From the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea: The New Geopolitical Arc of the 21st Century

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From the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea: The New Geopolitical Arc of the 21st Century

Energy, geography and great-power competition in the formation of a new strategic axis between the Middle East and Eastern Europe

“Who controls the Rimland[1] dominates Eurasia;
who dominates Eurasia influences the destiny of the world.”
— Nicholas Spykman

By Major General (Two Stars) (retd) Corneliu Pivariu

Two seemingly separate strategic theatres

In contemporary geopolitics, the lines of separation between major strategic theatres are becoming increasingly blurred. Spaces once considered distinct are beginning to function as elements of the same system of geopolitical interdependencies, in which energy routes, trade corridors and maritime chokepoints connect distant regions into a single strategic arc.

In this context, the Black Sea and the Middle East can no longer be viewed as two separate geopolitical spaces. While in traditional analysis the Black Sea was considered a frontier zone between Europe and the Eurasian space, and the Middle East an epicentre of energy politics and regional conflicts, developments over the past decade show that this conceptual separation is becoming increasingly irrelevant.

The two regions now appear as segments of the same strategic space linking the Persian Gulf to Eastern Europe. This geopolitical interdependence between the Middle East and the Pontic region has also been emphasized by other analysts, who describe this space as a zone of compression between the major maritime and continental geopolitical systems.

Within this geopolitical arc intersect the interests of great powers, energy flows and trade routes between Asia and Europe. Understanding this interconnection becomes essential for analysing geopolitical transformations in Eurasia and for assessing the new balances of power that are emerging in the 21st century.

The geography of energy and trade routes

This interconnection begins, above all, with geography. The Black Sea represents the gateway between Europe and the energy space of the Middle East and the Caspian basin. At the centre of this connection lies the system of the Turkish Straits — the Bosporus and the Dardanelles — the only maritime link between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, which makes control of this passage a geopolitical factor of global importance.

The legal regime of these straits is established by the Montreux Convention of 1936, which grants Turkey control over naval transit and provides Ankara with an essential strategic role in the military balance of the region.

The system of the Turkish Straits, the energy corridors crossing Anatolia and the Caucasus, as well as the transport infrastructure linking Asia to Europe create a strategic continuity between the two regions.

Within this system of interconnections, the Caucasus region plays the role of an intermediate strategic node through which the energy resources of the Caspian basin and the Middle East are connected to European transport infrastructures and markets.

The importance of this strategic arc has increased significantly in recent years, particularly in the context of European efforts to diversify energy and trade routes following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.

The military interdependence of the two fronts

The military dimension reinforces this interdependence. The war in Ukraine has transformed the Black Sea into a major strategic theatre of confrontation between Russia and the West. At the same time, recurring tensions in the Middle East continue to influence global energy stability and the security of maritime routes.

The two fronts do not evolve in isolation. In practice, they simultaneously affect Europe’s security: the Black Sea directly influences the European security architecture, while the Middle East affects the continent’s energy flows and economic stability. From this perspective, Europe’s security increasingly depends on developments in both regions.

Pivot actors of the extended geopolitical space

Turkey plays a central role in this interconnection. Control of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles gives Ankara a unique strategic position, as these maritime passages represent the only link between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

At the same time, Turkey is involved militarily and politically both in the Pontic space and in the Middle East. Its presence in Syria and Iraq, its involvement in Libya, as well as its role in the strategic balance of the Black Sea transform Ankara into a geopolitical pivot between Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East. This position allows it to influence developments in both strategic theatres simultaneously.

In the context of a possible major destabilization of Iran, Turkey faces a complex strategic dilemma determined primarily by geographical proximity and by the experience accumulated over the past decade in managing regional crises. The lessons of the Syrian conflict have shown Ankara that the collapse of state order in a neighbouring country inevitably generates massive migration pressures, security risks and internal economic instability.

Consequently, Turkey’s security doctrine has increasingly shifted toward the concept of forward security, according to which threats must be managed as close as possible to their point of origin, even beyond national borders.

Within this doctrinal framework, the Turkish military has developed contingency plans in recent years for scenarios of regional destabilization, including the hypothesis of a partial collapse of the Iranian state. Such a situation could generate massive population movements toward the Turkish border and could create power vacuums in frontier regions.

From Ankara’s perspective, the main objective in such a scenario would not be the occupation of Iranian territory but the creation of limited buffer zones designed to manage refugee flows and prevent the spread of chaos toward Turkish territory.

