Electoral Legislation of Uzbekistan: Effects of Steadiness

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Electoral Legislation of Uzbekistan: Effects of Steadiness

By Makhmud Istamov, Member of the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Exactly one year has passed since the Parliamentary and Local elections held in our country on the basis of the new legislation.

In a democratic state and society, it is paramount that the will of the people is respected above all else, without deviation.

Article 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan stipulates that “the people are the sole source of state power” and Article 32 states that “Citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall have the right to participate in the management of public and state affairs, both directly and through representatives”.

These rights find their practical expression exactly in the elections. The dedication of a separate chapter in the Constitution to electoral issues has served as an important legal basis for the formation of the national electoral legislation of the country. At the same time, this constitutional provision is an important factor in the continuous improvement of electoral legislation in Uzbekistan.

From this point of view, if we focus on the changes that have taken place in the electoral legislation and practice in recent years, we can see a high degree of efficiency of the systematic reforms in the field of national elections.

Over the past six years, Uzbekistan has held two parliamentary and two presidential elections. The extensive practical and legal experience gained during these elections, as well as the recommendations made by both national and international observers, have played an important role in improving electoral legislation.

In 2014, amendments were introduced to Article 117 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Central Election Commission was granted constitutional status and guarantees of its formation and independent activity were established.

The independence of the CEC members is guaranteed by the fact that their term of office is not limited in time and they are elected by local representative bodies and parliament.

According to the Law of 2015 and presumption of innocence it was determined that polling stations should be set up in temporary detention places to ensure that persons under investigation and whose guilt is not established by legal order participate in the elections.

The number of signatures in support of presidential candidates has also been sharply reduced, based on international electoral standards. Specifically, the required number of signatures was reduced from five to one per cent of the total number of voters.

In 2019, on the initiative of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the adoption of a single and unified Election Code, which included five existing election laws and dozens of by-laws, created an important legal basis for raising the electoral practice to a high quality level.

The adoption of the Election Code allowed to systemize the norms of electoral legislation (codification), eliminate similar norms and unify this sphere of legislation.

The draft Code was subject to international legal examination by the Venice Commission and a conclusion was obtained. The Code has implemented a number of international election standards, as well as recommendations of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR). As a result, the Election Code has been enriched with a number of improvements.

These important changes include: allowing the participation in the elections of persons who have committed misdemeanors and crimes not constituting great social danger; abolishment of 15 reserved seats for Ecological Movement in the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis; participation in the observations of elections by the representatives of non-governmental non-profit organization – citizens’ self-government bodies; allowing voters to sign in support of one or more political parties or presidential candidates.

Reforms in the electoral legislation and practice have been widely recognized not only by the participants of the electoral process, but also by the international community. This was also evident in the 2019 elections to the parliament and local Kengashes.

Specifically, the report of OSCE ODIHR’s full-fledged Election Observation Mission in connection with the 2019 parliamentary elections under the slogan “New Uzbekistan – New Elections” acknowledges a number of positive changes.

In particular, the Mission emphasizes in its report that “the elections took place under improved legislation and with greater tolerance of independent voices. There is more acceptance of free expression. The contesting parties presented their political platforms and the media hosted debates, many aired live. The Election Code incorporates several previous ODIHR recommendations and brings the legal framework closer in line with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections. The elections showed that the ongoing reforms need to continue”.

Undoubtedly, the updated electoral legislation of 2019, as well as the strengthening and widening environment of openness and transparency in our country, allowed the Central Election Commission to organize the parliamentary elections and raise it to a new, higher level.

What are the systematic changes that are being steadily implemented?

The formation of a single electronic voter list to ensure the implementation of the principle of “one voter – one vote” has become a completely new practice in the national electoral system of Uzbekistan. The list includes information on more than the 20.5 million citizens of voting age and was used during the previous elections.

Political parties and candidates have been provided with more opportunities than ever before to hold pre-election meetings. The 26 TV debates they held were all broadcast live. All this contributed, for the first time in the history of modern Uzbekistan, to elections held in a true competitive environment.

The opportunity of all our compatriots living abroad to vote is another important change. At 55 polling stations established in 38 foreign countries, 112,411 citizens exercised their constitutional right to vote. In the previous elections, only registered citizens in the diplomatic missions of our country abroad could participate in the elections.

During the preparation for the elections, about 180,000 members of election commissions were trained in practical seminars.

One of the most important innovations in the national electoral system of Uzbekistan – for the first time in the history of our country persons who have committed misdemeanors and crimes not constituting a great social danger had the honor to vote. Thus 4,308 such individuals exercised their right to vote in the previous elections.

A mechanism for a rapid response to media, social networks and citizens reports of electoral violations has been created which also allowed appropriate legal action to be taken if necessary. Through this mechanism, the results of the elections of the local representative bodies in two constituencies were declared invalid and the process of repeat elections was used for the first time in the national electoral practice.

It should be noted that this is, first of all, a clear confirmation of changes in the socio-political environment of new Uzbekistan, the principles of democracy, openness and transparency are beginning to be implemented. The whole world is watching with interest as the reforms are being steadily implemented, which require great wisdom, patriotism, a huge devotion to national traditions and ideas of modern democracy and a strong political will.

The adoption and successful implementation of the Election Code was a major step towards further strengthening and improving our national electoral legislation, which was formed during the years of independence, and relied on our nearly thirty years of experience in conducting democratic elections.

For the first time, the Central Election Commission has developed analytical information on the parliamentary elections in 2019, which, along with the achievements in the organization of elections, reflected the shortcomings and problems, the measures to be taken.

Further improvement of our national electoral legislation, to bring it in line with universally recognized international standards is a continuous and ongoing process.

The recommendations of international organizations on the improvement of the electoral system will be taken into account and implemented in compliance with the ongoing structural reforms in our country, of course, based on the national traditions and unique cultural values of our people.

At the same time, the analysis of Uzbekistan’s scores in the World Democracy Index over the past six years in the “Electoral Process and Pluralism” category raises some concerns and we hope that our international partners will pay more attention to this issue.

For six years in a row from 2014 to 2019, the score of Uzbekistan was the same – 0.08 in the World Democracy Index “Electoral Process and Pluralism”. According to the criterion of “free and fair elections” of the Transformation Index, compiled by the Bertelsmann Foundation – 2.

However, we believe that the effective reforms implemented in the electoral system of Uzbekistan in 2019 alone will significantly improve these numbers. As noted, it would be considered fair if the next international rankings reflect the adoption of a single Election Code and the analytical reports of influential international organizations published in 2020.

Of course, the ultimate goal is not to improve the numbers in the rankings. The most important thing is to firmly establish democracy, which is steadily strengthening in new Uzbekistan, and to further improve the conditions that serve to expand the electoral rights of citizens.

Palestine / Cour Pénale Internationale (CPI)

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Palestine / Cour Pénale Internationale (CPI)

Brèves remarques concernant la décision récente de la Chambre Préliminaire de la CPI

Photo de Nikki Haley, Représentante des États-Unis aux Nations Unies quittant la salle du Conseil de Sécurité au moment où Riyad Mansour, Représentant de la Palestine, commence son allocution, le 15 mai 2018 à New York. Photo extraite du cette note de pesse intitulée “EE.UU. se queda solo en la ONU ” (La Vanguardia, édition du 16/5/2018).

By Nicolas Boeglin, professeur de droit international public à la Faculté de Droit de l’Université du Costa Rica (UCR).

Depuis bien des années, les familles de victimes palestiniennes et les autorités palestiniennes cherchent à intéresser la justice pénale internationale,  qui compte avec une juridiction à vocation universelle, la Cour Pénale Internationale (CPI), créée en 1998.

L´argument selon lequel la Palestine n´est pas un État, et celui selon lequel la juridiction de la CPI ne peut s´exercer sur des actes commis par les forces de sécurité israéliennes au vu qu´Israël n´est pas partie au Statut de Rome de 1998, sont des arguments avancés par les autorités israéliennes (et leurs alliés) depuis maintenant fort longtemps : l´effet combiné de ces deux arguments garantit une impunité totale des militaires israéliens pour tout acte commis en territoire palestinien, et ce depuis bien trop longtemps. 

Une décision qui a été rendue le 5 février 2021 par la Chambre préliminaire de la CPI a décidé que cette argumentation trop souvent invoquée n´est plus : la CPI est pleinement compétente pour juger les exactions commises par Israël, et ce dans tous les territoires palestiniens, sans aucune exception (voir les communiqués de presse de la CPI en anglais et en français).

