Is the West finally afraid of Putin?

By  Eleni-Vasiliki Bampaliouta

For Russia, Ukraine is not just any other country. It is intertwined with its history and culture. The Russians converted to Christianity in Kiev and the first Russian state was born there. From a geopolitical point of view, the possible transformation of Ukraine into an anti-Russian bastion of NATO cannot be accepted by Moscow in any case, because it is considered unacceptable both in terms of history and ethnic presence of the Russians and in terms of security and geopolitical balance in Europe.

The United States, with Biden’s current policies, is returning to the old American policy of the 1990s and seeking to further marginalize and degrade Russia as a superpower and US geopolitical rival to a regional power in Eurasia. They believe that this project is possible, with the cooperation of Europeans. They therefore oppose the development of any European cooperation strategy with Russia, such as the Nord Stream II pipeline, believing that the development of a strategic cooperation with Russia undermines Europe-US geopolitical unity and strengthens Russia.

The division of the countries of the European Union

An ally of this American policy is the “New Europe”, the countries of Eastern Europe, which, due to their historical past, are supporters of an Atlantic anti-Russian policy. These countries are predominantly Poland and the Baltic states, which, for its own reasons, Romania also takes part. This scenario is reinforced by the apparent change in Finnish policy, which is tacitly abandoning traditional neutrality and approaching NATO, on the occasion of its accession to the European Union. Neighboring Sweden is doing the same, where strong anti-Russian sentiment is also being expressed and stepping up its armaments efforts.

In this context, the overthrow of Yanukovych in Ukraine and the establishment of a pro-Western regime, which wants to lead Ukraine to the European Union and NATO, has sounded the alarm in Moscow, which can in no way accept Ukraine’s accession to NATO, which rightly, after all, is an anti-Russian coalition.

With this data, the different position of the “old” Europe is obvious, with the main speakers being Germany, France and Italy, from the position of the Atlanteans and the USA. The US position, as expressed in the AUKUS Agreement (USA, UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada), is aimed at a policy of double restraint, directed against China and Russia. The practical application of this dual restraint poses a problem in Europe, which lacks the necessary unity and coherence to articulate its own policy, as an independent pole of power, but finds that if it aligns with tough American policy, it risks not only to lose any strategic autonomy but also to suffer a huge blow to its economies and prospects.

Religious conflict

The balance was upset by the decision of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople to recognize the Ukrainian Church in Kiev as self-governing. This act, which is unquestionably connected with the geopolitics of Orthodoxy, despite the invoked Ecclesiastical principles, greatly annoyed Moscow and the Russian Church. They saw in this move of the Ecumenical Patriarchate a decision manipulated by the Americans, which aims to cut off the Church of Ukraine from the Russian Church in order to deepen the separation of Ukraine from Russia. The Russian Church considers the blow much deeper and unacceptable because it touches on the very beginnings of Russian Christianity, which took place in Kiev.


The existing difficulties of the four major countries of Europe

First, as France is in a pre-election period. The country currently holds the presidency of the European Union. So his diplomatic moves on the issue will be used in the coming months as a weapon against the opposition in order for Emmanuel Macron to win the French presidential election again.

Second, Italy has fought three times for a stable political life. So one cannot say that they are going through the best period. Everything can be made fragile at any time. They have also had huge financial problems for several years.

Thirdly, Germany has just changed Chancellor. So the difference with Merkel is the stability she left in her country. But this does not mean that he will stay with the new one. Another very important fact is that Germany is more than 50% dependent on cheap Russian gas. The construction of the Nord Stream II pipeline shows that Germany, no matter how pioneering it is in supporting the green energy perspective for the future, knows that its secure energy supply has been linked to gas for many decades to come.

The supply of gas from Russia is obviously not unilateral for Germany. It is offset by exports and investments in Russia. These economic data explain the reluctance and discomfort of the German side and its reluctance to align with the harsh American policy, which could lead to a complete rupture and put Germany in a difficult position. German industrialists, like the Italians, rushed to send delegations to Moscow and make it clear that they were opposed to a policy of rupture and sanctions, for which European industry would pay a very high price.

Finally, as a fourth point, reference should be made to the anti-Russian behavior of the United Kingdom. The fluid political landscape created by Prime Minister Johnson himself, the internal war that has already begun, gives the impression that perhaps in a short time it can be replaced. Scandals such as the “partygate”, problems and resignations of government officials, the wrong policy on the issue of the Covid-19 and his choice to persuade the citizens to leave Britain from the European Union highlight a fragile political situation.

