
Slovak and Czech authorities take action against right-wing terrorism
A 22-year-old suspected of committing several terrorist and extremist crimes has been arrested in Slovakia. In an action supported by Eurojust, Europol and the United States, Slovak and Czech authorities searched two locations and seized a 3D printer and printed metal parts of weapons, computers and other electronic devices.
According to the investigation, the arrested suspect is believed to sympathise and promote far-right white nationalist movements such as the neo-Nazi ‘alternative right’, the ideology of ‘accelerationism’ and the ‘Siege culture’.
The suspect allegedly participated in several subversive and sabotage activities and acts of terrorism with the objective of publicly inciting the overthrow of the democratic political system. He shared photos of glorified far-right extremists to publicly support their activities. He also committed several extremist crimes.
He allegedly published instructions and diagrams for the production of improvised cold steel weapons, the domestic production of automatic firearms made in combination with printable parts on a 3D printer and homemade metal parts, and the production of explosives and mines. He also shared guidelines on how to carry out sabotage attacks.
The case was opened at Eurojust in 2021 at the request of the Slovak authorities. The Agency supported the authorities in Slovakia and the Czech Republic by setting up and funding a joint investigation team (JIT) into the case. One coordination meeting took place in Slovakia to share information, decide on a common strategy, and facilitate cooperation with the United States and Europol.
During an action day on 11 May, one suspect was arrested and one location was searched in Slovakia, where a 3D printer, computer and other electronic devices were seized. In the Czech Republic, one location was searched and a number of 3D printed metal parts of weapons were seized during an action day on 23 May.
The following authorities took part in this investigation:
- Slovakia: Special Prosecutor’s Office, the Presidium of the Police Force of the National Crime Agency
- Czech Republic: Regional Prosecutor´s office Brno, National Organised Crime Agency Prague
- United States: Federal Bureau of Investigation
President Agius meets with United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres
Arusha, The Hague, 8 June 2022 – The President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (Mechanism), Judge Carmel Agius, met yesterday with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. António Guterres, in New York. It was their last meeting before President Agius steps down from his role as Mechanism President, effective 1 July 2022
At the outset, the Secretary-General welcomed President Agius, expressing deep appreciation for his work and his outstanding leadership of the Mechanism since January 2019. Having commended the progress made by the Mechanism, the Secretary-General also highlighted its important contribution to international criminal justice, which he stated is crucial to preserve.
In turn, President Agius conveyed his heartfelt gratitude for the Secretary-General’s trust and support throughout, stating that serving as President of the Mechanism, and before it the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, had been the honour of his lifetime.
President Agius remarked that after three and half rewarding, yet challenging, years at the helm of the Mechanism, he will step down with a sense of pride in its progress, which had been a joint achievement. In this context, he was immensely encouraged by the inclusion of the Mechanism’s activities as key outcomes under the promotion of justice and international law, in the 2021 Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization.
The President also emphasised his conviction that the Mechanism will continue its good work under the direction of his successor, and will again benefit from the superb support provided by the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs. In this regard, he praised the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United Nations Legal Counsel, Mr Miguel de Serpa Soares, and the Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, Mr Stephen Mathias.
Finally, President Agius informed the Secretary-General that he remains as committed as ever to international criminal justice and to the mission of the United Nations, and continues to be available to serve as a Judge of the Mechanism.
President Agius is in New York to present the Twentieth Progress Report of the Mechanism to the United Nations Security Council.
Fraud with sale of used cars in Czech Republic halted with Eurojust support
Authorities in the Czech Republic and Romania have halted a fraud scheme allegedly involving the sale of used cars, depriving close to 200 victims of approximately EUR 1.6 million. During an action day, 17 places were searched and 4 suspects were arrested in both countries. Eurojust supported the action day and assisted the authorities in setting up and funding a joint investigation team (JIT) into the case.
The Prague police started investigations into the scam in 2019, after complaints by victims, who had paid deposits for the purchase of an imported used vehicle, which was never delivered. The fraudsters offered second-hand cars from abroad for sale on various professionally set up websites and asked customers for deposits between EUR 4 000 and EUR 8 000. The fraudsters told customers this amount was necessary to get the car through customs so it could be transported from the Czech border.
In reality, the vehicles on offer were not for sale at all. The Prague police identified a trail to Romania and found that the fraud was being orchestrated by three Romanian and Czech suspects. At a later stage, the scammers were joined by accomplices, who had set up false profiles of German companies, whose bank accounts were used for the payment of the deposits. The alleged fraudsters are suspected of forgery and money laundering.
For sales purposes, 28 fake identities of Slovenian vehicle owners were set up, pretending they wanted to sell their car. In another instance, fake identities of a Czech couple allegedly living in Germany were used, stating they wanted to sell their car to profit from a German subsidy for a new electric car. These false internet profiles of sellers made the scheme look very credible.
Apart from funding and assisting with the setting up of the JIT, Eurojust provided judicial support during the action day and helped with its preparations.
During an action day, 17 places were searched in Romania and the Czech Republic. In Romania, six suspects were charged, two of whom were arrested. In addition, a Czech European Arrest Warrant was executed resulting in the arrest of one suspect. Authorities froze assets – such as luxury cars, real estate, cash and jewellery – worth over EUR 600 000.
In the Czech Republic, one suspect was arrested.
The operation was carried out in both countries by:
- Czech Republic: Municipal Public Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) Prague; Prague police
- Romania: Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT) Vâlcea; PPO attached to the Craiova Court of Appeal; Service for Combating Organized Crime, Vâlcea
The 2022 Africa Day Celebration
Africa Day 2022, Strength, Resilience in Nutrition and Food Security in Africa
By Roy Lie Atjam
On the Occasion of Africa Day 2022, H.E. Ms. Irene F. M. Kasyanju, Ambassador of the United Republic of Tanzania in the Netherlands and Dean of the African Diplomatic Corps, organized a reception in Wassenaar on 31st May 2022.
Scores from the Africa diaspora in the Netherlands and beyond flocked in Wassenaar to celebrate this auspicious day with their brethren, friends and Africa well-wishers. The ambience was excellent.
The program featured speeches, cultural performances, videos, networking and showcasing of the savoury African cuisine.
It was the Moroccan group Gnawa that put on a cultural show. Gnawa is a cultural performance combining African, Arab-Muslim influences and native Berber cultural elements.
