Peace Negotiations amid Electoral Calculations and Europe’s Responsibility

“Peace becomes durable when violating it costs more than upholding it.”

By Major General (Two Stars) (retd) Corneliu Pivariu

Developments in October 2026 show that military pressure on Ukraine is unfolding alongside negotiations, selective sanctions relief and Western disagreements over the costs of support. Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s address to the Hudson Institute and the local humanitarian agreement announced by the White House for Oleshky point to the existence of channels for dialogue, but do not establish that a comprehensive settlement is within reach.

The analysis examines whether tactical Russian concessions could benefit the Trump administration politically ahead of the congressional elections, while treating this interpretation as a hypothesis. For Kyiv, the immediate risk is a further reduction in aid or the imposition of additional conditions. The positions of Bulgaria and Slovakia illustrate the fragmentation of support, without amounting to a withdrawal of European support as a whole. The durability of peace depends on verifiable obligations, predictable funding and the guarantors’ capacity to respond. Romania has an interest in helping to define these conditions and in developing its own security capabilities.

1. The Stakes of Peace and Sanctions Policy

Ukraine could reach a settlement that constrains its future without its army having capitulated. Russian military pressure, the conditions attached to U.S. support and the difficulties of European coordination could narrow Kyiv’s options to the point of accepting commitments it would struggle to sustain. The urgency of ending the loss of human life is beyond question. Yet the terms for ending the fighting must also be judged by their ability to prevent renewed aggression. This is why the word “credible” is essential: guarantees must influence the adversary’s calculations and be enforceable when a crisis occurs.

Access to resources, the costs of security and a say in decision-making are all at stake in the negotiations. Territory remains a fundamental issue, alongside Ukraine’s right to arm itself, choose its partners and protect its economy. Retaining institutions and internationally recognised borders can coexist with permanent external constraints. The effective exercise of sovereignty must therefore form part of any assessment of an agreement.

Changes to the U.S. sanctions regime have altered the terms of the negotiations. On 9 October, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License No. 135, authorising, subject to the exceptions specified in the document, transactions involving Russian-origin diesel, including imports into the United States, until 7 April 2027.^[1] Separately, the presidential order of 16 October granted waivers from the new sanctions and tariffs provided for in the Graham legislation, signed into law on 18 September. The earlier measures specified in the order remain in force.^[2]

The diplomatic value of these decisions depends on the commitments obtained from Russia. Easing economic pressure can support diplomacy if it is tied to verifiable obligations and clear deadlines. Granting benefits before those obligations have been fulfilled could encourage Moscow to believe that military pressure also brings economic rewards.

2. The Local Ceasefire and Electoral Calculations

Against this background, on 23 October, the White House announced that Melania Trump had secured agreement from Russia and Ukraine on a temporary cessation of military operations confined to Oleshky, in the Kherson region. The stated aim is to deliver humanitarian aid and prepare for the evacuation of civilians through a safe corridor. The U.S. statement envisages implementation beginning on 29 October. Implementation and compliance will need to be verified on the ground.^[3]

The initiative has humanitarian value in its own right. If it enables supplies to reach the population and civilians to be evacuated, its benefits should be acknowledged regardless of the broader political dispute. At the same time, a local arrangement demonstrates a willingness to engage in limited cooperation, rather than agreement on the general terms of peace. The safety of access corridors, civilians’ freedom of choice and the continuity of humanitarian access will provide the first concrete criteria for assessing the outcome.

The approaching U.S. congressional elections, scheduled for 3 November 2026, provide an additional incentive for visible diplomatic results.^[4] In my assessment, Putin might see value in limited, reversible concessions that would give the Trump administration and Republican candidates a boost to their public standing. He might then seek more substantial U.S. concessions on sanctions, the normalisation of relations or the conditions imposed on Kyiv. This scenario remains an analytical hypothesis, which the Oleshky humanitarian agreement does not in itself confirm.

Such a scenario would create an asymmetry if Russia offered temporary gestures in exchange for lasting political or economic benefits. Moscow could retain its underlying objectives and its freedom to resume pressure after the election. Russia’s conduct after securing the first benefits would be more revealing than the media impact of the initial announcements.

