Europe Rediscovers Total Defence – Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Options

Romania in Context

“In war, the functioning of society becomes part of defence.”

By Major General (Two Stars) (retd) Corneliu Pivariu

This article examines the return of total defence in Europe and the consequences of this development for Romania. Its central thesis is that defence can no longer be assessed solely in terms of personnel strength, weaponry and military budgets. A state’s ability to withstand pressure depends on the continued functioning of energy, communications, transport, healthcare, public administration, industry and decision-making mechanisms. Total defence means organising the military and civilian contribution so that society can continue to function under sustained pressure. The concept does not entail the militarisation of every activity, but rather the clarification of responsibilities, the preparation of cooperation arrangements and the testing of capabilities before a crisis occurs.

Europe’s reorientation is necessary, but belated. The Russo-Georgian War of 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 provided successive warnings, while many European states reduced their stockpiles, infrastructure and civil-preparedness mechanisms during the decades of the peace dividend. The Russian military threat remains central, but the overall picture also includes sabotage, cyberattacks, information manipulation, disruption of critical infrastructure and physical actions that are not immediately easy to classify as armed aggression. The response must protect the population and restore services even before an incident has been conclusively attributed; political accusations and any subsequent retaliation, however, require evidence and differentiated assessments.

Ukraine’s experience shows that resilience cannot be measured solely by survival of the initial strike. Repeated attacks seek to exhaust repair resources, stockpiles and personnel. Decentralised energy generation, standardised components, mobile generators, continuity of medical care and the ability to receive external assistance become elements of defence. At the same time, drone warfare and the pace at which software is modified require armed forces and industry to move from the acquisition of isolated platforms towards ecosystems that integrate sensors, command and control, electronic warfare, air defence, munitions, maintenance and continuous updating. Modernising equipment cannot substitute for transforming doctrine, training, force structures and personnel policies.

The analysis distinguishes between defence of the European Union and defence of Europe. The EU can mobilise financing, regulation, industry, infrastructure and protection of the internal market, but it does not possess all the military capabilities required for continental defence. Europe’s security architecture includes NATO, the United States and Canada, the United Kingdom, Norway, Türkiye, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and the Balkans. The proposed European Security Council, the European emergency protocol and the instrument for strategic enablers could reduce fragmentation, but their credibility will depend on powers, budgets, timelines, command arrangements and integration with NATO planning. An institutional announcement does not amount to an operational capability.

National models offer complementary solutions. Germany links the mobility and sustainment of Allied forces to civilian infrastructure and services. Finland organises the continuity of vital functions through responsibilities distributed among public authorities, the business sector, organisations and citizens. France connects strategic ambition with national resilience and industrial capacity. Poland couples population protection with dedicated funding; Italy draws on civil protection and organised volunteering; and the United Kingdom is rebuilding government planning for home defence and testing it through exercises. Romania should not copy institutions detached from their context, but should compare responsibilities, resources, joint testing arrangements and the remediation of shortcomings.

The intelligence dimension is decisive because warning must be converted into decision and action. EU INTCEN, EUMS INT, SIAC, SatCen and specialised structures provide a European analytical foundation, but they depend on national contributions, protection of sources and the willingness of states to share sensitive intelligence. Extending the powers of intelligence services, including the use of artificial intelligence and the possibility of active measures in cyberspace, requires a clear legal distinction between intelligence collection, counterintelligence, police activity and measures designed to produce effects against an adversary. A serious incident may result from a failure of collection, analysis, dissemination or decision-making; determining responsibility requires reconstruction of the entire chain.

European funding can accelerate investment, but it does not automatically generate capabilities. SAFE provides loans of up to EUR 150 billion and is intended to promote joint procurement and strengthen the European defence-industrial base. Loans must be repaid, while the systems procured require personnel, munitions, maintenance, infrastructure and operational integration. SAFE II remains a subject of negotiation, with eastern-flank states seeking a larger share of grant funding. Assessment should focus on common capability gaps and verifiable outcomes, while avoiding the transformation of urgency into a permanent mechanism for accumulating debt.

The transatlantic relationship is entering a period of transition. Europe must reduce its critical dependencies without prematurely weakening the deterrence provided by the United States. Command and control, intelligence, air and missile defence, strategic lift, air-to-air refuelling and nuclear deterrence cannot be replaced rapidly. The principal vulnerability is the gap between declining US willingness to provide these capabilities and the maturation of Europe’s own capacity. A shift towards a bicentric West, comprising the United States and a more capable, enlarged Europe, is possible only if declared autonomy is preceded by effective forces, stockpiles, command structures, industry and strategic enablers.

For Romania, military modernisation must be linked to protection of the population and the functioning of the state. CSAT decisions, procurement programmes and access to SAFE provide a basis for development, but the contracting timetable must not be mistaken for operational capability. Air defence, maritime security, the F-35 programme and support for Allied forces all depend on personnel, infrastructure, industry and civilian services. The Black Sea, the Danube and the Port of Constanța connect defence directly to the economy. The condition of civil-defence shelters, overlapping demands on specialist personnel and the continuity of hospitals show that preparedness must be measured by services actually available, not by the formal existence of plans or resources.

The recommended programme for Romania should begin with a joint government audit of plans, dependencies and resources. Within approximately one hundred days of its adoption, the functions that must be maintained, the institutions responsible and the minimum service levels should be established. During the first year, a national exercise should test leadership and cooperation among institutions, local authorities and private operators under conditions of simultaneous disruption. Each shortcoming must be assigned to a responsible institution, a deadline and the necessary resources, and the scenario should be repeated after remediation. For the 2030–2035 horizon, Romania requires predictable funding, trained personnel, pre-arranged resupply contracts and public communication adapted to local risks.

The conclusion is that total defence is the link between military capability, societal resilience and the legitimacy of decision-making. Preparedness for hybrid attacks, protection of infrastructure and the extension of security institutions’ powers are necessary, but they must be accompanied by rigorous attribution of incidents, proportionality and democratic oversight. Europe needs power to defend its political order without turning emergency into a permanent condition that weakens rights and public debate. For Romania, the decisive criterion is the state’s ability to continue making legitimate decisions, provide essential services and sustain national defence when normal conditions disappear.

Introduction

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has demonstrated that sustaining defence depends on the functioning of society as a whole. Attacks on energy infrastructure and disruption of medical services extend the consequences of war far beyond the front line. Repairing networks, continuing medical care, maintaining supplies and keeping public administration operational become conditions of national resilience.[1]

For European states, this experience raises an immediate question: to what extent can they sustain military defence when their own essential services are disrupted? Answering it requires an examination of the Russian military threat, hostile action below the threshold of armed conflict and the dependencies that may constrain Europe’s response. The updating of British plans, Germany’s logistical preparations and the strengthening of civil-defence mechanisms must be understood in this context.

The updating of the British plans known as the “War Books” and preparations for the ALBISTON SHADOW exercise in 2027 show how continuity of government under conditions of disrupted energy, communications, transport and public services has returned to European planning. The British case is examined separately in Chapter IV.[2]

This reality is not a recent discovery. Some European states preserved their preparedness mechanisms; others are rebuilding them; and still others are attempting to adapt institutions designed primarily for disaster response. The differences among them matter more than the general proposition that Europe is “preparing for war”.

As used here, total defence means organising the military and civilian contribution to national defence so that institutions, the economy and society can function under sustained pressure. The concept does not entail the militarisation of all activities. It requires responsibilities to be defined and cooperation arrangements to be prepared before a crisis forces the authorities to improvise.

Current concern with defence of the European Union cannot be explained solely by the war in Ukraine or the Russian threat. It forms part of a broader redistribution of power at the global, regional and national levels, in which military protection, industry, technology, energy and control of infrastructure are becoming components of the same strategic competition. In this context, the Union is attempting to move from being a protected space to becoming an actor capable of protecting itself, taking decisions and acting.

This reorientation is necessary, but belated. It comes after more than a decade of successive warnings — the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, US pressure for burden-sharing and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 — at a time when threats are evolving faster than Europe’s industrial, institutional and military capacity to respond. Europe is therefore trying, within a short period, to recover capabilities that were systematically diminished during the decades of the peace dividend.

A conceptual distinction is necessary from the outset. Defence of the European Union concerns its 27 member states and the Union’s economic, industrial, legal and institutional instruments. Defence of Europe has a broader geography and architecture: it includes NATO, the transatlantic dimension, the United Kingdom, Norway, Türkiye, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and the Balkans, as well as the strategic links among the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Arctic.

Defence of the European Union is a component of defence of Europe, but it cannot replace it.

This distinction also changes the criterion for analysis. The question is not whether the EU can reproduce NATO, but how the Allied military guarantee, the power of states and the Union’s ability to mobilise financing, industry, infrastructure and regulation can be brought together. Total defence is the level at which these components converge in the practical functioning of society.

For Romania, the issue must be examined by relating military investment to the country’s ability to sustain it. Procurement decisions are indispensable. Their effectiveness, however, also depends on the functioning of public administration, industry, infrastructure and services for the population.