Another sensitive element concerns the ethnic dimension of the region. In north-western Iran lives a large community of ethnic Azeris, estimated at approximately 15–20 million people, concentrated mainly in the province of Iranian Azerbaijan, with its centre in Tabriz.

The cultural and linguistic ties between these communities and Azerbaijan, as well as the increasingly close political relations between Ankara and Baku, give this region a particular geopolitical relevance. In the event of a major destabilization of Iran, the north-west of the country could become a space of strategic competition between several regional powers, and Turkey would inevitably be involved in the security dynamics of the area.

In recent years, Ankara has significantly strengthened the security infrastructure along its border with Iran, including through the construction of an extensive system of physical barriers, surveillance systems and aerial monitoring capabilities based on drones. These measures reflect Turkey’s constant concern regarding the risks generated by regional instability and demonstrate that the Turkish state is preparing flexible options for potential crisis situations.

Overall, the scenarios discussed in analytical circles regarding possible Turkish involvement in north-western Iran should be understood more in the logic of preventive planning than as indications of expansionist intentions. Ankara’s strategic priority remains maintaining stability at its own borders and preventing Turkey from becoming a space for absorbing crises generated by conflicts in its immediate neighbourhood.

However, the geopolitical implications of a possible destabilization of Iran go far beyond the strictly defensive dimension of this planning. From a broader perspective, the region of Iranian Azerbaijan, centered arround Tabriz, represents one of the sensitive links of the geopolitical space connecting the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Middle East.

In the event of destabilization in Iran, this area could become a point of convergence for the interests of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Russia and other regional actors. For this reason, developments in north-western Iran should be monitored not only as a regional security issue but also as a possible indicator of a reconfiguration of the strategic balance in a key region of Eurasia.

From this perspective, developments in Iranian Azerbaijan should not be viewed merely as a local security issue but as part of a broader geopolitical dynamic involving relations between the Turkic world, the Caucasian space and the Middle East.

In recent years, the consolidation of the strategic relationship between Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as regional connectivity and energy projects, has amplified the importance of this region within the geopolitical architecture of the Eurasian space.

Global competition within the strategic arc

Beyond the regional dimension, there is also a global competition unfolding in this space. The United States, Russia and China are simultaneously present both in the Middle East and in the extended Black Sea region.

For Washington, the stability of the Middle East and the security of the Black Sea are part of the same strategic system influencing European security and the control of energy routes.

For Russia, control of the Black Sea provides access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, strengthening its power projection in the southern space of Eurasia.

For China, the stability of these routes is essential for energy security and for the functioning of Eurasian trade corridors.

An emerging strategic arc between the Persian Gulf and Eastern Europe

In this context, developments in one strategic theatre tend to produce direct effects in the other. A major escalation in the Middle East could affect European energy security and increase the importance of routes in the Black Sea region. Similarly, destabilization in the Pontic region would influence trade corridors between Europe and the Middle East and modify the regional geopolitical balance.

The two strategic spaces are therefore linked through a system of interdependencies that is becoming increasingly evident.

Thus, the Black Sea and the Middle East can no longer be analysed separately. They form a strategic arc stretching from the Persian Gulf to Eastern Europe and connecting energy resources, trade routes and maritime chokepoints between Asia and Europe.

Within this arc unfolds today one of the most important geopolitical competitions of the 21st century: the control of energy flows, trade corridors and strategic infrastructures connecting Eurasia to the global economy.

From this perspective, the Black Sea and the Middle East appear as two segments of the same geopolitical arc linking the Persian Gulf to Eastern Europe. Control of energy routes, trade corridors and maritime chokepoints in this space becomes one of the central stakes of competition between the great powers.

At the same time, this strategic axis gains additional relevance in the context of Western efforts to develop alternative energy and trade corridors to traditional routes controlled by Russia.

In a world undergoing an accelerated process of geopolitical rebalancing, this strategic axis will play an increasingly important role in defining energy security, regional stability and the balance of power between Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East.

In this sense, the geopolitical arc between the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea is not merely a zone where regional interests intersect. It is one of the spaces where a decisive part of the balance of power in 21st-century Eurasia will be shaped.

Iran’s Multiethnic Structure and Its Geopolitical Fault Lines

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Iran’s Multiethnic Structure and Its Geopolitical Fault Lines

The Kurdish Question and the Role of Ethnic Minorities in the Stability of the Iranian Regime

“State borders are drawn on maps, but the real fault lines run through societies.”

