Monday, 17 May 2021, Berlin, Federal Republic of Germany: US President Joe Biden‘s Special Envoy for Climate, and erstwhile 68th Secretary of State John Kerry was received at the Representation ofthe State of North Rhine-Westphalia in Berlin by the latter state’s Premier Armin Laschet.
Both spoke about combating climate change as a global challenge. Special Envoy Kerry was accompanied by the Chargée d’affaires at the USA Embassy in Germany, Robin S. Quinville. Special Envoy John Kerry advises the US President on climate change issues. This is the first time an envoy for climate change is appointed.
Premier Armin Laschet underlined North Rhine-Westphalia’s experience in reducing greenhouse gases: “North Rhine-Westphalia is a pioneer in climate protection. By phasing out lignite, we are making a major contribution to reducing CO2. At the same time, we continue to set ourselves ambitious goals for the future: We will double the amount of renewable energies in North Rhine-Westphalia by 2030.”
Germany works with the United States in the field of climate protection at all levels. Areas of cooperation include the Transatlantic Climate Bridge, which was established in 2008 as a joint initiative of the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety with Canada and the United States. In the past four years, collaboration has taken place chiefly at municipal level and between enterprises and civil society organisations. With the new US Administration, this cooperation will be rejuvenated. In future, another important field of collaboration will be renewable energies. The global energy transition is essential in the fight against global warming. Climate-neutral hydrogen and its derivatives in particular will play a crucial role in decarbonisation.
The US Special Envoy on Climate Change, John Kerry, made stops in London and Rome over the past few days. In Rome, Kerry spoke with Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi as well as high-ranking business representatives. In the Vatican, he was received by the Bishop of Rome, Franciscus. In London, Kerry met with COP 26 President Alok Sharma. The UN climate conference is scheduled to take place in Glasgow, Scotland, in autumn 2021, after it had to be postponed in 2020 in the wake of the Corona pandemic.
In Berlin Special Envoy Kerry was also treated by Federal President Dr. Steinmeier to a private dinner, and was received by German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas beforehand at the Foreign Office located in Berlin-Mitte.
Depuis bientôt quarante ans, une institution arbitrale bien discrète œuvre dans le but de régler les différends entre les États-Unis d’Amérique et la République islamique d’Iran nés de la révolution islamique. Une belle occasion pour braquer les projecteurs sur cette institution peu connue du public haguenois et pourtant membre apprécié de la famille des institutions qui font de la ville de La Haye la ville de la justice internationale. En effet, le Tribunal quadragénaire contribue encore non seulement au règlement des différends entre les deux États qui lui ont donné mandat de ce faire, mais il aura également contribué de manière incidente -peut-être même involontaire- mais significative au développement du droit de l’arbitrage international.
On ne peut parler du Tribunal irano-américain sans rappeler les circonstances qui ont entouré sa création. La crise qui en est immédiatement à l’origine a été déclenchée par la révolution islamique ainsi que par l’événement traumatisant de la prise en otage membres du personnel diplomatique et consulaire de l’Ambassade américaine à Téhéran. Mais l’histoire est complexe et les causes plus lointaines de la crise sont liées au régime instauré par le gouvernement du Shah d’Iran, régime à la réputation redoutable, notamment du fait des agissements de sa police, la SAVAK, et par son association étroite avec les États-Unis dont il était un allié fidèle avec lequel il entretint d’excellentes relations économiques, militaires et politiques pendant de longues années.
C’est dans ce cadre qu’il avait conclu avec les États-Unis des contrats de fournitures et assistance militaires et lancé de grands projets d’infrastructure à la réalisation desquelles avaient été associée de nombreuses sociétés commerciales américaines. Pendant les années 1960 et 1970, de très nombreux ressortissants américains, hommes d’affaires, investisseurs, ingénieurs etc., s’étaient installés en Iran, Le rôle joué par les États-Unis n’était pourtant pas toujours bienvenu et fut source de tensions considérables ; dès les années 1960, l’opposition contre le Shah commença à s’organiser au sein de la société iranienne, une opposition pas seulement islamique mais de toute couleur politique. Le soulèvement populaire devait culminer dans la chute du gouvernement du Shah, le retour en début de l’année 1979 de l’Ayatollah Khomenei jusque-là exilé, l’accueil du Shah aux États-Unis pour traitement médical, et enfin la prise en otage de 52 membres du personnel de l’Ambassade américaine à Téhéran par des manifestants militants, le 4 novembre 1979, date qui restera ancrée dans la mémoire de ceux qui l’ont vécu – sans doute aussi parmi les lecteurs du Diplomat Magazine.
Cette prise d’otage et le soutien qu’elle reçut du nouveau gouvernement iranien déclencha une crise internationale majeure. En réaction à cette violation flagrante du droit international, les États-Unis tentèrent alors de jouer toutes les cartes : le Conseil de sécurité adopta deux résolutions condamnant les actes, le Secrétaire général de l’ONU fut sollicité pour faciliter des missions humanitaires et mettre sur pied une commission d’enquête, une série de mesures unilatérales adoptées par le président Jimmy Carter fut alors mise en place, avec notamment le gel des avoirs iraniens aux États-Unis, l’interdiction d’importation et d’exportation ainsi que l’interdiction de toute transaction financière. Le 29 novembre 1979, les États-Unis saisirent la Cour internationale de Justice, lui demandant de régler le différend et d’obtenir la libération des otages par une ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires. L’ordonnance rendue par la Cour resta sans suite, tout comme son célèbre arrêt de 1980 constatant la responsabilité du gouvernement islamique du fait de sa décision de pérenniser une situation créée par des personnes privées. Ces mesures n’eurent pas l’effet escompté. Dans une tentative désespérée de libérer les otages, les États-Unis envoyèrent huit hélicoptères pour libérer les otages, cette opération dite « Eagle Claw », tourna à la débâcle totale.
