China has become a strategic partner for many countries in the Middle East. China’s role has expanded greatly with Chinese President Xi Jinping‘s announcement in 2013 of the Belt and Road Initiative, which is the cornerstone of the modern Chinese strategy.
Egypt became the first Arab country to recognize the People’s Republic of China, after establishing diplomatic ties with it in 1956. In 1958, Iraq established diplomatic relations with China. In 1971, China established diplomatic connections with Turkey and Iran. Between 1990 and 1992, China established diplomatic ties with a number of Arab and Middle Eastern countries.
The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China convened on October 18, 2017, with President Xi Jinping delivering his report. International relations need to be rethought in his view in order to foster an environment of mutual respect, fairness and justice that benefits both parties, as well as the creation of a global community dedicated to building an open and prosperous world for all its members. These ideas should be taken into consideration while discussing Chinese policy in the Middle East.
In 2004, the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum conducted a ministerial meeting. Sino-Arab collaborative expansion of the strategic relationship was agreed to during Tianjin’s Fourth Ministerial Meeting in 2010 between China and Arab nations. There were three breakthroughs during the Sixth Ministerial Meeting: nuclear energy, space satellites and alternative energy sources were all mentioned by the Chinese President Xi Jinping as the three pillars of a ‘1 + 2 + 3’ cooperation pattern
Sino-Arab future-oriented strategic partnership of comprehensive cooperation and mutual development was agreed upon by the two sides in July 2018. The most crucial document in China’s Middle East policy was President Xi’s address to the Arab League’s headquarters on January 22nd.
Arab-Chinese relationship has long been seen strategically by China. China’s diplomatic principle has traditionally been to strengthen and promote the longstanding friendship between China and the Arab world. Rather than forming an alliance, China wants to create a network of connections across the region. A “strategic partnership” between China and Turkey was established in October 2010; a “strategic partnership” between China and Israel was founded in March 2017.
After visiting Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 2013, President Xi launched the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. China urged Arab countries to join the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road during the 2014 CASCF meeting. For this reason, the Arab Policy Paper states, “China is ready to coordinate development plans with Arab governments, establish international production capacity, and boost cooperation in various industries”.
Economic growth has taken place in the Suez Canal Economic Zone in Egypt, the Khalifa Industrial Zone in Abu Dhabi as well as Duqm and Jizan. Solar energy collaboration is on the table. In May 2017, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was invited to attend the first Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF). Second BRF in Beijing in April 2019 brought together Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and UAE Vice President Muhammed bin Rashid.
The Belt and Road Initiative is more than simply a series of land and maritime linkages; it is a network of partnerships and projects. The Middle East is the China’s principal source of crude oil. Among the top ten oil suppliers to China are Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Oman and Kuwait. CNPC and CNOOC signed 25-year contracts with Qatar in April 2008 to buy 3 million tons of LNG per year each. Qatar signed a new 22-year contract with CNPC to provide 3.4 million tons of LNG in September 2018. Besides nuclear and solar energy, China is also looking to cooperate in these fields with the Middle East.
Chinese involvement in the Middle East is also motivated by economics because the region is now a major export market for Chinese commodities and a profitable building industry for the country. The amount of Chinese construction contracts in the Arab world has increased by eight times from 2004 to a total of USD 3.28 billion. Tehran and Turkey are the two countries’ most important commercial partners and importers from China.
To protect Chinese interests and combat terrorism, China has stepped up its engagement with Middle Eastern countries. It provides UN peacekeeping forces; in 2006, China dispatched an engineering battalion to South Lebanon for the first time in the Middle East.
China has always been drawn to the Middle East because of the region’s long history and diverse cultural heritage. China is a staunch advocate of cultural exchange and respect for one another. China and Arab countries have formed a platform for civilizational dialogue under the CASCF.
Due to geopolitical competitions, the Middle East is regarded to be challenging and chaotic. So, China is very cautious in the Middle East, especially in dealing with unstable countries. In January 2016, Chinese President Xi visited both Saudi Arabia and Iran. President Xi visited the United Arab Emirates in July 2018, while Vice President Wang Qishan returned to the country in October 2018. Foreign Minister Wang Yi of China and Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan of the UAE met in Beijing on May 2 and resolved to form a bilateral intergovernmental committee for cooperation.
The Chinese government also set up a high-level committee in January 2016 to direct and coordinate bilateral cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Wang Yi and Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani met for the first time on December 12th, 2018, for the first round of strategic consultations between the two countries. During this summit, China and Qatar established an intergovernmental strategic dialogue framework.
China’s foreign policy in the Middle East appears to be firmly founded in an “all-friend” or “zero-enemy” approach. China is looking to work with major global powers in the Middle East. China deals with the Middle East according to Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence include respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention, and diplomatic and peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts.
China’s reaction to the Syrian crisis was shaped by these principles. China believes that a political solution is the only one that will last. There is no other way out of this situation than through political action. When it comes to finding a solution acceptable to all Syrian parties, the international community must assist the Syrian parties in quickly restarting engagement and negotiations under UN mediation. China hosted Syrian opposition groups four times in Beijing between 2012 and 2017, donating 680 million RMB in humanitarian aid to Syria and Syrian refugees abroad. According to China, in order to stabilize Syria, it is necessary to put an end to the bloodshed, counter terrorism, engage in an inclusive political process, provide humanitarian assistance, and rebuild.
China’s Middle Eastern strategy is guided by an emphasis on economic cooperation. President Xi Jinping believes that boosting economic growth is the best approach to overcome obstacles. Growth is vital for everyone’s well-being and dignity in order to end the conflict in the Middle East. It’s a race against the clock and a battle of hope over despair. In order for young people to have hope in their hearts, they must be able to live their lives with dignity and fulfilment.’ In China’s view, the BRI is a critical framework for economic cooperation between China and the Middle East. Collaboration is conceivable in the fields of infrastructure development, industrialization and industrial parks, energy, and facilitation of investment.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization counts China as a major member. The Shanghai Five Group was established on April 26, 1996, and the SCO was established on June 15, 2001. Following the SCO summit in July 2005, Iran sought for full membership in March 2008, becoming an observer member. The SCO welcomed Turkey in 2012. Several countries, including Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Qatar, and Israel, have shown an interest in participating in the SCO as observers or dialogue partners.
China might use the SCO as a new platform to cooperate with Middle Eastern countries. The cooperation would reduce competition between Belt and Road Initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union and increase SCO’s strategic influence if the SCO was expanded to South and West Asia.
About the author:
Dr. Mohamad Zreik
Dr. Mohamad Zreik has PhD of International Relations, he is independent researcher, his area of research interest is related to Chinese Foreign Policy, Belt and Road Initiative, Middle Eastern Studies, China-Arab relations.
The author has numerous studies published in high ranked journals and international newspapers.
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Previouslypublished by the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies
By Erika Mouynes, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Panama
In April 2021, the UN’s Intergovernmental Report on Climate Change provided the latest in a long line of dire warnings, telling the world what many already know: climate change is real, and the international community is squandering its chance to limit the consequences. World leaders need to approach this crisis with the urgency it deserves. As climate change is a global problem, it cannot be solved by isolated countries – the only way forward is through collaboration and diplomacy.
Too often, climate is treated as a diplomatic afterthought, forgotten in favor of whichever crisis is occupying the moment. By the time that climate change becomes the singular foreign policy catastrophe of our lifetimes – through massive natural disasters, unprecedented waves of migration, disruption of supply chains, wildfires that sweep away entire communities, and more – it will be far too late to stop it. The international community needs to make climate change its collective prerogative today – and not through empty words, but with consistent action.
Minister Erika Mouynes, visits Coiba National Park at the COIBA AIP Scientific Station and its laboratory, the only one of its kind in the Eastern Tropical Pacific. January 2022.
As foreign minister of Panama, I am proud to say that Panama has been a standard-bearer for this philosophy, putting climate at the center of our policies and discussions on the global stage. This is not just for altruistic reasons – Panama has a personal stake in halting climate change. According to the University of Hawaii’s Pacific Disaster Center, Panama’s extended coastline puts our country at particularly high risk from sea level rises, potentially impacting one million people and $31 billion in capital.
Indirectly, climate change and its accompanying natural disasters will accentuate mass migration and economic instability, both of which stand to uniquely impact Panama, a passageway for migrants and a major international trade artery. To avert these consequences and preserve our local biodiversity, Panama is bringing fresh resolve to the international effort to limit global temperature rises.
Our goal has been two-fold. First, we are focused on introducing Panama’s climate story to the international community – as one of only three carbon negative countries in the world – and cooperating with partners to ensure our model is sustainable in the long-term. Second, we want to translate Panama’s domestic climate momentum to the international stage, working through international mechanisms – or creating new ones – to catalyze meaningful global action on climate change.
Panama has reached carbon negativity through a combination of steadfast conservation commitments and an ambitious clean energy transition program. Our country has already extended safeguards to at least 30% of its land and sea territory, nearly a decade ahead of schedule. By creating national parks on land and extending protections to over 98,228 square kilometers of water, Panama is doing its part to ensure that its natural beauty and biodiversity will be maintained for future generations. Just this year, Panama approved an innovative policy giving legal rights to nature, protecting its right to exist, persist, regenerate, and be restored.
Foreign Minister Mouynes represents Panama at the debate on the ocean and Sustainable Development Goal 14: ” Life Below Water” June 2021.
Beyond the face-value benefits of preserving natural ecosystems, conservation on land and at sea protects carbon sinks which draw CO2 out of the air. Panama has already committed to restore 50,000 hectares of forest land nationally, which will contribute to the removal of approximately 2.6 million tons of CO2 from the atmosphere by 2050.
While conserving carbon sinks is essential in fighting climate change, any plan to tackle temperature rises is incomplete without addressing the reduction of carbon emissions at the source. Already, in 2021, Panama produced 82% of its electricity from renewable resources. Our government is also providing tools to organizations looking to make the switch to renewables – through our National Reduce Your Footprint Program, public and private organizations alike can access tools to monitor and reduce their carbon output.
The Panama Canal also plays into Panama’s sustainability story. Most know it as a vital artery for international commerce, enabling the passage of roughly $270 billion worth of cargo per year and serving as the backbone of Panama’s economy. Fewer people know that by cutting the distance ships have to travel, the Canal reduced CO2 emissions by 16 million tons in 2021 alone when compared to alternative routes. Through its Green Route strategy, the Canal also incentivizes transiters to comply with the highest environmental performance standards.
Minister Mouynes joins President Guillermo Lasso of Ecuador, Colombia and former US President Bill Clinton, to announce the creation of the Galapago’s Hermandad Marine Reserve. January 2022.
Together, these initiatives have made Panama a country which emits less carbon than it absorbs. I am proud to be a leader in a country that is showing the world what is possible when governments take climate change seriously. But the difficult truth is that none of my country’s innovative climate actions will save our people, economy, or biodiverse ecosystems from the consequences of climate change if the international community fails to cooperate on this issue. This is a fight that we can only win together. That is why steering Panama towards a policy of green diplomacy abroad has been such a priority, putting climate at the heart of our international work and extending our domestic progress on climate to international fora.
Whether through working with likeminded partners in existing international institutions, like annual UN COP conventions, or creating new instruments to drive climate action, Panama is committed to making a difference on a regional and global scale. For instance, we’ve launched a Carbon Negative Alliance with Bhutan and Suriname, the only other carbon negative countries in the world. Together, we are demonstrating how countries with different demographic, environmental, and economic make-ups can make meaningful contributions to the fight against climate change. As an alliance, we are sharing best practices with other countries and advocating for larger global climate ambition.
The Foreign Minister of Panama at the COP 26 in Glasgow, Scotland. November 2021
Last year, Panama partnered with Costa Rica, Colombia, and Ecuador, members of the Eastern Tropical Pacific Marine Corridor (ETPMC), to expand our collective marine protections, creating the largest protected marine area in the world. By connecting each country’s protected marine areas, the ETPMC preserves vital migratory routes for biodiverse marine species. This April, Panama assumed the presidency of the ETPMC. As President Pro Tempore, for the first time in the organization’s 20-year history, we are promoting renewed involvement from ETPMC countries’ foreign ministers, seeking to throw new diplomatic weight behind global conservation efforts. This will help the ETPMC not only make good on the conservation commitments we have already promised, but find new avenues of international collaboration and new alliances to ensure the conservation and protection of our planet as a whole.
In March 2023, Panama will host the eighth Our Ocean conference, convening governments, industry, civil society, and academia to forge deeper ocean protection measures. This is a prime example of the kind of work necessary to build a healthier, sustainable world: bringing together all involved parties to address a global problem.
When I speak about climate change, I do not pretend that the path before us will be easy. The challenges are real, but Panama is living proof that with sufficient political will, investment, and creative thinking, it is within our capacity to significantly reduce them.
Panama will continue to serve as a model, leading the world in conserving our carbon sinks while transitioning to clean energy. I will continue to put climate at the core of my diplomatic work, championing Panama’s success story and convening international actors to inspire climate action worldwide. For Panama, the world’s coastal nations, and an entire generation of young people, I call on my colleagues around the world to join us. The future of our planet very literally depends on it.
At the end of 1942, almost all European countries were occupied by the Nazis, supported the Nazis, or stayed neutral; only the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Iceland fought among the Allied Powers. Romania was a German ally and therefore has difficulties in coping with its role during the Second World War. The complex history of the country also shows that antisemitism was paramount before and during the wartimes. All the more remarkable that a senior official of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs actively opposed to the pro- German and antisemite policies of his own government and thus saved thousands of Jews.
