Global south engagement for peace in Ukraine

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
<strong>Global south engagement for peace in Ukraine</strong>

By Matthias E. Leitner

Precarious Conflict Trajectory – Russia and Ukraine are preparing for a spring offensive with higher levels of military involvement. Spill-over into the region has been avoided so far, despite several drone attacks on Russian bases in occupied Crimea and in western Russia as well as the bombing of Kerch Bridge that connects Crimea with Russia’s Taman peninsula in October 2022, one day after President Putin’s 70th birthday. It is not excluded that intensifying conflict or a costly prolonged stalemate can lead to escalation and actively involve NATO or one of the front-line states with Ukraine.

Prospects for peace talks between the conflict parties are remote after two initiatives from Türkiye in spring 2022. A credible, neutral intermediary with convening power is lacking, although there have been two larger prisoner exchanges between Ukraine and Russia in February, and another swap of over 200 prisoners of war occurred on 7 March 2023. The Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) brokered by the UN and Türkiye is still operational (UNCTAD, 2023), albeit at a relatively slow pace. Its extension from 18 March onwards is uncertain beyond 60 days after a recent meeting of UN and the conflict parties in Geneva.

Global South Actors on the Side-lines – Influential countries such as Brazil, India and Indonesia in the Global South have generally avoided taking sides in the conflict and stayed away from polarization. 32 countries chose to abstain from the 23 February UN General Assembly Resolution on Ukraine that demanded Russian troop withdrawal and condemned the aggression against Ukraine. Powerful G20 members India and South Africa were among them. India blocked a final statement mentioning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine at the 25 February meeting of G20 foreign ministers that it hosted. 

Considering failings in traditional diplomacy and conflict resolution for Ukraine, the contribution from Global South actors becomes more pressing and relevant, especially since they continue to be affected by global effects from the war.  The UN Global Crisis Response Group (GCRG) has tracked cumulative shocks in food security, energy prices and inflation since March 2022 (UNSDG, 2022). In particular, the lagged effect from spiking fertilizer costs which rose by 199% from May 2020 to the end of 2022 has been a constraint on global food production, including rice growing in many developing countries and emerging economies of the Global South (Broom, 2023). Russia is a major fertilizer producer and exporter. Eminent academics and advisers such as Prof. Jeffrey Sachs and former German diplomat and previous director of the Munich Security Conference (MSC) Wolfgang Ischinger have argued that the Global South and China can play a constructive role in helping to bring peace to Ukraine. Countries with populist leanings such as Brazil, Mexico and South Africa also have legacy relationships with China dating from the Soviet Union era (Brown, 2013). The recent agreement facilitated in Beijing between Saudi Arabia and Iran with major repercussions for the Middle East (Turak, 2023) makes it necessary to take a closer look at potentials in the Chinese 12-Point Position on Ukraine. 

China’s Significance and Reactions from Key Stakeholders  

China officially presented its 12-Point Position on peace in Ukraine on 24 February 2023, the anniversary of Russia’s invasion. The Position is China’s first public step in favour of peace in Ukraine after a period of half neutrality where much attention was given to strategic ties with Russia. China had declared its “no-limits partnership” with Russia just before the outbreak of the war and refrained from condemning the invasion. Bilateral economic ties deepened through more oil imports from Russia that replaced Saudi Arabia as main oil provider to China. Bilateral trade reached a record USD 190 billion in 2022 and Yuan-denominated transactions increased significantly on the Russian market in efforts to evade western sanctions. Beijing kept Moscow apprised of the 12 Points prior to their release and its top foreign policy official Wang Yi was received not only by his counterpart Lavrov but also by President Vladimir Putin. On 22 February, Russia stated it welcomed China taking a more active role in efforts to resolve the conflict in Ukraine and said it valued China’s “balanced approach”.   

The Position serves to position China as a peace-loving country and reminds Russia and the US as fellow UN Security Council members about their obligations to pursue peaceful courses of action. It also deflects criticism that China has ignored the Ukraine conflict. China had released principles for global peace in its Global Security Initiative (GSI) ahead of its Position on Ukraine. The intention was to communicate China’s vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, according to the Chinese MFA. Notably, the 12 Points balance respect for territorial integrity with legitimate security interests of countries, rejection of Cold War mentality and military alliances as well as criticizing the use of non-UN sanctions. While this is directed at NATO and the US, China’s Position not only rejects the use of nuclear arms but also the threat of doing so, which is aimed at Russia. 

