“The international order is not a static equilibrium, but a continuous process of adaptation among competing centres of power.”
By Major General (Two Stars) (retd) Corneliu Pivariu
The 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue confirmed the profound transformations affecting the contemporary international system. Beyond its regional dimensions, the conference highlighted the consolidation of a world characterized by asymmetric multipolarity, in which power is distributed among several competing centres without a perfect balance among them. This article examines the strategic significance of the conference, the role of the Indo-Pacific as the new centre of geopolitical gravity, the growing influence of middle powers, the implications of China’s absence, and the challenges associated with managing competition among major powers. It argues that the principal challenge of the twenty-first century is not the construction of a new world order, but rather the management of the ongoing rebalancing process among the actors shaping the evolution of the international system.
Held in Singapore between 29 and 31 May 2026, the Shangri-La Dialogue[1] represented far more than an annual gathering of defence ministers, military leaders, and security experts from the Indo-Pacific region. The conference provided a valuable perspective on the profound transformations affecting the international system and on the ways in which the principal centers of power seek to manage a major geopolitical transition.
While during the first two decades of the twenty-first century the attention of the international community was successively focused on the Global War on Terrorism, the crises in the Middle East, and later the war in Ukraine, this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue confirmed a trend that has been evident for several years: the gradual shift of the world’s strategic center of gravity toward the Indo-Pacific region.
Even more significant than this geographical shift, however, was the recognition—whether explicit or implicit by the participants—that the contemporary world has entered a phase characterized by the emergence of asymmetric multipolarity. We are not witnessing a return to a bipolar structure similar to that of the Cold War, nor are we entering a classical multipolar system comparable to the one that existed before the First World War. The new strategic configuration is far more complex, characterized by the existence of multiple centres of power with differing capabilities and levels of influence, yet all sufficiently strong to prevent the emergence of an uncontested global hegemon.
From Unipolarity to Asymmetric Multipolarity[2]
The collapse of the Soviet Union created the conditions for the emergence of a unipolar era dominated by the United States. For nearly three decades, Washington enjoyed an unprecedented degree of military, technological, financial, and institutional superiority unmatched in modern history.
Today, however, that situation belongs to the past. The rise of China, Russia’s return as a strategic actor, India’s consolidation as an emerging global power, the growing ambitions of several regional powers, and the expansion of frameworks such as BRICS[3] have profoundly altered the global distribution of influence.
Yet this new reality is not one of equality among the poles. The United States continues to possess the world’s greatest capacity for global military power projection, the most extensive alliance network, and one of the most advanced technological and financial ecosystems. China commands impressive economic power and unrivalled industrial capacity, but its global military and diplomatic influence remains below that of the United States. Russia retains significant military capabilities and plays a major role in the strategic and energy domains, yet it lacks the economic resources available to its principal competitors. India is increasingly asserting itself as an autonomous global actor, although it has not yet sought to assume global responsibilities comparable to those of either Washington or Beijing.
This unequal distribution of power defines what may be described as asymmetric multipolarity: the existence of several centres of influence capable of shaping global developments, while none possesses the ability to dominate the international system on its own.
The Indo-Pacific: The New Strategic Centre of Gravity[4]
One of the most important conclusions emerging from the Singapore conference is that the Indo-Pacific has become the principal arena of global strategic competition.
The region encompasses the world’s most important maritime trade routes, the most dynamic economies, critical technological supply chains, and a substantial share of global semiconductor production. It is also home to the major strategic flashpoints of the twenty-first century: Taiwan, the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, and the growing naval competition between the United States and China.
From this perspective, the Indo-Pacific plays for the twenty-first century a role comparable to that played by Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Whoever shapes the strategic balance in this region will exert a decisive influence on the evolution of the international order.
This shift in the strategic centre of gravity reflects not only the rise of Asia but also the relative decline of Europe’s influence within the international system. Over the past decade, a series of economic, energy, and industrial policies insufficiently adapted to global transformations, combined with demographic challenges and security vulnerabilities, have contributed to reducing the European Union’s competitiveness and its capacity for strategic power projection.
