How to draw the line between the recent and still unsettled EU/EURO crisis and Asia’s success story? Well, it might be easier than it seems: Neither Europe nor Asia has any alternative. The difference is that Europe well knows there is no alternative – and therefore is multilateral. Asia thinks it has an alternative – and therefore is strikingly bilateral, while stubbornly residing enveloped in economic egoisms. No wonder that Europe is/will be able to manage its decline, while Asia is (still) unable to capitalize its successes. Asia clearly does not accedpt any more the lead of the post-industrial and post-Christian Europe, but is not ready for the post-West world. Following the famous saying allegedly spelled by Kissinger: “Europe? Give me a name and a phone number!” (when – back in early 1970s – urged by President Nixon to inform Europeans on the particular US policy action), the author is trying to examine how close is Asia to have its own telephone number. By contrasting and comparing genesis of multilateral security structures in Europe with those currently existing in Asia, and by listing some of the most pressing security challenges in Asia, this policy paper offers several policy incentives why the largest world’s continent must consider creation of the comprehensive pan-Asian institution. Prevailing security structures in Asia are bilateral and mostly asymmetric while Europe enjoys multilateral, balanced and symmetric setups (American and African continents too). Author goes as far as to claim that irrespective to the impressive economic growth, no Asian century will emerge without creation of such an institution. * * * * By Professor Anis Bajrektarevic. For over a decade, many of the relevant academic journals are full of articles prophesizing the 21st as the Asian century. The argument is usually based on the impressive economic growth, increased production and trade volumes as well as the booming foreign currency reserves and exports of many populous Asian nations, with nearly 1/3 of total world population inhabiting just two countries of the largest world’s continent. However, history serves as a powerful reminder by warning us that economically or/and demographically mighty gravity centers tend to expand into their peripheries, especially when the periphery is weaker by either category. It means that any absolute or relative shift in economic and demographic strength of one subject of international relations will inevitably put additional stress on the existing power equilibriums and constellations that support this balance in the particular theater of implicit or explicit structure. Lessons of the Past Thus, what is the state of art of Asia’s security structures? What is the existing capacity of preventive diplomacy and what instruments are at disposal when it comes to early warning/ prevention, fact-finding, exchange mechanisms, reconciliation, capacity and confidence– building measures in the Asian theater? While all other major theaters do have the pan-continental settings in place already for many decades, such as the Organization of American States – OAS (American continent), African Union – AU (Africa), Council of Europe and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – OSCE (Europe), the state-of-arts of the largest world’s continent is rather different. What becomes apparent, nearly at the first glance, is the absence of any pan-Asian security/ multilateral structure. Prevailing security structures are bilateral and mostly asymmetric. They range from the clearly defined and enduring non-aggression security treaties, through less formal arrangements, up to the Ad hoc cooperation accords on specific issues. The presence of the multilateral regional settings is limited to a very few spots in the largest continent, and even then, they are rarely mandated with security issues in their declared scope of work. Another striking feature is that most of the existing bilateral structures have an Asian state on one side, and either peripheral or external protégé country on the other side which makes them nearly per definition asymmetric. The examples are numerous: the US–Japan, the US– S. Korea, the US–Singapore, Russia–India, Australia–East Timor, Russia–North Korea, Japan –Malaysia, China–Pakistan, the US–Pakistan, China–Cambodia, the US–Saudi Arabia, Russia –Iran, China–Burma, India–Maldives, Iran–Syria, N. Korea–Pakistan, etc. Indeed, Asia today resonates a mixed echo of the European past. It combines features of the pre-Napoleonic, post-Napoleonic and the League-of-Nations Europe. What are the useful lessons from the European past? Well, there are a few, for sure. Bismarck accommodated the exponential economic, demographic and military growth as well as the territorial expansion of Prussia by skillfully architecturing and calibrating the complex networks of bilateral security arrangements of 19th century Europe. Like Asia today, it was not an institutionalized security structure of Europe, but a talented leadership exercising restraint and wisdom in combination with the quick assertiveness and fast military absorptions, concluded by the lasting endurance. However, as