By Barend ter Haar. The words of Abraham Lincoln to honour the soldiers that sacrificed their lives in order “that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth” were spoken at Gettysburg, but these words apply as well to the countless soldiers that died for the cause of democracy in the following 150 years. Democracy has become such a sacrosanct concept that even the harshest dictatorships, such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, call themselves a democracy. But what is democracy? Was it democracy to give the British people the opportunity to vote about membership of the European Union after providing them with contradictory information about the consequences of leaving? Was it democracy to ask the opinion of the Dutch people about an Association Agreement with Ukraine for improper reasons? (The committee that took the initiative admitted that it did not care at all about Ukraine but wanted to use the referendum to destroy the European Union or drive the Netherlands out of the EU.) Is it democracy when Dutch ministers shy away from telling the people that the Netherlands is giving up (for very good reasons) part of its sovereignty to the European Union because that would incite people to vote for anti-European parties? (See my column Who dares to be honest? [1]) Obviously, if politicians believe that voters cannot be trusted with the truth, democracy is seriously at risk. For a democracy to function it is essential that a government respects the people and takes them seriously, not only those that have voted for that government, but all people. Furthermore, in order to exercise their democratic rights properly, people should be informed as fully as possible. Democracy is a form of conflict management within states, just as diplomacy is a form of conflict management between states. Both therefore usually lead to a compromise between different views and different perceived interests. That is certainly the case when a decision requires both agreement between and within states. Democracy is a living system of government that can only prosper by being reinvented again and again. It can be strengthened by a referendum if a question can be answered by a simple yes or no. However, democracy is undermined when people are made to believe that a complicated question that involves the interests of different countries can be satisfactorily answered by a referendum in one of these countries. Neither the future of the relation between the EU and Ukraine, nor the future relation between the United Kingdom and the EU can be based on a simplistic yes or no. [1] https://www.clingendael.nl/publication/who-dares-be-honest

By Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic. A freshly released IMF’s World Economic Outlook brings (yet again, for the sixth year in a row, and for the third time this year only) no comforting picture to anyone within the G-7, especially in the US and EU. Will the passionately US-pushed cross-Atlantic Free Trade Area save the day? Or, would that Pact-push drag the things over the edge and mark an end of the unionistic Europe? Is the extended EU conflict with Russia actually a beginning of the Atlantic-Central Europe’s conflict over Russia, an internalization of mega geopolitical and geo-economic dilemma – who accommodates with whom, in and out of the Union? Finally, does more Ukrainian (and Eastern Europe) calamities pave the road for a new cross-continental grand accommodation, of either austerity-tired France or über-performing Germany with Russia, therefore the end of the EU? For whose sake Eastern Europe has been barred of all important debates such as that of Slavism, identity, social cohesion (eroded by the plunder called ‘privatization’), secularism and antifascism? Why do we suddenly wonder that all around Germany-led Central Europe, the neo-Nazism gains ground while only Russia insists on antifascism and (pan-)Slavism? Before answering that, let us examine what is (the meaning and size of) our Europe? Where, how and – very importantly – when is our Europe? For example, is the non-EU Europe the existent but invisible world, sort of the dark side of the moon? Or, is that something more? Beyond the ancient Maastricht and Schengen: the Roman Hadrian Wall and Limes Line there was no world at all. There was only (an instrument of) the Silk Road – that antique WTO, isn’t it? Hence, is this unionistic condominium the best of Europe, or Europe itself? Is the EU an authentic post-Westphalian conglomerate and the only logical post-Metternich concert of different Europes, the world’s last cosmopolitan enjoying its postmodern holiday from history?[1] Is that possibly the lost Atlántida or mythical Arcadia– a Hegelian end of history world? Thus, should this OZ be a mix of the endemically domesticated Marx-Engels grand utopia and Kennedy’s dream-world “where the weak are safe and the strong are just”? Or, is it maybe as Charles Kupchan calls it a ‘postmodern imperium’? Something that exhorts its well-off status quo by notoriously exporting its transformative powers of free trade dogma and human rights stigma[2]–a modified continuation of colonial legacy when the European conquerors, with fire and sword, spread commerce,[3] Christianity and civilization overseas – a kind of ‘new Byzantium’, or is that more of a Richard Young’s declining, unreformed and rigid Rome? Hence, is this a post-Hobbesian (yet, not quite a Kantian) world, in which the letzte Mensch expelled Übermensch? Could it be as one old graffiti in Prague implies: EU=SU²? Does the EU-ization of Europe equals to a restoration of the universalistic world of Rome’s Papacy, to a restaging of the Roman-Catholic Caliphate? Is this Union a Leonard’s runner of the 21st century, or is it perhaps Kagan’s ‘Venus’– gloomy and opaque world, warmer but equally distant and unforeseen like ‘Mars’?[4] Is this Brussels-headquartered construct, the 20th century’s version of Zollverein with standardized tariffs and trade, but of an autonomous fiscal policy and politics? Thus, is the EU a political and economic re-approachment of sovereign states or maybe just an(other) enterprise of the borderless financial capital? Ergo, would that be a pure construct of financial oligarchy whose invisible hand tacitly corrupted the Maastricht Treaty as to web-up a borderless, limitless, wireless and careless power hub, while at the same time entrenching, silencing and rarefying labour within each nation state? Is this a supersized Switzerland (ruled by the cacophony of many languages and enveloped in economic egotism of its self-centered people), with the cantons (MS, Council of EU) still far more powerful than the central government (the EU Parliament, Brussels’ Commission, ECJ), while Swiss themselves –although in the geographic heart of that Union – stubbornly continue to defy any membership. Does it really matter (and if so, to what extent) that Niall Ferguson wonders: “…the EU lacks a common language, a common postal system, a common soccer team (Britain as well, rem. A.B.) even a standard electric socket…“? Kissinger himself was allegedly looking for a phone number of Europe, too. Baron Ridley portrayed the Union as a Fourth Reich, not only dominated by Germany, but also institutionally Germanized. Another conservative Briton, Larry Siedentop, remarked in his Democracy in Europe that it is actually France who is running the EU ‘show’, in the typical French way – less than accountable bureaucracy that prevents any evolution of the European into an American-style United States. Thus, Siedentop’s EU is more of a Third Bonapartistic Empire than possibly a Fourth German Reich. The Heartland or Rimland? After all, is the Union yet another virtue out of necessity, as Brzezinski claimed, that after centuries of colonial overstretch and of mutual destructions (between protagonists in close geographic proximity), Europe irreversibly lost its demographic, economic and politico-military importance, and that the early EU was more of an attempt to rescue a nation state than it was the quest for a true enterprise of the European Community building? Despite different names and categorizations attached, historical analogies and descriptions used, most scholars would agree upon the very geopolitical definition of the EU: Grand re-approachment of France and Germany after WWII, culminating in the Elysée accords of 1961. An interpretation of this instrument is rather simple: a bilateral peace treaty through achieved consensus by which Germany accepted a predominant French say in political affairs of EU/Europe, and France – in return – accepted a more dominant German say in economic matters of EU/Europe. All that tacitly blessed by a perfect balancer– Britain, attempting to conveniently return to its splendid isolation from the Continent in the post-WWII years. Consequently, nearly all scholars would agree that the Franco-German alliance actually represents a geopolitical axis, a backbone of the Union. However, the inner unionistic equilibrium will be maintained only if the Atlantic-Central Europe skillfully calibrates and balances its own equidistance from both assertive Russia and the omnipresent US. Any alternative to the current Union is a grand accommodation of either France or Germany with Russia. This means a return to Europe of the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries – namely, direct confrontations over the Continent’s core sectors, perpetual animosities wars and destructions. Both Russia and the US has demonstrated ability for a skillful and persistent conduct of international affairs, passions and visions to fight for their agendas. It is time for Brussels to live up to its very idea, and to show the same. Biology and geopolitics share one basic rule: comply or die.   Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic,  is professor in international law and global political studies, based in Austria. Vienna, 08 JUN 2016 / Contact: anis@bajrektarevic.eu   ^[1] One of the greatest historians of our age, Sir Toynbee, gives an interesting account of our civilizational vertical. He clas-sifies as many as nineteen major civilizations: Egyptian, Andean, Sinic, Minoan, Sumerian, Mayan, Indic, Hittite, Hellenic, Western, Orthodox Christian/Russian, Far Eastern, Orthodox Christian/main body, Persian, Arabic, Hindu, Mexican, Yucatec, and Babylonic. Further on, there are – as he calls them – four abortive civilizations (Far Western Christian, Far Eastern Christian, Scandinavian, Syriac) and five arrested civilizations (Polynesian, Eskimo, Nomadic, Ottoman, Spartan). Like to no other continent, majority of them are related (originating from or linked) to European proper. ^[2] Lately, it looks like a Gay-rights Jihad at many places. The non-selective, but massive push without premeditation on the key issue here: whether homosexuality should be either tolerated behavior or promoted life-style, has to be urgently revisited and (re-)calibrated. As it stands now, this Gay-rights Jihad serves neither the human/behavioristic rights nor a worrying birth-rates decline. The European demographics is far more of a serious and urgent socio-economic problem. Why? It is closely related to the emotional-charge inflammable triangular issues – identity, migration and integration, and by it triggered (to say: justified) right-wing anti-politics. ^[3] Is globalization the natural doctrine of global hegemony? Well, its main instrument, commerce –as we know – brings people into contact, not necessarily to an agreement, even less to mutual benefits and harmony…Or, “If goods cannot cross borders, armies will” is the famous saying of the XIX century French economist Frederic Bastiat, so often quoted by the longest-ever serving US Secretary of State Cordell Hull. ^[4] ”No venue has been created in which an EU-wide public opinion might be formed… European Parliament elections are not truly European because they are 27 different elections with different electoral systems after campaigns in which national issues predominate… Under present procedures, both the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Council are selected in private meetings of heads of governments..”, says former Irish Prime Minister John Bruton. Bruton, J. (2013), How real is the danger of an EU collapse?, EU Journal Europe’s World 23(13) 2013, Brussels    