The Holocaust
Beyond any doubt the Second World War was the most gruesome low point of human civilization. Never before have people been killed on such a scale, and part of them because of who they were. Never before have citizens on both sides been seen as important targets for mass killings, like bombardments. The deaths were the result of industrialized ethnic extermination of Jews, Roma, Sinti, and Slavic people; other causes of death were forced labor, direct acts of war and military operations, exploitation, forced migration, hunger and malnutrition, and state-organized terror against resistance fighters, political opponents, prisoners of war, homosexuals and Jehova witnesses.
Even a new generation of weapons of mass destruction was required to end the war with Japan. Shaken confidence and fear of repetition, mainly caused by the weak international cooperation at the time, led to post-war decolonization and the creation of international institutions like the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Union. In short, the Second World War has touched upon everyone, has set the new world order and remains the basis for a society of peace, security and human dignity.
The events between 1939 and 1945 are linked inextricably to the decades that preceded it. That epoch was marked by many international tensions and regional wars, such as the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), the Russian-Ottoman War (1877-1878), the two conflicts in the Balkans (1912 and 1913), the two Chinese-Japanese wars (1894-1895, 1937- 1945), the First World War (1914-1918), the Spanish civil war (1936-1939) and the Soviet- Finnish winter war (1939-40). All these military conflicts have contributed to, or cumulated in, the Second World War. Growing nationalism and racism in Europe and Asia, aggressive foreign policies, German annexation of adjacent areas, social unrest and extreme poverty, and the economic crisis in Germany eventually led to the biggest war ever, with an estimated number of casualties of 50 to 85 million worldwide.
The Holocaust or Shoah is an integral part of the Second World War. Seven specialized extermination camps were established by the Nazis to annihilate Jews, Roma, Sinti, and Slavs: Auschwitz-Birkenau, Belzec, Chelmno, Majdanek, Maly Trostenets, Sobibor and Treblinka. These camps were part of a huge system of places, more than 42,000 in total, where people were brought together under military compulsion and where millions of people died under appalling conditions. The Holocaust counts six million mortal victims, of which two million were not killed in gas chambers, but in mass shootings. The Holocaust was the most effective genocide ever and directed against the foundations of Western humanist civilization: unique because it was purely driven by ideology, and unique because of its incredible size and state-imposed industrialized destruction of fellow humans.
Resistance
In these anxious times of Nazi suppression, some showed courage notwithstanding the constant threat of violent punishment. Forms of resistance arose in the occupied regions. Among Jews armed resistance saw light: Mordechai Anielewicz and Marek Edelman led the uprising of 1943 in the Warsaw ghetto. Together with his army of partisans Tuvia Bielski was able to hide 1200 Jewish refugees from the Nazis successfully in the Belarus forests. Jewish militias were formed, some of them in uniform, such as near the Lithuanian Vilnius. In Auschwitz and Treblinka unsuccessful revolts took place, but the outbreak of the Sobibor uprising in October 1943 led to the closure of the camp. Jewish volunteers were parachuted into occupied territory to organize resistance, such as Hannah Szenes. Under General Wladyslaw Anders over one hundred thousand Polish soldiers and civilians, including many Jews as Menachem Begin, marched in 1942 under terrible conditions from Siberian Tashkent to Palestine; having arrived there, many joined the Allied armies.
Despite their own nationality others got involved in resistance against Nazi rule too. Examples are the German students Sophie and Hans Scholl, the theologian Dietrich Bonhöffer, the army officers Claus von Stauffenberg and Hans Oster, the head of the Abwehr Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, and possibly Field Marshal Erwin Rommel.
A few managed as alleged Nazis to save Jews from a certain death, such as the Sudeten German businessman Oskar Schindler who successfully dragged 1200 Jews through the war as indispensable workers. Using his status Albert Göring (indeed, brother of) saved several Jews and dissidents. The head of the registration of Jews in the Netherlands, Hans- Georg Calmeyer, approved 3700 official complaints, consciously preventing people to be sent to extermination camps. The German captain of the Wehrmacht Wilm Hosenfeld suffered until his death in 1952 in Russian captivity near Stalingrad, having saved a number of Polish Jews, such as the radio pianist Wladyslaw Szpilman. Having witnessed the gassing of Jews in Belzec, the pious SS-doctor and engineer Kurt Gerstein repeatedly tried to warn the Allied forces about the Holocaust from as early as 1942.
Some heads of state also opposed successfully. The Moroccan sultan Mohammed V refused to implement the racial laws imposed by Vichy France and ignored the demanded extradition of Jews to the extermination camps. The Bulgarian King Boris III, having joined the Nazi’s in March 1941, refused to impose anti-Jewish measures and to send army divisions to the Eastern Front. During a lunch with a furious Hitler Boris persisted that Jews were indispensable to the construction of internal roads and railways. Shortly afterwards Boris died unexpectedly, probably due to poisoning. Many military commanders and police officers in Italy refused to persecute and extradite Jews, and the Finnish government did so too.
Diplomats in wartime
Diplomats had the professional contacts and sometimes the resources to help persecuted people and refugees; in any case, they had access to much-needed travel documents. In July 1938 the international conference in Evian took place, intended to discuss the European refugee problem, to encourage the emigration of Jews and to establish an international organization. It soon became clear that the countries present were not prepared to increase immigration quotas, referring to the high unemployment figures in their own countries; only the Dominican Republic declared to accept them, while claiming remuneration in return.
Against this background, some diplomats in the years that followed refused to provide assistance to Jewish refugees, but others did it anyway.
The American Hiram Bingham IV, son of the explorer and scientist who stood model for Indiana Jones, worked as vice-consul in Marseille closely together with journalist Varian Fry. Bingham issued so-called Nansen passports, designed for stateless persons who could not get any identity document from local authorities. Fry hid the refugees, mostly well- known intellectuals and artists, awaiting for their journey to Portugal or Martinique. The Chinese Consul General in Vienna, Feng Shan Ho, witnessed the desperation among Austrian Jews after the Anschluss and Kristallnacht in 1938. Despite a strict ban he gave hundreds, possibly thousands of visas for Shanghai to Jews, thus enabling the possibility of legalized escape.
Many diplomats from neutral countries did what they could. The biggest orchestrated action to protect Jews took place in Budapest, which was in a spiral of violence against Jews in 1944 and 1945. Eventually, half the Jewish population would survive. The Swiss vice-consul Carl Lutz gave 8,000 letters of protection, proclaimed many houses with refugees under Swiss protection and negotiated directly with Adolf Eichmann. His performance was so openly that the German ambassador in Hungary, Edmund Veesenmayer, asked permission to murder Lutz. Lutz was supported by other diplomats of neutral countries, such as the Portuguese Carlos de Liz-Branquinho Teixeira and Carlos Sampaio Garrido, the Spanish Minister Angel Sanz Briz, the Swiss envoy of the Red Cross Friedrich Born and the Swedish consul Raoul Wallenberg. Wallenberg is almost certainly the most famous diplomat, having handed over tens of thousands of protection letters in Budapest in 1944 and having provided thirty shelter homes to Hungarian Jews. He personally followed a death march to Austria in order to claim as many Jews as possible under Swedish rule. Wallenberg died in Russian captivity, probably in 1947.
As a diplomat of the Vatican City in Bulgaria, Angelo Rotta provided baptismal certificates to Jews. When appointed papal nuncio in Budapest, he protested fiercely to the Hungarian government against the violence against Jews in 1944 and 1945. He also took the initiative to establish the so-called “international ghetto” (where eventually 25,000 Jews would survive the war) and was active in the international Red Cross Committee, established at the initiative of Carl Lutz. Angelo Roncalli did the same in Greece, being an old friend of the Bulgarian King Boris III and former papal nuncio in Sofia (1925-1934), Istanbul (1934- 1937) and Athens (1937-1944). He became known in 1958 as pope under the name John XXIII.
The Swiss vice-consul in Bregenz was Ernst Prodolliet, who supplied 300 Austrian Jews with transit visas. He was disciplinarily moved to Amsterdam but continued his assistance to Jews there. Aristides de Sousa Mendes, the pious Portuguese consul in Bordeaux, provided – against the explicit orders of his government – more than 1500 Portuguese entry and transit visas to Jews in June 1940. After he was recalled for disciplinary reasons, he passed the consulate in Bayonne, saw groups of desperate refugees at the consulate there too and again – on his own initiative – issued visas.
The Mexican consul in Marseilles Gilberto Bosques rented two chateaux to provide exit visas to nearly 40,000 Jewish and Spanish refugees. Bosques was arrested by the Gestapo in 1944 and exchanged against German prisoners of war. Later he became ambassador in European countries and in Cuba. Jose Castellanos Contreras was Consul General in Geneva in 1942 for El Salvador. He gave thousands of visas, even false ones, thus allowing Jewish refugees to travel to South America. He also issued 13,000 certificates stating the registered citizenship of El Salvador. The Brazilian Aracy de Carvalho Guimaraes Rosa was employed as diplomatic clerk in Hamburg. From the Kristallnacht onwards , she gave thousands of visas to Jews, but without the signature “J”, until Brazil joined the Allied Forces in 1942.
Selahattin Ülkümen was Turkish consul in Rhodes. In 1944 he tried to get the 1,700 Greek Jews, gathered for deportation, under the neutral Turkish authority, threatening with an international scandal. He failed, but was successful with the Turkish Jews. In retaliation the Turkish embassy was bombed, killing Ülkümens pregnant wife.
Even some diplomats belonging to the Axis powers helped Jews. The Christian Chiune Siguhara is the only Japanese who has been acknowledged by Yad Vashem. As consul in Lithuania, he did not wait for the required permission from Tokyo and gave 3,500 transit visas through Russia and Japan to Jewish refugees – even after the official ban. He collaborated with the Dutch consul Jan Zwartendijk, who issued the entry visas for Curaçao without the permission of the governor. The Italian Giorgio Perlasca worked as a meat buyer for the Italian Army on the Eastern Front. He maintained close contact with the Spanish Minister Sanz Briz and appointed himself as his deputy when Sanz Briz was called away from Budapest. It enabled him to smuggle thousands of Jews out of Hungary, on the basis of a law dating from 1924 according to which Spanish citizenship could be granted to Sephardic Jews. Perlasca always stayed silent about his role and was tracked by grateful survivors only in 1987, after years of searching.
Romania during the Second World War
Romanian memories of the Second World War are a painful subject. Between 2002 and 2005, a Commission established by President Ion Iliescu, investigated Romania’s involvement in the Holocaust. The impetus was the storm of criticism in reaction to the statement by a minister that no Holocaust had taken place on Romanian soil. The chairmanship of the committee was accepted by the Nobel Prize winner Elie Wiesel. The commission Wiesel came up with a figure of possibly 500,000 victims: between 280,000 and 380,000 Romanian and Ukrainian Jews were killed in Romania and in the territories under Romanian control; in addition, 135,000 Romanian Jews from Hungary and Transylvania (which was controlled by Romania); 5,000 Romanian Jews living outside Romania, and 11,000 Romanian Roma. This was double the number of victims the Romanian Holocaust was previously set at. Thus, the Romanians would have more deaths on their conscience than any other collaborating country, according to the commission.
Romania today is facing this dark period under the Nazi ideology. In Bucharest a multi-day pogrom was organized in January 1941, in which naked Jews were killed in a slaughterhouse. Another example is the infamous pogrom in the eastern town of Iasi: 13,000 Jews were murdered on June 27, 1941, when another group was being driven around in two death trains and dying due to exhaustion, suffocation, dehydration and suicide. Other systematic killings found their way into Bukovina, Odessa, Moldova (then known as Bessarabia) and Transnistria. In August 1941, Hitler praised the Romanian dictator Ion Antonescu for his radical approach. From October 1941 to January 1942 in and around the Ukrainian city of Odessa tens of thousands of Jews and Roma were murdered by Romanian and German troops. In other places the Einsatzkommandos were assisted by Romanian units.
Jewish mass graves with victims of death trains, outside Iasi (F. van Dijk)
Some nationalistic and fascist organizations threw themselves wholeheartedly into the mass murder of Jews, such as the Arrow Cross in Hungary and the Hlinka Guard in Slovakia. Romania had its Iron Guard (Garda de Fier). This movement was founded in 1930 by the German and French-educated antisemite Corneliu Codreanu. Originally named the Legion of the Archangel Michael (Legiunea Arhanghelului Mihail), it was a mixture of cultural nationalism, fascism, antisemitism, traditionalism, rejection of modernization and a unique religious orientation.
Codreanu went as a prophet on horseback across the country and proclaimed his militant rhetorics. In the turbulent thirties there were major tensions between the charismatic Codreanu and the government around King Carol II. The fact that Codreanu was maltreated during his arrest was answered with the murder of the responsible police prefect, a deed that was not prosecuted. The movement used provoked pogroms and political murders by death squads, called Decemviri and Nicadori. A short-lived reign of the Iron Guard resulted in a violent chaos. In 1938 Carol II took action: Codreanu was sentenced to ten years hard labor and killed during transport to another prison.
Since 1939 Romania was the largest oil supplier to Germany, although the country was officially neutral. On November 23, 1940 it joined the Axis powers. Under dictator Antonescu the Iron Guard, with their the new leader Horia Sima, got a second chance. But leather-clad Iron Guardsmen on motorcycles terrorized public life, and especially Jews. Now it was Antonescu’s turn to deal harshly with the rebels in January 1941, with the approval of Hitler – although the Iron Guard flirted openly with Nazi Germany. In return, a thankful Antonescu sent no less than fifteen army divisions to the Eastern Front.