Cette décision fort attendue par un grand nombre d´organisations et par les autorités palestiniennes, vient ainsi clore une longue étape procédurale et en ouvrir une nouvelle.

Il semble opportun de rappeler que le processus visant à saisir la CPI de l’examen des crimes internationaux commis sur le territoire palestinien s’est avéré non seulement ardu, mais aussi parsemé d´embûches : et ce depuis la toute première tentative des autorités palestiniennes remontant à l´année 2009, qualifiée par les autorités israéliennes de “terrorisme légal” : une notion originale et inconnue jusqu´alors par les spécialistes en la matière (Note 1).

De quelques réactions et manoeuvres

Comme on pouvait s’y attendre, cette décision de la Chambre de la CPI a été rejetée le jour même par les États-Unis (voir la déclaration officielle du Département d’État).  

Sans surprise, elle a provoqué les gesticulations officielles désormais habituelles des plus hautes autorités israéliennes contre la CPI (voir par exemple l’article de presse publié dans le Washington Post du 11/02/2021);  ainsi que des gestions diplomatiques au plus haut niveau, comme par exemple avec l´Inde, au succès assez incertain (voir cette note du The Indian Express en date du 11/02/2021).

Par contre, de la part des Nations Unies, le Rapporteur Spécial sur la situation des droits de l´homme dans le territoire palestinien occupé a clairement souligné que :

“Cette décision ouvre la porte à ce que des allégations crédibles de crimes relevant du Statut de Rome fassent enfin l’objet d’une enquête et puissent éventuellement atteindre le stade du procès devant la CPI” /…/ Selon l’expert, les allégations de crimes graves qui pourraient faire l’objet d’une enquête par la Procureure de la CPI comprennent « les actions d’Israël pendant la guerre de 2014 contre Gaza, le meurtre et les blessures de milliers de manifestants en grande partie non armés pendant la Grande Marche du retour en 2018-2019, et les activités de colonisation d’Israël à Jérusalem-Est et en Cisjordanie ». « La Procureure peut également examiner les allégations de crimes graves impliquant des groupes armés palestiniens » (voir communiqué de presse de l’ONU du 9/02/2020).

Concernant les organisations de la société civile spécialisées dans le domaine des droits de l´homme, outre les entités palestiniennes, plusieurs ont exprimé leur profonde satisfaction : parmi de nombreux autres textes, nous renvoyons nos lecteurs au communiqué de presse de Human Rights Watch (HRW), au communiqué de presse d’Amnesty International (AI) et à celuide la Fédération internationale des droits de l’homme (FIDH).

La Chambre de la CPI était composée de trois membres: une magistrate (du Bénin), et deux magistrats (de France et de Hongrie) ; elle était présidée par le juge hongrois, qui a choisi de se séparer de ses deux collègues, comme nous le verrons dans les lignes qui suivent.

Les conclusions de la Chambre de la CPI en bref

Dans son long arrêt (voir le texte complet de 60 pages en anglais), la Chambre de la CPI conclut dans son dispositif (page 60):

“- that Palestine is a State Party to the Statute; (…)

–  by majority, Judge Kovács dissenting, that, as a consequence, Palestine qualifies as ‘[t]he State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred’ for the purposes of article 12(2)(a) of the Statute; and (…)

– by majority, Judge Kovács dissenting, that the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in the Situation in Palestine extends to the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, namely Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem”

Deux des trois juges ont donc choisi de considérer que la justice pénale internationale est compétente pour examiner ce qui se passe dans tous les territoires palestiniens, y compris Gaza et Jérusalem-Est.

Il s´agit d´un scénario particulièrement redouté par Israël, et ce depuis bien des années : on se rappelera par exemple qu´en 2010, une conversation (privée) entre diplomates nord-américains et leurs homologues israéliens (voir correspondance diplomatique du 23 février 2010 de l´Ambassade des Etats-Unis a Tel Aviv révélée para Wikileaks), dévoilait que :

« Libman noted that the ICC was the most dangerous issue for Israel and wondered whether the U.S. could simply state publicly its position that the ICC has no jurisdiction over Israel regarding the Gaza operation ».

Le Colonel Liron Libman était, du moins à l’époque, un haut fonctionnaire israélien, fin connaisseur des règles existantes en droit international puisqu’il assuma pendant de longues années la Direction du Département de Droit International de l’armée israélienne (plus connue par ses sigles IDF).

L’échec de la tentative de certains États proches d’Israël

Ni Israël ni les États-Unis n´étant partie au Statut de Rome de 1998 qui crée la CPI, leurs appréciations concernant la portée exacte des dispositions du Statut de Rome sont d´une valeur assez relative.

Néanmoins, ces deux Etats sont parvenus à trouver des États parties au Statut de Rome disposés à convaincre les trois juges que la CPI devait être déclarée incompétente, en leur soumettant des avis juridiques (appelés “amicus curiae“) : sur les 123 États ayant ratifié le Statut de Rome (voir l´état officiel  des signatures et des ratifications), seuls l’Allemagne, l’Australie, l’Autriche, le Brésil, la Hongrie, l’Ouganda et la République tchèque se sont sentis obligés de porter secours à Israël, sans obtenir de succès majeur dans leurs efforts.

L´opinion juridique soumise par le Brésil présente un certain intérêt (voir le texte complet) s’agissant d’un État qui, contrairement aux six autres, reconnaît la Palestine comme État : Etat partie au Statut de Rome et reconnaissant la Palestine comme État (et ce depuis 2010), la position brésilienne consistant à démontrer que la CPI n’est pas compétente relève d´un exercice de créativité audacieux, rarement observé.

Toujours d’un strict point de vue juridique, l´absence de cohérence de certains peut également être apprécié si l’on se rapelle du vote qui a eu lieu en novembre 2012 à New York : sur les sept États mentionnés ci-dessus, trois d’entre eux (Autriche, Brésil et Ouganda) ont voté en faveur de la résolution 67/19 de l’Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies (voir textede cette résolution et le vote obtenu) reconnaissant la Palestine comme “État Observateur Non Membre” (Note 2), tandis que trois autres se sont abstenus lors du même vote (Australie, Allemagne et Hongrie).

Il convient également de rappeler que dans un communiqué de presse de mars 2020 (voirtexte complet), Amnesty International (AI) avait mis en garde l’opinion publique contre la manœuvre de ce petit groupe d’États, tout en soulignant une autre pression, plus feutrée, exercée cette fois par le Canada :

“We are also deeply concerned by news reports that one state party, namely Canada, has “reminded the Court” of its provision of budgetary resources in a letter to the ICC concerning its jurisdiction over the “situation in Palestine”, which appears to be a threat to withdraw financial support”.

Obtenir une version complète de cette fameuse lettre émise par le Canada serait l´idéal, mais il semble que ce document officiel envoyé à la CPI ne sera pas rendu public, alors que ce fut une organisation proche d’Israël au Canada la première à en signaler l´existence (voir note de CJNews du 26/02/2020). À moins, bien sûr, que les organisations de la société civile canadienne non seulement dénoncent cette manœuvre, somme toute assez grossière (comme, par exemple le fait ce communiqué de l´organisation non gouvernementale CJPMO en date du 3/03/2020), mais exigent également que leurs autorités la fassent connaître intégralement: ce afin que l’opinion publique soit informée de ce que le Canada est capable de faire pour protéger Israël.

Nous avions eu l’occasion d’analyser la portée de la demande intentée par la Palestine en 2018, ainsi que les tentatives (désespérées) d’Israël et de ses alliés pour empêcher à tout prix que ce qui a été entendu à La Haye ce 5 février 2021 ne se concrétise: cette décision ne fait que confirmer l’interprétation faite par le Bureau du Procureur de la même CPI en 2019 (Note 3).

Outre les amici curiae présentés par les alliés d´Israël, parmi les différents avis juridiques soumis à la CPI par des spécialistes du droit international public, les arguments juridiques présentés par le professeur Richard A. Falk de l’Université de Princeton (voir texte) et par le professeur John Quigley de l’Université de l’Ohio (voir texte) se distinguent de bien d´autres.

L´attitude de défiance d’Israël et de son fidèle allié américain face à la justice pénale internationale

On rappelera que, lorsque le Bureau du Procureur de la CPI a annoncé qu’il avait procédé à l’ouverture officielle d’une enquête en Palestine en décembre 2019 (voir communiqué officiel), en Israël le Premier ministre et le Ministre de la Défense n’ont pas trouvé de meilleur argument que de disqualifier la CPI, en indiquant qu’elle était “antisémite” (voir l’article du Jerusalem Post et ce câble de l´agence Reuters) : ceci dans le cadre des réactions courroucées de l’appareil d’État israélien qui ne font plus beaucoup d’effet.

