Royal Delft

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Royal Delft, established in 1653, is the last remaining Delftware factory from the 17th century. The world famous Royal Delftware is still entirely hand painted according to centuries old tradition. History The history of Royal Delft goes back to the 17th century. Tradesmen ofĀ  the Dutch East India Company (founded in 1602) brought back large quantities of Chinese porcelain from the Far East. This type of porcelain, which was decorated in blue on a white background, was very popular among the Dutch, and soon afterwards Dutch potters started to imitate it. Porcelain was a material unknown in the Netherlands, and so the potters attempted to imitate the Oriental products as well as they could with local clay. They succeeded in a relatively short period of time, and shortly after that a large number of factories were founded especially in the city of Delft (over 30). ā€œDe Porceleyne Flesā€ ( The Porcelain Jar) was founded in 1653 by David Anthonisz. v. d. Pieth, at the center of Delft. At the end of the 19th century only a small part of the once so prosperous industry was left and the production of the old techniques was largely given up and been changed to printed, mass produced articles. tulpenvaas 2008 emmink In 1876 Joost Thooft, a delft engineer, bought the factory with the intention of restoring the old tradition of producing hand painted Delft Blue. Knowing that people had no more confidence in the older, fragile earthenware, he realized that he would rigorously have to change the technique. Together with Abel Labouchere, his associate since 1884, he succeeded in finding a mixture of clay that resembled the stronger, white English earthenware. From then on, they produced a product that obtained worldwide fame. Royal Delft became known all over the world. Collection The Royal Delft collection still consist of a extended variety of items such as tulip vases, plates, vases and tableware. All items areĀ  painted by hand by our master painters and carry our trademark, painters initials and year code. It is possible to personalize your Delft Blue with your own text or logo. Ordering can be on a piecemeal basis but a series is also possible. We could even develop a totally new design for you. Visit to the factory You can also Ā visit the Royal Delft Experience today and discover the world of Delft Blue. ItĀ  includes a journey through the history of Delft Blue and Royal Delft and through the development and production process. You will see the master painter at work and visitĀ  the factory. Also the museum with antique Delft pieces and the historical courtyard can be seen. Ā  Ā  Ā  Rotterdamseweg 196, 2628 ARĀ  DELFT Tel.: 015- 251 20 30 info@royaldelft.comwww.royaldelft.com

