The Hague, 31 January 2024 – Chief Prosecutor Serge Brammertz of the IRMCT Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is on an official mission to Kigali, Rwanda from 30 January to 7 February 2024.
The purpose of the Chief Prosecutor’s mission is to have high-level and technical discussions concerning ongoing efforts to achieve more justice for more victims and survivors of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.
In view of the upcoming 30th commemoration of the Genocide, Prosecutor Brammertz is working to bring attention to the fact that more than 1,000 suspected genocidaires remain at large, living in countries across Africa, Europe, North America and elsewhere. That so many suspected perpetrators have fled to third countries and have not yet been prosecuted for their alleged crimes is deeply distressing to the victims and survivors, as well as a significant challenge to the rule of law.
Prosecutor Brammertz is committed to assisting Rwandan and other national authorities to bring these fugitives to justice, wherever they may be found. He will meet with the Minister of Justice, the Inspector General of Police and the Prosecutor General to brief them on the OTP’s efforts to provide a range of investigative and prosecutorial support to national partners, and discuss the ongoing successful cooperation between the OTP and the Rwandan justice sector. The Chief Prosecutor will further meet with representatives of the diplomatic community to discuss how to improve multilateral law enforcement cooperation in locating, arresting and prosecuting fugitive genocidaires currently residing in other countries.
Finally, Prosecutor Brammertz will meet with representatives of the victims and survivors to discuss the importance of securing more accountability for the crimes committed and their continued vital role in the justice process. He will also celebrate National Heroes Day and join in recognizing those who courageously demonstrated the highest integrity and commitment to the Rwandan people.
Judicial and law enforcement authorities in Cyprus, Portugal and Latvia have dismantled a criminal network suspected of organising 133 sham marriages in Cyprus to facilitate illegal immigration into the European Union. During a joint action day carried out on 29 January, 15 suspects were arrested: 13 in Cyprus, 1 in Latvia and 1 in Portugal.
According to the investigations, the criminal network was also involved in human trafficking and money laundering activities, as well as forcing victims into bogus marriages for immigration purposes.
The suspects allegedly recruited Latvian and Portuguese women and facilitated their journeys to Cyprus, where they entered into arranged marriages with third-country nationals. The suspects arranged all of the logistics, including the purchase of flight tickets and the acquisition of passports and other required documents.
The marriages enabled the non-EU nationals to obtain residence permits from third countries, which they then used to travel to other European countries.
A total of nine cases have been opened at Eurojust since 2022 for the facilitation of execution of European Investigation Orders and European Arrest Warrants linked to this investigation. The Agency organised two dedicated coordination meetings and facilitated the judicial cooperation between the authorities involved during the action day.
Europol’s Operational Task Force (OTF) Limassol was set up to facilitate the joint efforts of Cyprus, Latvia and Portugal to dismantle this criminal network. Europol supported this OTF by facilitating information exchanges, coordinating and financing operational activities and providing tailored operational analytical support. During the action day, Europol supported the field activities by crosschecking the operational information collected in real time.
The following authorities took part in this investigation:
· Cyprus: Law Office of Republic of Cyprus, Cyprus Police
· Latvia: Prosecutor General’s Office, State Police of Latvia
· Portugal: Lisbon Public Prosecution Office, Judicial Police
In an increasingly connected and globalized world, the age-old oversimplified, but good story of teaching someone to fish has morphed into a global conundrum of overfishing. The game rules are ones where everyone is pressured to build bigger and better fishing boats, equipped with the latest technology to haul in ever-increasing catches.
This global push, much like another story international development graduates are taught, the one of the well-intentioned Harvard graduates advising a small-time fisherman to expand his operations, has led to a frenzied race to harvest the seas. Everyone forges ahead, armed with the knowledge and resources to fish more efficiently, cast their nets wider and deeper, mirroring the vision of scaling well above for greater profits many times under the guise of fishing sovereignty.
But in this relentless pursuit, akin to the growing fleet of boats in our story, the once abundant oceans are now being emptied, a stark reminder of the fisherman’s peaceful and simple yet sustainable lifestyle. As we stand at this crossroads, we must ponder, much like the fisherman, whether the pursuit of more is worth the risk of losing what we already have – a thriving, sustainable ocean.
In accordance with SDG 14 – life below water – and the growing inclination towards more sustainable practices, the World Trade Organization (WTO) introduced, in June 2022, the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (AFS), an eagerly anticipated legal instrument aiming at reducing human impact on life below water. Narrowed down to twelve articles, the AFS specifically addresses subsidies contributing to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing), subsidies linked to overfished stocks, and other fisheries subsidies deemed harmful to the sustainability of aquatic fauna. Despite being a sincere effort to limit states’ involvement in funding unsustainable practices, the tangible outcome of the long-anticipated negotiations appears somewhat conservative.
To justify its existence, the Agreement will have to constraint the use of capacity-enhancing subsidies and redirect its focus toward the reinforcement of monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) mechanisms.
Fisheries Subsidies
Annually, countries invest billions of dollars in financial contributions to the fisheries sector. Despite the prevalence of fisheries subsidies, there is currently no universally recognized categorization, leading various organizations and academics to employ their own. For the purposes of this article, the classification proposed by Sumaila and al. (2019), as it distinguishes subsidies based on their long-term impact on the marine ecosystem, will be used. This framework divides fisheries subsidies into three groups:
Beneficial subsidies, defined as “investments in the promotion of fishery resource conservation and management”;
Capacity-enhancing subsidies, defined as “programs that currently, or have the potential to encourage fishing capacity to develop to a point where resource exploitation exceeds the maximum sustainable yield, effectively resulting in the overexploitation of natural assets”, and;
Ambiguous subsidies or “subsidies [having] the potential to lead to either sustainable management or overexploitation of the fishery resource”.
It is important to note that the AFS specifically addresses capture production and does not cover subsidies related to aquaculture or inland freshwater fisheries.
Capacity-enhancing subsidies
Overfishing and overcapacity are well-recognized challenges in the fisheries sector. According to the 2022 FAO report, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, “it is estimated that up to 35 percent of the global fisheries and aquaculture production is either lost or wasted every year” (FAO, 2022b). The report mainly attributes these losses to inefficiencies in value chains, a trend that has remained consistent over time.