The Dean of the African group H.E. Ms. Irene F. M. Kasyanju, Ambassador of Tanzania, delivered the welcome address that went down well with the audience. Ambassador Kasyanju touched on the Ubuntu spirit, Agenda 2063, the Maputo Protocol, CFC* and other African aspects.


The guest of Honor, Her Excellency Ms.Carola van Rijnsoever, Deputy Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, delivered the keynote address.
In short, this is what she said, the growing, global interest in Africa the beautiful, diverse and dynamic continent, by countries like China, the USA, Russia, Turkey and the Gulf States. Van Rijnsoever explained that the Netherlands places great importance on bilateral ties with African countries. She applauded the high-level participation, of both Europe and Africa in the EU-AU Summit held in Brussels in February this year. “The Netherlands, Europe and Africa are not distant acquaintances. We are close neighbours. And a changing global landscape is making his even clearer. Together, we can find answers to the challenges we all face.”

Other speakers were the Ambassadors of Egypt H.E. Mr. Hatem Abdelkader on behalf of the African Unity Chair. A resume of his speech. “59 years ago, on the 25th of May 1963, the founding fathers established the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – then called the Organization of African Unity – that sowed the seeds of our African unity and launched a new era of African synergy trajectory to lay the foundation for continental integration. Our leaders walked their path and established the bridges for Africa to cross to stability, progress, and prosperity.
Today, we harvest the fruits of the efforts of our founding ancestors of the AU after following their steps in a persistent manner all over the past decades. Our continent walks steadily towards the realization of sustainable development and economic growth guided by Agenda 2063. Under this ambitious Agenda, our joint efforts are intensified to transform our continent into a future driven by unity, self-determination, freedom, progress, and collective prosperity.
The year 2022 is the “Year of Nutrition” in Africa to strengthen resilience and food security in the continent. This comes at a time when the threat of food shortages, inflation, and higher consumer prices are looming over the whole world including on our African continent. Here we are today celebrating our Africa day where the spirit of African synergy, profound cooperation and integration are the basis of our continent.
I wish you many happy returns where all the peoples of Africa around the globe are bound together and progressing in line with the vision of our founding fathers.
Long live Africa.!”

H.E. Ambassador Salima Abdelhak of Algeria closed the speeches and rendered the spirit of her fellow Ambassadors through a toast she raised to Africa stating: “Let’s raise a toast to our Mother Africa. May it Be peaceful, prosperous and integrated. May it be driven by its own citizens and May it be a dynamic force in the international arena. To the address of the Guest of honor the MFA Deputy Secretary General, she added “May the partnership Africa / Netherlands be consolidated and Prosperous”

Here is the speech as pronounced by the Dean Ambassador Irene Kasyanju.
“At the outset allow me to welcome you all, and particularly our Guest of Honour, and express my sincere gratitude for your participation in this commemoration of Africa Day 2022. As we say in Swahili Karibuni Sana!
Indeed, I am so delighted and excited to be here and to have finally being able to hold this event in person, after two years of online engagements due to COVID–19 pandemic. This year’s celebration is of particular importance to me as it marks the end of my tour of duty as the Ambassador of Tanzania to the Netherlands. A position I have happily served for over 6 and a half years. This could not have been possible without the unwavering support I received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Group Ambassadors, and the entire Diplomatic Corps fraternity. I do not have a better way to extend my appreciation to you than by saying “thank you so much”.
As we mark the celebration of Africa Day, let me first start by commending the workmanship and dedication of our Experts, whose tireless efforts to coordinate and plan for the past two months made this celebration possible. I thank them wholeheartedly!
On the same level, permit me to extend sincere gratitude to all African Ambassadors for their commitment, guidance, and material support in ensuring this august event become a success. I remain hopeful that, the strong gesture of true friendship and collaboration among the African States demonstrated during the preparation of this event, will continue to radiate in other occasions. This is the Ubuntu spirit we always cherish in Africa.
Africa Day which is celebrated each year on the 25th of May is an important date in the history of our continent as it commemorates the founding of the first Union of African countries (OAU) in 1963, which was later transformed into the current African Union (AU) in order to have a more stable and prosperous Africa. Therefore, we gather to remember that day and to reflect on how far we have gone, what has been achieved, and what needs to be done in the future in order to build the Africa We Want!
This year’s Africa Day Theme: “Strengthening Resilience in Nutrition and Food Security on the African Continent: Strengthening Agro-Food Systems, Health and Social Protection Systems for the Acceleration of Human, Social and Economic Capital Development” is of paramount importance and very pertinent.
The Theme is not only critical to achieving the AU Agenda 2063 and transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future, as envisioned by our Heads of State and Government; but also offers an opportunity to boost intra-African trade through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) which was operationalized in January 2021, and indeed showcase that Africa is the future the world has been waiting for. A continent in which more than half of the Earth’s arable land – roughly 600 million hectares – is located, should not suffer food insecurity or malnutrition. This year’s theme certainly offers an impetus in the pursuit of an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa.
Indeed, Africa is richly endowed with vast human and natural resources which, if harnessed in accordance with our vision, Agenda 2063, will improve the livelihoods of the peoples of Africa. A continent of 1.3 billion plus people, where 60% of our population is represented by our youth, below the ages of 25 and boast a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $ 2.6 trillion across our 55 Member States, if we move together in unity the ‘Africa We Want’, will not be an agenda but a reality.
Cognizance of this endowment, African countries made reasonable progress to align agricultural and other policies, programs, and investments related to food security and nutrition with the Zero Hunger Vision and SDG 2 which aims to end hunger, achieve food security, improve nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture. However, such investment and the gains achieved seriously suffered during the Covid-19 crisis, affecting our health, food systems, and economies, causing children, women, and poor households to suffer the most.
African governments therefore need to enhance the mobilization of financial resources to invest in both food security and nutrition. We need to transform our agriculture and engage our youth and women in the sector for us to yield positive outcomes. African governments should live up to the commitments made in the Maputo Protocol to allocate 10 percent of national budgets to agriculture and rural development policy. This will ensure transformed agriculture through increased investment and agriculture productivity via irrigation and Agri – tech as well as value addition.