Constantin Karadja
On 24 November 1889 Constantin Jean Lars Anthony Demetrius Karadja (some family members chose for Caradja) was born in an upperclass environment. His father was the Ottoman prince Jean Constantin Alexandre Othon Karadja Pasha, born in 1835, a well-known diplomat, army officer, society figure, but also a virtuoso pianist and composer. His bloodline went back to the Venetian Doge family, the Byzantine nobility and rulers of Wallachia. His military and legal training he had gone through in Athens and Berlin. After embassies in Berlin, Brussels, The Hague, Turin, Ancona and Brindisi, he became director of the oldest high school in Turkey in 1879, founded in 1481, the Galatasaray Lisesi. Among the students would be formed later one of the leading Turkish football clubs. Karadja could now also carry the Ottoman noble title “Pasha”. Although only 46 years old, but after a diplomatic career of 31 years, he was appointed special envoy in The Hague and Stockholm in 1881. He took his temporary residence in Hotel Paulez in The Hague, while looking for a majestic house somewhere in the city.
Birth certificate of Constantin Karadja (Haags Gemeentearchief)
From the first marriage of Karadja senior with Caroline Durand a daughter was born, but the marriage had ended soon. He remarried in 1887 to Marie Louise Smith, better known as Princess Mary Karadja of Sweden, daughter of the wealthy beverage producer and politician Lars Olsson Smith. From that marriage at 2:30 PM on November 24, 1889 Constantin was born at the address Nassaulaan 1. Karadja senior, “residing in Constantinople”, signed birth certificate number 4934 on 26 November in the presence of witness doctor Jan Coert. As profession he mentioned “buitengewoon gezant en gevolmachtigd Minister van Turkije bij het Nederlandsche Hof”, to be translated as “special envoy and plenipotentiary Minister of Turkey at the Dutch Royal Court.” An older brother of Constantin lived only for ten months, and he had a younger sister by the name of Despina, born in 1892.
Mother Mary Karadja published in 1892 a well-reviewed bundle of 150 pages of philosophical musings in French, such as “God created man and woman, but who created the mother-in-law?”, “The god is for the unfortunates, as the medicine is for sick ” and “Prejudice is a wall of ice; one must melt it down.” The booklet costed 3,50 Dutch florins, which can be regarded as rather expensive at the time. Other books from her hand would follow, such as Spiritistische Phaenomene und Spiritualistische Offenbarungen (1900) and Sieben Sakramente (not dated). With such a broad international and intellectual background a promising career lay ahead for Prince Constantin Karadja. But he would surpass his colorful father and his sophisticated mother by obtaining fame by his acts during the war in many respects; even more remarkable that he is so unknown still.
According to insurances of real estate Karadja senior was registered at the address Nassaulaan 1. It was the first in a row, right next to the bridge across the canal, at the corner of the Mauritskade. It was built in 1846-47 as ordered by King Willem II, but number 1 was torn down and reconstructed in 1897. The houses were originally meant for cavalry officers of the King’s riding school at number 12; in 1863 the stables were renovated to the biggest church in the Netherlands at that time with more than 2,000 seats.
In the newspaper Nieuws van de Dag from February 2, 1889 a diplomatic riot was feared because of the stench of the open water in front of the Karadja’s place. Karadja senior, also being envoy in Stockholm, went abroad regularly. On February 11, 1890 in the Leydse Courant a removal was announced, most likely to the castle of Karadja senior in Bovigny, near Luxembourg; there he died on August 11, 1894 according to his obituary of August 13, 1894 (and not in The Hague, as stated erroneous until now). On April 10, 1890 an advertisement in the Haagse Courant announced the disposal of the household effects from Nassaulaan 1: birds, including peacocks (a strange phenomenon for a town house, as these are noisy animals), and a wine collection of some importance. Any connection between the stench and the removal to Bovigny cannot be proven.
After Karadja senior had deceased – Constantin was four years old – his mother returned to Sweden and Constantin went to high school there. For an education based on humanist principles he was sent to England: he attended Framlingham College in Suffolk from 1906 to 1908 and studied from 1908 to 1910 international law at the Honourable Society of the Inner Temple in London. Although a member of the Order of British lawyers, he then worked in the Ottoman Foreign Ministries’ Political Affairs Department. In October 1912 he returned to Sweden and worked in 1914 and 1915 for the “Private Sveriges Central Bank”.
Karadja 1913Karadja 1916Karadja 1922
One of his many talents was a great aptitude for languages: as a diplomat he would speak English, French, German, Romanian, Swedish, Danish and Norwegian. In addition, he mastered the extinct languages Latin and Greek. In 1916 he married a distant cousin, the Romanian princess Marcela Elena Karadja (1896-1971), and the couple settled in Bucharest. The city was then called “Micul Paris (“Little Paris “) because of its historical buildings, beautiful architecture and cosmopolitan atmosphere. Soon they had two children, Jean Aristide Constantin Georges Caradja (1917-1993) and Marie-Marcelle Naděje Karadja (1919- 2006); she would later become a nun in Jerusalem. Constantin Karadja was granted the Romanian nationality in 1920 and he started on an impressive career: Romanian consul in Budapest (1921-1922); adviser to the Ministry of Finance, including head of the Romanian delegation at the International Economic Conference in Geneva (1927); Director of International Policy (1927); Consul General in Stockholm (1928-1930); Consul General in Berlin (1932-1941) and Director of Consular Affairs at the Foreign Ministry in Bucharest (1941-1944). In the latter two functions, he acquired a good knowledge of the Nazi regime and its antisemitic ideology.
But Constantin Karadja was much more than a diplomat. He was an avid lover of literature. He was soon regarded an expert of incunabula, European prints dating from before 1501. Next to the well-known Bible by Johannes Gutenberg dating from 1455, the incunabula concern editions of manuscripts, printed in almost three hundred cities from Westminster to Constantinople and from Lisbon to Lübeck. The contemporary collections are stored worldwide in hundreds of libraries. Karadja was also the author of several works on the history of Romania, such as Die Ältesten gedruckten Quellen zur Geschichte der Rumänen, Gutenberg Jahrbuch 1934. In the early forties he also published one of the very first consular handbooks, an exceptional and systematic work still on the desks of many Romanian diplomats. This Diplomatic and Consular Handbook brings together laws, regulations, documents, instructions and excerpts of legal doctrine, accompanied by explanations designed to provide diplomatic and consular personnel with landmarks in their routine work.
From 1932 on, Karadja was Romanian Consul General to Germany. Berlin was the capital of the Nazis, the political center of the totalitarian regime. The events and locations are almost infinite: the rise of the NSDAP, the speeches of Hitler to the Reichstag, the blaze of the same building on February 27, 1933, the death sentence of the supposed perpetrator Marinus van der Lubbe, the massive book burning on May 10, 1933 at the Bebelplatz, the hunting of communists, the harassment of Jews, the designing and construction work to change Berlin from 1935 into Welthauptstadt Germania, the annexations of Saarland and Sudetenland, the Olympic Games of 1936, the Anschluss of Austria, the Kristallnacht of November 9, 1938, the political prison Plötzensee, the invasion in Poland, the removal of tens of thousands of Berlin Jews from railway station Grunewald, and so on. Karadja has seen them all from a very close distance. During the war, Berlin became increasingly more affected by allied bombings. Despite stubborn resistance from the SS foreign volunteers and soldiers of the Volkssturm the ruined city finally fell on April 30, 1945.
In a stream of memos, letters and reports, filed in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C., Karadja repeatedly asked for action from the central authorities in Bucharest, referring to the violation of the civil rights of Jews. He pointed out that “all Romanian citizens deserve our protection, regardless of their ethnic origin or their religion” (1938). In the summer of 1938 he proposed to protect the Jews “with all diplomatic means” together with the British and Americans, invoking the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of August 17, 1925. After the Kristallnacht of November 9, 1938, he sent a detailed report to Bucharest about antisemitic violence and reflected ominously over the foreseeable future for Jews in Nazi Germany. In a subsequent letter, he stated that it was impossible for Jews to stay any longer in Germany (1938). Karadja was very well aware of the growing anti-Jewish measures and stricter legislation in Romania (for instance with regard to the issuing of Romanian passports), but continued to defend and call for help for the Jews, “that requests from Jews of Romanian nationality, asking to return to Romania, will be processed without delay on humanitarian grounds. “
By Decision No. 2650 of August 8, 1940 the legal status of Jews was changed. The “Jew” designation in Romanian passports had to be added. Karadja protested successfully in writing directly to Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonescu (no relation with the state leader Antonescu) and referring to the logical consequences for the Jews. “From a humanitarian point of view, we will further aggravate the situation of the poor souls, unnecessary obstacles will be created to be put in the way of their exodus”, and “We will make the situation worse and after the war, we will be accused publicly because we participated in such an atrocity. ” Karadja proposed to re place te word “Jew” with the nondescript letter ‘X’. Only the Romanian authorities would carry this knowledge so that no “distinguishing characteristics” were recorded for public traffic (1941). Countless Jews remained outside the transports to the gas chambers. And for those who had not yet understood in Bucharest: “All Romanians should be protected abroad without distinction” (1941).
Constantin Karadja has experienced the advance of the Soviet troops in Bucharest, where he was transferred to on June 15, 1941. The city was bombed heavily from 1943 onwards. But he continued drawing attention and asking for action to save Jews. In a letter to Minister Davidescu he stressed that “every minority, like the Jews, has to submit not only to the laws of the country, but also has the right to diplomatic and consular protection” to escape (1943). Karadja also wrote: “In international law, the principles of universal ethics and the fundamental rights of mankind are not taken into account by the German authorities” (1943).
But Karadja did not only write letters and memos. On request, he also supplied the necessary travel documents to refugees with the notification “Bon pour se rendre en Roumanie”. The German Foreign Ministry protested in vain against this overt mutiny of this representative of their supposed ally. In April 1943 Karadja arranged with the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Jews with Romanian nationality “were allowed to stay in Romania until it is possible for them to emigrate to Palestine”. By granting this nationality he managed to thwart the deportation of many thousands of Romanian Jews from Vichy France and Hungarian Jews. Others from Germany, Greece and Italy fled to Romania as well.
In April 1941 SS Haupsturmführer Gustav Richter, the right hand of Adolf Eichmann, was sent to Romania with a special mission. In collaboration with the German Ambassador to Romania, Manfred Freiherr von Killinger, he had to prepare the deportation of 300,000 Romanian Jews. Although there were mass killings, this coordinated plan did not materialize: after the Battle of Stalingrad, from February 1943 the tide turned irreversibly for the Nazi powers.
During the spring of 1944 the Soviet Armies launched the offensive against Romania. This was followed in August by Ukrainian attacks on Iasi and Tiraspol, where the Romanian army offered little or no resistance. On August 23, 1944 a coup was committed by royalist supporters of King Mihai I against Antonescu, who was then locked up in the room with the royal stamp collection. The new government immediately switched to the Allied forces and suddenly the Embassy of former ally Germany was a besieged fortress. It can easily be imagined how the Soviet soldiers behaved against the civil population of the former Nazi ally. Romania thus ended the war with heavy fighting losses against Germany and Hungary, but was forced by the peace treaty of Paris to remunerations to the Soviet Union and had to renunciate Moldova. On June 1, 1946 Antonescu was executed. In December 1947 King Mihai was forced to resign and seek asylum in Switzerland.
After the war Constantin Karadja was not spared by the new communist regime. On October 17, 1944 he was dismissed from the diplomatic service, but shortly thereafter re- appointed by the new minister. He was elected an honorary member of the Academy of Sciences on July 30, 1946. His uncle Aristide was at that time still attached to the academy and had composed a huge collection of 125,000 Asian butterflies and moths. The diplomatic career of Constantin Karadja was terminated a second time on September 1, 1947. His state pension was taken away. To provide in his own maintenance he had to sell his beloved collection of books. In an environment of uncertainty and power changes within the new communist regime, but also of rising antisemitism and Jewish mass emigration to Israel, Karadja died on December 28, 1950, at the age of 61, possibly in a prison.
During his career as a diplomat, Constantin Karadja showed great courage and tenacity, evidenced by numerous diplomatic documents. His decisive actions against the persecution of Jews during the Holocaust were not in line with the government he served. His youth, education and the international influences he experienced made him a pan- European with strong humanist and intellectual bias. Human rights took center stage, only then came political and other interests. His scientific activities reflect his versatility and wide orientation.
Numbers are not important, when every life counts. The Holocaust is characterized by such incredible numbers, that one might forget too often that every single number represents a unique individual. He or she who saved one man or woman, risking his or her own life, showed courage. Those that saved tens or hundreds of people, showed courage. Constantin Karadja, diplomat by profession, lawyer by education, scientist by heart and human rights activist avant la lettre rescued 51,000 Jews from Germany, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy and Romania. There is no grave known to commemorate him. On September 15, 2005 he was awarded posthumously the title “Righteous among the nations” by the Yad Vashem Institute.