By Jan Dop. Introduction Embassies and Consulates have to deal with the Dutch when they represent their country in the Netherlands. Embassies and Consulates, however, enjoy a special status because they are considered to rule under their own flag and not under that of the country of residency. Nevertheless, on occasion they do have to deal with Dutch law, for example with regard to their locally hired personnel working in the Netherlands, when buying or selling property (residence, Embassy) or concluding any other commercial contract. This chapter will discuss the limits of diplomatic immunity and how said limits are defined, the consequences of the diplomatic status and the situations in which Dutch law will apply. Definitions Embassy An Embassy is the representation of a particular state in another state. Most states have their Embassy in the Netherlands located in The Hague, where the Dutch government is seated. The Ambassador The Ambassador is a diplomatic official, assigned (and recognized) to serve as the official representative of a particular state in a foreign state or an international organization. He holds the highest rank in the diplomatic hierarchy. A diplomatic mission headed by an Ambassador is known as an Embassy. Consulate A Consulate (or Consular Office) is predominantly in charge of issues relating to individual people and businesses, in other words, issues outside the scope of inter-governmental diplomacy. A country may have several Consulates or Consulates General in major economic centres to support their economic interests. Diplomatic corps The collective body of all diplomats residing in a particular country is called a diplomatic corps. State immunity Scope of immunity The independent character of a sovereign state conflicts with being subjected to the laws and jurisdiction of another state. For this reason, but also in order to enable states to carry out their public functions effectively, states have (state) immunity. State immunity refers to the right or privilege of being exempted from the existing power or jurisdiction of another state. National courts do not have jurisdiction over claims against a foreign state, its diplomats and/or diplomatic services. There is no uniform law on state immunity, but there are several conventions, such as the European Convention on State Immunity (ECSI 1972). Immunity of jurisdiction only applies to activities of governmental or public nature, the so-called acta iure imperii. It is not applicable to activities of a private or commercial nature, the so-called acta iure gestionis. This distinction is widely accepted. When immunity cannot be invoked, this does not necessarily mean that a judgement can be executed or property can be seized in full. According to the ECSI for example, a convicted member state will have to comply with the judgement by choice. However, it is not possible to seize property meant for public services. It is not permitted either to attach any goods or financial assets of the foreign state that are intended for public services. It is not clear however, whether bank accounts of diplomatic missions and consular posts can be attached. From numerous court decisions it can be concluded that, in case the bank account only serves the purpose of allowing the diplomatic mission or consular post to function, it cannot be attached. Waiving immunity Immunity from jurisdiction is not absolute. Therefore, the question of immunity only arises when the foreign state refuses to submit to the jurisdiction of the local court. A state is considered to waive its immunity when it appears in court, when it acts as plaintiff or starts a counterclaim, unless, of course, it appears in court to invoke immunity. Foreign states can waive their immunity voluntarily (in advance), both explicitly and silently. When immunity is waived or not applicable, the substantial rules of law applicable by the local or territorial court are fully effective. Immunity of jurisdiction with regard to employment law Almost all employment law issues are considered as acta iure gestionis of the Embassy if the work is performed in the receiving state and the employee has the nationality of the receiving state. Therefore, in most employment matters, state immunity cannot be invoked. This might be different with regard to diplomatic staff or personnel employed directly with the Ambassador. With regard to a state that is not a party to the ECSI, the court will apply international customary law, which considers the conclusion of an employment agreement an actus iure gestionis. Case law shows that the employing state cannot invoke its immunity if the employee has the nationality of the receiving state, if he has permanent residency in the receiving state, and/or if there are convincing connections between the employment and the receiving state. Dutch employment law can therefore also apply to diplomatic missions. The exception with regard to the legal obligation of Dutch employers to obtain a UWV (Employee Insurance Agency) permit in case they want to dismiss an employee, has lapsed since 1 July 2015. Thus, in the event of dismissal of an employee, depending on the reason for the dismissal, either the UWV or the Subdistrict Court will have to be addressed. For more information on Dutch employment law see Chapter 3. Finally, a state can invoke immunity in legal proceedings with regard to the termination of a private (employment) contract if these proceedings interfere with state security. Immunity of jurisdiction with regard to social security Locally hired staff will not be exempt from national insurance and employee insurance, such as state pension (AOW), incapacity for work benefits (WIA), sickness benefits and unemployment benefits (WW). Social security is also compulsory for technical staff, administrative staff and operating staff staying permanently (for longer than ten years) in the Netherlands. Diplomatic staff and staff that don’t have the Dutch nationality and are already insured in the country of origin are exempt from the insurance requirement. The social security requirement also includes the employer’s obligation to comply with the Dutch regulations regarding guidance and reintegration of sick employees. This includes regular contact with the occupational health and safety physician. Failing this, the paying institution, the UWV, may decide that the employer has acted inadequately and thus has to pay the wages of the sick employee not only during the first two years of sickness but also during the third year. Immunity of jurisdiction with regard to commercial contracts A state’s conclusion of a commercial contract is, in principle, an actus iure gestionis and therefore not subject to state immunity. Such contracts may be so closely linked to the interests of a state that they nevertheless fall under state immunity, which is not very common, however. Thus, for instance, an agreement for the supply of computer equipment for the Embassy will, in principle, not fall under state immunity. One exception is, in particular, state security, as a result of which immunity may indeed be applicable to a security software agreement. Immunity of jurisdiction with regard to real estate Embassies and the premises of Ambassadors are inviolable, even if they are not yet utilized. They are on Dutch territory however, and thus Dutch law is applicable to these premises, including real estate law. This is all the more so if the Embassy owns real estate which is not used for diplomatic services. Therefore, it is important to verify in advance whether your intended use of the premises corresponds with the zoning plan (not all villas in Wassenaar may be used as an office) and whether municipal permits are required. Changes to the building that have an effect on the appearance of the premises (cleaning/painting the facade or changing single glazing into double glazing!) require a permit, especially if the premises are a registered monument or part of a conservation area, as is the case with most Embassies. Security measures for Embassies, such as alarms, cameras, fences and/or roll-down shutters, often require a permit. If premises are leased, the owner has to agree to changes before they can be made. The same rules as to other commercial contracts apply to real estate contracts. Disputes with lessees, sellers, contractors and maintenance companies will be examined by a Dutch court according to Dutch law, unless specifically agreed otherwise. Diplomatic immunity Diplomatic immunity is a form of legal immunity to ensure that diplomats are given safe passage and are considered exempt from lawsuit or prosecution under the laws of the receiving state. The rules concerning diplomatic relations are laid down in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR 1961), which also applies in the Netherlands. The VCDR is an international treaty on diplomatic relations and the privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission. According to the Convention diplomatic relations between states and permanent diplomatic missions are determined by mutual consent. The functions of a diplomatic mission include:

• Representing the sending state in the receiving state

• protecting the interests of the sending state and of its nationals in the receiving state

• promoting friendly relations between the sending state and the receiving state

• developing economic, cultural and scientific relations.In general, diplomatic missions and their members and families must respect the principles of Dutch law because their immunity does not extend to legislation itself. Diplomatic immunity only restricts the Dutch authorities in exercising their power with regard to the diplomats’ compliance with Dutch legislation.In addition, according to the VCDR, the territory of the diplomatic mission is inviolable and immune from investigation or taxes (extraterritoriality). Representatives of the receiving state can only enter the diplomatic mission’s territory with consent from the head of the diplomatic mission.The diplomat is also inviolable. The private residence of a diplomat receives the same protection as the premises of the diplomatic mission. In addition, a diplomat is immune from the criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction (not relating to private immovable property or succession) of the receiving state. Immunity does not apply to the diplomat’s professional and commercial activities outside his official functions. The sending state can waive the diplomat’s immunity.Finally, even members of the administrative and technical staff and family members of the diplomatic mission enjoy some immunity, if they are not nationals of or residing permanently in the receiving state.Consular immunity Although Embassies and Consulates, and especially diplomats, enjoy immunity in the Netherlands, there are several situations in which they have to deal with Dutch law. The scope of their immunity depends on the diplomatic nature of their work and the nationality of their employees. Dutch employees are more likely to be subject to Dutch law than foreigners. In general, employees of diplomatic missions enjoy immunity with regard to their official acts, but not with regard to their personal conduct.

Conclusion The VCDR is not applicable to foreign Consuls and members of their staff. The consular mission falls within the scope of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR 1963), which confirms that Consuls and their staff enjoy immunity with regard to their official acts, but not with regard to their private acts.   About the author: Jan Dop is partner and Head of the Embassy Desk at Russell Advocaten. He advises and represents corporations, entrepreneurs and HR departments in corporate and commercial matters. Jan Dop, LL.M. (jan.dop@russell.nl).      

By Mr. Raphael  Mgaya, Advocate,  Ministry of Energy and Minerals, Tanzania. Fiscal regimes refer to laws and regulations governing taxation of a particular industry. The designing of a good fiscal regime for petroleum industry is challenging due to the high capital expenses involved, exhaustibility of petroleum resources and the volatility of revenues. The petroleum fiscal regimes are embodied within the hierarchy of laws namely, the Constitution, legislations, regulations and contracts, with the Constitution being the most superios in the hierarchy and contract being the least superior. The main elements of the oil and gas fiscal regimes in Tanzania are: royalty, cost recovery, profit sharing, state participation, bonuses, statutory taxes and fees. These elements are briefly discussed below: Royalty: This is a payment given to the resource owner. This is required under Section 113 of the Petroleum Act, 2015 (PA). Royalty is on sliding scale depending on the area where the hydrocarbon is being exploited with the rate being 12.5% onshore and shelf areas and 7.5% in the offshore areas. Royalty is charged on gross revenue.

Cost recovery: The PSA Contractor recovers the costs from the Cost Oil/Cost Gas. The cost recovery limit is 50% of the annual production net of royalty both onshore and offshore. The recoverable and non-recoverable costs are itemized under Annex D of each production sharing agreement (PSA) and the Model Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA), 2013. Annex D is used for the purposes of audit and control of costs. Some costs are not recoverable under the PSA such as financing charges, bonuses, costs related to arbitration, costs that were incurred prior to signing PSA, costs incurred due to gross negligence or willful misconduct of the Contractor/Licence holder. Profit Sharing: Profit oil and profit gas is the amount of oil or gas remaining after royalty and cost recovery has been deducted. This amount is shared between the national oil company (NOC), the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (on behalf of government) and the Contractor on pre-agreed proportions. The profit sharing is on the sliding scale with the share of the government increasing with increase in the size of production tranches. The MPSA 2013 contains benchmarks for profit sharing which are not binding (See figures below)

Tranches of Daily Production (BOPD)	NOC Share	Contractor Share
0-12,499	70%	30%
12,500-24,999	75%	25%
25,000-49,999	80%	20%
50,000-99,999	85%	15%
100,000- and above	90%	10%

 

Tranches of Daily Production (MMSCFD)	NOC Share	Contractor Share
0-19.99	60%	40%
20-39.99	65%	35%
40-59.99	70%	30%
60-79.99	75%	25%
80- above	80%	20%

  Fig. 1 Profit Oil Sharing Tranches (Onshore), MPSA 2013 Fig. 2 Profit Gas Sharing Tranches (Onshore), MPSA 2013 State participation: The state may elect to participate through the NOC upon commercial discovery. The State participation is not less than 25% (Section 45 of the PA). The MPSA 2013 sets out the modus operandi on State participation. The state participation has a long history. The state participation in the petroleum commercial activities is crucial for the reasons that it enables the State to assert its sovereignty over the strategic resources, promote transfer of technology to locals, promote employment of locals and increases the revenues flow to the State.