Plainly speaking, Africa needs strategic domestic and international partnerships to ensure access to international finance to fund African innovations and production for enhanced nutrition outcomes among our people. For us in the Netherlands, Institutions such as Common Fund for Commodities (CFC)* can play a significant role in relieving Africa from nutrition insecurity because CFC focuses on strengthening agro-food systems through investing in African Small Holders and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). Our production systems must change and encourage value addition practices to our commodities and minerals and generate real value to boost income for people. We need to invest in food fortification and promote the consumption of nutrients rich food.

Africa Day is the moment to celebrate the richness of our continent in terms of culture, traditions, history, and more importantly our unity. That unity, among others, is evident in the UNESCO’s decision in November 2021 to set 7th July as the World Kiswahili language Day – the official day to celebrate the Kiswahili language; as well as February’s 2022 African Union’s Heads of State decision to approve Kiswahili, the Pan African language, as an official working language of the bloc. We need to promote this unifying language, spoken by over 100 million people in Africa, for the wider communication and implementation of AU Decisions.
Before I conclude, allow me to leave you with an inspirational quote by Tanzania’s founding Father Mwalimu Dr. Julius Nyerere, the driving force behind the movement and firm believer of promoting Kiswahili for African unity, in his speech given in Accra, Ghana, 6 March 1997, and I quote: “Unity will not make us rich, but it can make it difficult for Africa and the African peoples to be disregarded and humiliated”.
As I conclude, kindly accept my sincere gratitude to you all for participating in this commemoration of Africa Day 2022 here in The Hague. Let’s celebrate together the richness of our continent in terms of culture, traditions, and history. The ambiance around here testifies to that.
I wish you all a wonderful Africa Day 2022 celebration.” end quote
* CFC In a rare display of praise and acknowledgement of the sincere but innovative work of an international organization, the Dean of African Ambassadors in The Hague, H.E. Irene Kasyanju, Ambassador of Tanzania to the Netherlands, congratulated Ambassador Sheikh Mohammed Belal, Managing Director of the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC), for their excellent work for the smallholders and SMEs in Africa and beyond. Ambassador Irene in her Africa Day 2022 welcome address stated that “For us in the Netherlands, Institutions such as Common Fund for Commodities (CFC) can play a significant role in relieving Africa from nutrition insecurity because CFC focuses on strengthening agro-food systems through investing in African Small Holders and Small and Medium Enterprises. Our production systems must change and encourage value addition practices to our commodities and minerals and generate real value to boost income for people. We need to invest in food fortification and promote the consumption of nutrients rich food”.
All attending participants acknowledged the above statement through their acclamation and individual felicitations to Ambassador Belal afterwards. It may be noted that CFC is the only UN- affiliated international organization in the Netherlands.
Ukrainian crisis –Meanings, Consequences, Outcome
By Covadonga Romero
Three months have now passed since the Russian ‘special operation in’ or ‘invasion of’ (depends which sources you are citing) of Ukraine began. As the international community strives to understand this ‘denazification and demilitarization’ event, its causes and consequences, much has been said about war’s potential to fundamentally change the world order—and about the way it illustrates already ongoing shifts. Yet, every aspect of the global balance of power, security architecture, and geopolitical dynamics is challenged by the conflict.
On May 20, the Habibie Center addressed this topical issue through its Public Lecture Series. In an event titled ‘The Ukraine Crisis and its Implications for the Global Political Chessboard’, the Jakarta-based think tank hosted Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic (Vienna, Geneva, universities of ) for a discussion on the war’s repercussions, both globally, as well as for the Asian continent and its Southeastern theatre.
Prof. Bajrektarevic framed his thorough analysis of the conflict by alluding to the usual pattern of “critical insight formation” around an international crisis. The ‘problem’ and its ‘solution’ are presented as two halves to a whole picture; the latter depends on the lens through which the former is viewed. Within this picture, the lights and shadows consist of the ‘costs’ associated with the problem, and their ‘cost distribution’. The multi-dimensional nature of Russia’s war in Ukraine can be understood through this framework. Depending on where the problem’s centre of gravity is located—the rise of new threats in a multipolar order, the global energy crisis, the deterioration of European security structures—different costs can be identified for various stakeholders.
Clearing points at the entrée, professor stated: “the way we formulate the problem will inevitably determine our answer/s and lead the course of our action”. Hence, “today I will concentrate only on setting the questions we must ask to answer what this crisis is about”, explained professor before getting into a 40-minute questions elaboration.
The first key point that was touched upon was the set of historical drivers that shape Russia’s foreign policy today, and along with it, the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Among these are the competing universalisms of East and West, insofar as these can be viewed as “not Venus and Mars, but rather two Martian worlds.” The beginning of this is marked by the great schism of the 11th century, with the split between the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches in 1054; from this arises the opportunistic use of religion and its different interpretations for ideological purposes, and the struggle between the dominant centre of religious interpretation and its peripheries or challengers. The events of the Age of Discovery—which saw the projection of European civilisation through political, military, and demographic expansion—reflect this, as exclusivity or dominance over religious interpretation was instrumentalised to justify imperialism.
Another historical factor is Russia’s prolonged perception of Europe as an existential threat. Although this is epitomised by the German-led Operation Barbarossa of 1941—which targeted Ukraine as an important economic territory—previous episodes, such as the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War of 1853-1856, European interventionism during the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917-1923, or the humiliation of the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1921, have also had a lasting impression on Russia’s historical memory. On this point, Prof. Bajrektarevic makes note of the symbolic parallels between the Napoleonic and Axis coalitions that have threatened Russia; these are strikingly similar in size and shape, both between themselves and to the European Union, a third ‘coalition’ that governs today’s continental Europe. Finally, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the fragmentation of Eastern Europe is mentioned, as yet another driver of Russia’s contemporary threat perception.
Against this backdrop, Prof. Bajrektarevic gives an overview of the various aspects—politico-military, legal, economic, and ideological—of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war that are worth considering, in terms of the conflict’s global impact. In the politico-military realm, four key ideas stand out. One is the astonishing deficit of the so-called ‘collective’ West in its response, which is limited by the lack of communications with Russia, and therefore a lack of critical insight about Russian intentions and capabilities. This has led to a shortage of sober analysis on the matter, which manifests as a “dangerous security experiment,” whereby the antagonisation of Russia, supported by “state adventurism,” contributes to conflict escalation. Linked to this is an essential question: who are the conflict’s protagonists? Is this a war between Russia and Ukraine, or between the Russian Federation and NATO on Ukrainian soil?