Dangers inside Ukraine


The recession that has been achieved, with great effort, is fragile, because the opposing forces that exist and push towards rupture and conflict are very strong. The greatest danger comes from inside Ukraine, where uncontrollable and extreme forces are operating. For this reason, calculated challenges can be taken, with the naivety that the Russian intervention was allegedly avoided due to the firm position of the USA and the fear of sanctions. An example of such a challenge is the artillery shelling of Donetsk airport.


Putin’s Russia

In any case, the divided big European countries are unlikely to be allowed to enter a new round of the Cold War, which could easily turn into a hot one, due to the fact that Ukraine is a country in Russia’s strategic court, for which last can not retreat beyond a red line. There are, unfortunately, many in the circle of the American President who confuse Yeltsin’s Russia with Putin’s Russia with an unprecedented anti-Russian hysteria. Putin managed, from the wreckage left by his predecessor, to restore Russia’s military power and restore its international standing and prestige. It will not allow its further strategic reversal today, which would even endanger its security. It is a fact that determines any discussions on the issue of Ukraine.

ICC Prosecutor Concerned by the Situation in Ukraine

0

Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Karim A.A. Khan QC, on the Situation in Ukraine: “I have been closely following recent developments in and around Ukraine with increasing concern.”

While on mission in Bangladesh, I have been closely following recent developments in and around Ukraine with increasing concern.

I remind all sides conducting hostilities on the territory of Ukraine that pursuant to the declaration lodged on 8 September 2015, accepting jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or the “Court”), my Office may exercise its jurisdiction over and investigate any act of genocide, crime against humanity or war crime committed within the territory of Ukraine since 20 February 2014 onwards.

Any person who commits such crimes, including by ordering, inciting, or contributing in another manner to the commission of these crimes, may be liable to prosecution before the Court, with full respect for the principle of complementarity. It is imperative that all parties to the conflict respect their obligations under international humanitarian law.

My Office has also received multiple queries on the amendments to the Rome Statute with respect to the crime of aggression, which came into force in 2018, and the application of those amendments to the present situation. Given that neither Ukraine nor the Russian Federation are State Parties to the Rome Statute, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over this alleged crime in this situation.

My Office will continue to closely monitor the Situation in Ukraine. In the independent and impartial exercise of its mandate, the Office remains fully committed to the prevention of atrocity crimes and to ensuring that anyone responsible for such crimes is held accountable.

Following my return to The Hague, I intend to issue a more detailed statement regarding the Situation in Ukraine, providing clarity on my assessment and the next steps I envisage in relation to this file.

Source: Office of the Prosecutor | Contact: OTPNewsDesk@icc-cpi.int  

VVD: International Wassenaarders: We Want Your Vote! ¡Queremos Tu Voto!

Due to some cancellations, mainly because of the war in Ukraine, we had to make the difficult decision to postpone our international debate of the 10th of March. Our hearts and thoughts go out to the Ukrainian people, and we pray for a quick ending of the war. The Wassenaarse VVD does feel the great importance of having an international debate, so if you would like to receive the Save the date, please send an e-mail to: secretaris@vvdwassenaar.nl. We hope to see you soon and of course, please vote, because democracy is so important, especial now. Vote Wassenaarse VVD, list 1 on the 16th of March.

Monday 14 – Wednesday 16 March, the Netherlands will have Local Elections.EU citizens and citizens from non-EU countries are allowed to vote in municipal elections if they meet the requirements. Citizens from non-EU countries are allowed to vote if they have lived legally in the Netherlands for at least 5 years before the election (https://www.government.nl/topics/elections/voting-in-municipal-elections).

Wassenaar is an international village with 20 percent foreigners that come and join our community for different reasons. They like the pleasant living environment, its location, and the services, such as international education or sports. Most important: these “International Wassenaarders” really like Wassenaar. Our Internationals stay more time than on average and some of them make a very important decision for their lives: They don’t go, they stay!

Internationals have become so important to our village that the Local Council is busy to determine their relevance on different fronts, such as the socio-economical and educational services. With the goal of increasing their participation in the community, by making them feel welcome and by meeting their needs.

According to the VVD one thing is certain: there is a big group of International Wassenaarders that live in Wassenaar, that would like to stay more time here (or come back from abroad!) and participate in improving our village and its services. Wassenaar needs to unleash this potential.

In the coming weeks we will embark on a series of conversations with Internationals – from one-to-one talks to an International Debate taking place March 10, 2022 – so we can bring the outcome of these conversations as input to a more practical level at the Local Council, where the perspective and needs of these Internationals will be taken into consideration for the development of a policy for the years to come.

The Team in charge of this purpose exists of two expats, Eduardo Islas and Katya Smit. These two International Wassenaarders have experience in policy making, psychology and business development, and have a clear belief in an international, future-proof Wassenaar where everyone feels welcome and eager to work with others to enrich our prosperous community.

We are committed to (International) diversity, inclusion, and participation.