3. Zelenskyy’s Position and Military Dependencies

On 23 October, speaking to the Hudson Institute by videoconference, Zelenskyy outlined the prospect of negotiations between Ukrainian, U.S. and Russian teams in the first half of November. He called for European participation, continued U.S. pressure on Moscow and a move from technical talks to a meeting of leaders. He welcomed the return of 270 Ukrainians from captivity, but criticised the restrictions on Starlink and Starshield and the delays in interceptor deliveries that had already been agreed.^[5]

In the ensuing discussion, Zelenskyy argued for a ceasefire, including sector-specific arrangements if a comprehensive agreement proved impossible, the maintenance of sanctions and funding for a strong Ukrainian army for at least ten years after peace was achieved.^[6] Military support would help deter renewed aggression while the Ukrainian economy recovered. The request raises legitimate questions about the size of the force, partners’ contributions and oversight of expenditure; it does not demonstrate an intention to continue the war for the same period.

Zelenskyy also described hybrid pressure on Europe—drones, cyberattacks and destabilisation in the Black Sea—as a Russian attempt to divide allies and reduce aid to Ukraine. He called for a clear mechanism for responding to future aggression.^[7] In practical terms, this warning raises questions about European defence preparedness: the availability of forces, air defence and the ability to turn promises into action. Support for Kyiv and the strengthening of European defence must be planned together.

Economic pressure also has an industrial dimension. On 24 October, Kyiv announced new sanctions against Russian arms manufacturers and suppliers of machinery, raw materials and components, including foreign electronics.^[8] The effectiveness of Western measures must also be judged by their ability to disrupt the supply chains that sustain Russia’s defence industry, rather than simply by the number of entities placed on sanctions lists. Controls on exports and intermediaries complement military deterrence.

On satellite communications, Zelenskyy announced on 24 October that Starlink and Starshield service speeds had been restored to their pre-restriction levels, following tests reported by the Ministry of Defence. He thanked the United States for its support while maintaining his call for the delivery of missile interceptors.^[9] The episode shows that diplomatic engagement can restore an essential capability without removing uncertainty about the continuity of cooperation.

Restoring the services eases an immediate difficulty, but the strategic dependency remains. Access to infrastructure, control over it and permission to use it for a particular mission are distinct matters. Defence planning must address contractual terms, notification of changes and backup options. For Europeans, diversifying capabilities requires investment, integration and training. Cooperation with the United States remains essential, alongside efforts to reduce dependencies that constrain freedom of decision.

4. Western Support and the Limits of European Cohesion

The European Union (EU) officially maintains its support for peace underpinned by robust and credible guarantees. The European Council conclusions of 15–16 October express regret at the U.S. easing of sanctions on Russian diesel and reaffirm Europe’s contribution to Ukraine’s security.^[10] Financial support includes the €90 billion loan for 2026–2027. Separately, Russian central bank assets worth approximately €210 billion are immobilised in the EU. Freezing these assets does not make them automatically available to finance Ukraine. The principal, the income it generates and the loan mechanisms must be treated separately.^[11]

The volume of support announced does not, by itself, guarantee that aid will continue. What matters is that payment authorisations, equipment deliveries, production and maintenance result in capabilities that can be used when they are needed. Expenditure on refugees, future commitments and actual deliveries serve different purposes. European governments must explain these distinctions, oversee the funds and address their own social difficulties. Support whose public justification is eroding becomes more vulnerable to domestic political change.

Bulgaria offers a concrete example. On 20 October, Prime Minister Rumen Radev stated that his country could not contribute to the new funding requested by Kyiv, referring to the €70 billion request discussed at the European Council. On 21 October, the government approved constructive abstention on funding the procurement of new lethal weapons through the European Peace Facility, while maintaining non-lethal support.^[12] These positions restrict Bulgaria’s participation in specific forms of assistance. Presenting them as an end to all Bulgarian contributions would go beyond what the decisions actually say.

In Slovakia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed on 24 October that Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár would travel to Moscow for the intergovernmental commission meeting on 26 October. The stated priority is energy security; talks with Sergey Lavrov are also planned. Bratislava says it is pursuing cooperation in sectors not covered by European sanctions.^[13] The announcement concerns a resumption of institutional dialogue with Moscow, rather than a new Fico–Putin meeting. This approach illustrates the differences between national priorities and the European policy of maintaining pressure on Moscow.

For Zelenskyy, such developments increase the risk of reduced support, delays or additional conditions. Trade relations with Russia, energy costs and social discontent can influence governments’ decisions even if the common official position does not immediately change. Any reduction in contributions would have to be offset by other partners, who face limits of their own. Fragmentation can make aid less predictable and weaken Kyiv’s negotiating position before the effects become apparent on the battlefield.

