Ukrainian crisis –Meanings, Consequences, Outcome

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Ukrainian crisis –Meanings, Consequences, Outcome

By Covadonga Romero

Three months have now passed since the Russian ‘special operation in’ or ‘invasion of’ (depends which sources you are citing) of Ukraine began. As the international community strives to understand this ‘denazification and demilitarization’ event, its causes and consequences, much has been said about war’s potential to fundamentally change the world order—and about the way it illustrates already ongoing shifts. Yet, every aspect of the global balance of power, security architecture, and geopolitical dynamics is challenged by the conflict.

On May 20, the Habibie Center addressed this topical issue through its Public Lecture Series. In an event titled ‘The Ukraine Crisis and its Implications for the Global Political Chessboard’, the Jakarta-based think tank hosted Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic (Vienna, Geneva, universities of ) for a discussion on the war’s repercussions, both globally, as well as for the Asian continent and its Southeastern theatre.

Prof. Bajrektarevic framed his thorough analysis of the conflict by alluding to the usual pattern of “critical insight formation” around an international crisis. The ‘problem’ and its ‘solution’ are presented as two halves to a whole picture; the latter depends on the lens through which the former is viewed. Within this picture, the lights and shadows consist of the ‘costs’ associated with the problem, and their ‘cost distribution’. The multi-dimensional nature of Russia’s war in Ukraine can be understood through this framework. Depending on where the problem’s centre of gravity is located—the rise of new threats in a multipolar order, the global energy crisis, the deterioration of European security structures—different costs can be identified for various stakeholders.

Clearing points at the entrée, professor stated: “the way we formulate the problem will inevitably determine our answer/s and lead the course of our action”. Hence, “today I will concentrate only on setting the questions we must ask to answer what this crisis is about”, explained professor before getting into a 40-minute questions elaboration.

The first key point that was touched upon was the set of historical drivers that shape Russia’s foreign policy today, and along with it, the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Among these are the competing universalisms of East and West, insofar as these can be viewed as “not Venus and Mars, but rather two Martian worlds.” The beginning of this is marked by the great schism of the 11th century, with the split between the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches in 1054; from this arises the opportunistic use of religion and its different interpretations for ideological purposes, and the struggle between the dominant centre of religious interpretation and its peripheries or challengers. The events of the Age of Discovery—which saw the projection of European civilisation through political, military, and demographic expansion—reflect this, as exclusivity or dominance over religious interpretation was instrumentalised to justify imperialism.

Another historical factor is Russia’s prolonged perception of Europe as an existential threat. Although this is epitomised by the German-led Operation Barbarossa of 1941—which targeted Ukraine as an important economic territory—previous episodes, such as the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War of 1853-1856, European interventionism during the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917-1923, or the humiliation of the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1921, have also had a lasting impression on Russia’s historical memory. On this point, Prof. Bajrektarevic makes note of the symbolic parallels between the Napoleonic and Axis coalitions that have threatened Russia; these are strikingly similar in size and shape, both between themselves and to the European Union, a third ‘coalition’ that governs today’s continental Europe. Finally, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the fragmentation of Eastern Europe is mentioned, as yet another driver of Russia’s contemporary threat perception.

Against this backdrop, Prof. Bajrektarevic gives an overview of the various aspects—politico-military, legal, economic, and ideological—of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war that are worth considering, in terms of the conflict’s global impact. In the politico-military realm, four key ideas stand out. One is the astonishing deficit of the so-called ‘collective’ West in its response, which is limited by the lack of communications with Russia, and therefore a lack of critical insight about Russian intentions and capabilities. This has led to a shortage of sober analysis on the matter, which manifests as a “dangerous security experiment,” whereby the antagonisation of Russia, supported by “state adventurism,” contributes to conflict escalation. Linked to this is an essential question: who are the conflict’s protagonists? Is this a war between Russia and Ukraine, or between the Russian Federation and NATO on Ukrainian soil?

The peculiar nature of military actions in Ukraine adds to the complexity that the country already experiences. A key aspect of this is its political history, from Kiev Russia, to a prosperous period under the Russian Empire, to a Soviet Republic. Furthermore, the way in which current military activity varies across different segments of Ukrainian territory is associated with the country’s demographic makeup. Before February 2022, Ukraine’s ethnic, linguistic, and religious composite was already reflective of various internal struggles, which have only been exacerbated by the conflict. In recent years, these have included an alarming Gini index and HDI score, as a result of depopulation, deindustrialisation, and the dismal state of civil rights in the post-Maidan Ukraine; now, the surge in internally-displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees will precipitate an irreversible change in Ukraine’s ethnic composition and socioeconomic development. Lastly, the landslide victory of President Zelensky, winning over 70% of the electoral vote in 2019, reflects the buildup of a certain political zeitgeist within Ukrainian society since 2014; among Zelensky’s main electoral promises was the peaceful reintegration of the contested Donbas region under the existing machinery of the Minsk talks.

Regarding these politico-military aspects of the Ukraine crisis, Prof. Bajrektarevic points out  the role of the media as an “accelerator of destruction.” Making reference to Herman and Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent, Bajrektarevic underlines the use of fear as a currency of control, and the widespread personalisation of the conflict through a sensationalist “Putin-versus-Zelensky” vision. This comes as a result of broader trends, such as the “long history of censorship in liberal democracies,” and the more recent phenomenon of complete desensitisation to misery by the numbers, epitomised by press coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic. The consequences of the media’s approach to Ukraine as an international crisis are far-reaching, with powerful and shockingly-different narratives being built around the conflict. An example is the issue of foreign aid for Ukraine, where a combination of widespread coverage and lack of transparency has led to a number of questions on the donors and receivers; on the quality and configuration of aid, particularly military aid; and on the potential threat of diverted stockpiles ending up in the black market.

On another note, there are several legal aspects to consider in order to understand the conflict’s evolution and implications. To begin with, the indivisibility of collective security from the very spirit of the UN Charter is presented as a potential issue. In this sense, the negotiations held in Geneva, between the US and Russia reflected the need and acceptance of a détente policy, which soon after officialized in the Helsinki Accords of 1975, and consequently institutionalized by the OSCE’s formation (Budapest) – were listed by professor along with other key elements of the post-WWII security architecture. In regard to previous disarmament and security non-expansion guarantees that are challenged by this conflict, it is worth noting the Reagan-Gorbachev talks in the late 1980s; the vision of a “common European home, from Lisbon to Vladivostok,” now seems but a “lame dream.” The same is true for NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) of 1994, which now stands in contrast to the Alliance’s paradoxical role, having been created for defensive purposes but with thirty years of accumulated offensive history across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. NATO’s interventions, although manifesting in different formats, have all underscored a “continued dismissal of Russian security concerns.”

Furthermore, the issue of “neutrality,” or lack thereof, is a key element of this crisis. To begin with, there is the question of Ukrainian neutrality, pledged in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and abandoned in 2014 with Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. Much like Ukrainian neutrality was among Russia’s demands in negotiations over the Minsk agreements (particularly Minsk II), it is now a key condition for peace in the current context. On the other hand, recent developments such as Sweden and Finland’s NATO applications demonstrate how neutrality is more of a fluid concept than a legal guarantee.

The implications of this period of change for the non-proliferation regime are disturbing, since unpredictability is a strong force of counterbalance against the multiple international treaties on nuclear and biological weapons. Ukraine’s abandonment of neutrality has led to capacity building, training, and an increase in bio-lab activities; Zelensky’s presidential statement at the Munich Security Conference in February 2022 further emphasizes this intention. All in all, it can be said that the notion of collective security, which previously seemed to rest upon a legal system of “confidence-building measures for active peaceful coexistence,” is seeing unprecedented erosion, into a selective one.

The global economic consequences of the Russo-Ukrainian war are presented from the perspective of costs induced and costs paid. Bajrektarevic’s argument highlights “peripheral countries” as those who bear the burden, particularly regarding the sectors that are at stake in this conflict; these include crude oil, natural gas, and wheat, which respectively come first, third and fifth among the world’s most traded commodities. On the other hand, a sector that is seeing growth as a result of this crisis is the global military-industrial complex. The war has accelerated the dismantling of obsolete military weaponry on Ukrainian soil, which is now being replaced with Western military purchases, financed through loans, donations, and lend-and-lease arrangements; in January 2022, a month before Russia’s intervention even began, the United States had already negotiated lend-lease contracts with Ukraine, totaling $30 billion. However, it is to note that gains for the military-industrial complex inevitably come with losses for international security and overall stability.

Another economic aspect, which has received much of the spotlight throughout the past three months, is the West’s sanctions on Russia and its legality. At present, the sixth round of sanctions has been negotiated. The continuity of this process and the short intervals between rounds make it a credible assumption that, for at least the first four rounds, the timeline was planned and expected. Moreover, the strategy within these rounds, including an arbitrary confiscation of overseas deposits and properties, has clearly been geared towards having an impact on the reputation and credibility of sanctions’ originators. On the other hand, a notion that illustrates the global spillover effects of the war in Ukraine is that of secondary sanctions, aimed at those who associate with the Russian Federation or refuse to punish it. The way in which ‘friendly’ and ‘unfriendly’ labels have been put on countries—even traditionally neutral actors—depending on their responses to this conflict is reflective of an overall realignment of the world order; or, at the very least, of the fight for control over the way in which this order is interpreted, and will further evolve.