Fatou Bensouda on the withdrawal of charges

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Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda,Ā on the withdrawal of charges against Mr. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta On the 3rdĀ of December 2014, the Judges of Trial Chamber V (B) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) declined to further adjourn the trial of Mr. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta.Ā  Accordingly, given the state of the evidence in this case, I have no alternative but to withdraw the charges against Mr. Kenyatta.Ā  Earlier today, I filed a notice to withdraw charges against Mr. Kenyatta.Ā  I am doing so without prejudice to the possibility of bringing a new case should additional evidence become available. This is a painful moment for the men, women and children who have suffered tremendously from the horrors of the post-election violence, and who have waited, patiently, for almost seven years to see justice done. I have decided to withdraw the charges against Mr. Kenyatta after carefully considering all the evidence available to me at this time. Ā I have based this decision on the specific facts of this case, not on any other consideration.Ā  As Prosecutor, my actions and decisions have always been guided by the law and the evidence.Ā  Notwithstanding my personal commitment to pursue justice and accountability for Kenyans who were subjected to the terrible violence that swept through Nakuru and Naivasha after the 2007 elections, I can only proceed to trial when there is a reasonable prospect of conviction at trial based on the evidence at my disposal.Ā  If there is no such prospect then it is my professional responsibility as Prosecutor to withdraw the charges against the accused. You will recall that on 5 September 2014, IĀ  requested the Trial Chamber to adjourn the trial of Mr. Kenyatta until the Government of Kenya executes in full the Prosecutionā€™s April 2014 Revised Request for records.Ā  I informed the Chamber at that time that my evidence remained the same as when I sought an adjournment of the trial date in December 2013, and as such, that I did not consider the available evidence to be sufficient to prove Mr. Kenyattaā€™s alleged criminal responsibility beyond reasonable doubt as is required at trial. Despite my persistent efforts and those of my committed Team to advance the course of justice in Kenya, in this instance, those who have sought to obstruct the path of justice have, for now, deprived the people of Kenya of the accountability they deserve. I have explained to the people of Kenya the severe challenges my Office has faced in our investigation of Mr. Kenyatta. These include the fact that:
  • Ā·Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā  several people who may have provided important evidence regarding Mr. Kenyattaā€™s actions, have died, while others were too terrified to testify for the Prosecution;
  • Ā·Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā  key witnesses who provided evidence in this case later withdrew or changed their accounts, in particular, witnesses who subsequently alleged that they had lied to my Office about having been personally present at crucial meetings; and
  • Ā·Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā  the Kenyan Government’s non-compliance compromised the Prosecution’s ability to thoroughly investigate the charges, as recently confirmed by the Trial Chamber.
I am withdrawing the charges against Mr. Kenyatta because I do not believe that it is possible at this time, for me to fully investigate and prosecute the crimes charged in this case. The withdrawal of the charges does not mean that the case has been permanently terminated. Mr. Kenyatta has not been acquitted, and the case can be re-opened, or brought in a different form, if new evidence establishing the crimes and his responsibility for them is discovered. My Office will continue to receive and consider information which may shed light on those who are responsible for the 2007-2008 post-election violence, and will assess what further steps it can realistically and meaningfully take at this point in time in relation to the crimes committed in Nakuru and Naivasha, considering the current situation in Kenya. However, I wish to say a few words about the failure of the Government of Kenya to cooperate fully and effectively with my investigations in this case.Ā  From the time that the Prosecution submitted its revised 8Ā April 2014 Request to the Government of Kenya, the material the Government sent us simply did not respond to a significant portion of our Revised Request for Records.Ā  In short, most of the material sought in my Revised Request was not provided.Ā  This is despite the fact that ICC Judges clearly confirmed that my Revised Request was valid, and dismissed all of the Governmentā€™s objections to it. In this situation, the most relevant documentary evidence regarding the post-election violence could only be found in Kenya.Ā  Yet, despite assurances of its willingness to cooperate with the Court, the Government of Kenya failed to follow through on those assurances.Ā  Ultimately, the hurdles we have encountered in attempting to secure the cooperation required for this investigation have in large part, collectively and cumulatively, delayed and frustrated the course of justice for the victims in this case. To conclude, today is a dark day for international criminal justice.Ā  Be that as it may, it is my firm belief that todayā€™s decision is not the last word on justice and accountability for the crimes that were inflicted on the people of Kenya in 2007 and 2008; crimes that are still crying out for justice.

