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Uruguayan Independence Day Celebrated in The Hague

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August 31, 2024

Uruguayan Independence Day Celebrated in The Hague

The Embassy of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay marked his country’s Independence Day with a grand and festive reception. Held on August 27 at the Leonardo Royal Hotel in The Hague, the event drew over 200 distinguished guests from various sectors of Dutch society.

Ambassadors, chiefs of international missions, diplomats, academics, business leaders, and representatives from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, along with members of the Uruguayan community, all responded to H.E. Ambassador Dr. Álvaro González Otero’s invitation to celebrate ‘Día de la Independencia’—Uruguay’s National Day, commemorating its independence from Brazil in 1825.

H.E. Dr. Álvaro González Otero, Ambassador of Uruguay. National Day 2024 The Hague.

After nearly 200 years of conflict and civil unrest under Spanish and then Brazilian rule, Uruguay has emerged as a country renowned for its welcoming people, stunning landscapes, first-class meat production, and high-quality wine. In recent decades, Uruguayans have enjoyed a stable democracy, a steady improvement in living conditions, and overall well-being.

In a packed room with an animated audience, Ambassador González Otero took the microphone to thank all the attendees for their sincere affection for his people and country. He then proudly expressed:

“Two years have quickly passed since I arrived in this lovely kingdom. Since then, we have started to shift the focus of the Embassy, placing more emphasis on our bilateral relations. The Netherlands and Uruguay have more in common than people might imagine. We share international principles, landscapes, agricultural production, developed services, qualified exports, and a progressive lifestyle.

We also share strong commitments to the well-being of our citizens and visitors, the protection of human rights, environmental sustainability, progressive social policies, and significant efforts towards renewable energy and climate action. Both countries also emphasize education, democratic governance, and active participation in international organizations promoting peace and development. So, we will keep working to boost our bilateral relations.”

Uruguay National Day, August 27 at the Leonardo Royal Hotel in The Hague.

From the Embassy of Uruguay, Counsellor Pablo Bayarres, Ambassador Gonzalez Otero and Hans Akerboom, Deputy Director Protocol and Host Country Affairs from the Netherlands.

Ambassador González Otero then listed some of the most relevant initiatives undertaken by the Embassy over the last few months:

– Uruguayan participation in the World Hydrogen Summit 2024: Led by the Minister of Industry, Energy, and Mining, Ms. Elisa Facio, with over 50 representatives from various sectors of the public and private sectors.

– Active participation in the “26th World Energy Congress.”

– Cooperation Project with Delft Institute for Water Education: Since 2011, Uruguayan professionals specializing in water resources have participated in the Delft Institute program for advanced training. Initially, the program began with 40 scholarships, resulting in 37 professionals successfully completing their studies. This early success led to the program’s relocation and implementation at the Technological University of Uruguay, now featuring regional participation. The program has since had two new editions in 2022 and 2024, expanding to include 17 professionals from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Peru. This development has transformed Uruguay into a regional hub in the field of water resource education.

– Uruguay’s status as one of the 32 signing states of the Ljubljana – The Hague Convention in February 2024.

– Positioning Uruguay as a potential living and working destination for Dutch farmers.

– Interactions with RVO and Port of Rotterdam related to port cooperation.

– Exploring and initiating new cooperation projects with Westland Municipality and Wageningen University.

– Meetings with private sector actors related to agribusiness.

– Preparation for the Capitan Miranda’s visit to Amsterdam: Uruguay’s school tall ship has already confirmed its participation in Sail Amsterdam 2025.

– Multilateral achievements: The Embassy has made progress in multilateral areas, including ongoing contributions and work with international organizations based in The Hague: the ICJ, ICC, OPCW, HCCH, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Additionally, a closer relationship with The Hague Academy of International Law has been pursued. Significant advances have also been made through the coordinated work of the GRULAC Group in relation to various international organizations.

H.E. Mr. Fernando Arias, OPCW Director General , Ambassador Gonzalez Otero and Mr Arias spouse, Patricia van Oordt.

Following his remarks, Ambassador González Otero invited the audience to watch a short video about Uruguay, which made a great impression on those present. He expressed, “Uruguay is an exceptional country that has developed a dynamic and robust culture, shaped by a fascinating blend of gaucho traditions, European influences, and the unique Rioplatense spirit. Tango, folklore, candombe, and milonga are examples of its rich artistic musical expression. Uruguayan gastronomy, featuring high-quality meat, wine, and dairy products, especially the beloved ‘dulce de leche,’ delights palates and consistently wins prestigious awards worldwide.”

“The work we have done does not mean we are satisfied; we want to continue advancing in a deeper process. The bilateral relationship is already strong, but the potential to strengthen bonds in several key areas is even greater.”

The Ambassador of Uruguay, H.E. Alvaro Gonzalez Otero and the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Graciela Gatti Santana with her husband Mr Gustavo Segovia.

The event was conceived to showcase the rich and diverse culture of Uruguay, a nation with a population of approximately 3,495,527 as of 2022.

The national anthems of Uruguay and the Netherlands were performed by the Uruguayan opera singer Sara de los Campos. After the ambassador’s speech, the Embassy paid tribute to two influential musicians: José “El Sabalero” Carbajal and Jaime Roos, who both lived in the Netherlands. Jaime Roos settled in Amsterdam in 1978, where he played bass in several salsa, rock, and jazz groups. He had a son and remained in the Netherlands until 1984 when he returned to Uruguay.

Carbajal spent his days in the Netherlands with his wife, Anke van Haastrecht, and their two children. Anke was invited to share some special stories from their life together.

The enthusiastic audience enjoyed an authentic performance by talented Uruguayan drummers Luis Gradin, Marcelo Terra, and Nicolás Sánchez. The celebration continued with Uruguayan wine, classic savory empanadas, and dulce de leche, which delighted the crowded room and completed the great celebration.

Ambassador González Otero concluded the event by thanking his Embassy team: Counselor Pablo Bayarres, Chancellor Gustavo Morales, his assistant Juan Diego, and Martha Hernández and Sofía Anastasiou. He then led a warm toast for the people of the Netherlands, Uruguay, and the necessary and desired peace in the world.

China: A New Actor in the Contemporary Multipolar World

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August 4, 2024

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China: A New Actor in the Contemporary Multipolar World

By Mariarosaria Iorio, Political Analyst

I. The post-cold war world

International relations are nowadays characterised by major changes that started at the end of the 80s with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Indeed, the end of the cold war was marked by the dislocation of the two main political blocks, namely the Soviet Union and the Western World. Such a dislocation resulted in the marginalization of the post-war multilateral system embodied in the United Nations, and the standstill of the multilateral trade negotiations in the late 90s in the context of the World Trade Organisation. New lines of political thought have been facing each other since then, while reshaping the post-cold war world in a number of fragmented and variable sub-blocks of countries.

The United States decided to put itself first by concentrating on its internal affairs, while withdrawing from international affairs.

Europe, the old continent, looks for an efficient strategy towards autonomy from the United States. Europe also tries, not without difficulty, to create a more cohesive internal and external political approach. The reality is however evolving rather more towards fragmentation of Europe in favour of European National fragmented interests. Such a fragmentation is the natural consequence of the decadence of the European Institutional and collective actions to the advantage of individual Sates actions and interests. In sum, what seemed to be a structured and coherent European Union block fighting for the promotion of its economic and political values all over the world has somehow become an alliance at variable geometry both internally and externally. The disorganisation of the leadership results in a chaotic and unpredictable European External and Internal action.

Thereof, the empty influence spaces left on the international relations scene has given new international actors the opportunity to emerge.

Meanwhile, the fragmentation of the European Institutions has also impacted the EU-USA relations within NATO, and affected the security and peace sphere. Security issues have been on and off on the European agenda.

In this context, Russia that has lost its empire in the 80s looks now for a new power game. In spite of the disruption of the Soviet Union, Russia attempts either by influence or by force to exercise power in its ancient affiliate countries. Russia that was supposed to be defeated with the fall of the Berlin Wall takes back its role of opponent to the Western World on the international scene at least as it concerns the international affairs philosophy. Thus, creating a tension aimed at restoring its power in the world.

The group of emerging and developing economies that constitute a new variable block with a large portion of population employed in agriculture have emerged as new actors in the world’s geo-political discourses. At the head of this block on the international scene, there is China. The shaky international leadership context has indeed given China a new space. China’s communist past combined with its market-based economic strategy gives it a particular position.

China is The One that can communicate to Russia. China is also The One that can have an influence on the Western economic and political scene as China owns a big part of Western Foreign Debt

China embeds a horizontal strategy in both its trade and development policies, while producing at low wages. Its production system coupled with its pragmatic political approach has reshaped the international power structure. The top-down approach of the Western World faces now the competition created by the horizontal win-win approach proposed by China in both developing and industrialized countries.