Il faut garder à l’esprit qu’Israël a bénéficié, comme jamais auparavant dans l’histoire, d’un occupant de la Maison Blanche (jusqu’en janvier 2021) prêt à satisfaire chacune de ses prétentions et de ses caprices, tant sur le plan bilatéral (Note 4) que multilatéral, marquant l´isolement de ces deux Etats au sein des Nations Unies comme jamais auparavant (Note 5).

Dans le cadre des pressions exercées sur la CPI, les États-Unis ont adopté de manière inhabituelle des sanctions contre le personnel de la CPI en juin 2020, que nous avions eu l’occasion d’analyser dans cette même section de Décryptages (Note 6). Concernant les diverses réactions d´Etats à ces sanctions nord-américaines , on peut citer, parmi quelques autres, la réaction officielle du Costa Rica lorsqu’en septembre 2020 les États-Unis ont matérialisé leurs sanctions contre le personnel de la CPI (Note 7), confirmant l’attachement que porte depuis 1998 le Costa Rica au Statut de Rome ; le soutien sans réserve du Costa Rica à la CPI a également été démontré, lorsqu’une initiative conjointe du Costa Rica et de la Suisse a réussi à recueillir 67 signatures d’États, dont celle de la France, rejetant l’annonce des États-Unis en juin 2020 en vue de sanctionner le personnel de la CPI (Note 8).

Auparavant, en signe de solidarité absolue avec Israël, les États-Unis avaient choisi de se retirer du Conseil des Droits de l’Homme des Nations Unies lorsque cet organe avait adopté une résolution créant un mécanisme d’enquête sur les exactions israéliennes contre les manifestants palestiniens participant à la “Grande Marche du Retour” en juin 2018, que nous avions également analysé (Note 9).

Photo de Nikki Haley, Représentante des États-Unis aux Nations Unies quittant la salle du Conseil de Sécurité au moment où Riyad Mansour, Représentant de la Palestine, commence son allocution, le 15 mai 2018 à New York. Photo extraite de cette note de presse intitulée “EE.UU. se queda solo en la ONU ” (La Vanguardia, édition du 16/5/2018).

Au-delà des gesticulations, des vociférations et des menaces de l’allié américain, en juillet 2020, la presse israélienne a révélé que les autorités préparaient une liste secrète de centaines de membres de ses forces de sécurité impliqués dans des actes pouvant être qualifiés de crimes de guerre ou de crimes contre l’humanité (voir l’article de Haaretz du 16/07/2020 intitulé “Israel Drafts Secret List of Hundreds of Officials Who May Stand Trial at International Court ” et cet autre article publié à la même date dans Times of Israel). Il s’agit d’officiers israéliens à qui leurs autorités expliquent ce que signifie le fait de voir leur nom inscrit dans une enquête de la CPI, quelles destinations à l’étranger ils devront d´éviter si la justice nationale a la possibilité d’ordonner leur arrestation en cas de mandat d’arrêt de la CPI; on ne peut exclure que divers mécanismes puissent leur être aussi suggérés afin de compliquer leur identification dans leurs documents d’identité.

On doit garder à l’esprit qu’Israël, en tant qu’État, ne coopérera pas avec la justice pénale internationale de La Haye et qu’il est fort prévisible que l’ensemble de son appareil d’État cherchera, par tous les moyens, à protéger ses ressortissants (militaires ou civils) s´ils sont requis par la justice pénale internationale.

En guise de conclusion

Au-delà de ce qu’Israël a prévu pour protéger ses ressortissants de la CPI, ce jugement du 5 février 2021 met fin à un long cheminement procédural depuis la demande d’enquête préliminaire déposée en mai 2018 par la Palestine.  

Dans son analyse de la décision du 5 février de la Chambre de la CPI (Note 10), François Dubuisson, professeur de droit international public à l’Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), note que :

“Même si la tenue d’un procès à La Haye envers des responsables israéliens peut s’avérer très hypothétique, la simple mise en accusation ou la délivrance d’un mandat d’arrêt à l’égard de divers hauts responsables israéliens, militaires ou politiques, serait déjà porteuses d’une grande force symbolique, susceptible de mettre une certaine pression sur les Etats occidentaux, alliés de l’Etat d’Israël. “

En effet, cette décision ouvre la voie à la justice pénale internationale pour examiner tout ce qui a été observé, documenté et dénoncé provenant du territoire palestinien (et ce depuis juin 2014) et qui a plongé dans le deuil nombre de familles palestiniennes. Concernant l´année 2014, parmi les divers documents existants, on citera ce recueil de témoignages de soldats et d´officiers israéliens ayant participé à l´offensive militaire  à Gaza en juillet 2014, réunis par l´organisation israélienne Breaking the Silence.

Le fait qu’une juridiction internationale telle que la CPI, pour la première fois dans l’histoire du droit international public, se prononce sur le statut de la Palestine en tant qu’État, et accepte d’examiner ce qui se passe à l’intérieur de son territoire, donne à cette décision une portée non seulement juridique, mais aussi hautement symbolique et porteuse d’espoir. 

–Notes–

Note 1 : Cf. FERNANDEZ J., La politique juridique extérieure des Etats- Unis à l´égard de la Cour Pénale Internationale, Paris, Pedone, 2010, p. 325. Sur la reconnaissance faite par la Palestine en janvier 2009 de la compétence de la CPI, voir PELLET A. et alii, “Les effets de la reconnaissance par la Palestine de la compétence de la C.P.I.”, document collectif en date du 14 février 2010 souscrit par de nombreux spécialistes du droit international public, disponible ici.

Note 2 : Cf. SALMON J., “La qualité d´Etat de la Palestine” , Revue Belge de Droit International (RBDI), Volume 45, 2012, pp. 13-40 (texte intégral disponible ici). Dans cet article, l´auteur signale de manière fort juste que: “Certes, l’Assemblée générale n’est pas censée reconnaître les États ; il n’en demeure pas moins que la qualification qu’elle détermine est le résultat de votes d’États souverains qui, lorsqu’ils se prononcent par un vote affirmatif, reconnaissent que l’entité visée est un État – sauf à plonger dans la schizophrénie. À partir de ce moment, il n’est plus contestable que l’entité qui bénéficie de cette qualification est titulaire des droits et des obligations que le droit international confère à l’État du droit des gens”.

Note 3: Cf. BOEGLIN N., “Solicitud de investigación contra exacciones militares israelíes procede en todos los territorios palestinos, Gaza incluida. Fiscal de la Corte Penal Internacional“, site officiel de la Universidad de Costa Rica (UCR), section Voz Experta, édition du 12/05/2020, disponible ici .

Note 4: Concernant  l´un des caprices israélien parfaitement illégal au regard du droit international public ayant obtenu le soutien inéquivoque de l´administration du Président Trump, cf. ALLAND D. “Un adieu au droit international public?  A propos d´un déclaration américaine relative aux colonies israéliennes en Cisjordanie et de ses suites”, Revue Générale de Droit International Public (RGDIP), 2020-I, pp.75-86 (número disponible dans son intégralité ici).

Note 5: Concernant le transfert de l´Ambassade des Etats-Unis a Jérusalem en 2018, la résolution 73/22 (voir texte complet) de l´Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies condamnant cette décision unilatérale a été adoptée avec 148 votes pour, 11 contre et 14 abstentions (voir vote enregistré): parmi les onze votes contre, outre les États-Unis et Israël, on dénombre l´Australie, le Canada, le Guatémala, les Iles Marshall, les Iles Salomon, le Kiribati, la Micronésie, Nauru et Palau.

Note 6 : Cf. BOEGLIN N., “Les sanctions annoncées par les États-Unis contre le personnel de la Cour Pénale internationale (CPI) : brève mise en perspective”, Le Monde du Droit, section Décryptages, édition du 14/07/2020, disponible ici.

Note 7 : Cf. BOEGLIN N., “Sanciones de EEUU  contra la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI): breves apuntes sobres las omisiones de sus verdaderas motivaciones”, Ius360, édition du 8/09/2020, disponible ici.

Note 8 : Le texte intégral de cette déclaration conjointe est reproduite dans notre analyse: BOEGLIN N., “Sanciones de EEUU a la Corte Penal Internacional: a propósito de la reciente respuesta colectiva de 67 Estados“, site officiel de l´Universidad de Costa Rica (UCR), Section Voz Experta, édition du 9/07/2020, disponible ici.