The Princely Palace of Monaco announced

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By Baron Henri Estramant. The Princely Palace of Monaco announced on 22 November 2014 the protocol to be followed after the birth of the expected two new princely heirs of the House Grimaldi. Spain, Monaco and the UK are the only European monarchies still applying semi-Salic succession, meaning that males are given preference over females. The latter signifies that if a girl is delivered before a boy as Princess CharlĆØne is expecting twins, then the boy still becomes the heir apparent in detriment to the girl. If two boys, or two girls are delivered, the one delivered first becomes the heir apparent with the title “Hereditary Prince/Princess of Monaco”.Ā  According to Monaco’s constitution the Sovereign Prince is the Head of State, and chief over its diplomatic policy. He represents the country in all foreign affairs. The Principality of Monaco’s has an embassy in Brussels led by Ambassador Gilles Tonelli, responsible for the Benelux countries, the EU and the international organisations in the Benelux. Monaco also has three general consulates located in Amsterdam, The Hague and Rotterdam.Ā Liechtenstein and the Vatican City State are the only monarchies in Europe were women are fully barred from the throne. The Palace announcement: On the occasion of the upcoming princely births, the Palace wishes to inform the people of Monaco and residents of the Principality of the following arrangements: – in celebration of the joyous arrival of these two children, and without distinction, forty-two cannon shots (twenty-one for each child) shall be fired from the Fort Antoine, – church bells shall ring for fifteen minutes, followed by boat horns, – a proclamation signed by HSH Prince Albert II will be displayed at the entrance outside the “Petits Quartiers” of the Princely Palace, – registries shall be open for signatures at the ā€œPetits Quartiersā€ of the Princely Palace, – the people of Monaco are invited to put up bunting and flags, under the same provisions as on National Day, from the day of the births to the day on which the Princely Couple will present Their children at the Place du Palais. The date of the official introduction will be communicated at a later date, – the people of Monaco, residents and workers of the Principality as well as any individuals who wish to do so, are invited to attend the Princely Couple’s presentation of Their children at the Place du Palais, in order to pay tribute to Them, on a date and under conditions that shall be specified at a later date, – that day will be declared public holiday for all individuals working in Monaco in celebration of this time of great joy. In addition, TT.SS.HH. the Prince and Princess of Monaco wishes to encourage donations to charity rather than gifts. The sums collected shall be redistributed to the charities and associations of Their choosing. Full information on donation payment methods shall be provided at a later stage. Ā 

The Hague’s status as international city boosts

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Photography: Loes Schleedoorn The Hague’s status as International City of Peace and Justice is proving increasingly beneficial to the local and regional economy. With as many as 37,500 jobs, the city’s international organisations are the most important engine driving employment in The Hague and surrounding region. Medium and low-skilled employees also benefit from this advantage. In addition, the international institutions account for as much as EUR 5.2 billion in indirect expenditure. This is according to a Decisio study into the economic impact of international organisations on The Hague region, published today. Deputy Mayor Ingrid van Engelshoven (Knowledge Economy, International Affairs): “Every single job in an international organisation is an extra job for the region. The effect of our status as International City of Peace and Justice is proving increasingly beneficial. This is a major advantage at a time when economic growth cannot be taken for granted.” Engine driving employment in The Hague With as many as 37,500 jobs, the city’s international organisations are the most important engine driving employment in The Hague and surrounding region. The Decisio study reveals that 19,500 employees in the region of The Hague are in work thanks to the presence of one of the international organisations. This is an increase of 7% compared to 2010. Indirect employment accounts for a further 18,000 jobs. These are primarily medium and low-skilled workers employed in ICT, cleaning, security, communications and financial services, for example. International status puts the city at a financial advantage The international organisations in The Hague and surrounding region account for total combined expenditure of EUR 2.5 billion. Indirect expenditure, in other words, spending by international employees, visitors and suppliers of the international organisations, totals EUR 2.7 billion. Overall, the presence of the international organisations brings more than EUR 5.2 billion to the region. International organisations show strong growth The number of international organisations in the region of The Hague is on the increase. In 2005, The Hague was home to 72 international institutions and 95 embassies. By the end of 2012, there were 240 international organisations and 115 embassies in The Hague and the surrounding region. This means that The Hague is becoming increasingly international. Every year, these organisations receive tens of thousands of visitors. The city is also attracting international students in increasing numbers, with the figure currently around 5,000. In addition, the city is playing host to increasing numbers of international conferences, the highlight of which was the Nuclear Security Summit in March 2014. Recommendations The report also makes several recommendations. One of these is to designate more buildings in the International Zone to be used to accommodate new institutions. If building stocks are available, demand will follow, concludes the report. The Decisio report also envisages opportunities for attracting greater numbers of tourists to the international city of The Hague