The State participation can be financed through many different ways such as paid up equity on commercial terms; paid up equity on concessionary terms; carried interest with repayment; tax swapped for equity; free equity; and equity in exchange for non cash contribution. In Tanzania, paid up equity on commercial terms and the carried interests with repayment are the most common. Bonuses: These are upfront payments to State. Bonuses are front-end loaded taxes they are considered as regressive from the point of view of the investor. Bonuses were initially introduced by Article 11 (c) of the MPSA 2013. The same is provided in PA under Section 115 and Section 116. The signature bonus rate is not less than $2.5million and production bonus is not less than $5million. Bonuses are not recoverable under the PSA but they are deductible for tax purposes. Domestic Market Obligation (DMO): Licence holder and Contractor are obliged to satisfy domestic market on pro rata basis with other Contractors (PA, Section 98 (1)). Both the Natural Gas Policy 2013 and the PA require that the natural gas price for supply in the domestic market should be determined based on the strategic nature of the project (PA, Section 99). Corporate Income: Resident Company is taxed at 30% on its worldwide income. A non-resident is taxed 30% on its Tanzanian sourced income. A new company is taxed at 25% if is listed on the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE) and at least 30% of its shares is held by general public. Annual Fees: The PA states that the amount of fees is to be prescribed in the regulations. The fees includes: Annual fees, Acreage rentals, and training fees which is currently is USD 400,000 as per the MPSA, 2013, and research fees. The actual training fees differ from PSA to PSA depending on the rate agreed at the entering into the PSA. The new rental fees as proposed by the new MPSA 2013 are: Initial period: USD 50 per sq.km; First extension USD 100 per sq.km; and Second extension USD 200 per sq.km. Ring fencing: Contract expenses are ring fenced within the Contract Area. The recoverable Contract expenses must have been incurred prior to the commencement of production. Activities in different contract areas are treated as separate operations and are taxed separately as per Section 20 of the Finance Act 2013, Section 118 PA 2015, Section 19 of Income Tax Act, 2004, Article 12(c) MPSA 2013. Capital Gain Tax: This applies in case of corporate reorganization and acquisition of assets. Transfer of shares subject to Capital Gain Tax at the rate of 30% of turnover. Since July 2012, indirect share transfer maybe taxed. The change of owner ship by 50% is treated under the Income Tax as a realization of asset/liabilities. Farm-out/Farm-in Fees: The MPSA 2013 introduces special fees for Farm-out and Farm-in arrangement: For the first USD 100mil: 1%; for the next USD 100mil: 1.5%; and for every dollar thereafter: 2%. This is not applicable to the existing PSAs. It applies to future PSAs which will be signed on the basis of the MPSA 2013. Withholding Tax: This is the amount of a service or goods provider’s pay withheld by the taxable entity and sent directly to the government as partial payment of income tax. The rate is 5% from payment of resident providers of technical or management services. Dividend is taxed 10%, but 5% for companies listed at DSE or in case 25% shares owned by residents. Value Added Tax (VAT): VAT is a pass through tax that applies at every transaction point. The rate is 18% of all taxable goods and services. All suppliers of goods and services with turnover at least TZS 40 million must be registered for VAT purposes. The oil and gas exploration companies are exempted from the VAT to extent provided in their respective PSAs. Other Taxes and Fees: Goods imported or exported in connection with oil and gas exploration activities are exempted from import and export duties. Stamp duties is payable in case of transfer of property or in case of assignment of rights under lease agreement at the rate of 1% of the turnover. Currently, the PAYE is payable at the rate ranging from 12% to 30% of the basic salary for resident employees and for non-resident employee the rate is between 15% employment income and 20% on the total income. The new rates of PAYE will be effective from 1 July 2016 where the minimum rate will be 9%. All employers with at least 4 employees are obliged to pay 5% of gross wage bill as a skill development levy chargeable under Section 14 (2) of the VETA Act. Worker’s Compensation fund became effective since July 2014. All private sector employers have to contribute to the Fund a rate 1% of annual wage bill as per the Workers’ Compensation Act, 2008. The employers also have to make contribution to pension funds of the employee’s choice. Service levy is also payable by companies at the rate of 0.3% to the municipal authorities of turnover or sales as per the Local Government Finance Act, 1982. Generally, there are several tax reliefs that are provided to oil and gas companies. These include the capital allowances and other reliefs provided under tax laws and bilateral agreements. So far the United Republic of Tanzania has entered into double taxation treaties with various countries including Canada, Denmark, Finland, India, Italy, Norway, South Africa, Sweden and Zambia.   The author is an Advocate of the High Court. He holds an LLB (Hons), LLM (Int’l law), LLM (Oil and Gas law); MBA (Corporate Management). He can be reached through: raphael.mgaya@gmail.com or consult@mgaya.lawyer              

By doc. dr Jasna Čošabić. IT law or cyber law or internet law, is evolving in giant steps. On its way, it has many challenges to meet and a lot of burdens to cope with. Being a part of international law, it is though specific in its nature, mode of implementation and protection. While the classic international law deals with classic state territories, state jurisdictions, with a clear distinction between national laws, the IT law is uncertain about the state jurisdiction, earthbound borders, rules and proceedings regarding any dispute arising on internet. However, with a fast development of information technology, the number of legal contracts and businesses on internet rises, requiring the fast response by legal order in terms of regulating and protecting it. From the time internet emerged, each entity operating on internet provided for its own rules. With the IT becoming more complex and demanding so were the rules. We therefore say that internet is self-regulated, with no visible interference by state, apart from criminal activities control. Some authors even call the internet private legal order where stateless justice[1] apply. Justice usually needs a state, which is a supreme authority, having the monopoly of violence, or the legitimate use of physical force. But speaking in internet terms, self-regulation has evolved, with the state interferece being mainly excluded. The form of entering into online contracts gets simplified, mainly requiring just a mouse click by ‘I agree’ or ‘I accept’. The quantity of such legal interactions increases. It is often simpler and more convenient to purchase goods via internet, e-commerce blumishes. Parallely to Single Market, the European Commission, the Junker’s Commission, has started to boost a Digital Single Market in 2015, which would provide growth of digital economy. It’s aim is to provide the EU citizens equal online access to goods and services, making a parallel world to a conventional or a non-digital one. The Commission has just, on 25 May 2016, presented a package of measures in that regard with the objectives of advancing EU data protection rules, reform of telecoms rules, copyright, simplyfying consumer rules for online purchases, providing the same online content and services regardless of EU country, etc. However, what happens if a dispute arises from an online legal interaction. Which court is in charge? In which state? Under what fees? The law has always provided for a procedural protection of obligations entered into by various types of contracts. The usual protection belongs to courts. Court proceedings may sometimes be time-consuming, barry expensive fees, and are usually non-voluntary for at least one party to the proceedings. That usually brings the use of multi-level proceedings, recourse to remedies and ends in compulsory enforcement proceedings. With the development of trade, especially of trade which crossed the state borders, there emerged a system of solving disputes before a non-judicial bodies, arbitration. Arbitration became a convenient way of solving disputes arising from contracts that involve a cross border element. The very important segment, which was not present in conventional court proceedings, is voluntarity of parties which agree even prior to any dispute that might arise, about an arbitration body which would be in charge, in case a dispute happens. The arbitration become institutionalised, like the Paris ICC Arbitration, New York International Arbitration Center, etc.. However, many forms remain non-institutionalised, which include impartial experts in the area of dispute, who with the help of parties, and implementing various forms of mediation and arbitration, aim to resolve the issue. This way of settling cases became very well accepted, as the parties voluntarily agree to arbitration rules and therefore enforcement of any such decision becomes more acceptable to parties and usually deprived of a compulsory element. So not many arbitration awards face compulsory enforcement by courts, which is otherwise provided by the New York Convention[2]. However, with the emergence of online trade, there also came a question of solving any such dispute that might arise from online trade, whether the subject of such trade are goods or services. It is more natural for parties who enter into their contract online, to solve the dispute online. In February 2016 the European Commission has launched an Online Dispute Resolution Platform (ODR)[3] in order to provide for the structured and institutionalized recourse to resolving legal disputes arising on internet. It is designed to bring together the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) entities by member states, which fulfill certain quality conditions, provided in the Directive on consumer ADR. [4] The European Parliament and the Council of the EU have adopted two key documents in respect of online dispute resolution (2013), i.e. the Directive on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and Regulation on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes. [5] The parties to the proceedings are a consumer, being a natural person, acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business, craft or profession, and resident in the Union, and a trader, a natural or legal person, privately or publicly owned acting for purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession. The fees of the proceedings are supposed to be minimal or none. The length of proceedings should not exceed 90 days. Comparing to court proceedings, which are often lengthy and costly, this makes a good alternative. Each trader is obliged to make visible the link to ODR platform, informing and enabling thus the consumers to initiate the proceedings in case of dispute. The online dispute proceedings are to be led by key principles[6] that ADR must fulfil including expertise, independence and impartiality, transparency including listing of ADR entities, natural persons in charge of ADR, the average length of ADR procedure, the legal effect of the outcome of ADR procedure including penalties for non-compliance, the enforceability of the ADR decision, if relevant. ADR proceedings must be effective, available and accessible with duration of up to 90 days except in highly complex disputes. But the question which arises after every dispute is solved, is the enforcement of its outcome. While the EU has just recently put forward the ODR platform, creating common principles of procedure for alternative dispute resolution entities joining the platform, there are already some good examples of self-regulated dispute resolution bodies. Some of the most succesful models include Pay Pal, CyberSettle, and Domain dispute resolution-UDRP. CyberSettle, the world’s first online claim settlement company which was launched in late 90’s and pattented in 2001, invented the ‘double-blind bid’ dispute resolution process, which includes two parties each making three offers and three demands in dispute resolution, in separate ‘blind’ submissions. The CyberSettle automatically choses the closest middle solution. PayPal profiled a system of chargeback, upon the complaint by the customer to his credit card issuer, in case, for example, of not receiving the ordered goods. PayPal holds the funds until the issue is resolved. UDRP (Uniform Domain-Name Resolution Policy) was designed to protect Trademarks from registering the same or similar domain names by non-owners of Trademarks, or cybersquatting. The common ingredient of these success stories is that the above ODR bodies themselfes provided for an efficient system of enforcement, i.e. the self-enforcement. The self-enforcement is considered to be the simplest and best way of enforcing a decision arising from an online dispute. Self-enforcement is possible with the support of technology. Another good incentive for enforcement is a trust the trader enjoys in the digital market. The impairment of the trust in the trader, would automatically scale down his position in the digital market. If a trader holds a Trustmark, as a guarantee of his quality, losing it for not complying with an online dispute resolution decision, would put him in a disadvantaged position, and would certainly make him obey the decision. Moreover, disclosure of list of traders not complying with ADR/ODR decision might be detrimental to their reputation, which speaking of online traders, plays very important role in geting trust from the consumers in digital market. Furthermore, social networking on internet enable the information to spread fast, which as a result may lead to a drop of trader rating. The trust is, speaking of online business, of utmost importance. Digital market is more sensitive and depending upon acceptance by the public then regular market. It responds quicker and any flaw is easily transmitted via internet. It lacks the physical assesment and therefore it is more reliable on written information. The market rules will certainly define that it is better for a trader to comply with the ODR decision, then to get an unfavourable reputation. E-commerce and e-business relies significantly on trust that it has built towards the custommers. A custommer is much more careful when entering an online shopping site then entering a real shopping mall. It is still early to have a case-law resulting from running of the ODR platform, as it has just been released in February 2016. However the move by the European Commission to bring the self-regulation and self-enforcement under certain unified rules, shall certainly bring results. The platform is currently applicable in EU member states, except for Croatia, Luxemburg, Poland, Romania and Spain. The remaining 23 member states reported to the Commission a wide list of ADR bodies, which may operate under different names, ombudsman, mediator, arbitrator, etc. This is a huge step in moving from the conventional court system, in cases that originated in online interactions. That gives another unified form to the online legal order that has been creating spontaneously and hectically from the time the internet spread as a tool. The European Commission, representing the key governing functions of the EU, made a move towards bringing online system of running businses, especially B2C, more secure and more convenient for the consumers. The enforcement of ADR decision should therefore not be uncertainty of online dispute resolution proceedings. In that regard, it should be stressed that a milestone judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, Hornsby v. Greece (1997), provided that it would be ‘illusory of a Contracting State’s domestic legal system allowed a final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party’. Accordingly, all procedural guarantees would be purposeless without protecting for the implementation of the result of the proceedings. Although the ODR proceedings are not judicial proceedings, often being left without state control, ammounting thus to stateless justice as referred to above, it would be unimaginable that the decision ending the online dispute resolution, remains with no effect in praxis. It would make the whole concept of online dispute resolution useless and deprived of its advantages, such as availability, fast resolution, small or no fees, and would eventually bring parties to the court, with all the shorcomings when online disputes are at stake, such as long proceedings, high fees, time-consuming, duty of appearing of parties in person, but with a certain enforcement. Accordingly, in order for the online dispute resolution to endure and evolve, as a breakthrough in IT law, the enforcement of its outcome, must not be compromised. About the author: doc. dr Jasna Čošabić is a professor of IT law and EU law at Banja Luka College, Bosnia and Herzegovina jasnacosabic@live.com   [1] See Ortolani Pietro, The Three Challenges of Stateless Justice, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 2016, 0, 1-32, Oxford, p. 6 [2] The Convention on the Recognition of Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 [3] https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/odr/main/index.cfm?event=main.home.show&lng=EN [4] Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR) [5] Regulation (EU) no 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR) [6] Directive on consumer ADR