VOTE FOR US, VOTE FOR WASSENAAR VVD! LIJST 1

Interested in participating, asking a question or participate in our International Debate, please send an email to: secretaris@vvdwassenaar.nl

For a Spanish version please visit www.vvdwassenaar.nl

Tashkent to Host High-Level International Conference on Regional Cooperation of Central Asian States in the Fight Against Terrorism

0

On March 3-4, 2022, a high-level international conference on the topic: “Regional cooperation of Central Asian countries within the framework of the Joint Action Plan for the Implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy”, will be hosted in Tashkent.

The landmark event, supported by international community, will become the practical implementation of the initiative of the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev, put forward at the 75th session of the UN General Assembly, and will make a significant contribution to consolidating the efforts of the countries of the region and the international community in the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UN GCTS) in Central Asia.

The conference is co-organized by the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan (ISRS), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), the UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The Tashkent Conference will be held in a hybrid format with more than 600 senior officials and leading experts from national and foreign think tanks in the EU, Central and South Asia, China, Russia, USA, Middle East and other countries, representatives of international and regional organizations and civil society institutions.

Among the invitees are the participants of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Compact for the implementation of counter-terrorism measures, special representatives of Member States as well as donor states of counter-terrorism activities.

At the opening ceremony, an address is expected on behalf of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Mr. Shavkat Mirziyoyev and a video message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. António Guterres. Other speakers include OSCE Secretary General Helga Maria Schmid, UN Under-Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism Mr. Vladimir Voronkov, Special Representative of the Secretary General for Central Asia and Head of the UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA), Ms.  Natalia German, Shanghai Coorperation Organization (SCO) Secretary General Zhang Mina, heads of delegations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

The Republic of Uzbekistan will be represented by members of government, heads of chambers and committees of the Oliy Majlis, specialists from ministries, departments and non-governmental organizations and leading researchers from think tanks and universities.

The 10th anniversary of the adoption of the Joint Plan of Action for Central Asia (JPOA) would provide an opportunity to learn about the unique experience of implementing the UN GCTS in this region, as well as to endorse a new edition of the regional JPOA, prepared on the basis of a ten-year review, multi-stakeholder consultations and consensus.

Within the framework of the conference, in the form of panel discussions, four breakout sessions will be held on each of the four pillars of the GCTS.  These include (i) addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; (ii) Preventing and countering terrorism; (iii) building states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard and (iv) ensuring respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism.

Three side events will be held on the margins of the Conference: 1) the role of the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in strengthening cooperation between the states of Central Asia within the framework of the JPoA, 2) the implementation of the UN GCTS, gender aspects in the work with women and children returning from war zones, 3) financial support for programs to counter terrorism. These side events will be organized by SCO RATS, OSCE, UNOCT and their partners.

The key documents following the outcome of the international meeting should be the Tashkent Declaration and updated Joint Plan of Action, in which the countries of Central Asia will reaffirm their commitment to the joint fight against terrorism, which poses a serious threat to international peace and security, define specific tasks for the near future.

The provisions of the Tashkent Declaration and the new Joint Plan of Action will become consistent and a logical continuation of previously adopted documents – the Ashgabat Declaration (2011), the Ashgabat Declaration on Countering Terrorism (2017), and the Dushanbe Declaration on the results of the high level international conference “International and regional cooperation against terrorism and its sources of financing, including drug trafficking and organized crime” (2019).

******

For more information:

• Visit the conference website: https://gcts-ca.uz/en;

• Contact the public relations coordinators;

• Review background materials such as the concept note, draft program and information for attendees posted on the conference website.

Residentie Orkest, “Colorful Sounds” Concert

By Roy Lie Tjam

Soon the coronavirus restrictions are to be lifted, The Hague Philharmonic Orchestra (Residentie orkest) took the stage on Friday 11 February  2022 for what may well be the last orchestral concert under coronavirus restrictions.

With the masterly of Brahms, the colourfulness of Stravinsky and the spectacular sounds of Walton, this is a fitting way to describe the “Kleurrijke Klanken” concert. 

The concert was an excellent opportunity to get acquainted with the guest conductor Nuno Coelho. What is more, the renowned Nicolas Altstaedt joined as a cello soloist.

The One Minute Symphony phenomena. It’s  a Residentie Orkest project. A composition student from the Royal Conservatoire in The Hague takes to the streets to contact residents in one of the city’s neighbourhoods. Subsequently, a symphony of one minute is composed that will premiere later. A personal story of a resident of The Hague is turned into music.

It has by all means been a dazzling concert.