The peculiar nature of military actions in Ukraine adds to the complexity that the country already experiences. A key aspect of this is its political history, from Kiev Russia, to a prosperous period under the Russian Empire, to a Soviet Republic. Furthermore, the way in which current military activity varies across different segments of Ukrainian territory is associated with the country’s demographic makeup. Before February 2022, Ukraine’s ethnic, linguistic, and religious composite was already reflective of various internal struggles, which have only been exacerbated by the conflict. In recent years, these have included an alarming Gini index and HDI score, as a result of depopulation, deindustrialisation, and the dismal state of civil rights in the post-Maidan Ukraine; now, the surge in internally-displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees will precipitate an irreversible change in Ukraine’s ethnic composition and socioeconomic development. Lastly, the landslide victory of President Zelensky, winning over 70% of the electoral vote in 2019, reflects the buildup of a certain political zeitgeist within Ukrainian society since 2014; among Zelensky’s main electoral promises was the peaceful reintegration of the contested Donbas region under the existing machinery of the Minsk talks.
Regarding these politico-military aspects of the Ukraine crisis, Prof. Bajrektarevic points out the role of the media as an “accelerator of destruction.” Making reference to Herman and Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent, Bajrektarevic underlines the use of fear as a currency of control, and the widespread personalisation of the conflict through a sensationalist “Putin-versus-Zelensky” vision. This comes as a result of broader trends, such as the “long history of censorship in liberal democracies,” and the more recent phenomenon of complete desensitisation to misery by the numbers, epitomised by press coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic. The consequences of the media’s approach to Ukraine as an international crisis are far-reaching, with powerful and shockingly-different narratives being built around the conflict. An example is the issue of foreign aid for Ukraine, where a combination of widespread coverage and lack of transparency has led to a number of questions on the donors and receivers; on the quality and configuration of aid, particularly military aid; and on the potential threat of diverted stockpiles ending up in the black market.
On another note, there are several legal aspects to consider in order to understand the conflict’s evolution and implications. To begin with, the indivisibility of collective security from the very spirit of the UN Charter is presented as a potential issue. In this sense, the negotiations held in Geneva, between the US and Russia reflected the need and acceptance of a détente policy, which soon after officialized in the Helsinki Accords of 1975, and consequently institutionalized by the OSCE’s formation (Budapest) – were listed by professor along with other key elements of the post-WWII security architecture. In regard to previous disarmament and security non-expansion guarantees that are challenged by this conflict, it is worth noting the Reagan-Gorbachev talks in the late 1980s; the vision of a “common European home, from Lisbon to Vladivostok,” now seems but a “lame dream.” The same is true for NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) of 1994, which now stands in contrast to the Alliance’s paradoxical role, having been created for defensive purposes but with thirty years of accumulated offensive history across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. NATO’s interventions, although manifesting in different formats, have all underscored a “continued dismissal of Russian security concerns.”
Furthermore, the issue of “neutrality,” or lack thereof, is a key element of this crisis. To begin with, there is the question of Ukrainian neutrality, pledged in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and abandoned in 2014 with Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. Much like Ukrainian neutrality was among Russia’s demands in negotiations over the Minsk agreements (particularly Minsk II), it is now a key condition for peace in the current context. On the other hand, recent developments such as Sweden and Finland’s NATO applications demonstrate how neutrality is more of a fluid concept than a legal guarantee.
The implications of this period of change for the non-proliferation regime are disturbing, since unpredictability is a strong force of counterbalance against the multiple international treaties on nuclear and biological weapons. Ukraine’s abandonment of neutrality has led to capacity building, training, and an increase in bio-lab activities; Zelensky’s presidential statement at the Munich Security Conference in February 2022 further emphasizes this intention. All in all, it can be said that the notion of collective security, which previously seemed to rest upon a legal system of “confidence-building measures for active peaceful coexistence,” is seeing unprecedented erosion, into a selective one.
The global economic consequences of the Russo-Ukrainian war are presented from the perspective of costs induced and costs paid. Bajrektarevic’s argument highlights “peripheral countries” as those who bear the burden, particularly regarding the sectors that are at stake in this conflict; these include crude oil, natural gas, and wheat, which respectively come first, third and fifth among the world’s most traded commodities. On the other hand, a sector that is seeing growth as a result of this crisis is the global military-industrial complex. The war has accelerated the dismantling of obsolete military weaponry on Ukrainian soil, which is now being replaced with Western military purchases, financed through loans, donations, and lend-and-lease arrangements; in January 2022, a month before Russia’s intervention even began, the United States had already negotiated lend-lease contracts with Ukraine, totaling $30 billion. However, it is to note that gains for the military-industrial complex inevitably come with losses for international security and overall stability.
Another economic aspect, which has received much of the spotlight throughout the past three months, is the West’s sanctions on Russia and its legality. At present, the sixth round of sanctions has been negotiated. The continuity of this process and the short intervals between rounds make it a credible assumption that, for at least the first four rounds, the timeline was planned and expected. Moreover, the strategy within these rounds, including an arbitrary confiscation of overseas deposits and properties, has clearly been geared towards having an impact on the reputation and credibility of sanctions’ originators. On the other hand, a notion that illustrates the global spillover effects of the war in Ukraine is that of secondary sanctions, aimed at those who associate with the Russian Federation or refuse to punish it. The way in which ‘friendly’ and ‘unfriendly’ labels have been put on countries—even traditionally neutral actors—depending on their responses to this conflict is reflective of an overall realignment of the world order; or, at the very least, of the fight for control over the way in which this order is interpreted, and will further evolve.
On the flipside of sanctions, other economic consequences can be found. One is the apparent shift towards de-dollarisation, and even a fragmentation of the global monetary system, so far defined by the ¥€$ (Yen-Euro-US Dollar) domination. The paradoxical resilience of the Russian economy, whose indicators are looking up in spite of sanctions, is a factor behind this; it is also exacerbated by the rise of the “petro-ruble,” along with Europe’s incoherence and panic around energy insecurity. The question of energy has led many countries linked to the Russian Federation’s resources to walk one of two paths: either decoupling and decarbonising, in line with the post-Paris Treaty environmental agenda, or leaning into “preferential prices for friendly countries.” It is largely for this reason -a long with the OPEC solidarity over quotas – that the Russian energy sector remains competitive on the global market, highlighting the important economic role played by third-party countries in this crisis; India stands out as a particular question mark. Beyond this, the overall disruption of global supply chains as a result of war in Ukraine is equally as catastrophic in other sectors; the shortage of wheat exports, in which Ukraine is the main provider for at least 26 countries, has heavily disrupted the global food supply. History shows that a food crisis is not only catastrophic in terms of human security and development, but also as a driver of social unrest and conflict.