On the flipside of sanctions, other economic consequences can be found. One is the apparent shift towards de-dollarisation, and even a fragmentation of the global monetary system, so far defined by the ¥€$ (Yen-Euro-US Dollar) domination. The paradoxical resilience of the Russian economy, whose indicators are looking up in spite of sanctions, is a factor behind this; it is also exacerbated by the rise of the “petro-ruble,” along with Europe’s incoherence and panic around energy insecurity. The question of energy has led many countries linked to the Russian Federation’s resources to walk one of two paths: either decoupling and decarbonising, in line with the post-Paris Treaty environmental agenda, or leaning into “preferential prices for friendly countries.” It is largely for this reason -a long with the OPEC solidarity over quotas – that the Russian energy sector remains competitive on the global market, highlighting the important economic role played by third-party countries in this crisis; India stands out as a particular question mark. Beyond this, the overall disruption of global supply chains as a result of war in Ukraine is equally as catastrophic in other sectors; the shortage of wheat exports, in which Ukraine is the main provider for at least 26 countries, has heavily disrupted the global food supply. History shows that a food crisis is not only catastrophic in terms of human security and development, but also as a driver of social unrest and conflict.

The last key theme touched upon by Prof. Bajrektarevic is the conflict’s ideological dimension. The unprecedented nature of a full-scale, traditional war in the European continent as of 2022, and its disruption of the Pax Europaea period that began in 1945, has given rise to a number of reflections and questions. Is it liberal to impose liberal values on illiberal societies? Is the Westernisation of Eastern Europe possible without perpetuating anti-Russian rhetoric? Under this umbrella, several norms, values and key tenets of the Western-led neoliberal institutionalist system—collective security, responsibility to protect (R2P), regime change—are challenged. In trying to make sense of this new reality, Prof. Bajrektarevic makes reference to the “three brave ideas of the 20th century” and their interpretation of territorial competition. First came the egalitarian, non-territorial dogma of the Bolshevik revolution; then, the radicalisation of the material and revival of imperialism through various Fascisms, as well as Nazism; lastly, the ultimate triumph of the non-material and non-territorial idea, through glasnost and Perestroika, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union marking a significant departure from the traditional international conduct.

With the transition into the 21st century, the emergence of “transhumanism” as an alternative (post) capitalistic ideological model where “humans [are seen ] without spiritual dimension, reduced on bio-hackable animal/Bionicle connected to a global IoT network for control and commercial end” gains on ground. This, along with the diminished credibility of Clash of Civilization reasoning, opens a whole new set of questions. The implications of this war for new conflicts within ethno-religious lines span not only the post-1990s “intra-Slavic Guernica”; they also include the wider Islamic world, whereby a break between the Muslim ‘core’ (the MENA region) and the ‘peripheral’ non-Arab Muslim communities in Europe’s south, Caucasus, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. Overall, the question mark next to the promise of democracy suggests that the Russo-Ukrainian war may be the prelude to an inevitable recession, to the return of great power competition. This reflects how the ideological crisis triggered by the conflict is also one of global proportions.

Having laid out all the relevant aspects explored in this lecture, some key takeaways remain. Regarding the potential future outcomes, Prof. Bajrektarevic illustrates the struggle between the ideas of “global realignment” and “decoupling.” Alluding to historical precedent, such as the contrast between the statesmanship of Metternich’s Concert of Europe and the short-sightedness of the Versailles Conference, he argues for the existence of various possibilities—ranging from the total destruction of Ukraine and nuclear war, to sincere peace talks. Finally, following “global repercussions” as the thread that runs throughout his argument, Bajrektarevic’s closing remarks are relevant to Asia-Pacific, and particularly to the Republic of Indonesia, where the Habibie Center is based. Likely outcomes of the conflict’s ripple effect are an overall momentum of destabilization reaching the region at large, thus leading to a reform of the triangular RIC (Russia-India-China) model in continental Asia, and a recession of multilateralism (including ASEAN) in Southeast Asia. Considering the role of Indonesia within this compact, and recalling the previous reflections on loss of neutrality, Prof. Bajrektarevic makes a key recommendation—where Indonesia, ASEAN and Asia must take a side, the side to pick is that of international law, and accelerated multilateralism including the spirt of Non-Aliened movement.

About the author:

Covadonga Romero – International Relations specialist (Madrid-based IE University, Spain) with a concentration on Peace, Conflict and Security. Foreign policy analyst and writer at RAIA Group.

Life in the time of mania

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Life in the time of mania

By John Dunkelgrün

Every now and then societies succumb to a collective madness, often accompanied by a general suspension of disbelief. “Witches” were tortured, burnt at the stake, or killed in mind-numbing trials by water or fire. Tulips became a mania in Holland in the 17th century and the South Sea Company in Britain in the 18th.

In the 20th century, the worst madness that ever took hold of a country was National Socialism with the adoration of Adolf Hitler. Then came the anti-communist witch hunt in America that only ended when Joseph Welch challenged Senator Joe McCarthy with a loud “Have you no sense of decency?”. It was followed by murderous manias in Africa and Cambodia. Then the British fell for the lies of power-hungry politicians – aided by Russian propaganda – to leave the European Union, which is the greatest advance in security and prosperity the continent has ever seen. “Take back control!” became their rallying cry without specifying what control would be taken back.

Then came the unraveling of the morals of the Republican Party, whose guiding light now seems to be “Right or wrong, my Party.” It became s shoo-in for Donald Trump whose lies of a ‘stolen election’ and discrediting of anything he doesn’t like are swallowed by millions with religious fervor.

Mass killings in the United States have exploded because of the ubiquitous availability of very dangerous weapons. Kids not old enough to buy alcohol legitimately can buy military weapons not usable for anything else but the killing lots of people quickly. There is ample evidence that restricting the availability of firearms in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada resulted in dramatic drops in deaths by shooting. Ted Cruz knows it, Greg Abbott knows it, and Ron de Santis knows it. The entire leadership of the NRA knows it. But fear of a boycott by voters crazed by gun mania or of losing profits by even the slightest forms of gun control, keeps them spouting lies like a fire engine spouts water. Together they are responsible for tens of thousands of deaths every single year, about the same number of deaths per year as the entire Vietnam war, most probably of more than all of Putin’s war in Ukraine.

What will finally break this deadly mania? When will politicians and gun paddlers be confronted with their “Have you no sense of decency?” Senator Chris Murphy’s brave “What are we doing?” speech, passionate as it was, should have done it, but unfortunately did not. For now, greed and FOLVES, the fear of losing votes, continue to muzzle the voices of conscience.

War between Russia and Ukraine: Analyzing Information and International Relations

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War between Russia and Ukraine: Analyzing Information and International Relations

Interview with Professor Maria Repnikova

In this exclusive interview, Professor Maria Repnikova (Georgia State University, United States) addresses Russia’s War in Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022. She highlights the role of information and the field of international relations. This expert focuses specifically on various aspects linked to the aforementioned military conflict, such as propaganda, psychological warfare, the communication skills of the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine, respectively Putin and Zelenskyy, and U.S. support of Ukraine. Repnikova also provides a few considerations regarding World War II and Russia’s military cooperation with China, India and Iran.

On February 24, 2022, Russia began what it calls a special military operation in Ukraine, but which other countries generally regard as a war. In this piece, in the form of an interview, Professor Maria Repnikova examines said military conflict, while stressing the relevance of information and various aspects in the sphere of international relations.

Information and Media

Though the hybridization of war already existed prior to 2022, according to Maria Repnikova this conflict between Russia and Ukraine entails the added importance of information. In this regard, Repnikova highlights sharp power. According to this academic, the restrictions on independent journalism that has been taking place in Russia, in the last 20 years, have been heightened with this war. Maria Repnikova points out the closure of websites of several independent media, as they were accused of being foreign agents. This analyst remarks that, despite Russia’s attempts to censor or limit social media, Telegram still remains quite open and accessible, unlike in China, with Weibo (the Chinese version of Twitter), which is highly censored. Repnikova underscores that Russian President Vladimir Putin needs Telegram to operate, in order to engage in propaganda. She feels that, in Russia, some news outlets, such as Meduza, can still be accessed and are broadly used, without causing major disruptions, that is, without entailing a great deal of domestic opposition to Putin’s decisions.

Game theory applies to international relations and to war. Recently, in April 2022, Russia tested a new nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile, which that nation disclosed through the media. This disclosure, according to Maria Repnikova, needs to be viewed in light of information warfare, with the aim of deterring countries from direct intervention against Russia, through military involvement in Ukraine. From the standpoint of the interviewee, as concerns nuclear weapons, there is a certain unpredictability with regard to Putin’s decision. 

Repnikova states that the conflict under analysis comprises an aspect of psychological warfare, involving manipulation of emotions. This scholar points out Russia’s domestic psychological warfare, by citing, as an example, the accusation of treason and anti-patriotism toward Russians who are against the war. To Maria Repnikova, criminalizing opposition to the war is a way of limiting protests. She considers that leading people to be fearful of opposing the Kremlin’s decisions is part of psychological warfare.