soon as the new Kaiser removed the Iron Chancellor (Bismarck), the provincial and backward–minded, insecure and militant Prussian establishment contested (by their own interpretations of the German’s machtpolitik and weltpolitik policies) Europe and the world in two devastating world wars. That, as well as Hitler’s establishment afterwards, simply did not know what to do with a powerful Germany. The aspirations and constellations of some of Asia’s powers today remind us also of the pre-Napoleonic Europe, in which a unified, universalistic block of the Holy Roman Empire was contested by the impatient challengers of the status quo. Such serious centripetal and centrifugal oscillations of Europe were not without grave deviations: as much as Cardinal Richelieu’s and Jacobin’s France successfully emancipated itself, the Napoleon III and pre-WWII France encircled, isolated itself, implicitly laying the foundation for the German attack. Finally, the existing Asian regional settings also resemble the picture of the post-Napoleonic Europe: first and foremost, of Europe between the Vienna Congress of 1815 and the revolutionary year of 1848. At any rate, let us take a quick look at the most relevant regional settings in Asia. Multilateral constellations By far, the largest Asian participation is with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation – APEC, an organization engulfing both sides of the Pacific Rim. Nevertheless, this is a forum for member economies not of sovereign nations, a sort of a prep-com or waiting room for the World Trade Organization – WTO. To use the words of one senior Singapore diplomat who recently told me in Geneva the following: “what is your option here? …to sign the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), side up with the US, login to FaceBook, and keep shopping on the internet happily ever after…” Two other crosscutting settings, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation – OIC and Non-Aligned Movement – NAM, the first with and the second without a permanent secretariat, represent the well-established political multilateral bodies. However, they are inadequate forums as neither of the two is strictly mandated with security issues. Although both trans-continental entities do have large memberships being the 2nd and 3rd largest multilateral systems, right after the UN, neither covers the entire Asian political landscape – having important Asian countries outside the system or opposing it. Further on, one should mention the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization – KEDO (Nuclear) and the Iran-related Contact (Quartet/P-5+1) Group. In both cases, the issues dealt with are indeed security related, but they are more an asymmetric approach to deter and contain a single country by the larger front of peripheral states that are opposing a particular security policy, in this case, of North Korea and of Iran. Same was with the short-lived SEATO Pact – a defense treaty organization for SEA which was essentially dissolved as soon as the imminent threat from communism was slowed down and successfully contained within the French Indochina. Confidence building – an attempt If some of the settings are reminiscent of the pre-Napoleonic Europe, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – SCO and Cooperation Council for the Arab states of the Gulf – GCC remind us of the post-Napoleonic Europe and its Alliance of the Eastern Conservative courts (of Metternich). Both arrangements were created on a pretext of a common external ideological and geopolitical threat, on a shared status quo security consideration. Asymmetric GCC was an externally induced setting by which an American key Middle East ally Saudi Arabia gathered the grouping of the Arabian Peninsula monarchies. It has served a dual purpose; originally, to contain the leftist Nasseristic pan-Arabism which was introducing a republican type of egalitarian government in the Middle Eastern theater. It was also – after the 1979 revolution – an instrument to counter-balance the Iranian influence in the Gulf and wider Middle East. The response to the spring 2011-13 turmoil in the Middle East, including the deployment of the Saudi troops in Bahrain, and including the analysis of the role of influential Qatar-based and GCC-backed Al Jazeera TV network is the best proof of the very nature of the GCC mandate. The SCO is internally induced and more symmetric setting. Essentially, it came into existence through a strategic Sino-Russian rapprochement , based, for the first time in modern history, on parity, to deter external aspirants (the US, Japan, Korea, India, Turkey and Saudi Arabia) and to keep the resources, territory, present socio-economic cultural and political regime in the Central Asia, Tibet heights and the Xinjiang Uighur province in line. The next to consider is the Indian sub-continent’s grouping, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation – SAARC. This organization has a well-established mandate, well staffed and versed Secretariat. However, the Organization is strikingly reminiscent of the League of Nations. The League is remembered