Toutes ces démarches des États-Unis ayant échoué, c’est par l’intermédiaire de la République fédérale d’Allemagne d’abord, puis de la République populaire et démocratique d’Algérie, qui accepta d’assumer ce rôle, que les deux Parties entamèrent des négociations, sans jamais se rencontrer. Ces négociations débouchèrent sur ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler les « Accords d’Alger » du 19 janvier 1981. Il s’agit de déclarations de la République d’Algérie que les deux Parties au différend s’engagent, séparément, de respecter. Les Accords d’Alger consistent en deux déclarations principales et deux plus techniques, mais leur ensemble constitue bien un traité au sens de la Convention de Vienne du droit des traités avec tout ce que cela implique, y compris en matière d’interprétation. Ils visent à mettre fin à un différend politique majeure par le règlement arbitral. L’acceptation des Accords d’Alger permit la libération des otages après 444 jours, le 20 janvier 1981, qui se trouva être la date de l’investiture de Ronald Reagan, vainqueur de Jimmy Carter aux élections. C’est ce dernier qui accueillit lui-même les otages sur une base militaire américaine en Allemagne.
Par la Déclaration générale, l’Iran s’engageait à libérer les 52 otages retenus depuis le 4 novembre 1979. Les États-Unis acceptaient les conditions de l’Etat iranien, à savoir : la non-intervention dans les affaires intérieures de l’Iran, l’annulation du gel des avoirs iraniens, la levée des sanctions contre l’Iran et l’annulation des réclamations contre l’Iran devant les juridictions des États-Unis ainsi que la restitution à l’Iran des biens du Shah. Enfin, les États-Unis devaient se désister de l’instance devant la Cour internationale de Justice, laquelle avait rendu son arrêt sur le fond mais demeurait saisie de la question des réparations.
La deuxième déclaration, la Déclaration sur le règlement du contentieux (Claims Settlement Declaration), est celle qui créa le Tribunal irano-américain, donnant mandat à celui-ci de se prononcer sur les réclamations de ressortissants de l’un des États contre l’autre (réclamations privées), ainsi que sur les différends juridiques entre les deux États concernant l’interprétation et l’application des Accords d’Alger (réclamations dites « A Claims ») et les différends entre les deux Etats concernant l’acquisition contractuelle de biens et de services, les official claims (réclamations dites « B Claims »).
La première séance du Tribunal s’est tenue le 1er juillet 1981 au Palais de la Paix, dans la petite salle de justice, fréquemment utilisée par le Cour permanente d’arbitrage, qui avait offert ses services à cette nouvelle institution arbitrale en attendant qu’elle puisse se doter d’un secrétariat et de locaux propres. Compte tenu du volume de réclamations attenues, il avait été convenu que l’Etat hôte mettrait à la disposition du Tribunal des locaux plus ou moins permanents, bien que l’on estimât à l’époque que les réclamations seraient traitées dans une période de cinq à dix ans…
Les promeneurs du quartier de Stolkpark connaissent sans doute le bâtiment emblématique qui sert de siège au Tribunal, situé entre les bois de Scheveningen et le Westbroek Park, un bâtiment qui a arbitré le Parkhotel puis, selon une rumeur non-confirmée, la Gestapo pendant l’occupation allemande.
On peut imaginer sans grande peine l’ambiance tendue qui régnait au Tribunal pendant les premières années. Cette expérience assez unique aurait facilement pu tourner à l’échec, mais elle est en réalité une belle leçon de l’effet pacificateur du règlement des différends par la voie arbitrale. En grande partie, cela est dû, qu’on me pardonne cette analyse de juriste, à l’existence d’un règlement de procédure permettant au Tribunal de continuer son travail malgré certaines difficultés rencontrées. C’est par une coïncidence fortuite que la création du Tribunal est à peu près contemporaine de l’adoption d’un règlement procédural de l’arbitrage sous l’égide de la Commission des Nations Unies pour le Droit Commercial International, la CNUDCI. Le Tribunal n’aurait pas pu mieux tomber. Le Règlement d’arbitrage adopté par la CNUDCI en 1976 présentait un ensemble complet et détaillé de règles de procédure pouvant être utilisé dans la conduite d’arbitrages commerciaux mais aussi, comme le Tribunal le prouve, internationaux. Les commentateurs en conviennent, l’existence de ce règlement a largement contribué au succès du Tribunal qui en a adapté quelques articles mais qui, s’est essentiellement servi de ce règlement pour résoudre des questions de procédure. Il fut ainsi l’un des premiers à devoir appliquer et interpréter les dispositions, faisant du Tribunal une référence en matière de procédure arbitrale.
Les Membres du Tribunal, leurs assistants et le secrétariat ont ainsi su surmonter les obstacles et ont réussi un remarquable tour de force : progressivement, le Tribunal s’est organisé pour traiter les quelques 3800 réclamations déposées par des personnes privées, naturelles et juridiques. Selon nos dernières informations, le Tribunal est venu au bout d’un nombre impressionnant d’affaires -près de 4000- dont toutes les réclamations privées, 72 affaires de la catégorie B et 21 affaires de la catégorie A. 16 affaires inter-étatiques demeurent pendantes. Le Tribunal a pris la décision, fort heureuse, de publier les sentences dans des Recueils et de les rendre ainsi accessible, non seulement au public intéressé mais aussi au monde de l’arbitrage at large. C’est d’ailleurs l’une des raisons pour lesquelles la jurisprudence du Tribunal a pu asseoir son autorité et influer sur le développement du droit de l’arbitrage :
La contribution du Tribunal au monde de l’arbitrage ne se limite pas aux questions de procédure. Des décisions du Tribunal irano-américain fréquemment citées dans les sentences arbitrales de tribunaux du CIRDI, ou encore de tribunaux ad hoc, notamment quand il s’agit d’analyser la notion d’expropriation, la nationalité effective, la force majeure, le droit de la responsabilité internationale, ou encore en matière de méthodes de calcul de la compensation (quantum).