Storytelling is a keyword in various contexts of communication such as propaganda. From Repnikova’s standpoint, a clash of narratives takes place via domestic and international media: on the one hand, Russia disseminates its greatness and, using arguments presented as historical, including from the Soviet era, seeks to convince recipients that the existence of an independent Ukraine makes no sense; on the other hand, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy uses his considerable communication skills to send messages to various parts of the world, regarding his country’s independence, strength, resistance and resilience. 

Leadership is related to communication skills. This war between Russia and Ukraine comprises two main players: Putin and Zelenskyy. They have distinct verbal and nonverbal communication styles. According to the interviewee, Zelenskyy’s communication skills, in some regards, include his ability to adapt the message to multiple target audiences, as well as to interact with different people, such as the presidents of several countries and French students.

Maria Repnikova characterizes Zelenskyy as someone attractive who communicates spontaneously, who generates emotions and who appears informally dressed among civil and military Ukrainians. She underlines the differences in relation to the President of Ukraine by describing Putin as someone living in an immense golden palace and who celebrates Easter with a very formal and very removed appearance. From an iconic standpoint, Repnikova highlights the long table used during Putin’s official meetings with foreign leaders. She believes that, while Putin’s discourses are well thought out, they are quite formal. 

Recently, Ukraine and some Western nations boycotted a few Russian media, such as RT and Sputnik. Russia, for its part, banned certain Western media, such as BBC and Voice of America. Currently, countries that are against Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine speak of Russia’s propaganda machine. In this regard, Maria Repnikova considers that, in comparative terms, in the so-called Western world, there are some media in the public sector that convey narratives of the State that created and sustains them.

This, according to Repnikova, occurs, for instance, with the U.S.’s Voice of America, which is linked to the State Department and comprises a diplomatic purpose. This analyst adds that, in the private sector, in general, though commercial media do not suffer greatly from state meddling, they can be influenced by their advertisers, investors and audiences, without constituting propaganda. Even if it is acknowledged that certain Western media serve propaganda-related purposes, Maria Repnikova feels that, comparatively, this still occurs more in state-controlled media environments in countries such as Russia and China.
 

As concerns war journalism, Repnikova does not overlook the debate calling journalists’ objectivity into question, when there is an emotional involvement with one of the parties at issue or when journalists provide coverage on their own country. She thinks that journalists need to diversify their sources and carefully confirm the information they obtain.
Also within the field of journalism, Maria Repnikova states that, to the Ukrainian government, it’s very important to be able to influence the news agenda of Western mainstream media, by raising their audiences’ awareness, in order to garner military and economic support. This academic feels that the public’s interest in the Russia-Ukraine War could wane over time, due to a certain trivilialization of the conflict and the emergence of new national and international news items with high media impact. This, in Repnikova’s opinion, would benefit Russia.


Evoking World War II

Within the context of the war under analysis, Russian troops displayed the flag of the Soviet Union on Ukrainian soil. To the interviewee, displaying said symbol in Ukraine means restoring Russia’s glorious past under the Soviet empire. Maria Repnikova underpins another relevant symbol: Russian troops recaptured a World War II memorial in Ukraine, while stating that, from that point onward, Ukrainians could celebrate the end of that historical event.

This academic considers that the legacy and echoes of World War II are highly important for Russia’s defense policy as well as for the domestic legitimacy of the Putin regime. The way Repnikova sees it, annual commemorations in Russia marking the Soviet victory in World War II serve to put current Russian power on display: military parades showing sophisticated weaponry help bring the government closer to the people while exalting patriotism. According to Maria Repnikova, the Kremlin somehow presents the current military conflict in Ukraine as Russia’s continuing the Soviet Union’s  World War II-era glory.


Russia’s relations with China, India and Iran

Repnikova has no doubts that China is carefully monitoring ongoing events in Ukraine, while seeking to gauge how the West would react to Chinese military intervention in Taiwan. She thinks that, for now, China at least is cautious in facing a future where the war in Ukraine would make the West stronger and more united, while weakening Russia and leaving China a little more isolated. However, Repnikova maintains that the advantages and drawbacks have yet to be cleared up, even though there are those who feel that China can derive economic benefits from this conflict. In the opinion of this scholar, China wishes to remain on good terms with the West, in order to achieve domestic legitimacy and not have to deal with other problems, on top of those that are domestically worrisome, such as COVID-19.

Maria Repnikova underscores that China’s official position in relation to Russia’s war in Ukraine is that of neutrality, standing in favor of peace. This analyst points out that, in English-language Chinese state media, such as the Xinhua news agency, calls have been made for negotiations between the warring parties, at times referring to China as a mediator of the conflict.
Generally speaking, there are simulations, deceptions and surprises within the context of war. In relation to this armed conflit in Ukraine, could Russia, on top of its military strengths, still end up having a few political and diplomatic assets, in terms of garnering some international backing, considering its influence, for instance, in Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia and the Middle East? To this end, Repnikova states that it’s still a bit too early to actually determine the extent of Russia’s victories.

This academic adds that, to date, it seems, at least, that Russia is not losing in the Global South, to the extent that some of these countries have yet to speak out against Russia, thus maintaining a certain neutrality. Still, according to Repnikova, it remains to be seen whether African governments will blame Russia or NATO for certain outcomes of the war, such as food shortages, including cereal, and economic problems, which are currently being felt in their countries and which could worsen as the conflict continues. In this scholar’s understanding, it’s important to know whether Russia has something more to offer African countries besides arms and narratives.

The 12th Edition of Indo-Russia joint military Exercise INDRA 2021 was held in August 2021, in Volgograd, Russia. In September 2021, with the Armed Forces of Russia and of other countries, India also took part in the Zapad-21 military exercise, conducted on Russian and Belarusian soil. In the opinion of the interviewee, Western media need to be more attentive to relations between said countries. Repnikova stresses that, worldwide, India is one of the biggest importers of Russian arms. From her standpoint, Russia seeks to strengthen its involvement with India, in order not to rely too heavily on China. This situation is characterized by Repnikova as being complex, given that there are some tensions between India and China. This occurs, for example, on the border between the two countries.

Also in the domain of international cooperation, in January 2022, the Navies of Russia, Iran and China conducted joint military exercises in the Indian Ocean. This, from Repnikova’s perspective, is of symbolic value, to show unity vis-à-vis the West’s military might. However, this analyst doubts that said countries currently have a military alliance whereby they are willing to jointly face enemies. In this regard, Maria Repnikova acknowledges that the future could bring surprises.


The U.S.’s backing of Ukraine

The interviewee feels that the U.S. Administration has dealt with this war between Russia and Ukraine in the best possible way, to avoid a direct military showdown with Russia that the American people don’t want and that Congress would approve only in the event of a certain escalation in the conflict. To Repnikova, not overstepping the fine line between American backing of Ukraine and its direct involvement against Russian troops is a huge challenge. Among several aspects, this scholar underscores the support given by the U.S. in terms of sharing intelligence, to enable the U.S. to anticipate the moves made by the Russian Armed Forces. Maria Repnikova thinks that the United States, together with its Western allies, have greatly helped Ukraine, in military and economic terms, as well as in the field of information, thereby mobilizing public opinion.
 

New world order

Repnikova considers that it’s too early to present the characteristics of a definitive new world order, before the end of the war between Russia and Ukraine. Still, this scholar maintains that we will likely see greater unity between the U.S. and Western Europe, greater integration of China in the Global South, distancing itself from the West, as is somehow the case right now, along with the weakening economic power of an anti-Western country: Russia.


Conclusion

These days, the hybridization of war amounts to a certain complexity, according to increasingly diversified domains involved in a military conflict. In 2022, the war between Russia and Ukraine is proof of the importance of information regarding civilians and troops, with its psychological aspect and by applying war game theory, in both the domestic and international spheres. To the various warring parties, it becomes relevant to influence perceptions, emotions and public opinion, through the media, increasingly including social media. In Russia, despite attempts at media control, the Kremlin allows Telegram to keep running, to the extent it also serves to disseminate Russian propaganda. For Ukraine, while it’s pivotal to keep this war at the top of the news media agendas, this could be more difficult as the conflict drags on and other high-interest topics emerge in the media.


Warranting particular attention, as part of information warfare, is the ability of the two leading players, Putin and Zelenskyy, to wield influence on domestic and international audiences by using the media and different verbal and nonverbal communication styles. As for characterizing both presidents, Zelenskyy can be regarded as a skillful communicator, while Putin is shown to be unpredictable. Within a military context, this unpredictability is viewed as a positive side of Putin, to the extent the enemy is left wondering about the other party’s decisions and actions.


The impact of symbols in a war is visible, for instance, when we see that the Soviet flag was displayed in Ukraine by Russian troops in 2022. This, while keeping alive the memory of Russia’s glorious past, within the Soviet sphere, is also somehow linked to evoking World War II. This is somehow shown by Russia to justify the current military clashes, as concerns one of its political and ideological goals: denazification of Ukraine. In the present, History could serve to motivate civilians and troops. 


It’s still unclear whether the Russia-Ukraine war is beneficial or harmful for the Chinese economy. In the international context, China has been publicly in favor of peace and willing to mediate the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Certainly, there are those in Beijing who look at the West’s reactions to what is currently happening on Ukrainian soil, in order to draw conclusions as to the possible outcomes of Chinese military intervention in Taiwan. 