Bibliography
J. Bank, Churches and religion in the Second World War, London (2015)
Y. Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust, New Haven (2002)
D. Deletant, Hitler’s forgotten ally; Ion Antonescu and his regime, Romania 1940-1944, Basingstoke (2006)
F. van Dijk, “Held in Roemenië”, NC Magazine, pp. 34-36 (2016)
D.J. Goldhagen, Hitler’s willing executioners; ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, New York (1996)
J. Govrin, “Romania’s Raoul Wallenberg: the untold story of Constantin Karadja”, Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 8-3, pp. 95-99 (2014)
R. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, New Harbor (2003)
A. Huiu, “Îngerul celor 50,000 the evrei Romani. Constantin Karadja, diplomatul care ith a pe păcălit nazişti în timpul Holocaustului”, Puterea 12-11 (2014)
P. Iancu, “Drept între Popoare”, Dilema Veche 90, 7-10 (2005)
R. Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania; the destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu regime, 1940-1944, Chicago (2000)
C. Karadja, Diplomatic and consular handbook, Bucharest (1941-1944)
C. Karadja, “Die ältesten gedruckten Quellen zur Geschichte der Rumänen”, Gutenberg-Jahrbuch, Mainz (1934)
C. Karadja “Incunabule povestind cruzimile despre lui Vlad Tepes” Cluj, Cartea Romaneasca (1931), în volumul “Inchinare lui Nicolae Iorga cu prilejul împlinirii vârstei 60 ani”
M. princesse Karadja, Etaincelles, The Hague (1892)
K. Lowe, Savage continent; Europe in the aftermath of World War II, London (2012)
T. Lutz, D. Silberklang, P. Troianski, J. Wetzel, M. Bistrovic, Killing sites – research and remembrance, Berlin (2015)
M. Paldiel, Diplomat Heroes of the Holocaust, Jersey City (2007)
I. Radu, The Holocaust in Romania: the destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu regime, 1940-1944, Chicago (2000)
E. M. Schatz, “Incunabule din Judeţul Mureş între lista lui Constantin Karadja şi “Libraria “,Targu Mures 1, pp. 64-70, Bucharest (2002)
D. Simonescu, “Un mare bibliolog român: Constantin I. Karadja”, in: Analele Universitatii Bucureşti, Limba şi literatura română, Bucharest (1971)
T. Snyder, Black Earth; the Holocaust as history and warning, New York (2015)
T. Snyder, Blood Lands; Europe between Hitler and Stalin, Philadelphia (2010)
I. Stanculescu, “Constantin Karadja – European diplomat,” in: Rev. at. Pol. Rel. Int., X 2, Bucharest (2013), pp. 28-42
M.D. Sturdza, Grandes Familles de Grèce, d’Albanie et de Constantinople, Paris (1983)
O. Trasca, S. Obiziuc, “Diplomatul Constantin I. Karadja şi situaţia Evreilor Cetăţeni Romani din Statele controlate / ocupate the Germania Nazista cell in the al-doilea război mondial”, in: Anuarul Institutului the Istorie “George Baritiu» din Cluj- Napoca XLIX, pp. 109-141, Cluj-Napoca (2010),
P.I. Virgil, “The Diplomat Constantin Karadja, Romanian Wallenberg,” Romania Libera 8 (1994)
E. Wiesel, T. Friling, R. Ioanid, M. E. Ionescu, L. Benjamin. Final Report of the
International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, Bucharest (2004) http://www.oldframlinghamian.com/images/articles/PRINCECONSTANTINKARADJA1906-08.pdf http://www.framlingham.suffolk.sch.uk/news/details?contentid=24185
The Leonardo Royal Hotel Den Haag Promenade is represented by both new and more experienced employees working together with passion as one team, to deliver great service and to depict the hotel’s values. In these monthly written pieces, there is a focus on their values and their approach to our international clients. Who are the employees as an individual? Allow us to introduce you to Gabor Balint
Nationality: Hungarian
Function: Employee
Department: Food and Beverage
When did you start working at the Promenade Hotel?
June 2021
What was your first impression of the Promenade Hotel?
That it was a beehive, where everybody is a busy bee. It has to do with the fact that I have joined the Promenade Hotel during the peak of the summer vacation frenzy.
What makes the Promenade Hotel suitable for welcoming people from all around the world?
Allow me to name just a couple of reasons, first things first:
All employees are fluent in English. They will provide every bit of necessary information to make our guests’ stay pleasant and optimize their convenience.
The kitchen can cater to and satisfy the palate of even the most sophisticated guests. The menu mirrors the hotel’s philosophy where all-encompassing and inclusiveness are the main objectives. Inspired by International Food Festivals and traveling, the visitors will be taken on a journey full of flavors, where a variety of authentic dishes will be represented from all around the globe.
Located in the heart of the Embassy district, the hotel provides the satisfaction to those who like to visit the beach at Scheveningen, or take a nice walk in next to the hotel.
Our hotel is pet friendly. You do not need to leave your favorite pet at home. Traveling, taking care or walking your animal has never been so easy.
What do you value most in the organization of diplomatic events at the Promenade Hotel?
It is easy to answer: connections and learning. Establishing connections and meeting people from different countries and walks of life broadens ones’ horizon. Every event is a priceless possibility to get acquainted with cultures and customs that normally would be out of reach. It is therefore a valuable chance to educate yourself. Diplomatic events are the perfect opportunity to learn about essential trait for a modern inquisitive mind, such as: diversity, universal, across the board etc.
What did you learn so far by working with diplomats? Some tips, rules or values to share?
I have had the opportunity to work during several diplomatic events ever since I started working in the Promenade Hotel. According to my observations, diplomats value precision, punctuality and some ‘’sweet and short’’ conversation. I definitely had to push myself into rethinking and optimizing my time managing skills. Multitasking and flexibility turned out to be my most trusted aids. What does it take to work with diplomats, or what are the essential attributes of a well versed and skilled staff? See all of the above-mentioned skills and, of course, a pinch of humor.
Which Food Festival has been your favorite so far or would you like to experience?
So far, I only had the opportunity to witness the Peruvian Food Festival. Just in two days the Peruvian chefs transformed our kitchen into an exotic taste haven. They presented, colorful dishes with unusual spices, richly adorned in the most elaborate way, at our restaurant’s tables. It was a delightful sight to behold.
In terms of what I personally would like to experience, it probably would have to be the Japanese Food Festival. I have been fascinated by Japan and its culture ever since my young adult age. Every aspect of their gastronomic heritage has an air of sophistication and/or is accompanied by an elaborate ceremony. Here, food and history go hand in hand and testify about ingenious and innovative spirits of the people from the Land of the Rising Sun.
What local food(s), from abroad, have you tried already?
In terms of local, Dutch, food I have tried: stamppot, stroopwafel, patat, poffertjes, oliebollen etc.
From Japanese cuisine I have tasted sushi, mochi and matcha tea.
What is your favorite drink or dish at LEO’s International Flavors?
I really like our falafel. It is a tasty dish that can satisfy vegetarian and adventurous omnivores as well.
What sustainable development goal do you value most? Why this one?
For me, ‘’no poverty’’ is the most important development goal for the near future. Poverty is directly interlinked to a vast amount of other serious issues, such as: crime, corruption, hunger, healthcare, education etc. It is a complex subject that concerns the well-being of the whole planet. By practicing mindfulness everybody can contribute a little bit to the cause. Support the local, or fair trade strive to non-consumerism.
What piece of good advice did you receive, and from whom, that you would like to forward?
There is a valuable piece of advice that I received from Yuni, one of my former colleagues in the hotel. ‘’Don’t leave thing for tomorrow that can be cleaned today.’’
Policy interventions for water related-challenges are largely shaped by two groups: water experts, equipped with technical knowledge, and diplomats, with a plethora of soft skills. However, while they work towards a shared goal, they inhabit two different worlds that seldom interact. This division means that opportunities for sustainable, ecologically viable and actionable solutions can be missed.
“Diplomats, lacking a deeper theoretical knowledge of water challenges, often suffer from an imposter syndrome, while natural scientists often lack skills such as communication and personal relations, which can lead to uncoordinated and fragmented efforts (…) and deepen the rift between hard soft sciences,” said Bota Sharipova, an IHE Delft Institute for Water Education PhD candidate who is exploring the role of trust in transboundary water conflict and cooperation.
Sensing this gap, Jenniver Sehring, senior lecturer in water governance and diplomacy at IHE Delft, created a six-month, hybrid, educational program for early-career diplomats interested in transboundary water cooperation.
Program participants at the 4th Water and Peace Seminar, from left to right: Flavia Eichmann (Switzerland), Sajid Karim (Bangladesh), Igbal Ali (Sudan).
Young Water Diplomats Program
The Young Water Diplomats Program (https://www.un-ihe.org/young-water-diplomats-program), launched in January 2022, aims to enhance an interdisciplinary understanding of transboundary water challenges and to advance tools for water diplomacy. Ultimately, it facilitates networking among the next generation of water and environmental diplomats.
The program is competitive, with just 15 participants selected from more than 400 applicants. It explores innovative ways of learning and collaborating in a hybrid reality by combining online thematic lectures delivered by leading academics with simulation games and seminars. The participants, all working professionals, spend about 16 hours a month on the program, the content of which is often related to their work.
Program participants at the 4th Water and Peace Seminar, from left to right: Bokang Makututsa (Lesotho), Mistre Dereje (Ethiopia).
Program participant Roos Middelkoop, a policy officer in Food Security and Water Management at the Dutch Embassy in Bangladesh, said the diversity of the participants benefited learning.
“The more I grow as a professional, the more I really see the value of these international working groups or programs,” she said. “The fact that this team has 15 participants from different parts of the world provides a very rich learning ground. In every conversation that I have, I learn about the different realities that inform the decisions people make.”
Applying theory in role play
In March 2022, after three months of virtual interaction, the participants met for the first time in the Netherlands, to apply theory in a simulation game. Several participants took on the roles of stakeholders from five countries that shared a fictional river basin, with others representing international organizations. They explored different positions, needs and interests and discussed ways to jointly address these challenges and, finally, they agreed on a joint institutional framework.
“We struggled quite a lot in the negotiations, but at the same time it was reassuring that all these patterns we encountered were actually part of real-life conversations. It was very intense and really added to the whole experience,” said Middelkoop.
The program’s first participants will receive their diplomas in June 2022, after a round of final presentations, reflections and discussions with a panel of water experts at IHE Delft. The next round of the programme is expected to start in January 2023, with more detailed information being available in September 2022.
During the role-playing game on transboundary cooperation, from left to right: Bokang Makututsa (Lesotho), Igbal Ali (Sudan), Mistre Dereje (Ethiopia).
Nurturing networks
During the course of the program, besides broadening the theoretical base on transboundary water challenges and cooperation, the participants learn to collaborate in intercultural and transdisciplinary teams. This program also entails participation in the Water and Peace Seminar (https://www.un-ihe.org/stories/4th-water-and-peace-seminar-emotions-and-human-relations-key-water-diplomacy), an annual science-policy dialogue organised by IHE Delft.
This program is partly funded by IHE Delft’s Water and Development Partnership Programme (https://www.un-ihe.org/dupc3-ihe-delft-partnership-programme-water-and-development), supported by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
About IHE Delft Institute for Water Education
IHE Delft, the world’s largest international graduate water education facility, was established in 1957 in Delft, the Netherlands. Since then, the Institute has provided water education and training to professionals from over 160 countries, the vast majority from Africa, Asia and Latin America. It carries out numerous research and institutional strengthening projects in partnership to strengthen capacity in the water sector worldwide. IHE Delft aims to make a tangible contribution to achieving all Sustainable Development Goals in which water is key.
A declaration titled ‘A Blue Deal for Water Security and Sanitation for Peace and Development’ was issued on behalf of all stakeholders World Water Forum, held in March in Dakar, Senegal. Forum participant Professor Eddy Moors, Rector of the IHE Delft Institute for Water Education, notes what he missed in the declaration.
“The Dakar Declaration contains important messages that call on the international community to guarantee the right to water and sanitation for all and to ensure the availability of resources and resilience, adequate funding and inclusive water governance, as well as to enhance cooperation. Though these are all good points, they have been on the table for quite some time. It feels a bit like business as usual – which we know is not good enough.
On the streets of Dakar, I talked with people who expressed frustration and disappointment as they still don’t have adequate access to clean water and sanitation. They told me they haven’t seen improvements in their livelihoods, in availability of water and sanitation. They feel left behind – and rightly so.
We need capacity
Their views make it clear: We need something else than business as usual. We need capacity; we need another way of working for water and sanitation access, and we need innovative approaches. But although I heard excellent presentations and took part in interesting events and discussions at the Forum, I did not hear a commitment to make the bold steps we need. Yes, we all agree that efforts must be accelerated, but despite the development and the political endorsement of the global acceleration framework, it remains unclear how in practice we will fulfil the justified expectations of those without water and sanitation access.
The 2 billion people who lack access to safely managed drinking water aren’t helped by declarations, promises or goals – they need access to water and sanitation, and they need it soon, if not now. The many people around the world who suffer in damaged environments need healthy ecosystems for their survival and their livelihoods. And the many people whose security is threatened by water-related conflict at local, national and international levels need peace. To deliver for them, we must change our approach.
IHE Delft alumni at the forum had clear ideas what’s needed. Landing Bojan, an MSc graduate who now is Senior Hydrologist at The Gambia’s Department of Water Resources, put it succinctly: ‘We have a tremendous work to do in capacity. It is something that we really need.’
I agree with him. The main barrier to progress at this point is not a lack of technology: instead, what is really holding us back is a lack of capacity at all levels – the individual, organizational and institutional. This lack of capacity leads to poor water governance, inadequate financial structures and often crumbling infrastructure, as well-meaning governments and benefactors sometimes forget that skilled people and resources are needed for maintenance.