In 2009, the World Bank highlighted the consequences of global fleet overcapacity, estimating a yearly gap of approximately $50 billion between potential and actual net economic benefits from marine fisheries (World Bank, 2009). In the subsequent “The Sunken Billions Revisited” report in 2017, this figure was revised to $83.3 billion in 2012 (World Bank, 2017). In parallel, market projections indicate an expected production of around 203 metric tons in 2031, while demand during the same year is estimated at approximately 183 metric tons (OECD & FAO, 2022). To sum it all up, supply already exceeds demand, and we need to learn to manage what we already produce before thinking about producing more.
As Mr. Abdul Hakim Elwaer, Assistant Director General UN-FAO Near East and North Africa said, “there is more than enough food produced in the world to feed everyone on the planet’’.
Yet, fisheries subsidies reached $35.4 billion in 2018, with about 60% considered capacity-enhancing subsidies. While understanding Members’ interest in investing in their national fleet to remain competitive in the global market, these numbers emphasize the need of limiting (or even prohibiting) capacity-enhancing subsidies.
However, determining the limits to be imposed on Members represents a meticulous task. For instance, a complete prohibition of capacity-enhancing subsidies for all Members, including those making minimal contributions to global marine capture production, would be impractical. Numerous proposals from various Members have been put forward, suggesting that a consensus representing all Members’ positions can certainly be achieved.
Finding a common ground
In a recent publication, Sumaila & al. (2022) provided a comprehensive overview of proposals made by Members. Commonalities in the proposals, namely the regulation of subsidies contributing to IUU fishing and the fishing of overfished stocks, have found their way into the initial draft of the Agreement.
Regarding IUU fishing, which accounts for more than 30% of all fishing activities worldwide (Government of Canada, 2021), the keystone of an effective agreement will be the reinforcement of monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) mechanisms of Member States. To ensure effective and low-cost MCS mechanisms, regional cooperation, which has proven to be efficiently working, should be the watchword. Case in point, the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Global, recognized as “the most productive tuna fishing grounds in the world”, has successfully employed strategies like regional sharing of enforcement costs and sharing catch and compliance information (Bergh & Davie, 2009). On a global level, the Global Record of Fishing Vessels, Refrigerated Transport Vessels, and Supply Vessels, primarily aiming at combating IUU fishing, is an attempt at making easily available certified data from State authorities about vessels and vessel-related activities.
Besides, practices related to flag identification, such as flags of convenience, which are intimately linked to IUU fishing, should face stricter regulations. In a draft agreement published in June 2021, section 5.4 stated that “no Member shall grant or maintain subsidies for a vessel not flying the flag of the subsidizing Member” (WTO, 2021). However, in the latest version of the Agreement, this section was replaced with more lenient language in section 5.2, stating that “a Member shall take special care and exercise due restraint granting subsidies to vessels not flying that Member’s flag”.
The well-known and documented relationship between the use of flags of convenience and IUU fishing was highlighted in a 2017 study by the INTERPOL, revealing that 82.2% of assessed vessels engaging in IUU fishing were using a flag of convenience (INTERPOL, 2017). Therefore, a step backwards with the reintegration of section 5.4 is called for. Being aware of such a relationship and allowing Members to subsidize vessels not carrying their flag amounts to supporting these illegal activities.
As for overfished stocks, article 4 of the Agreement currently grants full responsibility to the relevant State or RFMO/A to determine whether a stock is being overfished based on “the best scientific evidence available to it”. Essentially, the implementation heavily relies on Members’ willingness to cease subsidizing activities contributing to overfishing. A more effective approach to implementing such practices would have involved establishing an objective and universally applied definition of what constitutes an overfished stock. Maximum sustainable yield (MSY), defined as “the maximum catch (in number or mass) that can be removed from a population over an indefinite period” (Maunder, 2008) is widely recognized and used within the scientific community and could serve as a solid starting point for the objective definition of an overfished stock within the context of the Agreement.
In parallel, numerous Members have shown their interest in taking a more assertive stance in reducing capacity-enhancing subsidies (or those contributing to overcapacity). Despite various suggestions as to how this should be put into application, many Members seem to have opted for a cap-based approach. Notably, a proposal jointly crafted by Argentina, Australia, the United States, and Uruguay proposes a classification of Members based on their contribution to global marine capture production (WTO, 2019). According to SubsidyExplorer findings, a tool developed to measure and compare proposals made by Members, this proposal stands out as one of the most effective in terms of biomass changes and revenue increase.
The proposal suggests dividing Members into three tiers, each obligated to set a monetary cap on fisheries subsidies. Members in the first tier, contributing to 0.7% or more to global marine capture production, would negotiate individual “subsidy caps” or accept a default annual cap of $50 million if historically known for low or no subsidies. Members in the second tier, contributing to over 0.05% but less than 0.7% of global marine capture production, would similarly negotiate a cap or adhere to the $50 million limit. Finally, Members in the last tier, contributing to less than 0.05% to global marine capture production, would not be obliged to set a cap.
While the proposal stands out as the most logical, effective, and realistic, there is still merits in considering potential refinements to enhance its efficacy. To incentivize Members to continue investing in beneficial subsidies and prevent disparities among Members, the imposed cap should be a percentage of their total monetary investment in fisheries subsidies. Therefore, if a Member wishes to increase the monetary value of their capacity-enhancing subsidies, they will need to raise the overall monetary value of their fisheries subsidies, inevitably boosting their investment in beneficial subsidies and mitigating the adverse effects of capacity-enhancing subsidies.
This approach reduces capacity-enhancing subsidies while creating an incentive for increased investment in beneficial subsidies. For instance, Members in the first tier could commit to a capacity-enhancing subsidies ceiling rate of 20%, those in the second tier to 30%, and Members in the last tier would have no cap. The idea of setting caps based on a percentage instead of a fixed monetary amount is not a novel idea by any means, rather one that has been researched, reflected on and proposed by no other than by the most important contributor to global marine capture (17% of global marine capture), a country whose capacity-enhancing subsidies accounted for 80% of their total fisheries subsidies granted in 2018, China. This only demonstrates merits of cooperation and the recognition of all Member proposals’ strengths.