The last key theme touched upon by Prof. Bajrektarevic is the conflict’s ideological dimension. The unprecedented nature of a full-scale, traditional war in the European continent as of 2022, and its disruption of the Pax Europaea period that began in 1945, has given rise to a number of reflections and questions. Is it liberal to impose liberal values on illiberal societies? Is the Westernisation of Eastern Europe possible without perpetuating anti-Russian rhetoric? Under this umbrella, several norms, values and key tenets of the Western-led neoliberal institutionalist system—collective security, responsibility to protect (R2P), regime change—are challenged. In trying to make sense of this new reality, Prof. Bajrektarevic makes reference to the “three brave ideas of the 20th century” and their interpretation of territorial competition. First came the egalitarian, non-territorial dogma of the Bolshevik revolution; then, the radicalisation of the material and revival of imperialism through various Fascisms, as well as Nazism; lastly, the ultimate triumph of the non-material and non-territorial idea, through glasnost and Perestroika, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union marking a significant departure from the traditional international conduct.
With the transition into the 21st century, the emergence of “transhumanism” as an alternative (post) capitalistic ideological model where “humans [are seen ] without spiritual dimension, reduced on bio-hackable animal/Bionicle connected to a global IoT network for control and commercial end” gains on ground. This, along with the diminished credibility of Clash of Civilization reasoning, opens a whole new set of questions. The implications of this war for new conflicts within ethno-religious lines span not only the post-1990s “intra-Slavic Guernica”; they also include the wider Islamic world, whereby a break between the Muslim ‘core’ (the MENA region) and the ‘peripheral’ non-Arab Muslim communities in Europe’s south, Caucasus, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. Overall, the question mark next to the promise of democracy suggests that the Russo-Ukrainian war may be the prelude to an inevitable recession, to the return of great power competition. This reflects how the ideological crisis triggered by the conflict is also one of global proportions.
Having laid out all the relevant aspects explored in this lecture, some key takeaways remain. Regarding the potential future outcomes, Prof. Bajrektarevic illustrates the struggle between the ideas of “global realignment” and “decoupling.” Alluding to historical precedent, such as the contrast between the statesmanship of Metternich’s Concert of Europe and the short-sightedness of the Versailles Conference, he argues for the existence of various possibilities—ranging from the total destruction of Ukraine and nuclear war, to sincere peace talks. Finally, following “global repercussions” as the thread that runs throughout his argument, Bajrektarevic’s closing remarks are relevant to Asia-Pacific, and particularly to the Republic of Indonesia, where the Habibie Center is based. Likely outcomes of the conflict’s ripple effect are an overall momentum of destabilization reaching the region at large, thus leading to a reform of the triangular RIC (Russia-India-China) model in continental Asia, and a recession of multilateralism (including ASEAN) in Southeast Asia. Considering the role of Indonesia within this compact, and recalling the previous reflections on loss of neutrality, Prof. Bajrektarevic makes a key recommendation—where Indonesia, ASEAN and Asia must take a side, the side to pick is that of international law, and accelerated multilateralism including the spirt of Non-Aliened movement.
About the author:
Covadonga Romero – International Relations specialist (Madrid-based IE University, Spain) with a concentration on Peace, Conflict and Security. Foreign policy analyst and writer at RAIA Group.
Life in the time of mania
By John Dunkelgrün
Every now and then societies succumb to a collective madness, often accompanied by a general suspension of disbelief. “Witches” were tortured, burnt at the stake, or killed in mind-numbing trials by water or fire. Tulips became a mania in Holland in the 17th century and the South Sea Company in Britain in the 18th.
In the 20th century, the worst madness that ever took hold of a country was National Socialism with the adoration of Adolf Hitler. Then came the anti-communist witch hunt in America that only ended when Joseph Welch challenged Senator Joe McCarthy with a loud “Have you no sense of decency?”. It was followed by murderous manias in Africa and Cambodia. Then the British fell for the lies of power-hungry politicians – aided by Russian propaganda – to leave the European Union, which is the greatest advance in security and prosperity the continent has ever seen. “Take back control!” became their rallying cry without specifying what control would be taken back.
Then came the unraveling of the morals of the Republican Party, whose guiding light now seems to be “Right or wrong, my Party.” It became s shoo-in for Donald Trump whose lies of a ‘stolen election’ and discrediting of anything he doesn’t like are swallowed by millions with religious fervor.
Mass killings in the United States have exploded because of the ubiquitous availability of very dangerous weapons. Kids not old enough to buy alcohol legitimately can buy military weapons not usable for anything else but the killing lots of people quickly. There is ample evidence that restricting the availability of firearms in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada resulted in dramatic drops in deaths by shooting. Ted Cruz knows it, Greg Abbott knows it, and Ron de Santis knows it. The entire leadership of the NRA knows it. But fear of a boycott by voters crazed by gun mania or of losing profits by even the slightest forms of gun control, keeps them spouting lies like a fire engine spouts water. Together they are responsible for tens of thousands of deaths every single year, about the same number of deaths per year as the entire Vietnam war, most probably of more than all of Putin’s war in Ukraine.
What will finally break this deadly mania? When will politicians and gun paddlers be confronted with their “Have you no sense of decency?” Senator Chris Murphy’s brave “What are we doing?” speech, passionate as it was, should have done it, but unfortunately did not. For now, greed and FOLVES, the fear of losing votes, continue to muzzle the voices of conscience.
War between Russia and Ukraine: Analyzing Information and International Relations
Interview with Professor Maria Repnikova
In this exclusive interview, Professor Maria Repnikova (Georgia State University, United States) addresses Russia’s War in Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022. She highlights the role of information and the field of international relations. This expert focuses specifically on various aspects linked to the aforementioned military conflict, such as propaganda, psychological warfare, the communication skills of the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine, respectively Putin and Zelenskyy, and U.S. support of Ukraine. Repnikova also provides a few considerations regarding World War II and Russia’s military cooperation with China, India and Iran.