The Ibero-American Institute of The Hague for Peace, Human Rights and Justice (IIH), directed by Héctor Olasolo, organizes a two‑week event every year, which is partially hosted by the International & European Law Bachelor Program of The Hague University of Applied Sciences within its university premises. This event is referred to as the Ibero-American Week of International Justice. A record number of participants attended this 6th edition between 30 May and 10 June. The event is mainly in Spanish and features three main activities: The Spanish edition of the ICC Moot Court. The only international criminal law moot court competition for Spanish/Portuguese speaking students. The Ibero-American Week on International Justice. Bringing together professionals from various disciplines – law, psychology, engineers, religious studies etc.- to discuss current issues in this field during seminars. And the 1st Chinese Ibero-American panel on International Law. Providing a platform for discussion between two international actors. Additionally, there are also visits to several tribunals and international courts in The Hague. In 2011 the Ibero-American event started with 25 participants and has now grown to 250. This includes professors, researchers, students, law practitioners, social scientists, humanities professionals, and representatives from different embassies in The Hague. Therefore, the IIH hopes to expand its panels of discussions on international law to other countries and regions of the world. For example, in 2017 IIH plans to set in motion the Polyphonic Day of International Justice, with speakers from the Middle East, China, Latin-America, Spain, Portugal and Russia. The IHH expresses their thanks to the main sponsors: the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, the Argentinean Embassy to the Netherlands, the Municipality of Hague, and the Hague Academic Coalition. The IIH has a long standing relationship and intimate connection with the International & European Law Bachelor Program at The Hague University of Applied Sciences: the Spanish edition of the ICC Moot Court is applied law at its finest. The Law Program offers a specialization in International Criminal Law, which is one of the main areas of focus of the IIH event. It takes place in The Hague, the world capital of peace and justice, and attracts students of more than 60 different nationalities, including Spanish and Portuguese speaking countries.   To register for next year’s edition, for sponsor opportunities or to receive more information about the IIH, please contact Dr. Héctor Olasolo: info@iberoamericaninstituteofthehague.org News and updates can also be found on: Facebook:        www.facebook.com/InstitutoIIH/?fref=ts Twitter:           #InstitutoIIH Youtube:         www.youtube.com/channel/UCQniR5puGjKYrTPN2wRygyQ For information on the International & European Law Bachelor Program: www.thehagueuniversity.com  

By Roy Lie A Tjam. Cities are making the difference in our rapidly changing world. Diplomacy is no longer the preserve of national governments alone; cities are acting independently on the international scene. Cities as diverse as Chicago, Mombassa, Bangalore, Songdu and The Hague are examples of the city diplomacy phenomenon. In an address to university students in The Hague, City Diplomacy:noted that the city is the layer of government closest to the citizen, and is that to which he goes first when he would like to get something done. What really is City Diplomacy? Drs Willem Post, senior fellow at the Clingendael Institute in The Hague, media commentator and writer specialized in US politics and diplomacy, provides the answer in his fabulous new book, Cities go Global. In part, City Diplomacy incorporates non-state and sub-state actors. Key players include knowledge institutions, multinationals, NGOs, metropolitan regions and of course the cities themselves. Drs Willem Post is an advisor to the city of The Hague on International Affairs. In 2010, he published Attached to the World, a book on diplomacy and international relations. 2010 was the year the national governments of the United States and the Netherlands formally recognized cities as influential actors in international relations. According to President Barack Obama, strong cities are the building blocks of strong regions. Strong regions are essential for a strong America. Obama’s urban policy advisor Valerie Jarett, called cities the economic engines of the country. The Hague will be hosting the first-ever Global Parliament of Mayors from 10 to 12 September 2016. The Global Parliament of Mayors (GPM) is a new experiment in democratic global governance for cities. City diplomacy, smart cities, sister city partnership and more are all treated in Willem Post’s book, Cities go Global. The fascinating book is an eye-opener for city actors all over the world. ISBN: 978-90-821567-7-5 EAN: 9789082156775 Medium: Book 1 February 2016 Publishing house: Studio 92a