Indeed, as a result of the decline of the Western World global hegemony based on market access and economic and social liberalism as a means to ensure economic growth and promote economic development, the vision promoted by China’s discourse, centred on the protection of livelihoods and local sovereign choices finds new adepts. Furthermore, China has successfully attempted to promote a trade-off approach to international cooperation during the last 20 years. A cooperation that does not interfere in internal affairs of partner countries as it has often reproached to the Western countries involved in international cooperation.

As the developing countries leader, China positions itself as the spoke country for the poor. As a new world powerful economic actor China plays as the guarantor of the Western Economic stability. China positions itself as the bridge between the rich and the poor. It is representing a different hegemonic game that only changes in its discourse, while still pursuing its own interests and influence zones. Such a situation poses the question of the values that the international regime wants to embrace. Indeed, this changing world results in an increased number of conflicts – be new or historical conflicts.

The dislocation of the traditional leaders of the international relations has definitely created a chaotic and unpredictable scenario. Chaos has in some cases been chosen as a political strategy to disrupt the post-1945 international regime. Such a disruption has benefitted new actors, and given space to new lines of thought. These new lines of thought have attacked the existing international framework but has not yet succeeded in creating a new regime. The increasing unbalance of power and the lack of leadership on the international political scene is risky.

The reduction by choice of leadership of the United States has indeed resulted in the weakening of the values emerged as a result of the dramatic experience of Second World War, namely freedom of thought and freedom of speech to mention only a few. We are now facing a much more authoritarian world with force used as a means to manage the political arena. Dialogue seems to be a rather consuming exercise that has left its place to the use of force. Force is no longer seen as the last option but rather the opening act for political dialogue. Nationalism and individual interests are now at the centre of the political game. This trend is taking the world to instability and conflict.

The peoples of the world are more and more questioning the existing system. People’s needs and expectations are not met. The new emerged actors, such as China have given the hope of a possible change in the present international system without fundamentally questioning its rationale but rather trying to rip a slate of the cake.

The struggle for influence among countries has not succeeded in building a peaceful and stable world. Citizens will have to face the challenge of building a new era of peace and stability worldwide.

Derrière les murs du Palais de la Paix : permanence et changements de la Cour internationale de Justice

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June 3, 2017

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Derrière les murs du Palais de la Paix : permanence et changements de la Cour internationale de Justice

S.E. M. Philippe Couvreur est arrivé à La Haye en avril 1982, où il a d’abord occupé le poste d’assistant spécial aux bureaux du greffier et du greffier adjoint de la Cour internationale de Justice.

Il a ensuite exercé les fonctions de Secrétaire, Premier Secrétaire et Secrétaire juridique principal, avant d’être élu Greffier de la Cour en 2000, et réélu en 2007 et 2014. Pour marquer l’anniversaire de ses débuts à la Cour, il y a 35 ans, Diplomat Magazine l’a invité à témoigner de son expérience unique au service de cette institution, des évolutions qu’il a pu y observer, et à partager le regard qu’il porte sur les changements qui ont marqué la Cour et La Haye au cours des trois dernières décennies.

Philippe Couvreur avec le Pape Jean-Paul II prise le 13 mai 1985.

Je suis arrivé à La Haye en avril 1982 — de façon aussi inattendue que j’avais entamé des études de droit treize ans auparavant (mais c’est là une autre histoire…) — pour occuper un poste temporaire à la Cour internationale de Justice. La Cour était alors la seule institution judiciaire internationale existante au plan universel. Son activité, particulièrement faible à la fin des années 1970, ne pouvait en ce temps-là guère laisser présager du succès que rencontrerait la Cour dans les décennies à venir. Mon bienveillant maître de Louvain, le professeur Paul de Visscher, fils du célèbre internationaliste Charles de Visscher, unique juge belge à la Cour, m’avait prédit des jours aussi sereins qu’heureux, écoulés à lire et à écrire des ouvrages dans la solitude des imposants murs de la bibliothèque du Palais de la Paix…

Les mémoires ont été dûment déposés dans l’affaire El Salvador c. Honduras dans la salle Bol le 1 juin 1988, l’affaire du Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime.

En rejoignant la Cour, un frais matin d’avril, dont je garde un souvenir très précis, le jeune juriste que j’étais découvrit, non sans étonnement, une organisation de taille très modeste, le Greffe, qui en est l’organe administratif, alors composé de moins d’une quarantaine de fonctionnaires. Le fonctionnement de la Cour reposait entièrement sur cette équipe restreinte de personnel permanent, auquel s’ajoutait, selon que de besoin, un personnel temporaire pour faire face au surcroît de travaux linguistiques et de sténodactylographie lors des sessions (publiques et privées) de la Cour. Je me rappelle avoir été frappé par la personnalité haute en couleur de certains de ces traducteurs indépendants, dont la grande culture littéraire m’émerveillait. Cette structure très économique du Greffe impliquait une grande polyvalence de ses membres, et les Secrétaires de la Cour — ses fonctionnaires supérieurs — étaient appelés, en sus de leurs travaux de recherches juridiques, de préparation des documents de la Cour, et de rédaction de la correspondance diplomatique, à assumer eux-mêmes l’essentiel des tâches linguistiques (traduction et interprétation) et d’information, ainsi que la supervision de nombreuses activités administratives et logistiques.

La Grande salle de Justice, l’affaire Relative au Timor Oriental (Portugal c. Australie) Arrêt du 30 juin 1995.

Il n’était nullement rare qu’un nouveau venu comme moi ait à passer week-ends et nuits blanches au Palais de la Paix à effectuer les travaux les plus divers… allant jusqu’à imprimer et polycopier, sur de vieilles machines à stencils ronéotype, des décisions dont la Cour devait donner la lecture en séance publique le lendemain ! Dès mon arrivée au Greffe, j’ai eu le bonheur et le privilège d’être initié et associé à l’ensemble des fonctions de l’institution sous la patiente supervision de personnalités d’exception, tels que MM. Torres Bernárdez et Pillepich, alors respectivement Greffier et Greffier adjoint. J’en ai retiré le plus grand bénéfice, puisque cette immersion sans préparation dans toutes les facettes de l’activité du Greffe m’a permis d’acquérir de ce dernier une connaissance unique — de l’intérieur — et sous tous ses aspects —, un acquis particulièrement précieux au moment où j’ai été amené, bien des années plus tard, à assumer la délicate responsabilité d’en assurer la gestion au plus haut niveau. Devenir un fonctionnaire du Greffe au début des années 1980 signifiait accepter de se couler sans discussion dans un moule à tous égards exigeant, et se donner corps et âme, avec humilité et discrétion, à l’institution, sans penser à soi ni parler de soi. Depuis ces années d’initiation, j’ai été le témoin de profondes transformations de la Cour, rendues inévitables à la fois pour répondre à l’accroissement considérable de ses activités, avec la disparition du monde bipolaire qui avait relégué le règlement judiciaire à un rôle quelque peu marginal, et pour saisir les opportunités nouvelles offertes, notamment, par le progrès des technologies et de la communication. Entre 1982 et aujourd’hui, le nombre de fonctionnaires a ainsi presque triplé (il a quasiment doublé depuis l’an 2000, année de ma première élection en tant que Greffier). L’organisation du travail a été progressivement spécialisée entre les divers départements, juridique, linguistique et chargé de l’information, qui furent créés en 1997, et les services techniques. Par ailleurs, les Membres de la Cour ne disposèrent pas, pendant longtemps, de « référendaires » — ils s’y sont d’ailleurs longtemps refusés—, et l’assistance apportée aux juges en matière judiciaire était principalement répartie entre les fonctionnaires du Département des affaires juridiques.

H.E. Philippe Couvreur avec la Reine Beatrix photo prise pendant le 50 eme anniversaire de la Cour (18-04-1996).

