09.09.2024 (Caucasian Journal). Last month, Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party proposed to strengthen the constitutional status of the Orthodox Church and declare Orthodox Christianity as the state religion. Currently, Georgia’s constitution recognizes the country as a secular state, although Orthodoxy is the largest and historically dominant religion.
The current narrative of the ruling party attempts to fold the status of the church and the status of the government into the same institutional box, as custodians of family and traditional values. The opposition is asking whether EU membership aspirations can be squared with the ambition of establishing a “state religion.” To this question, one could counter: “Look at Greece and Cyprus,” where there is a state religion.
To address this question most competently, Caucasian Journal sought the expertise of Professor Andreas Takis, Professor of Jurisprudence at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki in Greece. Notably, Professor Takis previously served as the Deputy Ombudsman in Greece, a role closely tied to the defense of individual civil rights. His experience in this position allows him to speak to the tension between the church’s moral authority and the state’s power, and vice versa.
The interview was conducted by Dr. Ilya Roubanis, Government Affairs Consultant and Area Studies Analyst, and “our man in Greece”. Ilya and Andreas discussed the relevance of the Greek experience as context to conceptualize the political significance of the proposal before Georgians.
Ilya Roubanis: The incumbent Georgian ruling party is campaigning for re-election on a promise to raise the status of the Georgian church within the Constitution, thereby creating a “state religion.” As Greece already has a “state religion” and is an EU member state this would be a useful comparison. So, what is the relationship between the Orthodox Church and the state in Greece? How did this connection come up?
Andreas Takis: Let me start with a small comment on Georgia’s EU candidacy to the EU. Indeed, the choice of modern parliamentary democracy to establish a state religion has the potential to cause serious institutional tensions with the EU acquis. Technically, there is no problem in principle with being an EU member state and having a state religion. After all, Georgia is not alone in endowing the Orthodox Church with a special status in its Constitutional Preamble. There is no obvious matter of principle. What is at issue is not the principle, but the effect of establishing such a relationship on the freedom of conscience and religious freedom for minorities.
Usually, separating Church and State is the expected institutional pathway in Europe… Georgia intends to follow the opposite trajectory, which would be unique and counterintuitive.
I’m starting out with this remark because this is an ongoing reality in Greek constitutional politics. Greece has a long history of having a state religion, dating back in the early and mid 19th century, or the period we know as “Regency,” in 1833. This is when Regents were ruling Greece as custodians of the young monarch Otto of Bavaria, selected by three dominant powers (Britain, France, and Russia) until he came of age. Their concern was that the hierarchical and dogmatic dependence of the Greek clergy on the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople would constitute a backdoor for Ottoman interference in Greek affairs. Therefore, in creating a “state religion,” the Regents were essentially trying to subdue “their Church” to national authority, depriving the Ottomans of political influence over Greece.
This institutional legacy is quite uncommon for Western European standards of parliamentary democracy. Norway is somewhat comparable, but the role of the church there as “a state church” has a strictly ceremonial scope without affecting the constitutional freedoms of other religious groups. The same goes with Denmark, Finland, and the UK, where institutional ties between the state and church may also be traced. Usually, separating church and state is the expected institutional pathway in Europe, as was the case in Sweden. Georgia intends to follow the opposite trajectory, which would be unique and counterintuitive.
IR: So, in the Greek case a “state religion” has practical and tangible consequences. This is not merely about the recognition of the moral or national authority of the church, reflected in state ritual. How is this power of the church articulated in practical terms?
AT: There is a paradox. The strong ties between the state and the church have a strange and negative influence on both. Referring to the “power of the church”, as many liberals still do, may not be the right way of framing the issue at hand. All constitutions enacted since the recognition of Greek independence hail the status of the Greek Orthodox Church in the preamble, but also in the text. This has implications for both the church and the state.
Direct involvement of the church in institutional politics and public life contradicts openly with the proclamation of freedom of religious faith by the same constitutional text.
On the one hand, for the state, the issue at hand is not simply a matter of ritual. There are those in Greece who still proclaim the population to be over 90% followers of the Greek Orthodox Church. This kind of census is impossible, as it would be illegal, but it has become an operating truism nonetheless. Yet, it is a truism founded on doubtful foundations, since it disregards the existence of important religious minorities, growing under the influence of migration as well as the expansion of atheism.
The Constitution here plays a role. The 1975 Constitution of Greece, which has been in force since the aftermath of the Greek dictatorship, stipulates in its preamble that the function of the Hellenic polity is under the auspices of the Holy Trinity while Article 3 states, rather bluntly, that the “dominant” religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church. While several constitutional lawyers claim that such stipulations have only a descriptive and ceremonial significance, it is undoubtedly that both judicial courts and public administration attribute to them normative force providing grounding to several traditional privileges of the church (e.g. remuneration of priesthood by the state, tax exemptions especially on ecclesiastical and monasterial landed property, opt-out model of catechism in primary and secondary education, etc). Thus, while in other European countries the official entanglement of the state with the church is restricted to a rather ceremonial level, the special circumstances of the formation of the modern Greek state resulted in a direct involvement of the church in institutional politics and public life, whose persistence sometimes contradicts openly with the proclamation of freedom of religious faith by the very same constitutional text.