By Major General (Two Stars) (retd) Corneliu Pivariu

1. Iran – A Multiethnic State with Geopolitical Fracture Potential

Iran is often perceived as a relatively homogeneous state dominated by Persian identity. In reality, its ethnic composition is far more complex. Persians represent approximately 60–65% of the population, while the rest consists of numerous ethnic minorities: Azerbaijanis (≈16%), Kurds (≈10%), Lurs (≈6%), Arabs, Baluchis and Turkmen (≈2% each), along with smaller groups such as Talysh, Armenians or Assyrians.

An important strategic element is the geographical distribution: most of these minorities live in border regions, in direct contact with similar populations in neighboring states – Azerbaijan, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan or Turkmenistan.

This ethnic geography creates three strategic characteristics:

  • Transborder ethnic continuity
  • Potential external support
  • The possibility of territorial fragmentation in the event of a major political crisis.

For this reason, in many Western strategic analyses Iranian minorities are considered a potentially decisive factor in the event of destabilization of the regime in Tehran.

2. Minorities as a Strategic Factor in Regime-Change Scenarios

Ethnic minorities have consistently been more active in protests and anti-regime movements than the Persian majority population. Some studies estimate that approximately half of Iran’s population belongs to ethnic or linguistic minorities, and these communities have often been at the forefront of political opposition.

The Iranian regime perceives three regions as particularly sensitive areas of internal security:

  • Iranian Kurdistan (west)
  • Iranian Baluchistan (southeast)
  • Arab Khuzestan (southwest, an oil-producing region).

These territories combine three destabilizing elements: a distinct ethnic identity, a different religious component (many communities are Sunni), and an economic level below the national average.

Consequently, Tehran maintains a strong military and security presence in these areas, particularly through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Iran

3. The Main Minorities and Their Geopolitical Potential

Azerbaijanis

  • approximately 16–20% of Iran’s population
  • concentrated in the northwest
  • predominantly Shiite (like the Persians)

Although there is a strong ethnic identity, Azerbaijanis are relatively integrated into the state structure and hold important positions within the elite. For this reason, their secessionist potential is limited, even though there are cultural ties with the Republic of Azerbaijan.

However, from a strategic perspective, the Azerbaijani minority could represent the most significant systemic risk to the stability of the Iranian regime. Azerbaijanis are almost twice as numerous as the Kurds, are concentrated in a compact region in the northwest of the country, and maintain direct ethnic and cultural links with the neighboring state of Azerbaijan. In addition, Azerbaijani regions include important urban and economic centers, and a possible political mobilization in these areas could have a far deeper impact on the internal balance of the Iranian state than a peripheral insurgency in the Kurdish mountainous regions.

This strategic dimension has become even more visible in the context of recent tensions between Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan. On 5 March 2026, after drones originating from Iran struck targets in the Nakhchivan region, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev described the incident as an “act of terrorism”, convened the Security Council, and demanded official explanations from Tehran. Even though Iranian authorities denied direct responsibility, the episode illustrates how rapidly relations between Iran and the neighboring Azerbaijani state can become sensitive, particularly given the presence of a large Azerbaijani population on Iranian territory.

Arabs of Khuzestan

  • approximately 2–3% of the population
  • living in the oil-producing province of Khuzestan.

Their importance is strategic because the region produces a significant share of Iran’s oil. Separatist movements exist, but they have remained fragmented.

Baluchis

  • approximately 2% of the population
  • concentrated in the southeast, on the border with Pakistan.

They are predominantly Sunni and have a history of armed confrontations with the Iranian regime. However, the region is very poor and sparsely populated, which limits their strategic impact.

The Kurdish Question – Considered the Most Serious Internal Vulnerability

Over the past century, major powers have periodically supported various Kurdish movements, yet this support has almost always been limited by the logic of strategic interests. In the logic of realpolitik, foreign policy is not an act of solidarity but an instrument of power.

General data

  • approximately 8–10% of Iran’s population (3–5 million people)
  • concentrated in the provinces of Kurdistan, Kermanshah and West Azerbaijan
  • predominantly Sunni in a state dominated by Shiites.

Iranian Kurds are part of the transnational Kurdish space, which includes populations in: Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran.

In total, this community exceeds 30 million people, making the Kurdish issue one of the most complex geopolitical questions in the Middle East.

The modern history of the Kurds reflects one of the most persistent constants of regional geopolitics: the support of major powers is often circumstantial, and strategic interests prevail over political solidarity. This reality is reflected perfectly in the proverb: “The Kurds have no friends but the mountains.”