Final note
The eagerness to shift towards sustainable practices is evident. However, upon examining the Agreement, there seems to be a hesitancy among states to take the plunge (no pun intended). The measures implemented to address IUU fishing and the depletion of overfished stocks are commendable, yet they will need to be more stringent for substantial and lasting positive changes. Addressing overfishing and overcapacity must be the first item on the list at the next Ministerial Conference.
The cap-based approach, favored by numerous Members, proves to be an effective method for attaining results that are both environmentally and economically beneficial. This approach ensures equitable outcomes without hampering countries’ competitiveness in the global market and, akin to the insightful narrative of the Harvard graduates and the fisherman, invites reflection on the profound philosophy of equilibrium in our collective journey towards global sustainability.
About the author:
Audrey Beaulieu.
Audrey Beaulieu is a Canadian legal professional. She holds a bachelor’s degree in international development, a licentiate in civil law, and a Juris Doctor. While currently pursuing an MBA, she specializes in the intersection of agriculture and international trade.
With experience at the Supreme Court of Canada and contributions to humanitarian projects in Latin America with Lawyers without Borders Canada, Audrey seamlessly integrates legal expertise with a strategic business approach in her current role within the legal department of a national acquisition company.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) & Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (2022). Agricultural Outlook 2022 -2031 – Fish.https://www.fao.org/3/CC0308EN/Fish.pdf
World Trade Organization. (June 4, 2019). A Cap-Based Approach to Address Certain Fisheries Subsidies that Contribute to Overcapacity and Overfishing – Communication from China.
Exercise it’s a vital component of a healthy lifestyle. In the Netherlands, however, the statistics are concerning. Only 44% of Dutch people meet the exercise guidelines, a figure that’s dwindling.
Marjolein Bolhuis-Eijsvogel, temporary chairman of the Netherlands Sports Council, puts it bluntly: “We no longer have time to lose to exercise more if we want to give Dutch people a longer healthy life. A change of course is needed in the short term. Only 44% of Dutch people meet the exercise guidelines and that share is becoming increasingly smaller. Moreover, we are European sitting champions. So we’re moving backwards. This leads to 5,800 premature deaths per year and costs 2.7 billion euros in healthcare expenditure every year.”
The NLsportraad has sounded the alarm, urging the Dutch government to prioritize exercise as a fundamental aspect of daily life. Their advice, titled ‘Netherlands, get up! Make sufficient exercise a given every day’, advocates for a comprehensive approach involving various sectors of society.
A State Secretary for Exercise and Sports
Central to the NLsportraad’s recommendations is the appointment of a State Secretary for Exercise and Sports. This official would spearhead a coordinated effort across ministries to develop a long-term strategy for promoting daily exercise. By involving multiple government departments, including health, education, and urban planning, a holistic approach can be adopted to tackle the issue at its core.
A Collective Responsibility
Exercise shouldn’t be viewed as solely a personal choice but as a collective responsibility. In a society where economic growth and technological advancements often discourage physical activity, structural changes are imperative. The NLsportraad emphasizes the need for collaboration between government, businesses, civil society, and citizens to create an environment conducive to exercise.
Coalitions for Change
To make exercise more accessible, the NLsportraad advocates for the formation of coalitions involving various stakeholders. These coalitions would assess barriers to exercise in different settings such as workplaces, healthcare facilities, schools, and urban spaces. By working together, these entities can implement initiatives that integrate exercise into daily routines.
Incentives for Action
Beyond providing information, the NLsportraad proposes utilizing incentives to promote exercise. This includes initiatives like car-free streets, expanded pedestrian and cycling infrastructure, and creating ample play spaces in childcare centers.
Friday, 19 January, Stuttgart, Baden-Württemberg, Germany: The United Kingdom’s Deputy Ambassador Kieran Drake made his inaugural visit to Stuttgart, capital of the southwestern German federal state of Baden-Württemberg.
Top diplomat Kieran Drake was received by the Head of the State Chancellery, State Minister Dr. Florian Stegmann at the State Chancellery’s premises. The two dignitaries discussed opportunities for further strengthening the relationship between the UK and Baden-Württemberg building on the existing strong ties: Baden-Württemberg represents 13 percent of all German investment into the UK, with over 400 companies who employ 109,000 people. There are 149 UK companies invested in Baden-Württemberg, employing 28,000 people; in 2021 the UK and Baden-Württemberg signed an Economic Partnership followed by the opening of a Baden- Württemberg representation office in London, and the signing of a Joint Declaration between Baden- Württemberg and the devolved Welsh Government in November last year.
Mr Drake also visited the headquarters of the Stuttgart Police to discuss their preparations for hosting the UEFA Euro 2024 Mens Football Tournament, including a match between Scotland and Hungary to take place on 23 June 2024. The UK estimates over 500,000 fans will travel to Germany this summer for the tournament and the British Embassy is working closely with German partners to prepare for the occurance.
Deputy Ambassador Drake was accompanied during his visit by the British Honorary Consul in Stuttgart, Dr. Fritz Oesterle.
Kieran Drake has been serving as Deputy Head of Mission at the British Embassy in Germany since August 2021. Kieran joined the UK Civil Service in 2005 and has held senior roles in a range of Government Departments including the Cabinet Office, HM Treasury, and the Department for Exiting the European Union. He holds a MA (Hons) in Geography from Cambridge University.
The Deputy Head of Mission is a senior diplomat and typically a key advisor to the Ambassador or High Commissioner. They represent the UK’s interests in the absence of the Ambassador in the capacity as Chargé d’affaires.
His Excellency Mr. Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Brahim Khlil Zemm, Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, presented his Letters of Credence to His Majesty King Willem Alexander on Wednesday, January 31, 2024.
Mr. Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Brahim Khlil Zemm, was born on November 28, 1964 in Atar (Capital of the Adrar region, in northern Mauritania). He holds a doctorate in political science from the University of Paris Descartes (Paris V) and several higher degrees in the fields of diplomacy, philology and communication. He began his administrative career in July 1999 as Technical Advisor to the Minister of Communication and Relations with Parliament. He was then appointed First Counselor at the Embassy of Mauritania in Paris in 2003.