as an altruistic setup which repeatedly failed to adequately respond to the security quests of its members as well as to the challenges and pressures of parties that were kept out of the system (e.g. Russia until well into the 1930s and the US remaining completely outside the system, and in the case of the SAARC surrounding; China, Saudi Arabia and the US). The SAARC is practically a hostage of mega confrontation of its two largest members, both confirmed nuclear powers; India and Pakistan. These two challenge each other geopolitically and ideologically. Existence of one is a negation of the existence of the other; the religiously determined nationhood of Pakistan is a negation of multiethnic India and vice verse. Additionally, the SAARC although internally induced is an asymmetric organization. It is not only the size of India, but also its position: centrality of that country makes SAARC practically impossible to operate in any field without the direct consent of India, be it commerce, communication, politics or security. For a serious advancement of multilateralism, mutual trust, a will to compromise and achieve a common denominator through active co-existence is the key. It is hard to build a common course of action around the disproportionately big and centrally positioned member which would escape the interpretation as containment by the big or assertiveness of its center by the smaller, peripheral members. Multivector Foreign Policy Finally, there is an ASEAN – a grouping of 10 Southeast Asian nations , exercising the balanced multi-vector policy, based on the non-interference principle, internally and externally. This, Jakarta/Indonesia headquartered organization has a dynamic past and an ambitious current charter. It is an internally induced and relatively symmetric arrangement with the strongest members placed around its geographic center, like in case of the EU equilibrium with Germany-France/Britain-Italy/Poland-Spain geographically balancing each other. Situated on the geographic axis of the southern flank of the Asian landmass, the so-called growth triangle of Thailand-Malaysia-Indonesia represents the core of the ASEAN not only in economic and communication terms but also by its political leverage. The EU-like ASEAN Community Road Map (for 2015) will absorb most of the Organization’s energy . However, the ASEAN has managed to open its forums for the 3+3 group/s, and could be seen in the long run as a cumulus setting towards the wider pan- Asian forum in future. Before closing this brief overview, let us mention two recently inaugurated informal forums, both based on the external calls for a burden sharing. One, with a jingoistic-coined name by the Wall Street bankers – BRI(I)C/S, so far includes two important Asian economic, demographic and political powerhouses (India and China), and one peripheral (Russia). Indonesia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Iran are a few additional Asian countries whose national pride and pragmatic interests are advocating a BRIC membership. The G–20, the other informal forum, is also assembled on the Ad hoc (pro bono) basis following the need of the G–7 to achieve a larger approval and support for its monetary (currency exchange accord) and financial (austerity) actions introduced in the aftermath of still unsettled financial crisis. Nevertheless, the BRIC and G-20 have not provided the Asian participating states either with the more leverage in the Bretton Woods institutions besides a burden sharing, or have they helped to tackle the indigenous Asian security problems. Appealing for the national pride, however, both informal gatherings may divert the necessary resources and attention to Asian states from their pressing domestic, pan-continental issues. Yet, besides the UN system machinery of the Geneva-based Disarmament committee, the UN Security Council, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons – OPCW and International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA (or CTBTO), even the ASEAN Asians (as the most multilateralized Asians) have no suitable standing forum to tackle and solve their security issues. An organization similar to the Council of Europe or the OSCE is still far from emerging on Asian soil. Our history warns. Nevertheless, it also provides a hope: The pre-CSCE (pre-Helsinki) Europe was indeed a dangerous place to live in. The sharp geopolitical and ideological default line was passing through the very heart of Europe, cutting it into halves. The southern Europe was practically sealed off by notorious dictatorships; in Greece (Colonel Junta), Spain (Franco) and Portugal (Salazar), with Turkey witnessing several of its governments toppled by the secular and omnipotent military establishment, with inverted Albania and a (non-Europe minded) non-allied, Tito’s Yugoslavia. Two powerful instruments of the US military presence (NATO) and of the Soviets (Warsaw pact) in Europe were keeping huge standing armies, enormous stockpiles of conventional as well as the ABC weaponry and delivery systems, practically next to each other. By far and large, European borders were not mutually