Featuring on the program:

Nuno Coelho, conductor (Guest conductor of Orquestra Gulbenkian- Lisboa)

Nicolas Altstaedt:  cello

Max van Platen:    One Minute Symphony: Dance of the magpie. Composition student Max van Platen went looking for inspiration for his One Minute Symphony in the Kunstmuseum. Here he spoke to Doede Hardeman, Head of Collections at the museum, about Constant’s work ‘the Blue Flame’. In particular, the idea of ​​rearranging the world and achieving a utopia where one can have a free spirit appealed to Max.

BrahmsHaydnVariationen im Sommer  op.56a

Walton:  Cello concert 1956, Tema ed improvvisazioni.

Stravinsky :   

  • L’oiseau de Feu
  • Introduction
  • L’Oiseau de Feu Et Sa Danse
  • Variations de L’Oiseau de Feu
  • Pantomime I
  • Pas de Deux – L’Oiseau de Feu Et Ivan Tsarevitch
  • Pantomime II
  • Scherzo – Danse Des Princesses
  • Pantomime III
  • Ronde Des Princesses
  • Danse Infernale Du Roi Kastchei
  • Berceuse
  • Finale  

After the last piece in the program, the audience stood up in a standing ovation. It was a delightful program, colourful, virtuoso and exciting.

Five Italians face court in Romania accused of defrauding EU agricultural funds

0

The Hague, 23 February 2022

Eurojust supported the Romanian and Italian authorities in an investigation that concluded with the indictment of five Italian citizens accused of defrauding the EU of at least EUR 800 000 worth of EU agricultural funds. The fraudsters and four companies they set up first face trial in Romania. A trial for self money laundering will take place in Italy at a later date.

Judicial authorities from Romania and Italy met yesterday in Enna, Italy, to evaluate the joint investigation team (JIT) that unveiled the fraud. 

The case was brought to Eurojust by the Romanian authorities in 2019. The five Italian citizens allegedly set up shell companies in Romania to illegally obtain EU funds from the Romanian Agency for Payments and Intervention for Agriculture (APIA) for planting and selling tomatoes in the 2017 campaign. They drafted and submitted documents with false information on seed purchases and on tomato sales.

According to the investigations, the EU funds were never used to plant and sell tomatoes in Romania. The fraudsters transferred the money to several bank accounts and eventually withdrew it as cash from ATMs located in Italy (mainly in Nicosia, in the province of Enna).

The five Italian citizens appear to have committed multiple frauds in the agricultural sector in different countries since 2015. The frauds have generated approximately EUR 21 million, which has since been reinvested by the Italian citizens in Romania and elsewhere.

The five suspects and the companies they set up in Romania were indicted in 2021. They now face trial in Romania on charges of fraud against the financial interests of the European Union and forming an organised criminal group. The same accused persons have been charged by the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Enna for self money laundering and will face the court in Italy for this accusation in October 2022.

Eurojust assisted the Romanian and Italian judicial authorities in the exchange of information and coordination of parallel investigations. In particular, the Agency provided assistance on the issuance and enforcement of freezing orders on the assets of the suspects and their companies.

Eurojust also helped the countries to determine the most suitable jurisdiction for prosecution and gave advice to prevent multiple legal actions against perpetrators for the same offence, thereby avoiding a breach of the so-called ne bis in idem principle.

The evaluation meeting underlined the good cooperation between Eurojust and the national authorities to fight organised crime and was held in the ‘Falcone e Borsellino’ auditorium of the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Enna.

The following authorities took part in the investigation:

  • Romania: Prosecutor’s Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice, National Anticorruption Directorate, Craiova Territorial Office (DNA Craiova),
  • Italy: Public Prosecutor Office of ENNA (PPO ENNA), in Sicily,
  • European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)

Cyberwarfare and International Humanitarian Law

By Adrian Zienkiewicz and Eugene Matos De Lara

A virtual universe where assets and ideas are exchanged rapidly has become reality, and so too has the presence of a deep underbelly of the web that seeks to manipulate and steal valuable information.

Confidential information contained within complex computer networks is routinely targeted and cyberattacks are pervasive. Sometimes there are personal and financial motivations at play, but it becomes a uniquely geopolitical endeavor aimed at control and destabilization when backed by a State. Cyberwarfare is war in peacetime, and while not perceivable by ordinary citizens, it is ongoing daily through various retaliatory attacks. How is cyberwarfare constituted by international humanitarian law (IHL), and what are the legal voids?

Cyber warfare is a unique form of “force” enacted by a State, understood broadly through the lens of article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which a State must refrain from enacting and is irrespective of its duration or magnitude. Since government and financial institutions’ computer programs contain highly sensitive data, the breaching of these by a foreign entity are to be perceived as attacks on sovereignty. Even if not instigating a conflict, threats, coercion, or pressure applied through this manner are still discouraged.