Note 9 : Cf. BOEGLIN N., “El retiro de Estados Unidos del Consejo de Derechos Humanos: breves apuntes”, Derecho Internacional Público (DIPublico), édition du  20/06/2018, disponible ici .

Note 10 : Cf. DUBUISSON F., “Quelques réflexions sur la décision de la Chambre préliminaire de la CPI”, Association des Universitaires pour le Respect du Droit International en Palestine (AURDIP), édition du 7/02/2021, disponible ici.

Protocol to Manage Relationships Today

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Protocol to Manage Relationships Today

One of the authors, Isabel Amaral, left on the photo, granted the honour to hand out a copy to Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, President of the Portuguese Republic, signed by all 5 authors.

Amsterdam University Press recently published the book ‘Protocol to Manage Relationships Today: Modern Relationship Management Based Upon Traditional Values’, a book written by leading protocol experts from The Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom and with contributions from protocol experts at the European Union, the British Royal Household, the military, Gucci, ABN AMRO Bank, the cities of The Hague and Meijerijstad, UEFA and many others.

The book describes the successful application of contemporary protocol to build strong relationships by, among others, the Dutch King, at the Royal Wedding of Prince Harry to Meghan Markle and at the World Press Photo awards show. In the book Dutch fashion and lifestyle expert Maik de Boer explains the value of protocol in the world of fashion as well as the protocol of the famous Berlin techno club Berghain is described.

Protocol to Manage Relationships Today: Modern Relationship Management Based Upon Traditional Values.

‘Protocol to Manage Relationships Today’ also describes the success of Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, the recently re-elected President of the Portuguese Republic, to balance the protocol between tradition and modernity. The book explains that if the rules of protocol are applied too strictly, a meeting will be too formal and uncomfortable. Too casual and too little focus is also not good and applying too few rules leads to chaos. Also, too much symbolism in protocol will make people laugh and if there is no symbolism, we will not be able to recognize the story and/or understand why we are attending the event.

Protocol is all about balancing between tradition and modernity.

‘The night before the state visit to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Grand Duke Henri and the President of Portugal decided to go out for a few beers. The President felt right at home: an estimated 120,000 of the 550,000 people in Luxembourg are either born in Portugal or are of Portuguese ancestry. Even the Grand Duke himself has two Portuguese great-grandmothers. The President was welcomed with open arms and the unofficial and unorthodox start of the state visit was the beginning of a very good friendship between the two Heads of state.

‘This is a great example of how relations are built,’ the Founder and director of The standard Companion, the Australian-based etiquette school, Retallack explains in an interview in our book. ‘Building diplomatic relations relies heavily on face-to-face interactions where true connections are made. I admire the approach of the Portuguese President.’ The approach of the Portuguese President towards protocol is not about abolishing it but introducing small changes. It allowed him to achieve a lot and it is part of the reasons why he is so popular.

At the end of 2020 the authors of the book were granted the honour to hand out a copy to the President of the Portuguese Republic.

Order the book on www.protocolbureau.com/book

A Recipe For The War

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A Recipe For The War

By Zlatko Hadžidedić, Adnan Idrizbegović.

There is a widespread view that Germany’s policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina has always been friendly. Also, that such a policy stimulated the European Union to adopt a positive approach to the Bosnian quest to eventually become a part of the Euro-Atlantic integrations. However, Stefan Schwarz, a renowned German politician, in his recent comment for Deutsche Welle, raised the question of the true nature of Germany’s policy towards Bosnia, from 1992 to the present day. Here we shall try to offer possible answers to this question, so as to present a brief history of that policy.

A history of (un)recognition  

Germany officially recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state on April 6, 1992. Prior to that, such recognition had been granted to two other former Yugoslav republics, Slovenia and Croatia, on January 15, 1992. Germany recognised these two states against the advice by Robert Badinter, a jurist delegated by the European Commission to arbitrate in the process of dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, to recognize all Yugoslav republics simultaneously.

Under the pressure by Germany, 12 members of the European Community (United Kingdom, Italy, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Greece, Austria) recognized Slovenia and Croatia in January 1992. As Washington Post wrote on January 16, 1992,

The German government hailed today’s event as a historic development and immediately opened embassies in the two republics. But France and Britain, which still harbor doubts about the wisdom of early recognition, said they would wait to see if Croatia fulfilled its promises on human rights before carrying out an exchange of ambassadors.

There is a well-known myth, spread by the diplomats of Britain and France, that ‘early recognition’ of Slovenia and Croatia triggered the war in the former Yugoslavia. Such a claim is both absurd and obscene, bearing in mind that Serbia had already waged war against Slovenia and Croatia and was preparing a military attack on Bosnia for several months. However, the question that should be posed here is, why Germany recognised Slovenia and Croatia separately, instead of recognition of all the Yugoslav republics simultaneously, as advised by Badinter and strongly supported by the US? Does that imply that Germany practically left the rest of the republics to their fate, to be occupied and annexed by Serbia, which controled the former Yugoslav army and its resources? Was it a deliberate policy, or simply a reckless decision? In the same article, WP quotes the then German Minister of Foreign Affairs: 

“The German policy on Yugoslavia has proved correct,” said German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. “We’ve said for months that if the Community decided on recognition . . . that would initiate a process of rethinking, above all by the leadership of the Yugoslav army.”

Mr. Genscher probably offered a definite answer to that question. Also, the actual response of the Yugoslav army’s leadership to the German push for separate recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, counted in hundreds of thousands of dead and millions of ethnically cleansed in Croatia and Bosnia, testifies to the ‘correctness’ of such thinking. Yet, was it a momentary miscalculation by Genscher, the then Minister, or a long-term German foreign policy towards Bosnia, already projected to be the ultimate victim of the Yugoslav army’s agression?

An answer to this question is not very difficult to reach if we consider the German policy concerning the initiatives for ethnic partition of Bosnia, disseminated through the channels of the European Community. These proposals may have been initiated and instigated by the British Foreign Office and the French Quai d’Orsay; yet, partition along ethnic lines has always been the only European consensus about Bosnia, a consensus in which Germany participated with all its political will and weight.

Appeasement, from Munich to Lisbon

Prior to the 1992-1995 war, the European Community delegated the British and Portugese diplomats, Lord Carrington and Jose Cutileiro, to design a suitable scheme for ethnic partition of Bosnia, and in February 1992 they launched the so-called Lisbon Conference, with the aim of separating Bosnian ethno-religious communities and isolating them into distinct territories. This was the initiation of the process of ethnic partition, adopted in each subsequent plan to end the war in Bosnia. However, at the Lisbon Conference such a ‘solution’ was imposed by Carrington and Cutileiro as the only available when there was no war to end, indeed, no war in sight; and, curiously, it has remained the only concept the European Community, and then the European Union, has ever tried to apply to Bosnia.

Contrary to the foundations of political theory, sovereignty of the Bosnian state was thus divided, and its parts were transferred to the chiefs of three ethnic parties. The EC recognised these usurpers of the state sovereignty, having promoted them into legitimate representatives of their respective ethnic communities. The Carrington-Cutileiro maps were tailored to determine the territorial reach of each of these communities. What remained to be done afterwards was their actual physical separation, and that could only be performed by war, genocide and ethnic cleansing. For, ethnically homogenous territories, as envisaged by Carrington and Cutileiro, could only be created by a mass slaughter and mass expulsion of those who did not fit the prescribed model of ethnic homogeneity. In this way, the European Community created a recipe for the war in Bosnia. Yet, ever since the war broke out, the European diplomats have never ceased claiming that the ‘chaos’ was created by ‘the wild Balkan tribes’, who ‘had always slaughtered each other’.   

No one ever noticed German opposition to the Lisbon principles of ethnic separation and territorial partition, clearly leading to war and bloodshed. Is it, then, possible that German foreign policy was truly surprised by the Lisbon’s bloody outcome? Or the Lisbon Agreement was tailored in the best tradition of the Munich Agreement, as a consensus on another country’s partition between the three leading European powers – Great Britain, France, and Germany –  again, in the name of peace?