From 2005, he held high positions, particularly in the field of diplomacy. So he was: Ambassador, Permanent Representative to UNESCO (from October 29, 2005 to November 15, 2006), Ambassador to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (from November 15, 2006 to May 15, 2007), Ambassador to the Kingdom of Belgium, to the European Union and, as such, Permanent Representative of Mauritania to the Union for the Mediterranean, the Group of ACP Countries, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the World Trade Organization, the International Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Ambassador to the Netherlands and Luxembourg with residence in Brussels (from December 14, 2009 to September 19, 2012), Ambassador to France, Portugal and the Kingdoms of Sweden and Denmark with residence in Paris (from September 19, 2012 to May 15, 2014), Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, No-Resident Ambassador to Poland, Ukraine, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Austria, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia ( May 15, 2014 until September 1st , 2023).
Mr. Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Brahim Khlil Zemm, was also: Minister in charge of relations with parliament and civil society (from May 15, 2007 to May 11, 2008), Minister of Tourism and Crafts (from May 11, 2008 to August 6, 2008), Adviser in charge of communication at the Presidency of the Republic (from November 4, 2008 to December 14, 2009).
During his diplomatic career, Mr. Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Brahim Khlil Zemm, took part in several international conferences and colloquia organized by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, the Union for the Mediterranean, the group of African-Caribbean-Pacific countries, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Ambassador Vladimir Tarabrin, born in 1957, is a seasoned diplomat with an extensive career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR/Russian Federation starting from 1979. A graduate of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Ambassador Tarabrin has dedicated his life to serving his country in various capacities on the international stage.
From 1998 to 2002, he was the Senior Counsellor and Legal Advisor of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations in New York, also serving as the Alternate Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Security Council. He then advanced to become a Deputy Director of the Legal Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2002 to 2008.
Mr. Tarabrin’s ambassadorial career took off in 2008 when he was appointed as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the Gabonese Republic, a position he held until 2013. Following this, he served as Ambassador at large on international anti-corruption cooperation until 2017. His expertise in managing crises was recognized when he became the Director of the Department-Crisis Situation Centre of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2017 to 2019.
H.E. Mr. Vladimir Tarabrin, Ambassador ofd the Russian Federation, accredited to the OPCW.
Most recently, from 2019 to 2023, Ambassador Tarabrin was appointed as the Special Representative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs for international anti-terrorist cooperation and Director of the Department on the Issues of New Challenges and Threats.
He presented his credentials to Willem Alexander King of the Netherlands on January 31, 2024, he has been serving since then as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
Ambassador Tarabrin’s contributions to international diplomacy have been recognized through various state awards. Ambassador Tarabrin is not only a diplomat but also a family man, married with an adult son. He is multilingual, fluent in English and French, showcasing his versatility and capability to engage on the global stage.
Photography by Frank van Beek courtesy of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in The Hague.
January 29th, 2024, marked the sixth seminar of the International Holocaust Remembrance Day The Hague.
It was held in the Academy Building of the Peace Palace, where exactly a week earlier, the International Court of Justice had given its interim verdict of a case brought by South Africa against Israel.
The keynote speaker was Professor Tom Ginsburg from the University of Chicago, who would speak on the impact of the Holocaust on International Law. The seminar also paid tribute to the life and work of Judge Thomas Buergenthal (1934-2023).
H.E. Ambassador Dr. Marcin Czepelak, Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Photography by Arnaud Roelofsz .
Following words of welcome by the Honorable Jan van Zanen, Mayor of The Hague, Ambassador Dr. Marcin Czepelak, Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, made some opening remarks.
On January 27, 1945, the soldiers of the Red Army opened the gate of the German Nazi Concentration and Extermination Camp called Auschwitz, where, in the main camp, they found about seven thousand surviving prisoners. They remained there despite the evacuation and liquidation steps performed through the middle of January 1945 because the German leadership of the camp refrained from doing anything that would make it impossible for the camp to continue functioning. This is how 7 thousand remained, while about 56 thousand other prisoners were led out of Auschwitz from January 17-21, 1945, under the escort of heavily armed SS troops. Let me quote the text prepared by the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum of Former German Nazi Concentration and Extermination Camp:
“Along all the routes, the escorting SS guards shot both the prisoners who tried to escape and those who were too physically exhausted to keep up with their fellow unfortunates. Thousands of corpses of the prisoners who were shot or who died of fatigue or exposure to the cold lined both the routes where they passed on foot or by train. In Upper Silesia alone, about 3 thousand evacuated prisoners died. It is estimated that at least 9 thousand, and more probably 15 thousand, Auschwitz prisoners paid with their lives for the evacuation operation. After the war, the travails of the evacuated prisoners came to be known as the “Death Marches.”
There is a mass grave in Gliwice close to where his grandparents are buried, and this was his first tangible contact with the Holocaust. The Holocaust is too big a tragedy to comprehend, and Auschwitz has become a symbol for all that terrible name represents.
Professor Tom Ginsburg from the University of Chicago. Photography by Arnaud Roelofsz .
The Honorable G. Dineke De Groot, the first female President of the “Hoge Raad”, the Dutch Supreme Court, then introduced Professor Ginsburg. Following a most distinguished career in academia and as a legal advisor to the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in The Hague, he is now the Leo Spitz Distinguished Service Professor of International Law and Professor of International Science at the University of Chicago. She enumerated his more than 25 books, for several of which he won the most prestigious prizes in his field.
Professor Ginsburg’s address started by comparing Judge Buergenthal’s life and career with the development of International Law following the Holocaust. Since 1945, the Right to Life for every human being, Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, Women’s Rights, etc. have all become mainstream, and especially the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He noted that we have just celebrated the 75th Anniversary of the UDHR!
He pointed out that initially, Human Rights were essentially national. The French declarations of 1789 applied to Frenchmen only and only those in France itself, not in the colonies. The rights of Englishmen likewise did not apply to those in its colonies. He called this particularism. Opposed to that was the work to get the ideas of Human Rights into National Constitutions, making them internationally accepted and legislated, cosmopolitanism.
Mr. Roy Cohen of the NIG Den Haag with H.E. Mr Greg French, Ambassador of Australia. Photography by Arnaud Roelofsz .