An active foreign policy should invest in education, health and democracy

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By Barend ter Haar. Between the lines of its new policy paper on international security[1] the Dutch government seems to admit that the decision of the previous government to economize simultaneously on defense, diplomacy and development and to concentrate on short term economic interests was naĆÆve. Although it remains to be seen whether this insight will lead to more than a slowing down of the dismantlement of Dutch foreign policy, it could be a turning point. The crucial question is whether the Dutch government considers the development of an effective and active foreign policy more important than respecting the traditional fences between ministries. A prudent foreign policy should of course be based on a sound analysis of the current international challenges. Most of these do not fit in the concepts of a traditional security policy. A credible defense, for example, remains important to deter a Russian attack on the Baltic States, but it is of little use in the current crises in Ukraine, Syria and Libya. And dealing with problems such as climate change and infectious disease requires more than the traditional instruments of defense, diplomacy and development. Providing education for all, in particular for all girls and women, providing basic health care for everybody and supporting young democracies are examples of necessary investments in our own interest. It is regrettable that the paper, although it recognizes that the world has changed, fails to reflect that in the policy it proposes[2]. The paper recognizes the need of a structural, long-term approach to address the underlying causes of instability and acknowledges the need to pay special attention to climate change, scarcities and inequality, but it recoils from considering what type of foreign policy and what instruments would be needed to address these underlying causes and new challenges. The result is a paper that fails to address the current challenges and opportunities in a comprehensive manner. A truly coherent and comprehensive foreign policy should, inter alia:
  1. Look for opportunities to strengthen democracy and the rule of law (instead of waiting until crises and threats arise).
  2. Invest in positive developments, such as the increase of support for democracy in Tunisia and Ukraine (instead of ignoring their strategic importance).
  3. Invest in the people of our neighborhood (instead of closing the Netherlands Institutes in Amman, Ankara, Beirut, Rabat, etc).
  4. Recognize that education for all and global health care are in the interest of the Netherlands (instead of pretending that education and health care are domestic issues).
  5. Reform international institutions (instead of neglecting them, with the result that the WHO was incapable to react timely to the Ebola crisis).
The envisaged publication in the spring of 2015 of a new international security strategy will show whether the Netherlands government remains stuck in the straitjacket of traditional thinking or will address the wider challenges and opportunities that confront the Netherlands.


[1] Policy Brief on International Security, sent to Parliament on 14 November 2014
[2] See also: Barend ter Haar: How Security Strategies Can Harm our Interests in Studia Diplomatica (http://www.clingendael.nl/publication/how-security-strategies-can-harm-our-interests)

The Arab seasons

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By Peter Knoope. It is only four years since the spring, that started in Tunisia, invested Egypt and later Libya and Yemen, surprised the entire world. Not only did it surprise the world, it certainly brought joy and hope to many. Those who felt that the Arab spring indicated a change for the better, more freedom, more room for peopleā€™s opinions, were cheering and applauding the events. The Arab spring was welcomed as a sign of hope and progress. But then the events in Syria followed. It was a turning point. More than in other Arab spring countries, and even more than in the case of Libya, the great powers got a stake in the events. The Arab spring turned into world politics. Since Iraq went through dramatic changes after the US invasion, Syria held a strategic position in the architecture of the Middle East. Right in the middle between Iran, its friends in Bagdad, and Lebanon, Syria holds a key position. So the big players pushed for their interests. When interests are confronted in world politics, proxy is on the increase. And there are many in the Middle Ā East. Some of them are called foreign fighters. The number of victims increased. Refugees, displaced people, deaths. The human suffering is enormous. That is why and how the narrative changed from bright spring to Ā cold winter. And while the world focused on Syria, the human suffering and the world politics of the situation, slowly but surely the post revolution security and governance gap in some Arab spring countries, was effectively exploited by counter revolutionary forces. Of a variety of sources. Some came from countries that are worried that the Arab spring may also travel their way. Some are inspired by long lasting frustrations, unfinished business. Some are rebirths of a suppressed ideology. In short, when one looks at it from a distance it looks like it is a mess. While the original Arab spring seemed simple, a new generation wants freedom and protests against suppressive forms of governance, the winter looks complex and scary. So, as a result, many people beyond the region itself, turned their backs and became indifferent at best. But there are some new ingredients of late that have changed the equation and the season again. The threat of returning foreign fighters, added to the frightening images of beheadings by ISIS, has given rise to a general negative attitude towards the changes in the Middle East since spring in 2011. So from indifferent the general public and politicians became negative. The Arab spring is a failure. We were better off before than after. We seem to have collectively done away with the hope for a positive outcome of the Arab seasons. The question is relevant whether history will proof that negative judgement right or wrong. Ā Now I realise that the conviction that we should have no hope for the Arab revolutions to result in a positive outcome, even in the long run, is strong and based on the reports of realities on the ground in concrete examples. But maybe we should not judge easily. May be we are ignoring part of the reality. May be the reports are not fully covering all the realities. Because there are also other signals for those who care to listen. There is also a different story to be told. The story of a youth in the Arab world that will not accept that “their revolution” is high jacked or countered. A generation that is still and increasingly active on Facebook and other social media and that will not be silenced. A story of people that have overcome the fear of repression because they did away with authoritarian regimes. I spoke to people from Yemen that are ready to defend their revolution. At any cost. I checked the webpages of the youth in Tunisia. The websites of those who feel they belong to Ā a new and free generation that check and comment on the actions of their government. A new generation that holds the future. I know that it is unpredictable what season will come next. But let’s not conclude before the end of the developments. Something surprising may happen. Just like in 2011. There are still small signals of hope.   Ā 