Reactions from the West to the 12 Points were largely sceptical, with the US showing the most consistent and adverse reactions from the moment the Chinese Peace Plan was first mentioned at the Munich Security Conference. US mistrust and competition with China for global dominance coloured the US view, compounded by fears that China might exploit the US distraction in Ukraine for advancing against Taiwan. The US State Secretary spoke repeatedly of alleged Chinese military support being readied for Russia and senior US officials including President Joseph Biden pursued this line, questioning the basic credibility of China’s Position on Ukraine. Experts at the leading bi-partisan US Institute of Peace (USIP) agreed that the Chinese Position was unlikely to advance the cause of peace (Freeman and Glantz, 2023). Conservative commentators in the US saw Washington outflanked by the Chinese peace proposal which is designed to highlight US unreliability in a multipolar era (Brown, 2023).

In Europe, reactions from Germany and the EU were slightly more nuanced between disappointment and caution but seemed at least to give consideration to China’s Position on Ukraine. China’s top foreign policy official undertook a regional diplomatic tour to Germany, Italy, France, Hungary and Belarus ahead of the 12-Point launch. Germany’s Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock stated in New York that China as a member of the UN Security Council had an obligation to come out in favour of peace and a UN umbrella would have been preferable for the Chinese Position. German expert commentators saw an attempt by China to divide the EU and the US (Legarda, 2023). The EU was guarded in its reaction while looking at the 12 Points from the perspective that China had taken sides, according to EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. She also commented that China had not shared a peace plan but some principles. Further EU reactions aligned themselves closer with the US position.  

EU member state Hungary openly welcomed the Chinese Position on Ukraine. Despite misgivings about the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative in the European neighbourhood (Bastian, 2022), the EU is in principle interested in reducing economic and trade disruptions from the conflict in Ukraine. Points 11 and 12 of China’s Ukraine Position speak to this shared interest including for reconstruction of Ukraine. The USD 349 billion estimated reconstruction cost[2] requires a broad global effort where China could also engage. Eurasian rail transport links are still functioning for shipments of critical rare metals that are now even more in demand in EU defence industries (Tirone and Nardelli, 2023). Interlinked with the broader Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) network of trans-continental transport infrastructures, only part of the traffic has switched from the Northern Corridor through Russia to the Middle Corridor through Central Asia and the Caucasus to Türkiye and onward destinations in Europe (Standish, 2022). These freight links are important for speeding up substantial reconstruction efforts and reliable functioning of supply chains. Before the 2022 Russian invasion, Ukraine took an interest in the BRI and became a critical piece of the Initiative (Brown, 2023). 

Accelerating Diplomatic Impacts – Following the release of China’s 12 Points, there has been a perceptible shift in diplomatic activity surrounding the conflict, most clearly in the European theatre nearer to Ukraine. The President of Ukraine expressed interest in meeting with his Chinese counterpart. He also stated that it was generally good that China started talking about Ukraine. Ukraine tabled its own 10-Point Peace Plan at the G20 Summit in Indonesia last November. The President of Belarus accepted an invitation for a state visit to Beijing where he met with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping on 1 March. Canada’s Foreign Minister stated to media on 10 March that Canada had approached China about speaking also with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and not only with Russia during the recent G20 meeting. President Macron of France announced that he was planning to visit China in early April. These leaders’ visits are far from deliberately sequenced and offer no guarantee against possible military escalation. Yet they foster an environment that is more conducive to dialogue and discourage excessive steps in the conflict. 

In media comments on 7 March, the Kremlin’s spokesman explained that a big, powerful and authoritative country like China could not fail to have its own voice on problems high on the world agenda. He added that Moscow paid great attention to all the ideas from their colleagues in Beijing. President Xi Jinping’s first state visit after his re-election for an unprecedented third term in office was confirmed for Moscow from 20 to 22 March, following an invitation from President Putin. In the context of this visit, China’s Foreign Minister spoke with his counterpart in Ukraine and urged Kyiv and Moscow to restart peace talks as soon as possible, while the importance of Ukraine’s territorial integrity reportedly featured in this exchange, in reference to the very first Point of the Chinese Position.

Global South Confidence Building Outlook  

Apart from the accelerated general diplomatic tempo, China’s Position also provides an impulse to non-aligned countries in the Global South about becoming more engaged for peace in Ukraine. While political apace remains severely constrained to act as mediators, these countries can rally in new ways to build confidence between Russia and Ukraine. Brazilian President Lula da Silva already conveyed Brazil’s desire to talk with other countries and participate in any initiative related to building peace and dialogue when speaking with his Ukrainian counterpart in early March. He is scheduled to visit China and Russia and is on record as proposing the involvement of more neutral global players to end the war in Ukraine.   