Hague Corporate Affairs: Doing business in the Netherlands By Branko van Loon, Director of Hague Academy and Associate Partner of Hague Corporate Affairs Is The Hague your new posting? Did you recently arrive in the Netherlands? Will you be dealing with the Dutch and their politics, governance or businesses? We can help you settle in and find your way in the Dutch political arena. Hague Corporate Affairs is specialised in assisting Embassies, International organisations and businesses in the field of communication, Public Affairs and media. Doing business in the Netherlands Based on their own international experience in diplomatic affairs, business and politics our trainers from The Hague Academy have developed a new service: a crash course for foreign organisations, businesses and diplomats. Doing Business in the Netherlands prepares our participants to effectively deal with specific features and characteristics of the Dutch people and their culture. We introduce you to the wonderful world of Dutch history, culture, politics and business. We take you through the labyrinth of good intentions that characterizes the Netherlands, show how power and influence work here, and what you should and should not do to be successful. We believe in an interdisciplinary approach. We provide advice and products on the cutting edge of communications, media and public affairs, i.e. corporate affairs. Hague facilitates the conversation with your stakeholders: from politics to business, from media to society. We strengthen your reputation and help you to achieve your goals. Corporate Affairs, Academy and Brand Journalism Multi-functionality is our strength. Our consultants from Hague Corporate Affairs provide strategic advice, and take their extensive experience and network in media, politics and business along to the training courses of The Hague Academy. Within Hague Brand Journalism we work with our experienced storytellers and designers to create info graphics, newsrooms and digital platforms. Together, these three branches form Hague and contribute to our ultimate goal: improving your conversation with the outside world. Come and visit us! Would you like to learn more? We cordially invite you for a cup of coffee in our beautiful historical building in the heart of the Dutch political district. Hague Corporate Affairs www.hague.company info@hague.company +31 (0)70 2400832    