Mostar Bridge, Bosnia Herzegovina

Landgrab rewarded

In the following ‘peace plans’ for Bosnia, the European Community was represented by Lord Owen, accompanied by the representatives of the Organization of United Nations, Cyrus Vance and Thorwald Stoltenberg. Although the British diplomacy was clearly dominant in these attempts to find a ‘proper’ model for Bosnia’s ethnic partition, Germany’s Foreign Ministry was always fully present there through its Director of Policy Planning Staff, Wolfgang Ischinger. In the structure of the German Ministry, this position is occuppied by the most senior career diplomat, so that there can be no doubt about Ischinger’s capacity to articulate Germany’s strategic interests. During the process of negotiations under the Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg plans, Ischinger coordinated German policy towards Bosnia together with Michael Steiner, the head of „SoBos“ (Sonderstab Bosnien), a special Bosnian unit established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[i]

During the war in Bosnia, from 1992 to 1995, Germany and the European Community never abandoned the concept of Bosnia’s ethnic partition. In 1994, Germany took a more active role in its implementation within the (informal) International Contact Group, consisting of the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the US, where Germany was represented by both Ischinger and Steiner. The Contact Group Plan defined the final model of ethnic separation, having led to the ultimate breakup of the Bosnian territory into two ethnically cleansed and homogenised ‘entities’, tailored in accordance with an arbitrary proportion of 51:49%, which was subsequently implemented in the Dayton Peace Accords.

The entire struggle within the Contact Group was fought over the percentage and disposition of territory granted to particular ethnic communities, two of which served as Serbia’s and Croatia’s proxies. The principle of ethnic partition was never put in question. In this process, Germany became the exclusive advocate of Croatian interests, in Croatia’s attempts to cede the south-western part of Bosnia, whereas Britain and France advocated the interests of Serbia in its efforts to cede eastern and western parts of Bosnia. To some people’s surprise, the United States was the sole defender of Bosnia’s territorial integrity within the Contact Group. However, under the pressure by the European Community, the US was forced to make concessions, so as to eventually accept the prescribed 51:49% territorial distribution as an ‘internal reorganisation’ of Bosnia.

The US thus tacitly accepted the European initiatives to reward the landgrab of Bosnia’s territory, performed by Serbia and Croatia, against the UN Charter and international law. The European Community’s leading powers – Great Britain, France, and Germany – claimed that there was no other option but to accept such a landgrab, because the status quo, caused by the neighbours’ military aggression, could not possibly be altered. To strengthen this argument, the European Community also played the main role in imposing an arms embargo on the ‘warring parties’. This embargo effectively deprived the landlocked Bosnian army of the capacity to purchase weaponry and thus alter the status quo and liberate the country’s territory. Here the EC acted as a whole, again, without any dissent on Germany’s or anyone else’s part. 

Whose responsibility?

The Dayton Peace Accords is commonly perceived as an American political project. The partition of Bosnia is thus being interpreted as a concept that emerged for the first time during the Dayton negotiations, and its authorship is ascribed exclusively to the American negotiator, Richard Holbrooke. However, it is not so. The history of Bosnia’s partition clearly demonstrates that this very concept has persistently been promoted by the European Community, and then by the European Union, from the 1992 Lisbon Conference to the present day. Even the notorious partition proportion of 51:49% was determined by the Contact Group, well before the Dayton Conference.

A clear responsibility of the US negotiators is that they caved in to the pressures by the EC within the Contact Group. Still, the consistent striving to impose ethnic partition as the sole appropriate concept for Bosnia should definitely be attributed to its real advocates – the members of the European Community. Since Italy and Yeltsin’s Russia certainly played a minor role in the Contact Group, the lion’s share of responsibility for the final outcome, verified in Dayton, belongs equally to three EC powers, Great Britain, France, and Germany. The fact that the British policy-makers conceived the very principle of ethnic partition, that their French colleagues were so enthusiastic about its implementation, while the Germans accepted it as the best available mode of appeasement, abolishes neither of them of gigantic moral and political responsibility for all the suffering the Bosnians have had to go through.      

[i] As consequent advocates of the German foreign policy in the Bosnian episode, both Ischinger and Steiner have continuously enjoyed upward promotion within the ranks of the German foreign policy establishment. Thus Ischinger first took the position of the Ministry’s Political Director under Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, and then of the Staatssekretär (deputy foreign minister) under Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. Ischinger also represented Germany at numerous international and European conferences, including the 1999 G8 and EU summit meetings in Cologne/Germany and the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at the United Nations, New York. He was also appointed as the European Union Representative in the Troika negotiations on the future of Kosovo in 2007. Since 2019, Ischinger has been co-chairing on the Transatlantic Task Force of the German Marshall Fund and the Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung (BKHS) and, finally, has become the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference (!). During his mandate in the Contact Group, Steiner was awarded the position of head of the Ministry’s co-ordination unit for multilateral peace efforts. After the war, he served six months (January–July 1997) as a principal deputy to Carl Bildt, the first high representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1998, he was selected by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder to work as the Chancellor’s foreign and security policy adviser.

About the authors:

Dr. Zlatko Hadžidedić is the founder and director of the Center for Nationalism Studies, in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (www.nationalismstudies.org).

Adnan Idrizbegović, Independent Researcher, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina

Diplomatic life behind the scenes

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Diplomatic life behind the scenes

By Kateryna Denysova.

We often hear stories about captivating and fascinating diplomatic life, but how is it experienced by those who are behind the scenes? This month, we begin our new article column dedicated to sharing diverse life stories of diplomatic offspring.

Our first guests are Roes Lirizky Lufti (Kiky) and Roes Ebara Gikami Lufti (Regi), daughter and son of Army Attaché of the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in The Netherlands. They were born and raised in Bandung (Indonesia). However, at the ages of 6 and 9, following their father’s assignment, Kiky and Regi moved to Australia. There, they had attended a private Islamic school of Canberra but, later, transferred to a public school.

Did you experience culture shock?


R: “Yes, definitely. What shocked me the most was the national development of the country and overall quality of life. Compared to our home country, Australia has great infrastructure and availability of public facilities.”


K: “I was younger than Regi, so my memories are very childish. However, I was amazed to find out Australians to be very welcoming and genuine; everyone was willing to help. Indeed, most surprisingly, I experienced actual culture shock when I returned to my home country, Indonesia.

It might sound paradoxical but adapting to life back in my country was harder than I imagined. The mentalities are different. This does not only refer to the overall surroundings and lifestyle but also language confusion. I often unintentionally code-switched English and Indonesian, which caused giggles of my fellow students. At that time, it seemed to be a struggle.”

Roes Lirizky Lufti (Kiky) and Roes Ebara Gikami Lufti (Regi), daughter and son of Army Attaché of the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in The Netherlands.

How many languages can you speak?

Smiling, Kiky and Regi answered: “A lot! Indonesian is our mother tongue, and English can be considered as the first foreign language. In Australia, we learned some Arabic in the Islamic school and French in a public school. After returning to Jakarta, we had to take language German classes and Mandarin. Then, before moving to The Netherlands, we completed intermediate Dutch. This might be astonishing, but we don’t have any solid knowledge of languages, with the only exception being Indonesian and English, which we use on a regular basis.”

Two years ago, Kiky (18) moved with the parents to The Netherlands, whereas Regi (21) decided to stay and undertake his undergraduate studies in Indonesia. Kiky finished Indonesian school in The Hague and also enrolled in the same university as Regi. However, they chose different career paths.

Do you see your future career related to the diplomatic sphere?

K: “Not at all. I’m proud to be the first generation of doctors in my family. I always have been passionate about the field of medicine. Thus, when it was time to decide on the degree, without any doubt, it was dentistry. I haven’t regretted it.”

R: “My career interests diverge from Kiky’s. I’m specializing in economics, similar to my mom’s profession. In the future, I would like to improve the quality of life for Indonesians, and I believe that economy plays a fundamental part in it. Living in Australia and The Netherlands have just convinced me even more that Indonesia needs good economic policy implemented.”

During the pandemic, Kiky and Regi reunited with their parents in The Hague and have followed online classes since then. They acknowledge that being family members of a diplomat is tough with continuous life on the go, but it always brings adventures, the aspect they enjoy the most.

No SDGs without elimination of Violence

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No SDGs without elimination of Violence

Against Women and Girls

During the 16 Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence from the 25th of November to the 10th of December, the Ban Ki-moon Centre for Global Citizens contributes to the Orange the World Campaign globally and in Austria, calling for the elimination of violence against women and girls.

Five years ago, in 2015, the member states of the United Nations (UN) agreed on 17 global goals to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all. Since then, these Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have evolved into a guiding roadmap for finding long term solutions to global challenges. “Leaving No One Behind” has become the key message of this agenda, as the global community emphasised that the SDGs can only be achieved if peace and prosperity holds true for everyone.