Also in the field of international relations, while Russia conducted military maneuvers with China, India and Iran in 2021 and 2022, this doesn’t mean that said countries have a military alliance in place or that they will actually engage in joint combat. This situation needs to be duly monitored, since the future could bring changes.


It’s expedient to point out that, to date, some Global South countries have remained neutral with regard to the Russia-Ukraine war. However, said neutrality can be shaken by economic problems and food shortages, in Africa, due to the continuing military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In life in general as well as in war, (short-, medium- or long-term) time management is crucial.


The U.S.’s military backing of Ukraine, together with its allies, namely, for instance, arms and intelligence, requires careful consideration, so as not to transition to direct confrontation with Russia.
At the moment, though it’s unwise to make definitive considerations, with regard to a new world order stemming from the war under analysis, it’s now possible to uncover  a few situations: greater unity between the U.S. and Western Europe, China’s growing investment in the Global South and Russia’s greater antagonism toward the West.


References

– Georgia State University College of Arts & Sciences / Maria Repnikova. Retrieved  25.5.2022 from https://cas.gsu.edu/profile/maria-repnikova/ 

Interview

This interview was conducted, via Zoom, on May 19, 2022 Published by Marinho Media Analysis

http://www.marinho-mediaanalysis.org/articles/war-between-russia-and-ukraine-2022-analyzing-information-and-international-relations

This piece was also published on the following site:

International Affairs Forum – Center for International Relations (Washington D.C., United States of America) / June 1, 2022

https://www.ia-forum.org/Content/ViewInternal_Document.cfm?contenttype_id=5&ContentID=9366

About the authors:

Professor Maria Repnikova

Maria Repnikova is an expert in the following topics: Russia, China, global communication, political communication and media activism (Georgia State University College of Arts & Sciences / Maria Repnikova). 

Jorge Marinho

Jorge Marinho is a Research supervisor. PhD in Communication Sciences, BA in International Journalist

Júlio Ventura

Júlio Ventura – BA in Law, MA student in Political Science and International Relations at the Portuguese Catholic University (Lisbon, Portugal)

Guilherme Guimarães

Guilherme Guimarães – BA in Law, MA student in International Law at the Portuguese Catholic University (Porto, Portugal)

OPEC and International Law

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OPEC and International Law

By Eugene Matos and Adrian Zienkiewicz

OPEC is a leading international organization driving the prices of petroleum worldwide. Just like a blowout from an oil well, the price of black gold skyrocketed through the influence consolidated by OPEC to then find itself oscillating due to global changes in economic models, extraction processes, political mentalities and supply. Many countries experienced an energy crisis in 2021, and although there is greater diversity in primary energy production, a total transition away from oil is impractical, if not impossible, for the next few decades. That is where OPEC’s relative power shines through as its members’ proven crude oil reserves account for nearly 80% of global reserves as per OPEC’s 2018 reports. How is OPEC perceived through the scope of international law?

OPEC is often described as an intergovernmental cartel, since its thirteen independent members work together to maintain control over the market, all whilst increasing their revenue. What leads to this attribution is its fascinating decentralized nature, as all members retain their state sovereignty and policy is expressed through resolutions. These resolutions, which are analogous to treaties that operate on the basis of pacta sunt servanda, are passed unanimously under article 11 c) of the OPEC Statute, but there are no monitoring mechanisms for noncompliance.

Production policy is not articulated through these resolutions, further emphasizing the need for members to act in good faith and cooperate more efficiently with shifting supply and demand. As listed in article 9 of the OPEC Statute, OPEC’s governing bodies operate in voting policies and managing the organization. Although the Secretariat exists as a quasi-executive organ, its role also consists of preparing the Conferences represented by the members’ delegates. State sovereignty and autonomy principles are supreme, and understanding the organization’s existence through mutual self-serving economic interests means that there are no inherent or desired supranational qualities.

OPEC has never managed to develop its own court to settle disputes related to petroleum matters, and there is no solitary codified regulation, as all points are brought before the Conferences. OPEC can be characterized as a legal entity holding diplomatic and political advantages, as it benefits primarily from the principle of sovereign immunity, one that, according to article 6A of the OPEC Statute, is from every form of legal process unless “expressly waived”.

The meteoric rise on the global stage that OPEC experienced in the 1970s accompanied a fair share of lawsuits through antitrust arguments. This was seen especially in the U.S., where the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 contended with OPEC’s legal status, opening the doors to several legal actions and culminating with International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v OPEC. IAM was concerned with the high prices of petroleum during the latter half of the decade and possessed a personal interest as this would affect its profits. It was argued that price setting breached U.S. antitrust laws. The court ultimately sided with the defendant, since deciding on the legality of a sovereign act would have politically sensitive and unintended effects. On appeal, this decision was affirmed and even cited the act of state doctrine, which expresses the sovereignty of states and non interference, and arguments in favor of the Sherman Antitrust Act fell.

American citizens would have been able to successfully sue through State courts, and even though the “action of sovereign nations coming together to agree on how each will perform certain sovereign acts can only, itself, be a sovereign act”, this could have only increased in volume and possibly included situations of vexatious litigation. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California nevertheless settled in 1993 that violations to the Sherman Act can be used to make a sovereign entity liable if it intends to restrict trade. This has not yet been utilized against matters involving OPEC.

Besides, Illinois Brick Co. v Illinois decided that violations to antitrust laws can be remedied only to direct and not indirect actors of a particular sector. Direct suppliers of petroleum could theoretically proceed through litigation, but the complexity and intertwining nature of the sector makes it that OPEC isn’t challenged this way. OPEC adapts to market trends and establishes accommodating prices to the members’ and most of the supply chain’s advantage.

Prewitt v OPEC was another high profile U.S. case that elaborated antitrust breaches through the Clayton Act, referred to Austrian law (seeing how the seat of OPEC is in Vienna) and mentioned the federal International Organizations Immunities Act which OPEC is not designated by. No matter the difference in how the U.S. government officially perceives OPEC, the organization is heavily protected by international principles. United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 1803 (XVII) and 3281 (XXIX) point to the sovereign control over resources. OPEC is an organization of several independent, sovereign countries, and thus legal actions would not hinder their operations or exporting capacities. The organization is by all means a monopoly, but claims of significant predatory practices have not been satisfied.

The defense through the foreign sovereign compulsion principle, which posits that a defendant could have been compelled to breach antitrust laws, has rarely been used. Its use against OPEC has never been raised and would otherwise be irrelevant, as the only successful application was seen in Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo bearing specific circumstances. Successful legal action against OPEC in national jurisdictions would have to compete with international tenets.

In the U.S. again, the judicial path is narrow, and the violations and legal remedies available would have to be specific. Although the U.S. enjoyed greater levels of petroleum production throughout the 21st century, legislative proposals for expanding antitrust laws to target OPEC exist. “NOPEC”, an amusing pun to the organization, is an unenacted bill that was most recently debated in the House Judiciary Committee in 2021. With OPEC’s unique status, the recourse through international apparatuses is unclear and OPEC is not challenged.

About the authors:

Eugene Matos De Lara

(MA, MBA, LL.L, JD, LLB, BA.pol.pad, BA.dvm, BA.sc PMP) is an officer with the Canadian Armed Forces, currently working for the International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan studies, based in Ljubljana, and the Geneva Desk for Cooperation. Multilingual internationally published legal graduate with an extensive corporate legal background, and exposure to private international law, international relations, politics, public administration and public affairs.

Adrian Zienkiewicz

Co-Author Adrian Zienkiewicz

(LL.B., J.D.) is a law student at Université de Montréal and an officer in the Canadian Armed Forces. He has a marked interest for all spheres of public international law. Environmental and Energy Law are his real passions.

Trust Fund for Victims: Making reparative justice a meaningful reality for victims

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Trust Fund for Victims: Making reparative justice a meaningful reality for victims

By Ms. Minou Tavárez Mirabal, TFV Board Chair

It is impossible to fully undo the harm caused by the most serious human rights violations in the world – crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes and crimes of aggression. However, it is possible to recognise victim survivors for the harm or damage they suffered and to redress them. It is possible to make their right to reparations a reality.

The international community made a commitment to justice for victims of these most serious crimes by adopting the Rome Statute in 1998. The Statute created the International Criminal Court (ICC) for prosecuting those responsible for these crimes and provided for a Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) of the crimes under the Rome Statute and for their families, to make the funds of the convicted persons and additional voluntary contributions available for the benefit of the victims. The TFV implements awards of reparations ordered by the ICC against the convicted person, and provides assistance to victims in ICC situation countries.

While the TFV Secretariat is funded by regular assessed contributions by States Parties, the reparations and assistance programmes have been funded through voluntary contributions from States Parties to the Rome Statute and private donations, as all to date convicted persons were held not to have the funds to pay for reparations themselves. A very limited source of funds to date have been fines imposed as a penalty in the Bemba et al. case on persons convicted for having committed offences against the administration of justice.

Minou Tavárez Mirabal

Governance

The TFV, established by the Rome Statute, is led by a Board of Directors, elected and accountable directly to the Assembly of States Parties (ASP).