Compte tenu de l’étendue du mandat du Tribunal, la nature des affaires traitées par celui-ci n’est pas homogène ; il s’agit parfois d’affaires simples, à caractère commercial, parfois d’affaires d’un degré de complexité juridique et factuelle des plus sophistiqués. Le lecteur du Diplomat Magazine est invité pour s’en assurer à consulter la dernière décision rendue dans l’affaire A :15, une affaire inter-étatique qui comportait des réclamations multiples, rassemblées en clusters thématiques. Sans même lire les près de sept-cents pages de la sentence partielle (opinions séparées non-comprises !), le lecteur pourra parfaitement mesurer la fascinante combinaison de questions factuelles et juridiques traitées par le Tribunal dans cette affaire, et ce n’est qu’une seule affaire !
La composition du Tribunal est des plus classiques en matière d’arbitrage international, et n’est pas sans rappeler celle des Commissions mixtes créées à l’issue de la première Guerre mondiale. Le Tribunal est composé de neuf membres, trois nommés par les États-Unis, trois nommés par l’Iran et trois nommés conjointement par les six arbitres déjà nommés, les membres ressortissants de pays-tiers, les « TCMs », third-country Members. Il se trouve que, depuis la création du Tribunal, les membres de pays-tiers ont été, à l’exception de l’Argentin José Maria Ruda, des ressortissants de pays européens de tradition de droit civil. Parmi les juristes internationaux appelés à siéger en tant que « membre de pays tiers » on retrouve des noms familiers : Michel Virally, José-Maria Ruda, Willem Riphagen, Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Hans van Houtte ou encore les membres actuels, les professeurs Nicolas Michel, Herbert Kronke et Bruno Simma.
Eu égard à la nature hétéroclite des affaires portées devant le Tribunal, ses Membres doivent être de fins juristes, spécialistes non seulement du droit international public et du droit de l’arbitrage, mais aussi du droit comparatif, du droit international privé et du droit des contrats, avec un intérêt particulier pour les transactions commerciales, et disposer aussi une certaine expertise en matière pétrolière, militaire et aéronautique. Enfin, il leur faut également avoir « la bosse des maths », lorsqu’ils ont à déterminer le montant des compensations à accorder selon des méthodes de calcul parfois très élaborés. Pour ce qui est des connaissances linguistiques, de nos jours, les Membres du Tribunal s’expriment en anglais seulement, les décisions étant en revanche rendues dans les deux langues officielles du Tribunal.
Quarante ans après la première séance du Tribunal, il est temps de célébrer cette belle réussite de l’arbitrage international. Il est vrai que, lors de sa création, personne n’aurait imaginé que le règlement de ce contentieux durerait autant d’années, mais ce qui compte, ce sont les milliers de sentences rendues, dans des circonstances parfois difficiles. Les relations entre les deux États parties ont connu des hauts et des bas (des bas surtout) les forces politiques ont pu changer, des gouvernements sont tombés, des administrations avec, d’autres les ont remplacés, car les données géopolitiques subissent d’incessants changements, mais au cours de toutes ces années, quelle qu’ait été la situation politique du jour, le Tribunal a continué à travailler sans relâche, à rendre des sentences d’un haut degré de complexité juridique et factuelle, et qui plus est, les deux États concernés, les États-Unis et l’Iran, ont tenus à coopérer avec le Tribunal, ont contribué à son budget, participé aux procédures et audiences, et exécuté ses sentences arbitrales. Après des débuts quelque peu difficiles, c’est dans le cadre de débats sereins que les Parties et les Membres du Tribunal s’acquittent de leur mission commune : trouver une solution aux différends divers qui fondent la compétence du Tribunal. Le Tribunal peut en témoigner : le règlement des différends par la voie arbitrale ou judiciaire est une voie fort prometteuse – quelle que soient les circonstances extérieures.
Il ne nous reste qu’à adresser nos vives félicitations au Tribunal irano-américain des réclamations, ainsi qu’aux deux États parties, pour avoir contribué au règlement pacifique de ce différend majeur de notre époque – contre vents et marées.
Cristina Hoss est juriste au Greffe de la Cour internationale de Justice et, entre 2015 et 2017, a été conseillère juridique de S.Exc. M. Bruno Simma, Membre du Tribunal.
Elle garde de son passage au Tribunal un souvenir ému et saisit cette occasion pour saluer ses anciens collègues et amis. Les vues exprimées sont strictement personnelles et ne reflètent pas nécessairement celles des Nations Unies ou de la Cour internationale de Justice.
Long-standing Guyanese public official, Mr. Vic Persaud CCH passed away on Thursday 13th May 2021.
He has been referred to as an outstanding public servant whose dedication to his country and his work, won the respect and affection of all those who has the opportunity to work with him. The tributes of former colleagues have indeed shone a light on a man whose professionalism and dedication are worthy of respect and admiration.
The president of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, H.E. Dr. Mohammed Irfaan Ali referred to ‘uncle Vic’ as an “institution” having served the country in many different capacities in his public service. During his career, Mr. Persaud has served all nine Executive Presidents. Dr. Irfaan Ali added that the qualities of Mr. Persaud, namely his wit, charm, grace, sophistication, excellence and efficiency were considered to be hallmark of his exemplary service to the nation.
Mr. Joseph Hermon, the leader of the Opposition, described Mr. Persaud as “one of Guyana’s most revered and outstanding public servants…. who served his country for half a century… and not only a colleague but a friend and mentor to many who came into contact with him.” Mr. Hermon also noted that Mr. Persaud’s integrity and unflinching attention to detail is what made him a great success in his career and that his exemplary professionalism will be missed by all.
The late Leon Rockcliffe, remarked(2015) on the occasion Mr. Persaud received the prestigious distinction of Cacique’s Crown of Honour (CCH) that Mr. Persaud has made himself invaluable to the public service. He referred to Mr. Persaud as the “white-haired eminence, the Prince of Protocol.”
From right to left, President David Arthur Granger, Mr Vic Persaud Chef of Protocol and Mr Moses Nagamootoo taking oath as Prime Minister (Courtesy Guyana Chronicle)
Vic, the man as I knew him, was colorblind. He looked beyond party loyalties, social status or ethnicity. He was a man of equity, a real man of the people. He was relaxed in social settings and oh yes, Vic knew how to have a good time.