Until recently the state approval of the construction of places of worship other than Orthodox without consent of the official Church was practically impossible. Even after the European Court of Human Rights vindicated plaintiffs protesting this reality, it remains the status quo. Jehovah’s Witnesses, for instance, found that their freedom of religion was curtailed.
More specifically, Article 13 of the Greek Constitution professes freedom of religion for all Recognised Religious Creeds, with the operative term here being “Recognised.” The influence exercised by the church, as a major pressure group, on judges and administrators concerning the recognition of a religious creed as opposed to a sect, has persistently kept Lutheran and Evangelical creeds in Greece at the societal margins. Similarly, until recently state approval of the construction of places of worship other than Orthodox, without the explicit consent of the official church was practically impossible. Even after the European Court of Human Rights has vindicated plaintiffs protesting this reality, this remains the status quo. So, Jehovah’s Witnesses, for instance, have found that their freedom of religion is significantly curtailed.
The official first session of the Greek parliament is preceded by a mass in the plenary. There are still prayers in school, even as the school population comes from creeds other than the Orthodox Church.
Until recently, this authority extended to a whole array of issues, including civil matters such as name-giving, marriage, etc. While this agenda has been now updated to be more inclusive and reflective of the needs of the Greek population, public rituals continue to emanate the dominance of the Orthodox Church. The official first session of the parliament is preceded by a mass in the plenary. In education, there are still prayers in school, even as the school population comes from creeds other than the Orthodox Church. And it goes without saying that many if not most Greek holidays are linked to religious events.
There have been numerous legal initiatives contesting the situation, such as judicial challenges to the presence of religious icons in courtrooms. Opponents argue that this could predispose the court towards non-Orthodox plaintiffs.
However, on the other side of the coin, the state exerts tremendous influence on the Church. Any change in the organizational structure of the Church, which is a state institution, must be enacted by public law. This undermines the Synodic form of governance common to the Orthodox Church. In some respects, this is in line with a Byzantine tradition. Byzantium was never a theocracy, but the state retained control over the Patriarchate, as seen by numerous instances of property confiscation. This tradition of confiscations continues to date.
Monasteries in Greece retain massive real estate portfolios, which the Greek state tries to regulate. The Church has won important cases in the European Court of Human Rights, resisting the confiscation of its “private property,” even as all Greek clergy remains in the public payroll and priests are public officers.
The conflation of Church and State has implications for both. Ultimately, successive Greek governments try to borrow religious authority to appeal to voters, while religious leaders try to retain spiritual authority by political means. We are not a theocracy, even as there are interpretations of the Constitution that could make Greece comparable to Iran. However, the Greek Church is known to make a fierce case in matters dear to the Church, such as (recently) the opposition to gay marriage.
IR: What is the public sentiment towards this relationship? Is there a general consensus or how do national and religious minorities view this relationship?
AT: Your question brings me back to the distinction between the ceremonial and civil authority of the Church.
Greeks, in their majority, due to public school catechism, have deeply ingrained in them the idea that the Greek nation and the Eastern Orthodox creed are intertwined. In this sense, “state religion” resonates with national identity for the majority of the population, even if they are not religious or Orthodox. It would be unthinkable even for atheists to think of public holidays founded, say, on a calendar other than that of the official Church.
In civil and matrimonial affairs, the religious element is retreating, like marriage and name-giving. Even socioeconomic groups strongly associated with the Orthodox Church do not want Church oversight over civil documents, like ID cards. Hardliners are a minority.
We are not a theocracy, even as there are interpretations of the Constitution that could make Greece comparable to Iran.
IR: So, the introduction of a state religion in Georgia would not stand in the way of EU membership, correct?
AT: As I said beforehand, not in principle. In effect, however, it could have serious adverse consequences when it comes to the protection of fundamental rights, which form an integral part of the EU acquis as determined by the relevant provisions of the Treaties and the European Convention of Human Rights, to which the EU, as well as its individual members, adhere.
Across Western Europe, over the last decade, amid a profound economic crisis, there has been a rekindling of identitarian politics, which can be distinctly anti-Islamic. This can create liabilities, as there is a regrouping around national symbols. That is, I believe, the fundamental issue in the Georgian debate as well. This discussion on the relationship of church and state is, unfortunately, framed by a nationalistic and defensive context, which the government can exploit. That is not a dynamic unique to Greece or Georgia. Remember Sarkozy’s “Ministry of National Identity” or, just a few years back ago, the rather disgracing creation of an EU Commissioner’s role defined as “Commissioner for a European Way of Life” [By the way, this position is currently held by a Greek politician – CJ]
The Greek and Cypriot relationships between church and state are unique in the EU. And in the context of religious minorities, there are legitimate concerns when it comes to the proliferation of such a relationship. The negotiation of civil rights in this institutional context can be precarious. Fears of a collision with a particular culture of civil rights are not unfounded. The church has a very strong grassroots organization that can allow it to become a political actor if it chooses to. Imbuing that potential with constitutional authority can be problematic, as it has been in Russia.
Legally, officially, and technically, the officialization of relations between the state and church in Georgia should not inhibit the country’s institutional trajectory. However, as the Russian case illustrates, this new relationship can be used to impose restrictions on civil rights regarding marriage, family, and religious expression.
Thank you very much, dear Greek colleagues!
Published by Caucasian Journal