Education at all levels
The Dakar declaration emphasises the need to invest to build infrastructures. But how can you build and maintain infrastructures if you don’t have the capacity to properly operate and maintain them? How can you ensure that infrastructures improve lives? That their potential environmental, socioeconomic and political impacts, both in the area but also in neighbouring countries, are considered and mitigated?
Education at all levels is needed to develop such capacity. We need training for water leaders, for plumbers and technicians, as well as scientists and managers. We need all of them to create strong institutions and organizations that are efficient and effective. Even the most modern technology likely will fail to make a difference unless there are capable people who keep it running.
The local communities whose human rights to water and sanitation are not yet met should be our starting point. What do they need most? The international community’s role is to provide, in collaborations steered by communities in need, support and guidance – and, importantly, capacity development opportunities and financing.
IHE Delft Rector Eddy Moors
At IHE Delft Institute for Water Education, we aim to develop the capacity of not only the Masters and PhD students who come here from around the world, but also of the many participants in our training courses, including open online courses.
With 23,000 alumni, many of whom now are water leaders or teachers in their home countries, we are making an impact. As proud as I am of the Institute’s 65 years of capacity-building efforts, I recognise that they are not enough.
I therefore support the Dakar Declaration’s call for enhanced cooperation, and I look forward to intensify our engagement with partners so that we can deliver faster.”
Since its unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine, Russia has inundated the world with misinformation and disinformation in efforts to justify its military operations and to claim its strict observance of the rules of warfare. Unsurprisingly, many of these efforts have often been penetrated due to the poor and blatant construction exposed by the mainstream Western mass media that perhaps interact closely with the intelligence circles.
But this hardly means that Western governments and the mass media are bona fide disseminators of war information that are free from distortion and manipulation. This is because, in the modern and contemporary history of war, government propaganda is a commonplace. It is instrumental to mobilize, sustain and strengthen domestic and international support for war efforts, particularly when magnified by mass media. An underdog country can use such propaganda to enhance international support, especially through provision of weapons, ammunition, logistics and, if feasible, reinforcements, to complement its inferior war capability, as well as economic sanction against the top dog country. On the other hand, the latter can employ such a propaganda to enhance popular morale and supplement resource mobilization capacity.
In fact, Western government war propaganda and the mainstream mass media reports have established a predominant international opinion that sides sympathetically with Ukraine as the innocent underdog[2]. This is particularly because numerous video footage has lively covered massive exoduses of Ukrainian women and children to neighbouring countries, missile bombardment and other forms of shelling against urban residential areas, and vivid images of killed and injured non-combatants as well as combatants, among others. Unfortunately, timely open-source information on evolving operational and tactical realities is limited, partial, unbalanced and/or, biased, possibly with intentional distortions and manipulations. Yet, the reports seem to prove atrocities committed by the Russian invasion forces, demonizing these forces and President Vladimir Putin at the levels of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.
Yet, war propaganda becomes unplausible and ineffective, especially when detached from evolving battlefield realities. Until then, war propaganda surely hampers coolheaded analysis and appropriate policy prescription on how to end a war, while unnecessarily protracting warfare involving a significantly higher death toll and further destruction.
In this light, this study will cast some different light on the tenability of the predominant factual recognition and discourse in mainstream Western mass media. The first jus in bello cases is about Western allegation of atrocities committed by the Russian side against Ukrainian non-combatants, particularly under the condition of extremely fierce urban warfare in the cities of Mariupol and Bucha. The second jus ad bellum case is about Russian allegation of U.S.-assisted biological weapon R&D in Ukraine. These cases are particularly important because most of Western news and reports have flatly turned down Russian counterparts as misinformation and disinformation, without any serious examination. Certainly, the current author of this piece does not enjoy any privileged access to classified information but only to open sources. Yet, careful examination of open-source materials, including Russian and alternative media sources, may make it possible to identify blind assumptions and invalid judgements in the current dominant Western discourse, if not to present correct facts and cogent judgements.
1-The Mariupol Case
The Context
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in his on-line speech of March 23 to the Japanese Diet that several thousand Ukrainian civilians, including 121 children, had been killed, together with nine million refugees and internally displaced civilians[3]. This unexpectedly low level of death toll may indicate that Russian invasion forces exercised certain self-restraint in attacking civilians, except collateral damage.
In fact, Douglas Macgregor[4], a retired U.S. Army Colonel and a Senior Advisor to Acting Secretary of Defence Christopher Miller, stated that, despite the strong impression generated by the repeated exposure to video footage, President Vladimir Putin strictly ordered from the outset of the war to avoid killing civilians and destroying urban areas as much as possible[5]. This is consistent with his historical outlook on the triune Russian national identity – White, Little and Great Russians (respectively, Belarussians, Ukrainians and Russians), characterized by strong historical unity and brotherhood[6]. Naturally, it begs the question of why the Russian forces killed many Ukrainian civilians and severely destroyed urban residential areas in Ukraine, involving an inscrutable disjunction between Putin’s own creed and practice.
Extremely fierce urban warfare, especially in the City of Mariupol, is a natural consequence of the stark disparity of Russian and Ukrainian military power, to which both sides have even introduced foreign volunteer fighters and mercenaries[7]. With its overwhelming superiority, the Russian invasion forces neutralized a significant portion of main high-end platforms, assets and on-ground facilities of the Ukrainian armed forces at the initial stage of the current war, including air superiority fighters, major battle tanks and the command & control systems[8]. This is consistent with numerous video footage available in public domain that primarily captures Ukrainian infantry operations with portable anti-tank missiles for close combat and low-altitude anti-air missiles, while few high-end platforms are visible. In fact, the Russian Defence Ministry said that, soon after the start of the war, the Russian forces totally destroyed Ukrainian Air Force combat aircraft while some of them escaped to Poland and Romania[9]. Reportedly, the Russia forces destroyed 974 Ukrainian tanks and other armoured vehicles just for the first three weeks[10]. No wonder, MacGregor judged that the Ukrainian units still active “(were) completely surrounded, cut off and isolated in various town and cities”, with supplies likely running out soon[11]. Ukrainian infantry and special operation forces in Mariupol were cornered at bay without reinforcement nor air cover. An Azov Battalion commander there vainly urged the U.S.-led NATO to make armed intervention against Russia, especially to set an effective no-fly zone over Ukraine, while attributing a grave humanitarian crisis in the making to Russia[12]。
Who attacked the maternity hospital and the drama theatre?
The Ukrainian government strongly condemned Russia for its military attack against a maternity hospital in Mariupol on March 17[13], which injured 17 people including women, children and doctors, with at least five of them dead thereafter[14]. But Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov justified the attack because an Azov Battalion unit turned the hospital to a combat base[15], claiming the victims as unavoidable and lawful collateral damage. Surprisingly, the pregnant woman on spotlight in the reports later disclosed that Ukrainian soldiers used the hospital as base while holding these civilians as human shield against Russian forces, suggesting that the incident was an act of self-destruct and a false flag operation by the Ukraine’s side[16]. This is compatible with other fragmentary video footage that capture how Ukrainian civilians in Mariupol have been used as human shield[17] and prevented from leaving the city[18].
Also, the Ukrainian government alleged, echoed aloud by major Western mass media, that, on March 16, a Russian airstrike dropped a powerful bomb on the Mariupol Drama Theatre sheltering some 1,300 local residents, including women and children, and despite large signs of “children” that were clearly visible from aircraft. Reportedly, the death toll reached at least to 300[19]. The Russian government flatly denied the allegation and instead accused the Azov Battalion, a far-right Ukrainian militia, of blowing up the theatre building. This is compatible with the interview of a 17- year-old female survivor of the incident with the Abkhazian Network News Agency, who eye-witnessed Azov soldiers hiding themselves behind civilian hostages in the building[20].
More specifically, a Russian military spokesman stated that Azov Battalion units held civilian hostages in the theatre building as human shield, using the upper floor as firing points. This means that the Russian attack aimed at these units, involving significant civilian casualties as collateral damage during the engagement[21]. This is a plausible account on what happened, particularly given the very similar circumstances of the above hospital case.
It is now crucially important to inquire what the Azov Battalion is all about and if the troop has the established notoriety of committing such atrocities.
The Azov Battalion[22]
The Azov Battalion is now a part of the Ukrainian National Guard, which is the country’s gendarmerie under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Its name originates from the fact that it has been based in Mariupol in the Azov Sea costal region since 2014, first as a volunteer militia that fought against Russian separatist forces in the Donbas War and later in the same year incorporated into the National Guard while expanded in scale into a regiment. As Russia labels it as neo-Nazis, it in fact uses controversial symbols resembling the Nazis SS Wolfsangel, though it denies any connection with Nazism[23]. Yet, in 2015, an Azov spokesman disclosed 10-20% of units consisted of neo-Nazis members[24]. The concern over the Azov is serious enough to the extent that the U.S. Congress enacted a legislative measure, Consolidated Appropriation Bill of 2018, to ban military aids to the paramilitary due to its white supremacist ideology and neo-Nazism[25].
The Azov has faced serious allegations of committing torture and war crimes, including the grossly under investigated case of the 2014 Odessa Clashes in which some 50 pro-Russia separatists were killed[26]. In fact, the U.N. Human Rights Office of High Commissioner published reports that connect the Azov Battalion to war crimes such as mass looting, unlawful detention, and torture[27]. Clearly. Russia’s counter-allegations on the above atrocities in Mariupol are at least compatible with an established understanding on Azov’s behavioural pattern connected to war crimes.
Actually, Russia’s emphasis and Western de-emphasis on the Azov Battalion is obscurely central to their intensified exchanges of war propaganda and counter-propaganda, on the ground that the paramilitary has constituted a major U.S instrument of covert military intervention in Russia-Ukraine armed conflict. More specifically, the CIA had a secret advisory and training program for Ukrainian paramilitaries and militias, most probably including the Azov, for eight years until shortly before the start of the current war, despite the aforementioned legislative ban. The CIA has had training centres in the U.S. and eastern Ukraine for sniper techniques[28], anti-tank missile handling, covert communications, and other tactics necessary for insurgency and counter-insurgency[29]. Thus, the issue of the Azov Battalion cannot simply be reduced to the question of war crimes, but can only be fully comprehended in the context of a U.S.-Russia proxy war over the Donbas region that is central to NATO expansion to Ukraine and determination of their spheres of interest.
2. The Bucha Case
Asimilar suspicion of war propaganda is not easily excludable, with a focus on the atrocities allegedly committed by the Russian armed forces against local Ukrainian civilians in the city of Bucha. Major Western governments and the mainstream mass media are condemning, with strongest terms, the unspeakable atrocities against local Ukrainian civilians on the way of retreat after hard battles to vainly capture Kiev. However, on March 31 when the Russian forces left the city, its mayor did not at all mention of the atrocities in an interview with a Ukrainian on-line news site[30] which is compatible with his bright expression in a selfie video taken on the same day[31]. On April 2, when Ukrainian army forces entered the city to make sure of a complete retreat of the Russian forces, the video footage by a local news media captured no corpse on roads and no sign of emotional distress among the local population. On April 1, Azov Battalion troops entered the city[32], and on April 3, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence released video footage as evidence of the atrocities committed by the Russian forces, which neither the New York Times nor the Pentagon are independently able to verify the assertion of the Ministry[33]. In addition, in the U.N. Security Council, the U.S. and the U.K. blocked Russia’s proposal to send an independent fact-finding mission to Ukraine[34].
Thus, there is a good possibility that the Azov Battalion might have fabricated or purposefully committed at least some parts of the “atrocities” by itself[35]. (More specifically, to differentiate which camp they belong, pro-Ukraine and pro-Russian civilians wear blue or white armbands respectively. Many corpses in Bucha wore white armbands as in video footage available. The Azov and/or other ultra-right militia units may have committed the atrocities out of emotional impulse, while the mass media and propaganda section of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs may have made up the scene to impute responsibilities of war crime to the Russian invasion forces[36]. It should be reminded that the current war has the dimension of ethnic conflict as well as that of inter-state war.)
Given the leading role of BBC reports on this matter with the analysis of a satellite image, this begs the question of if the U.K. intelligence circles are engaged in elaborate war propaganda against Russia to mislead and manipulate other major Western governments and mass media[37].
3. The Case of Biological Weapon R&D
Possession of weapon of mass destruction by a revisionist power may constitute a casus bello of a status quo power, particularly when the latter sees the former’s move as its existential threat or serious threat against its vital national interests. Yet, legitimatizing a war has to satisfy some procedural requirements according to international law with presentation of solid evidence to the international society.
In this light, Russia’s allegation on Ukraine’s nuclear weapon programs is not tenable at all, at least at this point, due to its abrupt aggression against Ukraine without presenting any substantial evidence[38]. Also, there are little significant related information in public domain, though Ukraine has active nuclear power plants with some substantial potential to develop nuclear weapons as the country was part of the Soviet Union.
But Russia’s accusation of U.S.-assisted biological weapon R&D in Ukraine, as articulated with a trove of original documentation by Lieutenant-General Igor Kirillov, Commander of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection Troop of the Russian Army[39], is not totally deniable but seems plausible with open-source information[40]. Most remarkably, Victoria Nuland, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, admitted the existence of biolaboratories in Ukraine under the bilateral cooperative programs of the U.S. Defence Threat Reduction Agency during a hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations[41], while the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department unequivocally denied U.S.-funded biological weapon laboratories in Ukraine[42]. In addition, an official letter from an official in charge at the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence to a project manager of Black & Veatch, a DTRA contractor, attests to their significant collaborative research relationship, while another official letter from an official in charge at the DTRA office in Kiev to an official in charge at the Ukraine Ministry Defence indicates their clear awareness of the potential usefulness of their research collaboration for biological weapon development[43].