Les cinq premiers postes de juristes référendaires ne furent obtenus de l’Assemblée générale et créés qu’en 2002, à l’issue de difficiles négociations que je me souviens avoir menées avec beaucoup de plaisir et d’intérêt ; le nombre de ces postes s’est progressivement accru, pour s’élever à quinze aujourd’hui. Les divers développements qui ont marqué le monde au cours des dernières décennies n’ont pas manqué de soulever pour la Cour de nouveaux défis. Comme c’est le cas pour toute institution, elle n’a pu les relever en faisant table rase des enseignements de son histoire ni, à l’inverse, en ne saisissant pas toutes les opportunités offertes par le temps présent. A ces différents égards, la Cour est certainement parvenue, au fil des ans, à assurer un équilibre, toujours délicat, entre changements et continuité. La continuité de la Cour est bien sûr inscrite dans son Statut, qui fait partie intégrante de la Charte des Nations Unies, et reflétée dans ses méthodes judiciaires, qui ont été très largement élaborées par sa devancière, la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, et héritées d’elle. Cette continuité historique était particulièrement présente lorsque j’ai rejoint le Greffe. Ainsi, en manière d’anecdote, divers hauts fonctionnaires alors en poste avaient eux-mêmes côtoyé, au début de leur carrière, d’anciens fonctionnaires de la Cour permanente. Tous nourrissaient à l’égard de cette dernière le plus grand respect. Il régnait d’ailleurs dans les couloirs du Palais de la Paix une atmosphère feutrée et délicieusement surannée, évocatrice de la défunte Société des Nations. Je me souviens en avoir encore utilisé maintes fournitures de bureau ! La continuité jurisprudentielle et procédurale entre les deux Cours constitue pour les Etats une garantie importante de sécurité et de prévisibilité juridiques. Cette continuité, juridique et historique, de même que l’expérience accumulée en plus de quatre-vingt-dix ans d’exercice de la fonction judiciaire, sont pour la Cour un facteur crucial de légitimité.

H.E. Philippe Couvreur vec le Roi Willem-Alexander photo prise pendant le 70 eme anniversaire de la Cour (20-04-2016).

En même temps, la Cour a eu, à l’évidence, à s’adapter aux changements du monde réel dans lequel elle opère, comme aux nécessités et opportunités nouvelles de chaque époque traversée. L’une des transformations notoires auxquelles j’ai assisté fut l’ouverture croissante de la Cour sur l’extérieur : longtemps à l’écart, à dessein, des organes politiques des Nations Unies, la Cour a souhaité se faire plus et mieux entendre de ces organes et des Etats membres. Elle a ainsi rompu avec ce qui était parfois perçu comme un « splendide isolement » au sein des Nations Unies, même si elle défend toujours jalousement son autonomie. La Cour doit en outre désormais également tenir compte des nombreuses autres juridictions, internationales ou régionales, qui ont été créées ces dernières années, et veiller, autant que possible, à assurer l’harmonie du « concert judiciaire » que permet ce foisonnement de cours et tribunaux sur la scène internationale. Davantage ouverte sur la communauté internationale et ses réalités, la Cour s’est montrée de plus en plus attentive, non seulement à sa place dans l’Organisation des Nations Unies, mais aussi à la poursuite des objectifs de celle-ci et à sa mission propre au service du règlement pacifique des différends internationaux. Des différends de plus en plus complexes, tant juridiquement que factuellement, en même temps que politiquement plus denses, lui ont été soumis. En révisant constamment, selon que de besoin, ses méthodes de travail, elle a su les résoudre rapidement et efficacement, à un coût particulièrement modeste pour la communauté internationale, tout en assurant le développement du droit. Enfin, pour conclure sur une note plus prosaïque, mais qui est loin d’être négligeable, je ne peux taire la chance que j’ai eue de connaître l’extraordinaire développement de la ville de La Haye au cours des 35 dernières années. Celle-ci offre aujourd’hui à la Cour, comme aux nombreuses institutions internationales qui s’y sont installées à sa suite, une qualité de vie et un cadre de travail uniques, qui sont très loin de ressembler à ce que j’ai trouvé en y arrivant. A l’image de l’imposante stature du Palais de la Paix où elle siège, symbole mondialement connu de la justice internationale, la Cour est une institution solidement établie. En dépit des périodes de doute ou de désaffection qu’elle a traversées par le passé, son rôle est unanimement salué au sein de la communauté internationale et le recours à ses services par les Etats n’a jamais été aussi soutenu. 35 ans après, je continue de mesurer chaque jour le privilège qui est le mien de servir au mieux de mes capacités l’organe judiciaire principal des Nations Unies. —– Les photos dans l’article sont une courtoisie de la Cour International de Justice.

Romania “at the Gate of Storms[1]” and Without a Strategic Narrative

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November 2, 2025

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Romania “at the Gate of Storms[1]” and Without a Strategic Narrative

“A nation without a strategic vision has no future, only reflexes.”
— adaptation after Raymond Aron

By Lieutenant General Corneliu Pivariu (ret)

The Meaning of a Strategic Signal

The announcement regarding the withdrawal of part of the American troops from Romania[2] is not merely an operational adjustment of the U.S. presence on NATO’s eastern front. Rather, it is a strategic signal that must be read in the context of a world undergoing reconfiguration. At a time when the global balance of power is under multiple pressures — from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East to the emergence of a new Eurasian economic axis — any change in the U.S. military footprint in Eastern Europe carries major significance. It demonstrates the evolution toward a multipolar world in which the United States can no longer act as “the world’s policeman.”

Romania, situated “at the gate of storms,” in a buffer zone between Russia, the Balkans, and the Black Sea, is directly exposed to these shifts. This partial withdrawal should not be viewed through panic or conspiracy theories, but as a test of strategic maturity: does Romania have its own vision of its place in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture? Or does it continue to define its position merely through reflexes of loyalty to its partners?

Unable to properly assert its own interests and present its true strategic importance, Romania must escape the political stagnation in which it finds itself and act with strategic vision to preserve its future.

The Political Level – Between Loyalty and Lack of Vision

Politically, Washington constantly adjusts its global posture. If during 2022–2024 the focus was on consolidating the eastern flank, we are now witnessing a rebalancing — a redistribution of resources toward other areas of interest, including the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. This is not a withdrawal from NATO commitments, but a strategic optimization, in a world where the United States must carefully calibrate its military and financial presence.

Nevertheless, we cannot fail to observe that this rebalancing takes place in Romania and not in Poland, which is also on the eastern flank. Most likely, this is due to a certain political “de-synchronization” that Romania has demonstrated over the 35 years since the events of December 1989, during which it has had to live under the vision of the politicians who governed it[3].

The problem is not what the United States is doing, but what Romania is not doing. For more than three decades, Romania’s strategic discourse has been limited to formulas such as “strategic partnership”, “firm commitment”, “full support for allies.” Although diplomatically correct, these do not constitute a strategic narrative. Romania needs its own story about itself: about its role in the region, its national interests, the balance between security and development.

The absence of such a narrative results in dependence on the perceptions of others. Countries in the region offer contrasting models: Poland asserts itself as a regional leader through massive defense investments; Hungary cultivates its sovereign and mediator profile; Turkey plays the role of pivot between geopolitical blocs. Romania, by contrast, defines itself through strategic silence — it reacts, often belatedly, but rarely acts.

The Military Dimension – Between Presence and Relevance

From a military perspective, the partial withdrawal of U.S. troops does not signify abandonment, but rather a resilience test for Romania’s Armed Forces and national defense system. For years, Romania has relied on allied presence as a security guarantee. Yet external guarantees cannot substitute internal responsibility.

Without a realistic national defense strategy, grounded in its own priorities, Romania risks becoming merely a logistical territory, not a strategic actor. The military infrastructure developed with allied support (the Mihail Kogălniceanu base, the facilities at Câmpia Turzii or Deveselu) must be matched by a competitive national defense industry capable of ensuring minimal autonomy in times of crisis.

At present, Romania continues to lean on the symbolism of the “NATO umbrella” without building its own shield. In a multipolar world where alliances are increasingly flexible, real security is measured in internal capability, not in the number of joint declarations.

The current state of the Romanian Armed Forces unfortunately reflects a growing gap between political rhetoric and operational reality.

In terms of personnel, the army faces a chronic shortage of active troops and reservists. The average age exceeds 40, and voluntary recruitment fails to offset retirements and professional migration. Military education has been partially modernized, but tactical training and adaptation to new forms of warfare (hybrid, cyber, informational) remain insufficient, especially at unit level.

Regarding equipment, Romania has made specific advances (Patriot systems, HIMARS, Piranha armored vehicles, F-16 modernization), but without national industrial and logistical coherence. The absence of an integrated strategy leaves acquisitions largely dependent on imports and allied initiatives, with limited contribution to the domestic defense economy.

As for the national defense industry, it survives more through inertia than vision[4]. Many capacities are unused or technologically outdated, and the production chain no longer covers even basic needs in ammunition, maintenance, and individual equipment. Recent attempts at revitalization (such as reopening powder production in Făgăraș[5]) are welcome, but cannot replace the lack of a coherent defense industrial policy coordinated between the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of National Defense.