It remains to be seen if the Global South will configure diplomacy as peace positive engagement, e.g. in the format of a consultative contact group, or agree to China as convener for initial confidence building steps. For instance, China’s Ukraine Position is explicit specific about implementing the Black Sea Grain Initiative (Point 9), which has resulted in the export of 25 million tons of food and agricultural produce as of 15 March 2023, according to UN data. Ukraine recently declared readiness for scaling up the BSGI by adding new ports, after criticizing lack of Russian cooperation in ship inspections. 

There is space for further non-traditional confidence building measures and scaling them. Facilitation of Russian fertilizer exports, including with UN guarantees about fair trade practices, or environmental war damages reduction and clean-up in the heavily industrialized Donbass region are possible areas. Environmental Peacebuilding (EP) approaches are already tested and available (Barnhoorn and Krampe, 2022). Using labour-intensive methods and skills development with modern technology from China as enabler, human capital in Ukraine and Russia can be jointly strengthened and pave the way for gradual normalization and recovery. These non-traditional confidence building measures are useful for creating a conducive environment to bilateral military talks and lessening fighting in certain front-line sectors ahead of a general cease fire. Starting to move the dial back from warfare to gradual conflict reduction is within reach but the time window for bringing meaningful Global South contributions to the table may be rapidly closing.

Bibliography:
Barnhoorn, Anniek, Krampe, Florian et al., Environment of Peace: Security in a New Era of Risk. (SIPRI Stockholm, 2022)
Bastian, Jens, “The Dragon Reaches the Eastern Mediterranean: Why the Region Matters to China”. CSES (70/3 2022)
Broom, Douglas, “This is How War in Europe is Disrupting Fertilizer Supplies and Threatening Global Food Security”. World Economic Forum (1 March 2023)
Brown, Kevin, “China’s Peace Plan is About More than Ukraine”. The National Interest, 16 March 2023
Freeman, Carla and Mary Glantz, What China’s ‘Peace Plan’ Reveals about its Stance on Russia’s War on Ukraine. USIP (2 March 2023)
Legarda, Helena, “The Peace Plan that Wasn’t”. MERICS Short Analysis (28 February 2023).
Standish, Reid, “China’s Belt and Road Focuses on New Eurasian Trade Routes Due to Ukraine War”. RFE/RL (18 July 2022)
Tirone, Jonathan and Alberto Nardelli, “How Europe Needs Freight Trains to Cross Russia from China”. Bloomberg News, 22 January 2023
Turak, Natasha, “The China-brokered Saudi-Iran Deal has Big Repercussions for the Middle East — and the U.S.”. CNBC (15 March 2023)
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), A Trade Hope. The Impact of the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Geneva, March 2023
United Nations Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG), Global Impact of War in Ukraine on Food, Energy and Finance Systems. Brief No. 1 (April 2022)

About the author:

Matthias E. Leitner – Picture by IFIMES

Matthias E. Leitner currently serves as Analyst and Knowledge Management Lead in the Crises and Fragility Team of OECD GPP Directorate (Development Cooperation Division). His professional background is in peacebuilding, stabilization and transition to development, mainly through UN and OSCE regional peace assignments in Europe and the Africa/Middle East Region and in Southeast Asia. He takes an active interest in mediation and confidence building processes for innovative conflict resolution in the era of multi-crisis. His academic background from Bonn and Oxford Universities is in languages and history.

Published by IFIMES / Ljubljana/Washington/Berlin, 25 March 2023

Iran at the doorstep of the nuclear club?

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
<strong>Iran at the doorstep of the nuclear club?</strong>

Last year saw escalation of the Russia-Ukraine war.  However, it is expected that the biggest crisis the world will face this year will arise in the Middle East. 

According to the reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), at its Fordow nuclear site Iran je has enriched uranium to around 83.7 percent, which is 19 times higher than the 3.67% defined by the 2015 Agreement. If it transpires that the contents of the report is correct, bearing in mind that Iran has sufficient quantities of uranium enriched to 83.7% and is in possession of advanced centrifuges for production of fusion material required for development of a bomb, the question to be asked is in how many days or weeks at most will Iran become a member of the nuclear club. This would be an unprecedented scenario in the history of the Iranian nuclear program, which commenced in 1950 with the assistance of the US, and would mean crossing of all red lines with respect to the Iranian nuclear program. In fact, some subject matter experts believe that the achieved percentage of uranium enrichment is sufficient for development of an atomic bomb, bearing in mind that the atomic bomb thrown on the Japanese town of Hiroshima in 1945 was made of uranium with enrichment level of around 84%.