In this endeavor, he noted a group of important Jewish jurists who put these concepts into the international legal canon: Hersch Lauterpacht, Rafael Lemkin, Louis Henkin, Egon Schwelb, Jacob Robinson, and René Cassin.
Professor Ginsburg ended by showing the steadily growing number of national constitutions that include the UDHR as well as other ‘cosmopolitan’ ideas on human rights.
Dr. Karin van Leeuwen of the University of Maastricht, who has an historian’s view on the development of law, highlighted how human rights had entered Dutch law. She added Tobias Asser to the group above, who was elemental in establishing the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the first Court to settle in the Peace Palace.
H.E. Modi Ephraim, Ambassador of Israel. Photography by Arnaud Roelofsz
The ambassador of Israel, H.E. Modi Ephraim, stressed the importance of remembering The Holocaust, especially in the light of the Hamas atrocities on October 7th, and the subsequent worldwide rise of overt antisemitism. Livia and Gabriël Lokker, young teenage twins, then lighted six candles in honor of the six million Jews who were murdered during the Holocaust. At the same time, Naomi van Hessen and Arkady Blegherov performed brilliantly on violin and viola. The complicated ceremony was emceed like clockwork by Ms. Laura Renberg.
The formal addresses were followed by a shortened version of a documentary by the noted documentarist Nathalie Toisuta on the life and work of Judge Thomas Buergenthal. In a deeply moving series of interviews with the judge, his wife, and his sons, she showed how his survival in the camps formed him and urged him to become a human rights lawyer. His career was crowned by his appointment to the bench of the International Court of Justice.
Rabbi Smuel Katzman. Photography by Arnaud Roelofsz .
Rabbi Smuel Katzman, the originator of the IHRD The Hague tradition, closed the evening by saying that getting Human Rights into law may have originated in a cosmopolitanism movement. Still, it had to be implemented in a particularist environment, in the national constitutions.
The seminar was attended by over 350 people, among which many VIPs and representatives of the Diplomatic Corps in The Hague, judges from the ICJ, the President of the Dutch Supreme Court, Secretary General of the PCA, MP Pieter Grinwis, and ambassadors of Israel, France, Slovenia, Kosovo, Switzerland, Rwanda, Germany, Ecuador, Canada, Australia, and South Africa.
Rabbi Soetendorp with HE Vusimuzi Mandonsela. Photography by Laura Renberg.
The latter, H.E. Vusi Madonsela, flaunting a large Rainbow-Nation’s scarf, got into a very lively discussion with Rabbi Awraham Soetendorp. When your correspondent asked him what he would suggest when a deadly enemy who has sworn to annihilate you hides among civilians, he answered, “Don’t shoot”. What he would do, he wouldn’t say.
Livia and Gabriël Lokker, young teenage twins, lighting six candles in honor of the six million Jews who were murdered during the Holocaust. Photography by Arnaud Roelofsz.International Holocaust Remembrance Day 2024, Peace Palace, The Hague. Photography by Arnaud Roelofsz.
Thursday, 25 January 2024, Munich, Free State of Bavaria, Germany: Bavaria’s European and International Affairs Minister Eric Beißwenger received the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Sweden, Veronika Wand-Danielsson, for a bilateral conversation in Munich’s Prince Carl Palais, managed by the state government.
European Minister Eric Beißwenger said as per statement: “Hej and välkommen: Meeting with the Swedish Ambassador Veronika Wand-Danielsson in the Prince Carl Palais of the Bavarian State Chancellery in Munich. We are a little proud that the first trip to a federal state after taking office is to Bavaria. Bavaria is pleased about Sweden’s accession to NATO. We want to work even more closely together on future technologies such as aerospace.” Ambassador Wand-Danielsson was accompanied to the meeting by Honorary Consul Dr. Mathias Fontin.
On the same day, Wand-Danielsson held a meeting with Bavaria’s Deputy Premier and Minister of Economic affairs, Regional Development and Energy, Hubert Aiwanger. Amongst the topics discussed were commercial exchanges with of satellites with the Space Center Kiruna. Moreover the fact that Sweden can become an important supplier country for hydrogen via the Nordic-Baltic corridor. Ca. 1600 companies in Bavaria carry out businesses with enterprises in Sweden.
Este 26 de enero del 2024, la Corte Internacional de Justicia (CIJ) dio a conocer su ordenanza, respondiendo a la solicitud urgente de medidas provisionales interpuesta por Sudáfrica contra Israel el pasado 29 de diciembre del 2023: el texto de la ordenanza puede ser consultado en este enlace en francés y en inglés.
Cabe advertir desde ya que esta ordenanza es una decisión preliminar de carácter ugente del juez de La Haya, distinta a la sentencia o fallo sobre el fondo, que se tomará tan solo dentro de unos años por parte del juez de La Haya.
Breve puesta en contexto
La petitoria final de Sudáfrica sobre las medidas provisionales de carácter urgente figura en las páginas 83-84 de su intervención ante los jueces de La Haya realizada el pasado 11 de enero y consta de un total de 9 puntos (véase texto). Por su parte, las conclusiones finales de Israel pidiendo desestimar y archivar esta solicitud se encuentran en la página 75 de su intervención ante los jueces realizada el 12 de enero del 2024 (véase texto)
Resulta de interés señalar que durante estas audiencias realizadas los días 11-12 de enero, Chile envió a su máximo representante en La Haya y lo hizo ver mediante un documento circulado por su aparato diplomático (véase comunicado oficial del 11 de enero). Menos de una semana después, conjuntamente con México, Chile solicitó a otra instancia jurisdiccional con sede en La Haya, la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI) la remisión urgente de la situación en Gaza a la Oficina del Fiscal de la CPI (véase comunicado oficial de Chile y comunicado de México, ambos del 18 de enero del 2024): tuvimos oportunidad de analizar en detalle ambos comunicados (Nota 1), planteando de paso la inacción observada por parte de los demás 122 Estados Partes al Estatuto de Roma.