On February 24, 2022, Russia began what it calls a special military operation in Ukraine, but which other countries generally regard as a war. In this piece, in the form of an interview, Professor Maria Repnikova examines said military conflict, while stressing the relevance of information and various aspects in the sphere of international relations.
Information and Media
Though the hybridization of war already existed prior to 2022, according to Maria Repnikova this conflict between Russia and Ukraine entails the added importance of information. In this regard, Repnikova highlights sharp power. According to this academic, the restrictions on independent journalism that has been taking place in Russia, in the last 20 years, have been heightened with this war. Maria Repnikova points out the closure of websites of several independent media, as they were accused of being foreign agents. This analyst remarks that, despite Russia’s attempts to censor or limit social media, Telegram still remains quite open and accessible, unlike in China, with Weibo (the Chinese version of Twitter), which is highly censored. Repnikova underscores that Russian President Vladimir Putin needs Telegram to operate, in order to engage in propaganda. She feels that, in Russia, some news outlets, such as Meduza, can still be accessed and are broadly used, without causing major disruptions, that is, without entailing a great deal of domestic opposition to Putin’s decisions.
Game theory applies to international relations and to war. Recently, in April 2022, Russia tested a new nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile, which that nation disclosed through the media. This disclosure, according to Maria Repnikova, needs to be viewed in light of information warfare, with the aim of deterring countries from direct intervention against Russia, through military involvement in Ukraine. From the standpoint of the interviewee, as concerns nuclear weapons, there is a certain unpredictability with regard to Putin’s decision.
Repnikova states that the conflict under analysis comprises an aspect of psychological warfare, involving manipulation of emotions. This scholar points out Russia’s domestic psychological warfare, by citing, as an example, the accusation of treason and anti-patriotism toward Russians who are against the war. To Maria Repnikova, criminalizing opposition to the war is a way of limiting protests. She considers that leading people to be fearful of opposing the Kremlin’s decisions is part of psychological warfare.
Storytelling is a keyword in various contexts of communication such as propaganda. From Repnikova’s standpoint, a clash of narratives takes place via domestic and international media: on the one hand, Russia disseminates its greatness and, using arguments presented as historical, including from the Soviet era, seeks to convince recipients that the existence of an independent Ukraine makes no sense; on the other hand, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy uses his considerable communication skills to send messages to various parts of the world, regarding his country’s independence, strength, resistance and resilience.
Leadership is related to communication skills. This war between Russia and Ukraine comprises two main players: Putin and Zelenskyy. They have distinct verbal and nonverbal communication styles. According to the interviewee, Zelenskyy’s communication skills, in some regards, include his ability to adapt the message to multiple target audiences, as well as to interact with different people, such as the presidents of several countries and French students.
Maria Repnikova characterizes Zelenskyy as someone attractive who communicates spontaneously, who generates emotions and who appears informally dressed among civil and military Ukrainians. She underlines the differences in relation to the President of Ukraine by describing Putin as someone living in an immense golden palace and who celebrates Easter with a very formal and very removed appearance. From an iconic standpoint, Repnikova highlights the long table used during Putin’s official meetings with foreign leaders. She believes that, while Putin’s discourses are well thought out, they are quite formal.
Recently, Ukraine and some Western nations boycotted a few Russian media, such as RT and Sputnik. Russia, for its part, banned certain Western media, such as BBC and Voice of America. Currently, countries that are against Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine speak of Russia’s propaganda machine. In this regard, Maria Repnikova considers that, in comparative terms, in the so-called Western world, there are some media in the public sector that convey narratives of the State that created and sustains them.
This, according to Repnikova, occurs, for instance, with the U.S.’s Voice of America, which is linked to the State Department and comprises a diplomatic purpose. This analyst adds that, in the private sector, in general, though commercial media do not suffer greatly from state meddling, they can be influenced by their advertisers, investors and audiences, without constituting propaganda. Even if it is acknowledged that certain Western media serve propaganda-related purposes, Maria Repnikova feels that, comparatively, this still occurs more in state-controlled media environments in countries such as Russia and China.
As concerns war journalism, Repnikova does not overlook the debate calling journalists’ objectivity into question, when there is an emotional involvement with one of the parties at issue or when journalists provide coverage on their own country. She thinks that journalists need to diversify their sources and carefully confirm the information they obtain.
Also within the field of journalism, Maria Repnikova states that, to the Ukrainian government, it’s very important to be able to influence the news agenda of Western mainstream media, by raising their audiences’ awareness, in order to garner military and economic support. This academic feels that the public’s interest in the Russia-Ukraine War could wane over time, due to a certain trivilialization of the conflict and the emergence of new national and international news items with high media impact. This, in Repnikova’s opinion, would benefit Russia.
Evoking World War II
Within the context of the war under analysis, Russian troops displayed the flag of the Soviet Union on Ukrainian soil. To the interviewee, displaying said symbol in Ukraine means restoring Russia’s glorious past under the Soviet empire. Maria Repnikova underpins another relevant symbol: Russian troops recaptured a World War II memorial in Ukraine, while stating that, from that point onward, Ukrainians could celebrate the end of that historical event.
This academic considers that the legacy and echoes of World War II are highly important for Russia’s defense policy as well as for the domestic legitimacy of the Putin regime. The way Repnikova sees it, annual commemorations in Russia marking the Soviet victory in World War II serve to put current Russian power on display: military parades showing sophisticated weaponry help bring the government closer to the people while exalting patriotism. According to Maria Repnikova, the Kremlin somehow presents the current military conflict in Ukraine as Russia’s continuing the Soviet Union’s World War II-era glory.
Russia’s relations with China, India and Iran
Repnikova has no doubts that China is carefully monitoring ongoing events in Ukraine, while seeking to gauge how the West would react to Chinese military intervention in Taiwan. She thinks that, for now, China at least is cautious in facing a future where the war in Ukraine would make the West stronger and more united, while weakening Russia and leaving China a little more isolated. However, Repnikova maintains that the advantages and drawbacks have yet to be cleared up, even though there are those who feel that China can derive economic benefits from this conflict. In the opinion of this scholar, China wishes to remain on good terms with the West, in order to achieve domestic legitimacy and not have to deal with other problems, on top of those that are domestically worrisome, such as COVID-19.