5. The Political Tradition of the Kurdish Movement in Iran

The Kurdish movement in Iran has a long political tradition:

  • 1946 – the Republic of Mahabad[1], the first modern Kurdish state, supported by the USSR
  • after 1979 – the Kurdish revolt against the Islamic regime
  • the emergence of political and paramilitary organizations.

The most important organizations are:

  • The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI)
  • PJAK (ideologically affiliated with the PKK)

These groups have bases in northern Iraq, from where they conduct political or military activities against Tehran.

6. Why the Kurds Are Considered the “Primary Vector” of Destabilization

The Kurdish issue is often considered Iran’s main internal vulnerability for several strategic reasons. First, the Kurds have a significant tradition of political and military organization, being one of the most politically active minorities in Iran. Second, the autonomous experience accumulated in the region plays an important role: the existence of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region in Iraq and the consolidation of influential Kurdish entities in Syria have created a political and symbolic precedent that fuels Kurdish national aspirations.

At the same time, Kurdish-inhabited regions form a relatively continuous territorial arc from the Mediterranean Sea to western Iran, facilitating cross-border cooperation and maintaining political and military links among different Kurdish communities[2]. In addition, the Kurdish factor has repeatedly been used by different states as a geopolitical instrument in regional competitions, which has amplified its strategic relevance.

However, the Kurdish issue has not remained unresolved because it would be impossible to solve, but because no major actor is willing to bear the geopolitical cost of the emergence of an independent Kurdish state. From this perspective, the Kurdish file remains one of the most persistent and complex geopolitical issues in the Middle East.

In a potential scenario of destabilization of Iran, the Kurds could play a significant role. However, it is unlikely that they would become the decisive actor of regime change. The most realistic scenario would be one in which Kurdish movements are used rather as a peripheral pressure element, while the decisive evolution would depend on the dynamics of the political crisis within the ruling elite in Tehran.

7. The Limits of Using Minorities Against the Iranian Regime

Although ethnic minorities represent a potential vulnerability for the Iranian regime, using them as a destabilization instrument also faces important limitations. First, Iranian national identity still remains a significant factor of cohesion. Many members of minorities identify not only with their ethnic belonging but also with the Iranian state, which reduces the potential for separatist mobilization.

Second, the political and military organizations of these minorities are often fragmented and even rival among themselves, which makes it difficult to form a coherent and united opposition against the regime in Tehran.

At the same time, the Iranian state possesses effective instruments for managing such internal challenges. The security apparatus is strongly consolidated, particularly through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), supported by extensive internal security networks and strict border control.

Finally, another limiting factor is the widespread fear within Iranian society of the risk of ethnic fragmentation of the state. For a significant part of the population, the prospect of a “Yugoslav scenario”, characterized by state disintegration and internal conflicts, represents a powerful argument in favor of maintaining territorial integrity and the stability of the Iranian state.

8. Conclusions

Iran is a multiethnic state in which minorities represent approximately one third, and according to some estimates even almost half of the population. Most of these communities are concentrated in peripheral border areas, which gives them particular geopolitical relevance and creates potential pressure points on the central authorities.

Among them, the Kurds are often considered the minority with the greatest destabilizing potential, due to their relatively high level of political organization, the military experience accumulated over time, and their transborder connections with other Kurdish communities in the region.

However, from a broader strategic perspective, the Azerbaijani minority could represent an even more significant systemic risk for the stability of the Iranian state, due to its demographic size, compact territorial concentration, and ethnic links with the neighboring state of Azerbaijan.

In the event of a major crisis of the regime in Tehran, minorities could become a determining factor in the internal evolution of the Iranian state. Nevertheless, their external instrumentalization does not automatically guarantee regime change, since Iranian national identity and the sense of belonging to the state still remain important elements of internal cohesion.

Ultimately, Iran’s stability will depend less on the strength of its security apparatus than on the state’s capacity to manage the ethnic fault lines that run through its society.

Brașov, 4 March 2026

[1] The Republic of Mahabad was a short-lived Kurdish state proclaimed on 22 January 1946 in the city of Mahabad, in north-western Iran, in the context of the Soviet occupation of northern Iran following the Second World War. The state was led by the Kurdish leader Qazi Muhammad and benefited from indirect support from the Soviet Union. The republic existed only briefly and was dissolved in December 1946 after the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the restoration of control by the Iranian authorities. Its leaders were arrested, and Qazi Muhammad was executed in 1947. The Mahabad episode remains one of the main historical reference points of the Kurdish national movement and the first modern attempt to establish a Kurdish state.