A smile and a thoughtā€¦.European (Dis)Union?

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Column by Eelco H. Dykstra, MD For Diplomat Magazine
Ā 
Eelco Dykstra writes a monthly column called ā€œA smile and a thoughtā€¦ā€ The columns put a playful spotlight on the interface between the Dutch and the International Community it hosts. Yes, his musings may appear at times to be mildly provocative at first sight but they are first and foremost playful ā€“ with a little irony thrown in here and thereā€¦ You be the judge!
His columns are intended to give you ā€˜a smile and a thoughtā€™. A smile because perhaps you hadnā€™t quite looked at something that way and a thought because the column may leave you wonderingā€¦
European (Dis)Union?Ā  Money mattersā€¦ and ā€˜Secure Societiesā€™Ā  tooā€¦ As you know, this column regularly reviews whatā€™s on the mind ā€“ and in the hearts ā€“ Ā of people. It often does so by linkingĀ  the perspectivesĀ  of ā€™policyā€™ and ā€˜practiceā€™. While one would assume that these perspectives coincide, this is alas, often not the case. So, whatā€™s on the minds of the ā€˜policyā€™ people? Risks. Risks to loose (political) power and influence, sure, but also grander issues such as ā€˜Pandemicsā€™, ā€˜Climate changeā€™, ā€˜Terrorismā€™ and ā€˜Cyber securityā€™. And the economic crisis of course, particularly because the recovery from it in Europe ranges from ā€˜slowā€™ to ā€˜non-existentā€™. So, whatā€™s on the mind of the ā€˜practiceā€™ people? Being able to work and being able to do the work; caring, supporting managers, a reasonable salary and interesting work. And security of course, we all want to live in ā€˜secure societiesā€™. When we look at ā€˜Secure Societiesā€™, this also means talking about ā€˜economicsā€™ and ā€˜riskā€™ from an European perspective. Now, before you decide you want to leave this page to look for lighter fare, let me assure you it will be fun to read on. A thought with a smile and a smile with a thought, I promise. Is there a European mandate? The European Union has no executive mandate but a legislative one. ā€˜Brusselsā€™ produces policies and some laws, but doesnā€™t decide nor execute. The EU member states do. This thing called ā€˜Subsidiarityā€™, remember? So where does the funding for the EU come from and what does it do with the money? European money mattersā€¦ The EU depends for its funding entirely on contributions by its member states. For many years, the EU has been overspending, running up a considerable deficit. Yet, unlike the member states themselves, the EU cannot borrow money to finance it debts.Ā  It appears therefore on the books as ā€œRestĆ© Ć  Liquiderā€ā€¦ to the tune of well over ā‚¬ 322,000,000,000 (and growingā€¦). European research programs Since the EU has no executive mandate, it does develop a lot of policy papers . Many of these policy papers are based on research conducted by consortia that are made up of partner organizations from EU member states. ā€˜Horizon 2020ā€™ A new multi-year research program called Horizon 2020 is about to start and includes a Work Program on ā€˜Secure Societiesā€™ which deals with ā€“ inter alia ā€“Ā  pandemics, cyber security, terrorism, CBRNE and Climate change. A recent initiative is worth mentioning. It is aimed at bringing the many stakeholders and the many EU Directorate-Generals that bear responsibility for the complex issue of ā€˜Secure Societiesā€™, together into a ā€˜Community of Usersā€™, a CoU. Ā  Cross connections, much needed in the European (Dis)Union. Is this useful or important to you? – The Hague is the international city of peace, justice andā€¦ security, nā€™est ce pas? – Secure Societies combine policies and practice. – Secure Societies includes cyber security, a hot topic at the moment and subject to an international summit in April 2015 in The Hague. – Secure Societies and Horizon 2020 also reaches out to non-EU partners in the research projects. ā€˜Secure Societiesā€™ is an important and over-arching issue, for Horizon 2020 for The Hague for the European (Dis)Union for You. Is this useful or important to you? Me Thinks So. Ā  Ā  Ā  Ā  Ā  Ā 