Maria Repnikova underscores that China’s official position in relation to Russia’s war in Ukraine is that of neutrality, standing in favor of peace. This analyst points out that, in English-language Chinese state media, such as the Xinhua news agency, calls have been made for negotiations between the warring parties, at times referring to China as a mediator of the conflict.
Generally speaking, there are simulations, deceptions and surprises within the context of war. In relation to this armed conflit in Ukraine, could Russia, on top of its military strengths, still end up having a few political and diplomatic assets, in terms of garnering some international backing, considering its influence, for instance, in Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia and the Middle East? To this end, Repnikova states that it’s still a bit too early to actually determine the extent of Russia’s victories.
This academic adds that, to date, it seems, at least, that Russia is not losing in the Global South, to the extent that some of these countries have yet to speak out against Russia, thus maintaining a certain neutrality. Still, according to Repnikova, it remains to be seen whether African governments will blame Russia or NATO for certain outcomes of the war, such as food shortages, including cereal, and economic problems, which are currently being felt in their countries and which could worsen as the conflict continues. In this scholar’s understanding, it’s important to know whether Russia has something more to offer African countries besides arms and narratives.
The 12th Edition of Indo-Russia joint military Exercise INDRA 2021 was held in August 2021, in Volgograd, Russia. In September 2021, with the Armed Forces of Russia and of other countries, India also took part in the Zapad-21 military exercise, conducted on Russian and Belarusian soil. In the opinion of the interviewee, Western media need to be more attentive to relations between said countries. Repnikova stresses that, worldwide, India is one of the biggest importers of Russian arms. From her standpoint, Russia seeks to strengthen its involvement with India, in order not to rely too heavily on China. This situation is characterized by Repnikova as being complex, given that there are some tensions between India and China. This occurs, for example, on the border between the two countries.
Also in the domain of international cooperation, in January 2022, the Navies of Russia, Iran and China conducted joint military exercises in the Indian Ocean. This, from Repnikova’s perspective, is of symbolic value, to show unity vis-à-vis the West’s military might. However, this analyst doubts that said countries currently have a military alliance whereby they are willing to jointly face enemies. In this regard, Maria Repnikova acknowledges that the future could bring surprises.
The U.S.’s backing of Ukraine
The interviewee feels that the U.S. Administration has dealt with this war between Russia and Ukraine in the best possible way, to avoid a direct military showdown with Russia that the American people don’t want and that Congress would approve only in the event of a certain escalation in the conflict. To Repnikova, not overstepping the fine line between American backing of Ukraine and its direct involvement against Russian troops is a huge challenge. Among several aspects, this scholar underscores the support given by the U.S. in terms of sharing intelligence, to enable the U.S. to anticipate the moves made by the Russian Armed Forces. Maria Repnikova thinks that the United States, together with its Western allies, have greatly helped Ukraine, in military and economic terms, as well as in the field of information, thereby mobilizing public opinion.
New world order
Repnikova considers that it’s too early to present the characteristics of a definitive new world order, before the end of the war between Russia and Ukraine. Still, this scholar maintains that we will likely see greater unity between the U.S. and Western Europe, greater integration of China in the Global South, distancing itself from the West, as is somehow the case right now, along with the weakening economic power of an anti-Western country: Russia.
Conclusion
These days, the hybridization of war amounts to a certain complexity, according to increasingly diversified domains involved in a military conflict. In 2022, the war between Russia and Ukraine is proof of the importance of information regarding civilians and troops, with its psychological aspect and by applying war game theory, in both the domestic and international spheres. To the various warring parties, it becomes relevant to influence perceptions, emotions and public opinion, through the media, increasingly including social media. In Russia, despite attempts at media control, the Kremlin allows Telegram to keep running, to the extent it also serves to disseminate Russian propaganda. For Ukraine, while it’s pivotal to keep this war at the top of the news media agendas, this could be more difficult as the conflict drags on and other high-interest topics emerge in the media.
Warranting particular attention, as part of information warfare, is the ability of the two leading players, Putin and Zelenskyy, to wield influence on domestic and international audiences by using the media and different verbal and nonverbal communication styles. As for characterizing both presidents, Zelenskyy can be regarded as a skillful communicator, while Putin is shown to be unpredictable. Within a military context, this unpredictability is viewed as a positive side of Putin, to the extent the enemy is left wondering about the other party’s decisions and actions.
The impact of symbols in a war is visible, for instance, when we see that the Soviet flag was displayed in Ukraine by Russian troops in 2022. This, while keeping alive the memory of Russia’s glorious past, within the Soviet sphere, is also somehow linked to evoking World War II. This is somehow shown by Russia to justify the current military clashes, as concerns one of its political and ideological goals: denazification of Ukraine. In the present, History could serve to motivate civilians and troops.
It’s still unclear whether the Russia-Ukraine war is beneficial or harmful for the Chinese economy. In the international context, China has been publicly in favor of peace and willing to mediate the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Certainly, there are those in Beijing who look at the West’s reactions to what is currently happening on Ukrainian soil, in order to draw conclusions as to the possible outcomes of Chinese military intervention in Taiwan.
Also in the field of international relations, while Russia conducted military maneuvers with China, India and Iran in 2021 and 2022, this doesn’t mean that said countries have a military alliance in place or that they will actually engage in joint combat. This situation needs to be duly monitored, since the future could bring changes.
It’s expedient to point out that, to date, some Global South countries have remained neutral with regard to the Russia-Ukraine war. However, said neutrality can be shaken by economic problems and food shortages, in Africa, due to the continuing military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In life in general as well as in war, (short-, medium- or long-term) time management is crucial.
The U.S.’s military backing of Ukraine, together with its allies, namely, for instance, arms and intelligence, requires careful consideration, so as not to transition to direct confrontation with Russia.
At the moment, though it’s unwise to make definitive considerations, with regard to a new world order stemming from the war under analysis, it’s now possible to uncover a few situations: greater unity between the U.S. and Western Europe, China’s growing investment in the Global South and Russia’s greater antagonism toward the West.