I. Threats Requiring Total Defence Preparedness

Current Threats and Strategic Pressures

Russia constitutes the central military threat in any assessment of European defence. Its war against Ukraine, which began in 2014 and expanded with the full-scale invasion of February 2022, requires preparedness for the use of force against a European state. NATO’s assessment links this threat to hybrid campaigns against the Allies. Preparedness must encompass both territorial defence and protection of the mechanisms that make it possible to sustain operations.[3]

Actions below the threshold of armed conflict can affect infrastructure, freedom of political decision and public confidence. The Council of the EU identifies sabotage, cyberattacks, disruption of critical infrastructure and information manipulation among the components of Russian hybrid campaigns. For total defence, the consequence is the need for a response that combines technical protection, investigation, warning and continuity of services. Each incident must be attributed on its own evidence; its effects on the population require action even before the investigation has been completed.[4]

David Petraeus[5] warns that grey-zone warfare is not limited to air incursions, cyberattacks or demonstrations intended to intimidate. It may include the recruitment of intermediaries, sabotage, violence, destruction and terrorist acts conducted on the territory of NATO states. The effectiveness of such operations depends not only on the adversary’s resources, but also on the ability of the targeted states to detect, prevent and attribute them, and to limit their consequences. In the absence of a coordinated response and credible costs imposed on the perpetrator, the grey zone can become a domain of repeated aggression with little risk for the initiator.

On 18 September 2026, following a meeting with political leaders and the heads of France’s intelligence and security agencies, Emmanuel Macron stated that the Russian hybrid threat had intensified and that the nature of its aggressiveness was changing. He cited a drone attack on a passenger train near the Polish border, an attempted attack on Leipzig Airport, airspace incursions and other hostile acts, before calling for a plan to protect critical infrastructure and defence-industry facilities against cyberattacks and drone attacks. The warning does not demonstrate that direct war is inevitable, but it does show that operations below the threshold of war are being incorporated into national-defence preparations. The gravity of these attributions nevertheless requires a clear distinction among confirmed incidents, intelligence assessments and political hypotheses.[6]

Terrorism and instability in Europe’s southern neighbourhood complete this picture. China should be analysed through the lens of strategic competition and relevant economic and technological dependencies, separately from the Russian military threat. Access to components, raw materials and digital services can affect Europe’s capacity to respond. Supplier diversification must be assessed against actual dependencies and the feasibility of replacing them, without equating every commercial relationship with a security threat.[7]

A reduction in US support before Europeans possess sufficient command and control, intelligence, air and missile defence, strategic lift, air-to-air refuelling and stockpiles would not produce autonomy, but a power vacuum. Strengthening Europe’s capacity must therefore be planned within the transatlantic relationship and calibrated to the time required to make alternatives operational.[8]

Transatlantic interdependencies are also beginning to be examined as potential instruments of political, economic or military pressure. The European Union Institute for Security Studies recommends maintaining cooperation with the United States in areas of common interest while developing European means of resisting coercion. Trade and investment instruments can support this position, but using access to bases or airspace as leverage would be risky, especially for the eastern flank. For Romania, the priority remains to strengthen European capacity without prematurely creating a security vacuum in the Black Sea region.[9]

Declining Preparedness and Civilian Dependencies

After the Cold War, the diminished perception of a conventional military threat encouraged reductions in investment in civil preparedness. At the same time, armed forces became more dependent on commercial infrastructure and services. NATO describes this development explicitly: transport, communications and support for Allied forces rely to a significant degree on civilian resources.[10]

This transformation brought economic and technological benefits, but it changed the conditions for conflict preparedness. The commercial availability of a service in peacetime does not guarantee access to it when demand rises abruptly, personnel are absent, communications are interrupted or the provider faces difficulties of its own.

Private ownership is not, in itself, a vulnerability. Vulnerability arises when continuity responsibilities, priority access, contractual obligations and compensation mechanisms have not been sufficiently clarified. The state may depend on a capability that it does not directly control; precisely for this reason, it must know under what conditions that capability can be used.

Total defence begins with the interdependent character of society’s functions. In a scenario involving a widespread electricity outage, the effects may extend to water pumping, communications, payments, fuel distribution and hospital operations. Assessing each sector separately may fail to reveal the fragility of the links among them.

The origin of a disruption remains essential to the political and security response. A technical failure, a natural event and sabotage may produce partly similar effects without having the same significance. Protection of the population and restoration of services must begin even when attributing an incident takes time. An accusation of aggression, by contrast, must be supported by evidence.

Nor is a progression from pressure to sabotage and then to armed conflict inevitable. Hostile action below the threshold of war may seek to intimidate, extract concessions or weaken public confidence. Societal preparedness reduces the ability of such action to produce the political effects sought by its initiator.

This is also the link between resilience and deterrence. An adversary that expects disruption of infrastructure neither to paralyse government nor to interrupt the sustainment of defence must revise its cost-benefit calculation. Civil preparedness therefore contributes to military defence even before a conflict begins.

Repeated Attacks on Critical Infrastructure and Essential Services

The war in Ukraine confirms that the threat is not confined to the initial strike. Restoring capabilities and facing renewed attacks pose different problems, and the adversary may seek to exhaust repair resources and personnel. Europe must prepare simultaneously for an immediate response and for prolonged sustainment. Achievements must be assessed alongside losses and limitations, without presenting a society’s resilience as a cost-free model.

Energy provides a documented example. The International Energy Agency reports that the wave of attacks from March to May 2024 caused Ukraine to lose a further 9 GW of electricity-generation capacity. The figure describes that period, not the current condition of the system. It illustrates the scale of a disruption that simultaneously affects production, services and living conditions.[11]

The energy response must combine protection of installations with restoration and diversification of supply. In its 2026 analysis, the IEA describes a shift towards decentralised generation of electricity and heat, as well as the use of mobile generators. Standardised equipment and stockpiles of compatible components can accelerate repairs. The lesson concerns the ability to restore service, including when an installation is struck again.[12]

For European planners, this raises a precise question: how much of an essential service can be maintained while repairs are under way? A backup installation must have personnel, fuel and the means to connect to priority consumers. Physical protection, alternative sources and repair capacity must be assessed together. Procuring reserve equipment satisfies only one of these conditions.

Pressure on the Medical System and Essential Personnel

The medical system is under comparable pressure. In its communication of 23 February 2026, the WHO reported that attacks on healthcare in Ukraine had increased by almost 20 per cent in 2025 compared with 2024. The indicator covers attacks affecting personnel, facilities, ambulances and other components of healthcare; it is not a count of hospitals destroyed. This distinction permits a proper assessment of pressure on the service as a whole.[13]

A hospital must treat the wounded, continue caring for chronically ill patients and protect its personnel. Disruption of water or electricity can constrain its activity even when the building itself has not been struck. European preparedness must include continuity of care, patient transfers and support for institutions receiving evacuees. Surge capacity is measured by the services actually delivered and sustained by personnel and supplies.

Drones, Technological Adaptation and the Pace of Learning

Adaptation to drones offers another lesson. NATO’s Layered Counter-UAS Initiative, LCI-X, uses threat-informed scenarios and support from JATEC[14] to test cooperation among different technologies and actors. The approach reflects the need to integrate detection, command and control, and countermeasures. Publication of such a programme demonstrates a process of learning and experimentation, not the existence of comprehensive protection.[15]

The industrial implication is that a procurement programme must allow adaptation throughout a system’s service life. Training and maintenance must keep pace with technical change. The cost of a solution must also be assessed against its availability, its consumption of munitions or components and its capacity for repeated use. A comparison based solely on the price of a drone and that of an interceptor would overlook the importance of the asset being protected and of the other means of defence.

David Petraeus’s assessment indicates that the war in Ukraine requires not only modernisation of equipment, but institutional transformation of the armed forces. The distinction is fundamental: modernisation replaces older equipment with more capable variants, whereas transformation changes doctrine, force structure, training, leader development, procurement, personnel policies and military infrastructure. Larger budgets are insufficient if additional resources merely reproduce structures and procedures designed for the wars of the past.

The speed of adaptation becomes a decisive criterion. Ukrainian manufacturers can modify software in approximately one week and physical components in three to four weeks. Under these conditions, the strategic advantage does not necessarily belong to the weapon system that is superior at the outset of a confrontation, but to the ecosystem capable of learning, adapting and changing faster than its adversary. Military procurement must therefore include access to software, the ability to upgrade systems, integration capacity and a continuous relationship among users, industry and research organisations.

Traditional platforms do not disappear, but they lose effectiveness when used in isolation. Tanks, crewed aircraft and ships remain necessary, but they must be integrated with drones, distributed sensors, electronic warfare, air defence and digital command systems. The issue is not the complete replacement of the old by the new, but a change in their relative weight and the integration of capabilities into a combat ecosystem. Europe must avoid financing the armies of the past to fight the wars of the future.

Prolonged resistance also has a human dimension. Replacing personnel, caring for the wounded and supporting families all affect the continuity of services. Not everyone able to contribute is interchangeable: a specialist working in an energy network or a hospital may be difficult to replace. Military mobilisation must therefore be coordinated with the retention of essential civilian professions. The objective is to preserve society’s capacity to function throughout the entire effort.