He was my mentor, the one who initiated me into the world of diplomacy and her protocols. I am enormously grateful for that. I considered him to be my boss and simultaneously as my close friend.
One of my fondest memories of Vic, is during a visit of the Prime Minister of the Netherlands Antilles to Guyana. As a result of his keen interest in the Dutch language, he surprised the Prime Minister when he welcomed her in perfect Dutch. Vic visited me on several occasions in The Hague when he was posted in Moscow. Guyana, as well as the Caribbean have lost in Vic Persaud, a great son of the soil, a diplomatic colossus.
My thoughts are with his wife, Carol, his children, siblings and his nephew, Vinod at this time of their bereavement.
From right to left: Mr Vic Persaud, Chief of Protocol, Mr Moses Nagamootoo taking oath as acting President and Justice Carl Singh(sitting) Photo courtesy Staboeknews
Monday, 17 May 2021, Apia, Independent State of Samoa: Chiefess Fiame Naomi Mataafa is poised to become Samoa’s first female prime minister, after the Pacific nation’s Supreme Court helped break a month-long political impasse that followed a tightly contested election held in April.
Samoa’s top court on overruled an attempt by the O le Ao o le Malo of Samoa (Head of State), His Highness Tuimalealiifano Vaaletoa Sualauvi II to calls for new polls in order to break the impasse.
The top court also rejected the post-election creation of an additional parliamentary seat that briefly gave the incumbent government a majority.
The court decisions clear the path for Mataafa’s FAST party to form a government, ending the rule of Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi, who has fought to hold onto power after governing for 22 years.
Samoa gained independence in 1962 after nearly 50 years as a New Zealand protectorate.
Matai (Chiefess) Fiame Naomi Mata’afa hails from one of the four paramount chieftainly houses in Samoa. Her father, the late Fiame Mata’afa Faumuina Mulinu’u II served as Samoa’s very first prime minister in 1959. Naomi Mata’afa herself is a woman of firsts. She was Samoa’s first female cabinet member in 1991 when appointed Minister of Education. She subsequently served in the capacity of Minister of Women, Community & Social Development, and later as Minister of Justice. She was Samoa’s first female Deputy Prime Minister between 2016 and 2020.
The Pacific nation shut its borders early in the coronavirus pandemic and has any avoided widespread community transmission of COVID-19 infections.
Monday, 3 May 2021, Bogotá, Republic of Colombia: President Iván Duque Márquez announced a cabinet reshuffle wherein Dr José Manuel Restrepo Abondano is to serve as Minister of Finance and Public Credit au lieu of heading the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism.
The announcement of Dr Restrepo Abondano’s (b. 1969) appointment as Minister of Finance and Public Credit was widely hailed in Colombia.
Dr Restrepo graduated from the Del Rosario University in 1994 and completed a master’s degree in Economics from London School of Economics in 1998. He completed a postgraduate degree in Finance and Executive Management from Del Rosario University in 2004 as well as a PhD in Higher Education Management from the University of Bath in 2015. He is much appreciated for his professionalism, and dedication to public service.
Cabo Delgado, once heartland of the Mozambican national liberation struggle, is turning into an epicenter of conflict and instability, which threatens neighboring countries and regional stability. Armed conflict with Jihadist extremists is exacerbated by privatized security forces and a lack of tangible regional solidarity and security coordination.
Large offshore gas deposits act as an additional driver of conflict while peacebuilding initiatives are still at the very beginning. Extremists aligned with ISIS are emplacing an ecosystem for transnational illegal activity- just as the major gas project development can bring real peace dividends to the impoverished province. In view of escalating violence, it is time for the international response to shift gears and invest in peacebuilding besides counter-insurgency assistance and security sector reforms, including for regulating the activity of private military and security companies. In a new paradigm of partnership with the government, joined-up cooperation, including with future gas customers across the Indian Ocean could buttress the response to the escalating violence.
Conflict Trajectory – Armed violence has steadily escalated in Cabo Delgado province of northern Mozambique since 2017. In the last two years, the Jihadist insurgency of “Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jama” (ASWJ) has gained momentum beyond rural areas. In August 2020, insurgents took control of Mocimboa da Praia town on the northern coast. The complex attack on 25 March against the densely populated city of Palma targeted a staging area for the large offshore gas development project[2]. As a result, the leading energy firm involved in the gas project, Total Company of France, stopped operations and withdrew its personnel from the area.
Although the government announced on 7 April that Palma was recaptured, experts estimate that currently some 60% of sub-districts in the province are no longer under effective government control. The humanitarian fallout from the fighting is catastrophic: 700,000 persons are displaced and around a quarter of the provincial population. The fighting has caused 2,800 casualties so far, reportedly more than half of them civilians, according to ACLED statistics[3].
Government Response – The government struggled to keep the insurgency at bay after initial denial of the problem. In 2020, the government took steps to reorganize its security posture in Cabo Delgado and created a joint task force against the terrorists. Mozambique and Tanzania concluded an agreement to form a joint defense and security committee in mid-January 2021 for the purpose of intelligence sharing and coordination.
There has also been a growing readiness to accept foreign military advisers and trainers, while local militia groups were used in parallel. The US has recently agreed to provide military expertise and two-month training for Mozambican forces; former colonial power Portugal is sending trainers. The EU has stepped up planning for a possible EU Military Mission to assist the government, after the SADC neighboring states fielded a recent assessment[4].
However, Mozambique has been adamant against foreign troop deployments, due to its non-aligned diplomatic tradition and concerns about national sovereignty. The SADC regional block started to deliberate about a joint security response in late 2020. However, the recent SADC troika summit meeting on 8-9 April devoted to regional security challenges remained inconclusive.
Reforms in Mozambique’s security sector have been incomplete since the end of the civil war 1977-1992, which has debilitated the army in front line roles against violent extremists. Anti-terror legislation was adopted only in 2018 when the insurgency already began to make itself strongly felt. Security governance is further complicated by Mozambique’s reliance on private military and security firms (PMCs/ PSCs), including from Russia and South Africa (Wagner Group, Dyck Advisory Group/DAG) which failed to rout the Jihadists. In northern Mozambique, these para-military actions have drawn strong criticism from human rights organizations such as Amnesty International. There is testimony accusing security company employees of indiscriminate violence.