El contenido de la ordenanza de la CIJ en breve
En el texto de su ordenanza dada a conocer este 26 de enero (parte dispositiva tomada con 15 votos a favor en su casi totalidad, párrafo 86), la CIJ declara que:
“1) Par quinze voix contre deux,
L’État d’Israël doit, conformément aux obligations lui incombant au titre de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, prendre toutes les mesures en son pouvoir pour prévenir la commission, à l’encontre des Palestiniens de Gaza, de tout acte entrant dans le champ d’application de l’article II de la convention, en particulier les actes suivants :
a) meurtre de membres du groupe ;
b) atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique ou mentale de membres du groupe ;
c) soumission intentionnelle du groupe à des conditions d’existence devant entraîner sa destruction physique totale ou partielle ; et
d) mesures visant à entraver les naissances au sein du groupe ;
2) Par quinze voix contre deux,
L’État d’Israël doit veiller, avec effet immédiat, à ce que son armée ne commette aucun des actes visés au point 1 ci-dessus ;
3) Par seize voix contre une,
L’État d’Israël doit prendre toutes les mesures en son pouvoir pour prévenir et punir l’incitation directe et publique à commettre le génocide à l’encontre des membres du groupe des Palestiniens de la bande de Gaza ;
4) Par seize voix contre une,
L’État d’Israël doit prendre sans délai des mesures effectives pour permettre la fourniture des services de base et de l’aide humanitaire requis de toute urgence afin de remédier aux difficiles conditions d’existence auxquelles sont soumis les Palestiniens de la bande de Gaza ;
5) Par quinze voix contre deux,
L’État d’Israël doit prendre des mesures effectives pour prévenir la destruction et assurer la conservation des éléments de preuve relatifs aux allégations d’actes entrant dans le champ d’application des articles II et III de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide commis contre les membres du groupe des Palestiniens de la bande de Gaza ;
6) Par quinze voix contre deux,
L’État d’Israël doit soumettre à la Cour un rapport sur l’ensemble des mesures qu’il aura prises pour donner effet à la présente ordonnance dans un délai d’un mois à compter de la date de celle-ci.
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(1) By fifteen votes to two,
The State of Israel shall, in accordance with its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in relation to Palestinians in Gaza, take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all acts within the scope of Article II of this Convention, in particular:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; and
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(2) By fifteen votes to two,
The State of Israel shall ensure with immediate effect that its military does not commit any acts described in point 1 above ;
(3) By sixteen votes to one,
The State of Israel shall take all measures within its power to prevent and punish the direct and public incitement to commit genocide in relation to members of the Palestinian group in the Gaza Strip ;
(4) By sixteen votes to one,
The State of Israel shall take immediate and effective measures to enable the provision of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance to address the adverse conditions of life faced by Palestinians in the Gaza Strip;
(5) By fifteen votes to two,
The State of Israel shall take effective measures to prevent the destruction and ensure the preservation of evidence related to allegations of acts within the scope of Article II and Article III of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide against members of the Palestinian group in the Gaza Strip;
(6) By fifteen votes to two,
The State of Israel shall submit a report to the Court on all measures taken to give effect to this Order within one month as from the date of this Order”.
De algunos detalles de interés
Resulta inusual que la Presidenta de la CIJ refiera expresamente, en el resumen de una decisión como la ordenanza leída este 26 de enero del 2024, al contenido de declaraciones oficiales, como las declaraciones israelíes escalofriantes oídas desde el pasado 7 de octubre: en la gestual extremadamente formal y a veces muy parsimoniosa de los jueces de la CIJ, este primer detalle no ha pasado desapercibido para muchos de los observadores internacionales. Tratándose además de una magistrada oriunda de los Estados Unidos, la señal enviada desde la Presidencia del máximo órgano judicial de Naciones Unidas puede considerarse particularmente clara.
Como se recordará la solicitud de Sudáfrica planteaba como primer punto (de los 9 que contenía su solicitud) el ordenar un cese al fuego inmediato, tal y como tuvimos la oportunidad de analizarlo en una nota anterior cuando presentó su demanda en diciembre del 2023 (Nota 2).
La CIJ no acogió esta solicitud de manera expresa. Algunos juristas podrían interpretar que la CIJ deja entonces a Israel la posibilidad de continuar sus acciones militares en Gaza, las cuales ya han causado la muerte de casi 26.000 personas y herido a más de 64.000 según el último informe de situación de Naciones Unidas al 25 de enero (véase informe). No obstante, el inciso 2 del párrafo operativo 86 viene a limitar esta interpretación literal, al señalar la CIJ que hay una inmediatez ordenada a Israel:
“(2)L’État d’Israël doit veiller, avec effet immédiat, à ce que son armée ne commette aucun des actes visés au point 1 ci-dessus /…/The State of Israel shall ensure with immediate effect that its military does not commit any acts described in point 1 above ;
Es de notar que con relación a una solicitud similar proveniente de Ucrania en febrero del 2022, esta misma solicitud de cese de las hostilidades sí había sido acogida de manera expresa – y de manera unánime – en la ordenanza del 16 de mazro del 2022 adoptada por la CIJ (véase texto).
Por otro lado, Sudáfrica solicitaba que la CIJ ordenara a Israel permitir la entrada de misiones internacionales de investigaciones en Gaza (más conocidas como “fact finding missions“). El punto 7 de su petitoria indicaba en efecto que:
“(7) The State of Israel shall take effective measures to prevent the destruction and ensure the preservation of evidence related to allegations of acts within the scope of Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; to that end, the State of Israel shall not act to deny or otherwise restrict access by fact-finding missions, international mandates and other bodies to Gaza to assist in ensuring the preservation and retention of said evidence“.
La CIJ no acogió esta petitoria: en el punto 5 del precitado párrafo 86 ordena únicamente a Israel proceder a evitar la destrucción de indicios de actos cubiertos por la Convención contra el Genocidio de 1948.
No obstante estos dos puntos de importancia que no fueron expresamente contemplados por los jueces de la CIJ en su ordenanza, los puntos 1,2,3,4,5 y 6 de su decisión leída este 26 de enero del 2024 dejan entrever que actos cometidos por Israel en Gaza desde la tarde /noche del 7 de octubre sí interesan disposiciones de la Convención contra el Genocidio de 1948: lo cual constituye en sí una señal muy significativa y debería interpelar en Israel (así como fuera) a muchos decisores sobre la forma tan peculiar que tiene Israel de llevar a cabo sus operaciones militares en Gaza.