recognized. Essentially, the west rejected to even recognize many of the Eastern European, Soviet dominated/installed governments. Territorial disputes unresolved Currently in Asia, there is hardly a single state which has no territorial dispute within its neighborhood. From the Middle East, Caspian and Central Asia, Indian sub-continent, mainland Indochina or Archipelago SEA, Tibet, South China Sea and the Far East, many countries are suffering numerous green and blue border disputes. The South China Sea solely counts for over a dozen territorial disputes – in which mostly China presses peripheries to break free from the long-lasting encirclement. These moves are often interpreted by the neighbors as dangerous assertiveness. On the top of that Sea resides a huge economy and insular territory in a legal limbo – Taiwan, which waits for a time when the pan-Asian and intl. agreement on how many Chinas Asia should have, gains a wide and lasting consensus. Unsolved territorial issues, sporadic irredentism, conventional armament, nuclear ambitions, conflicts over exploitation of and access to the marine biota, other natural resources including fresh water access and supply are posing enormous stress on external security, safety and stability in Asia. Additional stress comes from the newly emerging environmental concerns, that are representing nearly absolute security threats, not only to the tiny Pacific nation of Tuvalu , but also to the Maldives, Bangladesh, Cambodia, parts of Thailand, of Indonesia, of Kazakhstan and of the Philippines, etc . All this combined with uneven economic and demographic dynamics of the continent are portraying Asia as a real powder keg. It is absolutely inappropriate to compare the size of Asia and Europe – the latter being rather an extension of a huge Asian continental landmass, a sort of western Asian peninsula – but the interstate maneuvering space is comparable. Yet, the space between the major powers of post-Napoleonic Europe was as equally narrow for any maneuver as is the space today for any security maneuver of Japan, China, India, Pakistan, Iran and the like. Let us also take a brief look at the peculiarities of the nuclear constellations in Asia. Following the historic analogies; it echoes the age of the American nuclear monopoly and the years of Russia’s desperation to achieve the parity. Besides holding huge stockpiles of conventional weaponry and numerous standing armies, Asia is a home of four (plus peripheral Russia and Israel) of the nine known nuclear powers (declared and undeclared). Only China and Russia are parties to the Non-proliferation Treaty – NPT. North Korea walked away in 2003, whereas India and Pakistan both confirmed nuclear powers declined to sign the Treaty. Asia is also the only continent on which nuclear weaponry has been deployed. Cold War exiled in Asia As is well known, the peak of the Cold War was marked by the mega geopolitical and ideological confrontation of the two nuclear superpowers whose stockpiles by far outnumbered the stockpiles of all the other nuclear powers combined. However enigmatic, mysterious and incalculable to each other , the Americans and Soviets were on opposite sides of the globe, had no territorial disputes, and no record of direct armed conflicts. Insofar, the Asian nuclear constellation is additionally specific as each of the holders has a history of hostilities – armed frictions and confrontations over unsolved territorial disputes along the shared borders, all combined with the intensive and lasting ideological rivalries. The Soviet Union had bitter transborder armed frictions with China over the demarcation of its long land border. China has fought a war with India and has acquired a significant territorial gain. India has fought four mutually extortive wars with Pakistan over Kashmir and other disputed bordering regions. Finally, the Korean peninsula has witnessed the direct military confrontations of Japan, USSR, Chinese as well as the US on its very soil, and remains a split nation under a sharp ideological divide. On the western edge of the Eurasian continent, neither France, Britain, Russia nor the US had a (recent) history of direct armed conflicts. They do not even share land borders. Finally, only India and now post-Soviet Russia have a strict and full civilian control over its military and the nuclear deployment authorization. In the case of North Korea and China, it is in the hands of an unpredictable and non-transparent communist leadership – meaning, it resides outside democratic, governmental decision-making. In Pakistan, it is completely in the hands of a politically omnipresent military establishment. Pakistan has lived under a direct military rule for over half of its existence as an independent state. What eventually kept the US and the USSR from deploying nuclear weapons was the dangerous and costly struggle called: “mutual destruction assurance”. Already by the late 1950s, both sides achieved parity in the number and type of nuclear warheads as well as in the number and precision of their delivery systems. Both sides produced enough warheads, delivery systems’ secret depots and