[2] In the context of the escalation of the conflict in March 2026, Iran launched several missile and drone strikes against bases belonging to Iranian Kurdish organizations located in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, which Tehran accused of preparing cross-border incursions. The operations targeted facilities associated in particular with groups such as the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) and Komala, including positions in the areas of Erbil, Koya and Sulaymaniyah. According to Iranian authorities, the strikes – carried out in cooperation with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – were intended to destroy the bases and weapons depots of these groups.

German-Nordic Defence Industry Dialogue

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German-Nordic Defence Industry Dialogue

23 February-25 February 2026, Nürnberg, Free State of Bavaria, Germany: Enforce Tac, Europe’s leading trade fair for law enforcement, defence, tactical equipment and internal security technologies hosted a “German-Nordic Defense Industry Dialogue” featuring the participation from the ambassadors from the Nordic and Baltic regions accredited to Germany. ‘

During the panel the heads of mission of Sweden, Veronika Wand-Danielsson and Finland, Kai Jürgen Sauer, touched on current issues such as the development of an innovative defense tech ecosystem in Europe, that is, scaling up production and delivery capacities. Panelists agreed that the European defence industrial mindset needs to adapt to “wartime readiness”, further to high tech military capabilities. The societal resilience was highlighted as an equally important deterrence as well as a good and resilient understanding among neighbours and strategic allies.

Ambassador Wand-Danielsson and CIO of Diehl Defence, Helmut Rauch

Enforce Tac in Nuremberg is a highly specialized trade fair aimed at professionals from security agencies and the armed forces.

Since its inception in 2012, it has become an essential industry meeting place, renowned for its discreet atmosphere and the high quality of its exhibits and presentations.

The fair is organized by NürnbergMesse GmbH, one of Germany’s leading trade fair organizers, whose extensive expertise and professionalism provide the ideal framework for this event.

For further information

Enforce Tac: https://www.enforcetac.com/en/_site_enfor

Pictures courtesy of the Swedish Embassy in Germany 

9th EU–Turkmenistan Inter-Parliamentary meeting held in Brussels

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9th EU–Turkmenistan Inter-Parliamentary meeting held in Brussels

Thursday, 5 March 2026, European Parliament, Brussels: The European Parliament hosted the 9th Inter-Parliamentary Meeting between the European Union and Turkmenistan. During the meeting, the parties discussed current issues of political and economic cooperation, the regional agenda of Central Asia, the international situation, as well as matters related to the rule of law and social policy.

The Turkmen delegation consisted of members of the Mejlis of Turkmenistan and was headed by Mr. Maksat Kulyyev, Chairman of the Committee of the Mejlis of Turkmenistan on International and Inter-Parliamentary Relations. On the side of the European Parliament, the meeting was chaired by Member of the European Parliament Ms. Giuseppina Princi, Head of the European Parliament Delegation for Relations with Central Asian countries (DCAS).

Images courtesy of the Embassy of Turkmenistan to the European Union 

Opening the meeting, participants emphasized the importance of regular inter-parliamentary contacts as an effective instrument for strengthening trust and mutual understanding.

During the exchange of views on the state of bilateral cooperation and the international agenda, Members of the European Parliament noted the growing importance of cooperation between the European Union and Central Asia amid ongoing international tensions. At the same time, interest was expressed in expanding the scope of partnership, including economic and energy cooperation, as well as in developing ties in education and scientific programmes.

The Turkmen side highlighted the initiatives and national priorities being implemented in the areas of sustainable development, energy, environmental protection, and the expansion of renewable energy sources. Particular attention was also given to the importance of transport connectivity and to Turkmenistan’s geostrategic role in the development of international transit and logistics routes, including the potential of the Turkmenbashi International Seaport as an important hub within regional transport corridors.

In the context of discussions on regional policy in Central Asia, attention was given to issues of stability and the development of regional connectivity. It was noted that the permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan is regarded as an important contribution to strengthening peace and security and serves as a foundation for expanding the humanitarian dimension and cooperation on regional projects, including those related to Afghanistan.

9th EU-Turkmenistan Inter Parliamentary meeting

Within the agenda item devoted to the humanitarian dimension and social issues, the European side underlined the importance of continuing the relevant dialogue and exchanging best practices.

The participants positively assessed the substantive and constructive nature of the exchange of views and reaffirmed their intention to continue inter-parliamentary cooperation. In this regard, an agreement was reached to hold the next meeting at the beginning of next year in Ashgabat.