Certainly, the Agency’s Biological Threat Reduction Programs may serve bona fide statutory purposes, not designed to contribute to virus and other biological weapon R&D. Yet, suspicion remains, given that the offense and defence of biological warfare is generally the head and tail of similar biological weapon technologies while there is no clear demarcation line between military and civil research in most advanced virus and other biological R&D that involves genetic manipulation. The lack of confidence in the sectoral culture has recently become worse because Anthony Fauci, Chief Medical Advisor to the President Joseph Biden, hid the fact before a Senate hearing that the EcoHealth Alliance, New York City-based non-profit organization, funnelled U.S. public funds to gain-of-function research on bat coronaviruses at China’s Wuhan lab, making it feasible to bypass stringent domestic regulations and strict public eyes. The experiment is suspected potentially useful for biological weapon R&D, and a virus leak from the lab might have been a primary cause of the current COVIT-19 pandemic[44].
4. Reflection
Hitherto, this investigative inquiry has cast significant doubt and suspicion on the established Western discourse that sided uncritically with Ukraine in its war against hyper-demonized Russia, almost exclusively on the basis of Western government war information and mass media reports, and without carefully checking Russian reports.
Of course, Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine is utterly indisputable, and a great number of innocent Ukrainian civilians have been killed in the current war, either in atrocity or collateral damage. But who killed how many civilians and in what ways is not self-evident as reported in the Western media, especially in the context of ethnic conflict and urban warfare as the world learnt from gross information manipulation in the former Yugoslavia ethnic conflict[45]. It is increasingly necessary to check Western reports carefully against Russian ones, while verifying the authenticity of allegedly “original” U.S. documents presented by the Russian government and mass media. The U.S. government will be accountable, if verified.
Inundated with propaganda and counter-propaganda both by the West and Russia day after day, both political leaders and the public in the West will suffer self-poisoning effect of the hyper-demonized image of Russia on making coolheaded policy analysis. It is high time that the Western governments and mainstream mass media recalibrate war propaganda and counter-propaganda, in view of the need to think of how to end the current war and to keep diplomatic channels open with Russia that would most unlikely capitulate, given that it is a nuclear power coequal to the United States
This article has been originally published by International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies Ljubljana/Osaka, April 20, 2022
About the author:
Prof. Dr. Masahiro Matsumura
Prof. Dr. Masahiro Matsumura is Professor of International Politics and National Security, Faculty of Law, St. Andrew’s University (Momoyama Gakuin Daigaku). He is Member of IFIMES Council.
The views expressed in this explanatory note are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect IFIMES official position.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an Order on 16 March 2022, indicating that “the Russian Federation should immediately suspend the military operations that it commenced on 24 February in the territory of Ukraine”. This Order was made up under the Genocide Convention of 1948 [1], invoked by Ukraine to support its case. Ukraine stated that there simply was no genocide by Ukraine against the Russian speaking population in the Donbas region which could be used as a pretext for military action by Russia against Ukraine. The Genocide Convention has a compulsory system for disputes between states, involving the establishment of jurisdiction of the ICJ for settling such disputes. .
We are a full month later, and no practical steps have followed this judgment by the ICJ. More precisely, the Russian Federation continues and intensifies the military operation notably in the East of Ukraine (the Donbas region). Heavy losses of life are being reported amongst the civilian population, which seems to be targeted by the Russian forces in order to create disorder and terror. Terrible examples of military misbehaviour are shown on our TV’s, leading to claims of war crimes and even of genocide by the Russian forces. Commentators of international justice are suggesting ways and means how to prosecute such crimes, and how to hold Putin to account, without however identifying a track that would work without the cooperation of Russia itself.
For the moment, it is still highly unclear (at best) what the effect of the Order of the ICJ will be. Rather likely, it will go down as an unintended failure of the international legal system to be effective in restoring peaceful relations between states. Bringing this case to the table of the Security Council, according to the procedure set out in the Charter of the UN, does not offer much hope as the Russian Federation holds a power of veto over any decision-making in that Council.
Against this gloomy background, it is interesting to look back to the time that the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, brought a visit to the Peace Palace. This was in November 2005[2]. He was received with full honours by the ICJ, and delivered a speech to the 15 judges of the Court, at the time under the presidency of judge Shi from China. I remember it very well, as I was in charge at that time in the Peace Palace. There also was a distinct Russian interest to learn more about the history of this institution in which the Russian czar Nicolas II played a pioneering role.
President Putin stated first that he was trained in the Russian school of law, and that he took great pride in addressing the principal judicial organ of the UN[3]. He dwelt some time on the important Russian contributions to the first Peace Conference in the Hague in 1899, and noted that not only had this conference given rise to the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration – the first permanent universal mechanism for the settlement of inter-state disputes – but equally significant, it had led to the concept of international justice itself.
The Russian President told the judges of the ICJ “that Russia had confirmed (in 2005) its commitment to the primacy of international law”. Russia, he said “is in favour of strengthening the Courts’ role”. President Putin stressed that the “judgements and advisory opinions of the ICJ play an extremely important role in strengthening and developing international legal principles and norms; because they provide a clear understanding of States’ rights and obligations”.
The Court , he added, influences in a positive way the process of universalization of international law and serves to bolster the stability and legitimacy of the United Nations.
If one reads this, the conclusion can be no other than that the words and good intentions of President Putin were there, back in 2005. Words of respect for the ICJ, and words of involvement in the shaping of international law. Would someone in the close vicinity of the Russian President have the courage to remind him of this positive attitude towards international law, and explain that the military invasion of another country simply tramps under foot the rights of that other country under the United Nations Charter ?
And that an Order by the International Court of Justiceshould be given a follow up, even if the Order did not go your preferred way ?
The Order of the ICJ in the case brought by Ukraine should not go down in history as just a piece of paper, or as an email attachment which is easy to delete. The world must not allow the international legal order to be brushed to the side , as is being done now.
[1] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
The strategic stability concept was created in the United States after it had become absolutely clear that a nuclear war between the USSR and the U.S. would inevitably lead to their complete destruction. This concept is based on the nuclear deterrence policy, which was also devised in the United States at the dawn of the nuclear era and designed to show the U.S. ability to deliver a crushing nuclear strike in the event of a possible adversary’s aggression against America or its allies. But as the strategic arsenals of the two sides equalized, it became absolutely clear that each of them was capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on each other even after absorbing a counter-force attack. Therefore, nuclear war becomes senseless as it will inevitably end in complete destruction of the warring parties.
At first, the Soviet Union and the United States (and then Russia and the U.S.) agreed, informally and later in official nuclear arms control agreements, to maintain the situation of “mutual destruction,” which essentially served as a basis for the strategic stability concept. In June 1990, the sides reached a common understanding of this term. They defined strategic stability as the balance of strategic nuclear forces that rules out incentives for any party to launch a nuclear first strike. The parties did not specify what exactly they meant by such incentives. Nevertheless, based on the overall context of the nuclear deterrence concept, most experts concluded that it could be the acquisition by one side of the ability to launch a disarming first strike.
The set of factors that could influence strategic stability in its initial interpretation was quite limited: it implied only those of them that affect the ability to deliver a first strike and a retaliatory strike. Apart from quantitative and qualitative characteristics of strategic offensive weapons, such factors also include missile defense, antisubmarine defense, and air defense. The Soviet Union and the United States officially recognized the special influence of missile defense on strategic stability and in 1972 concluded an open-ended ABM Treaty, thereby sharply limiting the negative impact of this factor.
As new weapons appeared, including more effective non-nuclear ones, many experts began to say that the new systems could have a serious impact on strategic stability as well. They include strategic non-nuclear systems, precision weapons, primarily non-nuclear global strike weapons, space weapons (if any), and others.
Simultaneously, the term ‘strategic stability’ itself began to be interpreted more broadly. As a result, in many cases, strategic stability became almost synonymous with security, and the range of factors that can affect strategic stability in this interpretation has expanded dramatically. This process is characteristic not only of Russia, but also of the United States and other Western countries. As for China, the term ‘strategic stability’ is not used at all, at least in official rhetoric.
Such a “broad” approach did not negate the original interpretation of the term ‘strategic stability’ based on the nuclear deterrence concept. As before, this term is used by the professional community when negotiating and evaluating agreements on strategic nuclear weapons, with its almost identical understanding by all parties involved, primarily Russia and the United States.
From our point of view, the “broad” understanding of strategic stability should mean the “sustainability of political-military relations” between both states and their associations. It is difficult to say why the term ‘strategic stability’ came into use instead. Apparently, it turned out to be so handy and attractive that its use in relation to the political and military situation in various areas and regions of the world was considered quite justified not only by Russian, but also by many Western politicians and experts.
Our survey did not seek to find out what interpretation of strategic stability prevails in the Russian expert community, and what point of view each of the interviewed experts holds. We consider that it is much more important to identify the factors that affect strategic stability at present and will affect it in the foreseeable future, as well as ways to strengthen security and stability in any of the above interpretations.
Methods and Composition of the Expert Group
Expert surveys use various, often unique, methods. Some of them are created exclusively for a specific case study. Nevertheless, there are some universal guiding principles. This particular survey used an integrated approach, which, in our opinion, proved most effective.
A special questionnaire was drawn up for this survey and sent to each expert individually. The experts did not know who else was participating in the survey or how many people were to be polled. The questionnaire contained questions that each expert had to answer in consecutive order. It also provided sample tables. The survey mainly took place in absentia, but some of the experts were interviewed in person. Their questionnaires were filled in during the interview which was conducted using the standard method. The multi-stage (Delphic) method was not used.
Experts were selected individually on the basis of open information about their qualifications and authority. The group included leading Russian specialists, with many years’ professional experience in the international security field. The initial plan was that twenty-four experts would take part in the survey, but four of them could not participate for various reasons. The survey was conducted on condition of anonymity, and no names of the experts will appear in this article. However, we must say that the majority of the experts involved have academic degrees (five hold doctoral and thirteen candidate degrees). At least a third of the twenty experts have practical experience in conducting official arms control negotiations, and have worked in various Soviet and Russian military and civilian bodies (Foreign or Defense Ministry). In particular, four of them have the military rank of general. During the survey, the experts gave detailed answers to the questions asked, which allows the authors to make a number of generalizations and conclusions that sufficiently reflect the views of a significant part of the Russian military-political elite on one of the most pressing security issues, that is, the need to strengthen strategic stability.
It should be emphasized that Russian experts were invited to participate in the survey regardless of their political views. The selection was based on their professional experience, authority in academic, military, and political circles in Russia and abroad, and a high level of their expertise. With this regard we believe that the conclusions and recommendations presented in this work generally reflect the opinion of the Russian professional expert community on important security and strategic stability issues.
Factors Affecting Strategic Stability
According to the results of the survey, experts identified twenty different factors which they believe affect strategic stability at present or will affect it in the future. In fact, more such factors were named, but we combined answers that looked similar in order to systematize the data. For example, the “High-precision weapons group” also included “rapid global strike weapons” and “hypersonic weapons,” and the Ukraine factor was incorporated into the “Growing conflict intensity between leading world powers” group.
During the survey, each of the experts (with only one exception) named three to ten factors that, to his opinion, affect strategic stability. At the same time, the majority cited from six to seven such factors. In total, nineteen out of twenty experts named 127 factors, which in most cases were identical in different answers. Only one respondent believes that there will be no threats to strategic stability in the foreseeable future, and there are no factors that can motivate countries to use nuclear weapons. At the same time, he thinks that the risk of the use of nuclear weapons remains, but solely due to a combination of accidental events and technical failures.
Most often the factor of space weapons was mentioned (90% of experts). Precision weapons (including rapid global strike and hypersonic weapons) rank second with 85%. They are followed by missile defense (ABM) and cyber weapons (both factors were mentioned by 80% of respondents), third-country nuclear weapons (75%), and non-strategic nuclear weapons (75%). The remaining factors were named by less than half of the experts polled. According to 40% of the survey respondents, the most significant of them are various interpretations of growing conflict intensity between leading countries, primarily Russia and the U.S. and NATO, the U.S. and China, and the West and the East (see Fig. 1).
The above picture will be incomplete unless we consider the experts’ responses in terms of the importance of each factor. Space weapons top the list. Nine out of eighteen experts who included this factor in the list named their major impact on strategic stability. Two experts put space weapons in second place, three in fourth place, one in fifth place, and three in sixth place.
Only one expert named precision weapons as the main factor affecting strategic stability. Three experts put this factor in second place, seven in fourth place, four in fifth place, and two in eighth place. None of the experts considered missile defense to be the main factor influencing strategic stability. Only one respondent put missile defense in second place, three in third place, eight in fifth place, three in sixth place, and one in ninth place. Only one expert mentioned antisubmarine defense (third place), and no one named air defense.
Two experts ranked cyber weapons third―the highest position in this group. Three experts put this factor in fourth place, one in fifth, eight in sixth, and two in seventh place. Only one expert named third-country nuclear weapons as the main factor affecting strategic stability. Nine respondents ranked them second, one put them in third place, one in fourth place, one in fifth place, and as many put them in seventh and eighth places. Non-strategic nuclear weapons received two first places, one second place, seven third places, four fourth places, and one seventh place.
Growing conflict intensity between leading world powers was noted as the main factor affecting strategic stability by four experts. One expert put this factor in second place, and one gave it third place. The Ukraine conflict received one first place and one third place.