En el párrafo 54 de la ordenanza de este 26 de enero del 2024 se lee que:
“54. La Cour est d’avis que les faits et circonstances mentionnés ci-dessus suffisent pour conclure qu’au moins certains des droits que l’Afrique du Sud revendique et dont elle sollicite la protection sont plausibles. Il en va ainsi du droit des Palestiniens de Gaza d’être protégés contre les actes de génocide et les actes prohibés connexes visés à l’article III et du droit de l’Afrique du Sud de demander qu’Israël s’acquitte des obligations lui incombant au titre de la convention.
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54. In the Court’s view, the facts and circumstances mentioned above are sufficient to conclude that at least some of the rights claimed by South Africa and for which it is seeking protection are plausible. This is the case with respect to the right of the Palestinians in Gaza to be protected from acts of genocide and related prohibited acts identified in Article III, and the right of South Africa to seek Israel’s compliance with the latter’s obligations under the Convention”
Al tiempo que en el párrafo 59 la CIJ dictamina que:
“59. La Cour considère que, par leur nature même, certaines au moins des mesures conservatoires demandées par l’Afrique du Sud visent à préserver les droits plausibles qu’elle invoque sur le fondement de la convention sur le génocide en la présente affaire, à savoir le droit des Palestiniens de Gaza d’être protégés contre les actes de génocide et les actes prohibés connexes visés à l’article III et le droit de l’Afrique du Sud de demander qu’Israël s’acquitte des obligations lui incombant au titre de la convention. En conséquence, il existe un lien entre les droits revendiqués par la demanderesse que la Cour a jugés plausibles et au moins certaines des mesures conservatoires sollicitées.
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59. The Court considers that, by their very nature, at least some of the provisional measures sought by South Africa are aimed at preserving the plausible rights it asserts on the basis of the Genocide Convention in the present case, namely the right of the Palestinians in Gaza to be protected from acts of genocide and related prohibited acts mentioned in Article III, and the right of South Africa to seek Israel’s compliance with the latter’s obligations under the Convention. Therefore, a link exists between the rights claimed by South Africa that the Court has found to be plausible, and at least some of the provisional measures requested”.
La ofensiva militar israelí en Gaza: algunas interrogantes
Desde un estricto punto de vista militar, la “estrategia” de Israel plantea serias interrogantes, al no haber alcanzado ninguno de sus objetivos militares después de más de 110 días de intensos bombardeos en Gaza: los rehenes israelíes siguen sin ser localizados, escondidos en alguna parte en Gaza con sus custodios; al tiempo que los principales mandos militares del Hamás siguen en vida y su estructura militar pareciera resistir al asedio total que Israel inflige diariamente a Gaza con sus bombardeos. Los numerosos escombros de inmuebles en Gaza constituyen ahora escóndites muy útiles para los combatientes del Hamás en sus operaciones contra las fuerzas militares israelíes. Un especialista francés en asuntos militares y connotado comentarista, recientemente escribió en su blog que:
“La situation sur la bande de Gaza est parfaitement désespérante. D’un côté, le gouvernement israélien annonce régulièrement qu’il va enfin sortir de cette opération dévastatrice dont le bilan est parfaitement catastrophique. Mais dans la réalité, rien ne change à ce stade où chaque jour renouvelle son lot de bombardements qui dévastent littéralement la bande de Gaza.
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Dans la partie Nord, censée avoir été nettoyée (c’est le terme militaire) par l’armée israélienne, les unités de Tsahal sont régulièrement harcelées par des miliciens qui ont fait des décombres leur refuge. Dans la partie Sud, l’armée affirme vouloir réduire le « quartier général stratégique » du Hamas qui se situerait à Khan Younes, après avoir été vainement cherché à Gaza même puis sous l’hôpital Al Shifa, un QG fantôme qui ne justifie en aucun cas les bombardements opérés sur l’ensemble de la bande de Gaza.
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Si cette opération déclenchée par le gouvernement Netanyahou contre la bande de Gaza continue, le risque d’escalade régional est avéré et le risque pour l’avenir d’Israël est constitué. Il appartient aux alliés d’Israël et à toutes les sociétés qui comprennent que la paix ne se construit pas dans la vengeance, de l’obliger désormais à sortir de cette impasse sanglante et de construire sur ces décombres inutiles l’avenir et la stabilité de cette région” (Nota 3).
Una ordenanza de la CIJ que lanza un llamado a la acción
Al haber Sudáfrica invocado la Convención contra el Genocidio de 1948 como base de competencia para interponer su demanda contra Israel el pasado 29 de diciembre, la CIJ tenía limitado su ámbito de acción, procediendo a verificar únicamente si las evidencias probatorias presentadas por Sudáfrica eran de recibo (o no) y si guardaban alguna relación (o no) con las disposiciones de este instrumento multilateral. El sútil equilibrio que la CIJ imprime tradicionalmente a sus decisiones no pareciera esta vez haberse verificado del todo.
Al señalar en su ordenanza que sí existe esta relación, que es plausible que Israel esté violando disposiciones de este instrumento, y al ordenarle a Israel varias de las medidas provisionales solicitadas por Sudáfrica, el equipo legal de Sudáfrica puede sentirse muy satisfecho por la labor realizada.
Esta ordenanza de la CIJ también interpela de ahora en adelante al resto de la comunidad internacional para idear cómo frenar de manera significativa a un Estado cuyas máximas autoridades parecieran decididas a llevar a cabo una operación militar punitiva contra la población civil de Gaza, en represalia al ataque sufrido en la mañana del 7 de octubre perpetrado en territorio israelí por parte del Hamás. Es muy probable que, ordenanza de la CIJ en mano, Estados, sea a título individual o colectivo, se planteen algunas interrogantes muy válidas:
-¿se puede seguir manteniendo relaciones diplomáticas, económicas “normales” con un Estado al que la CIJ señala que puede estar violando varias disposiciones de una emblemática convención como la Convención contra el Genocidio de 1948?