Overall, Romania’s military system operates under a structural imbalance: insufficient and partially unprepared personnel, modern equipment but poorly integrated, an inert defense industry, and growing reliance on allied infrastructure. Without a long-term national program reconnecting training, procurement, and domestic production, Romania risks remaining a military transit corridor, not a source of strategic regional resilience.

Romania Between Globalism and Strategic Sovereignty

The absence of a national strategic narrative is visible in Romania’s relation to major global trends. In the context of the confrontation between globalism and sovereignty, Romania has failed to define its own position. The country oscillates between full attachment to Western structures and a latent, content-less sovereigntism.

A state that does not know its priorities cannot claim a regional leadership role. A strategic narrative is not merely a communication exercise, but a national thinking framework: it links foreign policy objectives to economic, energy, defense, and cultural goals.

Without such a framework, Romania risks becoming a transit gate for the interests of others — a buffer zone between spheres of influence, but without true decision-making power. In the absence of a coherent strategy, even the best partnerships become dependencies, and allied presence risks being perceived more as a substitute for internal vision than as the result of conscious planning.

The Need for a Strategic Compass

The partial withdrawal of American troops from Romania is a test of geopolitical clarity. It is not a loss of protection, but an opportunity for reflection. It shows that Romania needs, more than ever, its own strategic compass — an integrated vision of defense, economy, and diplomacy.

A state that aspires to stability and respect must speak through initiative, not reflex. Romania has the resources, geographic position, and historical experience to become a pillar of regional balance, but this cannot be achieved without a coherent internal vision. Yet, the politicians who have led the country for the past 35 years are preoccupied with petty interests, eager to please one side or another to preserve their privileges, and lack strategic vision.

A national strategic research center, a politically educated elite in geopolitics, and an informed society are the minimum conditions for formulating a credible national narrative.

Without it, Romania risks remaining what it has gradually become: a gate open to storms, but without a lighthouse to foresee them. Yet Romania is not condemned to be a gate to storms — it can become the lighthouse that signals them. The choice lies entirely with us.

Brașov, 29 October 2025

[1] An expression inspired by the title of Eusebiu Camilar’s book “Poarta furtunilor” (The Gate of Storms), published by Editura Militară in 1955, which recounts episodes from medieval history, when Romania stood at the crossroads of three empires: Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg.

[2] The decision to suspend the rotation of a U.S. brigade — which was to be deployed across several allied countries, including Romania — was communicated by Romania’s Ministry of National Defense on 29 October 2025. It was specified that approximately 1,000 U.S. troops will remain on Romanian territory, and that the modification concerns primarily the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base (the only location where the rotation of the brigade will no longer take place).

[3] Immediately after 1989, Romania missed the opportunity to unite with the Republic of Moldova, and even concluded a treaty with the USSR, which was already on the verge of collapse. Romania’s integration into the European Union and NATO was achieved with a delay of 5–6 years, after other Eastern European states had already been accepted. This was due to internal reasons: the absence of a consistent political elite, economic fragmentation, and delayed reforms.

Although the political leadership in the United States changed, Romania remained attached to the political orientation of the Obama and Biden administrations, without adapting to the strong conservative shift that occurred in 2024–2025. This is also illustrated by the presence in the Bucharest government, in positions of primary importance, of personalities well-known for their political preferences and public statements openly opposed to the current administration in Washington, including recently through the nomination of a new Deputy Prime Minister and the continued posting in Washington of an underperforming ambassador.

[4] According to data available from September–October 2025, a significant number of enterprises within the National Company Romarm S.A. and its network of military-profile subsidiaries (Uzina Mecanică Cugir, Plopeni, Dragomirești, Sadu, Mija, Carfil, Moreni, Metrom, etc.) do not have their revenue and expenditure budgets approved for the current year.

[5] In December 2005, powder production at the Făgăraș Powder Plant was largely halted. It was only on 27 August 2025 that the Romanian state signed a contract with Rheinmetall — Germany for the construction of a new strategic powder production facility for ammunition, more than three years after the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine.

The Middle East and North Africa: Strategic Competition, Energy and Security Reconfiguring the Global Balance

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November 2, 2025

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The Middle East and North Africa: Strategic Competition, Energy and Security Reconfiguring the Global Balance

“True power in the 21st century no longer lies solely in the strength of arms, but in the ability to connect resources, routes and people.” “In the Middle East, reality changes faster than perceptions, and perceptions often shape reality.”
By Lieutenant General Corneliu Pivariu (ret)

MENA as a Key Space of Global Rebalancing

The Middle East and North Africa – known under the acronym MENA – represent, more than ever, a crossroads of history, religion, energy, and geopolitics.
Here, millennial civilizations, contemporary ideologies, and global economic interests collide and reshape themselves in a continuous process.

We live in an era where transformations unfold at the pace of a historical revolution, and developments in this region have repercussions that reverberate worldwide.
After more than seven decades of almost uninterrupted conflict, MENA now stands at the centre of a new strategic competition where energy, technology, and political influence intertwine within a transforming architecture of power.

The region has become the symbol of the emerging multipolar world – one without a single hegemon, but with a complex network of regional and global powers that cooperate, compete, and condition one another.
This multipolarity does not signify fragmentation, but rather a redistribution of decision-making centres and their adaptation to a logic of strategic interdependence.

Energy and Strategic Interdependence

Energy remains the keystone of power in the Middle East.
The Gulf States – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates – still hold a dominant share of the world’s oil and gas reserves.
However, they no longer play the passive role of resource suppliers. Over the past two decades, these countries have evolved into strategic decision centres, diversifying their economies and investments in technology, infrastructure, defence, and green energy.

A new form of power is thus emerging: not the one that merely extracts the resource, but the one that transforms it, directs it, and connects it.
Green hydrogen, solar energy from the Maghreb, trans-Saharan interconnections, maritime corridors, and port infrastructures now form the circulatory system of the global economy. Energy has become not only the source but also the language of contemporary geopolitics.

As shown in my previous analyses on BRICS and “Globalisation 2.0”, the redistribution of energy and technological flows is shifting the global centre of gravity from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific, with MENA serving as the critical interface between the Global South and the industrialised North.
Energy corridors – from Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb to Suez and the Eastern Mediterranean – are the arteries through which not only energy, but global stability itself, flows.

Europe, faced with its own energy vulnerability since 2022, is rediscovering MENA’s strategic role – not merely as an alternative source, but as an indispensable partner for energy transition and global security.

Strategic Competition among Major Powers

Nowhere is the new global contest for influence more visible than in MENA.
The United States, China, Russia, the European Union, and regional actors – India, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt, and others – simultaneously compete for space, resources, and narrative control.

The United States seeks a balance between partial disengagement and sustained influence, relying on selective partnerships and the consolidation of the Abraham Accords.
China promotes a subtle strategy: through the Belt and Road Initiative and its mediation role (e.g., between Iran and Saudi Arabia), it asserts itself as a major economic and diplomatic actor – without direct military presence.
Russia, though weakened by the war in Ukraine, maintains strategic anchors in Syria, Iran, and Algeria, cultivating asymmetric networks of influence.
The European Union remains the main trade partner, yet still lacks a coherent security strategy for the region.

Meanwhile, India discreetly expands its economic and technological footprint in the Gulf and East Africa, while BRICS+ increasingly emerges as an attractive platform for Arab states seeking to diversify their financial and energy partnerships.

Regional actors are also asserting greater autonomy:
– Iran capitalises on the “axis of resistance” (Hezbollah, the Houthis, Shiite militias);
– Saudi Arabia diversifies its partnerships and aspires to a global role within BRICS+;
– Turkey adopts a flexible stance between NATO, Russia, and the Muslim world;
– Israel, as I have shown in the study “Super Sparta”, strengthens its technological and intelligence superiority, but faces a serious erosion of image and growing diplomatic isolation amid the Gaza crisis.

In the logic of the new realpolitik, competition is no longer purely military but also narrative: each actor strives to define the meaning of world order, to impose its own framework of legitimacy and its own version of international normality.

Security and Instability – Fragile Equilibria

The Gaza crisis remains the epicentre of tensions.
After a year of open conflict, the human and political toll is tragic: tens of thousands of victims, massive destruction, a paralysed peace process, and a climate of hatred fuelling new generations of radicalism.
The elimination of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders has not brought stability – only a pause between two phases of the same confrontation.

The war in Gaza has become a symbol of a world increasingly unable to negotiate lasting peace – the latest agreement concluded in Egypt being a telling example.
Behind the military confrontation lies a battle for narrative control: who is the aggressor, who is the victim, and who defines the legitimacy of action?
This is the purest expression of the strategic narrative – a concept that redefines the relationship between power and perception in the 21st century.