launching sites to amply survive the first impact and to maintain a strong second-strike capability . Once comprehending that neither the preventive nor preemptive nuclear strike would bring a decisive victory but would actually trigger the final global nuclear holocaust and ensure total mutual destruction, the Americans and the Soviets have achieved a fear–equilibrium through the hazardous deterrence. Thus, it was not an intended armament rush (for parity), but the non-intended Mutual Assurance Destruction – MAD – with its tranquilizing effect of nuclear weaponry, if possessed in sufficient quantities and impenetrable configurations – that brought a bizarre sort of pacifying stability between two confronting superpowers. Hence, MAD prevented nuclear war, but did not disarm the superpowers. As noted, the nuclear stockpiles in Asia are considerably modest . The number of warheads, launching sites and delivery systems is not sufficient and sophisticated enough to offer the second strike capability. That fact seriously compromises stability and security: preventive or preemptive N–strike against a nuclear or non-nuclear state could be contemplated as decisive, especially in South Asia and on the Korean peninsula, not to mention the Middle East . A general wisdom of geopolitics assumes the potentiality of threat by examining the degree of intensions and capability of belligerents. However, in Asia this theory does not necessarily hold the complete truth: Close geographic proximities of Asian nuclear powers means shorter flight time of warheads, which ultimately gives a very brief decision-making period to engaged adversaries. Besides a deliberate, a serious danger of an accidental nuclear war is therefore evident. Multilateral mechanisms One of the greatest thinkers and humanists of the 20th century, Erich Fromm wrote: “…man can only go forward by developing (his) reason, by finding a new harmony…” There is certainly a long road from vision and wisdom to a clear political commitment and accorded action. However, once it is achieved, the operational tools are readily at disposal. The case of Helsinki Europe is very instructive. To be frank, it was the over-extension of the superpowers who contested one another all over the globe, which eventually brought them to the negotiation table. Importantly, it was also a constant, resolute call of the European public that alerted governments on both sides of the default line. Once the political considerations were settled, the technicalities gained momentum: there was – at first – mutual pan-European recognition of borders which tranquilized tensions literally overnight. Politico-military cooperation was situated in the so-called first Helsinki basket, which included the joint military inspections, exchange mechanisms, constant information flow, early warning instruments, confidence–building measures mechanism, and the standing panel of state representatives (the so-called Permanent Council). Further on, an important clearing house was situated in the so-called second basket – the forum that links the economic and environmental issues, items so pressing in Asia at the moment. Admittedly, the III OSCE Basket was a source of many controversies in the past years, mostly over the interpretation of mandates. However, the new wave of nationalism, often replacing the fading communism, the emotional charges and residual fears of the past, the huge ongoing formation of the middle class in Asia whose passions and affiliations will inevitably challenge established elites domestically and question their policies internationally, and a related search for a new social consensus – all that could be successfully tackled by some sort of an Asian III basket. Clearly, further socio-economic growth in Asia is impossible without the creation and mobilization of a strong middle class – a segment of society which when appearing anew on the socio-political horizon is traditionally very exposed and vulnerable to political misdeeds and disruptive shifts. At any rate, there are several OSCE observing nations from Asia ; from Thailand to Korea and Japan, with Indonesia, a nation that currently considers joining the forum. They are clearly benefiting from the participation . Consequently, the largest continent should consider the creation of its own comprehensive pan-Asian multilateral mechanism. In doing so, it can surely rest on the vision and spirit of Helsinki. On the very institutional setup, Asia can closely revisit the well-envisioned SAARC and ambitiously empowered ASEAN fora. By examining these two regional bodies, Asia can find and skillfully calibrate the appropriate balance between widening and deepening of the security mandate of such future multilateral organization – given the number of states as well as the gravity of the pressing socio-political, environmental and politico-military challenges. In the age of unprecedented success and the unparalleled prosperity of Asia, an indigenous multilateral pan-Asian arrangement presents itself as an opportunity. Contextualizing Hegel’s famous saying that “freedom is…an insight into necessity” let me close by stating that a