Our preliminary conclusion is that, in terms of quantitative indicators, space weapons are the most important factor that, according to leading Russian experts, affects strategic stability. This factor ranks first both in terms of the total number of references and the number of answers that put it at the top of the list. The quantitative distribution of the other positions does not clearly indicate the importance of the other factors mentioned by the experts. In this case, everything depends on the chosen evaluation methods.
For example, judging by the total number of references (as mentioned above), high-precision weapons should be followed by space weapons, then missile defense and cyber weapons, third-country nuclear weapons and non-strategic nuclear weapons. But if the list of factors is drawn up according to the ranking by the degree of importance (the number of first places), then the picture will change quite dramatically (Fig. 2). Space weapons will remain in first place (nine first places), but the second position will be occupied by growing conflict intensity between leading world powers (five first places). They are followed by non-strategic nuclear weapons (two first places), and four other factors, each holding one first place (third-country nuclear weapons, precision weapons, agreements on strategic offensive weapons, the crisis of the system of international institutions). At the same time, missile defense and cyber weapons, which were never put at the top, fall out of the first part of the list.
We considered that further specification in determining key factors among those that have the greatest impact on strategic stability, for example, by ranking them according to the average position assigned to them by the experts, would be redundant and even misleading. This would distort the overall picture, since the least often mentioned factors but holding top positions would have an advantage. Therefore, in this case more informative will be analyzing the received results qualitatively by examining these factors in terms of their impact on strategic stability as assessed by Russian experts.
The Impact of Individual Factors on Strategic Stability
As mentioned above, the experts assessed how the factors they named will impact strategic stability in 2022, 2026, and 2036. The summary data based on their responses are given in Table 1 and Graphs showing the dynamics of each factor’s impact on strategic stability.
Table 1. Impact of individual factors on strategic stability in 2022, 2026, and 2036, %
Factor/Year
2022
2026
2036
Space weapons
5
20
60
Precision weapons, including rapid global strike and hypersonic weapons
15
35
55
Missile defense
0
5
20
Cyber weapons
5
20
55
Third-country nuclear weapons
10
35
60
Non-strategic nuclear weapons
20
20
35
Growing conflict intensity between leading countries (Russia-NATO and U.S., U.S.-China)
40
30
20
Let us consider each year separately.
2022. The results of the survey show that the growing conflict intensity between leading world powers has the greatest impact on strategic stability at present. This impact was assessed as “significant” by all six experts who included it in their lists, regardless of its place in them. If we add up the factor of Ukraine (mentioned by two experts who marked it as “significant influence”), we will see that almost half of the experts name these factors as having the main impact on strategic stability.
Against this background, the factors that topped the lists in the quantitative analysis have noticeably lost their positions. For example, second place is held by non-strategic nuclear weapons, whose impact on strategic stability was assessed as “significant” by four experts.
Three experts assessed the influence of precision weapons as significant. These are followed by third-country nuclear weapons (two), space weapons (one), cyber weapons (one), and missile defense, the impact of which on strategic stability was not regarded as significant by any of the experts polled.
The impact of strategic offensive weapons, including START treaties, on strategic stability was assessed as significant by all three experts who mentioned this factor.
2026. By 2026, several factors can significantly increase their influence on strategic stability, thus moving up to the top of the list and pushing growing conflict intensity to third place. This is, first of all, precision weapons, the influence of which this year was considered significant by seven experts. The same can be said of third-country nuclear weapons (assessed as significant by seven experts).
Russian experts expect the impact of growing conflict intensity between leading world powers on strategic stability to slightly decrease. And yet it will most likely remain a major factor. Five experts assessed its impact as significant. One expert expects the Ukraine factor to continue to have a significant impact on stability.
Experts noted that the influence of other factors on strategic stability will increase by 2026. These include non-strategic nuclear weapons, space weapons, cyber weapons (four experts considered the effect of each factor significant). The impact of missile defense will also slightly increase (one expert).
2036. Russian experts expect the list of the most significant factors in terms of strategic stability to change considerably by 2036. For example, space weapons and third-country nuclear weapons are expected to move up to the top of the list (twelve respondents identified it as significant). Precision weapons, which will somewhat lose their leading position since 2026, and cyber weapons will come close to them (eleven answers each).
This is followed by non-strategic nuclear weapons (seven responses). Least of all, strategic stability will be affected by missile defense and growing conflict intensity between leading world powers (four responses each). It should be noted that the fact that growing conflict intensity moves down does not mean that its impact will decrease substantially. This relocation is solely due to the fact that this factor was named by a smaller number of experts than the others. The impact of growing conflict intensity is assessed mainly as significant throughout the projected period (with the exception of the Ukraine factor, which may lose its significance or even disappear from the list of these factors in 2026).[1]
Fig. 3 shows the change expected by experts in the share of individual factors in the stated years in terms of their “significant” impact on strategic stability.
As can be seen from Fig. 3, Russian experts believe that by 2036, the main factors affecting strategic stability (except for growing conflict intensity between leading world powers) can become much more significant. All this raises the question of how these factors can be taken into account in order to neutralize their negative impact on security.
Necessary Measures to Address Factors Affecting Strategic Stability
All Russian experts noted that the factors they named as affecting strategic stability should be addressed one way or another by 2036 (see Fig. 4). As for 2026, some experts believe that by that time some factors may be ignored due to their small influence on stability. Space weapons (70% of respondents say they need to be factored in) and precision weapons (also supported by 70% of experts) top this list. They are followed by non-strategic nuclear weapons and cyber weapons (65% of the experts insisted that both factors will have to be taken into account). Finally, missile defense and third-country nuclear weapons come third (55% of respondents believe that these factors must be taken into consideration in 2026).
The experts offered their views on how and in what form the above factors affecting strategic stability should be dealt with in the future. These proposals include a wide range of measures and initiatives for each of the factors named. At the same time, only one of 113 recommendations implies a military-technical response to the actions of other countries, which, in the opinion of this expert, can weaken or even undermine strategic stability.
Third-Country Nuclear Weapons
Summing up the experts’ proposals, we can note the following. It is important to achieve mutual understanding, primarily between Russia and the United States, on the nuclear arsenals of third countries. The key to solving this problem may be a trilateral dialogue between Russia, the United States, and China, with possible engagement of the other nuclear powers. It should be preceded by increased informal contacts between representatives of these countries, including through international seminars, discussions, other forums, joint projects, etc. To this end, the experts suggest using existing platforms and mechanisms for such contacts, in particular those that have been established and operate within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Ultimately, all efforts should be directed if not towards drafting a multilateral treaty between the five nuclear powers (although some experts suggest such an option), then definitely towards ensuring transparency and predictability in this area. Some experts consider it important to develop a “code of conduct” in the field of nuclear weapons, and persuade individual countries to assume unilateral obligations not to increase their nuclear arsenals.
Missile Defense
None of the experts insisted on the restoration of severe ABM restrictions provided for in the 1972 Treaty. In rare cases, a “light” version of this treaty was proposed, with partial restrictions on certain ABM parameters. Some experts believe that the missile defense issue can be addressed through a trilateral U.S.-Russian-Chinese dialogue as the sides move forward in discussing their nuclear arsenals. Some experts insist on linking strategic offensive arms cuts to defensive systems. Others suggest fixing such interdependence in a future START treaty (START-4), as was done in START-3.
Many experts believe it is important to develop confidence-building and predictability measures in the area of strategic defense, as well as voluntary unilateral measures of restraint in implementing relevant programs. Among direct prohibitions, experts named the advisability of reaching an agreement on the non-deployment of missile defense systems and their components in space.
In general, according to leading Russian experts, missile defense is not among major factors that affect strategic stability. Nevertheless, they believe that it should be addressed, but not under agreements imposing harsh restrictions, but rather on the basis of better mutual understanding, greater predictability, and self-restraint.
Precision Weapons, Rapid Global Strike Systems, Hypersonic Weapons
As mentioned above, in order to systematize the information received from the experts polled, three categories of weapons were combined into one group. In fact, only one out of twenty experts put non-nuclear rapid global strike systems and hypersonic weapons in separate categories. Therefore, the recommendations below will apply to all three arms groups combined under the name “precision weapons.”
A large part of the experts interviewed proposed to conclude agreements on certain categories of these weapons. Some believe that it would be possible to draw up a treaty covering certain categories of precision weapons. Another solution is to incorporate precision weapons capable of carrying nuclear weapons into a new START-4.
Some experts think that coordinating separate protocols, declarations and joint understandings without drafting a special treaty would be enough. This should be accompanied by increased confidence-building and transparency measures, as well as unilateral steps to address concerns about specific aspects of the introduction, deployment, and operation of precision weapons.
Only one expert suggested expanding the strategic partnership between Russia and China in this area, meaning particularly joint creation of the latest weapons for asymmetric deterrence of the United States and its NATO partners.
Space Weapons
Since space weapons as such do not exist yet and their control will be quite difficult (most likely, these will be dual purpose weapons), many experts did not insist on harsh restrictions in this area. The majority of experts believe that the most effective way to ensure security in this area would be agreeing on a “code of conduct” in space. Unilateral actions and commitments by states actively exploring outer space could also play a positive role.
Some of the experts insisted that the countries concerned should consider working out a legally binding agreement that would drastically restrict (prohibit) both the deployment of weapons in space and their use against space systems. This implies, first of all, a complete ban on anti-satellite weapons.
Experts believe that the development of a mechanism for implementing the proposed measures should begin with a series of consultations between Russia and the United States, to be joined later on by other space powers, primarily China. Some experts suggest starting such consultations immediately in a tripartite or even multilateral format.
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
As is well known, the United States has proposed to address the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons in future agreements. Some of the experts shared this view, suggesting that not only strategic offensive weapons but also all nuclear systems should be put under control by a single agreement (START-4). Some experts believe that intermediate-range nuclear weapons should be taken out of such a general agreement and addressed in a separate document, similar to the INF Treaty. Some proposed holding relevant negotiations among Russia, the U.S. and China.
Some experts draw attention to the difficulty of non-strategic nuclear arms verification. Detailed negotiations on this issue should be preceded by consultations with the United States on monitoring and transparency in this area. The conclusion of separate monitoring agreements, both with the United States and with other nuclear powers, is not excluded. The view expressed by experts is that such agreements will be enough to neutralize the negative impact of non-strategic nuclear weapons on strategic stability in the foreseeable future.
Some experts suggested addressing this issue step by step, specifying that the focus should be on nuclear warheads, not on weapons in general. Some experts believe that the resolution of the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be linked to further progress in limiting and reducing strategic offensive weapons. Others proposed to develop separate agreements on the two categories of nuclear weapons regardless of each other.
Cyber Weapons
As with space weapons, some experts suggested working out a code of conduct in cyberspace. Most experts believe that the impact of cyber weapons on strategic stability should be discussed and resolved through dialogue. At the same time, almost no one mentioned the idea of a legally binding agreement in this area, except maybe on certain issues, particularly the inadmissibility of cyberattacks on military command and control systems and critical infrastructure. They also suggested developing international cooperation to investigate such cases.
Russia, the U.S., and NATO were named as “priority” participants in such a dialogue. Some experts believe that the initial dialogue could be limited just to Russia and the United States. None of the experts polled named China explicitly.
Only one expert expressed the opinion that the problem of cyber weapons does not have a solution at all. The majority believes that unilateral obligations can help strengthen strategic stability. In particular, the parties concerned should pledge to refrain from intervening and targeting key systems that ensure strategic stability, including space-based elements of communications and command and control systems of the strategic nuclear forces and theearly warning systems.
Other Factors Affecting Strategic Stability
As noted above, growing conflict intensity between leading world powers stands first among the factors that received less than half of the votes from the experts surveyed. Experts suggested solving this problem by restoring dialogue between Russia and the United States, and between Russia and NATO. They believe that such a dialogue should lead to the conclusion of bilateral and/or multilateral legal agreements on security assurances, especially in Europe. Active work of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, the development of confidence-building measures, and arms control can play a role in this process.
Some experts pointed to the “strategic ‘infantilism’ of political elites and their lack of understanding of the importance of strategic stability.” To solve this problem, experts proposed to initiate an international campaign with the active participation of natural scientists to explain the real consequences of nuclear irresponsibility, including all aspects of the use of nuclear weapons.
Many of the interviewed experts believe that arms control can also play a positive role in solving the problem ofnew strategic weapons, and other problems directly related to nuclear and conventional arms. In the latter case, these concern the imbalance in conventional weapons and, in general, conventional triggers of nuclear escalation.
* * *
The above analysis of the results of the survey among leading Russian experts concerning factors that affect strategic stability showed that the expert community is both united and divided over a number of critical security issues.
In our view, there is no unity on the substance of the very concept of strategic stability. Although no such question was asked, the results of the survey clearly indicate that its participants have different approaches to the issue.
The lack of unity among the Russian experts on this issue was vividly expressed by the fact that they named more than twenty factors affecting strategic stability. We believe this clearly indicates the urgent need to intensify the discussion on the specific content of the notion of strategic stability, which is already actively used by Russian and Western politicians and experts, even though it is understood differently.
Such differences would have been expected to affect the experts’ approaches to ways and methods of strengthening strategic stability, including the weakening or neutralization of factors that adversely affect stability. But it is precisely this area where the experts were quite unanimous.