External-Support Logistics and the Limits of Transferring Experience

External support is an important resource, but it presupposes the capacity to receive, distribute and use assistance. In Ukraine, the WHO documents the delivery of medical supplies, coordination of teams and efforts to limit disruption of services, including in countries hosting refugees. Such cooperation requires logistical and institutional continuity both in the country receiving support and in partner states.[16]

Lessons from Ukraine must be transferred to NATO with discernment. The Allies have different collective-defence arrangements, a different distribution of resources and reciprocal responsibilities. Ukraine provides direct experience of functioning under attack, not a template that can be copied in full. For Romania, the value of this experience lies in the questions it imposes on exercises, procurement and civil preparedness.

Scenarios for the Coming Years

For the 2030–2035 horizon, three working assumptions are relevant: simultaneous pressure in several European regions; the proliferation of drones and autonomous systems accompanied by constantly changing countermeasures; and prolonged disruption of communications, navigation and supply. These are preparedness scenarios, not predictions. Their severity depends on the adversary’s intentions, the capabilities available and the Allies’ response.

A simultaneous scenario is more demanding than the sum of incidents analysed separately. The same transport assets, technical teams or medical resources may be required in several locations. Planning must test how priorities are established and what support remains available when partners face emergencies of their own. Natural disasters and technological accidents may aggravate such a situation without being confused with deliberate aggression.

II. The European Union and the European Capacity for Action

Europe Extends Beyond the European Union

The distinction between defence of the EU and defence of Europe is operational, not merely terminological. The Union can organise financing, procurement, standards, infrastructure, protection of the internal market and the resilience of services. As such, however, it does not possess the entire command system or all the capabilities required for continental defence. NATO remains the framework for collective defence, while European states outside the EU possess capabilities without which the continental equation would be incomplete.

The United Kingdom and France are nuclear powers; Norway occupies an essential position in the High North and in energy security; Türkiye controls a decisive space between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean; Ukraine provides combat experience, innovation and strategic depth; and Canada maintains a transatlantic link that is not identical to Washington’s policy. The Republic of Moldova and the Balkans likewise demonstrate that the continent’s vulnerabilities do not follow the institutional borders of the Union.

Canada’s role in this configuration became more visible with its official application, on 16 September 2026, to join the Joint Expeditionary Force, a UK-led formation comprising Nordic and Baltic NATO members. Canada cannot detach itself strategically from the United States, given geography, economic integration and its participation in NORAD. It can, however, diversify its military and industrial relationships and become a bridge linking North America, the Arctic and Europe. Its closer ties with the EU, the United Kingdom and the Nordic states confirm that defence of Europe is tending to organise itself across a space broader than the Union, while remaining within the transatlantic framework.[17]

Russia is also geographically part of Europe, even though it currently constitutes the principal military threat to the European order. Deterrence and immediate defence do not remove the question of a future continental security architecture. Such an architecture cannot grant Moscow a veto over its neighbours’ choices, but neither can it assume that Russia’s geography and potential will disappear from long-term calculations.[18]

From Strategic Autonomy to a European Capacity for Action

The State of the Union address of 16 September 2026 marks a change in vocabulary and ambition. The formulation of a Europe that is “stronger and independent” and whose destiny must remain in European hands goes beyond the elasticity of the concept of strategic autonomy. Security is becoming an organising principle of the European project alongside competitiveness and cohesion, while the future European Security Strategy is expected to connect defence with energy, technology, critical raw materials, industry and border protection.[19]

This development responds to a reality: Europe is preparing for a world in which US protection can no longer be considered either automatic or sufficient. It does not proclaim separation from the United States; rather, it seeks to reduce the risk of paralysis when US priorities change, support is delayed or a threat remains below the threshold of open war.

Rym Momtaz presents the same tension in critical terms: Europe is passing through a “moment of power”, but Brussels’ institutional time remains slower than strategic time. The Union has begun to transform its resources into instruments of security, yet common decision-making, implementation and acceptance of costs are not advancing at the same pace. The institutional project is therefore still moving faster than the military power required to sustain it.[20]

This also reveals a deeper political dilemma. Europe needs power to protect its democratic ideal, but the accumulation of power can alter that ideal if emergency becomes permanent and oversight is weakened. Extending security policy to encompass “cognitive warfare” is justified by interference, falsehoods and influence operations; it must not, however, allow legitimate criticism, political disagreement or scrutiny by the press to be confused with adversarial action.

The language of a European “revolution” can be read as recognition of an epochal rupture: the Union, created to manage peace and interdependence, is beginning to organise itself to manage conflict and to mobilise before an open confrontation. This wording does not announce that war is inevitable, but it normalises the idea that security will increasingly shape European policies. Precisely for this reason, faster decision-making and the concentration of power must be accompanied by legal limits and democratic oversight.

From this perspective, the address also marks a shift away from the founding logic of European integration. The European project sought to make war among European states not only undesirable, but practically impossible through reconciliation, economic interdependence, law and negotiation. In the current discourse, peace no longer appears solely as the outcome of integration, but also as an effect of power, preparedness and the capacity to compel. This is not a declared abandonment of the founding values, but a change in their hierarchy: security and the capacity for action are tending to become preconditions for prosperity, freedom and solidarity. The risk is that, in attempting to defend the project of peace, the Union may gradually adopt the logic of permanent mobilisation and transform the very nature of the project it seeks to protect.

The announced initiatives do not begin from nothing. Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union provides for assistance in the event of armed aggression, while Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union establishes the solidarity clause for terrorist attacks and disasters. The new emergency protocol should address hybrid incidents and rapid consultation more effectively, without duplicating or weakening NATO.

New Mechanisms and Their Limitations

The proposed European Security Council could institutionalise consultation between the EU and partners such as the United Kingdom, Norway, Ukraine and Canada. Its value would lie precisely in extending beyond the 27 member states. Its composition, decision-making rules, relationship with the European Council, NATO and the Coalition of the Willing, and the link between deliberation and the actual employment of military capabilities nevertheless remain unclear.

The European emergency protocol on security would allow member states to be convened in response to hybrid acts and incidents below the threshold of armed aggression. The comparison drawn with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty must not cause confusion: the mechanism would organise consultation, coordination and the mitigation of consequences; it would neither constitute an “EU Article 5” nor provide an automatic guarantee of collective defence.

The European instrument for strategic enablers targets precisely those fields in which dependence on the United States is most difficult to replace: air and missile defence, strategic lift, air-to-air refuelling, space, intelligence and cyber defence. The choice of priorities is appropriate. The instrument’s credibility will nevertheless depend on its budget, timelines, command arrangements, national contributions and full integration with NATO planning.

Public reporting and analysis of these proposals confirm the distance between announcement and mechanism: neither the date on which the new council would become operational nor its concrete outputs have been established, and the relationship among existing formats and the protocol’s deterrent effect remain uncertain. These ambiguities do not invalidate the initiatives, but they require them to be assessed by capabilities delivered and executable decisions, not by the scale of the rhetoric.[21]

Within this architecture, Ukraine appears not only as a recipient of assistance, but also as a provider of security, experience and technology. Its functional integration can accelerate European adaptation, provided that continental defence is not reduced to reproducing the lessons of a single war. The southern flank, the Atlantic, the Arctic, maritime security and undersea infrastructure require additional capabilities and scenarios.

NATO, the United States and the Challenge of Transition

The analysis by Franklin C. Miller, Eric Edelman and Walter B. Slocombe warns that the credibility of European defence will erode if the US commitment is reduced before European Allies can assume critical functions. Europe cannot rapidly replace the connection among conventional forces, strategic enablers and nuclear deterrence provided within the Alliance. A premature withdrawal would create a period of vulnerability in which an adversary could test precisely the uncertainty surrounding the transition.

European autonomy should therefore be defined as growing operational sufficiency and a stronger European pillar within NATO. The reasonable objective is for Europeans to act more rapidly, bear a larger share of the effort and continue defending themselves even when US support is limited, without abandoning the advantages of integrated command and transatlantic deterrence.

US pressure for more balanced burden-sharing is producing an effect that goes beyond its original financial purpose. European states are beginning to assess military systems in terms of freedom of employment, access to components, software and munitions, maintenance, and the ability to modernise them without the supplier’s authorisation. Legal ownership of a platform does not ensure operational autonomy if its availability depends on decisions, services or updates controlled from abroad. Burden-sharing is therefore gradually becoming a policy of reducing critical dependencies.

If this trend becomes consolidated, the West could evolve from a structure organised almost exclusively around US power towards a potentially bicentric configuration. The United States would remain the dominant military, nuclear and technological centre, while an enlarged Europe bringing together the EU, the United Kingdom, Norway, Canada and other partners could acquire more autonomous conventional and industrial capacity. The two centres would remain profoundly asymmetrical and connected through NATO. This is not yet an established reality, but a possible direction for the transformation of the transatlantic relationship.

European discourse remains incomplete regarding nuclear deterrence, the role of the French and British arsenals, personnel strength, munitions, maritime defence and burden-sharing. These very omissions separate a political vision from a military doctrine. They must be addressed before the new institutions can be regarded as a defence architecture.