Ukraine’s leadership must also manage the cost of its own public messaging. Firmness can protect Ukraine’s essential objectives, while highlighting military dependencies can mobilise support. Yet a tone perceived as an ultimatum may strengthen resistance among some partners or deepen public fatigue. A reduction in aid cannot be explained solely by Zelenskyy’s rhetoric: industrial capacity, budgets, economic interests and donors’ political choices also play a role. Kyiv’s diplomacy has an interest in setting clear priorities, with achievable objectives and clearly accepted responsibilities.

This requires transparency, oversight of expenditure and a credible explanation of the gradual transition towards financing its own defence. Supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty is compatible with critically examining its leadership’s decisions. At the same time, pressure for compromise must be accompanied by a clear explanation of the protection to be provided after an agreement is signed. Demanding immediate concessions from a vulnerable state in exchange for inadequately defined promises could aggravate the very problem the agreement is meant to resolve.

5. Negotiations and Security Guarantees

Negotiations are taking place alongside discussions about meetings between the major powers. On 19 October, the Kremlin confirmed that the possibility of a Putin–Trump–Xi meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in China had been discussed, while specifying that neither the meeting nor its agenda had been agreed.^[14] The possible China–U.S.–Russia trilateral must be distinguished from the Ukraine–U.S.–Russia negotiations mentioned by Zelenskyy. The former could place the Ukrainian issue within a broader negotiation in which Kyiv and Europe would have limited influence over the initial agenda.

The participation of Ukraine and European states must be commensurate with the obligations and risks they would be expected to bear. Dialogue between major powers can open up useful possibilities, but implementing an agreement requires the acceptance and cooperation of those directly affected. Europe can strengthen its influence through a core group of states able to offer predictable support and operational proposals. The capacity to finance, produce and deliver gives it weight at the negotiating table.

The experience of the Budapest Memorandum explains Kyiv’s mistrust of general formulations. On 5 December 1994, as part of the process in which Ukraine relinquished the Soviet nuclear weapons located on its territory and acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom reaffirmed their commitment to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and existing borders and to refrain from the threat or use of force against it.^[15]

The Memorandum provided security assurances and envisaged consultations, as well as efforts to secure a response from the UN Security Council in the situations concerning the use of nuclear weapons specified in the text. It did not establish a collective defence mechanism comparable to that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion in 2022 showed that these commitments had failed to prevent aggression by Russia, one of the signatory states.

Credible guarantees require clarity about which authority will establish that violations have occurred, how decisions will be made and what means of response will be available. Timelines, available forces, logistical support and funding must be specified. No diplomatic formula can eliminate every risk, but essential ambiguities can be reduced before an agreement is reached. A solemn obligation that lacks either the capacity or the will to enforce it carries little weight in the calculations of a potential aggressor.

Sanctions relief and economic benefits can be phased in according to compliance with commitments and made subject to suspension mechanisms. At the same time, ending the fighting and legally resolving territorial disputes may follow different timetables. An armistice can allow the state to recover and the population to be protected without legal recognition of territorial gains achieved by force, provided it preserves Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and limits the possibility of a new offensive.

In my assessment, the more likely short-term prospect remains continued confrontation alongside negotiations and limited agreements. In Oleshky, implementation of the announced agreement will provide a concrete test of compliance with commitments. Consolidating a coherent European position could strengthen the guarantees underpinning a future agreement; fragmentation of support could hasten a vulnerable compromise.

6. Implications for Romania and the Republic of Moldova

For Romania, the implications are direct. The October European Council conclusions condemn attacks on commercial shipping, including incidents in the exclusive economic zones of Romania and Bulgaria, and call for the restoration of safe civilian navigation in the Black Sea.^[16] Bucharest needs air defence, maritime surveillance and protection for energy and port infrastructure. Logistical capacity and military mobility must be backed by sufficient resources and procedures that can be applied in a crisis.

The Republic of Moldova must be included in the same assessment. A weakened Ukraine could heighten pressure on Chișinău without making a direct military attack inevitable. Energy interconnections, the continuity of transport services and support for institutions strengthen regional resilience. Romania can contribute to a durable peace through domestic preparedness and participation in defining the obligations that affect its security. Geography can be translated into influence if it is backed by capabilities and clear political proposals.

Conclusions

A ceasefire must be judged by its effects on the population and its ability to prevent renewed aggression. Local humanitarian initiatives deserve support and verification on the ground. Extending them into a comprehensive agreement requires separate commitments, monitoring mechanisms and a credible response to violations.