The expansion of the conflict through attacks from Yemen and the pressure on Red Sea maritime routes shows that regionalised warfare has already become a reality.
Against this backdrop, Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia attempt cautious mediation efforts, but the lack of consensus among major powers keeps peace as a more declarative than substantive objective.

Security in MENA today is a fragile mosaic in which local stability depends on global balances, and each conflict represents a link in a broader geopolitical chain.
In a deeper historical sense, we are witnessing a reactivation of post-Ottoman fragmentations, where symbolic frontiers have returned stronger than geographic ones.

Romania and MENA – Between Experience and Opportunity

Romania has a solid and long-standing tradition of dialogue and balance in the Middle East, dating back to the Cold War era.
During the 1970s and 1980s, Romanian diplomacy was respected in Cairo, Damascus, Tehran, and Tel Aviv – as well as in Washington, Beijing, and other capitals – for its capacity to maintain open channels between antagonistic camps.

After 1990, this vocation gradually faded.
Foreign policy focused almost exclusively on the Euro-Atlantic vector, while regional expertise diminished.
Nevertheless, the current context provides a genuine opportunity for strategic re-engagement – even if the present diplomatic leadership seems little, if at all, concerned with seizing it.

Romania could act along three main directions:

Energy and infrastructure – through the Port of Constanța and the Rail2Sea and Danube2Sea projects, which could logistically connect Eastern Europe with the Mediterranean and MENA, strengthening its position within the Three Seas Initiative.
Education and cultural diplomacy – by expanding university cooperation with Arab states and creating a framework for training regional specialists, continuing the former tradition of expertise and balance.
Mediation diplomacy – by reviving a foreign policy based on credibility, continuity, and active balance.

A major advantage for Romania is that it is a European state without a colonial past in the region, a trait that offers it genuine potential for credible partnership with the Global South.

As highlighted in Global Geopolitical Evolutions up to 2050, Romania has the vocation of a bridge between North and South, between Europe and the Orient, provided it assumes a pragmatic, not merely declarative, role within the global architecture.

MENA as the Laboratory of the New World Order

The Middle East and North Africa have become the testing ground of the multipolar order.
Here intersect the new forms of power: economic, energetic, technological, and informational.
Here, too, the parameters of European security are indirectly being shaped.

The region is no longer merely an object of great power competition, but an autonomous actor capable of influencing global trends.
For Romania, the challenge is clear: not to observe these transformations from the sidelines, but to take part in them – through dialogue, expertise, and vision.

In a world where the “force of arms” is increasingly replaced by the power of connections, true influence will be measured by the ability to understand, anticipate, and connect.
The future will not belong solely to the greatest powers, but also to those who can build bridges between them – and Romania has the chance to be among these, if it ceases to act merely as a docile executor of directives from Brussels or elsewhere, and instead acts with professionalism and strategic vision.

Presentation delivered at the 11th MEPEI Forum “Middle East from Chaos to the New (Dis)Order”, Bucharest, 30 October 2025.

Selective Bibliography

International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2025, Paris, 2025.
Chatham House, Middle East Energy Transition: Opportunities and Risks, London, 2024.
Brookings Institution, The New Middle East Order: Power and Partnership in the Post-Oil Era, Washington DC, 2024.
RAND Corporation, US Strategic Posture in the Middle East 2023–2030, Santa Monica, 2023.
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2025, London, 2025.
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), BRICS+ and the Global South: Implications for Energy and Security, Washington, 2024.
Miskimmon, A., O’Loughlin, B., Roselle, L., Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order, Routledge, 2013.
United Nations ESCWA, Arab Regional Outlook 2025: Connectivity, Energy, and Climate Transition, Beirut, 2025.
Corneliu Pivariu, Global Geopolitical Evolutions up to 2050, Financial Intelligence, Bucharest, 2025.

Building bridges between strategic cultures

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October 31, 2025

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Building bridges between strategic cultures

By Captain Edouard Jonnet, French Defence Attaché in the Netherlands

France and the Netherlands are both NATO and EU founding members, but have inherited sometimes differing strategic cultures. The war in Ukraine, the situation in the Middle East and the Caribbean, among others, lead us to rethink how to defend our shared interests. As a defense attaché, one of my duties is to cultivate a shared strategic thinking and foster our “intellectual re-armament”.

Beyond the percentages of GDP allocated to defense, this intellectual re-armament should allow us to shape our military capabilities in a way that will enable us to prevail in the event of a high-intensity conflict. In this spirit, the participation of the Netherlands as guests of honour in the Paris Defense and Strategy Forum last March and the Franco-Dutch Defense Talks in September are examples of how to build bridges between our strategic cultures.

In the past months, several developments had a positive impact on the build-up of a common strategic culture.

Lessons learned from WWII encourage us to develop a common strategic culture. The 2024 twining between the municipalities of Kapelle and Orry La Ville supports this way forward.

At the beginning of the Second World War, France was the only country to deploy large units to support Dutch Armed forces in Brabant and Zeeland in May 1940. Most remarkably, after the capitulation, Dutch troops in Zeeland kept fighting for a few more days under French command. Nowadays, French soldiers who died in the Netherlands during WWII are buried in the town of Kapelle. To a certain extent, the poor coordination between French and Dutch forces back in 1940 had been nurtured by the lack of a shared strategic culture. This lesson learned from history should not be forgotten now.

It is also worth noting that, in similar fashion, Dutch forces fought on French soil. The Princess Irene brigade took part in the battle of Normandy in 1944, and Dutch soldiers are buried in the cemetery of Orry La Ville. In 2024, Orry La Ville and Kapelle have officialized their twinning programme, during a moving ceremony in Orry[1].

Training with similar equipment is a catalyst for a common strategic culture build up

In terms of capabilities, the acquisition by the Netherlands of four Orka-class submarines from Naval Group and its Dutch partners marks a turning point[2]. Beyond the industrial links that will emerge from this cooperation, it is also an opportunity to build up a shared strategic thinking on submarine warfare and therefore contribute together to the security of Europe in the coming decades. As a defense attaché, but more importantly as a submariner, I am of course very enthusiastic about this perspective. Several other projects regarding helicopters, mine warfare, radars and smaller equipment are also great opportunities to build bridges between our strategic cultures, just like radars or other.

Organizations’ rapprochement eases a common strategic culture

The creation of a Joint Force command[3] in the Dutch ministry of defense is a very interesting move. The Dutch organization will be more joint and closer to the French organigram. This kind of rapprochement should not be underestimated. Officers will definitely be more eager to exchange information if they don’t struggle to grasp someone else’s organization.

In a way, evolutions towards similar organigrams and decision-making processes are key topics for bringing strategic cultures closer.

Even if there is still room for improvement in order to bring our strategic cultures ever closer, the evolutions of the last few years have been significant and encourage us to move forward with greater energy and will.

Finally, strategic culture is about learning who we are, and understanding each other. It may be the most decisive step of the much-needed intellectual rearmament of Europe.

[1] https://www.kapelle.nl/orry-la-ville-et-kapelle

[2] https://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2024/06/12/politieke-steun-voor-bouw-onderzeeboten-door-naval-group

[3] https://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2025/09/04/met-joint-force-command-beter-voorbereid-op-grootschalig-conflict

General Elections in the Netherlands 29 October 2025

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October 30, 2025

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General Elections in the Netherlands 29 October 2025

By Roy Lie Atjam

Early general elections took place in the Netherlands on Wednesday, October 29, 2025, to elect members of the House of Representatives. Initially scheduled for 2028, they were accelerated due to the collapse of the Schoof cabinet after the Party for Freedom (PVV) withdrew from the coalition.

Voter turnout reached 76%. The House of Representatives comprises 150 seats, with 76 needed for a majority. Since 1894, no party has achieved a majority due to the country’s proportional representation system, making coalition formation necessary after extensive negotiations.

Electoral System – Elections occur every four years in March unless a snap election is called. The 150 members are elected through semi-open lists in a single nationwide constituency, requiring a minimum of 0.67% of votes to qualify for seat distribution. Voters can cast preferential votes, with seats allocated first to candidates who meet a threshold of 25% of the Hare quota. Any remaining seats are filled based on candidates’ positions on the list.Unlike the Westminster model, the Dutch make use of a proportional representation system, making it highly unlikely for any one party to obtain a majority. Instead, it is expected that a coalition of political parties will be formed after a period of extensive negotiations.

Election Day – Polling stations operated from 7:30 AM to 9:00 PM, with a few in Arnhem, Zwolle, opening shortly after midnight. Train station booths opened early for convenience.

Voting from Abroad – Dutch citizens abroad could vote if they registered with the Municipality of The Hague by September 17, 2025. Transfer of voting passes and proxy voting were permitted.