Implementing the EU-Turkey Statement – Questions and Answers On 18 March 2016, EU Heads of State or Government and Turkey agreed to end the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU and replace it instead with legal channels of resettlement of refugees to the European Union. The aim is to replace disorganised, chaotic, irregular and dangerous migratory flows by organised, safe and legal pathways to Europe for those entitled to international protection in line with EU and international law. The Statement took effect as of 20 March 2016, and 4 April 2016 was set as the target date for the start of returns of people arriving in Greece after 20 March and of the first resettlements. 4 April 2016 thus saw the start of two processes: returns from the Greek islands to Turkey to make clear that this is a dangerous route and the wrong route; and the first resettlements of Syrian refugees from Turkey to Europe, to underline that this is how Europe lives up to its responsibilities as a continent committed to providing protection to those in need, as well as the Geneva Convention and to the fundamental right to asylum. The implementation of the Statement requires huge operational efforts from all involved, and most of all from Greece. As European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said, this is a Herculean task. Greece and Turkey are the two governments in charge of implementing the Statement. It is their authorities who have to do the legal and operational work. The Commission is assisting Greece with advice, expertise and support from the EU budget and by coordinating the support which is being provided by other Member States and EU agencies – via the EU Coordinator Maarten Verwey who is leading three teams in Brussels, Athens and Ankara. Significant steps in the implementation of the Statement have been taken and good progress in operationalising the Statement has been made. Continued success will however depend mainly on the political determination of all parties involved. So far, 511 Syrian refugees have been resettled from Turkey to Europe. The return of 462 migrants who had not made asylum applications in Greece has been carried out from the Greek islands to Turkey, in full respect of EU and international law. There has been a substantial decrease in the numbers leaving Turkey for Greece: In the weeks before the implementation of the Statement, around 1,740 migrants were crossing the Aegean Sea to the Greek islands every day. By contrast, the average daily arrivals since 1 May are down to 47, a decrease of over 95%. Continued efforts are needed from Greece, Turkey and all EU Member States in the days and weeks to come. What was agreed in the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March? The EU and Turkey agreed that: 1) All new irregular migrants or asylum seekers whose applications have been declared inadmissible crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as of 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey; 2) For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled to the EU from Turkey directly; 3) Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for irregular migration opening from Turkey to the EU; 4) Once irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU are ending or have been substantially reduced, a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme will be activated; 5) The fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap will be accelerated with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016. Turkey will take all the necessary steps to fulfil the remaining requirements; 6) The EU will, in close cooperation with Turkey, further speed up the disbursement of the initially allocated €3 billion under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. Once these resources are about to be used in full, the EU will mobilise additional funding for the Facility up to an additional €3 billion to the end of 2018; 7) The EU and Turkey welcomed the ongoing work on the upgrading of the Customs Union. 8) The accession process will be re-energised, with Chapter 33 to be opened during the Dutch Presidency of the Council of the European Union and preparatory work on the opening of other chapters to continue at an accelerated pace; 9) The EU and Turkey will work to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria. What has Greece done to implement the Statement? Since 18 March 2016, Greece has: Moved all migrants who arrived on the islands before 20 March to the mainland; Returned from Greece to Turkey 462 persons who entered irregularly after 20 March and did not apply for asylum; Adapted its hotspots to facilitate swift returns and provided for closed reception facilities where necessary to avoid irregular migrants absconding when they are subject to return decisions; Adapted its legislation to provide a legal framework for the implementation of the ‘first safe country of asylum’ and ‘safe third country’ principles and ensuring fast-track procedures for the examination of asylum applications, including appeal procedures with currently 20 appeal committees operational to examine all pending asylum claims at second instance by the end of 2016; Agreed to further amend their legislation to set up the new Appeal Authority and the new Appeal Committees responsible for the judicial review of decisions on applications for international protection taken by the Greek Asylum Service; Begun processing claims and delivering judgments and appeals, based on individual assessments. What has Turkey done to implement the Statement? Since 18 March 2016, Turkey has: Effectively received all those returned from Greece; Provided formal guarantees that all Syrian refugees returned to Turkey from the Greek islands may request and be granted protection under the temporary protection regulation in Turkey; Provided formal guarantees that non-Syrians in need of international protection who are returned from Greece to Turkey will be able to apply for and receive protection and have their applications processed in a timely manner and will be protected from refoulement; Agreed to allow the EU to monitor regularly the situation of Syrians and non-Syrians returned to Turkey, including access to refugee camps and centres, and concluded an agreement with the UNHCR to provide access to removal centres to monitor implementation of international protection procedures. The first visits to these camps and removal centres have already taken place; Ensured access to the labour market for non-Syrians in need of international protection; Put in place a roadmap to reduce the backlog of applications for international protection by non-Syrians; Completed and shared with the Commission a roadmap on the implementation of voluntary returns. The Turkish Parliament approved the entry into force of the provisions of the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement concerning third country nationals as of 1 June. The relevant law was signed by the President’s office on 18 May and published in Turkey’s Official Journal on 20 May. The entry into force of the provisions on third-country nationals of the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement should be completed with a decision by the Turkish Council of Ministers as a matter of urgency to allow for actual readmission. Continuous patrols by the Turkish and Greek authorities are an important factor in preventing migrants crossing the Aegean. The Greek and Turkish authorities now exchange information on a regular basis. During the first five months in 2016, the Greek Coast Guard alerted its Turkish counterpart to 120 search and rescue cases. Frontex has deployed a liaison officer in Ankara since April which has allowed for regular operational contacts and daily reporting with the Turkish National Frontex Point of Contact. Since 2 May 2016, a Turkish Liaison Officer has also been stationed with Europol. The Turkish authorities have set up units on migrant smuggling and human trafficking and are taking legislative steps to put in place higher penalties for smugglers. How many staff from the EU Agencies have been deployed to the Greek islands? EU Agencies are providing the necessary support to the implementation of the Statement. In total, 141 Frontex and European Asylum Support Office (EASO) officers are currently working in Greece under the EU-Turkey Statement (43 interpreters, 47 asylum experts and 51 escort officers) – corresponding to the current needs identified by the Greek authorities. A total of 584 Frontex officers are currently deployed in Greece within the framework of the Rapid Intervention Poseidon. All Member States have provided detailed indications including figures for their contributions to Frontex and EASO calls for experts and a significant number of additional experts have been identified for deployment should the Greek authorities so request. How many migrants arrived in Greece since 20 March? In the weeks before the implementation of the Statement, there were around 1,740 daily crossings of migrants to the Greek islands. Since 1 May the average daily number of arrivals is down to 47, a decrease of over 95%. The total numbers of irregular arrivals from Turkey to Greece in September, October, November, December 2015, January and February 2016 were respectively 147,639, 214,792, 154,381, 104,399, 61,602 and 56,335 persons. For the same months the corresponding daily averages were 4,921, 6,929, 5,146, 3,368, 1,987 and 1,943 persons. How many returns and resettlements have taken place so far? Since the Statement entered into force, there have been 462 returns from the Greek islands to Turkey of persons who did not apply for asylum or voluntarily revoked their asylum application, including 31 Syrians. Other nationalities returned have included Pakistanis, Afghans, Bangladeshis, and Iranians as well as people from Iraq, India, Congo, Algeria, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Nepal, Somalia, Ivory Coast, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority. In total, 1,546 returns of irregular migrants have been carried out from Greece to Turkey in the course of 2016. 511 Syrian refugees were resettled from Turkey to Europe to underline that Europe will live up to its responsibilities as a continent committed to the Geneva Convention and to the fundamental right to asylum. How are resettlements and returns physically being carried out? Resettlements from Turkey to the European Union are taking place via plane. Returns from the Greek islands to Turkey are taking place via ferry and bus. The operational arrangements are decided between Turkey and Greece. Frontex is assisting in their practical implementation. Frontex has mobilised the following resources for the time being: 2 ferries 3 buses for transportation from the hotspots to the ports 1 charter plane 51 Frontex escort officers On what basis are Syrians being resettled from Turkey? Resettlement from Turkey to the EU will be carried out in the first instance by honouring the commitments of Member States under the Council conclusions of 22 July 2015 of which 18,000 places for resettlement remain. Furthermore, the Commission has proposed an amendment to the relocation decision of 22 September 2015 to allow for the resettlement of an additional 54,000 persons under a voluntary arrangement. Beyond this, the Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme based on the Commission’s Recommendation to that effect last December, will be activated. How does the resettlement process, including the selection of candidates, work? To organise fast-track resettlement under the 1:1 scheme, a mechanism is being established and Standard Operating Procedures have been developed, in close cooperation between the Commission, Member States, EASO, UNHCR and Turkey. The system foresees that an initial list of resettlement candidates is prepared by the Turkish authorities on the basis of vulnerability criteria. This list is then assessed by UNHCR in order to identify the eligible cases to be submitted to EU Member States for resettlement, especially taking into account their situation and vulnerability. Member States make the final decision on candidates submitted to them by the UNHCR, and carry out their own security checks. On what legal basis are irregular migrants being returned from the Greek islands to Turkey? People who do not apply for asylum in Greece or whose applications for asylum have been declared inadmissible will be returned to Turkey. The legal framework for these returns is the bilateral readmission agreement between Greece and Turkey and the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement. On what legal basis are asylum seekers being returned from the Greek islands to Turkey? People who apply for asylum in Greece will have their applications treated on a case-by-case basis, in line with EU and international law requirements and the principle of non-refoulement – the EU-Turkey Statement has made this very clear. There will be individual interviews, individual assessments and rights of appeal. There will be no blanket and no automatic returns of asylum seekers. The EU asylum rules allow Member States in certain clearly defined circumstances to declare an application “inadmissible”, that is to say, to reject the application without examining the substance after a fast-track procedure and thereby to accelerate the process of handling applications. There are two legal possibilities that can be used for declaring asylum applications inadmissible, in relation to Turkey: 1) first country of asylum (Article 35 of the Asylum Procedures Directive): where the person has already been recognised as a refugee in that country or otherwise enjoys sufficient protection there; 2) safe third country (Article 38 of the Asylum Procedures Directive): where the person has not already received protection in the third country but the third country can guarantee effective access to protection to the readmitted person. To ensure full respect of EU and international law, Greece and Turkey have both taken a number of legislative and administrative steps. As well as providing assurances that all returned Syrians will be granted temporary protection upon return, the Turkish authorities have provided further written assurances to the Commission that each non-Syrian who seeks international protection in Turkey will enjoy