The nature of the concept differs considerably with article 51; through this, cyberwarfare would have to be sufficiently coordinated, bearing enough evidence of its State involvement and motivations for it to be designated as an “armed attack”. The international community intends to keep cyberwarfare solely as a method of self-defense that must be considered through necessity, proportionality, distinction, and prevention of wrongful conduct before its occurrence. The notions must be considered with the heightened anticipation of the consequences of taking one path instead of the other. Thus, preemptively establishing virtual defense technologies would be appropriate. Still, for instance, it is not the case in harassing an opposing party’s networks to disrupt their military capabilities or disable entire power grids

Cyberspace shouldn’t be exploited as a frontier of conflict, although it often is. More than just protecting information, the promulgated objective is deterrence. Cyberwarfare could potentially provoke more open, conventional forms of armed conflict- an accumulation of consistent cyber attacks could be detrimental to a country’s progress- but it is, through jus in bello, itself a type of conflict. Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, through article 49(1), asserts that “[a]ttacks means acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence”, and cyberwarfare is precisely acts of hostility of a State against another.

Cyberwarfare indeed ascribes to the rules of IHL: civilians cannot intentionally be targeted, the same follows for essential infrastructure that provides basic resources, and so forth. That is why cyberwarfare, even through extensive operations, tends to be precise in its function and minimizes damage. A State wants to naturally lower the odds of having its operations intercepted, and a minor wrongdoing could simply be answered with an equal wrongdoing or condemnation. When done right, cyberspace is where anonymity and covertness commingle, therefore allowing a State to openly deny attacks even though they are the true perpetrators, further reducing accountability. While it’s a web of worlds within worlds and worlds apart from each other, it is possible to leave a trail in cyberspace and evidence could point to a State party committing some wrongdoing, although it’s oftentimes inferred.

Most attacks are committed by third party groups and even more are left unaccounted for. Also, attacks presenting patterns or targeting exceptionally specific programs can be proof of State sponsored actions, but liability is squashed or at the least greatly diminished when operating through an array of proxies. Cyber warfare is sophisticated, and despite occasional acts of overt sabotage, it is the subtle extraction of information that provides advantages without the other parties knowing it that is sought. Discovering facts that a State deliberately tried to keep secret could be used against them at the negotiation table, leaving them dumbfounded as to why its counterpart is adopting a particular stance.

All States that have the technological capacity, advanced or otherwise, participate in some form or another in this boundless warfare. It is incorporated by IHL, but is distinct enough for the international community to potentially advance a uniform regulatory body, a task that has not been envisioned yet. The Tallinn Manual serves as the most foremost study on cyber warfare, conducted at the behest of NATO, but it too demonstrates the difficulty of ascertaining the effects on objects that are both immaterial and intangible. There are constraints in quantifying losses when no visible damages are present, and when some attacks are negligible it is likewise difficult to find acceptable solutions. Some States such as the US, still the preeminent power in cyber warfare, have attempted to categorize cyberattacks according to their corresponding danger, increasing response efficacy all while weighing the notion of proportionality. The ICJ, as shown through Nicaragua v. United States, argues that peaceful countermeasures are a response to low level threat.

There is no end to sight of cyber warfare, as there is a functional contradiction between discouraging its perpetuation and its actual practice. The ability to gain an upper hand in any desired sector with insignificant consequences doesn’t act as a deterrent but rather an incitement. A State that doesn’t keep pace in cyberspace is bound to get left behind in the material world and is susceptible to foreign pressure. International resolutions can be adopted alongside diplomatic sanctions, but they will ultimately yield no change to the modus operandi of cyberspace activities.

There is an assortment of definitions for cyberattacks and there is no definitive way of attributing responsibility of a cyberattack to a State. The effective control test posited in the Nicaragua case contrasts with the looser overall control in Prosecutor v. Tadic. Other responsibility thresholds have been conceptualized, but international jurisprudence on cyber warfare is nonexistent. Obtaining remedies through international institutions is a tough challenge for States even when citing precedence due to legal knowledge on cyber warfare constantly morphing. Time will tell how the law can follow the practice when cyberspace continues to expand.

About the authors:

Adrian Zienkiewicz

Author Adrian Zienkiewicz (LL.B., J.D.) is a law student at Université de Montréal. He has a marked interest for all spheres of public international law. Environmental and Energy Law are his real passions.

Co-Author Eugene Matos De Lara (MA, MBA, LL.L, JD, LLB, BA.pol.pad, BA.dvm, BA.sc PMP) is currently working for the International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan studies, based in Ljubljana, and the Geneva Desk for Cooperation. Multilingual internationally published legal graduate with an extensive corporate legal background, and exposure to private international law, international relations, politics, public administration and public affairs.