Significance of Transnational Extremist Threat – Already in July 2019, the ASWJ insurgents pledged allegiance to the ISIS branch in Central Africa ISCAP which operates in Congo DRC. Their fighting strength is believed to be around 2,000 in Cabo Delgado province. ASWJ publicly stated its intention to apply Sharia Law as agents of a “government of God”, similar to ISIS in the Middle East and the
Al Shabab militia in Somalia. ASWJ has also accused the ruling FRELIMO Party in Mozambique of corruption. In March 2021, the U.S. imposed sanctions against leaders of ISIS-ISCAP and counterparts in ASWJ as terrorists.
Counter-terrorist experts believe that ASWJ which is also locally known as ‘Al Shabab’ (‘Ansar al-Sunna’ or simply as ‘mashababos’) has mostly homegrown origins. However, there are indications that at least some of the leading ASWJ cadres are in fact from Tanzania. Polarization between Mwani and Makonde ethnic groups in provincial sub-districts of Mozambique also plays a role in the violence.
There are growing concerns that the insurgency could spill over into neighboring provinces of Mozambique, especially Nampula and Niassa. Experts have pointed out that there is a risk of expanded territorial control and illicit revenue streams (from timber, precious stones, and heroin smuggling). This might give the insurgents access to more sophisticated arms[5]. The illegal gold mining business sis supposedly bankrolling the insurgency against government control measures.
Spillover into Tanzania across the shared border has already occurred[6]. Security analysts are pointing to an expansion trend of ISIS and Jihadist violence in Africa as their new frontier. Cabo Delgado could replicate the violence in the Sahel region and add a trans-continental dimension to extremism by expanding to the Indian Ocean seaboard. In this view, ASWJ- ISCAP could pose a critical threat to the more developed economies in neighboring South Africa and Tanzania as well as for international shipping and trade. Cabo Delgado is an entry point for what observers have called Africa’s rise as a ‘multi-functional platform’ for global terrorism.
Hydrocarbon Pull Factor in Mozambique’s Insurgency – Cabo Delgado province is a majority Muslim area in Mozambique with a history of government neglect and under-development. Youth unemployment is staggeringly high as well as the levels of illiteracy among youth. The province is also a national hotspot for COVID-19 infections.
By contrast, the 20bn USD offshore LNG gas project in the province represents the largest private investment in Africa’s energy sector. Total energy firm of France aims to produce 13 bn tons of LNG gas annually from 2024. Despite the recent setback, Total has stated that the project remains on track.
The lucrative hydrocarbons development and expected funds flows act as an additional driver of extremist violence, competing with the reach of government authorities. Some sub-contractors might end up paying protection money to the Jihadists, although control of gas wells is not realistic for AWSJ.
New Energy Triangle: Africa, Gulf States and Asia – As global energy consumptions patterns start shifting, producers in eastern/southern Africa are transforming the energy map. A new “Energy Triangle” is developing for gas flows between the Gulf, East Africa and Asia[7]. Besides significant deposits in Mozambique, Somalia also intends to develop its offshore oil and gas resources which locked the fragile country into a bitter maritime boundary dispute with Kenya for the better part of two years.
More flexible energy supplies via LNG shipments are a key element in international energy relations, since gas as “companion fuel” to exit sustainably and smoothly from fossil fuels is almost indispensable for providing a stable industrial energy base load. Asia in particular lacks regionally integrated energy grids. Asian emerging markets drive an unbroken global urbanization trend which requires energy sources ‘cleanest in quantity’, with an emphasis on natural gas and LNG. Qatar has positioned itself for maximum commercial advantage as the world’s leading LNG producer, raising output by 10 % in the first six months of 2020. Competition with emerging producers from Africa will be fierce in years to come.
Enhanced International Cooperation against Violence in Cabo Delgado – Militarized responses to the insurgency have proven ineffective so far and only made matters worse. Therefore a concerted and multi-dimensional effort is needed to engage in peacebuilding, dialogue and civilian-led security sector reform development with provincial focus. Forward-looking cooperation that draws on the significant economic oil and gas potential to deliver a peace dividend to the population is also required to produce scaling effects for peaceful development and breaking the circle of violence. Yet these energy flows are not destined to lock in competition, but instead hold the key to cooperation in reverse trades of skills and technology for the energy transition through 2050 that can be beneficial for the situation in Cabo Delgado.
Within the ambit of civilian peacebuilding, there is a need for inclusiveness in Mozambique’s security governance. It is important to ensure control over the private military and security firms in the counter-terrorist campaign[8]. In addition, focused deradicalization and extremist prevention actions specifically targeting youth are required. Specialist counter-terrorist skills are a critical element for the Mozambican security forces. President Filipe Nyusi’s new Agency for Integrated Development of the North (ADIN) is a welcome step towards participatory development planning. In late April, the World Bank allocated a $100m USD grant for ADIN for livelihoods, social cohesion and economic opportunities, with additional resources available to Mozambique under the Bank’s Prevention and Resilience program.
Given the magnitude of the challenge, resolving the conflict might require innovative cooperation formats centered on energy links. BRICS countries or a similar arrangement (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) could anchor multi-dimensional peacebuilding interventions in Cabo Delgado through robust joint ed-up cooperation which is complementing technical military assistance from friendly nations.
Building a new “Skills Bridge” across the Indian Ocean around gas technology and capacity transfer for employment could leverage South Asia’s and the Gulf region’s digital learning and training platforms. This could go a long way to make gas flows drivers of stability between two of the most dynamic world regions and emerging markets in preparation of the global energy transformation.
About the author:
Matthias E. Leitner – Picture by IFIMES
Matthias E. Leitner has served in international peace and security since 1997, mainly in UN and regional peace operations across Africa and in Southeast Asia/Myanmar as well as the Middle East. His specialization is in the Horn of Africa/IGAD Region and inter-regional cooperation as well as cross-learning including COVID-19 resilience. His academic background from Bonn and Oxford Universities is in languages, history and international law.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect IFIMES official position.