need for the domesticated pan-Asian organization warns by its urgency too. Clearly, there is no emancipation of the continent; there is no Asian century, without the pan-Asian multilateral setting. Link to a complementary new text: http://moderndiplomacy.eu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=2068:why-is-europe-able-to-manage-its-decline-while-asia-is-still-unable-to-capitalize-on-its-successes&Itemid=156 ————– About the author: Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic, Chairman Intl. Law & Global Pol. Studies (author of the book ‘Is there life after Facebook’, Addleton Academic Publishers, NY) Vienna, 16 DEC 16 anis@bajrektarevic.eu Post Scriptum How can we observe and interpret (the distance between) success and failure from a historical perspective? This question remains a difficult one to (satisfy all with a single) answer… The immediate force behind the rapid and successful European overseas projection was actually the two elements combined: Europe’s technological (economic) advancement and demographic expansion (from early 16th century on). However, West/Europe was not – frankly speaking – winning over the rest of this planet by the superiority of its views and ideas, by purity of its virtues or by clarity and sincerity of its religious thoughts and practices. For a small and rather insecure civilization from the antropo-geographic suburbia, it was just the superiority through efficiency in applying the rationalized violence and organized (legitimized) coercion that Europe successfully projected. The 21st century Europeans often forget this ‘inconvenient truth’, while the non-Europeans usually never do. The large, self-maintainable, self-assured and secure civilizations (e.g. situated on the Asian landmass) were traditionally less militant and confrontational (and a nation-state ‘exclusive’), but more esoteric and generous, inclusive, attentive and flexible. The smaller, insecure civilizations (e.g. situated on a modest and minor, geographically remote and peripheral, natural resources scarce, and climatically harshly exposed continent of Europe) were more focused, obsessively organized, directional and “goal–oriented” (including the invention of virtue out of necessity – a nation-state). No wonder that only Asian, and no European civilization has ever generated a single religion. Although it admittedly doctrinated, ‘clergified’ and headquartered one of the four Middle East-revelled monotheistic religions, that of Christianity. On the other hand, no other civilization but the European has ever created a significant, even a relevant political ideology. Acknowledgments For the past twelve years I hosted over 100 ambassadors at my university, some 30 from Asia alone. Several of them are currently obtaining (or recently finished) very high governmental positions in their respective countries. That includes the Foreign Minister posts (like the former Korean ambassador Kim Sung-Hwan, or the former Kazakh ambassador Yerzhan Kazykhanov), as well as the SAARC Sec-General post (former India’s Ambassador Kant Sharma), or candidacy for the OIC Secretary-General post (including the former Malaysian Ambassador to the UN New York, Tan Sri Hasmi AGAM, currently the SUHAKAM Chairman in Kuala Lumpur). It would be inappropriate to name them here. However, let me express my sincere gratitude for all the talks and meetings which helped an early ‘fermentation’ of my hypothesis claim as such. Finally, I would like to name the following personalities (in their current or past capacities) for the valuable intellectual encounters and their sometimes opposing but always inspiring and constructive comments in the course of drafting the article: H.E. Mr. Dato’ Misran KARMAIN, the ASEAN Deputy Secretary General H.E. Mr. I Gusti Agung Wesaka PUJA, Indonesia’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN and other IO’s in Vienna (currently Director-General for ASEAN Affairs in the Indonesian Foreign Ministry) H.E. Ms. Nongnuth PHETCHARATANA, Thai Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the OSCE, UN and other IO’s in Vienna (currently Thai Ambassador in Berlin) H.E. Ms. Linglingay F. LACANLALE, the Philippines’ Ambassador to Thailand and the UN ESCAP H.E. Mr. Khamkheuang BOUNTEUM, Laos’ Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN and other IO’s in Vienna H.E. Mr. Ba Than NGUYEN, Vietnam’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN and other IO’s in Vienna H.E. Mr. Ibrahim DJIKIC, Ambassador and former OSCE Mission Head to Ashgabat However, the views expressed are solely those of the author himself. References: Bajrektarevic, Anis, “Verticalization of Historical Experiences: Europe’s and Asia’s Security Structures – Structural Similarities and Differences”, Crossroads, The Mac Foreign Policy Journal, Skopje (Vol. I Nr. 4) 2007 Bajrektarevic, Anis, “Institutionalization of Historical Experiences: Europe and Asia – Same Quest, Different Results, Common Futures”, Worldviews and the Future of Human Civilization, (University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, November 2008) Malaysia (2008) Bajrektarevic, Anis, “Destiny Shared: Our Common Futures – Human Capital beyond 2020”, the 5th Global Tech Leaders Symposium , Singapore-Shanghai March 2005 (2005) Bajrektarevic, Anis, “Structural Differences in Security Structures of Europe and Asia – Possible Conflicting Cause in the SEA Theater”, The 4th Viennese conference on SEA, SEAS Vienna June 2009 (2009) Duroselle, J.B., “Histoire Diplomatique – Études Politiques, Économiques et Sociales”, Dalloz Printing Paris (first published 1957), 1978 Friedman, George, “The Next 100 Years”, Anchor Books/Random House NY (2009) Fromm, Erich, “The Art of Loving”, Perennial Classics, (page: 76) (1956) Hegel, G.W.F., Phänomenologie des Geistes (The Phenomenology of Mind, 1807), Oxford University Press, 1977 (page: 25 VII) Mahbubani, Kishore, “The New Asian Hemisphere”, Public Affairs, Perseus Books Group (page: 44-45) (2008) Sagan, S.D. and Waltz, K.N., “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed”, (page: 112) (2003)    

By Barend ter Haar. For people involved in international affairs, as most readers of Diplomat Magazine presumably are, 2016 was a bad year. In many countries politicians came to the fore that excelled in denigrating other nations and other cultures. Showing disrespect for people that are different and encouraging fear of them proved to be an effective way to attract votes. In response, established parties often felt forced to support short-sighted selfish policies, rather than to do what would be in the best interest of their country. As many governments shy away from their common responsibility for our planet, the world moves into a new year without obvious leaders and without a clear direction. But not all is gloom. The present situation also provides new opportunities. For many years the countries of Western Europe and the United States played a leading role in the world, partly because of their economic and military power, but increasingly by the power of their ideas and the power of their example. But now most of these countries seem no longer able or willing to provide leadership. So which country dares to take up this challenge? Will China set the example for a responsible environmental policy? Will Indonesia become the showcase of a country where Muslims and Christians live harmoniously together? There are also vacancies for politicians that dare to develop a vision that goes beyond the next election. The more politicians try to please their voters by posing as short-sighted nationalists, the more politicians that dare to tell the truth are needed. There are also new opportunities for local authorities. When national governments forsake their duty to promote the long-term interests of a country, local governments are challenged to show that they can do better. California might set an example. As far as environmental and social responsibility are concerned, commercial companies used to follow the rules set by governments. But if governmental leadership is lacking, companies are challenged to show that long-term profitability and responsibility can go hand in hand. In short: a failure of governments to address the great challenges of our times, provides a challenge and an opportunity for companies, local authorities, civil society organisations and individual people to show that they can do better. Finally, not all the trends are negative. Some are very positive indeed. To know more: test yourself. It takes only about three minutes: http://www.nature.com/news/three-minutes-with-hans-rosling-will-change-your-mind-about-the-world-1.21143 (The Tedtalks in the article are also worthwhile, but they take more time.)

By Nika Salvetti and Prof. Andre Nijhof. Is there a positive connection between these two terms? Especially when we hear news about the wrong doing of companies operating in complex contexts? There is a very simple answer also supported by vast research findings, which is a positive answer, just because today companies cannot afford to do bad without having been noticed thus without facing serious consequences which would undermine their image, reputation and overall legitimacy. The role of business in society has changed. On one side businesses are expanding their operations and activities outside the traditional markets, along a more complex global supply chain which increases unpredictability and uncertainty increasing business risks; on the other side society is more aware of their actions and impacts and it is demanding more responsible behaviours and practical solutions to address common social, economic and environmental challenges (Prandi and Lozano, 2010). As the McKinsey report (2010) stresses, busineses today are challenged by the changing context in which businesses operate, from traditional and established, to non traditional and complex business environment; by a progressive stress on natural resources (i.e. water) which threaten their availability; by the increasing complexity of socio-economic and environmental global problems, i.e. climate change, structural unemployment, disproportionate urbanization, insecurity, which raise the societal pressure on businesses to act and provide innovative solutions (McKinsey, 2010).