The Union’s Instruments for Preparedness and Financing

The Preparedness Union Strategy, presented in March 2025, seeks to coordinate public authorities, involve society and prepare for risks of different origins. It includes public-private cooperation, exercises, protection of vital functions and the development of guidance for a minimum of 72 hours of household self-sufficiency.[22]

This interval should be understood as an initial stage of preparedness. It is neither the probable duration of a crisis nor a deadline by which services are guaranteed to be restored. Household self-sufficiency can reduce the immediate pressure on public emergency response, but it must be accompanied by measures for people unable to secure the necessary resources themselves.

The EU Stockpiling Strategy, presented in July 2025, adds a focus on identifying shortages, coordinating reserves and organising distribution logistics. The Medical Countermeasures Strategy likewise seeks to ensure the availability and production of resources required for the health response.[23]

For a member state, European reserves complement national preparedness. Planning must also take account of a situation in which several countries request the same resources simultaneously. Solidarity is more effective when transport, distribution and rules of use have been prepared before the emergency.

In the digital domain, the reporting obligations under the Cyber Resilience Act began to apply on 11 September 2026, creating an additional link between manufacturers and the responsible authorities. The obligations concern actively exploited vulnerabilities and serious incidents affecting the security of products with digital elements. This stage does not amount to full application of all the Regulation’s requirements.[24]

For total defence, the usefulness of reporting depends on the ability of institutions to convert the information received into protective measures. A technical notification must reach those who understand which services may be affected and what alternatives are available.

The assumption of greater European responsibility must be assessed according to the same logic. Reducing a military dependency presupposes the existence of effective alternatives. The political timetable must be aligned with the availability of forces, their sustainment, and command and intelligence capabilities.

III. European Models and the Limits of Comparison

Germany and the Sustainment of Allied Defence

Operationsplan Deutschland, known as OPLAN DEU, connects the military components of national and collective defence with the necessary civilian support. The Bundeswehr specifies, however, that the plan does not regulate the whole of civil protection or every aspect of supplying the population. These belong to the broader framework of overall defence. This distinction matters: OPLAN DEU should not be presented as a document that, by itself, resolves all the requirements of German resilience.[25]

Germany’s position at the centre of Europe gives it a major role in the transit and sustainment of Allied forces. Preparedness requires cooperation with local and regional authorities and with operators in transport, infrastructure and services. For Romania, this model is relevant because of the way in which military requirements are translated into civilian tasks and arrangements prepared in advance.

The CIMIC Quadriga 2026 exercise provides a public example of how such cooperation is tested: military personnel and civilian partners from 28 countries participated in scenarios involving public authorities, emergency services, hospitals and businesses.[26]

The practical conclusion is that military mobility must be examined together with the functioning of the territory being crossed. A route that is available on a map must be capable of supporting transport, refuelling and maintenance without causing uncontrolled disruption to the services on which the population depends.

France and the Link Between Strategic Ambition and National Capacity

The Revue nationale stratégique 2025 sets objectives for the 2030 horizon and explicitly addresses the risk of a major conflict in Europe. The document connects defence with national resilience, industrial capacity and a stronger European contribution within the Alliance. The 2030 horizon is one of strategic preparedness; it should not be turned into a prediction of when a war will begin.[27]

For comparative analysis, the French case raises the question of the relationship between political decision and the resources required to implement it. Increasing military production requires predictable orders, suppliers, skilled personnel and the capacity to expand output. A strategic orientation becomes credible when progress on these conditions can be tracked through implementation.

The French experience is also useful because of the attention paid to local and regional government. The SGDSN has published a guide for integrating the national resilience strategy into the work of local authorities.[28]

This dimension matters for Romania. The continuity of the state is also tested by the ability of a local authority to provide information, support vulnerable people and cooperate with utility operators.

Finland and the Continuity of Societal Preparedness

Finland is a central reference point because it provides a framework in which preparedness is distributed among public authorities, the business sector, organisations and citizens. The Security Strategy for Society, adopted in January 2025, defines the vital functions and the tasks required to protect them. Its implementation is monitored, including through annual reporting to the government.[29]

The model’s value lies in turning participation into an organised practice. The responsibilities of all actors must be known before a crisis, while continuity of preparedness must extend beyond the length of a political term.

Romania cannot mechanically copy this system. Its administrative structure, population distribution, economic capacity and level of public trust are different. It can, however, adopt the principle that every vital function must have a responsible authority, identified partners and a method of testing preparedness.

Italy and Poland as Complementary Reference Points

Italy offers the experience of a civil-protection system that integrates public authorities, emergency-response structures and organised volunteering. Training volunteers and coordinating logistical, medical and communications resources are explicit responsibilities of the relevant institutions. This foundation is relevant to mobilising the civilian contribution, but it does not automatically demonstrate preparedness for all the requirements of a prolonged conflict.[30]

Poland provides a reference point for linking objectives to funding. Its Population Protection and Civil Defence Programme for 2025–2026 is tied to an annual funding threshold of at least 0.3 per cent of GDP. The allocation does not prove that expenditure is effective, but it makes a distinct budgetary commitment verifiable.[31]

The European comparison applies the same criteria to every state: responsibilities, resources, joint testing and remediation of shortcomings. The assessment distinguishes declared ambitions from publicly documented results.

IV. The United Kingdom and the Rebuilding of Home-Defence Planning

The British case is relevant because it attempts to bring together government planning, military requirements and societal participation. The Home Defence Programme was established in August 2024 to align the civilian and military effort in the event of escalation towards conflict. A parliamentary response of March 2026 confirms the participation of the health sector and attention to personnel, infrastructure and medical stockpiles.[32]

The updating of the War Books should be understood within this framework. Such an instrument defines how institutions coordinate their actions and move from normal functioning to the management of a conflict situation. Its relevance lies in the relationships among responsibilities, decisions and resources.

It would be inaccurate to conclude that the United Kingdom spent decades without emergency planning. The question under discussion is the adequacy and integration of preparedness for a major conflict, which may place simultaneous demands on several sectors and last far longer than a local emergency response.

The Strategic Defence Review 2025 links protection of infrastructure to the ability of the armed forces to deploy and sustain operations. The document gives attention to access to privately owned infrastructure, the mobilisation of industry and reserves, and the legislative instruments required for preparedness. These are policy directions and recommendations whose implementation must be assessed separately.[33]

The National Risk Register 2026 performs a different function. It is the public version of the government’s risk assessment and enables actors outside central government to align their preparedness with a common framework. The risk register and the action plan are complementary: identifying a threat must be followed by defining measures and assigning responsibility.[34]

Exercises test this connection. The Cabinet Office has stated that major ministerially led exercises involve government departments, agencies, non-governmental organisations and local response structures. ALBISTON SHADOW is focused on home defence.[35]

The value of such an exercise depends on the rigour of the questions put to participants. Who decides when intelligence is contradictory? Who allocates scarce resources? What happens if a major supplier cannot meet its obligations? How does government continue to function when normal communications are unavailable?

The British lesson for Romania is the need for planning that can be implemented and tested. The title of the document matters less than the ability of institutions to work from the same assumptions and to correct the shortcomings identified.

V. Intelligence, Early Warning and Continuity of Decision-Making

The Structures Available to the European Union

The European Union has an architecture for analysis, warning and decision support; it does not have a supranational intelligence service with autonomous collection powers. The EU Intelligence and Situation Centre, EU INTCEN, operates within the European External Action Service and constitutes the civilian component. Its products are based on contributions from member states’ intelligence services, diplomatic reporting and open sources, and are intended for senior EU decision-makers.[36]

The Intelligence Directorate of the European Union Military Staff, EUMS INT, provides strategic military intelligence analysis. Together with EU INTCEN, it forms the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity, SIAC, the mechanism through which civilian and military contributions are combined into joint assessments. SIAC does not replace national intelligence services, and the quality of its output depends on the relevance, timeliness and continuity of the intelligence that those services are willing to provide.

Within this architecture, the Hybrid Fusion Cell supports the analysis of hybrid threats. The European Union Satellite Centre, SatCen, provides geospatial analysis and products derived from satellite imagery. Europol contributes in the fields of terrorism and organised crime; Frontex and EUROSUR contribute to situational awareness at the borders; and ENISA and CERT-EU contribute to cybersecurity. These structures have different powers and legal regimes; combining their products must not be confused with placing them under a single European intelligence service.[37]

Directions for Development

The commitment to strengthen SIAC has been translated into a roadmap and a review of the EUMS INT structure. Council documents identify the priority fields: defence, space, air, maritime affairs, cybersecurity, threats to economic security and insufficiently covered geographical areas. The review provides for five additional posts, including for hybrid issues, naval and maritime analysis, air and space, management of intelligence requirements and administration of the geospatial database. It also seeks interoperable information systems, a more rigorous process for managing intelligence requirements and faster geospatial support for decision-making.[38]

On 16 September 2026, the European Parliament called on the member states to increase intelligence sharing and strengthen SIAC in response to hybrid threats. The direction is logical, but its effect will depend on trust among intelligence services, protection of sources and a clear definition of the recipients. A larger organisational chart cannot compensate for states’ reluctance to share sensitive intelligence or for the inability of political institutions to act on a warning.[39]

Germany and the Expansion of the Intelligence Services’ Operational Role

On 12 August 2026, Germany’s federal government approved draft amendments to the legislation governing the Federal Intelligence Service, BND, and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, BfV. The bills require parliamentary approval and should not be presented as laws already in force. Their stated purpose is to reduce dependence on intelligence supplied by Allies and to adapt the services to the intensification of espionage, sabotage, cyberattacks and hybrid operations conducted by state actors.[40]

The proposed amendments expand access to digital data and devices, the use of artificial-intelligence tools for analysis and the possibility of active measures against infrastructure used in hostile operations. Under regulated conditions, such measures could include penetrating information systems, disabling servers used for attacks, disrupting communications or physically preventing an operation under preparation. The precise scope of the powers differs between the foreign and domestic services and will depend on the version adopted by the Bundestag.