In the past two years revival of the nuclear agreement from 2015 was expected. US President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew the US from the agreement in 2018. The fact is that after nine rounds of direct negotiations between Iran and the “4+1” (France, United Kingdom, Russia, China and Germany) group and the indirect talks with the United States in Vienna, no progress was achieved from April 2021 to April 2022. An agreement was brokered in September 2022, when Josep Borrell, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, presented a comprehensive document for achievement of an agreement. Washington accepted it, while Tehran stalled and presented preconditions for acceptance of the agreement, requesting from Washington to lift the sanctions against the Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and suspend all other sanctions as well.

Iran’s goals of escalation 

Iran is aspiring to achieve several goals with the latest Iranian nuclear escalation, most important of which are the following:

● Opposing Western pressures after the classified report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was publicized in early February 2023, revealing the fundamental modification of the connection between the two series of centrifuges for enrichment of uranium to 60% at the Fordow site, without notifying the IAEA. This indicates that Teheran is insisting on escalation, particularly at the time when it is under increasing pressure and sanctions of the West. The latest of these suctions was imposed by the EU Council of Ministers on 20 February 2023. The sanctions were introduced against 32 individuals, including two ministers, and two entities responsible for the violent crackdown of the recent protests in Iran. The latest sanctions were the fifth package of sanctions imposed by the EU against Iran. 

● Response to Israeli threats: Tehran uses its nuclear escalation to respond to Israeli threats against the country, like in the case that occurred several days after the attack on the military facility of the Iranian Ministry of Defense in Isfahan in late January 2023. Iran officially accused Israel for the attack. 

An Iranian attack on an Israeli vessel in the Arab Sea followed. The Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Iran for the incident. On 19 February 2023, Israel bombed military facilities belonging to Iranian-backed militia in the Syrian capital of Damascus. 

● Initiation of nuclear talks: As a result of nuclear escalation Tehran aims to initiate nuclear talks with the West, which have been at a standstill since September 2022. Iran is making indications that it wants revival of the nuclear agreement, underlining that it had exchanged messages with Washington through mediators (Qatar and Iraq).

In parallel, Iran wants to calm down the fears of the West, particularly after the visit of the IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi to Tehran in early March 2023. Namely, Iran is aware that nuclear escalation could trigger adoption of decisions by the IAEA Board of Governors, which will meet in March 2023. If it is proven that Iran has enriched uranium to such a high percentage and a respective decision is adopted, the UN Security Council could reintroduce UN sanctions, which were lifted in 2015. 

Tehran will probably pursue two courses of action. The first course of action will be escalation through increasing pressure- nuclear or missile. The second course of action will be to pacify the fears of the West by calling for continuation of the suspended talks in Vienna. 

American role in the Russian-Iranian relations

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Washington aspired to obstruct any cooperation between Moscow and Tehran. In fact, in 1995 it brokered with the Russian side the “Gore – Chernomyrdin” agreement, which envisaged an obligation of Russia to prevent export of weapons and defense systems to Tehran, in exchange for getting US concessions and economic aid. This was not sufficient for Washington, which deliberately revealed the classified provisions of the Agreement in 2000 in order to block what then seemed as progress in Russia-Iran bilateral relations. Cooperation between Russia and Iran took a new turn in 2006 with limited cooperation in the energy sector, as a part of the Russian response to deployment of a large number of US missile systems in Eastern Europe and its efforts to persuade Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO. It is important to note that intensive cooperation between Russian and Iran started only after the introduction of sanctions against Iran in 2010.

Relations between Moscow and Teheran particularly improved in 2011, in light of their common understanding of developments in Iraq, Afghanistan and the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Therefore, 2011 is considered as the beginning of the “Russian-Iranian spring” and fostering of their strategic partnership, which lead to the signing of the nuclear agreement with Iran in 2014 on construction of eight new nuclear reactors. In such a way, Moscow forced Washington to turn a blind eye to the Russian annexation of Crimea in the same year. 

The strategic partnership of Moscow and Tehran evolved into a strategic alliance, and one of its signs include the supply of Moscow with drones and the agreement of their production in Russia. Negotiations regarding Iranian procurement of modern Russian Su-35 aircrafts have been concluded, while the negotiations in relation to the S-400 missile systems are well advanced. 