Published by IFIMES . Ljubljana/Washington/Berlin, 16 May 2021
Footnotes: [1] IFIMES – International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has Special Consultative status at ECOSOC/UN, New York, since 2018. [2] The attack is described as a well-prepared, multi-pronged raid which sent government forces fleeing (ASWJ Launches Highly Coordinated Assault against Palma. Intelyse, March 2021). It is assessed that this attack will increase the appeal of the insurgency to foreign fighters. [3] Cabo Ligado: Weekly Report 26 April to May 2021. [4] In the context of possible EU assistance, the French Minister of Defence has indicated that France’s military assets in the Indian Ocean might play a role. [5] IHS Africa Conflict Series- Mozambique. 7 January 2021. [6] In October 2020, an insurgent raid on Kitaya village in Tanzania claimed over 50 lives (see: The Islamic State in Mozambique. Lawfare Blog (24 January 2021). [7] This is based on a contribution to the 9 April 2021 Blue Circle Conference on the geopolitics of energy (Matthias E. Leitner: “ Emerging Geopolitics of Gas Flows – Asia and Africa”). [8] Normative frameworks exist for private military and security companies in warfare, e.g. the ICoC Voluntary Code of Conduct and the 2008 Montreux Document governing state use of mercenaries.
Energetically Marching in to the Wrong Side of History
By Tomislav Jakić
The first half of May in Croatia is marked by the anniversaries of two events from the end of the Second World War. With one democratic Croatia, which, if we believe its Constitution, is built on the foundations of anti-fascism (and opposite the so called Independent State of Croatia, established by the Ustasha movement, under the wings of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy) should be proud of, the other would be politically opportune not to mention at all, or keep within the limits of individual commemorations. We are speaking, of course, of Victory Day and the date of the surrender of the remnants of the Ustasha and Home Guard forces, united in the Croatian Defense Forces, on the Bleiburg field, ie the liquidation of still uncertain number od those made prisoners there.
The opposite is happening, however. Instead of being proud of the V Day, the official Croatian tries to push it into oblivion, and because it does (still) cannot, makes only certain protocol gestures. And the fact that during WW2 a Croatia existed which was on the side of Nazi-fascism existed and kept fighting to the last day, and even after that, that there was a Croatia which systematically committed war crimes against Serbs, Jews, Roma and Croats – political opponents, thus tarnishing the Croatian name, is persistently being pushed in the foreground. With a barely concealed positive context.
This is obvious not only from this year, but exactly in this, 2021. it becomes, perhaps, most clear than ever. And this presents the Republic of Croatia as a state that is dangerously turning into the waters of neo-fascism, that is, Ustashaism. Of high representatives of state, Victory Day was personally marked only by the head of State, who laid flowers at the tomb of national heroes, ie. Partisan fighters (representatives of high positioned politicians are not worth mentioning, they were really there just to satisfy form). And yes, one, the only (!) Academy was organized to mark that day by the Alliance of Anti-Fascist fighters and Anti-Fascists (and not the State!). It commemorated the Victory Day, the (almost forgotten) Day of the Liberation of Zagreb, and Europe Day, which is marked on May 9th in order to convey in this way the message that post-war Europe, and that should mean today’s Europe too, is built on the foundations of the anti-fascist struggle and on the values of anti-fascism. The current President was not present at that academy. There were two former presidents of the Republic and again – several representatives. The information about this celebration somehow found its way into the media, but that was all.
Public television marked this significant day by broadcasting one American and one Russian-Ukrainian film with a theme from the time of the Second World War. And with an unspoken message: that war in Croatia did not rage, and if by some chance it did – there are no films about it (what about some of world-famous movies showing the antifascist struggle in Yugoslavia, such as Neretva or Walter defends Sarajevo?)
The other event, the surrender at Bleiburg and everything that happened after that, has been talked about for days. The state (Parliament) and the Church are maximally engaged in the organization of the commemoration of something that is as cynically as hypocritically called the Memorial Day for “Croatian victims in the fight for freedom and independence”. Mass celebrations and gatherings will be held in three (!) places in Croatia, and buses (even from Germany) are being organized to bring “pilgrims” to them. And what about pandemic? Everything will be, they say, in line with epidemiological measures and restrictions. They say so and they knowingly and recklessly lie, believing that the public is so stupid, or resigned, that something like this can be served to them with impunity, even on the eve of important local elections.
Since 1990, when the surrender at Bleiburg was publicly marked for the first time in Croatia (and when on that occasion the re-named Croatian Radio “shone” with a report, featuring Dinko Šakić, former commander of Jasenovac, one of about 60 concentration camps in the Ustasha state, who categorically stated that – if he lived again – he would do everything the way he did, this commemoration turned not into commemoration of those executed without trials after the surrender, but into regret over the defeat of the Ustasha para-state which, in accordance with Tudjman’s statement at the First HDZ congress, held in Yugoslav times, was “the realization of the centuries-old aspirations of the Croatian people too ”.
Austria has for years tolerated gathering on Bleiburg field, speeches that were often politically colored, highlighting of the Ustasha symbols and flags (the first white field in the Croatian coat of arms), but then – largely under pressure from Europe – denied its hospitality to the, as it was called by a reputable European medium, the largest gathering of radical right-wingers and neo-fascists on the Old Continent. Official Croatia, but also the “Church of the Croats” could not come to terms with that, so last year the “Bleiburg Mass” was held in Sarajevo (probably to remind how Sarajevo was part of the Ustasha state), while this year gatherings organized are being organized, it is worth repeating, on three locations in Croatia, the largest one in Udbina.
What message does such treatment of Victory Day and the date of capitulation of Ustasha and Home guard forces (along with other collaborators from Yugoslavia) sends to Europe and to the whole world?