It is therefore no coincidence that several European states, particularly France and the United Kingdom, are expanding their naval and diplomatic presence in the region. The message conveyed at Shangri-La was clear: European security and Indo-Pacific security can no longer be treated as separate realities.
Vietnam and the Rise of Middle Powers
Beyond the speeches delivered by the major powers, the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue also highlighted a less spectacular but highly significant phenomenon for the evolution of the international system: the growing role of middle powers[5].
The fact that the opening address was delivered by the President of Vietnam was not merely a matter of protocol. It reflected the increasing importance of states which, despite lacking the resources and capabilities of major powers, are successfully maximizing their influence through diplomacy, strategic flexibility, and geoeconomic positioning.
Vietnam offers a particularly relevant example. Benefiting from rapid economic development over recent decades, integration into global production chains, and a balanced foreign policy, Hanoi seeks to avoid the logic of exclusive alignment with any single major power. Its economic relations with China coexist with expanding security cooperation with the United States, Japan, India, and other regional actors.
This approach reflects a broader trend. From Southeast Asia to the Middle East, numerous states are attempting to transform great-power competition into an opportunity for development and the strengthening of their own strategic autonomy. In a multipolar world, middle powers are no longer merely objects of geopolitical competition; increasingly, they are becoming actors capable of influencing regional balances and, at times, even global processes.
Great-Power Messages and the Significance of China’s Absence
The intervention of the U.S. Secretary of Defense confirmed the continuity of Washington’s strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, the speech highlighted a shift in emphasis regarding relations with allies. The United States is no longer asking solely for political solidarity, but also for a more substantial sharing of the costs associated with collective security.
The message is familiar to America’s European NATO allies as well: common security requires shared responsibilities.
Paradoxically, one of the conference’s most significant themes was generated not by a speech, but by an absence. The non-attendance of China’s Minister of National Defense became the subject of extensive commentary and interpretation. Beyond the official explanations, this absence may be interpreted as an indicator of a period of strategic recalibration within the Chinese leadership and of Beijing’s preference for bilateral channels of communication with Washington.
In geopolitics, absences are sometimes as significant as presences. At Shangri-La 2026, China[6] was paradoxically one of the most visible actors precisely through what it chose not to do.
Managing Great-Power Competition
Perhaps the most important lesson of the conference is that the principal challenge of the current era is not the elimination of rivalries among major powers, but their effective management[7].
During the Cold War, relative stability was ensured by the existence of two clearly defined blocs and by the mechanisms of nuclear deterrence. Today, the international system is considerably more fluid. Alliances are more flexible, interests overlap selectively, and states simultaneously pursue cooperation and competition.
India cooperates with the United States while maintaining important relations with Russia. Southeast Asian states are developing security partnerships with Washington while preserving deep economic ties with China. European states seek to strengthen the transatlantic relationship while simultaneously discussing greater strategic autonomy.
This complexity transforms the management of competition into a continuous balancing exercise. The objective is not the definitive victory of one power over another, but rather the prevention of strategic rivalries from evolving into direct confrontation.
Asymmetric Multipolarity and the Fractures of the Emerging World Order
Viewed through the lens of the structural transformations affecting the international system, Shangri-La 2026 offers an illustrative example of what may be described as the ongoing process of fragmentation and rebalancing of the world order.
Competition between the United States and China reflects the geopolitical dimension of this transformation. Disputes over supply chains, semiconductors, critical resources, and markets reveal the growing economic and technological fracture. Discussions concerning energy security and the protection of maritime routes highlight the persistence of the energy fracture. Debates regarding artificial intelligence, digital infrastructures, and information control point to the deepening of the informational and cognitive fracture.
At the same time, differing views regarding international norms, sovereignty, and the legitimacy of global institutions confirm the existence of civilizational and political fractures[8] that cut across the contemporary international system.
From this perspective, Shangri-La 2026 should not be viewed merely as a regional security conference. It can also be interpreted as a strategic snapshot of the principal fault lines shaping the evolution of the contemporary world. Asymmetric multipolarity does not eliminate these fractures; rather, it makes them more visible and more influential in shaping the behaviour of states.
Consequently, the fundamental challenge of the coming decades will not be limited to managing competition among major powers, but will also involve managing the effects generated by the simultaneous interaction of these fractures upon international stability.