Electoral Council – The Electoral Council oversees elections and acts as an advisory body on voting laws and procedures.

Possible coalitions

D66 leader Rob Jetten experienced a triumphant night, while left-wing leader Frans Timmermans faced significant setbacks. The spotlight also turned to the far-right figure Geert Wilders, raising intriguing questions about potential coalitions.

Several parties, including GroenLinks/PvdA, VVD, and CDA, have made it clear they do not want to ally with the PVV.

Mr. Jetten has expressed a preference for a coalition that includes the CDA, GroenLinks-PvdA, and VVD. A centre-left coalition could secure 86 seats, whereas a centre-right alliance with D66 would only reach 75 seats—insufficient for a governing majority.

The results with 98% of the votes counted
D66 26
PVV 26
VVD 22
GL-PvdA 20
CDA 18
JA21 9
FvD 7
BBB 4
SP 3
Denk 3
PvdD 3
SGP 3
CU 2
Volt 0
50+ 2

Election results will be validated on November 7, 2025, with the new House of Representatives convening on November 12, 2025.

Explores the Impact of Artificial Intelligence on International Arbitration

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October 28, 2025

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Explores the Impact of Artificial Intelligence on International Arbitration

New Book by Dr. Fernando Messias Published by Springer Nature

Lisbon, 28 November 2025 — Portuguese lawyer and researcher Dr. Fernando Messias has released his new book, “The Practice of Law and International Arbitration in the Age of Artificial Intelligence”, published by Springer Nature. The publication offers an in-depth analysis of how artificial intelligence is transforming legal practice and international dispute resolution.

Springer Nature, one of the world’s leading academic publishers, is renowned for its rigorous peer-review process and scientific excellence. It publishes thousands of peer-reviewed journals and books annually, serving as a global benchmark for research quality and trusted scholarship.

Dr. Messias’s book examines the ethical, organisational, and procedural implications of integrating artificial intelligence into law and arbitration. Drawing on interdisciplinary research spanning law, ethics, and organisational psychology, it proposes a forward-looking framework for the responsible incorporation of AI in international arbitration.

Impact of Artificial Intelligence on International Arbitration

The official book launch will take place during the international seminar “AI and International Arbitration – Ethical and Practical Challenges in Light of the New CIArb Guidelines”, to be held on 28 November 2025 in Lisbon. The event is supported by the Fundação Lusíada, the CIArb Iberian Chapter, and Springer Nature.

Confirmed speakers include Professor Dr. Diogo Leite de Campos, Dr. Abel Lacerda Botelho, Prof. Nazareth Romero, Dr. João Valadas Coriel, Dr. Claire Morel de Westgaver, Dr. Eduardo Gómez, Dra. Silvana Marcotulli, among others.

The seminar will also feature the attendance of the President of the Portuguese Bar Association, underscoring the institutional importance of this discussion on the evolving role of artificial intelligence in legal practice and international arbitration.

For more information on the book, visit:
Springer Nature – The Practice of Law and International Arbitration in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

Czech Republic Reiterates Commitment to Victims of Rome Statute Crimes

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October 27, 2025

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Czech Republic Reiterates Commitment to Victims of Rome Statute Crimes

The Czech Republic, a State Party to the International Criminal Court (ICC) since 2009, has made an unrestricted voluntary contribution of EUR 20,000 to the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV), reaffirming its steadfast commitment to international justice and the rights of victims of crimes under the Rome Statute.

Mr. Andres Parmas, Chair of the Board of Directors of the Trust Fund for Victims at the ICC, stated:

“This continued support highlights the Czech Republic’s dedication to addressing the harm endured by victims of Rome Statute crimes. Through this contribution, the Czech Republic demonstrates its commitment to justice and to ensuring that victims of the most horrendous crimes regain their hope, dignity, and ability to rebuild their lives.”

H.E. René Miko, Ambassador of the Czech Republic to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, remarked:

“I am pleased to announce the Czech Republic’s contribution to the Trust Fund for Victims at the ICC. Its mandate to support those who have suffered harm constitutes an inherent component of international law. Reparations and assistance provided by the Trust Fund are vital parts of restorative justice and reconciliation, complementing the role of the International Criminal Court.”

Since 2011, the Czech Republic has consistently supported TFV programmes benefiting victims through sustained and progressively increasing voluntary contributions.

For more information about the Trust Fund for Victims at the ICC, please contact trustfundforvictims@icc-cpi.int or visit www.trustfundforvictims.org

Negotiating Peace in a Fragmented World: The Case for Preventative Diplomacy

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October 27, 2025

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Negotiating Peace in a Fragmented World: The Case for Preventative Diplomacy

By Mr. Rabbih El-Haddad, Director of the Division for Multilateral Diplomacy at UNITAR

Across the world, fractures appear to be widening faster than old wounds can heal. Conflicts that were once local now reverberate globally while new crises – pandemics, climate change, and mass displacement – place unprecedented strain upon our established systems of cooperation. In such a landscape, it might seem as though the time for preventative diplomacy has passed. However, the commitment to negotiate before disputes spiral out of control has never been more important.

Preventative diplomacy has always been one of the most vital, yet most understated tools of the United Nations. It tends to operate outside of the spotlight, seeking to de-escalate tensions through dialogue and mediation rather than force. Though its successes may rarely make headlines, its absence is unmistakable in the devastation left by war. The conflicts that dominate our headlines today illustrate the immense cost of waiting too long to negotiate and remind us that prevention is not only more humane, but far less costly than response and reconstruction. As the United Nations commemorates its 80th anniversary, this is a moment to reaffirm the founding vision of the Charter: that lasting peace is built not only on agreements, but on the constant practice of dialogue, cooperation, and trust.

Preventive diplomacy begins with that trust, both between parties in a conflict and in the multilateral institutions that make dialogue possible. The erosion of this trust has made prevention harder to sustain than ever. Rebuilding it therefore calls for a renewed culture of engagement across divisions, where listening and inclusion form the foundation of collective action.

In this spirit, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research is proud to announce the second edition of World Negotiation Day, which will be taking place on the 8^th of December 2025 in Doha, Qatar. Hosted by UNITAR in collaboration with the Doha Forum and QatarDebate, this year’s event is structured around the theme “Negotiating Peace in a Fragmented World: The Case for Preventative Diplomacy.” Qatar has emerged as a key mediator in some of the world’s most complex and protracted conflicts, and its sustained commitment to dialogue makes Doha a particularly meaningful host for this initiative.

The forum will convene leading voices from international organizations, governments, and civil society to examine how negotiation can, and must, be revitalized as the first line of defense against conflict. Its agenda features an opening ceremony, a high-level panel, and the presentation of the “Doha Best Negotiator of the Year” award, which honors an individual whose skills, integrity, and impact in negotiation have contributed meaningfully to international peace and cooperation.

As fragmentation threatens the foundation of multilateralism, we must resist the temptation to believe that dialogue is no longer sufficient or effective. Negotiation is not a relic of a more optimistic age, but the pathway to a more sustainable one.

For more information or to submit nominations for the Doha Best Negotiator of the Year Award, please contact dwnd@unitar.org. Registration for in-person and online participation is open through UNITAR’s website.

About the author:

Mr. Rabbih El-Haddad is the Director of the Division for Multilateral Diplomacy of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), his work focuses on supporting governments, decision-makers, multilateral negotiators and the numerous negotiating groups that use diplomacy and negotiation as tools to defend their national interests in a complex context.

China Defined – Propositions on the meaning of “developing country” in the World Trade Organization

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October 27, 2025

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China Defined – Propositions on the meaning of “developing country” in the World Trade Organization

By Isa Jeziah Dookie

“CHEATING,” is how President Donald Trump described China’s self-designation as a developing country in the World Trade Organization (WTO). One might be forgiven for dismissing President Trump’s tweet as just another bombastic Trumpism were it not for the fact that the subsequent U.S. administration and the U.S. Congress made it clear this, albeit in more diplomatic but no less strong words, was U.S. policy. Under the Biden administration, the (unpretentiously named) “PRC Is Not a Developing Country Act” cleared the House in a 415-0 vote and was approved by a Senate committee, though it has not yet been enacted into law. The U.S. remains firm in its stance that China should not receive developing-country treatment at the WTO.

China, for its part, labelled President Trump’s cheating allegation as the absurd trickery of a global hegemon and has staunchly defended its position before the WTO, maintaining that it is merely the world’s largest developing economy. However, in September 2025, China announced that while it continues to regard itself as a developing country, it will no longer seek Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) in current and future WTO negotiations, a significant policy shift aimed at defusing the long-running U.S.–China dispute. Even so, Beijing’s declaration does not affect its existing WTO commitments or its broader developing-country narrative, leaving the debate over how “development” should be defined very much alive.