The maximum pressure policy pursued by former US President Donald Trump against Iran and the withdrawal of the US from the nuclear agreement created a window for Iran to develop even closer relations with Russia. Teheran swiftly fostered its relations with Moscow, considering it as a very important strategic partner and an irreplaceable source for procurement of weapons and military weapons, as well as a path to circumvent numerous US sanctions.  For that reason, since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, Iran extended its full support to the Russian side. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi stated that his country understands the concerns of Russia regarding its security, as a result of NATO actions in Eastern Europe.

Russian fear of revival of nuclear agreement is even bigger, as for Moscow it would mean loss of the “Iranian sanctions”- element, which has been of multiple interest to Russia. Specifically, the constant Iran’s need for Russian technology for the oil industry, the coordinated bilateral policy against Washington, etc. Russia does not fear a “nuclear Iran” as much as it fears an “Iran in an alliance with the West,” which the West could use as a Western tool to weaken Russia and gain control over Central Asia. 

In March 2022, Russia obstructed conclusion of a final agreement with Iran in Vienna. Namely, Russia requested from the United States written guarantees that economic relations between Moscow and Teheran would not be subject to sanctions that the West had introduced against Russia because of its intervention in Ukraine. The Russian request was undoubtedly not to the liking of Tehran because it wanted to broker an agreement, but at the same time did not want to impair its relations with Russia, which supported it and was its partner at its most difficult times. Specifically, when Tehran was under the US sanctions over the past decades. 

Israel’s response

The question to be asked is how Washington and Tel Aviv would act and what would be their options for a military response. 

Israel persistently repeats that it will not “accept” a nuclear Iran and increasingly often speaks about the need to attack Iran before it is too late. It is evident that the US administration headed by President Joseph Biden is not trying to rein in Israel in relation to an attack on Iran. Israel and the United States recently conducted unprecedented joint military exercises, which are broadly believed to be a simulation of execution of an attack on Iran. Furthermore, intensive military consultations between US and Israel create an impression of increased readiness for such a conflict. Such an approach is in striking contradiction to the approach from the time of former US Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, who actively tried to block any Israeli military action that could draw Washington into yet another direct regional confrontation. European countries which have long played an active role in pacifying the relations between Israel and Iran, currently predominantly have no specific stance on the issue because they are excessively occupied with Ukraine.

Tactical US-Israel strikes could delay the Iranian nuclear program. However, it is uncertain how much they would influence destruction of the program, bearing in mind that Iran had constructed its nuclear plants deeply underground and at different locations. Military attacks would definitely spark a strategic debate within Iran regarding active nuclear weapons, which would bolster the position of the hardline elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Guard (IRGC) in Iran, who see Pakistan as the best model to follow and thus autonomously ensure military control of the country. 

This hardline faction believes that despite the short-term price that Pakistan had paid for its nuclear program, procurement of nuclear weapons has ultimately ensured a balance with its nuclear rival India. Individuals in the Iranian leadership believe that Teheran has already paid the political and economic price of existence of a full nuclear weapons program and now has to continue and arm itself. Israeli-US military strikes would probably speed-up Iran’s advancement towards intensive arming with nuclear weapons. 

Indirect effects of strikes against Iran would probably be equally disastrous.  Military strikes that Israel could launch against Iran would trigger Iran’s response. Apparently, Iran could start its retaliation measures through its allies in Syria and Lebanon- and they would be aim at the neighboring Israel. Teheran could also continue with direct attacks on key shipping-routes   and oil plants in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in an attempt to disrupt the global route used for the Gulf oil, which amounts to 20% of the global daily production. This would be a major blow to the global economy, particularly because of the war in Ukraine. In fact, suction actions and responses could also destroy the fragile peace in Iraq and end the ceasefire in Yemen, which could then lead to attacks by the Huti movement on the Saudi oil plants, as in 2019 when drone attacks on Abqaiq–Khurais halved the oil production from ten to 5 million barrels per day. 

EU policy towards Iran

A military conflict with Iran would be a disaster and should be avoided before it is too late. A war would have horrible and counterproductive consequences for the West, Israel, Iran’s neighbors, as well as the Iranian people.  European pressure to have the IRGC proclaimed a terrorist organization would be an unprecedented action of the EU against a national entity, just like the recent decision of Germany, to exclude Iranian officials from the Munich security conference and extend invitations to Iranian dissidents in exile instead.