For further information 

Embassy of Turkmenistan to the European Union: https://belgium.tmembassy.gov.tm/en/news/158562 

Images courtesy of the Embassy of Turkmenistan to the European Union 

Team France in Germany coordinates work with French Ambassador Delattre

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Team France in Germany coordinates work with French Ambassador Delattre

An enriching exchange took place at the French Embassy in Germany, bringing together key stakeholders for a wide-ranging discussion with French Ambassador François Delattre on Franco-German relations in the current geopolitical context and the state of the German economy.

The meeting was held against a backdrop defined by pressing challenges such the ongoing war in Ukraine; the economic stakes facing Europe in its relations with China and the United States; as well as the growing frequency of attacks on the foundations of democratic systems.

Against this complex backdrop, participants converged on a clear conclusion, namely, that European, collective responses to these challenges are not only desirable, they are necessary. The Franco-German relationship remains a cornerstone of European cohesion, and strengthening this relationship at the level of citizens, businesses and states is a shared and deeply felt motivation among all actors of Team France in Germany.

Team France in Germany brings together the best public and private sector solutions to facilitate and accelerate international business development. Its network in Germany comprises:

·        State services: the Embassy, the Regional Economic Service in Berlin, and the Consulates

·        Business France (Business France Deutschland)

·        Foreign Trade Advisors (Conseillers du Commerce Extérieur)

·        French Tech communities: French Tech Berlin, French Tech Munich, French Tech Düsseldorf

·        Franco-German business clubs: Deutsch Französischer Wirtschaftskreis (DFWK); Deutsch-Französischer Wirtschaftsclub in Bayern; Club d’Affaires franco-allemand du Bade-Wurtemberg; Club des Affaires Saar-Lorraine; Club des Affaires NRW; Club des Affaires de la Hesse e.V.; Club des affaires Saxe/Saxe-Anhalt/Thuringe; Club d’affaires franco-allemand du Bade-Wurtemberg e.V.; CAFA Hamburg

·        Chamber of Commerce: The French Chamber of Commerce in Germany (CCI France Allemagne / CCFA e.V.)

·        Strategic partners in Germany: Qivive Avocats & Rechtsanwälte, Forvis Mazars in Germany, LPA Law, DWF, Pramex International, vif Management, ALTIOS International, Emploi Allemagne.

For further information

French Embassy in Germany: https://de.ambafrance.org                          

Rwanda: Where International Women’s Day Means More

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Rwanda: Where International Women’s Day Means More

International Women’s Day means more when it stays close to visible results. In Rwanda, women lead in sectors that move goods, attract visitors and help firms grow. Their work appears in exports, aviation, banking, tourism, technology, diplomacy and fashion. As a result, their leadership shapes daily economic life in practical ways. These are not symbolic roles. Instead, these women make decisions, run systems and open routes to market.

Export leadership in motion

Angel Uwantege of Bahage Foods offers a clear example. In October 2024, Bahage Foods reportedly shipped a full container of Hass avocados weighing 22 tonnes. According to the source, it was the first Rwandan woman-led business to export a full container of avocados. That result points to careful planning, quality control, buyer trust and strong execution. In other words, export growth rarely arrives with noise. More often, it moves through deadlines, standards and logistics that hold together under pressure.

Tourism, routes and access

Meanwhile, other women shape Rwanda’s growth story in equally practical ways. Bonita Mutoni (Uber Luxe Safaris) reflects a tourism model built on experience design, premium travel and strong storytelling. As such, her work points to a tourism offer that goes beyond sightseeing alone. At the same time, Yvonne Manzi Makolo, as CEO of RwandAir, helps shape how visitors and business travellers enter and leave Rwanda. Routes, partnerships and passenger experience all affect tourism flows and trade ties. Therefore, connectivity does not simply support growth. It actively helps create it.

Finance and export credibility

Likewise, Dr. Diane Karusisi leads Bank of Kigali from a position that can influence business growth in direct ways. Her role connects to lending priorities, product design and the ability of entrepreneurs to formalize and scale. In coffee, Epiphanie Mukashyaka of Bufcoffee shows what export credibility requires over time. She represents consistency, traceability and long-term relationships with producers and buyers. Together, these elements help products travel well and compete in demanding markets.