Just one thing: as far as Victory Day is concerned, we’re not sure whether it should be and how celebrated, because in the meantime we succeeded in transforming the winners into criminals and murderers, and their Supreme Commander as “one of the 10 mega murderer of the 20th century” , and are open to considering the Day of Liberation of the Croatian Metropolis as the day of the beginning of its occupation (this, under the mask of the freedom of public speech can be calmly stated today – as an explanation why the street of May 8th 1945. was abolished . On the other hand, we are very engaged in commemorating those forces and their members who, ignoring the unconditional capitulation of the Third Reich signed on May 8th in Reims and on May 9th in Berlin, continued fighting until mid-May, trying to escape Tito’s partisans, knowing that among the partisans there is hardly anyone who has not directly or indirectly felt the Ustasha terror. Official Croatia and the Catholic church are commemorating and mourning their defeat, because they were – as it is written in a stone memorial at Bleiburg field “the Croatian army.” Were they really? And what were the Croatian partisans?
There is not a single country in the world that would organize commemorations for war criminals executed without trial or sentenced to death (and that there were such people in the Bleiburg field is an indisputable fact). Croatia is an exception – for now. And we have listed these two categories of post-war victims (if that is an appropriate term) because retaliation was not a specific feature of Yugoslavia. It took place, on a larger or smaller scale, for several weeks or several months in all the European countries occupied until then. In France, unofficial estimates list about 100,000 liquidated collaborators, while the leader of the Free France, who would later become the president of the Fifth Republic, General Charles de Gaulle, officially admitted 10,000, with the laconic remark : “Given what they were doing at the time of the occupation, France can live with this”.
Croatia may soon find itself in the company of several other countries, former Soviet satellites, which are well immersed in historical-revisionist waters, which allow marches of former members of SS units and which – like Ukraine – proclaims notorious collaborators (Stepan Bandera) as national heroes. But, will it mean that Croatia is on the right way by (almost) ignoring V-day and by glorifying and mourning the members of the collaborationist forces? Not at all! This will be just be another worrying indicator of the divisions within the European Union and of the abandoning, by some of its “young” members the ideas and ideals that guided those who conceived the project of a united Europe. That accepting the idea of the possibility of a new war (and the EU should have prevented it for all time) is not just a theoretical possibility, is best seen from the wholehearted adherence of part of the EU to the American policy of confrontation with the Russian Federation (even armed, military drills lasting for several months in Europe just now, demonstrate this).
And, finally, let’s go back to the name of the Memorial Day in mid-May, mentioned earlier. It is the Memorial Day for the Croatian victims in the fight for freedom and independence. What does that mean? That only Ustashas (Croatian fascists) and Home guards were fighters for Croatian freedom and independence? Given the date, such a conclusion seems only possible. But, if that is the case, then all those Croats (not to mention Serbs from Croatia) who fought in the ranks of the People’s Liberation Army were the enemies of Croatian freedom and independence. But, if somehow, we “remembered” what is written in the Constitution, if today’s Croatia, democratic and independent Croatia, “generously” added Partisans to Ustashe and Home Guard, this would mean the completion and realization of morbid ideas of the first Croatian president Franjo Tudjman who wanted to bury the remains of the victims of fascism and anti-fascist fighters together with those who killed them in the area of the former Ustasha concentration camp Jasenovac. Tudjman then, under pressure from abroad (even from the USA), had to give up copying something that was realized in Spain during his long-term dictatorship by the openly pro-fascist generalissimos Francisco Franco (who in the meantime was “removed” from that memorial complex by democratic Spanish authorities).
His successors went a step further. While Tudjman never attacked the People’s Liberation Struggle (he participated in it), nor did he utter an ugly word about Marshal Tito, they “bravely” abolished Marshal Tito Square in Zagreb (and none of the candidates for Zagreb mayor dares to say that he would return the square with that name), they tolerate and even encourage the harshest revision of history (as if learning from Serbian right-wingers, but also the current authorities who marked Victory Day with an academy with pictures of Chetnik leader Draža Mihailović and partisan leader Josip Broz Tito, claiming the resistance to fascism only for the Serbian people), they are (almost) ignoring Victory Day and glorifying the sacrifice of those who had been on the side of Nazi-Fascism throughout World War II.
Does today’s Croatia (not only the official) really has a dilemma: either to celebrate the V-day, or to mourn the surrender of quisling forces near Bleiberg, their defeat? Judging by what we are witnessing – no! And his is devastating not only for Croatia, but also for the European Union of which Croatia is a member.
About the author:
Tomislav Jakić is one of the most influential Yugoslav and Croatian journalists, who is covering the international relations for over 50 years and who served as Foreign policy Advisor to Croatian President Stjepan Mesic (2000. – 2010.)
By Mr. Giorgi Nakashidze, Chargé d’Affaires a. i., Embassy of Georgia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands
26 May 2021 marks 103rd year of the Democratic Republic of Georgia as well as 30th anniversary of the restoration of independence from the Soviet Union. On 26 May 1918, Georgia declared independence. Despite the short period of its existence (1918-1921), the Democratic Republic of Georgia had a significant impact on the development of the Georgian statehood in a long run.
At the referendum in 1991, Georgian voters (99.08%) answered ‘yes’ to one single question: ‘Do you support the restoration of the independence of Georgia in accordance with the Act of Declaration of Independence of Georgia of 26 May 1918?’ Consequently, the country gained back its sovereignty in 1991. Since then, Georgia has made a substantial success in multiple directions, including on the path to the European and Euro-Atlantic integration.
Due to Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic course, maintaining of independence, unfortunately, turned out to be harder than gaining it. Since regaining independence, Georgia has been target of full-scale military aggression and hybrid warfare from the Russian Federation aiming to destabilise the country, keep it in the sphere of influence and hinder its pro-western foreign policy. Even today, Georgia continues its fight for territorial integrity. The Russian Federation continues the illegal occupation of the indivisible regions of the country – Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia. In a historic judgment in January 2021, the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights found that Russia is exercising effective control over Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia and it is responsible for the mass violations committed against the Georgian population.