The doctrinal significance lies in the transition from a model in which an intelligence service’s output culminates principally in warning the decision-maker to one in which the service may be granted legal authority to influence directly an adversary’s capacity to act. Intelligence is active by its nature: it directs collection, penetrates protected environments and supports decision-making. Yet being active must not automatically be equated with offensive action, coercive intervention or covert operations. The expansion of German powers illustrates precisely why the law must distinguish intelligence collection, counterintelligence, cyber defence, police activity and measures intended to produce effects against an adversary.

The reform has generated concerns about privacy protection, the proportionality of measures and preservation of the separation between intelligence services and the police established in Germany after the experience of the Nazi regime. Strengthening oversight through the Independent Oversight Council and parliamentary and judicial mechanisms therefore becomes part of operational capacity, not an external obstacle to it. The lesson for total defence is that expanding the power of intelligence services must be accompanied by clearly defined conditions of authorisation, accountability, traceability of decisions and democratic oversight.

Total defence requires a shared understanding of risk, built from security intelligence, technical data and knowledge of how the economy functions. Intelligence services play an essential role in identifying hostile intentions and preparatory actions. System operators and sectoral authorities, however, understand dependencies and failures that may not be visible from an exclusively military perspective.

The challenge is to integrate these contributions. Several incidents may have a common cause, but their mere simultaneity does not prove hostile coordination. Analysis must compare alternative explanations and state the level of confidence attached to its conclusions.

A common situational picture does not mean that every participant has access to all intelligence. It means that each institution receives, in time, the information required to discharge its responsibility. An operator may need an actionable warning without knowing the secret source that contributed to it.

The increasing autonomy of battle management changes the very relationship between intelligence and decision. Petraeus anticipates battle-management systems that will integrate, in real time, the air picture, threats, protected assets and available capabilities, autonomously assigning tasks to sensors and weapons. A human would supervise the system as a whole, but the speed of confrontation may reduce the ability to verify every decision before it is executed.

Under these conditions, a human may remain formally responsible without being effectively present in every decision loop. The human role shifts from controlling each individual action to establishing objectives, limits and rules of engagement. The doctrinal question is whether supervision retains genuine control or becomes merely the legal and moral validation of decisions made by a machine at a pace beyond human reach.

The consequence for intelligence is direct. Erroneous intelligence, misattribution or the deliberate manipulation of data may no longer influence only a commander’s assessment; it can be converted automatically and extremely rapidly into an operational effect. Intelligence services and command systems must protect both what the state knows and the process by which it comes to know, understand and decide. Strategic advantage will not necessarily belong to the actor that grants artificial intelligence maximum autonomy, but to the one that finds the optimal relationship between machine autonomy and human judgement.

In this context, four categories of failure can be distinguished. The first concerns collection: relevant data are not obtained. The second concerns analysis: available intelligence is misinterpreted or inadequately assessed. The third concerns dissemination and institutional integration: the warning fails to reach the competent actor or is not correlated with other data. The fourth concerns decision and execution: the risk is understood, but the necessary measures are not adopted or implemented.

This distinction is useful in determining responsibility. A serious incident does not automatically demonstrate a failure of the intelligence services. It may indicate an analytical error, a problem in the circulation of intelligence or a refusal to act on an accurate warning. Assessment must reconstruct the full sequence of events.

At government level, a permanent function for integrating the situational picture is required, with clear relationships among existing structures. The need for such a function does not automatically justify creating a new institution. The organisational form should be chosen only after analysing current powers and gaps.

Exercises must also test the quality of decision-making under conditions of incomplete information. Leaders may be compelled to act before an incident has been conclusively attributed. Protective measures must be proportionate and capable of revision when new information emerges.

Continuity of decision-making also requires preservation of institutional memory. A change in leadership should not interrupt the monitoring of warnings, known vulnerabilities and agreed measures. Preparedness depends on an institution’s ability to learn and transmit this experience.

The necessary development of Europe’s analytical capacity does not justify reproducing a national intelligence service at EU level without an explicit political and legal basis. The priority is to make faster use of existing intelligence, close gaps and convert warning into decision. Broader access to data must be accompanied by traceable responsibility, parliamentary oversight and protection of fundamental rights.

VI. Defence Financing, SAFE and Democratic Oversight

SAFE and the Transition from Financing to Capability

SAFE addresses another component: the financing of defence investment. The instrument makes loans of up to EUR 150 billion available. Their financial nature matters: access to favourable financing eliminates neither the obligation to repay nor the operating costs of the equipment procured.[41]

European capacity is built by aligning these instruments with national and Allied requirements. Investments in equipment, industry and infrastructure must produce mutually compatible results. A system delivered without the necessary personnel and infrastructure may remain an incomplete capability.

SAFE became operational through Regulation (EU) 2025/1106. The Commission presents it as a long-term loan instrument capped at EUR 150 billion; 19 member states have submitted national investment plans. At least 65 per cent of the cost of components must originate in the EU, Ukraine or eligible states of the European Economic Area and EFTA. Procurement is normally conducted jointly by at least two countries, one of which must be a SAFE beneficiary, although the Regulation also temporarily permits national procurement for the rapid delivery of critical equipment.[42]

These rules pursue three outcomes simultaneously: faster procurement, less fragmentation and a stronger European defence-industrial base. They do not, however, guarantee interoperability or the delivery of capabilities on time. States choose the programmes, industry requires multi-year orders, and the systems procured must be integrated into NATO planning, staffed and supported by munitions, maintenance and infrastructure.

SAFE II Between Political Project and Financial Instrument

In September 2026, the name SAFE II denotes a direction of negotiation, not an adopted instrument with a final budget and settled conditions. During the initial consultations on SAFE, states’ maximum intended borrowing totalled approximately EUR 188 billion, almost EUR 40 billion above the ceiling. In June 2026, estimates of the amount that might remain unused in the first phase ranged from EUR 8 billion to EUR 18 billion, but the final figure depends on the conclusion of the loan agreements.[43]

The debate over SAFE II concerns the form of support. Eastern-flank states, which face greater exposure and have limited fiscal space, are requesting grants, whereas repeated borrowing would increase public debt. The source of funding, the balance between grants and loans, industrial conditions, Ukraine’s participation and the criteria by which states demonstrate efficient use of the first phase all remain to be determined.

The estimate that replacing US military assets in Europe could cost up to EUR 500 billion indicates the scale of the problem, not the exact price of European autonomy. Strategic enablers cannot all be procured within a single budget cycle. Any future SAFE II should prioritise common capability gaps that are difficult to address nationally, without turning urgency into a permanent debt mechanism lacking parliamentary oversight.

Costs, Rights and Public Accountability

Total defence entails costs that must be explained. Reserves, alternative capabilities and support personnel may see limited use under normal conditions. They must be justified by the risk addressed, their effects on essential services and comparison with other solutions.

The dual-use character of an investment may increase its utility, but it should not be assumed automatically. A project can serve both civilian activities and military requirements if it is designed and scaled accordingly. The label “dual-use infrastructure” does not replace the need to demonstrate the benefit.

Acquisition costs must be considered together with operating and maintenance costs. Equipment that cannot be sustained over the long term may consume resources without producing the expected availability. Financing for preparedness must include exercises, personnel training and the remediation of shortcomings.

Democratic oversight does not require publication of sensitive locations, operational stockpiles or protection procedures. It requires the competent institutions to have access to the information needed to verify legality, effectiveness and implementation. The public must be able to know the general objectives, the responsibilities assigned and the progress achieved.

Societal preparedness must preserve the distinction between threat and disagreement. Criticism of a procurement decision, opposition to a budgetary priority or a request for explanations are legitimate components of democratic life. Attributing such conduct to influence operations requires evidence.

Trust is also built by communicating limitations. Public authorities cannot promise absolute protection. They can explain the risks, the available measures and the recommended conduct, while accepting the obligation to assess shortcomings when they emerge. Acknowledging a technical limitation does not remove the duty to verify whether institutions have fulfilled their responsibilities.

Public participation will be stronger if preparedness is perceived as a fair effort. Vulnerable people, communities with limited resources and poorly equipped local institutions require differentiated support. A national system is constrained by the capacity of its most exposed components.

Conclusions

Total defence is the condition that enables military defence to function during a prolonged conflict. The war in Ukraine demonstrates that armed forces depend on energy, transport, communications, healthcare, industry and public administration, while the Russian military threat and hybrid campaigns require the simultaneous preparedness of armed forces, institutions and civilian services. If these systems cannot withstand attacks and recover from them, the technical advantage of weaponry deteriorates and freedom of political decision is constrained.