The Board of Directors represents each of the five regional groups. On 6 December 2021, the seventh Board of Directors of the TFV was elected for a three-year term (2021 – 2024) (LINK), and so the Board is composed of Ibrahim Sorie Yillah (Sierra Leone), representing the African States, Sheikh Mohammed Belal (Bangladesh), representing the Asia-Pacific States, Andrés Parmas (Estonia), representing the Eastern European States, Kevin Kelly (Ireland), representing the Western European and other States and myself (Dominican Republic), representing the Latin American and Caribbean States.

As per the relevant ASP Regulations (ICC-ASP/4/Res.3), the TFV, through its Board, is mandated to fundraise for its activities, decide on the use of funds, implement reparation awards ordered by the Court, conduct outreach, consult with victims, experts. For its proper functioning, the Board of Directors is assisted by a Secretariat that carries out the day-to-day activities of the TFV relevant to fundraising, fund management and all implementation-related activities.

The Secretariat operates under the full authority of the Board of Directors, is headed by an Executive Director and currently consists of about 25 staff members. For administrative purposes, the Secretariat and its staff are attached to the Registry of the Court. The TFV operates in The Hague and in ICC situation countries with staff members at currently five ICC Country Offices. The TFV collaborates with numerous sections within the ICC in the delivery of its activities. 

Minou Tavárez Mirabal

Strengthening the Board and the Secretariat of the TFV

The Board is conducting an ambitious program of work to address the challenges faced by expanding reparations and assistance programs, as well as ensuring transparency and accountability to States Parties, the Fund’s donors and, most importantly, to victims of crimes so that their human rights are not violated again.

Accordingly, instead of the mandated annual meeting, the Board is meeting every month remotely to drive strategic planning, institutional development and provide direction to the activities of the Secretariat. The Board will prioritize fundraising and convening increased political support to the essential work of the Trust Fund.

Also in 2022, the Board has, in agreement with the current Executive Director, initiated a transition in the Secretariat of the TFV, with the position of Executive Director becoming open for recruitment. The Executive Director Pieter de Baan, who has been in office since 2010, has led the set up of the TFV, several cycles of assistance programmes in Uganda and DRC and the programmes described below. This important transition will bring new opportunities to further develop the TFV.

Reparative Justice for victim survivors

Reparations are ordered by the ICC and implemented by the TFV (Article 75.2 of the Rome Statute) following a judicial process and are directly related to the criminal responsibility of a convicted person established by the ICC. The ICC has issued four reparation orders in the Lubanga, Katanga, Al Mahdi, and Ntaganda cases. A fifth reparation order is expected in the Ongwen case later this year.

In the Katanga case, the TFV complemented the awards for individual reparations for 297 victims of the case in 2017 and 2018, with the voluntary contribution of the Netherlands.  Implementation of the collective awards for education support and income-generating activities ended  in early 2022. The last collective awards relevant to psychological rehabilitation and housing assistance will be completed in 2022.

In the Lubanga case, the TFV has launched the reparation programme with a consortium to implement the collective service based awards for the benefit of the more than 2,000 former child soldiers and their families. In 2021, a five-year programme started that requires additional funding of about EUR 4.5 Million. In 2022, the TFV has started the implementation of the symbolic award intended to build multi-functional spaces to be used for peacebuilding and culture activities among the community members.

In the Al Mahdi case, the reparation programme started with the payment of individual compensation awards as of January 2021 and nearly 800 individuals have received the award to date. In March 2021, the TFV in collaboration with the Presidency of Mali, hosted a high level ceremony in Bamako, with the participation of the ICC Prosecutor, to award a symbolic euro to the government of Mali, in relation to moral harm suffered by the Malian population, and to UNESCO, in relation to moral harm suffered by the international community for the destruction of the world heritage sites in Timbuktu.

In the Ntaganda case, the TFV started in 2022 to provide a limited number of priority victims in urgent need with initial reparation measures through its existing partners in Ituri Province, DRC.

In addition to implementing reparation awards ordered by the ICC, since 2008 the TFV has provided support in the form of administrative, non-judicial reparations to individuals who have suffered harm from crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC. Victims receive medical treatment, trauma counselling as well as socio-economic support. Through its implementing partners, the TFV also establishes community dialogues and conducts peacebuilding activities. 

Currently, the TFV is implementing such assistance programmes in the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda. The TFV will launch in 2022 new programmes in Georgia, in Mali and in Kenya.

Minou Tavárez Mirabal

Call for action for victim and survivors of atrocity crimes

Hundreds of thousands of individuals have suffered from armed conflict. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing conflict exacerbates pre-existing conditions of their physical and mental wellbeing. Victims and survivors of atrocity crimes have the right to receive reparations for the harm they have suffered.

Thanks to the support received from the TFV’s donors and implementing partner organisations, more than 1,600 individual beneficiaries to date received a variety of reparation measures, and the population of Mali and the international community received symbolic reparations for the destruction of world heritage sites in Timbuktu.  In addition, the Trust Fund has provided to tens of thousands of victims in the DRC and northern Uganda since 2008, and more recently in the Central African Republic and Côte d’Ivoire as part of its non-judicial mandate (assistance programmes). In 2021 alone, the Trust Fund provided reparative measures to more than 17,000 direct beneficiaries across those programmes. 

Additional funds are needed to allow the Trust Fund to treat victims in one case and one situation country equally and provide them all with a similar kind of reparations. Continuity is essential to ensuring a lasting effect of reparations and to avoiding re-traumatization of victims.

The TFV therefore calls for support politically, morally, and financially from governments, individuals, academics and private sector, to amplify the voices of victims and survivors at the centre of the Rome Statute system, to ensure their rights to receive reparations can be realised.

For more information about the Trust Fund for Victims, please contact: trustfundforvictims@icc-cpi.int or visit: www.trustfundforvictims.org

TFV donor countries:

Andorra, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,  Luxembourg, Mali, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines (before withdrawal from the ICC), Poland, Portugal, Republic of Congo, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, and Uruguay.

TFV implementing partner organisations:

Association des Femmes Juriste de Centrafrique (AFJC), Comité Inter Africain pour les Femmes de Centrafrique (CIAF), DanChurchAid (DCA), Mukwege Foundation, Medicins d’Afrique Centrafrique, AVSI Foundation, Développement Rural à l’Ouest – La Lutte Contre le Faim (DRAO-LCF), West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP-CI), Association des Mamans Anti-Bwaki (AMAB), Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI), Sociétés des Missionnaires d’Afrique (SMA), Solidarité pour la Promotion Sociale et la Paix (SOPROP), Appui aux Femmes Démunies et Enfants Marginalises (AFEDEM) -R.D. Congo, Médecins du Monde Belgique (MdM), World Relief, CIDEAL, CFOGRAD, UNESCO, AVSI Foundation, Centre for Children in Vulnerable Situations (CCVS), Center for Victims of Torture (CVT), Health Right International (HRI), Transcultural Psychological Organisation (TPO).

Minou Tavárez Mirabal

A world for everyone to live with dignity

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A world for everyone to live with dignity

On the occasion of the presentation of arguments for the “Status and use of the waters of the Silala” before the International Court of Justice in The Hague last April, the Foreign Minister of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Rogelio Mayta, spoke with Diplomat Magazine about People’s Diplomacy.

Minister Mayta explained that Bolivia seeks to consolidate its participation in the international agenda through the deployment, strengthening and visibility of People’s Diplomacy for life. This entails strengthening ties with countries of the world, within the framework of the proactive and purposeful role that has characterized Bolivia’s foreign policy since 2006.

“Bolivia proposes a world for everyone to live with dignity, where no one is marginalized and everyone feels included in a world tailored to all”, the Foreign Minister pointed out.

The global agenda and the current world crises demand responses with a strong component of interrelationship across countries. This world scenario presents countries with the challenge of establishing dialogue among blocs of States with expeditious decision-making procedures, while at the same time incorporating the interests of the peoples concerned, especially those most in need.

“Bolivia will continue to propose to the international community to strengthen and expand the rights of Mother Earth, the rights of indigenous peoples and nations, and the right to international peace,” Foreign Minister Mayta stressed.

The foreign policy of the Plurinational State of Bolivia is committed to establish good relations with the nations of the world based on respect for the self-determination of peoples, the sovereignty of States and non-interference in internal affairs. In the same way, it privileges the recognition of the principles of international law and promotes equal treatment of the States with which Bolivia interacts.

Leonardo’s Faces – Joshua Noordwijk

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Leonardo’s Faces – Joshua Noordwijk

The Leonardo Royal Hotel Den Haag Promenade is represented by both new and more experienced employees working together with passion as one team, to deliver great service and to depict the hotel’s values. In these monthly written pieces, there is a focus on their values and their approach to our international clients.

Who are the employees as an individual? Allow us to introduce you to introduce Joshua Noordwijk.

  • Nationality: Dutch & Surinamese
  • Function: Commercial Management Trainee     
  • Department: Booking Office

“I started working for the Promenade Hotel at the 22nd of January in 2018″ Said Joshua. “I started working at the Front Desk as a receptionist of the former Crowne Plaza Den Haag – Promenade. Originally, I was hired with the intention that I would become the Concierge of the hotel. However, due to a change of plans, this did not happen. Despite that, I continued working at the hotel during the past years, while I was doing my International Hospitality Management bachelors in Leeuwarden. Last February, I started my 10-month internship, for which I switched my Front Desk position to Commercial Management Trainee.