While operating in complex settings, such as conflict affected areas and fragile states[1], businesses are more exposed to issues related to human rights, sustainable development and peace building (UNGC, 2010). Usually businesses operate in complex settings due to the opportunity of the easy access and exploitation of natural resources, cheap labour and a new and large market, often ignoring the high costs and risks associated to the increase of uncontrolled insecurity, lack of good governance and abuse of human rights (Anderson, Markides and Kupp, 2010). If we look at the textile industry, for example, the famous Western brands have no interest to get trapped in a negative campaign which boycott their operations caused by the irresponsible behaviours of their local providers to not respect the basic rules and regulations in relation to labour and/or environmental rights. The recent accident in Turkey, forecasted by BBC worldwide, denouncing local garments’ factories to exploit Syrian refugees’ girls by providing very bad working conditions, had an immediate reaction internationally prompting one of the retailer companies to adopt a remediation plan with also the option to terminate the contract, if immediate labour adjustments would not take place. This is just an example of how today the communication becomes a clear weapon against irresponsible behaviours. But the point to address is another. Why should we wait for these ‘accidents’ to occur to prompt a more responsible reaction of the companies? What about preventive and conscious business measures to establish the foundation of peaceful and responsible relationships? Recognizing that the primary responsibility of restoring stability, security and promoting development lies with the legitimate Government, we believe that a more active and responsible participation of businesses in contributing to peace and sustainable development in complex environments is expected. Businesses are today seen as a potential partner for building peace while contributing to sustainable development and stability (UNGC, 2010). To fulfil such exigent tasks, businesses have to recognize the relevant role they can play in such complex environment, ensuring sustainable economic growth while concurrently mitigating social and environmental impacts. In fact they are the engine for jobs’ creation, local economic growth through the potential promotion of inclusive and local businesses. They can promote better relationships between different stakeholders and guide and support local governments in addressing and solving social and environmental problems. Moreover they can contribute to the national economic growth through their capital investments and tax revenues. However if their contributions are not aligned with the principles of responsible investments as stressed by the UN Global Compact (2010), the OECD guidelines for Multinationals, the ILO convention on labour rights, the Business & Human Rights nexus promoted by the Ruggie Report[2], they can easily contribute to the exacerbation of conflict manifested by violent societal upraises, workers’ strikes and boycotts, societal polarization which might lead to a worst case scenario of civil conflict. Getting to know the local context, its challenges and opportunities, the roles and level of influence played by the different stakeholders, might be a first step to review business strategies in order to gain long term financial returns by joining collective efforts to address the major local socio-economic and environmental challenges (Davis and Franks, 2011)[3]. Overall businesses have to realize that the costs related to conflict and instability is much higher than the ‘costs’ of building and keeping peace thus sustainable development (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2012). —————— About the authors: Phd Cand. Nika Salvetti, Nyenrode University. Email: N.Salvetti@nyenrode.nl Programme Leader Business & Peace. UPEACE Centre The Hague. Email: nsalvetti@upeace.org (for more information about the programme on Business & Peace please check our website www.upeace.nl) Prof. Andre Nijhof,  Nyenrode University. Email: A.Nijhof@nyenrode.nl ——————– [1] A fragile state is a low-income country characterized by weak state capacity and/or weak state legitimacy leaving citizens vulnerable to a range of shocks. Conflict affected areas are those in which significant socio-economic disruptions lead to weak governance, extensive damage to infrastructure, and disruption of social provision. ADB, 2012. [2] United Nations Global Compact (UNGC)’s principles; OECD [3] Davis, R. and Franks, D.M., 2011. The costs of conflict with local communities in the extractive industry. Published for the first international Seminar on Social Responsibility in Mining. Oct. 2016. Santiago de Chile.  

By Jhr. Alexander W. Beelaerts van Blokland. ——————- About the author: Jhr. Alexander W. Beelaerts van Blokland LL.M., Justice (Judge) in the Court of Appeal and Special Advisor International Affairs, appointed by the Mayor and Aldermen of The Hague. a.beelaerts@planet.nl