Brand, policy and digital reach

Beyond those sectors, Sonia Mugabo adds another dimension through fashion and brand-building. As founder and CEO of her label, she connects contemporary Rwandan identity with local craftsmanship. Similarly, Irene Murerwa, appointed Chief Tourism Officer at RDB in late September 2024, brings cross-sector leadership to tourism management. Clare Akamanzi also links public leadership with private-sector reach through her move from RDB to NBA Africa. In addition, Louise Mushikiwabo brings diplomatic influence through international leadership. Finally, Clarisse Iribagiza adds a digital enterprise lens through HeHe Limited and recognition in UNCTAD’s eTrade for Women network.

A wider growth story

Taken together, these women show how Rwanda’s economic story takes shape in real work. They finance, connect, design, negotiate and build. Consequently, their leadership gives that story both structure and momentum.

Cyprus contribution to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims

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Cyprus contribution to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims

The Republic of Cyprus, a State Party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) since 2002, has made a voluntary contribution of EUR 25,000 to the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV), reaffirming its commitment to international justice and the rights of victims of crimes under the Rome Statute.  This amount has been marked by the Republic of Cyprus as an unrestricted contribution and will be used to redress the harm suffered by victims. 

H.E. Kevin Kelly, Member of the Board of Directors of the TFV stated, “On behalf of the Board of Directors, I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to the Republic of Cyprus for its voluntary contribution to the Trust Fund for Victims. Cyprus has displayed remarkable commitment to the TFV’s cause, consistently donating to the Fund annually since 2017. This new donation sends an important signal of support in these challenging times and will be instrumental in ensuring that victims of heinous crimes are afforded redress and have a chance at healing and rebuilding their lives.” 

H.E. Spyros Attas, Ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus to the Kingdom of The Netherlands stated, “The Republic of Cyprus reaffirms its steadfast support for the ICC Trust Fund for Victims through a continued voluntary contribution, acknowledging the Fund’s very important and impactful work.” 

Cyprus has been providing regular support to the TFV through voluntary contributions each year since 2017, with its total voluntary contributions amounting to over EUR 150,000. 

Israeli Candidate Elected President of Key Body of the Hague Conference on Private International Law

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Israeli Candidate Elected President of Key Body of the Hague Conference on Private International Law

Israeli candidate Yael Weiner has been elected Chair of the Council on General Affairs and Policy (CGAP) of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) on Thursday, March 5. This marks the first time that an Israeli representative will lead this important governing body of the organization.

Weiner was elected by a large majority of the HCCH’s Member States, following a multi-month diplomatic process led by the Israeli Embassy in The Hague in cooperation with the Israeli Ministry of Justice.

During the meeting, a small group of countries—including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Malaysia, and Spain—proposed postponing the vote. A large majority of Member States rejected this proposal, after which the election proceeded by secret ballot, resulting in clear support for Weiner.

Weiner currently serves as Vice-Chair of the CGAP and has been closely involved in the organization’s work for many years. She was the sole candidate for the position and is widely regarded within the organization as a highly experienced expert in international legal cooperation.

Founded in 1893, the Hague Conference on Private International Law today counts around 90 Member States. The organization develops international legal frameworks that facilitate cooperation between countries on cross-border legal matters, including international family law cases and other forms of judicial and administrative assistance.

The Council on General Affairs and Policy serves as the principal governing body of the HCCH, overseeing the organization’s activities and determining its strategic direction and work programme.

Weiner’s election reflects the confidence of Member States in her leadership, solid knowledge, and extensive experience, as well as her long-standing commitment to the work of the HCCH.

Seized Phones in Swedish Town Uncover Global Drug Trafficking Network

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Seized Phones in Swedish Town Uncover Global Drug Trafficking Network

The Hague, 6 March 2026

A global drug trafficking network has been dismantled following coordinated actions by authorities worldwide, supported by Eurojust and Europol. The operation resulted in the arrest of 15 suspects and began after Swedish investigators seized two mobile phones in a small town.

Forensic analysis of the devices revealed international contacts and communications used to coordinate criminal activities far beyond Sweden. The data exposed a sophisticated network involved in large-scale drug trafficking and money laundering, linking several criminal groups operating through a web of companies across multiple countries.

Investigators determined that members of the network in Thailand ran an online drug distribution operation targeting customers in the Nordic region. In Sweden, associates managed domestic distribution and laundered criminal profits, while in Spain a high-value target facilitated large-scale drug trafficking.

Following the discovery, Eurojust brought together judicial authorities from several countries to exchange information and coordinate strategic action. Early results included the seizure by German authorities of 1.2 tonnes of synthetic drugs destined for the Australian market. Two distributors waiting for the shipment were subsequently identified and arrested in Australia.