Emmanuel Macron’s warning of September 2026 also illustrates the dual function of security discourse. On the one hand, it responds to a genuine threat and justifies protecting infrastructure, increasing resilience and preparing for hostile actions capable of producing physical effects without a declaration of war. On the other hand, a threat can become a political resource used to legitimise rearmament, extend the powers of the security apparatus, secure acceptance of economic costs and strengthen executive power. These two dimensions are not mutually exclusive. Their very overlap makes rigorous attribution of attacks, explanation of the proportionality of measures and preservation of democratic oversight essential, so that total defence does not transform legitimate political disagreement into an alleged manifestation of foreign interference.

The Ukrainian experience also shows that technical modernisation cannot substitute for institutional transformation. Doctrine, force structures, training, procurement and the relationship with industry must be adapted to an environment in which software and equipment change at an accelerated pace. The relevant capability is no longer merely the platform, but the ecosystem that develops, builds, coordinates, adapts and reproduces it.

The State of the Union address of 16 September 2026 constitutes a political threshold because it acknowledges that European doctrine, institutions and the pace of decision-making no longer correspond to the security environment. The European Security Council, the emergency protocol and the initiative on strategic enablers could reduce fragmentation. They will become an architecture only if their powers and resources, their relationship with NATO and the procedures by which decisions are implemented are clearly defined.

The national models confirm that there is no single European formula. Finland begins with continuity of societal preparedness; Germany with the sustainment of collective defence and Allied mobility; France with strategic ambition and national resilience; Poland with dedicated funding for population protection; and Italy with civil protection and volunteering. The United Kingdom adds government planning for home defence. Romania must combine verifiable principles rather than copy institutions detached from their contexts.

For Romania, CSAT decisions and capability-development and procurement programmes provide a basis for modernisation. Public data confirm the existence of mechanisms for civil and economic preparedness, as well as the movement of some procurements into the implementation phase. Assessment must examine how these components combine to produce defence capability.

In the field of intelligence, Europe’s problem is not a complete absence of structures, but their dependence on national contributions and the distance between assessment and action. Strengthening EU INTCEN, EUMS INT and SIAC can improve warning of hybrid, military, space, cyber and economic threats. The outcome must be measured by the quality and timeliness of decision support, not by the number of structures created.

SAFE demonstrates that the Union can mobilise financing on a scale beyond the reach of many states acting individually. Its limitation is equally clear: a loan is not a capability, a contract is not an operational system, and an industrial criterion does not guarantee military relevance. SAFE II could correct some of these limitations only if it links financial support to common capability gaps, interoperability and verifiable outcomes, without concealing the burden of debt.

The priority is to align investment with the personnel, industry, services and public administration required to sustain it. Progress can be measured through availability, continuity and the remediation of shortcomings. Publishing a strategy or signing a contract marks the beginning of an obligation to implement it.

Romania needs a preparedness system that can withstand political change and be tested periodically. This requires continuity of responsibility, professional assessment and democratic oversight. Military capability and protection of the population must be developed together because each depends on the functioning of the other.

Defence of the European Union is necessary, but it constitutes only one part of defence of Europe. The EU can convert its economic mass and regulatory power into resilience, industry and infrastructure. Continental defence, however, also requires NATO, the United States and Canada, European powers outside the Union, the integration of Ukraine and a coherent approach to the neighbourhoods stretching from the Arctic to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

During the global redistribution of power, defence of the EU represents an attempt to transform the Union from a protected space into an actor capable of protecting itself. Success will be measured not by the volume of funds mobilised, but by the ability to convert economic power into decision-making autonomy, military production, technological superiority, societal resilience and operational power, without diminishing democratic oversight.

The principal vulnerability of the transition is the gap between the weakening of the US guarantee and the maturation of European capacity. The sustainable solution is the creation of a bicentric West: the United States and an enlarged Europe that is more capable militarily and more autonomous in decision-making, cooperating within a rebalanced alliance. The two processes must be synchronised to prevent an interval in which the old protection is no longer assured and the new capacity is not yet functional.

US pressure for burden-sharing may, over time, reduce Europe’s strategic dependence. The sequence, however, is decisive: forces, command structures, strategic enablers, stockpiles and the industrial base must be built before dependencies can be reduced without weakening deterrence. Only on this basis could NATO evolve into the connecting structure between two asymmetrical Western centres.

For Romania, the distinction between Europe and the EU has direct consequences. Its security depends simultaneously on the Allied guarantee, European instruments, the partnership with the United States, the resilience of Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, and the functioning of the strategic Black Sea-Danube corridor. Total defence is the mechanism through which these external relationships become verifiable national capacity.

Europe needs power to defend its democratic ideal, but that power must remain subject to law and debate. Preparedness, legitimate secrecy and the response to hostile influence cannot suspend public accountability. Otherwise, the continent risks protecting its institutions at the cost of distorting the principles those institutions are meant to defend.

In the long term, defence of Europe must combine the deterrence of Russia with geographical realism. Russia cannot be granted a veto over its neighbours, nor can it be treated as though it will disappear from the continental architecture. A future order will have to limit its capacity for aggression, protect the sovereignty of states and preserve channels for managing strategic risk.

The measure of total defence is what the state can continue to do when normal conditions disappear: make legitimate decisions, provide essential services and sustain national defence.

Annex. Romania Between Military Modernisation and Whole-of-State Preparedness[44]

Romania’s Exposure and Immediate Protection Requirements

Romania must begin with the actual exposure of its population and infrastructure. On 29 May 2026, communications issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, MAI, reported that a drone had fallen onto a residential building in Galați, followed by an explosion and fire. Subsequent updates described the evacuation or self-evacuation of approximately 70 people and the intervention of several institutions. These data document the civilian emergency response; on their own, they are insufficient to assess the entire chain of detection and air defence.[45]

The case shows why assessment must follow the sequence from warning and protection of the population through emergency response to the restoration of normal functioning. For citizens, what matters is whether the message is clear, whether a safe place is available and whether assistance is provided after the incident. For the authorities, coordination of information and the clear allocation of responsibility are essential. Communication of residual risk must be accompanied by examination of any shortcomings.

In the Black Sea and on the Danube, protection of economic activity must be linked to military support and to relations with Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. Scenario analysis must include transport disruption, pressure on port services and simultaneous humanitarian demands. Romania’s priorities should be established according to their effects on essential functions, avoiding the assumption that the entire national territory faces the same degree of exposure.

This assessment provides the criterion for examining procurement: what risk does each programme reduce, when does it begin to have an effect and what other capabilities are required for its use? Air defence, maritime security and force sustainment must be connected to the civilian infrastructure and resources that make them possible. CSAT decisions can thus be placed within an operational and societal framework for assessment.

CSAT Decisions and Their Significance

The CSAT meeting of 7 September 2026 provides a concrete starting point. It approved the Armed Forces Procurement Plan for 2027–2036, the programme for transformation, development and procurement through 2044, and the analytical document on the implementation of SAFE. The communiqué also refers to an assessment of the dialogue concerning the US military presence and preparation of decisions on the support Romania will provide as a host nation.[46]

Implementing these decisions requires contracting, construction of infrastructure, delivery, training and integration. Progress must be monitored throughout the entire process.

The 2036 and 2044 horizons must be accompanied by intermediate objectives. Capabilities planned for the end of those periods cannot be counted as responses to present vulnerabilities. Analysis must identify what improves at each stage and how the intervals between the retirement of existing systems and the operationalisation of new ones will be managed.

Host nation support introduces the civilian dimension directly. An Allied presence must be sustained through infrastructure, services and institutional cooperation. Such support is more credible when military requirements are aligned with the functioning of the economy and the needs of the population.

What Public Data Reveal About Procurement

The MApN announced that on 26 August 2026 it had received SAFE pre-financing of EUR 2.5 billion, representing 15 per cent of Romania’s EUR 16.68 billion allocation. The same communiqué states that payments of approximately EUR 800 million were being made in August and September for contracted military equipment and for the development of production capabilities in Romania.[47]

Pre-financing, payments to contractors, acceptance of deliveries and operationalisation are distinct stages of implementation.

The MApN communiqué of 29 May 2026 provides precise examples: a framework agreement for 298 infantry fighting vehicles and variants, valued at EUR 3.337 billion excluding VAT; very-short-range air-defence systems valued at EUR 981.95 million; two patrol vessels and two diver-support craft valued at EUR 920 million; and 35 mm AHEAD ammunition valued at EUR 449.75 million.[48]

These programmes address different requirements and must be assessed in the context of the force as a whole. For armoured vehicles, unit preparedness and technical sustainment matter. For air defence, integration with detection, command and control, and the supply of munitions are essential. For vessels, personnel, support infrastructure and technical availability must be examined.

The F-35 programme illustrates the duration of such a transition. A 2025 MApN publication described an initial phase of 32 aircraft, with the first deliveries planned for 2030–2031. Until the new aircraft become operational, Romania must maintain its existing capabilities and prepare the required personnel and infrastructure.[49]

Media reporting on programme costs and industrial participation plays a legitimate role in public scrutiny. Comparisons must, however, be made between equivalent data: values including or excluding VAT; firm or maximum quantities; and equipment alone or packages that also include munitions and support. A framework agreement should not automatically be presented as the total value of deliveries already ordered and financed.