Regardless of the internal turmoil in Iran and the violent breakdown of democratic protests, European governments, and particularly the German government should engage in efforts to prevent a broader regional war, which the current nuclear situation could spark. Washington often cooperates with adversaries, despite their brutal internal policies – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, China etc. – in situations when global security is at stake. 

German politicians have to abide by diplomatic norms and standards, as well as work on lowering the tensions- not raising them in the existing complex international circumstances. Namely, during her visits to Iraq on 7 March 2023 German Minister of Foreign Affairs Annalena Baerbock stated in Baghdad that Iran was endangering “stability” in the Middle East. “The Iranian regime shows with its missile attacks that it not only represses its own population with recklessness and brutality, but is apparently prepared to jeopardize lives and stability in the entire region to maintain power.”  

Iran condemned the statements by the German Minister, described them as anti-Iranian and reminded of the role of Germany in the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988. “Such baseless claims are aimed to cover up the scandalous crime of arming the Iraqi regime with chemical weapons, which was used against military troops and citizens of Iraq and Iran.”

The German Minister of Foreign Affairs apparently had forgotten the cross-border military operations of Turkey against terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq, and Israel’s in Syria and Lebanon. 

US lacks effective diplomatic options 

Iran has become more radical in its stances and is rather unlikely to return to the same nuclear agreement, unless it gets some additional concessions. On the other side, it is also rather unlikely that President Biden would accept a “weaker” agreement from the US point of view, than the original one. Therefore the possibility of achievement of a diplomatic solution is significantly reduced. 

President Biden is aware that the nuclear agreement “is dead, but we are not going to announce it”, as such an announcement would open the door to a more difficult questions of what could happen next. As the last thing that Biden wants is a new US war in the Middle East, it is still plausible that launching of US strikes against Iranian nuclear plans would be the last resort.  The most likely option is that the US and Israel will increase pressure on Iran without resorting to a war and in a way that will guarantee deceleration of the Iranian nuclear program. There are many other options as well, including cyber-attacks or covert sabotage operations against the Iranian nuclear program, execution of limited military attacks, stronger US sanctions against Iran, etc. 

How to deal with nuclear Iran?

Today we have to reckon with a nuclear Iran.  Is coexistence with it at the regional and international level possible? If not, what are the options to address that issue? Would it be possible to launch an Israel-US attack to paralyze the nuclear program? What consequences and results could stem from Iran’s response to such an attack? 

Former US State Secretary Henry Kissinger said Iran has to choose will it be a nation or pursue a revolutionary cause. Iran, as a nation, decided to engage in negotiations about its nuclear program not to reach a solution, but to pursue its revolutionary goals- which is possession of nuclear weapons. If the negotiations fail, the logic of the revolutionary cause emerges and the right to possess nuclear weapons or, in the worst case scenario, achieve the nuclear threshold to join the nuclear club. 

An important question can be raised here: why some regional powers- such as India and Pakistan- can have nuclear weapons, and Iran cannot have that right? It could be said that the fundamental difference between Iran and the mentioned powers is that Iran aligns its regional project with its nuclear weapons, which means it has political projects of expansion, framed in religious and ideological formulations. (In example, the government in Baghdad, Syrian regime, Hezbollah u Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic jihad in Palestine, and the Houthi movement in Yemen, etc.)

All the considerations should focus on analysis of the dangerous phase that the region, and maybe even the world, would face if the situation reaches the point of launch of military attacks against the Iranian nuclear program. 

Finally, some food for thought – What if Iran becomes a nuclear power? Will it become more responsible in international relations than it has been so far? 

Published by IFIMES – The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) from Ljubljana, Slovenia, 22 March 202

Belgium to become second EU country to recognize Buddhism

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Belgium to become second EU country to recognize Buddhism

Reuters (17.03.2023) – Belgium is expected to officially recognize Buddhism after the federal government approves a draft law on Friday, opening the door to federal funding, official delegates and school classes.

The Belgian Buddhist Union had requested recognition in March 2006. The union estimates the number of Buddhists in Belgium at 150,000. The only other EU country where Buddhism is recognized is Austria.

There are currently six worship services officially recognized in Belgium: the Roman Catholic, the Orthodox, the Israelite, the Anglican, the Protestant Evangelical and the Islamic, recognized in 1974.

Buddhism would be recognized as “a non-denominational philosophical organization” alongside organized secularism, recognized since 2002. It would receive federal funding of up to 1.2 million euros.

Once voted by the Parliament, the law will pave the way to the creation of local institutions, to the sending of Buddhist delegates in ports and airports, in prisons, in the army, hospitals, the opening of Buddhism courses in official education alongside teaching of the other worships services.