Welcome Ambassadors !

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Ā 
By Jhr. Mr. Alexander W. Beelaerts van Blokland, Justice (Judge) in the Court of Appeal and Special Advisor International Affairs of the Municipality of The Hague.
On Wednesday October 1st the King received the ambassadors of Belgium, Ireland and France. H.E. Chris Hoornaert (Belgium; born 1963) was diplomatic advisor of the Prime Minister, permanent representative at OESO in Paris and advisor external relations of the harbour of Antwerp. H.E. John Neary (Ireland; 1951) works already 40 years for the MFA in Dublin, Luxembourg, London, Riyadh, Vienna and Brussels and was Irelands ambassador in Tokio since 2010. H.E. Laurent Pic (France; 1964) ā€“who studied Russian – worked in Bahrein, Brussels and New York, was deputy secretary general European Affairs and was diplomatic advisor of the Prime Minister. The new ambassadors of South Africa, Hungary and Georgia presented their credentials on October 15th. H.E. Vusi Bruce Koloane (South Africa; 1962) started his diplomatic career in Cairo, Tokio, Shanghai and Beijing. Then he became ambassador in Madrid and was afterwards Chief of State Protocol. H.E. Ms Orsolya Szijjarto (Hungary) got a PhD in economics and studied also in The Netherlands (Maastricht). She was lately managing director of aĀ  company on tourism and EU consultancy. H.E. Konstantine Surguladze (Georgia; 1971) worked in politics and in the oil industry and was lately state minister for the Georgian diaspora. In November the King received the ambassadors of Panama, Cuba and Guatemala on the 19th and those of South Corea and Costa Rica on the 26th. H.E. Willys Delvalle Velasco (Panama; 1958) worked all his life in the maritime business. Since 2012 he was president of the Maritime Chamber of Panama. H.E. Fermin Gabriel Quinones Sanchez (Cuba; 1971) was from 2001 to 2004 second secretary at the Cuban embassy in The Hague. He was since 2011 the Cuban ambassador in Prague. H. E. Gabriel Edgardo Aquilera Peralta (Guatemala; 1940) was university professor and diplomat; was deputy minister of foreign relations, ambassador in Germany and Peru and wrote several books. H.E. Jong-hyun Choe (South Korea; 1956) worked in Seoul, Canada, El Salvador and New York. Since 2010 he was ambassador in Oman and lately director protocol at the MFA. H.E. Sergio Ugalde Godinez (Costa Rica; 1971) is expert in international law and since 2006 member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. I wish all of you a lot of success and also happy years in The Hague ! a.beelaerts@planet.nl Ā  Ā 