Relations between the European Union and Georgia started soon after Georgia regained its sovereignty. The European Union and Georgia’s close relationship is based on the EU-Georgia Association Agreement including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), which entered into force in July 2016 and strives for political association and economic integration. Besides, since 28 March 2017 nationals of Georgia are exempt from visa requirement to travel to the Schengen zone for a short-stay. As a next benchmark, Georgia is preparing to apply for full EU membership in 2024.
Georgia is a thriving Eastern European democracy and as a successful case of European integration, it carries an important benefit for the EU as a value-based transformational power. Georgia is the EU’s gateway to the Caucasus, to the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. As a Black Sea littoral state, it can play a significant role as Europe’s alternative transport hub and an alternative energy route. Georgia is also a contributor to tackling global and regional security challenges. A Framework Agreement on Georgia’s participation in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy operations entered into force in March 2014, and Georgia has since made remarkable contributions to several operations.
Accession to the NATO is another top foreign and security policy priorities of Georgia. Shortly after Georgia restored independence in 1991, the country joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992. At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, the Allies agreed that Georgia will become a NATO member. This decision has been reaffirmed at successive NATO Summits. By actively involving in NATO-led operations, Georgia aims at becoming not only the consumer of security, but also an important player for strengthening common Euro-Atlantic security.
During past three decades, Georgia demonstrated significant progress in the economic and cultural diplomacy. As of now, country has free trade with 2.3 billion-consumer market. Georgia is a leader in the region in terms of stability and investment attractiveness. The elements of Georgian intangible cultural heritage, among others, include the ancient Georgian traditional Kvevri winemaking method. In 2017, 8,000-year-old pottery fragments revealed the earliest evidence of grape winemaking in Georgia, which entered Guinness World Records as the ‘oldest wine’.
30 years after regaining independence from the Soviet Union, Georgia has become a reliable partner in the international community to which world also presents differently. Country’s geopolitical, economic and cultural interests have spread across the globe while its security, political and economic stability are in the interests of the majority of the countries in the world. In pursuit to bridge Georgia and the world, Georgia continues to maintain a persistent foreign policy and conduct proactive diplomacy guided by predictability, sustainability and continuity.
Ireland sends important message of support for reparative justice with €300,000 contribution to Trust Fund for Victims
Reaffirming its support for reparative justice and the related mandates of the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) at the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Government of Ireland has pledged a voluntary contribution of €300,000 to the TFV this year. This marks a significant increase in its annual contribution, which amounted to €200,000 in 2020, and demonstrates Ireland’s strong support for the TFV and its critical work in support of the reparative justice function of the Rome Statute.
The voluntary contribution will be equally divided, with €150,000 assigned to the reparations mandate and €150,000 to the assistance mandate.
H.E. Mr. Kevin Kelly, Ambassador of Ireland .
Speaking on Ireland’s support for the TFV and the Rome Statute, H.E. Mr Kevin Kelly, Ambassador of Ireland to the Kingdom of the Netherlands said “With this contribution Ireland wishes to signal its commitment to international criminal justice and to ensuring victims of the worst crimes are seen, heard and delivered the justice they deserve. This increased contribution from Ireland is also an expression of our confidence in the TFV to fulfil its critically important mandate of making reparative justice a reality and giving dignity and hope to victims of crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction”.
Baroness Arminka Helić, the TFV Board member representing the Western European and other States Parties, welcomed the contribution saying “On behalf of the Board of Directors of the TFV I extend my warmest thanks to Ambassador Kelly and the Government of Ireland for this increased contribution and the message it sends. Ireland has been a tireless supporter of the TFV and its mission and has truly engaged with our work at every level to ensure we can deliver on our mandate. Ireland has shown itself to be a staunch supporter of the fight against impunity and for this the TFV Board of Directors is very grateful”.
TFV Executive Director Pieter de Baan thanked the Irish Government saying “The steadily increasing value of Ireland’s contributions to the TFV signals strong political support, as well as an apt recognition of the increasing portfolio of the TFV, across reparations cases and situation countries. Ireland’s designation recognises the importance of both judicial reparations and assistance activities in responding to the gravity of harm suffered by victims of Rome Statute crimes”.
ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, ICC President Judge Piotr Hofmański, H.E. Kevin Kelly, Ambassador of Ireland to The Netherlands and ICC Registrar Peter Lewis with the artwork donated to the ICC by the Government of Ireland
On 18 March 2021, H.E. Ambassador Kevin Kelly and ICC President Judge Piotr Hofmański unveiled a new artwork donated by Ireland to the International Criminal Court (ICC), symbolising Ireland’s support for the Rome Statute, its commitment to ending impunity and its clear understanding that justice is a prerequisite for lasting peace, stability and equitable development.
Wednesday, 12 May 2021, Stuttgart, Baden-Württemberg, Germany: Baden-Württemberg’s State Diet has re-elected Winfried Kretschmann in the capacity of premier (Ministerpräsident) and confirmed the state government he formed. The coalition agreement between Alliance 90/The Greens and the CDU forms the basis of the government’s work from 2021 to 2026.
This is Kretschmann’s third term at the reins of the Southwestern German state with capital in Stuttgart. He was first elected in 2011, and remains hugely popular.
Cabinet members are:
Deputy Premier and Minister of the Interior, for Digitisation and Local Authorities: Thomas Strobl. Minister of Finance: Dr. Danyal Bayaz. Minister for Culture, Youth and Sport: Theresa Schopper. Minister for Science, Research and the Arts: Theresia Bauer. Minister for the Environment, Climate and Energy: Thekla Walker. Minister for Economic Affairs, Labour and Tourism: Dr. Nicole Hoffmeister-Kraut. Minister for Social Affairs, Health and Integration: Manne Lucha. Minister of Justice and Migration: Marion Gentges. Minister for Transport: Winfried Hermann. Minister for Food, Rural Areas and Consumer Protection: Peter Hauk. Minister for Regional Development and Housing: Nicole Razavi.
In Berlin, State Secretary and Plenipotentiary of the Land to the German Federation, Federal Policy Coordination is Rudolf Hoogvliet.
In Brussels, State Secretary at the Ministry of State and Representative of the State of Baden-Württemberg to the European Union: Florian Hassler.