All Belgian provinces and the Brussels Region would then also have to each finance a local Buddhist centre.

Photo: People are seen at the pedestrian area in Brussels, Belgium, August 1, 2015. REUTERS/Eric Vidal

The Constitution of Uzbekistan Enshrines the Norms of Environmental Law

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
The Constitution of Uzbekistan Enshrines <strong>the Norms of Environmental Law</strong>

Today our life is undergoing profound qualitative changes. Cardinal reforms are rapidly forming a completely new image of our society.

The new edition of our Constitution contains special norms on ensuring environmental rights of citizens, in particular, everyone has the right to a comfortable environment, reliable information about its condition, the state takes measures on improvement, restoration and protection of the environment, maintaining the ecological balance, protection of the ecological system of Aral Sea Region.

This constitutional norm is enshrined in the Development Strategy of New Uzbekistan to achieve goals such as increasing the share of renewable energy sources by 25% by 2026 and reducing the amount of harmful gases emitted by industries by 10% in exchange for renewable energy capacity of 15,000 MW by 2030.

Today, when natural resources are being depleted and global climate change threatens the future of humanity with environmental and natural problems, these standards are important.

In order to ensure the environmental rights of citizens and to prevent harmful effects on the environment, the State will create conditions for public control in the sphere of urban planning.

The environment is a key factor affecting human health and life. According to the UN, human health depends on the state of the environment by 20-40 percent. Today, when global problems threaten the future of mankind, comfortable environment is becoming increasingly important. Therefore, in many developed countries this problem is widely discussed and new norms concerning environmental protection are included in the constitutions.

It is vital to reduce environmental damage. In particular, the environmental damage from construction in some of our cities and villages exceeds the established norms. Since in recent years our country has turned into a huge construction arena, the measures are taken to strengthen public control in the field of urban planning activities in order to ensure the environmental rights of citizens and prevent the harmful effects of structures on the environment.

By expanding public control, this norm strengthens the constitutional guarantees of maintaining a comfortable and ecologically clean area for our compatriots and future generations, providing a comfortable environment for reliable protection of public health.

In addition, the State takes measures on protection and restoration of the ecological system of the Aral Sea Region, as well as the socio-economic development of the region.

In fact, the global environmental problem that has arisen in the Aral Sea Region has a negative impact on the way of life of about 50 million people in the region. Therefore, Uzbekistan is paying special attention to eliminating the consequences of the Aral Sea problem. In particular, afforestation works are being carried out on more than 2.5 million hectares of dry area of the Aral Sea.

Along with this, the large-scale projects aimed at protecting the complex ecological situation of the Region, protecting the its population’s gene pool, improving their health, and ensuring sustainable development in the area are being implemented.

This norm of the new edition of the Constitution ensures the creation of decent living conditions for the inhabitants of the region and significant improvement in the standard of living. The package of additional benefits will be extended to all professions, primarily to the representatives of the social sphere, while business structures and non-governmental non-profit organizations will have an opportunity to actively participate in various projects aimed at environmental protection.

This norm creates constitutional guarantees of maintaining a comfortable and ecologically clean area for the population and future generations, providing social and economic support to people living in the Aral Sea Region, and reducing unemployment.

Boriy Alikhanov,

Chairman of the Senate Committee

for Development of the Aral Sea Region

and Ecology

Lebanese PR received the Grand Chancellor of the Sovereign Order of Malta

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Lebanese PR received the Grand Chancellor of the Sovereign Order of Malta

Rome 16 March 2023 – Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati had talks this morning at the Magistral Palace with the Grand Chancellor of the Sovereign Order of Malta, Riccardo Paternò di Montecupo. After the meeting, the Prime Minister was received by the Lieutenant of the Grand Master, Fra’ John Dunlap.

In the talks – in which Grand Hospitaller Fra ‘ Alessandro de Franciscis took part – the excellent relations established over 70 years of diplomatic relations were reiterated. The first healthcare centre dates back to 1957 and the Lebanese Association started its health and social care programmes in 1981. Since then the Order of Malta has played – and continues to play – a key role in Lebanon, suffering a 15-year civil war and serious social and economic crises.

‘The Order of Malta is doing excellent work in my country,’ said Prime Minister Mikati, stressing the very difficult crisis that Lebanon is currently undergoing and how ‘my government’s priorities concern education and health. One of our priorities is to elect the President of the Republic, an office vacant since last October.’