The UAE, one nation, seven federal emirates

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By Baron Henri Estramant. The UAE has celebrated for the 43rd time the creation of a union amongst the emirates of the Gulf formerly known as the Trucial States under a British protectorate. What many people do not seem to fathom is that the Emirates is composed of much more than Abu Dhabi and Dubai, though the richest emirates in the Union, there are in fact seven emirates as federal entities of the United Arab Emirates. These Emirates and their ruling dynasties are Abu Dhabi (ruled by Al Nahyan), Ajman (ruled by Al Nuaimi), Dubai (Al Maktoum), Fujairah (Al Sharqi), Ras al-Khaimah (Al Qasimi), Sharjah (Al Qasimi), and Umm al-Qaiwain (Al Muā€™alla). According to the countryā€™s constitution the Chief of State (President) is to be elected amongst the hereditary amirs (or rulers as they are also known in English), nevertheless, in practice the position of President of the UAE has gone twice already to the reigning Amir of Abu Dhabi, first with the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan (1971-2004), then to his eldest son, heir for Abu Dhabi and incumbent, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan (2004- today). It is expected that Amir Khalifa will be succeeded as President by the present Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, General Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, who is already Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the Presidentā€™s half-brother. Hence making the office de facto hereditary for the Amir of Abu Dhabi, albeit the constitution clearly states that the seven amirs in the Federal Supreme Council should vote every five years for a President and a Vice-president. However it is not known whether a symbolic election to ratify the incumbents actually takes place in council. The President serves as Head of State, Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, Chairman of the Supreme Council of Rulers and the Supreme Petroleum Council. The Vice-presidency as well as the Premiership are held in trust by the Al Maktoum, the ruling house of Dubai. The incumbent is likewise The Amir of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum. His two deputy prime ministers, are two half-brothers of the countryā€™s president and members of Abu Dhabiā€™s Ruling House, that is since 2009, Sheikh Saif and Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan (also Minister for Presidential Affairs). The Prime Minister is Head of Government, chairs the cabinet meetings held weekly in Abu Dhabi. Thus far his deputies always hail from the ranks of Al Nahyan or Al Maktoum, excluding all other five ruling houses from the main political offices of the federation. Yet the amirs enjoy great sovereign powers within their own emirates, since all powers not explicitly given to the federal government by the constitution belong to the endemic amirs. Some amirs also preside over their own executive councils, and oversee ā€œdepartmentsā€or ā€œauthoritiesā€ reflective of federal ministries, particularly in the fields of tourism, culture and heritage, the environment, investment, water supplies, or health. In addition to the heirs apparent titled ā€œcrown princesā€, the amirs appoint ā€œdeputy rulersā€ who deputise the monarchs in the exercise of some of their executive, legislative and judicial prerogatives. Sometimes these offices also serve to provide a powerful office to another line of the Ruling House. The amirs of the UAE The word Amir in Arabic simply translates to Prince, in this regard it is used as ā€œSovereign Princeā€ as those in Monaco or Liechtenstein. Therefore the ruling houses are ā€œprincelyā€ or ā€œamirialā€ rather than ā€œroyalā€ as they lack a king. It is simply a question of ranking. The amirs are colloquially known by the honorific ā€œSheikhā€ followed by their given forename, patronym and name of their house. For instance, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the UAE. The title of sheikh is an honorific used by all the members of all seven ruling houses regardless of their own ranking within the dynasties. It is not equal to a princely title. The amirs, their heirs apparent (crown princes), children and siblings are normally styled ā€œHighnessā€. Other high-ranking members are entitled to the style ā€œExcellencyā€ whereas the lower ranking (normally those who are not descendants of previous rulers) have no claim to a form of address by birth in addition to their ā€œsheikh/sheikhaā€ honorifics. The spouse(s) of the amirs may become patrons of different organisations yet are normally not seen in public, or television. They are not styled ā€œAmira of the Emirate of Xā€, nor are there any official ā€œcrown princessesā€. The only true publicly known spouse of any Emirati amir, is the second wife of the Amir of Dubai, HRH Princess Haya bint El Hussein of Jordan. Seven amirs HH The President of the UAE, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed AL NAHYAN, Amir of Abu Dhabi HH The Vice President and Prime Minister of the UAE, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid bin Said AL MAKTOUM, Amir of Dubai HH Dr Sheikh Sultan III bin Mohammed AL QASIMI, Amir of Sharjah HH Sheikh Saud bin Saqer AL QASIMI, Amir of Ras Al-Khaimah  
HH SheikhĀ Hamad bin Mohammed AL SHARQI, Amir of Fujairah
HH Sheikh Humaid bin Rashid AL NUAIMI, Amir of Ajman HH Sheikh Saud bin Rashid AL MUā€™ALLA, Amir of Umm Al Qaiwain Al Qawasem control as only dynasty two emirates, Sharjah and Ras Al-Khaimah. Malaysia has a similar federal system with nine monarchs notwithstanding these enjoy far less powers and prerogatives than in the UAE. Ā 

