

Following the preliminary examination process, I have determined that there is not a reasonable basis to believe that alleged crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or the “Court”) have been committed. In particular, I have concluded that the alleged conduct does not satisfy the contextual elements for crimes against humanity. Namely,  the information available does not provide a  reasonable basis to believe that the alleged acts of the organisers and participants of the blockades – even if established – would amount to a campaign directed against the civilian population of Bolivia pursuant to or in furtherance of an organisational policy, as to qualify as an attack within the meaning and scope of article 7 of the Statute. Moreover, I have determined that the alleged acts attributed to the persons involved the blockades would not constitute any relevant offences under article 7(1) of the Statute.

In accordance with my mandate, my role is not to pass judgment on the political context in which the alleged incidents occurred, but to determine – through an independent, impartial and objective assessment – whether they constitute Rome Statute crimes. For the reasons set out in my detailed report, I have concluded they do not. This conclusion was reached as part of the legal filtering function of the preliminary examination process, and therefore should not be seen as taking a position on any of the events or dynamics concerning the alleged incidents or on the experience that the people of Bolivia had of those events.

My decision may be subjected to judicial review by  Pre-Trial Chamber I of the Court at the request of the referring State. It may also be reconsidered by my Office on the basis of new facts or information. The Office’s findings are also without prejudice to a State’s duty to provide any effective remedy that may be warranted under the circumstances to affected persons under national or international law more generally.

‘5000 Years of Beads’ on display in the Dutch National Museum of Antiquities

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‘5000 Years of Beads’ on display in the Dutch National Museum of Antiquities

New temporary exhibition in the galleries on ‘Archaeology of the Netherlands’

The Dutch National Museum of Antiquities (Rijksmuseum van Oudheden, RMO) in Leiden has brought together the finest beads from its collections in a new exhibition entitled ‘5000 Years of Beads’. Visitors can enjoy hundreds of colourful necklaces and beads, which give an impression of how beads were used over the centuries and what they symbolised. Most of these objects have been excavated in the Netherlands, although they come from all over the world, and are made of all kinds of material, ranging from wood to gold. ‘5000 Years of Beads’ will be on display until 7 May 2023. Ticket reservation via www.rmo.nl

‘5000 years of beads’ presents beads as items of fashion and expressions of culture, examining the questions of who wore what, when and why. The exhibition displays beads through the ages, from Prehistory until the 17th century. It includes beads from 5000 year-old megalithic tombs, strings of amber beads from the Iron Age, Roman melon beads, Merovingian grave goods, Medieval prayer beads and waste from Amsterdam’s large-scale bead production around 1600. Prominent in the exhibition are the Early Middle Ages, with long strings full of beads of glass and precious stones, many of which were imported from the Middle East, Mediterranean or Scandinavia.

It has long been assumed that beads cannot be dated well, but new excavation techniques and technical analyses of their materials have made identification of their origins and age increasingly possible. Research has shown that beads were used to designate phases of life, family connections and social status. Being both valuable and easy to transport, beads were travellers and souvenirs in all periods. Beads reflect the world.

Most of the beads in the exhibition come from the museum stores. On display are beads from the Netherlands and other museum collections. The exhibition also features loans from the Amsterdam and Bois-le-Duc archaeological services and various private collections. Late medieval prayer beads are accompanied by a magnificent, illuminated manuscript with images of rosaries made of blood coral; a special loan by the University Library of the Free University of Amsterdam.

The beads are displayed according to themes, such as ‘Always and Everywhere’, ‘For Man and Animal’, ‘Piety and Prayer’ and ‘Eye beads and beady eyes’. Images of people wearing beads, including a statue of a Mesopotamian prince, provide additional context. Visitors will also encounter personal stories associated with contemporary strings of beads, such as a Tasbih and a ‘Bravery Cord’ (documenting juvenile cancer treatment), and can leave behind their own bead-related stories. Floor Kaspers’ fluid modern bead art connects the bead theme with the present day, with works such as her still growing ‘Covid Timeline’.

The exhibition is accompanied by the publication ‘5000 jaar kralen’, written by Mette Langbroek and Annemarieke Willemsen (in Dutch, €12.50, ISBN 978-90-71201-48-6, 88 pages), which has been partly financed by the Sigrid van Roodefonds for publications on archaeological jewellery, the Stichting N. van Ballegooijen Fonds and the Stichting Het Nederlands Gebruiksvoorwerp.

Human Rights at the Sharm El-Sheikh Youth Forum

Diplomat Magazine
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Human Rights at the Sharm El-Sheikh Youth Forum

A group of young people from all over the world participating in the World Peace Forum in Sharm El-Sheikh, the City of Peace, modelled the activities of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in the presence of President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi.

Young people of many different nationalities participated in the simulation model, which aimed to help participants make recommendations to WYF.

This year, 115 youth participated in the simulation to represent 47 UNHRC member states, in addition to eight observer countries on the council, as well as 15 participants represented by NGOs and five participants represented by national councils. In addition, the President High Commissioner of the UNHCR attended the meeting.

The President of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees inaugurated the event, explaining the title and purpose of the meeting. He also named the participating countries. The High Commissioner then gave a speech explaining the role of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in safeguarding basic human rights during the coronavirus pandemic.

4th Youth World Forum, Sharm El-Sheikh.

Then the heads of the council, the Member States and the observers gave speeches. Finally, non-governmental organizations and national councils spoke at the end of the meeting.

The WYF administration took all possible steps to simulate the setting as the UNHRC headquarters in Geneva. In addition, preparatory workshops were held to train participants over two days on anything related to the Council and its rules of procedure. They were instructed on the proper way for the representatives of the states to write a speech and to respect the time allotted to them by the moderator of the session. Participants were also trained to write and vote on a draft resolution.

About the UNHRC

The UNHRC is an intergovernmental body affiliated with the United Nations. It aims to promote and protect human rights around the world, as well as to investigate allegations of human rights violations in the UN Member States. The Council also has the power to discuss all human rights issues throughout the year. It holds its meetings at the United Nations Office in Geneva.

It is worth noting that the International Council on Human Rights, at its 41st session, adopted the first UN resolution highlighting the contributions of the first and second editions of the WYF and where the WYF is considered an international forum for discussing global issues from its perspective.

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