References
– Georgia State University College of Arts & Sciences / Maria Repnikova. Retrieved 25.5.2022 from https://cas.gsu.edu/profile/maria-repnikova/
Interview
This interview was conducted, via Zoom, on May 19, 2022 Published by Marinho Media Analysis
http://www.marinho-mediaanalysis.org/articles/war-between-russia-and-ukraine-2022-analyzing-information-and-international-relations
This piece was also published on the following site:
International Affairs Forum – Center for International Relations (Washington D.C., United States of America) / June 1, 2022
https://www.ia-forum.org/Content/ViewInternal_Document.cfm?contenttype_id=5&ContentID=9366
About the authors:
Maria Repnikova is an expert in the following topics: Russia, China, global communication, political communication and media activism (Georgia State University College of Arts & Sciences / Maria Repnikova).
Jorge Marinho is a Research supervisor. PhD in Communication Sciences, BA in International Journalist
Júlio Ventura – BA in Law, MA student in Political Science and International Relations at the Portuguese Catholic University (Lisbon, Portugal)
Guilherme Guimarães – BA in Law, MA student in International Law at the Portuguese Catholic University (Porto, Portugal)
OPEC and International Law
By Eugene Matos and Adrian Zienkiewicz
OPEC is a leading international organization driving the prices of petroleum worldwide. Just like a blowout from an oil well, the price of black gold skyrocketed through the influence consolidated by OPEC to then find itself oscillating due to global changes in economic models, extraction processes, political mentalities and supply. Many countries experienced an energy crisis in 2021, and although there is greater diversity in primary energy production, a total transition away from oil is impractical, if not impossible, for the next few decades. That is where OPEC’s relative power shines through as its members’ proven crude oil reserves account for nearly 80% of global reserves as per OPEC’s 2018 reports. How is OPEC perceived through the scope of international law?
OPEC is often described as an intergovernmental cartel, since its thirteen independent members work together to maintain control over the market, all whilst increasing their revenue. What leads to this attribution is its fascinating decentralized nature, as all members retain their state sovereignty and policy is expressed through resolutions. These resolutions, which are analogous to treaties that operate on the basis of pacta sunt servanda, are passed unanimously under article 11 c) of the OPEC Statute, but there are no monitoring mechanisms for noncompliance.
Production policy is not articulated through these resolutions, further emphasizing the need for members to act in good faith and cooperate more efficiently with shifting supply and demand. As listed in article 9 of the OPEC Statute, OPEC’s governing bodies operate in voting policies and managing the organization. Although the Secretariat exists as a quasi-executive organ, its role also consists of preparing the Conferences represented by the members’ delegates. State sovereignty and autonomy principles are supreme, and understanding the organization’s existence through mutual self-serving economic interests means that there are no inherent or desired supranational qualities.
OPEC has never managed to develop its own court to settle disputes related to petroleum matters, and there is no solitary codified regulation, as all points are brought before the Conferences. OPEC can be characterized as a legal entity holding diplomatic and political advantages, as it benefits primarily from the principle of sovereign immunity, one that, according to article 6A of the OPEC Statute, is from every form of legal process unless “expressly waived”.
The meteoric rise on the global stage that OPEC experienced in the 1970s accompanied a fair share of lawsuits through antitrust arguments. This was seen especially in the U.S., where the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 contended with OPEC’s legal status, opening the doors to several legal actions and culminating with International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v OPEC. IAM was concerned with the high prices of petroleum during the latter half of the decade and possessed a personal interest as this would affect its profits. It was argued that price setting breached U.S. antitrust laws. The court ultimately sided with the defendant, since deciding on the legality of a sovereign act would have politically sensitive and unintended effects. On appeal, this decision was affirmed and even cited the act of state doctrine, which expresses the sovereignty of states and non interference, and arguments in favor of the Sherman Antitrust Act fell.
American citizens would have been able to successfully sue through State courts, and even though the “action of sovereign nations coming together to agree on how each will perform certain sovereign acts can only, itself, be a sovereign act”, this could have only increased in volume and possibly included situations of vexatious litigation. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California nevertheless settled in 1993 that violations to the Sherman Act can be used to make a sovereign entity liable if it intends to restrict trade. This has not yet been utilized against matters involving OPEC.
Besides, Illinois Brick Co. v Illinois decided that violations to antitrust laws can be remedied only to direct and not indirect actors of a particular sector. Direct suppliers of petroleum could theoretically proceed through litigation, but the complexity and intertwining nature of the sector makes it that OPEC isn’t challenged this way. OPEC adapts to market trends and establishes accommodating prices to the members’ and most of the supply chain’s advantage.
Prewitt v OPEC was another high profile U.S. case that elaborated antitrust breaches through the Clayton Act, referred to Austrian law (seeing how the seat of OPEC is in Vienna) and mentioned the federal International Organizations Immunities Act which OPEC is not designated by. No matter the difference in how the U.S. government officially perceives OPEC, the organization is heavily protected by international principles. United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 1803 (XVII) and 3281 (XXIX) point to the sovereign control over resources. OPEC is an organization of several independent, sovereign countries, and thus legal actions would not hinder their operations or exporting capacities. The organization is by all means a monopoly, but claims of significant predatory practices have not been satisfied.
The defense through the foreign sovereign compulsion principle, which posits that a defendant could have been compelled to breach antitrust laws, has rarely been used. Its use against OPEC has never been raised and would otherwise be irrelevant, as the only successful application was seen in Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo bearing specific circumstances. Successful legal action against OPEC in national jurisdictions would have to compete with international tenets.
In the U.S. again, the judicial path is narrow, and the violations and legal remedies available would have to be specific. Although the U.S. enjoyed greater levels of petroleum production throughout the 21st century, legislative proposals for expanding antitrust laws to target OPEC exist. “NOPEC”, an amusing pun to the organization, is an unenacted bill that was most recently debated in the House Judiciary Committee in 2021. With OPEC’s unique status, the recourse through international apparatuses is unclear and OPEC is not challenged.
About the authors:
Eugene Matos De Lara
(MA, MBA, LL.L, JD, LLB, BA.pol.pad, BA.dvm, BA.sc PMP) is an officer with the Canadian Armed Forces, currently working for the International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan studies, based in Ljubljana, and the Geneva Desk for Cooperation. Multilingual internationally published legal graduate with an extensive corporate legal background, and exposure to private international law, international relations, politics, public administration and public affairs.
Co-Author Adrian Zienkiewicz
(LL.B., J.D.) is a law student at Université de Montréal and an officer in the Canadian Armed Forces. He has a marked interest for all spheres of public international law. Environmental and Energy Law are his real passions.