International Law and Diplomatic Covert Intelligence

By Eugene Matos and Adrian Zienkiewicz

Most discussion around diplomacy is usually about how they go about representation, however little is discussed about the equally important duty of observing and reporting. It takes big events such as the Raymond Allen Davis case. A contractor with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) shot two men killing both in Lahore, Pakistan. In the aftermath, the U.S. government contended that Davis was protected by diplomatic immunity because of his CIA employment with the American consulate in Lahore. The event highlighted a question on the scope of immunities given to consular and diplomatic staff, and more precisely, the role and protections awarded to diplomats working as undercover intelligence agents.

Diplomacy and its legal protection, practices and communication cables, diplomatic bags, have partially, if in theory alone, institutionalized aspects of espionage. Where does diplomacy end and spying begin? Where must one draw the line between official diplomacy and the murky world of espionage? “Every embassy in the world has spies,” says University of Buckingham’s Prof Anthony Glees during an interview, director of the Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies. Because it is common practice, there’s an unwritten understanding that governments are prepared to turn a blind eye to what occurs within embassies. It is a fragile quid pro quo between nation-states that has substantial political ramifications.

Most contemporary intelligence officers aren’t deeply embedded undercover; these agents are posted as either low or mid-level workers in foreign embassies and monitor affairs from there. The host countries are aware of their actual identities and the types of duties they carry out. They are generally disregarded until they become threats – easier to track the spies you know about than the ones you don’t.

In the nuclear, technology and cyberspace era, international law requires constant reinterpretation or reassertion to challenge new problems and adapt to developments in the global system. There are various elements to espionage concerning its purpose, methods, and practices that include these innovative arenas. Excluding armed conflicts, espionage is never explicitly addressed in law; the question is left virtually unanswered. Needless to say, there is a varying consensus by legal scholars regarding its limitations.

What is Diplomatic Espionage?

With the advent of technology, the practices vary immensely; albeit, it can be defined as a tool for the execution of policy as well as a tool to inform policy, dividing it into two categories: covert operations, which is the tool for the execution of policy, and intelligence, the tool to inform policy. There are two types of espionage in law: covert operations and covert intelligence. Both occur in secrecy to avoid detection, and therefore require significant consideration and preparation.

The first type- covert operations- consists of active and cyberspace operations. States conduct such actions to influence a foreign state. Covert operations remain very classified, which put them in the deep end of espionage. These can be of a coercive nature, and may include, but not be limited to, sabotage, theft, covert political action, and propaganda.

The second type is covert intelligence, the subject of this present analysis and the more obscure strand of diplomatic espionage. It is divided further into two categories: collection of information and analysis of that information. With respect to international law, the initial collection of information raises considerable legal questions, making it highly contested, especially for diplomats whose primary function is to listen and report. Accordingly, both mandates, covert intelligence and diplomacy, are interested in gathering vital and classified foreign information through different techniques, of private and public nature, for strategic policy goals. Usually, the distinction is perceived through the methods used and the targets in mind, is where the line of malpractice in diplomacy is drawn.

Why is it Important?

Foreign data collection itself has several variants and they are used to guide foreign policy and apprehend the future behaviour of its constituents not only in military applications, but also in trade and investments, as well as general regional politics. Thus, intelligence gathering is a crucial practice towards the greater ambitions of a state, and its secrecy further implies that intelligence is integral in the state decision-making process.

A question of diplomatic practice

The issue is rightfully not whether diplomats can spy or not; rather, one should understand the limitations. Espionage, economic and industrial intelligence remains a missing dimension of international affairs, diplomatic history and its study. Diplomatic espionage is also practiced between friendly states, ‘friendly’ economic espionage is seen as a covert activity between competing foreign states to acquire economic intelligence used to interfere with certain states’ economic opportunities. These are popular variables in trade negotiations. The USA has successfully used macroeconomic, microeconomic and economic counterintelligence against its allies. In fact the New York Times confirmed that the United States has expanded the role of American diplomats in collecting intelligence overseas. Case in point, United States diplomats were directly instructed to spy on United Nations, and EU leaders, as confirmed by Wikileaks, a 2009 confidential directive from the United States Department of State.

Is Diplomatic Covert Intelligence Legal?

Diplomatic immunity is a form of legal immunity that ensures diplomats are given safe passage in the host country. Diplomats are unsusceptible to lawsuits or prosecution under the host country’s laws. Although the practice of espionage is technically illegal, it is forgivable by law for diplomats, yet the line between ethical practice does affect contemporary diplomatic relations when crossed arbitrarily. In certain cases, states knowingly cross this line despite high geopolitical stakes, with considerable aftermath as seen with the Snowden leak in Venezuela/Germany/USA relations.