Women make up half of the world’s population, but they still struggle to even exercise their fundamental human rights. A staggering one in three women experiences physical or sexual violence in their lifetime.[1] Violence against women and girls is, thus, one of the most pervasive human rights violations and perhaps the most obvious manifestation of the deeply rooted imbalances in power in our societies. How will we ever reach the SDGs if such inequalities still exist?

In 2008, the UN, under the leadership of its 8th Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, pushed for a multi-year effort aimed at preventing and eliminating violence against women and girls around the world, called UNiTE to End Violence against Women.  The campaign called on governments, civil society, women’s organizations, young people, the private sector, the media and the entire UN system to join forces in addressing the global pandemic of violence against women and girls. It has, for example, worked to adopt and enforce national laws to address and punish all forms of violence against women and girls, in line with international human rights standards.[2]

In 2015 UN Women became the agency entrusted to lead the UN’s efforts to advocate the elimination of violence against women and girls. To strengthen UNiTE, UN Women announced the “Orange the World” campaign, to take place annually during the period between the 25th of November, the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, and the 10th of December, Human Rights Day. During these 16 Days of Activism Against Gender-Based Violence, the world’s most prominent monuments and buildings are illuminated in orange, representing a future free from violence against women and girls.

Hosting the United Nations and located in the heart of Europe, Austria plays a key role in boosting the campaign on a local and international level. UN Women Austria, Soroptimist International Austria, HeForShe Austria and the Ban Ki-moon Centre are working in close partnership on the Austrian contribution to Orange the World. In 2019, the partners counted over 130 Austrian buildings in monuments illuminated in orange during the 16 Days of Activism. In 2020, the aim is to surpass this number and to shed light on current challenges regarding gender-based violence with the support of the Austrian actress Ursula Strauss as the campaign’s spokesperson.

2020 has been rattled by the Covid-19 pandemic and emerging data has shown that the lock-down measures around the world were accompanied by a spike in reported domestic violence cases. This alarming development demonstrates that action must be taken to prevent the aggravation and contribute to the elimination of what UN Women has named ‘The Shadow Pandemic’.[3]

Image Reference: https://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2020/issue-brief-covid-19-and-ending-violence-against-women-and-girls-en.pdf?la=en&vs=5006

To spread the message of the campaign to a wider audience and discuss the issues of the Shadow Pandemic with high-level actors, two online events will take place during the Orange the World timeframe.

At a virtual high-level roundtable on November 26th titled “Tackling the Shadow Pandemic – Violence Against Women During COVID-19 Times”, Executive Director of UN Women Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, former Prime Minister of New Zealand Helen Clark, Regional Director of UN Women Asia and Pacific Mohammad Naciri, CEO of Avon Angela Cretu, and women’s rights activist Trisha Shetty will discuss what steps can be taken to address the spike in violence against women during COVID-19. The event will be hosted by the Co-chairs of the Ban Ki-moon Centre, 8th UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and 11th President of Austria Heinz Fischer.

On December 1st, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Ban Ki-moon Centre will host a Virtual Expo called “Education, Empowerment, and Effective Policies: Innovative Initiatives Preventing Gender-Based Violence”. As part of UNODC’s Education for Justice Global Dialogue Series, changemakers from around the world will come together and present how they take action to prevent violence against women and girls.

To make the world a safer and better place for all, we must all do our part to eliminate violence against women and girls in all its forms. We encourage you to get active in the Orange the World campaign by hosting an event, sharing its messages, and becoming part of this global movement!

About the Ban Ki-moon Centre:

In 2018, Ban Ki-moon and Heinz Fischer founded the Ban Ki-moon Centre for Global Citizens (BKMC), to empower women and youth to become global citizens within the framework of the SDGs. Acknowledging that gender-based violence restricts, if not prevents individuals to be a part of and contribute to the 2030 Agenda, the BKMC, based in Vienna, Austria, also advocates for the elimination of violence against women and girls. The Ban Ki-moon Centre has been an active contributor to the Orange the World Campaign in Austria since 2018. (www.bankimooncentre.org)

About the author:

Text by: Viola Christian, Program Officer Ban Ki-moon Centre for Global Citizens (advocacy, empowerment)

The EU Sputnik Borrell in Moscow: An aftermath, of diplomacy

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The EU Sputnik Borrell in Moscow: An aftermath, of diplomacy

In the picture Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

By Tomislav Jakić.

After almost unanimous assessment of the Western media and analysts (one would be inclined to conclude they are “gleichgeschaltet”, modeled on the methods of Nazi master of propaganda Goebbels), a visit to Moscow of the EU High Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Joseph Borrell, was – depending on the author – a failure, a fiasco, a disgrace.

And it was, indeed. But not by the criteria applied by Western propaganda; it is difficult, when reading these “analyzes”, to avoid the conclusion that their authors are neither journalists nor political analysts, but just – propagandists, harnessed, consciously or unconsciously – this could be discussed – in the circle of politics that the West applies in dealing with Russia for years. It is the policy of “containment” which is only a weak, but no less dangerous copy of the policy that the West practiced towards the Soviet Union. Worthwhile to note: apparently none of these so well-informed “journalists” and “analysts” take into account that Putin is not Stalin and that today’s Russia is not the former Soviet Union.

The problems, if that’s even the right term, in relations between the West and Russia begun after at the helm of Russia Vladimir Putin replaced Boris Yeltsin. Of course, Yeltsin, known for his alcoholic escapades, was to the liking of the West. Russia under his leadership was rapidly declining and not only was it no longer any, even potential, threat to the West, but it could not be its competitor in any area, even in its influence in Third World countries. 

At the same time, no one in the West resented Yeltsin for using even the most brutal force to stay in power. We are thinking of the order to “subdue” the Russian parliament, which resisted the unconstitutional dissolution, with tank shells . On the contrary, the Western media rejoiced at every hit of a tank grenade in the building where the seat of the Russian parliament was, and from which the parliamentarians allegedly offered armed resistance. 

When asked by a foreign journalist why is he reporting about gunshots from the parliament building, when it is obvious that there were none, a Wastern correspondent offered the following answer: “So it was decided!” Those grenades didn’t bother anyone, neither then nor later. But, those shots which were not fired, were “invented”, because they were needed for having the wanted picture. A hint of the “objective” reporting we are witnessing in recent weeks and months, relating to Alexei Navalny and the Russian vaccine Sputnik V.

With the arrival of Putin on the scene, however, another Russia emerged; Russia, which had the ambition to be a relevant factor in international relations and which not only wanted, but expected to be treated as a great power, and with respect. Since then everything goes downhill. The West did not want to accept the fact that Russia refuses to be treated as defeated and submissive. So the accusations started, so the sanctions started, some after obviously staged occasions, some evidently without any basis.

And now Borrell is coming to Moscow with the proclaimed goal of re-establishing dialogue, but most likely too with the task of examining the extent to which the Russian vaccine against covid19 can help Europe, which has found itself in an awkward situation due to drastic reductions in deliveries or delays from manufacturers of the vaccine it has ordered. But even before going to Moscow Borrell announced his intention to visit in prison Navalny who was sentenced to 3.5 years for violating probation. Let us remember: Navalni, an activist and blogger was transferred, with the “blessing” of the Kremlin to hospital in Germany after he was taken ill on an internal flight in Russia. It was immediately “clear” to everyone that he was poisoned and that, of course, the government, and Putin himself, was behind the assassination attempt. 

In Germany, poisoning was promptly confirmed, but only with the “assistance” of a military doctors, poisoning with Novičok, an extremely lethal means from the Soviet arsenal of chemical weapons. To make things more convincing, the findings from Berlin were also confirmed by laboratories in Paris and Stockholm. No one from those around Navalny had the slightest symptoms of poisoning (everybody apparently forgot the spectacle with protective measures and decontamination, staged by the British after the alleged poisoning of Skripal’s). Navalni quickly recovered and, although the Germans now claim that he could not leave to Russia because he was undergoing medical treatment, it is documented that he traveled around in Germany, with the assistance of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), and that he worked on a film which, as soon as he returned to Russia and was arrested, would “revealed” Putin’s glamorous “secret residence”.

Russia persistently asked to get the findings that confirm the poisoning, but – it did not get them. And with a laconic “explanation”, that the Russians anyhow know everything. The Russian findings made before Navalny left for Germany were simply ignored.