The Shangri-La Dialogue 2026 did not produce historic treaties, nor did it generate dramatic shifts in strategic alignments. Its importance lies in the fact that it provided a clear picture of a world in the making.
The conference confirmed that the international system is undergoing a period of transition characterized by the emergence of asymmetric multipolarity, in which power is distributed among several competing centres without a perfect balance among them. At the same time, it became evident that the Indo-Pacific represents the principal theatre of global geopolitical competition and that developments in this region will decisively influence the international architecture of the coming decades.
Shangri-La 2026 confirms that the world is not evolving toward a classical form of multipolarity, but toward an asymmetric multipolarity characterized by the unequal distribution of power among several competing centres of influence. This reality creates both new opportunities for cooperation and increased risks of strategic competition and international fragmentation.
Above all, Shangri-La 2026 demonstrated that the fundamental challenge of the twenty-first century is not the construction of an ideal new world order, but the management of a period of strategic rebalancing[9] in which cooperation and rivalry permanently coexist. In this transitional environment, success will not necessarily belong to the most powerful actors, but rather to those capable of managing most effectively the relationship between competition, influence, and stability.
Shangri-La 2026 suggests that the future will not belong to the actor that accumulates the greatest amount of power, but to the one that best understands the rules of a world simultaneously characterized by competition, interdependence, and strategic rebalancing.
Brașov, 1 June 2026
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
- International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Shangri-La Dialogue 2026.
- Henry Kissinger, World Order.
- Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?
- Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.
- Parag Khanna, The Future Is Asian.
- Corneliu Pivariu, Rebalancing the World: The Dynamics of Power in the Multipolar Era (forthcoming).
7. Corneliu Pivariu, The Fractures of the World Order: Between the Civilizational Paradigm and Structural Analysis, IFIMES, Ljubljana, 2026.
[1] The Shangri-La Dialogue is the leading annual security and defence forum in the Indo-Pacific region, organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London. Held annually in Singapore since 2002, the conference brings together heads of state and government, defence ministers, senior military leaders, diplomats, and security experts from around the world. The 2026 edition, held between 29 and 31 May, was the twenty-second iteration of the Dialogue and took place against a backdrop of intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China, the continuation of the war in Ukraine, tensions in the Middle East, and the consolidation of multipolar trends within the international system.
[2] For the purposes of this article, asymmetric multipolarity refers to an international system characterized by the existence of multiple relevant centres of power possessing unequal resources, influence, and strategic projection capabilities, without the presence of an uncontested global hegemon.
[3] Following its expansion during 2024–2025, BRICS evolved beyond its original composition of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, becoming one of the principal coordination platforms for states advocating a less Western-centric international order.
[4] According to the European Union Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and assessments by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Indo-Pacific region accounts for approximately 60 percent of the world’s population, more than 40 percent of global GDP, and nearly two-thirds of global economic growth. The region also encompasses some of the world’s most important maritime trade and energy routes, which is why many analysts regard it as the principal strategic centre of gravity of the twenty-first century.
[5] The growing influence of middle powers is one of the defining characteristics of the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar order. These states frequently benefit from competition among major powers in order to expand their strategic autonomy and bargaining capacity.
[6] The rise of China is widely regarded by numerous analysts as the most significant shift in the global distribution of power since the end of the Cold War, contributing decisively to the transition from the unipolar moment of the 1990s to the current multipolar configuration.
[7] The concept of managing great-power competition has become central to contemporary strategic literature and is closely associated with efforts to prevent direct confrontation between the United States and China in a context characterized by economic interdependence and geopolitical rivalry.
[8] The concept of the fractures of the world order describes the principal structural fault lines shaping the evolution of the contemporary international system. For a more detailed development of this analytical perspective, see Corneliu Pivariu, “The Fractures of the World Order: Between the Civilizational Paradigm and Structural Analysis,” published by Financial Intelligence on 15 April 2026 and subsequently republished by IFIMES (International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies, Ljubljana), as well as by other international geopolitical analysis platforms.
[9] The term rebalancing is used to describe the gradual redistribution of power and influence among the major actors of the international system, without implying the emergence of a new stable and universally accepted world order.