For every major programme, public assessment should examine the relationship among the operational requirement, the delivery timetable and sustainment resources. This makes it possible to discuss procurement efficiency without disclosing sensitive operational information.

Participation of Romanian Industry

Local production can contribute to total defence if it develops skills and capabilities that remain usable over time. An announced localisation percentage does not, by itself, describe that outcome. Assessment must examine which activities are performed in Romania, what personnel are trained and what maintenance or repair work can be carried out domestically.

Assembly, component manufacture, integration and access to technology have different implications. They may constitute stages of the same programme, but they must be differentiated in an assessment. Continuity of orders also matters, because an industrial capacity that is difficult to sustain economically in peacetime may not be available when an emergency occurs.

The case of the Făgăraș Powder Factory illustrates the difference between the existence of a strategic enterprise and the actual availability of capabilities required for defence. Its historical production of propellant powders for ammunition ceased in 2004, although the company continued to manufacture explosives. Information published in September 2026 indicates continued activity in the latter field, but also difficulties concerning plant safety and working conditions, without confirming the resumption of powder production. From the perspective of total defence, retaining a company within the national defence-industrial base is insufficient: functioning facilities, qualified personnel and conditions that permit production to be sustained during a prolonged crisis are also necessary.[50]

During a prolonged crisis, the problem extends to suppliers of materials, energy and services. A military factory depends on a functioning economy. Defence-industrial preparedness must therefore be connected to the preparedness of infrastructure and civilian personnel.

The realistic criterion is a reduction in critical dependencies and an increase in sustainment capacity. Romania need not manufacture every component itself, but it must understand the dependencies that could limit the availability of its equipment and prepare responses to them.

Existing Civil and Economic Planning

Romania has a legal framework for preparing the national economy and territory for defence. Law No. 477/2003 regulates this field and distributes institutional responsibilities. Law No. 294/2024 on the resilience of critical entities adds requirements for protecting the delivery of essential services. The two frameworks have distinct scopes that must be coordinated in implementation.[51][52]

There is also public evidence of exercises. The ANRSPS report for 2024 records five mobilisation exercises organised and led by the MApN together with partner institutions, as part of testing the preparedness of the population, economy and national territory for defence.[53]

This information rules out a diagnosis that planning is entirely absent. The relevant question concerns the degree of integration and the results: which dependencies were tested, which failures were identified, who was tasked with remediation and whether the corrective measures were subsequently verified.

Public information about the conduct of an exercise does not necessarily describe the severity of the scenario or the participants’ performance. At the same time, the fact that an assessment has not been published does not prove that none exists. A public summary of the general conclusions would permit stronger democratic oversight without revealing operational details.

Civil-Defence Shelters and the Gap Between Records and Protection

The Court of Accounts audit of civil-defence shelters, published in 2025, indicated that purpose-built shelters could accommodate 3.21 per cent of the resident population. The figure describes the audited situation and demonstrates the scale of the task of improving population protection.[54]

The indicator alone does not answer the question of functionality. Protection depends on technical condition, accessibility, maintenance and the information available to those expected to use the space. A place entered in an administrative register must be physically inspected and assessed against local risk.

An improvement programme should begin with geographical priorities and realistic technical possibilities. Not every locality faces the same risks, and sheltering is only one protective measure. It must be coordinated with warning, evacuation where appropriate, emergency response and continuity of services.

Personnel, Healthcare and Shared Resources

Any assessment of total defence must examine the availability of people. The same specialist may perform an important role in a public institution, a company and a mobilisation mechanism. Preparedness must identify these overlapping demands and establish priorities before a crisis.

For hospitals, surge capacity must be assessed together with personnel, supplies, energy and the ability to continue routine care. The number of beds or the presence of a generator does not, by itself, describe how a hospital will function under pressure. Assessment must follow the entire service delivered to the patient.

At territorial level, competing demands may arise for transport, fuel and infrastructure. Sustainment of Allied forces and protection of the population must be planned together. The way in which these demands are adjudicated is one test of the system’s genuine integration.

For Romania, the Black Sea, the Danube and the Port of Constanța are domains in which the connection between defence and the economy is evident. Analysis must examine the functioning of port services, transport, repairs and supply alongside military protection. The strategic relevance of a territory becomes an advantage when it can reliably sustain the activities assigned to it.

A Preparedness Programme for Romania

The initial priority should be a joint assessment of existing plans and capabilities. A government-coordinated audit can identify differences among institutional assumptions, overlapping claims on resources and responsibilities that have not been sufficiently clarified. Operational findings can remain protected, while general conclusions and remedial measures can be presented publicly.

Within approximately the first one hundred days after the programme is adopted, the functions to be maintained, the institutions responsible and the minimum service levels sought should be established. Physical inspection of priority resources must accompany examination of the documents. The deadline marks a stage of organisation and diagnosis, not a promise that every shortcoming will be resolved.

On the basis of the findings, the government should approve a common framework for continuity and defence support that connects sectoral plans. It must specify who can activate the measures, how decisions are communicated and how conflicts among priorities are resolved. Drafting a new document is justified only if it improves these relationships and closes the gaps identified.

During the first year, a national exercise in leadership and inter-institutional cooperation could test the simultaneous functioning of several sectors. Private operators and local authorities should participate effectively, with tasks and decisions of their own. A scenario involving combined disruptions can test whether measures prepared in one sector merely transfer the difficulty to another.

The exercise must be followed by a corrective-action programme. Each shortcoming requires a responsible institution, a deadline and resources. Repeating the scenario after remediation shows whether the problem has been resolved. The number of exercises conducted is an activity indicator; the reduction of shortcomings measures progress.

Over the following one to three years, investments should be prioritised according to their effect on continuity of services. A resource that supports several functions may take precedence over a more visible project with limited utility. Choices must be based on risk and cost assessment, not on a uniform list applied to every institution.

Preparedness must extend beyond initial self-sufficiency. Once stockpiles are consumed, requirements emerge for resupply, replacement personnel and repairs. Pre-arranged contracts with suppliers, technical-response capacity and alternative distribution methods must be tested together with the reserves themselves.

For the 2030–2035 horizon, the objective should be a stable preparedness system with predictable financing, trained personnel and periodic assessment. The voluntary participation of civilian specialists can complement existing institutions if their roles, training and conditions of activation are clear.

Communication with the population must be integrated from the outset. Guidance should be adapted to local conditions and accompanied by accessible training. Public authorities must explain both what citizens can do and what obligations institutions assume. Individual preparedness works when it is supported by credible public services.

Selective Bibliography

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Echevarria II, Antulio J. War’s Logic: Strategic Thought and the American Way of War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.

Freedman, Lawrence. The Future of War: A History. New York: PublicAffairs, 2017.

Galeotti, Mark. The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022.

Giles, Keir. Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2019.

Giles, Keir. Russia’s War on Everybody: And What It Means for You. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022.

Hoffman, Frank G. Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007.

Kaldor, Mary. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 3rd edition. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012.

Murray, Williamson and Peter R. Mansoor, eds. Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Renz, Bettina. Russia’s Military Revival. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018.

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[3] NATO, Deterrence and Defence, assessment of threats and hybrid campaigns. https://nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/deterrence-and-defence. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[4] Council of the European Union, Hybrid threats, including the conclusions of 16 March 2026. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/hybrid-threats/. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[5] David H. Petraeus, interview with RBC-Ukraine, republished by Digi24, “The Future of War Is Being Written Now. Former CIA Director: All NATO Countries Must Radically Change the Structure of Their Armed Forces”, 17 September 2026, https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/externe/viitorul-razboiului-se-scrie-acum-fost-director-cia-toate-tarile-nato-trebuie-sa-si-schimbe-radical-structura-fortelor-armate-3949849.

[6] Présidence de la République française, “Situation internationale: réunion avec les chefs des partis”, statement by President Emmanuel Macron, 18 September 2026, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2026/09/18/situation-internationale-reunion-avec-les-chefs-des-partis; Reuters, “France says Russian hybrid attacks are intensifying”, 18 September 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-prepares-react-russian-hybrid-threats-intensify-2026-09-18/. Accessed 19 September 2026.

[7] NATO, Strategic Concepts, overview of the 2022 Strategic Concept. https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/strategic-concepts/. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[8] Franklin C. Miller, Eric Edelman and Walter B. Slocombe, “The Crumbling Defense of Europe”, Foreign Affairs, 15 September 2026. https://reader.foreignaffairs.com/2026/09/15/the-crumbling-defense-of-europe/content.html. Accessed 17 September 2026.

[9] Giuseppe Spatafora, “More Arrows to Europe’s Quiver: How to Manage Transatlantic Relations Beyond the Midterms”, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 15 September 2026, https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/more-arrows-europes-quiver-how-manage-transatlantic-relations-beyond-midterms. Accessed 18 September 2026.