A diplomat has the conventional duty, by nature and mandate, to observe the receiving state. However, some diplomats have lurked away from the light and gone into endeavours that are incompatible with their official plan, such as infiltration, development of cover identities, or by monitoring the behaviours of individuals or groups to gather information and persuade political disenchantment. In correlation, we accord an interest to the instructive case of legal resident spies operating in a foreign state with an official cover and protection of a member of a diplomatic mission, which is yes protected by law. However, the law creates a clear distinction if the member is a consular or diplomat.

Consular staff

Immunity is a product of the Vienna Convention on Consular/Diplomatic Relations, 1963/61, and the International Law Commission. To begin with consular agents, they are accountable to all state laws except for a few functional circumstances. In addition, a consular officer’s protection is limited to reporting and performing intelligence functions by all lawful means and can only report on the conditions and developments of the receiving State’s commercial, economic, cultural and scientific life.

Moreover, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963 (VCCR) art 43 ss. 1 states that consular staff are “not amenable to the jurisdiction of the judicial or administrative authorities of the receiving State in respect of acts performed in the exercise of consular functions” and that they should only be liable to arrest, according to article 41, “in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a decision by the competent judicial authority”.

In other words, the law has given us parameters for consular agents to respect these: intelligence from resident accredited consular staff is legal under the VCCR 1963 insofar that, the consular mission respects the laws of the receiving State, that the activities do not include illegal covert operations, that the activities are restricted to observe and report (intelligence) in matters within the function of the consulate and that the intelligence is restricted to only the socio-economic development of the host state.

Diplomatic Staff

If a diplomatic member assigned to an embassy is caught crossing the line in espionage , the host authorities would have to admit the principle of diplomatic immunity, by which diplomatic officials are not subject to the jurisdiction of local courts and other authorities for both their official and, to a large extent, their personal activities. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961, offers broader protections than the consulate. For example, the archives and documents of a diplomatic mission are inviolable and shall not be seized or opened by the host government (Article 24).

The host country must permit and protect free communication between the diplomats of the mission and their home country. A diplomatic bag must never be opened, even on suspicion of abuse, and a diplomatic courier must never be arrested or detained (Article 27). Diplomats must not be liable to any form of arrest or detention, and the receiving state must make all efforts to protect their person and dignity (Article 29). Diplomats are immune from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the host state, with exceptions for professional activities outside the diplomat’s official functions (Article 31). Therefore, the only clear path to prosecution offered is Article 32, permitting sending states to waive this immunity.

It is safe to assume that the repercussions vary enormously giving us a plethora of options if a diplomat gets caught crossing the line. Detention, interrogation and the possibility of a trial in a public venue are not usually possible for diplomats. Again, the factors depend on the government in question, who the diplomat is working for, their citizenship, and what information they may have received or transferred. Thus we switch to the political context.

If a diplomat gets caught crossing the line of what’s acceptable, but they’re not causing noteworthy harm, usually they’ll just get kicked out of the country and sent back home; these actions are swift. Getting caught red handed is the genesis of a wave of political humiliation and negative diplomatic relations. In the case of diplomatic immunity, an intelligence operator would be, in general, only answerable to the jurisdiction of the host state if the sending state waives off the diplomatic immunity.

Repercussions for non diplomats?

However, once a spy crosses the line and they do not carry or diplomatic immunity is waived, it’s game on. If it’s an ally that has compromised defenses, an exchange or kicked out of the country, and if it’s a citizen to the host country a lengthy jail term is likely in store. The ally, too embarrassed about getting caught, no one wants to cause an international diplomatic incident over something they were trying to keep hush-hush in the first place. Enemy spies are slightly different, and their fates largely depend on the relationship between the two nations. They also make good bargaining chips – even bitter enemies have been known to trade captured spies. Whenever an enemy spy gets sent back to his home country, it’s usually because someone wanted to keep the peace.

Espionage is just war and politics played out on a smaller scale by unelected officials and political appointees. Accordingly, the fate of any one agent is largely determined by negotiations, the political environment and of course diplomacy. Spying is illegal as per the national law of almost every state, but some foreigners can be protected or immune to those laws, insofar that the method of covert intelligence fits in the parameters of the principles of diplomatic or functions of the consular immunity.

About the authors:

Author Eugene Matos De Lara (MA, MBA, LL.L, JD, LLB, BA.pol.pad, BA.dvm, BA.sc PMP) is currently working for the International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan studies, based in Ljubljana, and the Geneva Desk for Cooperation. Multilingual internationally published legal graduate with an extensive corporate legal background, and exposure to private international law, international relations, politics, public administration and public affairs.

Adrian Zienkiewicz

Co-author Adrian Zienkiewicz (LL.L JD) is a law student at Université de Montréal. He has a marked interest for all spheres of public international law. Environmental and Energy Law are his real passions.