Future networking foreign ministries is no business as usual

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Jan.MelissenBy Jan Melissen and Julian Slotman. Networking is as old as diplomacy and often instinctively considered an ā€œembassy gameā€. Foreign ministries themselves do however rely more and more on their networks. Collaboration with actors outside the public sector is on the rise. High-quality networks are not just for purposes of outreach, but also to help deliver concrete and measurable results, and contribute significantly to policy innovation.Ā  As part of its broader action plan on the modernization of its diplomacy, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs has decided to take a closer look at its own networking practices. In close cooperation with the MFA Strategic Advisory Unit, the Clingendael Institute is currently conducting pilot research on the complex policy networks of the Ministry. Changes in international relations require a more open and flexible organizational structure for the foreign ministry – and not just in The Hague. With this pioneering project, the Dutch seem to make the point that governmental networking practices may require an update to modern-day realities. Recent innovations in diplomatic policy making such as trilateral cooperation, digital diplomacy and the integrative approach of combining defence, diplomacy and development policies, require a more systematically networked approach. In actual fact, the need for more systematic networking applies to MFA activities across the board. It has everything to do with diplomacy becoming increasingly enmeshed with society and the need for more MFA extra-governmental collaboration. Ten MFA departments, directorates, task forces and embassies in and outside Europe are participating in interactive workshop sessions, with the aim of thoroughly analysing their networks and networking practices. The workshops are part of a larger research effort aimed at a thorough understanding of current practices as well as the scope for improvement. Surveys, in-depth interviews and the workshops in the purpose-designed MFA Strategy Lab result in a wealth of information about the diversity of networks and current practices. Local staff at the Dutch embassy in New Delhi, for instance, faces entirely different issues when broadening and deepening their networks, both India and back home, than employees of a task force or thematic directorate in the Foreign Ministry. Inefficiencies in policy networks have to be addressed to stay ahead in the diplomatic environment of the 21st century. Indeed, openness and flexibility are the key ingredients of future diplomacy. Our preliminary conclusion warranted by discussions in the MFA Strategy Lab so far, is that individual diplomats, their teams and the MFA as a whole can significantly improve their performance through improved networking. A strategic perspective and more systematic approach will be instrumental in promoting desired diplomatic outcomes. This project will result in a report for the Netherlands MFA. In the interests of sharing best practices, some of the main findings will be published on the Clingendael website in early 2015. Ā Jan Melissen is a Senior Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute, Professor of Diplomacy at the University of Antwerp and founding Co-Editor of The Hague Journal of Diplomacy. Julian Slotman is a Clingendael Research Assistant on the Clingendael project on MFA Networking.