The WTO should adopt objective but non-deterministic criteria for deciding which countries are “developing countries” for the purpose of WTO trade agreements and which are not. The decision on whether a country is developing should be placed before the Dispute Settlement Body as a strategy to break the deadlock on the WTO Appellate Body.

The Dispute: Redefining “Developing” in the WTO Order

In the aftermath of World War II, the United States and its allies rebuilt global institutions on principles of fairness, justice, and non-discrimination, establishing the United Nations to safeguard peace and human rights and creating a new economic order, embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and later the WTO, to promote equal access to trade, economic collaboration, and shared prosperity.

The WTO trade order rests on five core principles: non-discrimination, freer trade, predictability, fair competition, and support for development. Non-discrimination, through Most-Favoured Nation and national treatment rules, ensures equal trading conditions among members. Together with tariff reduction, transparent commitments, competitive fairness, and flexibility for developing nations, these principles aim to create a stable and equitable global trading system.

Concessions for developing countries in the WTO

The WTO’s founding promise was clear: give developing nations, especially the poorest, a fair share of global trade, but in practice, those lofty words often clash with limited capacity and uneven benefits. In line with the stated principle to encourage development and economic reform, the WTO agreements contain special provisions to the benefit of developing countries by offering special rights or extra leniency. This is referred to as “special and differential treatment” (SDT).

Developing countries are facilitated by being allowed extra time to fulfil their commitments, given greater market access to increasing trading opportunities, having their interests safeguarded, and being helped. Developing countries enjoy limited trade advantages under WTO rules.For instance, the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement exempts those with a per capita GNP under $1,000 from subsidy bans and grants all developing members a grace period to phase out export subsidies. They also benefit from the Generalized System of Preferences, which lowers tariffs on their exports to developed nations, and from preferential trade arrangements among developing countries themselves.

China’s WTO Accession and the “Developing Country” Status

In the WTO’s world, countries decide for themselves whether they’re ‘developing’; a self-declared status that lets China and others claim benefits meant for the world’s poorest nations.

When China joined the WTO in 2001, it claimed developing-country status but was pressed by the U.S. and EU to accept stricter “WTO-plus” terms eliminating subsidies without a transition period and waiving rights under Article 27 of the Subsidies Agreement. Two decades later, Beijing highlighted its over-compliance, cutting tariffs on manufactured goods to 2.8% below required levels and opening 20 more service sectors than pledged, yet critics argue it still lags on subsidy disclosure and reform of its vast state-owned enterprises.

The USA’ led complaints

From the start, developed nations bristled at China’s ‘developing country’ label, a dispute that has since snowballed into a global backlash against self-designation even stalling the Doha talks.

In February 2019, the U.S. escalated its challenge to the WTO’s self-declared “developing country” system, warning in a 45-page paper that the practice was outdated, stifled liberalization, and risked making the WTO irrelevant; it also tabled a draft decision urging that wealthier members forgo special treatment in future trade talks.

U.S. lawmakers have taken a united stand against China’s “developing country” label. After the protectionist Inflation Reduction Act, Congress introduced Mitt Romney’s Ending China’s Developing Nation Status Act, and the PRC Is Not a Developing Country Act, which orders the State Department to identify all treaties granting China leniency based on development status within 180 days, a clear signal that Washington’s patience has run out.

Self Designation – Is It Really the Issue?

Analysts argue that China’s “developing country” status offers little real benefit, since it cut industrial tariffs to 9.5% from the usual 31.4% and agricultural tariffs to 15.1% from 37.9%, showing that even as a self-declared developing nation, it received almost no preferential treatment.

While accession concessions dilute the strength of SDT, they remain a key bargaining tool for developing nations. Developed members negotiate on the assumption that such countries need incentives to join the free trade system, calibrating SDT reductions to their economic limitations. Today’s backlash arises from the view that China’s remaining SDT benefits, once justified by its developmental status, now grant it an unfair competitive edge it no longer needs.

India made a different case that the label does not matter. India argued that most SDT provisions in the WTO covered agreements are imprecise, unenforceable and in the form of ‘best endeavour clauses, noting that though Members can declare themselves as developing, their specific rights and obligations are still subject to negotiations.

India’s stance carries weight. Developing-country status under the WTO is less a fixed label than a flexible negotiating tool that depends on each nation’s economic capacity and trade needs. The law merely requires developed members to avoid demanding reciprocal concessions that exceed those capacities. From this perspective, debates over who “is” a developing country miss the point, the real question is how development needs should be assessed case by case in future negotiations.

The EU’s proposal for a targeted, evidence-based approach to SDT reflects a shift toward practicality, moving away from broad, open-ended exemptions. This approach assumes that SDT was a mechanism designed by developed countries to help or control developing nations within a global trade framework. Yet the balance of advantage has shifted: rather than a gateway to economic liberalization, SDT has become a strategic shield for emerging powers like China, which have used it to expand global market access while limiting exposure to intrusive trade rules. In this light, debates over original intent are secondary to present realities; if China truly gained no advantage from its developing status, it would have little reason to resist mounting pressure to give it up.

Alternatives to Self-Designation

If the era of self-designation is to end, what is to replace it? In its draft decision, the United States proposed that WTO members falling into any of four categories should no longer qualify for SDT: those belonging to or seeking accession to the OECD, members of the G20, countries classified by the World Bank as “high income,” or those accounting for at least 0.5% of global merchandise trade. These are independent disqualifiers; meeting even one would exclude a member from SDT, and the proposal also reserves the right to deny SDT to other developing countries in specific sectors.

The U.S. justified this approach to modernize WTO rules, yet each criterion raises questions. OECD membership is treated as proof of “developed” status, even though this effectively substitutes one form of self-declaration for another. G20 membership is offered with no clear rationale, despite including entities like the EU and the African Union that are not countries. The World Bank’s income classification provides a more objective measure, though its thresholds are arguably arbitrary. The trade volume test, set at 0.5% of global merchandise trade, is equally problematic, as it ignores the nature of exports and unfairly penalizes populous economies such as China.

Critics argue that these criteria are designed to target China, which meets several of them, and to curtail SDT for emerging economies more broadly. China denounced the proposal as relying on “flawed” indicators that exaggerate development levels, while India condemned it as “arbitrary” and “divisive,” suspecting it to be a strategy to phase out SDT altogether.

Two weeks after the U.S. unveiled its proposal, China, India, and several developing nations fired back with a joint statement invoking Thomas Jefferson’s warning that “nothing is more unequal than the equal treatment of unequal people.” They defended self-declaration as the fairest way to define developing-country status, acknowledging economic progress but stressing that indicators like per capita GDP, poverty, undernourishment, agricultural dependence, and energy disparities still justify differential treatment.

What criteria then?

While agreeing with the U.S. that self-declaration should be replaced by objective measures, the U.S. criteria, based largely on membership and size, fall short of true objectivity. A fairer approach would combine measurable indicators like GDP per capita, poverty and undernourishment rates, life expectancy, and the share of high-value trade and services, reflecting real quality of life and economic capacity. Such a multi-factor model would prevent any single metric from being decisive, with disputes over classification settled by the WTO’s dispute resolution system, once, that is, the U.S. agrees to restore the Appellate Body it helped disable.

About the author:

Isa Jeziah Dookie is a multi-jurisdictional lawyer called to the Bars of England & Wales, Trinidad & Tobago, and Ontario, Canada. He carries qualifications in business law and middle-eastern law, and has appeared before various courts and panels in the Caribbean, Canada, and the UK, at the first-instance and appellate levels.

Bridging the Future: Strengthening Economic and Security Ties between Romania and the Kingdom of the Netherlands

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October 24, 2025

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Bridging the Future: Strengthening Economic and Security Ties between Romania and the Kingdom of the Netherlands

By H.E. Mr. Nicolae Comanescu, Ambassador of Romania to the Kingdom of the Netherlands

In recent years, the diplomatic, economic, and security relationships between Romania and the Kingdom of the Netherlands have witnessed significant growth and development. Rooted in shared values and interests, the bilateral cooperation continues to evolve, reflecting both countries’ commitment to enhancing their partnership in a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape.