The Persian Gulf and Red Sea to be connected

By  Eleni-Vasiliki Bampaliouta

The Persian Gulf and Red Sea are to be connected by one of the largest railways in the world, at a cost of $250 billion

One of the largest and most expensive projects in the world is being built in the Arabian Peninsula. The Gulf Cooperation Council, made up of six extremely rich Arab countries, is building a 2,000 kilometer railway to connect the region’s states in the best possible way. Crossing the Arabian Desert and creating tunnels in the mountains, the challenges of this project are enormous and perfectly match its cost.

The countries that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman. The idea for the magnificent project was born in 2009, while its construction costs will be shared between the countries and will range from 100 to 250 billion dollars.

A key element of this new railway network is the existing modern Etihad railway. It is a $ 1,200 km, $ 11 billion passenger and commercial freight rail line that runs across the Emirates and connects the Gulf of Oman with the Persian Gulf.

A large railway is being prepared in Egypt for a total cost of $ 4.5 billion.

It is expected that the majority of the order will be accounted for in 2022 after the financial agreements have been signed. The approved contract covers the initial 660 km of the planned 1800 km railway network. The railway will also include the Suez Canal.

The 660-kilometer line will connect the port city of Ain Sokhna on the Red Sea with the port city of Marsa Matrouh and Alexandria in the Mediterranean, connecting two cities, including the the Suez Canal. The Egyptian government has an ambitious plan to invest heavily in a state-of-the-art, reliable and sustainable 1,800-kilometer high-speed rail network that will provide efficient, safe and affordable transportation for all Egyptians, as well as freight, across the country.

The two additional railways will connect the Greater Cairo area from the city on October 6 along the Nile River with Aswan and Luxor via Hurghada to Safaga. The entire network will make Egypt a regional leader in transportation, will influence different economic sectors giving an overall boost to the country’s economy. The consortium will immediately create more than 15,000 jobs in Egypt and an additional 3,800, which will be covered by Egyptian suppliers and the wider Egyptian economy.

Arabian railway.

The connection will carry more than 30 million passengers annually and save up to 50% travel time, a fact which will significantly increase labor productivity, while also connecting Cairo with emerging urban communities. Cairo’s population has doubled in size since 1980 and today some 20 million people call Cairo their home. To alleviate traffic congestion, new cities are currently being developed around the Cairo metropolis.

Arabian railway

From Austria to Greece, via Serbia by train.

A state-of-the-art railway is being built in the Eastern Mediterranean. This project will start in Salzburg, Austria and will end in Thessaloniki and Piraeus in Greece; a distance of about 1,600 kilometers. The pan-European highway Corridor X connects central with southern Europe, via Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and North Macedonia.

The Serbian section was completed two years ago at a cost of 400 million euros. The big bet now is to build the railway at the same time. The first modern section of this network will start next month with a train that will reach speeds of 200 kilometers per hour. Serbia is in the phase of complete renewal of its infrastructure, a fact that also benefits Greece, as it facilitates thousands of visitors from all over Europe.

Northern Macedonia and Greece are moving forward on their own part. Investment in trains and railways is the future, not only for transport and traffic management, but also for environmental reasons. 

President of Colombia visits International Criminal Court

0

On 17 February 2022, H.E. Mr Iván Duque Márquez, President of the Republic of Colombia, visited the International Criminal Court (ICC), where he met the President of the Court, Judge Piotr Hofmański, the Court’s First Vice President, Judge Luz del Carmen Ibáñez Carranza, Second Vice President Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua, Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan QC and Registrar Peter Lewis

In his remarks at the meeting, President Hofmański thanked President Duque for honouring the Court with his visit and stated: “The commitment and full cooperation of States is essential for the ICC to be able to discharge its mandate independently and effectively. In this context, Colombia’s continued support for the Court is of vital importance and much appreciated.”

President Duque reiterated Colombia’s commitment to the guiding principles of the Rome Statute and manifested President Piotr Hofmański and Registrar Peter Lewis his “admiration for the International Criminal Court and the work it has been carrying out, particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic”. He expressed his appreciation for “the efforts that the Court is doing to ensure that victims of the most heinous crimes can obtain justice, even during these difficult circumstances”.

Additionally, President Duque recalled that “the Cooperation Agreement between the government of Colombia and the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, signed in Bogotá in October 2021, marks a milestone in the relationship between his country and the ICC”, and affirmed that his encounter with Prosecutor Karim Khan was a propitious opportunity to further develop it.

He highlighted that “Colombia has an enormous experience in the field of ​​transitional justice” and stressed the importance of said agreement, as “it opens new ways to share that know-how with the ICC and its States Parties, always looking towards the compliance of the objectives of the Rome Statute”.