What was your first impression of the Promenade Hotel?

My first impression of the hotel was very good. I came back to the Netherlands after an internship in London, and I was looking for a new luxurious hotel to work for. I started looking for a suitable hotel in The Hague, and the Promenade Hotel immediately stood out for me. The appearance of the big lobby, the beautiful and convenient location and of course the extensive Promenade Healthclub & Spa make the hotel really impressive.

What makes the Promenade Hotel suitable for welcoming people from all around the world?

The hotel has such a rich international history and has welcomed many (famous) internationals already. The team is also very international, which also creates a welcoming atmosphere for international guests. Additionally, I believe that our new restaurant concept ‘LEO’S International Flavors’ makes the hotel even more suitable, as it really gives the guest the chance to choose dishes from all over the world.

What do you value most in the organization of diplomatic events at the Promenade Hotel?

What I value the most is to see how all departments work together to create the best possible event. From the Booking Office to Housekeeping, and from the Kitchen staff to the Front Desk; all departments play their part to achieve the same goal during these diplomatic events. It really creates a good atmosphere that guests also experience.

What did you learn so far by working with diplomats? Some tips, rules or values to share?

What I especially learned by working with different diplomats are the cultural differences between the different nationalities that visit the hotel. I always find it very interesting to see what habits and values are attached to certain cultures. Experiencing the various food festivals also contributes to this.

Which Food Festival has been your favorite so far or would you like to experience?

There have been many Food Festivals during the previous years. However, for some reason the Tunesian, Vietnamese, Italian and Peruvian Food Festival especially made a good impression to me. As far as I can remember, these were very successful editions. I would love to see a Surinamese Food Festival with all popular dishes from Suriname.

What local food(s), from abroad, have you tried already?

I have tried many different cuisines and food in my life. I am a big fan of the Italian cuisine since I love pizza and pasta, but I also love Mexican dishes like Fajitas or Enchiladas. Furthermore, I love Indian food like Butter Chicken and of course Surinamese Roti.

What is your favorite drink or dish at LEO’s International Flavors?

Since LEO’S International Flavors offers so many different dishes I still did not try all of them. However, I’m a big fan of the Japanese Beef Tataki. This has always been one of my favorite starters and I really like how they present it at LEO’S. In addition, I really love the South-Korean Sticky Chicken with noodles. My favorite drink on the menu would be the Carmenere Gran Reserva, which is a Chilean red wine.

What sustainable development goal do you value most? Why this one?

The sustainable development goal that I value the most is ‘Climate Action’. I think it is important that the world takes urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts. The world is warming up and the sea levels have risen a lot, the whole world experiences the effects of climate change. Therefore, I think it is important that the world takes action to minimalize the consequences of climate change.

What piece of good advice did you receive, and from whom, that you would like to forward?

One piece of advice that I follow for myself is to enjoy life every day. You never know if tomorrow may come so I think it is important to make the best out of every thing and enjoy the little things in life.

Anglo-American Axis Needs Common Market, not Common Alliance

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Anglo-American Axis Needs Common Market, not Common Alliance

By Chan Kung

With the eruption of the war in Ukraine, and considering the post-war situation, the alliance system in the West and its future should be something worthy of concern.

Anglo-American Axis is a concept that I proposed well before Brexit, and such an axis has already been fully formed today. With Brexit, the United Kingdom is now no longer part of the continental European alliance. It has instead re-aligned with the United States, and reverted to being a maritime nation that it used to be.

Such an axis would not be moved by the independence inclination of France, the wish of Germany to become the leader, nor the ambition of Turkey to be a regional hegemon. It cares even less about countries like Israel, Iran, and India. What the Anglo-American Axis focuses is to control the high ground of fundamental values, so that it can win the historic future as long as civilization continues to progress. Wars in other regions do not carry much significance to it. For NATO to play a role, it must negotiate conditions with the United States. It is not the Anglo-American Axis that needs NATO, but that NATO needs the Anglo-American Axis.

The United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, the former members of the Commonwealth, have formed the largest single market in the world, with a coordinated monetary policy for the U.S. dollar and British pound. Such a market can consider certain African and South American countries, as long as they remain stable, and this usually means some “friendly dictatorships with open economies”, similar to Chile in the past.

Civilization is a dynamic force. Although many have studied monetary issues and finance, they fail to link these with civilization. In fact, these are appendages of civilization, and they are products of it. Humanity will inevitably move towards civilization.

About the author:

Chan Kung

Chan Kung- Founder of ANBOUND Think Tank (established in 1993), Mr. Chan Kung is one of China’s renowned experts in information analysis. Most of his outstanding academic research activities are in economic information analysis, particularly in the area of public policy.

Water for Development and Cooperation

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Water for Development and Cooperation

By H.E. Mr. Chatri Archjananun, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Thailand to the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Thailand and The Netherlands share a common culture of constructing livelihoods throughout natural and man-made water canals. The Dutch have benefitted from vast canal systems which have enabled trade and commerce to enter the ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

Thais likewise have created klong systems or waterways as channels for transport and irrigation. Due to its large role in Thai culture and society, Thais traditionally host the Songkran Festival in celebration of the New Year which features a country-wide water festival. It is apparent that while water is an essential driver of both economies, it is also a constant dilemma to be managed.

The Royal Chaophraya Yhai Project

As they say there are “two sides to a coin,” both countries face the constant problem of how to keep flood waters at bay while retaining enough water for its essential uses. Historic nation-wide flooding has been the cause of a traumatic learning curve to both Dutch and Thai society. Thailand’s annual rainy season and heavy rainfall places immense pressure upon the country’s drainage system, natural reserves, and tropical terrain each year. As a major exporter of rice and products of agriculture, the country is heavily reliant on availability of water for irrigation and rice farming. Likewise, The Netherlands continues to manage rising sea-levels by advancing the nation’s countrywide dams which collectively pushes back the sea. The relationship which Thailand has shared with the Dutch has granted Thailand various opportunities to learn and adopt the methods founded by Dutch engineers. Just last year, former Dutch Ambassador H.E. Mr Kees Rade signed an MOU of Cooperation in Integrated Water Management with Thailand to continue the two countries´ joint efforts to share and discuss innovations in the water sector. IHE Delft also contributes to preservation projects in Ayutthaya province, which seeks to prevent flooding of heritage sites.

Thailand’s cooperation with The Netherlands in creating hydraulic systems dates back to 1903 when JH Homan van der Heide, a Dutch engineer, visited Siam and conducted a large study of the Chao Phraya basin and how it played a role in the everyday life of Siamese citizens. His trip to Siam is documented in Han Ten Brummelhuis’s book King of Waters published in the year 2000. According to Brummelhuis, van der Heide discovered that shorter klong systems were “limiting the potential of silt deposits through natural flooding.” Without a solution to the water shortage problem, the Kingdom would also lose significant amounts of national wealth that can be drawn from its rice exports. His notable achievements in Bangkok were his renovations of the local klong systems and extension of waterways that enhanced Siam’s irrigation routes. His engineering talent made him a popular figure in the Royal Court of King Rama V of Siam.

Rice field – Thailand

His Majesty King Chulalongkorn prioritized water management and food security throughout his reign, which drew the interest of other European engineers from Austria and United Kingdom to take part in hydraulic projects in Siam. Such developments not only enabled the advancement of agriculture, but also the introduction of running water into households. Thailand later moved towards large scale industrial projects such as the construction of Pasak Chonlasit Dam and the Royal Rainmaking Project which became an internationally-recognized method of alleviating conditions of drought.

Chaophraya Dam, first dam in Thailand constructed in 1957.

A prominent project undertaken by the late King Bhumibol The Great was a water retention system called the Kaem Ling project that was replicated across Thailand as a flood prevention measure. Kaem Ling means ¨monkey cheeks¨ in Thai, and the hydraulic device replicates the way a monkey chews food and stores it in its cheeks for future consumption. His Majesty King Bhumibol The Great had once stated that water is a paradox for Thai people, “when the water comes, there is a flood, when the water recedes there is a drought.”

Today, Thailand continues to send academics and specialists to study water management on the country’s government scholarship program at TU Delft and other renowned Faculties of Engineering in The Netherlands. Current areas of priority for Thai water management includes flood prevention, wastewater treatment, and fresh water production.

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The War in Ukraine is Already Reshaping Global Order

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The War in Ukraine is Already Reshaping Global Order

By Corneliu Pivariu

Interview with  Dr. Sergei Konoplyov – former  Director of the Harvard Black Sea Regional Security Program initiated by the US, Harvard University -Kennedy School of Government

Dr. Sergei Konoplyov was Director of the Harvard Black Sea Regional Security Program (BSRSP) initiated by Harvard University – Kennedy School of Government since its inception till 2017 when the US ceased to fund the Program as a result of shifting the strategic orientation towards Asia-Pacific.

It brought together political, diplomatic and military personalities through annual lectures and conferences for the coastal states of the Black Sea, and not only, and sought to create a better knowledge and rapprochement among the participants of the respective countries for enhancing the security situation in the area. As of 2010, the Russian Federation discontinued its participation to the Program. Dr. Konoplyov is an American citizen of Ukrainian descent who has been honoured with numerous awards and medals from the participant states to BSRSP for his contribution to the development of the relations among the respective states.