Any tactical concessions by Putin would not justify disproportionate or hard-to-reverse concessions from the West. Their possible electoral value to the Trump administration remains an analytical hypothesis. Reciprocity and verification of compliance with commitments must take precedence when assessing the outcome of negotiations.

For Kyiv, maintaining Western support is becoming a condition for preserving its freedom to negotiate. Zelenskyy must combine firmness with prioritising requests and accepting domestic responsibilities. Europeans must ensure the political backing and industrial capacity needed to sustain aid, so that war fatigue does not become a decisive advantage for Moscow.

The lesson of Budapest is that the means and mechanisms for enforcing new guarantees must be established before an agreement is signed. For Romania, what is at stake is a viable Ukrainian state, a resilient Republic of Moldova and the security of regional shipping and infrastructure. The cost of peace without such guarantees would also be borne by those who had little influence over the negotiations.

Brașov, 25 October 2026

Selected Bibliography

1. Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, 5 December 1994. UN Treaty Series, vol. 3007, No. 52241. Document.

2. U.S. Treasury and the White House. OFAC General License No. 135, 9 October, and Executive Order No. 14436, 16 October 2026. Document 1; Document 2.

3. Office of the President of Ukraine. Address and discussion at the Hudson Institute, 23 October; restoration of Starlink/Starshield services and new sanctions, 24 October 2026. Document 1; Document 2; Document 3; Document 4.

4. Reuters. Andrea Shalal and Olena Harmash. Report on the negotiations and guarantees requested by Zelenskyy, 23 October 2026. Document.

5. The White House. First Lady Melania Trump Secures Ceasefire Between Russia and Ukraine, Localized to Oleshky. 23 October 2026. Document.

6. U.S. Federal Election Commission. 2026 general election calendar. Document.

7. European Council and Council of the European Union. Conclusions of 15–16 October 2026 and EU financial assistance to Ukraine. Document 1; Document 2.

8. Bulgarian News Agency. The Prime Minister’s statements on funding for Ukraine and the decision on the European Peace Facility. 20–21 October 2026. Document 1; Document 2.

9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia. Statement on the consultations in Moscow. 24 October 2026. Document.

10. Reuters. Kremlin says Putin, Trump and Xi could hold a three-way meeting in China next month. 19 October 2026. Document.

^[1] U.S. Treasury, OFAC, General License No. 135, 9 October 2026, paragraphs (a)–(b). Document.

^[2] The White House, Executive Order No. 14436 on implementing the Graham legislation, 16 October 2026, section 4. Document.

^[3] The White House, statement on the local agreement in Oleshky, 23 October 2026; implementation scheduled for 29 October. Document.

^[4] U.S. Federal Election Commission, 2026 general election calendar: 3 November. Document.

^[5] Office of the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s opening address to the Hudson Institute, 23 October 2026. Document.

^[6] Reuters, Andrea Shalal and Olena Harmash, report on Zelenskyy’s address and answers at the Hudson Institute, 23 October 2026. Document.

^[7] Office of the President of Ukraine, report on the meeting with Hudson Institute representatives, 23 October 2026: hybrid attacks and mechanisms for security guarantees. Document.

^[8] Office of the President of Ukraine, new sanctions against manufacturers and suppliers serving Russia’s defence industry, 24 October 2026. Document.

^[9] Office of the President of Ukraine, announcement of the restoration of Starlink and Starshield services, 24 October 2026. Document.

^[10] European Council, conclusions of 15–16 October 2026, EUCO 14/26, paragraphs 18–20 and 25. Document.

^[11] Council of the European Union, EU financial assistance to Ukraine, updated 14 October 2026; the support loan and immobilised Russian assets. Document.

^[12] Bulgarian News Agency (BTA), Prime Minister Radev’s statements of 20 October and the decision on constructive abstention of 21 October 2026. Document 1; Document 2.

^[13] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia, statement of 24 October 2026 on Juraj Blanár’s visit and the meeting in Moscow on 26 October. Document.

^[14] Reuters, report on the Kremlin’s position regarding a possible Putin–Trump–Xi meeting in China, 19 October 2026. Document.

^[15] Budapest Memorandum, 5 December 1994, paragraphs 1–6, authentic English text, UN Treaty Series, vol. 3007, No. 52241, pp. 168–170. Document.

^[16] European Council, conclusions of 15–16 October 2026, EUCO 14/26, paragraph 17 on shipping in the Black Sea. Document.