They were unanimous in saying that problems associated with the negative influence of various factors on strategic stability can be resolved through negotiations. There were practically no proposals concerning “retaliatory,” “asymmetric” or other unilateral military-technical measures. The Russian experts suggested strengthening existing and creating new channels of official and unofficial contacts with the United States and other Western countries in order to jointly find solutions to vital security problems and avoid an arms race in “traditional” and new areas of military activity. In their opinion, efforts to increase mutual understanding, and ensure openness, transparency, and predictability in the military field should facilitate this process.
In conclusion, we should note that the proposals put forth by the Russian experts cannot be implemented without reciprocity from the West. Contacts between Russia and Western countries, both official (diplomats, the military) and unofficial (scientists, experts), have shrunk significantly in recent years. This can hardly contribute to better understanding between countries and progress in strengthening security and strategic stability, which all international actors are presumably interested in.
About the authors:
Alexander G. Savelyev
Alexander G. Savelyev
Doctor of Political Science Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow, Russia Chief Research Fellow; National Research University–Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia Institute for Advanced Strategic Studies Chief Expert
Lomonosov Moscow State University, Russia Department of International Security of Faculty of World Politics Senior Lecturer; National Research University–Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia Institute for Advanced Strategic Studies Expert
Note from the Editors: This article had been written and accepted for publication before the start of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine. Naturally, the research does not include expert assessments of the latest developments; however, its major conclusions remain remarkably valid.
By Jorge Marinho, Júlio Ventura, Guilherme Guimarães
Cultural Diplomacy
Cultural diplomacy is currently a dynamic sphere of academic research (What is Cultural Diplomacy? What is Soft Power?). Even though the term cultural diplomacy is relatively recent, this reality has been in place for several centuries (What is Cultural Diplomacy? What is Soft Power?). Throughout history, interaction among peoples has amounted to an exchange of languages, religions and arts, for instance, thus enabling improved relations among differing groups (What is Cultural Diplomacy? What is Soft Power?).
Maria Regina de Mongiardim (February 2021, pp. 39-40) states that cultural diplomacy currently comprises a priority strategic importance, with political, economic and even security implications. This author points out the relevance of cultural diplomacy, as concerns countries’ international prestige and projection (Mongiardim February 2021, p. 38). Using a multiplicity of means, said diplomacy includes formal and informal aspects related to initiatives undertaken by national governments and by several parties involved (Moita, et alii May 2019, p. 58 / Mongiardim February 2021, pp. 38-39).
The European Union, which includes Portugal as a member-state, has created a Cultural Diplomacy Platform (Relações Culturais Internacionais). In 2020, after four years, this served as the basis for creating a global cultural relations platform, comprising participants such as the Goethe Institute, the University of Siena, the European Foundation for Culture and the international contemporary performing arts network (Relações Culturais Internacionais).
For Portugal, language diplomacy (that is, lusophony) is a complement to cultural diplomacy, within a context that goes beyond the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries and the Portuguese Diaspora worldwide (Mongiardim February 2021, p.41). Under this diplomatic domain, Portugal relies on the Camões Institute, which is linked to the Foreign and Culture Ministries (Mongiardim February 2021, p. 41). This institute also engages in artistic activities (Mongiardim February 2021, p. 41). The Portuguese Budget for 2021 contains various sections pertaining to streamlining cultural diplomacy and internationalizing Portuguese Culture (OE 2021, pp. 13 / 24). This document highlights visual and performing arts in order to ensure Portugal’s international projection (OE 2021, p. 14). In 2022, then-Portuguese Foreign Minister Augusto Santos Silva stressed Portugal’s ability to disseminate its heritage, arts and artists in 70 to 80 countries on every continent, while then-Culture Minister Graça Fonseca felt that Cultural Diplomacy is of strategic importance projecting the nation (PortugalProjecta a Sua Cultura em Mais de 70 Países February 8, 2022) .
Art Diplomacy
While Art Diplomacy is certainly one of the oldest forms of diplomacy and international relations, only recently has it been studied at academic level (Cohen July 12, 2019). Experts acknowledge that Art makes cultural diplomacy easier and more effective, creating empathy and overcoming obstacles such as language (Nazarian September 5, 2019). We should point out Art’s ability to humanize (McCulloch-Lovell September 4, 2005). The Academy for Cultural Diplomacy considers that Art can serve as an instrument for influencing the atmosphere of intercultural relations (Art as Cultural Diplomacy. About the Program). Art diplomacy contributes to mutual understanding and toward respect for foreign beliefs and cultural values (Grincheva 2010). On the international stage, Art can be linked to soft power, while being used for determining attitudes toward other countries (Nazarian September 5, 2019). Shoqiran (September 14, 2016) states that Art can lie at the basis for joint political projects. This author considers that Diplomacy, together with culture and Art, permeates society (Shoqiran September 14, 2016).
Art can serve to both disseminate cultural heritage and identity while constituting a neutral meeting point for artists, audiences and people involved in cultural management (Art asCultural Diplomacy. About the Program). Natalia Grincheva (2010) feels that Art, to the extent it has always represented national culture and tradition, is notably featured in cultural diplomacy practices. According to Marta Ryniejska-Kiełdanowicz (2009), Art and culture correspond to the forefront of many countries’ promotional initiatives. This way, such countries construct a positive image aimed at achieving political goals (Ryniejska-Kiełdanowicz 2009).
Artists engage their audiences emotionally (Canales), which is of interest to foreign governments seeking to influence hearts and minds through music, cinema and the media in general (Doeser, Nisbett 2017, p. 9). It should be stressed that the success of cultural diplomacy initiatives somehow involves artists who are familiar with certain aspects that go beyond their customary performances (Renewing Canada’s Cultural Diplomacy). For example, on an institutional site of Brazil’s Federal Government, Cultural Diplomacy is linked to Visual Arts, Music and Literature (Cultural Diplomacy Themes).
The U.S. Administration’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs seeks to create lasting relations between that nation and other countries: this allows Americans to gain access to international artists, while sharing the culture of U.S. visual and performing arts with international audiences (Cultural Diplomacy).
Consulate-General of Portugal in Newark, U.S.
Throughout its history since its founding in 1143, Portugal has forged relations with peoples on every continent (História). According to Portuguese Ambassador Júlio Vilela (February 2021, p. 85), in the case of Portugal, we cannot separate consular activity from immigrants, given that, historically, this is a country of outward migration. According to data provided by local authorities and, in the absence of such data, based on consular registrations, on December 31st, 2018, the Portuguese community living abroad was estimated at around 5.4 million Portuguese nationals and descendents, distributed as follows:
56.7% in the Americas
30.1% in Europe
7.5% in Africa
4.9% in Asia
under 1% in Oceania (Vilela February 2021, p. 93).
Over time, consular activity has evolved to support integrating Portuguese nationals living in host countries; as such, this fosters their civic and political prominence (Vilela February 2021, p. 82).
It is wise to envision the long-term goals of Foreign Policy (Lopes 2017, p. 33). An analysis of the programs of Portugal’s 16 governments, from 1974 to 2019, reveals a few topics that have constituted foreign policy priorities, such as the following:
– fostering Portuguese language and culture
– transatlantic relations
– Portuguese communities scattered all over the world and modernizing consular services (Vilela February 2021, p. 89).
Consular activity is a gateway to presenting Portugal as a modern, innovative country, attracting tourists and enhancing ties linking Portuguese immigrants and their descendents to the nation (Vilela February 2021, p. 96). Technological development should benefit services provided by consulates, in an automated and simplified manner, without compromising the country’s security (Vilela February 2021, p. 99).
Given the considerable size of the Portuguese community in the Americas, there is an extensive consular network (Americas). At the Portuguese Government’s Diplomatic Portal, the American community of Portuguese descent (some 1.3 million people) is presented as being well integrated in the U.S. (Americas). The New York Times has published several pieces where Newark is characterized by a notable Portuguese presence, in demographic and cultural terms (Levy October 6, 1995 / Shepard October 18, 1979). This is indicative of Newark’s importance, as part of the History of Portuguese immigration to the U.S., mainly in the 20th century, which is still being felt in the 21st century. In September 2021, Portuguese President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa was in Newark, having symbolically visited the Sport Club Português (Mano September 21, 2021).
The importance of Cultural Diplomacy in relations between Portugal and the U.S. is certainly recognized by diplomats of both countries. For instance, the U.S. Ambassador to Lisbon is depicted as a cultural diplomat (Levine, Randi Charno – Portuguese Republic – November 2021), while Portugal’s Consulate-General in Newark shows interest in organizing cultural events (Monteiro). This consular post wants to be more than a document-generating instrument. For such purpose, it needs to be close to the Portuguese community and its recreational clubs, while joining in artistic events, for example, as revealed by Consul-General Pedro Monteiro in an exclusive interview. This diplomat feels that the opening, at Newark’s Consulate-General, of José Rodrigues Miguéis Hall, named after a writer from the Portuguese Diaspora who lived in the New York area, serves to create an official, neutral venue for hosting a variety of events within the Portuguese community.
According to Pedro Monteiro, while cultural events organized by Portugal’s Consulate-General in Newark are chiefly geared to the Portuguese community, they can also reach out to Americans. To Pedro Monteiro, artistic initiatives undertaken by the Consulate-General contribute toward maintaining emotional ties between its audiences and Portugal. This diplomat acknowledges that, in the U.S., people of Portuguese descent feel a very strong sentimental affinity to Portugal, despite the geographic distance and generational aspects (second and third generation). These highly positive sentiments regarding Portugal surprise Pedro Monteiro, when thinking of immigrants who left their country of origin due to lack of conditions that would have otherwise enabled them to stay. According to Pedro Monteiro, this is why the emphasis given by Portuguese nationals living in the U.S. to positive things describing Portugal (while putting negative aspects on the back burner) is a more emotional attitude than a rational one. This Consul-General’s work experience leads him to conclude that esthetics and emotions are important in the diplomatic context, particularly notable when involving Art.
Pedro Monteiro appreciates the works that endure over time, which leave their mark, as can be seen on a Newark street, with an azulejo glazed tile panel depicting Amália, a renowned singer of fado (typically Portuguese music). This diplomat highlights a fado festival that took place in the last few years, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, in collaboration with Portugal’s Consulate-General in Newark. As Pedro Monteiro states, this consulate has also collaborated with the New Jersey Performing Arts Center (NJPAC) in promoting events that include fado, making Mariza known to the American public.
In assessing his work as Consul-General in Newark from September 2018 to March 2022, with regard to organizing artistic activities, Pedro Monteiro underscores the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, to the extent that, for instance, events could not be attended in person. This diplomat feels that the Portuguese community, chiefly older folks, hardly buy into virtual initiatives, that is, online. Pedro Monteiro acknowledges that there needs to be improvement in linking the Consulate-General in Newark to a certain audience comprising young people of Portuguese descent, by disseminating messages via communication channels which are actually used more often by the target audience. This diplomat already has cultural / artistic programming ideas to be put in place by the Consulate-General, in the latter half of 2022, including, for instance, documentaries made by Portuguese nationals.
The Camões Institute, in the Newark area, as stated by its local representative in an exclusive interview, aims to make cultural resources and activities available to Portuguese and American communities. This representative, José Carlos Adão, makes particular reference to cooperation protocols between the Camões Institute and Rutgers University (Newark), which look to conduct research into Portuguese Literature. In the view of José Carlos Adão, events related to said literature seek not only to strengthen the ties that join the community of Portuguese people and those of Portuguese descent to its culture, but also to disseminate Portuguese authors to Americans. Within this context, according to José Carlos Adão, events are organized in partnership with local basic, secondary schools and universities enabling direct contact with authors and their works.
Conclusion
Throughout History, Art has been significantly present in relations among peoples, even contributing toward overcoming differences, through activities organized by public or private organizations. Art can serve to manifest a certain identity of countries and to project these on the international stage. In order to bring all this about, artists are vital, of course.
Art Diplomacy, within the broadest sphere of Cultural Diplomacy, is characterized, among other aspects, by being able to emotionally engage its audiences. This type of engaging can prove to be particularly effective in pursuing certain objectives, in the short and, mainly, in the medium to long term, by way of influencing people’s hearts and minds. Art runs deep and, at times, in a subtle manner, in various spheres of society.
Portugal’s Foreign Ministry currently stresses the strategic importance of the nation’s artistic heritage. For example, Pedro Monteiro, Portugal’s Consul-General in Newark, and José Carlos Adão, representative of the Camões Institute in that same U.S. city, aim to organize artistic initiatives, including Literature, reaching not only Portuguese immigrants and people of Portuguese descent, but also to Americans. Pedro Monteiro acknowledges that the highly positive view that Newark’s Portuguese community has of Portugal, a country which they left for lack of conditions enabling them to stay, is due to emotional factors more than to rational ones.
According to Pedro Monteiro, the COVID-19 pandemic made it difficult and, in some cases, impossible to organize live events. This diplomat concedes that, on the one hand, Newark’s Portuguese community, chiefly among older folks, does not easily buy into online events, and that, on the other hand, the Consulate-General has to improve communication with young people of Portuguese descent; to this end, the most appropriate communication channels need to be used. Pedro Monteiro would like for the consular post not to be viewed merely as a document-generating instrument.
About the authors:
Jorge Marinho, Research supervisor. PhD in Communication Sciences, BA in International Journalism.
Júlio Ventura, BA in Law, MA student in Political Science and International Relations at the Portuguese Catholic University (Lisbon, Portugal), intern at the Consulate-General of Portugal in Newark, New Jersey (United States of America).
Guilherme Guimarães, BA in Law, MA student in International Law at the Portuguese Catholic University (Porto, Portugal), intern at the Consulate-General of Portugal in Newark, New Jersey (United States of America).