Question (Corneliu Pivariu): Dr. Konoplyov, we have known each other for over 20 years beginning with 2001 with my first participation to BSRSP at Harvard and from that time we have met almost every year at the programs organized for the alumni in different capitals of the world from Moscow, Erevan and Kyiv to Istanbul and Paris, and of course several times in Bucharest.

Although the Russian Federation tried to stand out as a different entity compared to the rest of the participants, and after 2010 it discontinued its participation, I do appreciate that the Program was extremely useful and interesting especially the way the US conceived and built it – including through your contribution but also that of other important personalities, and I make a single mention – Samuel Huntington – and, in general, it was extremely useful for the region. I had a deep regret when the US decided to withdraw from the Program and I shared with you my opinion. Don’t you think that under the current circumstances in the region it would be of great use whether the US Administration reconsider its decision and resume the Program in a new formula taking account of the present geopolitical realities?

Answer (Sergei Konoplyov): Yes, you are absolutely right.  The program was unique in its nature because it was conceived as a clearinghouse for high-level security managers of the countries of a wider Black Sea region and the US general officers.

The main idea was to provide a neutral place to exchange freely views which many times were contradictory. This place was Harvard Kennedy School of Government and I am very proud that in many years of the program existence hundreds of military officers and security officers of Eastern Europe and the United States had the possibility to meet face-to-face. Many of them still hold important positions in their countries and communicate among themselves not only professionally but on a personal level, too. 

In early 2000 The United States never considered the Black Sea region as important as for instance the former Yugoslavia or the Baltic countries. Despite the presence of the frozen conflicts in the Black Sea area, the United States considered that overall, the region would not require any special attention because the probability of any military conflicts was minimal. They concentrated their efforts to help countries which decided to join NATO and the European Union. Indeed, Romania and Bulgaria became members of both organizations. Ukraine and Georgia also had aspirations to become members. However, as you correctly noted, Russia always had a separate position even when the Russian delegations took part in the program sessions both at Harvard and in the capitals of Eastern European countries.

Russia had serious concerns that both Ukraine and Georgia- which were part of the Soviet Union before and part of the Warsaw Pact- would become members of NATO. At the Bucharest NATO summit in 2008 these two countries were denied the Membership Action Plan that would open the doors to the Alliance. Russia was pleased with that decision and there were no indications at that time of any aggressive Russian attempts toward the regional countries. At the same time the EU started to institutionalize its policy toward the region, establishing such initiatives as Black Sea Synergy and Eastern European Neighborhood program.

The US decided that Europe could efficiently deal with Eastern European problems without American involvement. Romania took the lead in continuing the Harvard Black Sea program under the auspices of the Administration of the President and held regional events for many years. It is possible that in some future the US would like to establish a similar program due to unprecedented changes in the security architecture of Europe. In any case, the successful experience of the program proves the importance of informal dialogue between the decision makers from the different countries.

Q.C.P.: How does the American society see/perceive the conflict between Russia and Ukraine? I mean its duration (where the opinions expressed by experts and opinion shapers are vastly different, starting with four months – Ukraine, two years – Gen. Michael Repass – former Commander of the US Special Forces in Europe and after that military adviser in Kyiv for six years, to five-ten years – other opinions in Western Europe).

A.S.K.: The Russian aggression toward Ukraine in February 2022 was unexpected but inevitable, as we can see now looking at the evidence which we always had before but refused to believe. Russia never considered Ukraine as an independent state. President Putin warned the West in 2008 – when Ukraine officially applied to receive MAP – that Russia would protect the Russian speaking population in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, few people paid attention to that statement.

However, many years earlier, after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the leading US political thinkers like Samuel Huntington and Zbigniew Brzezinski (both were speakers at Harvard program) warned that Russia would never let Ukraine out of its orbit of influence. Since its independence Ukraine has been a recipient of US financial aid and political support. The annexation of Crimea and the attempts to occupy the Eastern Ukraine (Donbass) took the world by surprise. International reactions have largely been condemnatory of Russia’s actions, supportive of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and supportive of finding a quick end to the crisis.

The United States and the European Union threatened and later enacted sanctions against Russia for its role in the crisis, and urged Russia to withdraw. Putin has accused the United States and the EU of funding and directing the Ukrainian revolution to destabilize Russia. He called it a coup d’état using this as a pretext to invasion. Despite the Western economic sanction Russia was practically unpunished for violation of international law and illegal occupation of other country’s territory. The current Russian attack on Ukraine was a thoroughly calculated plan. 

There are two major mistakes that Russia made in planning the so called “special operation”. First, they underestimated the resistance from Ukraine, both military and political. Second, they thought that the US and EU sanctions would be the same as in 2014, that means acceptable by Russia. The US besides its political support has also a moral responsibility to provide Ukraine with all possible assistance. This is because the US was attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border, ignoring the perils of retaliation, according to John Mearsheimer, a well-respected expert on Eurasia from Chicago University.

Another factor to consider is that the war in Ukraine could become a European or even a global conflict and the US might be directly involved in it. Besides the financial and military help, the whole US nation is extremely supportive of Ukraine at the community level. For example, in my small town I see many Ukrainian flags at people’s houses. I can definitely see the consolidated opinion of both politicians (republicans and Democrats) and experts about the situation in Ukraine.

Q.C.P.: Do you consider that the exceedingly high level of the  Ukraine’s public debt and its implications (aside from the other known considerations) played a role in Putin’s making the decision of triggering the aggression against Ukraine?

A.S.K.: I don’t think that any economic factors including Ukrainian dependency from IMF loans were considered when the Russia war plans were designed. It was a political decision and also personal decision based on “we can do it” egoistic thinking rather on a rational calculation of potential benefits and risks.

Q.C.P.: After the Sea Breeze 2021 military aplication, V.Zelenski replaced the operative command of the army (the Chief of defense, the Commander of the Operational Command, the Chief of Staff of the Operational Command, the Commander of the Military Air Forces) and, in the fall of the same year, he sacked the minister of Defense A. Taran, too. What could have been the reasons the Ukrainian president took into account?

A.S.K.: There were many changes in the whole government in the last two years. As to the Ministry of Defense, first of all Ukrainian President had to put the end of the ongoing conflict between the Minister of Defense and the Head of the General Staff. It was a paradoxical situation when two main figures in the Ukrainian Armed Forces were not communicating among themselves mostly due to personal reasons. It was a very dangerous situation. That’s why the decision was made to change the leadership in the Ministry of Defense especially when the Russian troops buildup was becoming a real threat. Another factor – the Ukrainian President wanted to have more loyal people in the military who would not question his orders when the war would start and tough decisions would have to be made. I also think that he listened to the advice from the US experts who know very well the situation in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Besides those officials, V. Zelenski fired three deputy ministers of defense and two first deputy ministers of Ukrainian Security Service.

Q.C.P.: How do you assess the performanceof Ukraine’s foreign intelligence  and of the counterintelligence agencies during the most important kinetic confrontation unfolding in Europe after WWII? Do you consider that the tragic death in Egypt, in May 2021, of the retired General Victor Hvozd, former Director of the Directorate of Military Intelligence and then of Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service, known to be an Ukrainian patriot and an advocate of the country’s democratic development, could be connected to Moscow’s preparation of the aggression against Kyiv?

A.S.K.: All Ukrainian special services deserve a credit for their performance. Even before the Military Directorate of Intelligence planned a unique operation to capture Russian mercenaries from Wagner group who committed crimes in Eastern Ukraine. The main problem in the intelligence community in Ukraine was the infiltration of Russian agents in its structures even at the top. I am not sure if they are completely removed now but, in any case, their damage is minimum. Recently the budget for the intelligence services were increased, they get modern equipment and training. Also, the United States has increased the flow of intelligence to Ukraine about Russian forces in the Donbas and Crimea. The information could allow the Ukrainians to conduct more effective counterattacks against Russian forces in the Donbas or Crimea, or better predict the movement of Russian troops from those areas against Ukrainian forces.

As to the death of Lieutenant General Victor Hvozd, I think it happened due to tragic circumstances. At least there are no indications that it could be conceded to Russia. Victor was a good friend for many years and several times took part in Harvard Black Sea program as a participant as a speaker. After his successful career in the Ukrainian intelligence community, he established a thinktank that provided very professional analysis about security and defense affairs. I keep his book about history of Ukrainian intelligence services on my bookshelf.

Q.C.P.: During the first three months of military confrontations, Kyiv proved its ability to strongly resist and twart Moscow’s initial plan of getting rapidly the Ukraine’s full control, yet it won another extremely important battle, the one of the public domestic and international communication. The Kremlin was not able to counter effectively on the international level the Ukrainian activity in this field. How do you think this conflict will continue from the standpoint of public communication, who would be the winner?