Navalny, like Khodorkovsky at a time, is clearly the West’s choice in the role of Putin’s opposition leader and his possible successor. The scenario is known from all the so-called colored revolutions in Eastern Europe. To what extent he is “the puppet on the string”, and to what extent he has his own agenda, is a matter for discussion. But it is undeniable that he has the full support, both financially and logistically, of Western services in everything he does (including the production of sensational discoveries that the Russians will immediately unmask as a montage, but that will remain largely or completely ignored by the Western media).

However, although the Russians have shown that “Putin’s secret residence” is not who Navalny claims, but the site of a super-luxury hotel still in construction, owned by a few oligarchs, although they show how in the animation of the entrance door the Russian emblem (eagle) was replaced by the Montenegrin, although there are recordings that show how “peaceful” demonstrators for Navalny physically attack Russian policemen, in the West every average citizen today “knows” that Moscow poisoned Navalny, that Putin has a secret residence, and that Russian police across the country is beating peaceful demonstrators who only want Putin’s removal (although they, young people in the first place, are invited to demonstrate by promising that it will be a “good party”).

The same type of “blindness” prevailed until a few days ago in relation to the Russian vaccine against covid19. Despite the fact that it is for weeks applied in Russia, that it is exported to a dozen countries, some of which take on the production (such as for example Serbia, or Iran), in the Western media Sputnik V, the world first registered vaccine against Corona simply did not exist. And even after the UN Secretary-General explicitly cited Sputnik V as a significant tool in the fight against the pandemic, this vaccine was nonexistent in the Western media. Until Europe was confronted with the fact that the favored AstraZeneca drastically reduced the promised delivery and until a prestigious British medical journal did not “discover” that the Russian vaccine was both effective and harmless. And now suddenly all those who have kept silent or ignored the vaccine, not because it is suspicious, but because and only because it came from Russia, and was – above all – the world’s first, seem to compete in writing and speaking about Sputnik V.

In such circumstances Joseph Borrell went to Moscow. And, of course, he disappointed all those Western propagandists who still live in the “Trump film”, who are still prisoners of the policy of “containing Russia”, because – instead of hammering with his fist on the table, instead of threatening and blackmailing – he mostly silently listened to the remarks of the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, including the one describing the European Union is an “unreliable partner.” But now analysts and journalists, both of whom does not deserve to be called as such, compete in attacking Borrell, saying that his performance was shameful and that he disgraced European Union, that his trip to Moscow was a “failure” and wishing in his place Mike Pompeo, Trump’s foreign minister (yes, so far we have fallen!). 

And the Russians, to show how the time had passed when they silently received blows from the West, just at the time of Borrell’s visit to Moscow, announced the expulsion of three Western diplomats for “participating in illegal demonstrations by Alexei Navalny’s supporters.” The West does not accept this, ignoring the fact that the demonstrations did take place without the permission of the authorities and that the job of diplomats is not to be “in demonstrations”, but to report on them. But very significantly, the German chancellor did not fail, in condemning the Russian step, to add that stopping the completion of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline is out of the question.

And that is exactly the core of today’s problems in the relations between the West and Moscow. If the West start using common sense in achieving its interests in relations with Russia, if it stops playing on this or that potential successor of Putin (which would be more acceptable to the West, which means more compliant, not to say more obedient), if it stops treating the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a unique victory of one, its, system over another (liberal capitalism over the idea of socialism, because socialism as a system presented itself in many different forms, of which the Yugoslav was the most liberal), it will create conditions for a new, open dialogue. A dialogue in which neither Moscow will have to listen to the “lectures” from Brussels, nor the EU will be forced to “swallow” unpleasant Russian responses.

But it must be a dialogue of equal, because the crucial Russian ambition is to be accepted as an equal partner and not treated as defeated and subordinate. As long as the politicians and the so-called journalists in their service do not understand this, failures and shames will continue. But whose? Not Europe’s, not Russia’s. Any further failure in the effort to put Russian-European relations on a new, different and healthy foundation will be a failure and a shame for common sense, but also for the interests of the citizens of both Russia and the countries of the European Union. We are consciously not mentioning America in this context, because Europe should be able to act in its own name and in defense of its interests. But, judging by the reactions to Borrell’s visit to Moscow, we are still very, very far from that.

About the author:

Tomislav Jakić, one of the most influential journalist and publicist from East-southeast Europe, writing on politics and international affairs for over 6 decades. He was a Foreign Policy adviser to the Croatia’s President Mesic (2000-2010)

Democracy or what? – and then climate

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Democracy or what? – and then climate

By Dr J Scott Younger.


Most of us were appalled to see what happened in Washington ten days ago when a ‘mob’, incited by Donald Trump’s address, stormed the Capitol building to prevent the presentation of Joe Biden as the next President. He gave voice to a possible fraudulent (in his mind) election, by putting suspicion on the postal ballot long before the election took place, and tried to ‘engineer’ the ballot by putting his ‘own’ man in control of it. He tried to manipulate the Supreme Court by replacing vacancies with people he expected to follow his lead and must have been disappointed, if not shocked, to find that the court unanimously rejected his claim that the votes had been rigged and should be thrown out. His unruly term of office saw the greatest turnover of people of any previous presidential term as staff could only hack the unusual behaviour of a disordered mind for so long. And so on and so on. Much will be written about the 4-year aberration that was Donald Trump. On a lighter note, his escapades in golf have given rise to a book, ‘Commander in Cheat’!

Concerned people have written and spoken about the state of democracy today. Those of us who have spent some time stateside appreciate the immensity of the country, how one is made welcome, but also the prejudices that one finds and the general unknowing of the world we live in by large swathes of the population. Some are still steeped in attitudes that pre-date the civil war. Donald Trump played to all of those and gave them voice.

That is a big challenge facing Joe Biden and Kamala Harris to get America back on track and if not ‘great again’ to stand up and join the rest of us and share and appreciate that there are billions of other people that are working away with hopes and dreams and looked to the US as a beacon.

That should be the meaning of ‘great again’, and if they can look up and truly be the land of the free and welcome the weak and downtrodden who are fleeing war and violence, as was once the way, then we can say that once more ‘you have earned the right to be the leader of democracy’, and democracy, for all its imperfections, is still the least bad form of government. It is well that the US re-joins the world as totalitarianism, in all its forms and at all levels, is on the rise again. Countries that espouse democracy and heed its precepts need to speak up loudly and be heard once again.

In November of this year is the World Climate Meeting, COP21, in Glasgow, Scotland at which the latest news on climate will be debated. Hopefully, the coronavirus will be on the decline and the US election will no longer be an issue. We can then get together on the one matter that should concentrate all our minds and separate the wheat from the chaff because there is some said that is wrong that muddies the waters, and leads the politicians to make incorrect decisions. But change is around us.

Climate is a highly complex issue, arguably the most complicated, that not all the modelling can get right, but study must go on. It is strange that it has only come to our notice since the population of the world over the past 60 years, has increased dramatically from approaching 3 billion to 8 billion. Mankind has thus significantly increased breeding himself, and thus his use of natural resources, for example cutting down trees, which need carbon dioxide to live, and vastly increased the pollution of the seas and the seas cover 70% of the planet. It has only been in comparatively recent times that we have started to pay attention to the seas and are alarmed at what we see.

However, we have the tools to put things right. We just need the will and ability to spend money wisely.

About the author:

Dr J Scott Younger President Commissioner of Glendale Partners and member of IFIMES Advisory Board

Dr J Scott Younger, OBE, is a professional civil engineer, he spent 42 years in the Far East undertaking assignments in 10 countries for WB, ADB, UNDP.  He published many papers; he was a columnist for Forbes Indonesia and Globe Asia. He served on British & European Chamber boards and was a Vice Chair of Int’l Business Chamber for 17 years. His expertise is infrastructure and sustainable development and he takes an interest in international affairs. He is an International Chancellor of the President University, Indonesia. He is a member of IFIMES Advisory Board.
 
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect IFIMES official position.

Cross-generational and cross-sectoral Recovery for the Union:

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Cross-generational and cross-sectoral Recovery for the Union:

Towards a New Independent authority?

By Nora Wolf

The first address of the European Commission since the pandemic was one highly anticipated by all the citizens of the EU block. On September 16, President Ursula van der Leyden took it upon herself to reveal the EU’s roadmap for a post-Covid world following the approval of the recovery funds last July which constituted a breakthrough and sent a welcome signal in terms of cohesion and solidarity on the part of the 27 members.