Once the key actors within the network were identified, authorities prepared a coordinated international operation. On 4 March, approximately 20 searches were carried out in Spain, Sweden and Thailand, leading to the arrest of 13 suspects. Investigators seized phones, documents and other evidence, which are now being further analysed.

Judicial cooperation through Eurojust began in early 2025 after the Swedish Prosecution Authority identified the need for international coordination. Meetings held at Eurojust in The Hague brought together authorities from Sweden, Germany, Spain and Australia to exchange intelligence and plan strategic actions. Eurojust also facilitated the preparation and execution of European Investigation Orders, European Arrest Warrants and freezing orders across multiple jurisdictions.

Europol provided extensive operational support throughout the investigation, including advanced analytical assistance, cryptocurrency analysis, intelligence reporting and funding for cross-border investigative activities.

Commenting on the operation, Senior Public Prosecutor Tove Kullberg of Sweden stated: “The support from Eurojust during the action day made things run smoothly. I found the support from Eurojust invaluable.”

Authorities involved:

Sweden: Swedish Prosecution Authority – National Unit Against Organised Crime; Swedish Economic Crime Authority; Swedish Police.

Spain: Central Investigative Court No. 4; Anti-Drug Prosecutor’s Office; Guardia Civil – UCO Málaga and Balearic Islands; Judicial Police Unit of Catalonia.

Total Football and the Korea-Netherlands Semiconductor Alliance

Diplomat Magazine
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Total Football and the Korea-Netherlands Semiconductor Alliance

By H.E. Mr. Seok In Hong, Ambassador of South Korea

In the early 1970’s, The Orange Legion – the Dutch National Team – caused a shift in the global football paradigm through their infamous “Total Football”. With the players moving fluidly across the field, the result of the game was determined by the performance of the systematic strategy rather than an individual player’s prowess. The modern semiconductor industry, the “oil of the twenty-first century”, is no different. It reaches its highest level of competitiveness when materials, equipment, design, and manufacturing come together a synergistic ecosystem. Due to complex processes and intertwined nature of supply chains, it is virtually impossible for any single country to create a complete ecosystem. In today’s turbulent geopolitical environment, Total Cooperation with the Netherlands, our trustworthy ally, is the best path to success.

In stark contrast to the idyllic scenery of windmills and tulip fields, the Netherlands is also home to ASML, the world’s sole manufacturer of EUV lithography equipment. As such, the Netherlands is an indispensable partner for Korea, as we aim to evolve from a memory chip giant into an AI powerhouse. In December 2023, our countries declared a semiconductor alliance, laying the institutional foundation for a total cooperation system. Building upon the well-established interconnected system between ASML, Samsung Electronics, and SK Hynix, our governments declared their partnership on the semiconductor supply chain resilience and technological collaboration.

Korea and the Netherlands shared policy approaches on semiconductors, economic security, and strategic material through consistent dialogue while actively searching for avenues of cooperation on R&D, talent development, and supply chain stability. Since February 2024, Korean universities and research institutes have taken part in the “Korea-NL Advanced Semiconductor Academy” alongside global companies. Every year, over 100 students and engineers visit the Netherlands to experience the frontier of semiconductor innovation. Furthermore, the Foreign Ministers and Trade Ministers held the inaugural “2+2 Foreign and Industry High-Level Dialogue” in February, reaffirming their commitment to maintain and strengthen strategic cooperation between our respective semiconductor ecosystems as expressed in the joint statement.

To guard against the fierce geopolitical winds sweeping across the globe, our countries are also strengthening cooperation in diplomacy and security. Our leaders have maintained close communication on the highest level, including a phone call on the inauguration of the new Korean government in August 2025 and the Dutch Prime Minister’s participation in the UN Security Council Open Discussion on AI chaired by the Korean President in September of the same year. Notably, the Netherlands plans to dispatch a naval vessel to the Indo-Pacific this April, contributing to the region’s peace and stability.

Today, the world is engaged in an unprecedented, holistic competition – not only in semiconductors but across multiple sectors, such as new technologies, cyber, and supply chains. This further necessitates close cooperation with a trusted partner, coordinating a well-equipped posture to analyze the field from every angle while being prepared. The organic cooperation of 20th century ‘Total Football’ was once enough to take on the world from within a single nation. Now heading into the mid-21st century, we need collaboration that transcends national borders. Korea and the Netherlands are strategic partners that complement each other’s semiconductor supply chains seamlessly, and together we look forward to establishing the ‘Total System’ that stretches from Busan to Rotterdam.

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