Diplomatic Engagements and NATO Cooperation

Building on this strong foundation, this year marks 145 years of diplomatic relations between Romania and the Netherlands, highlighting the enduring partnership between the two countries. Recent high-profile diplomatic engagements, including meetings between the Romanian and Dutch foreign ministers, have reaffirmed their shared commitment to deepening cooperation across political, security, economic, technological, and cultural domains. This interaction was further illustrated by Romania’s active involvement in the NATO Summit held in The Hague in June 2025, where discussions focused on bolstering defense capacities amid the ongoing geopolitical challenges in Eastern Europe. The ongoing war of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine has galvanized both nations to reinforce their commitment to NATO and European security.

Both countries are united in supporting Ukraine against this aggression, firmly believing in the importance of European solidarity and the defense of common values. The NATO Summit in The Hague in June 2025 marked a critical point in enhancing strategic military cooperation, with Romania benefiting from the stationing of NATO battle groups on its territory, further integrating into the collective defense framework.

The bilateral military cooperation has been strengthened through visits and meetings attended by Dutch military officials and their Romanian counterparts. A pivotal agreement emerged during the NATO Summit, with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on the expansion of the F-16 Training Center in Romania – highlighting the countries’ joint commitment to improving their defense capabilities.

Economic Collaboration

Beyond security, the economic relationship between Romania and the Netherlands has been flourishing. The Netherlands is one of the largest foreign investors in Romania, accounting for approximately 20% of total foreign direct investments, with a social subscribed and paid-in registered capital of €9.9 billion and more than 25 billion euro total invested capital across various sectors. Over 6,200 Romanian-Dutch joint ventures and a bilateral trade turnover in goods amounted to 9 billion euro in 2024 and around to 10 billion euro expected in 2025, signify the robust economic ties between the two nations. Based on this, Netherlands occupies the 7^th place in the ranking of the trade partners of Romania, both on export and import.

In the ever-evolving European landscape, the two countries are currently identifying cooperative projects between their defense industries, leveraging new frameworks supported by the European Commission, such as the Readiness 2030 Plan (ReArm Europe) and the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation. There is unexploited potential for collaboration within these sectors, and both nations are poised to maximize resources to achieve NATO’s capability targets.

A significant upcoming event, the NATO-Industry Forum set to be held in Bucharest in November 2025, serves to further enhance economic cooperation in the defense sector. This forum will create opportunities for increased engagement between transatlantic defense industries, allowing for extensive bilateral contacts.

Near-Shoring Initiatives

Further cooperation has erupted in the production industry, with Romanian and Dutch companies exploring joint ventures aimed at attracting new orders and relocating manufacturing from Asia. This “near-shoring” policy is particularly relevant in the current global and regional geopolitical and economic climate, and it promises to stimulate local economies while enhancing resilience in supply chains.

Supported by one of the largest pools of IT specialists in Central and Eastern Europe, Romania is emerging as a regional high-tech hub, with recent significant investments from the Netherlands in microchip and R&D projects underscoring the maturity of its tech ecosystem and the growing confidence of international investors.

The agri-food sector attracts strong interest from both sides, as numerous Dutch investors are already active in our country and Romania aiming to enhance the value of its high agricultural potential.

Cultural Ties as a Foundation for Cooperation

Cultural initiatives significantly complement the economic and security cooperation between Romania and the Netherlands. In September 2025, a major exhibition was inaugurated and open to the public at the H-Art Museum in Amsterdam. This exhibition features over 30 sculptures by the renowned Romanian artist Constantin Brâncuși, alongside photographs, drawings, and archival materials, all inspired by Brâncuși’s studio, a space he deemed sacred. The exhibition will remain open to the public until January 20, 2026.

The last retrospective of Brâncuși’s work in the Netherlands was held 50 years ago, and the exhibition is expected to attract over 100,000 visitors, marking a significant cultural milestone. Such cultural exchanges serve to reinforce the deep-rooted ties between the nations, showcasing shared heritage and enhancing mutual understanding.

Summarizing, the relationship between Romania and the Kingdom of the Netherlands is characterized by dynamic cooperation across economic, security, and cultural dimensions. Marking 145 years of diplomatic relations, both nations are committed to strengthening their partnership in addressing current challenges, promoting shared values, and exploring new avenues of growth. As they continue to navigate the complexities of the current geopolitical landscape, the future looks promising for the further deepening of their long-standing and flourishing ties.

The Bridge Between Our Nations

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October 24, 2025

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A Conversation with H.E. Mr. Almir Šahović, Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Diplomat Magazine had the pleasure of meeting H.E. Mr. Almir Šahović, Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Permanent Representative to the OPCW, for an insightful discussion on the evolving relations between his country and the Netherlands. The Ambassador shared thoughtful reflections on diplomacy, economic cooperation, cultural ties, and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s European aspirations.

Speaking about the current state of relations between the two nations, Ambassador Šahović said:

“The relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Netherlands are very good and friendly. We enjoy strong political and economic ties, and the Netherlands is the seventh most important foreign investor in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are pleased to see a growing number of Dutch companies interested in working with Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Bosnian companies starting to invest in the Netherlands.”

“Another important link between our two countries is the Bosnian and Herzegovinian diaspora. Around 60,000 people from Bosnia and Herzegovina live in the Netherlands. They serve as a true bridge between our nations — real ambassadors of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Netherlands, and of the Netherlands in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

When asked about Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress toward European integration, Ambassador Šahović reaffirmed that EU membership remains the country’s highest foreign policy goal.

“EU accession is the highest priority of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s foreign policy. In this context, we highly appreciate the Netherlands’ support for our European path. We are aware that the traditional Dutch approach to EU enlargement is summarized by the principle ‘strict but fair,’ and that the Netherlands sometimes places greater emphasis on the full implementation of conditions required from candidate countries than some other EU partners.

All the more, we are pleased that the Netherlands has recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina’s strong commitment to its European future. Over the past four years, we succeeded in securing Dutch support for the EU’s decision to grant Bosnia and Herzegovina candidate status, as well as for the opening of accession negotiations with our country.”

On the topic of EU-level initiatives such as border security and institutional capacity building, the Ambassador stressed Bosnia and Herzegovina’s alignment with Dutch and EU efforts:

“We strongly support the Netherlands’ participation in EU-level initiatives such as border security cooperation and institutional capacity building. These initiatives are crucial not only for EU member states but also for candidate countries, as they help strengthen overall regional stability and preparedness for eventual EU membership.”

Looking toward the future, Ambassador Šahović noted several promising areas for bilateral cooperation, highlighting culture as a growing field of exchange:

“In general, I believe there is still much potential to further intensify cooperation between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Netherlands — not only in politics and the economy, but also in the field of culture. A good example of this was the exhibition of the artwork Bird of Peace by the renowned Bosnian artist Mirza Morić, which was displayed in front of The Hague City Hall last summer. It demonstrated the great potential for cultural collaboration between our two countries.”

When discussing people-to-people connections, Ambassador Šahović underlined their importance for lasting understanding:

“People-to-people connections are essential for building understanding and practical cooperation between our two countries. As Ambassador, I strive to encourage such activities by visiting various Dutch cities and institutions. We have established particularly strong cooperation between Sarajevo and The Hague, especially involving young people.

I have also visited Maastricht, Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Groningen to promote local-level cooperation. In addition, I regularly give lectures on Bosnia and Herzegovina at different Dutch universities, helping to deepen academic and cultural ties between our nations.”

He also referred to the shared remembrance of the Srebrenica Genocide as a deeply meaningful component of bilateral understanding:

“In close cooperation with the Association of Survivors of the Srebrenica Genocide, as well as with the City of The Hague and several other cities and universities — particularly Utrecht University — we regularly organize and participate in various activities aimed at preserving the memory of and honoring the victims of the Srebrenica Genocide.

The Srebrenica Genocide forms part of our shared Bosnia and Herzegovina–Dutch history and our common memory.”

Reflecting on his tenure of more than four years in the Netherlands, the Ambassador shared highlights of his diplomatic achievements:

“Having served for over four years as Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Netherlands and Permanent Representative to the OPCW, I am proud of the results we have achieved.

Among other accomplishments, we successfully organized two official presidential visits from Bosnia and Herzegovina. As I mentioned earlier, we also secured Dutch support for the EU’s decision to grant Bosnia and Herzegovina candidate status and to open accession negotiations.

Furthermore, Bosnia and Herzegovina was, for the first time, elected as a member of the Bureau of the International Criminal Court.

I also had the honor of being elected Chairperson of the 29th Conference of the States Parties to the OPCW and was entrusted by the OPCW Member States to chair the Open-Ended Working Group on the implementation of rules governing the election of members of the Executive Council.”

Ambassador Šahović’s words reflect a vision of partnership built on dialogue, shared values, and human connection. The bridge between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Netherlands — strengthened by trade, culture, and the dynamic Bosnian community — continues to stand as an attribute of friendship, cooperation, and mutual respect.

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