Aside from paying tribute to our frontline workforce and praise the courage and human spirit showed by all in the face of virus spread, van der Leyen set out what she called NexGenerationEU; a movement to breathe new life into the EU but also and most importantly to adapt and lead the way into shaping tomorrow’s world. Through her speech, the president highlighted roughly 8 key themes which will be at the centre of this new European era’s agenda for the next 12 months, in accordance with the cardinal principles of trust, tolerance and agility. In other words, the 750 billion recovery funds raised extra-ordinarily will be directed towards the following areas:

1° Economy: the Union members must all breed economies that offer protection, stability and opportunities in the face of the continuous health crisis with a specific wish expressed for a stronger Health union – and thereby an extension of the Union’s competencies on the matter – but also the advent of European minimum wages.

2° Green Revolution: the Union will adopt more radical attitudes towards mitigating climate-change and safeguarding our planet, starting with the ambitious aim of becoming the first climate-neutral continent by 2050 through the EU’s Green Deal. So called ‘lighthouse’ high-impact and hydrogen-based projects will become an additional focus.

3° Technology: Europe has to step up its game and become a digital leader through securing industrial data and using it to support innovation. Delineating the use of AI by regulating the field, creating a secure EU e-identity and ensuring connectivity deployment so as to fully cover rural areas are also high on the list.

4° Vaccine management: The Union praises the open approach followed up until now in facing the virus whilst many others have opted for withdrawal and undercutting of cooperation. Having served as an example regarding vaccines research and funding, the EU must uphold its policy all the way to the finish line and ensure its accessibility for every citizen around the world.

5° Multilateralism: the current international order system needs some rethinking and international institutions need reform in order to de-paralyze crucial decision-making in urgent situations. This starts with the EU taking faster univocal positions on global issues (Honk-Kong, Moscow, Minsk, and Ankara) and systematically and unconditionally calling out any HR abuses whilst building on existing partnerships with EU’s like-minded allies.

6° Trade: Europe will be made out as a figure of fair-trade by pushing for broker agreements on protected areas and putting digital and environmental ethics at the forefront of its negotiations. Global trade will develop in a manner that is just, sustainable, and digitized.

7° Migration: A New Pact on Migration will be put forward imminently as to act on and move forward on this critical issue that has dragged for long enough; in that regard every member state is expecting to share responsibility and involvement including making the necessary compromises to implement adequate and dignifying management. Europe is taking a stand: legal and moral duties arising from Migrants’ precarious situations are not optional.

8° Against hate-inspired behaviours and discriminations: A zero-tolerance policy is reaffirmed by the Union by extending its crime list to all forms of hate crime or speech based on any of the sensitive criteria and dedicating budget to address de facto discriminations in sensitive areas of society. It is high time to reach equal, universal and mutual recognition of family relations within the EU zone.

Granted, the European ‘priorities forecast’ feels on point and leaves us nearly sighing in relief for it had been somewhat longed for. The themes are spot on, catch words are present and the phrasing of each section is nothing short of motivational with the most likely intended effect that the troops will be boosted and spirits lifted subsequently. When looking closer to the tools enunciated for every topical objective, there seems however to be nearly only abstract and remote strategies to get there.

This is because a great number of the decisive steps that the Union wishes to see be taken depend on the participation of various instruments and actors. Not only does it rely for most on the converging interests, capabilities and willingness of nation States (inside and outside the euro zone), but it is also contingent on the many complex layers and bodies of the Union itself. And when a tremendous amount of the proposed initiatives for European reconstruction is reliant on such a far-reaching chain of events, it simply calls into question the likelihood for the said measures and objectives to be attained – or at the very least in which timeframe.

One might then rightfully wonder whether good and strong willpower coupled with comprehensive projections can be enough.

Whilst van der Leyen’s announcement was promising and efficient in that it sent an important message – the EU is wanting to get in the driver’s seat – only the follow-up with radical motions such as the creation of a readily available tool to implement fast and impactful changes can lend support to a claim that Europe is in a position to resolve current internal and external EU challenges, and more generally to bounce back from conceded decline suffered in the most recent decades.

As a matter of fact, Diplomat Ali Goutali and Professor Anis Bajrektarevic were the firsts to make an analysis in that sense as they articulated their proposal for the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) earlier this year. Faced with similar challenges and need for sharper thinking and tools in order to be at the forefront of the economic and technologic challenges ahead, the OIC had relied heavily on its Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation and agenda reform to reinforce its cooperation and innovation capabilities as a global player.

Nevertheless, Goutali and Bajrektarevic already felt months ago that additional steps ought to be taken for the OIC to be able to respond swiftly and reaffirm further its mandate of facilitating common political actions. To that end, it was suggested that a mechanism for policy coordination in critical times – the Rapid Reaction Capacitation – in charge of, primarily, vaccines management and AI applications should be introduced. Furthermore, the stakes behind the urgent need of strengthening our international order through cohesive endeavours are evidently the same for both the EU and the Arab World. That is to permanently leave behind a pseudo-competitive nation-based attitude that is nothing but a relic from the past and has achieved little in the context of the Covid outbreak.

Hence, if such an independent body was to be established, all three authors agree that it could gather the indispensable political power and resources to carry out the desired reforms on multilateralism, cyber and digital infrastructures, Covid recovery measures or geopolitical partnerships. Necessarily streamlined in order to avoid undue blockades, these new regional bodies could be composed of energetic forward thinkers across the private and public sectors empowered to map out and act on adequate strategies for a post-Covid world. This is because we all share the same goal: achieving solidarity not only on paper or as a conceptual motto but in real life and in real time. And after all, didn’t von der Leyen herself concur with that line of thinking as she enjoined Member states to move towards qualified majority voting to avert slow and cumbersome decision-making processes?

It seems pretty clear to me that such discussions in relation to the aggressiveness in actions and potential bureaucratic barriers might raise an old-as-the-world yet still very important questions: Should we, Europe, be ready to risk losing some of the legitimacy or democratic aspects of our political bodies in order to gain in speed and efficiency in times of crisis? And if not, considering the embracement of some of our supra-national entity’s actions is already on shaky grounds, how can we ensure that such bold measures may still be reconciled with maximal legitimacy given our equally urging need for unity?

About the author :

Nora Wolf

Nora Wolf, of the Kingston and of University of Geneva is an International Politics & Economics specialist. Her expertise includes Human Rights, Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law in an inter-disciplinary fashion for the EU and the UN-related think-tanks and FORAs. Currently is attached with the IFIMES Permanent Mission to the UN Geneva as the second alternate.

Dutch Uncle launches home & lifestyle services for diplomats in the Netherlands

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Dutch Uncle launches home & lifestyle services for diplomats in the Netherlands

Luxury lifestyle and VIP service Concierge Amsterdam launched a new label this week: Dutch Uncle. This service to unburden, is specialized in Lifestyle Services for diplomats and Home Management Services and focuses on wealthy households and foreigners in the Netherlands.

In global cities such as New York, London, Paris, The Hague busy business people and internationals make eager use of home managers and personal concierges when moving or while traveling. This fact is fairly new in the Netherlands, even though there is a market for it.

Dutch Uncle provides a soft landing in the Netherlands “We are responding to this,” says Stephanie Broeke, co-founder of Dutch Uncle. “Many diplomats who settle here can feel lost. The first step, such as first accommodation or a hotel reservation is often arranged by the embassy. But then it really starts. What are the best places to decorate your home? What insurance is needed, what is the best school for your children and how do you arrange other practical matters such as the dentist? Where can you find a nanny, a personal trainer or a private driver? but often they have no idea where to start and start a search on the internet, whereby trial and errors.

This detour is no longer necessary with Dutch Uncle. Thanks to our powerful network and years of experience in providing services for VIPS, we have the direct entrances and with our Expat Lifestyle Services we ensure a soft landing so that this target group feels at home faster and saves a lot of time.”

Home Management Services takes care of practical matters in and around the house. In addition, Dutch Uncle also provides clients with personal services in a higher segment. “Think of industrialists, dignitaries and people working in the high-end entertainment industry,” Broeke continues. “There is often no shortage of budget, but there is a shortage of time – that has become a luxury good. With our Home Management Services we ensure that practical matters are taken care of. This can range from furnishing a pied-à-terre to arranging the post mail and cleaning when someone is traveling.”

Bojana Duovski, co-owner of Dutch Uncle and founder of Concierge Amsterdam adds: “Although Concierge Amsterdam mainly focuses on diplomats and international VIPS who stay here for a short time, we increasingly received requests for structural support in the field of home management and concierge services.”

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