-¿se puede seguir exportando armas y municiones, componentes electrónicos con fines militares a un Estado que está demostrando no saberlos usar correctamente, con bombardeos indiscriminados y desproporcionales y una delibrada política de destrucción total?
-¿se puede seguir manteneniendo relaciones en el ámbito académico, en materia de cooperación técnica y científica, con un Estado que desde la tarde/noche del 7 de octubre destruye de manera intencional y deliberada escuelas, centros educativos superiores, y universidades en Gaza?
Por su parte, es muy probable que, también con la ordenanza de la CIJ en sus respectivas carpetas, los integrantes del Consejo de Seguridad, de la Asamblea General y de otras instancias de Naciones Unidas opten por nuevas iniciativas.
En cuanto a la Oficina del Fiscal de la CPI (que se ha mostrado hasta ahora bastante distante con el drama cotidiano que se vive en Gaza desde la tarde/noche del 7 de octubre), alguna declaración de su parte permitiría encausar acciones y materializarlas, de cara a establecer la responsabilidad penal individual de varios altos mandos israelíes: es lo que diversos sectores en Europa buscan realizar, en particular desde Francia y Bélgica (Nota 4).
En su comunicado oficial (véase texto) acogiendo con beneplácito la ordenanza de la CIJ, se lee por parte de Sudáfrica que:
“The United Nations Security Council will now be formally notified of the Court’s order pursuant to Article 41(2) of the Court’s Statute. The veto power wielded by individual states cannot be permitted to thwart international justice, not least in light of the ever-worsening situation in Gaza brought about by Israel’s acts and omissions in violation of the Genocide Convention. Third States are now on notice of the existence of a serious risk of genocide against the Palestinian people in Gaza. They must, therefore, also act independently and immediately to prevent genocide by Israel and to ensure that they are not themselves in violation of the Genocide Convention, including by aiding or assisting in the commission of genocide. This necessarily imposes an obligation on all States to cease funding and facilitating Israel’s military actions, which are plausibly genocidal “.
A modo de conclusión
No está de más señalar que los argumentos elaborados por la defensa de Israel, acompañados por esfuerzos inusuales por parte de algunos grandes medios de comunicación, no tuvieron mayor impacto en los jueces de la CIJ: esta ordenanza se tomó con un voto contudente de 16 contra uno (siendo el juez ad hoc israelí la única voz en contra), o en algunas partes del párrafo dispositivo 86, con 15 contra 2 (siendo la jueza oriunda de Uganda la otra voz discordante observada, que consideró oportuno emitir una opinión disidente). Cabe precisar que el juez ad hoc de Israel sí votó en favor de los puntos 3 y 4 del precitado párrafo operativo 86, mientras la juez titular oriunda de Uganda votó en contra.
Con relación a Israel, es de esperarse a reacciones iracundas contra los jueces de la CIJ por parte de sus máximas autoridades, las cuales ya no deben impresionar mayormente. En una nota anterior, tuvimos la oportunidad de señalar que:
“Israel deberá entonces ponderar si se arriesga a no acatarla o si cesa sus acciones militares en Gaza. El descrédito generalizado de su accionar en Gaza ha ido en aumento desde el pasado 7 de octubre, y colocarse en abierto desafío al máximo órgano judicial dentro del organigrama de Naciones Unidas conllevaría consecuencias, en particular para algunos de sus aliados más cercanos“.
Con relación a medidas provisionales ordenadas por la CIJ y posteriormente ignoradas por un Estado, recientemente tuvimos la ocasión de observar el irrespeto a las medidas ordenadas contra Rusia por parte de la CIJ en el mes de marzo del 2022, solicitadas por Ucrania (véase ordenanzadel 16 de marzo del 2022).
El conjunto de sanciones tomadas en contra de Rusia y que se reforzaron al no acatar Rusia lo establecido por el juez internacional a partir de marzo del 2022, interpelará probablemente a muchos en Europa, Estados Unidos y Canadá con relación a un eventual desacato por parte de Israel a la ordenanza de la CIJ leída este 26 de enero del 2024.
El autor:
Dr. Nicolas Boeglin.
Nicolas Boeglin, Profesor de Derecho Internacional Público, Facultad de Derecho,Universidad de Costa Rica (UCR). Contacto : nboeglin@gmail.com.
Nota 1: Véase BOEGLIN N., “Gaza / Israel: a propósito del anuncio de remisión conjunta de México y de Chile a la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI)“, editada el 18 de enero del 2024, y disponible aquí.
Nota 2: Véase BOEGLIN N., “”Gaza / Israel: a propósito de la reciente demanda interpuesta por Sudáfrica ante la Corte Internacional de Justicia (CIJ)“, editada el 29 de diciembre del 2023 y disponible aquí.
Nota 3: Véase ANCEL G., “L’Ukraine oblige l’Europe à se réveiller tandis qu’Israël sombre dans le déni“, Ne pas subir, Blog de Guillaume Ancel, édición del 20 de enero del 2024, disponible aquí.
Nota 4: En el caso de Francia, una propuesta del Senado circula desde el 5 de enero del 2024 (véase texto de la “proposition de résolution“) llamando a Francia a solicitar a la CPI e invitando en particular “… le Gouvernement à inclure dans ce renvoi une demande de saisine de la Chambre préliminaire aux fins que soient délivrés des mandats d’arrêt à l’encontre de M. Benyamin Netanyahou et de toute autre personne impliquée, selon l’évolution de l’enquête” (página 28). Cabe señalar además una declaración conjunta de profesores belgas de derecho internacional público (véase texto) con fecha del 13 de noviembre del 2023, indicando: “5. Compte tenu du risque de génocide, l’obligation de le prévenir, due conformément à la Convention de 1948 pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, est dès à présent déclenchée“. Esta declaración hecha en nombre de la Société Belge pour le Droit International (SBDI) denota una sensibilidad mucho mayor a la de otras sociedades europeas de derecho internacional público. Salvo error de nuestra parte, solamente se registra, anteriores al texto de la SBDI, esta declaración de expertos españoles en derecho internacional público y relaciones internacionales (véase texto) y esta otra adoptada en nombre de la Società Italiana di Diritto Internazionale (SIDI) el 13 de octubre del 2023.