protection from refoulement, in line with international standards and in accordance with the applicable Law on Foreigners and International Protection. The Commission has continued to support Greece by providing it with all the elements to conclude that Turkey is a safe third country and/or a country of first asylum within the meaning of the Asylum Procedures Directive, for the purpose of returning irregular migrants from the Greek islands to Turkey under the terms of the EU-Turkey Statement. The Commission, as communicated to the Greek authorities on 5 May, finds that the legal framework in Turkey which establishes the protection status granted to Syrians (Temporary Protection Regulation) appears as sufficient protection or protection equivalent to that foreseen by the Geneva Convention. The Commission assess that Turkey has taken all the necessary measures in order to allow Greece to declare, on the basis of individual assessments, an application for asylum inadmissible in accordance with the Asylum Procedures Directive for both Syrian and non-Syrian applicants for asylum who had irregularly crossed into the Aegean Islands via Turkey as of 20 March 2016. Moreover, at the meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 May 2016, Member States indicated that they share this assessment. What safeguards exist for asylum seekers? All applications need to be treated individually and due account must be given to the situation of vulnerable groups, in particular unaccompanied minors for whom all decisions must be in their best interests. All applicants will also be able to appeal the decision. Will asylum seekers remain in Greece during the appeal procedure? Yes. When applying the concept of “safe third country” and “first country of asylum”, any return decision is suspended automatically while the first appeal is being treated. A further judicial appeal does not have an automatic suspensive effect on the return process. Where will migrants be accommodated whilst they await return? Migrants will be accommodated either in open or in closed reception facilities on the Greek islands. The Asylum Reception Conditions Directive and the Return Directive contain rules on the possibility to detain asylum-seekers and irregular migrants, in particular if there is a risk of absconding. Detention must only ever be a means of last resort and must be proportionate. The Commission is therefore asking Greece to pay particular attention to the needs of vulnerable people and unaccompanied minors, who in principle should not be detained. How can you be sure that asylum seekers will be given protection in Turkey? Both the EU and Turkey agreed in their Statement of 18 March to respect the principle of non-refoulement. Turkey has agreed to allow the EU to monitor regularly the situation of Syrians and non-Syrians returned to Turkey, including access to refugee camps and centres, and has concluded an agreement with UNHCR to provide access to removal centres to notably monitor Turkey’s practices in relation to international protection procedures. In addition, the EU is speeding up the disbursement of funds from the €3 billion Facility for Refugees in Turkey. This funding will support Syrians in Turkey by providing access to food, shelter, education and healthcare. An additional €3 billion will be made available after this money is used to the full, up to the end of 2018. The UNHCR will be a key actor in the resettlement process to provide additional support and supervision. Who is coordinating the EU support to implement the EU-Turkey Statement? Heads of State or Government meeting in the European Council on 17-18 March 2016 agreed that “the Commission will coordinate and organise together with Member States and Agencies the necessary support structures to implement it effectively.” President Juncker appointed Maarten Verwey to act as the EU coordinator to implement the EU-Turkey Statement. Maarten Verwey is the Director-General of the European Commission’s Structural Reform Support Service. He is supported by a coordination team responsible for the overall strategic direction and relations with key stakeholders, an operations group responsible for analysing all relevant data, planning and deployment of Member State experts, and a team focused on resettlement. A steering committee, chaired by the Commission with Greece, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Frontex, Europol, and representatives of the Netherlands (Council Presidency), France, the United Kingdom and Germany, oversees the implementation of the Statement when it comes to returns and resettlement and addresses bottlenecks. The EU coordinator has at his disposal significant resources from relevant European Commission services and EU agencies (FRONTEX, EASO, Europol). What financial support is being provided to Greece? The Commission estimated the costs of the practical implementation of the Statement to be around €280 million over the next six months and it was agreed that the EU budget should finance these costs. The EU will support Greece to put in place the necessary human resources, infrastructure and reception capacity in order to carry out registrations appeals processes and large scale return operations. Emergency assistance Since the beginning of 2015, Greece has been awarded €262 million in emergency assistance. For 2016, the Commission has significantly increased the emergency assistance budget under the Asylum Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the Internal Security Fund (ISF) – the total amount of emergency funding available in 2016 for the refugee crisis now stands at €464 million of which €267 million had been earmarked for Greece. Since the last report on 20 April, the Commission has awarded a further EUR €56 million of emergency funding under AMIF to increase the capacity of the Greek authorities to register new arrivals and process asylum claims. This funding will create better conditions for vulnerable migrants and strengthen the process with additional human resources, better IT infrastructure, increased availability of interpreters and better access to information. Discussions are ongoing with Greek authorities on further emergency assistance requests, including a request from the Greek Ministry of Health. This final set of emergency assistance requests would complete the implementation of the emergency response plan for Greece set out in March 2016. On 19 April, the European Commission announced €83 million under the new Emergency Assistance Instrument, proposed by the Commission on 2 March, to improve living conditions for refugees in Greece, with funding made available immediately to the UNHCR, the International Federation of the Red Cross and six international NGOs. Thanks to these new projects, the Commission will help provide tens of thousands of refugees and migrants in Greece with primary health care, food, better hygiene conditions, child friendly spaces and construct temporary housing. Funding available under the Greek multiannual National Programmes The emergency funding comes on top of the €509 million already allocated to Greece under the national programmes for 2014-2020 (€294.5 million from AMIF and €214.7 million from ISF). Frontex funding €60 million euro is available in funding for return operations, including the reimbursement of the costs of Frontex return experts, the reimbursement of transport costs (including vessels made available through Frontex) and the reimbursement of police officers for return escorts (including police officers seconded by other Member States on the basis of bilateral police cooperation agreements). EASO funding Under the budget of the European Asylum Support Office, €1.9 million is available to support Member States under particular pressure in 2016 with the funding of, for example, asylum experts and mobile containers. On 24 May, the Commission awarded €25 million in emergency funding to EASO to enhance its capacity to support the Greek authorities. Emergency Assistance mechanism On 2 March, the Commission proposed an Emergency Assistance instrument, providing €700 million over the next three years, to be used within the European Union to provide a faster, more targeted response to major crises, including helping Member States cope with large numbers of refugees. The estimated needs for 2016 are €300 million with a further €200 million each for use in 2017 and 2018, respectively. What happens to migrants who were already in Greece before 20 March? The total number of persons relocated from Greece by 10 June stands at 1,503. Although this constitutes progress, it still falls far short of the Commission’s ambition for Member States to relocate 6,000 people per month. With the financial support of the Commission and support on the ground from EASO and UNHCR, the Greek asylum service launched a major pre-registration exercise on 8 June with the aim to pre-register 1,400 persons per day to accelerate the identification and full processing of relocation applicants. A significant number of additional asylum seekers will be ready for relocation within the following months. What is being done to prevent the development of new alternative migratory routes? For the moment there is no evidence that new routes are developing directly as a result of the EU-Turkey Statement and the efforts to control the flows on the Eastern Mediterranean route. However, the situation is being monitored closely by the Commission and Frontex In the framework of the European Border Surveillance System, Frontex shares incident reporting and operational information, and undertakes risk analysis, in order to quickly identify any possible shift in migratory routes. Different surveillance tools, including satellite monitoring, are being used for the Adriatic Sea and the Mediterranean. The Frontex operation Triton in the Central Mediterranean has also been extended to cover the part of the Adriatic Sea between Greece, Italy and Albania. Aerial surveillance between Italy and Albania under the Triton operation is also taking place. What is the state of play as regards visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens? On 4 May, the Commission published its Third Progress Report on the implementation of Turkey’s Visa Liberalisation Roadmap and proposed lifting the visa requirements for the citizens of Turkey, under the understanding that the Turkish authorities will fulfil, as a matter of urgency and as they committed to do on 18 March 2016, the outstanding seven benchmarks. While two of the seven outstanding benchmarks require a longer timeline for implementation, five benchmarks remain to be fulfilled: To adopt the measure to prevent corruption foreseen by the Roadmap, ensuring an effective follow-up to the recommendations issued by the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); To align the legislation on personal data protection with EU standards, notably to ensure that the data protection authority can act in an independent manner and that the activities of law enforcement agencies fall within the scope of the law; To conclude an operational cooperation agreement with Europol; To offer effective judicial cooperation in criminal matters to all EU Member States; To revise the legislation and practices on terrorism in line with European standards, notably by better aligning the definition of terrorism in order to narrow the scope of the definition and by introducing a criterion of proportionality. For practical and procedural reasons, two of the seven outstanding benchmarks require a longer timeline for implementation: Fully implement the provisions of the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement; including those related to the third country nationals; Upgrading the existing biometric passport so as to include security features in line with the latest EU standards. Since 4 May, further progress has been made, notably with the entry into force on 1 June of the provisions related to third-country nationals under the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement which should be completed with a decision by the Turkish Council of Ministers as a matter of urgency to allow for actual readmission. The Commission will continue to support Turkey in the work that still needs to be done to fulfil the remaining benchmarks. What is the state of play as regards the implementation of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey? The Facility for Refugees in Turkey provides for a joint coordination mechanism for actions financed by the EU budget and national contributions made by the Member States, designed to ensure that the needs of refugees and host communities are addressed in a comprehensive and coordinated manner. The resources of the Facility will come from the EU budget and from EU Member States over 2016 and 2017, making a total so far of €3 billion over two years. In addition to €1 billion from the EU budget, all EU Member States have now sent in their contribution certificates for the €2 billion in national contributions pledged for 2016-2017. The Facility is now fully operational. So far, of the overall €3 billion, €740 million has been allocated, for both humanitarian and non-humanitarian assistance. Of the €740 million allocated, €150 million has been contracted. Of these €150 million contracted, €105 million has been disbursed so far. The Commission aims by before the end of the summer to have committed €2 billion of the Facility envelope for 2016-2017 and to have contracted €1 billion. Funding under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey supports refugees in the country – it is funding for refugees and not funding for Turkey. The support seeks to improve conditions for refugees in Turkey as part of the EU’s comprehensive approach to addressing the refugee crisis inside and outside the EU. Has the Commission presented a proposal to open Chapter 33 as referred to in the 18 March EU-Turkey Statement? Work is progressing on Chapter 33 (financial and budgetary provisions) as scheduled. The Commission submitted a Draft Common Position to the Council on 29 April. The examination of this document by the Council started on 3 May. This puts the Council in a position to complete the necessary procedures in time for the opening of this chapter during the Dutch presidency of the Council of the European Union, as referred to in the 18 March Statement.