A.S.K.: A lot has been written about Russia’s disinformation campaigns and efforts to spread fake news, which flooded western countries in the past decade and had different effects around the globe. Russia has also worked to discredit the image of Ukraine among its western partners. Special vocabulary was even promoted to portray Ukraine negatively. One of the decisions for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia was a belief that its propaganda had succeeded in building a base of supporters in Ukraine. Nonetheless, Russian troops aren’t welcome in Ukraine and have faced fearless resistance from ordinary citizens in every corner of the country. Both NATO and Ukraine have been depicted as aggressive foes that want to destroy Russia. On the other hand, Russia positioned itself as the last bastion and defender of the true pure values of Orthodoxy and the Russkiy mir (Russian world), which are threatened by the corrupt liberal West. Russian propaganda has grown bolder and unanswered for years, leading to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine while serving to mislead and deceive Russians.

The governmental funding for propaganda in Russia was tripled since the Russian invasion. Unfortunately, it made many Russians to believe that the war against Ukraine was inevitable. The number of supporters in Russia grew in last three months. Ukraine has no recourses that could match the Russian funding for its government-controlled media. However, I can definitely see the international coverage of Russian aggression in the leading Western media. Unfortunately, Russian citizens have no access to free media – Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and all Russian independent media were banned in Russia. A short answer to your question – Russia wins information war whin Russia but loses it globally.

Q.C.P.: How do you assess the evolution of the military conflict on the ground? The Russian army experienced a lot of malfunctions from instruction, equipment, the use of forces and the way the cooperation among the cathegories of forces worked. At the same time, the seven years from the invasion of Crimea seemed to have been well spent by the Ukrainian army, benefitting from an important military support from the democratic states and especially from the USA. How do you see, in this framework, the outcome of the conflict and the time horizon or the situation that will emerge and will determine the end?

A.S.K.: It is absolutely clear that so called Russian “special operation” is not going according the plan. Russia thought it would be a blitzkrieg which would allow them to put a Russia-friendly president. They were not prepared for a long war and colossal loses in personal and military equipment. They underestimated the reparented of Ukrainian armed forces and the resistance of Ukrainian citizens. Their second mistake – Russia thought that the international response would be similar to the previous economic sanctions. All this makes Russia to change its propagandistic narrative. To justify the loss the lives of Russian solders they claim that now Russia has to fight against all NATO countries since they provide military assistance to Ukraine.

This is the indication that they are losing in Ukraine and frantically looking for any solution to end the war on their conditions. Otherwise, Russia will have only two choices: to capitulate and admit they lost the war or to convert the current “special operation” in a full fledge European war. In any case Russia is already a looser. It became a pariah state, every day western companies are leaving Russia. Europe made an unpresidential decision to stop using Russian gas – the main revenue of Western currency to Kremlin. The recent decision of Finland and Sweden to join NATO is a powerful blow to Putin. Russia is a strong country but its recourses are getting low.  I believe that Russia will soon proclaim the “victory” and sell this to the Russian public. However, the future of Russia is dark. Putin became the liability for the Russian elites.

Q.C.P.: What are the chances of Russia’s moving toward widening the conflict, especially in the Republic of Moldova?

A. S.K.: Russia has demonstrated an inability to take and hold territory more than two hundred kilometers from its territory. So far it sounds not realistic that Russia would send troops to Moldova since it had to be by airlift only.  Even that Russia has 1500 “peacekeepers” in Transnistria those soldiers and officers are not combat ready. I believe that initially Russia wanted to establish a land bridge connecting Transnistria to Crimea. In that case Russia would proclaim the re-establishment of so called ‘Novorossiya’. There were a series of explosions in Transnistria at the end of April. Also -according to some reliable sources – Russians planned to have a referendum during which the population (half of them have Russian passports) would vote in favor to become part of Russian Federation. However, Moldova is a neutral country and such a move would definitely get a strong international reaction making Russia political and economic position even worse.

Q.C.P.: The war shattered all the economic plans of Ukraine. Recent data (end of April) showed that the Russian army destroyed around 30% of the country’s infrastructure and that the direct and indirect damages reached, according to the president V.Zelensky’s  Office head, to more than $560 billion. The World Bank estimates that Ukraine’s economy will shrink by 45% in 2022 while around 60% of the SMEs are closed or have suspended their activities. Under such circumstances, how and how long will take for Ukraine to recover economically and socially?

A.S.K.:As an advisor to the Minister of Finance of Ukraine, I can tell that it is impossible to have precise estimates of current economic loss in Ukraine. According to international financial agencies, between 500 billion and 1 trillion dollars of capital stock has been destroyed, after two months of war in Ukraine. In the future this number will only grow. To rebuild Ukraine, a consolidated international effort is needed like US Marshall Plan in the 1945 to help rebuild Europe after the Second World War. The common opinion is that the Russian government should pay for damages, using Russian assets that were seized or frozen by the U.S. and European Union. Those assets are around 1 trillion US dollars. Revenues from Russian oil imports could also be used in the same way that Iraq’s oil revenues were used for nearly 30 years to pay reparations to Kuwait, which was invaded in 1990. Depending on the scale of the international effort the rebuilding of Ukraine would take at least five years or more.

Q.C.P.: A timeless dictum says that   ”there’s nothing like peace without victory”. What kind of victory and what kind of peace is it all about? What will happen with the Crimea Peninsula, the Donbass region and the Snake Island? What are the compromises Kyiv is ready to make and, at the same time, what are the compromises Moscow would make?

A.S.K.: Two months ago, I would say that Kyiv could consider making compromises since the common opinion was that victory of Russia would be a matter of weeks. However, now it became obvious that Russian miliary is not that good as it was generally thought and Ukrainian armed forces inflict Russia unprecedented damages. Russia become politically isolated and its economy is going down due to the several packages of really strong sanctions. Moreover, Finland and Sweden announced their plants to join NATO. At the beginning of the war western countries were reluctant to give too many advanced weapons to the Ukrainians. But by seeing the destruction of Ukrainian cities and the crimes committed by Russian forces – NATO countries have significantly increased the amount of modern heavy weapons. All that means that the situation at the negotiations has changed – Ukraine actually can win without losing its territories. On the other hand, Russia also is not ready for any compromises just because it considers itself a global superpower. Making any concession to Ukraine would be the end of Putin autocratic regime.

Q.C.P.: China has its own interests in what concern both its relation with Ukraine and the Russian Federation. How do you see China’s  getting involved in the ”2022 Ukraine File”?

A.S.K.: The position of China about Russian aggression in Ukraine are multifaceted and reflects most of all Chinese national interests in many spheres. The official statements from Beijing have significantly changed since the first weeks of the war. If previously the China authorities were calling to protect the Russian interests, arguing that the US is responsible for the conflict by pushing Ukraine toward NATO, now their statements are more neutral. Now China is calling for the negotiations between the US (NATO) with Russia and propose to be a mediator. China doesn’t want to become a target for the Western sanctions especially when the perspectives of Chinese economic growth are not very bright. Especially when the main megapolis Shanghai is closed due to COVID outbreak. Also, Beijing is learning from Russian mistakes about what might happen if China decides to take over Taiwan. Another factor to consider that China still thinks that 1,5 million square kilometers of its territory were taken by Russia a hundred years ago, including Siberia and Far East. That means that China would prefer to see a weaker Russia as a neighbor with a debt to pay.

Q.C.P.:  In the situation of possible negotiations between the two parties, who could qualify as mediators and who can be the possible guarantors of the understandings which will be eventually reached?

A.S.K.: Many countries offered to be a mediator, among them China and Turkey. France also could play this role as it did during the Russia war with Georgia in 2008. Technically, the EU was the mediator but under the French presidency. I believe it should be a special group under the UN auspices if the negotiations would take place. However, there is a possibility that if Putin is taken out power, Russia might admit that it lost the war. A similar outcome was during Algeria’s 1954–62 war against France.

Q.C.P.: What are the possible post-conflict adjustments in Kyiv’s official policy after the Russian Invasion? Joining the EU, joining NATO or neutrality?

A.S.K.: The European Union has reacted positively to the EU membership application that V. Zelensky submitted on Feb. 28, 2022. Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission told that “Ukraine belongs to our European family.” The EU will announce its decision in June 2022. As to NATO, Ukraine is very firm to join the Alliance and will be its member if Russia loses the war.

Q.C.P.: There are assessments that after this conflict ends we will witness gradually the setting up of a new international order. Do you think that this is a possibility and, if yes, what kind of a new order will it be?

A.S.K.: The war in Ukraine is already reshaping global order. NATO became more united and soon it will welcome two new members – Sweden and Finland – countries that used to have neutrality for decades. The European countries decided to end their energy dependence on Russia. These factors would not lead to major changes in the world order – just the Western countries would become even a stronger player in international affairs and with the leadership of the United States would like to maintain the unipolar dominance based on economic and military power.

Corneliu Pivariu. Photographer: Ionus Paraschiv.
Corneliu Pivariu. Photographer: Ionus Paraschiv.

Interview realized by Corneliu Pivariu and first published by Geopolitica – https://corneliupivariu.com on 22 of May 2022.

Dr. Sergei Konoplyov’s picture copyrighted by Knis Snibbe/Harvard News Office.

About the author:

Corneliu Pivariu Military Intelligence and International Relations Senior Expert. A highly decorated retired two-star general of the Romanian army, during two decades he has led one of the most influential magazines on geopolitics and international relations in Eastern Europe, the bilingual journal Geostrategic Pulse.

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