[10] NATO, Resilience, Civil Preparedness and Article 3. https://nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/resilience-civil-preparedness-and-article-3. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[11] IEA, Ukraine’s energy system under attack, in Ukraine’s Energy Security and the Coming Winter, 2024. https://www.iea.org/reports/ukraines-energy-security-and-the-coming-winter/ukraines-energy-system-under-attack. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[12] IEA, Energy System Resilience, Executive Summary, 2026. https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-system-resilience/executive-summary. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[13] WHO, Attacks on Ukraine’s health care increased by 20% in 2025, 23 February 2026. https://www.who.int/news/item/23-02-2026-attacks-on-ukraine-s-health-care-increased-by-20-in-2025. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[14] JATEC, the Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre, is a joint NATO-Ukraine centre inaugurated on 17 February 2025 in Bydgoszcz, Poland. It draws on lessons learned from the war in Ukraine through analysis, training and education, helping to improve interoperability between NATO and Ukraine. See NATO, “NATO and Ukraine Open the Joint Analysis Training and Education Centre”.

[15] NATO JATEC, Layered Counter-UAS Initiative (LCI-X) is Building NATO’s Approach to a Fast-Moving Threat, 2026. https://www.jatec.nato.int/article/lci-x-builds-nato-approach-fmt/. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[16] WHO, Ukraine emergency. https://www.who.int/emergencies/situations/ukraine-emergency. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[17] Reuters, “Canada applies to join UK-led military coalition”, 16 September 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/canada-applies-join-uk-led-military-coalition-says-carneys-office-2026-09-16/.

[18] Russia’s dilemma between Europe and Asia is more a matter of identity and geopolitics than of geography: historically and culturally linked to Europe, but extending territorially largely across Asia, Russia oscillates between European integration and the assertion of a distinct Eurasian identity. Its aspiration to constitute a pole of global power comparable with the United States encourages the claim to an autonomous role that transcends exclusive membership of either space.

[19] Ursula von der Leyen, 2026 State of the Union Address, 16 September 2026. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_26_1868. Accessed 17 September 2026.

[20] Rym Momtaz, “The Speech Ursula von der Leyen Can’t Deliver”, Carnegie Europe, 15 September 2026. https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe. Accessed 17 September 2026.

[21] Luca Bertuzzi and Angela Skujins, “Inside von der Leyen’s pitch for a new EU security architecture”, Euronews, 17 September 2026. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/09/17/inside-von-der-leyens-pitch-for-a-new-eu-security-architecture. Accessed 17 September 2026.

[22] European Commission, EU Preparedness Union Strategy, 26 March 2025. https://commission.europa.eu/topics/preparedness_en. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[23] European Commission, Strengthening crisis readiness and health security, 9 July 2025. https://commission.europa.eu/news-and-media/news/strengthening-crisis-readiness-and-health-security-2025-07-09_en. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[24] European Commission, Cyber Resilience Act – Reporting obligations, updated 11 September 2026. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/cra-reporting. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[25] Bundeswehr, Gesamtverteidigung: Alles über den Operationsplan Deutschland. https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/organisation/operatives-fuehrungskommando-der-bundeswehr/auftrag-und-aufgaben/operationsplan-deutschland. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[26] Bundeswehr, CIMIC Quadriga 2026. https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/organisation/unterstuetzungsbereich/zivil-militaerische-zusammenarbeit-der-bundeswehr/cimic-quadriga-2026. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[27] SGDSN, Revue nationale stratégique 2025, 14 July 2025. https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250713_NP_SGDSN_Actualisation_2025_RNS_FR.pdf. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[28] SGDSN, Collectivités territoriales: mieux connaître la stratégie nationale de résilience. https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/collectivites-territoriales-mieux-connaitre-la-strategie-nationale-de-resilience. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[29] Security Committee of Finland, Security Strategy for Society, adopted on 16 January 2025. https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/en/security-strategy-for-society/. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[30] Dipartimento della Protezione Civile, Office I – Volunteering, Training and Assistance. https://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/en/department/structure/office-i-volunteering-traning-and-assistance/. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[31] Government of Poland, Program Ochrony Ludności i Obrony Cywilnej, programme for 2025-2026. https://www.gov.pl/web/priorytety/p8. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[32] UK Parliament, Home Defence Programme, parliamentary answer of 31 March 2026. https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2026-03-02/116874/. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[33] UK Government, The Strategic Defence Review 2025 – Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, 2025. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic-defence-review-2025-making-britain-safer-secure-at-home-strong-abroad/the-strategic-defence-review-2025-making-britain-safer-secure-at-home-strong-abroad. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[34] Cabinet Office, National Risk Register 2026, 14 July 2026; updated 12 August 2026. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-risk-register-2026. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[35] UK Parliament, Cabinet Office answer concerning national exercises and ALBISTON SHADOW, 28 July 2026. https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2026-07-14/18846. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[36] European External Action Service, “EU Intelligence and Situation Centre – EU INTCEN”, institutional description and recruitment notice for the Intelligence Analysis Division, 2025. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eeas-vacancy-administrative-agent-astsc2-euintcen1-eu-intelligence-analysis-division-job-460367_und_en. Accessed 17 September 2026.

[37] European Union Satellite Centre, overview of its mission and geospatial-analysis products. https://www.satcen.europa.eu/. Accessed 17 September 2026.

[38] Council of the European Union, “EUMS Intelligence Directorate Structure Revision”, document 14206/1/24 REV 1, 10 October 2024, pp. 2-7. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14206-2024-REV-1/en/pdf. Accessed 17 September 2026.

[39] European Parliament, “The European Parliament demands a firmer EU response to hybrid threats”, 16 September 2026. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20260911IPR47452/the-european-parliament-demands-a-firmer-eu-response-to-hybrid-threats. Accessed 17 September 2026.

[40] Reuters, “German cabinet approves plan to grant more powers to spy services”, 12 August 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/german-cabinet-approves-plan-grant-more-powers-spy-services-2026-08-12/; Associated Press, “Germany beefs up its intelligence services as threat from foreign powers rises”, 12 August 2026, https://apnews.com/article/9df4f0b15e682c1fbf6ce9c1b4dbbaa8.

[41] Council of the European Union, What is Security Action for Europe (SAFE)? https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/safe/. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[42] European Commission, “SAFE – Security Action for Europe”, updated 17 September 2026. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/safe-security-action-europe_en. Accessed 17 September 2026.

[43] Luca Bertuzzi, “The path to SAFE II: inside the struggle to revamp Europe’s defence financing tool”, Euronews, 12 June 2026. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/06/12/the-path-to-safe-ii-inside-the-struggle-to-revamp-europes-defence-financing-tool. Accessed 17 September 2026.

[44] The separation of this material into an annex serves an exclusively methodological and editorial purpose. Romania is a member state of the European Union and an integral part of Europe’s defence architecture; separate treatment brings together the national implications and applied recommendations without placing Romania outside the European framework examined in the body of the article.

[45] MAI, communications of 29 May 2026 concerning the drone that fell onto a residential building in Galați, including updates on the emergency response. https://www.mai.gov.ro/2026/05/29/. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[46] Presidential Administration, Meeting of the Supreme Council of National Defence, 7 September 2026, communiqué reproduced by AGERPRES. https://agerpres.ro/comunicate/2026/09/07/comunicat-de-presa—administratia-prezidentiala–1591463. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[47] MApN, Romania received the first payment under the SAFE instrument, Communiqué No. 272 of 27 August 2026. https://www.mapn.ro/cpresa/19380_Rom%C3%A2nia-a-primit-prima-plat%C4%83-%C3%AEn-cadrul-instrumentului-SAFE. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[48] MApN, Press Release No. 165, 29 May 2026. https://www.mapn.ro/cpresa/19273_comunicat-de-presa. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[49] MApN, Romanian Defence 2025, section entitled “The Major Procurement Programs of the Romanian Armed Forces”. https://www.mapn.ro/publicatii_militare/documente/romanian_defence_2025.pdf. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[50] According to reporting by Europa Liberă in 2023, the production of propellant powders at Făgăraș ceased in 2004. On 31 August 2026, Cartel ALFA reported that employees were refusing to restart production according to schedule, citing technological-safety concerns. On 3 September 2026, Bună Ziua Brașov reported that the dispute had ended through a protocol agreed with management and stated, on the basis of trade-union data, that explosives production in 2026 amounted to approximately 80 tonnes per year. The end of the dispute does not, in itself, confirm that the technical problems were fully remedied or that propellant-powder production resumed. See Europa Liberă, Cartel ALFA, 31 August 2026, and Bună Ziua Brașov, 3 September 2026; accessed 18 September 2026.

[51] Law No. 477 of 12 November 2003 on the Preparation of the National Economy and Territory for Defence, text published by ANRSPS. https://www.anrsps.gov.ro/legislatie/legea477-2003.pdf. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[52] Law No. 294 of 27 November 2024 on the resilience of critical entities, Official Gazette No. 1189 of 29 November 2024. https://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocumentAfis/291491. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[53] ANRSPS, Assessment Report for 2024, section II, Preparation of the National Economy for Defence. https://www.anrsps.gov.ro/rapoartestudii/Raport%20de%20evaluare%20pe%20anul%202024%20al%20ANRSPS.pdf. Accessed 15 September 2026.

[54] Romanian Court of Accounts, Public Report for 2023, summary of the audit concerning civil-defence shelters. The cited data refer to the situation audited, not to an inventory updated in September 2026. https://www.curteadeconturi.ro/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Raportul%20public%20al%20Curt%CC%A6ii%20de%20Conturi%20pe%20anul%202023.pdf. Accessed 15 September 2026.