The talks also addressed the issue of humanitarian corridors to Syria, even more essential after the earthquake in February.

The Grand Chancellor reiterated that ‘Lebanon has a place in the Order of Malta’s heart. We are ready and willing to make every possible effort to increase our health and social care programmes. A meeting is scheduled in Beirut very soon between Prime Minister Najib Mikati and the President of the Lebanese Association Marwan Sehnaoui to take stock of the situation and coordinate efforts.’

Since 2019, Lebanon is again experiencing a humanitarian catastrophe further aggravated by the pandemic emergency and the explosion in the port of Beirut in August 2020. The economic crisis has severely weakened the health system; vendors, hospitals and pharmacies lack basic medicines. The population is no longer able to afford medical treatment and the demand for humanitarian assistance is growing. Inflation in Lebanon has reached a dramatic level and the consumer price index (CPI) has registered an annual increase of 123.5%.

The Order of Malta in Lebanon is in the vanguard for providing health and social care to the most vulnerable through its eleven health and social centres and projects nationwide. Seven mobile clinical units reach the most remote areas of the country. The Order of Malta’s Lebanese Association also organises cancer and heart disease prevention and awareness campaigns and runs programmes to assist pregnant women. The Association recently opened a new health centre in Beirut, capable of assisting up to 500 patients a day.

Blessed Gerard, the Order’s founder

There are also specific projects for the elderly and those with special needs, with particular attention for children with brain disorders. Every year, summer camps are organised for young people with severe disabilities, in which hundreds of Order of Malta volunteers participate from all over the world. In recent years, the Association has also launched agro-humanitarian projects to support farmers and the local economy.

All assistance activities are supported by bilateral agreements for health and humanitarian cooperation between the Lebanese Government and the Sovereign Order of Malta. The first cooperation agreement dates back to 2009.

The projects in the social sphere are also of great value, developed in close collaboration with other faiths present in the country, such as the Sunni Dar El Fatwa institution, the El Sadr foundation – one of the most influential Shiite NGOs – and with the Sheikh Abou Hassan Aref Halawi Foundation, considered the main and most respected institution within the Druze community.

Luxembourgish accreditation for Turkmenistan’s Palvanov

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Luxembourgish accreditation for Turkmenistan’s Palvanov

Wednesday, 22 March 2023, City of Luxembourg, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg: At the Grand Ducal Palace in the city centre of Luxembourg’s capital, His Royal Highness The Grand Duke of Luxembourg received for an audience the non-resident head of mission of Turkmenistan to the European state, Ambassador Sapar Palvanov. 

Palvanov is a career diplomat who joined the Turkmen foreign service back in 2013 by becoming a specialist, and subsequently a lecturer at the Institute of International Relations. From 2015, he specialised at the Americas Department of the Turkmen Foreign Ministry, and became its Head in 2018. 

During his tête-à-tête with Grand Duke Henri, Ambassador Palvanov assured his interlocutor of the firm position of the Turkmen Government aimed at bringing bilateral ties between Turkmenistan and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to a new high level. Palvanov is based in Brussels, and wherein he already serves as ambassador to Belgium since 13 October 2022. 

For further information 

Grand Ducal House of Luxembourg: https://monarchie.lu/fr/actualites/accreditations-de-nouveaux-ambassadeurs-au-luxembourg-22-mars-2023

Armando Varricchio welcomed in Düsseldorf

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Armando Varricchio welcomed in Düsseldorf

Monday, 20 March 2023, Düsseldorf, NRW, Germany: Premier Hendrik Wüst received Italy’s Ambassador Armando Varricchio for his inaugural visit to the State Chancellery. The exchange focused on the close relations between the two countries, and the further expansion of the partnership with the Piedmont region, which was concluded last year.

Premier Hendrik Wüst as per statement below written in the German-language: “For us, Italy is a focal country in our relations and an important partner in Europe. Many people in North Rhine-Westphalia have Italian roots, and our civil society and economic ties are close. Together we face great challenges. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has once again made clear to us how important it is to have a strong and capable European Union. This is what we are working for together with Italy. Our Union becomes even stronger when individual regions are also connected with each other. With our Italian partner region Piedmont, we are therefore working on concrete projects with added value for both sides on the topics of artificial intelligence, hydrogen and autonomous driving. At the same time, we are strengthening cohesion in Europe with our regional partnership.”

Another topic of the exchange was Premier Hendrik Wüst’s upcoming trip to Rome from Wednesday to Thursday, 22-23 March 2023. On Thursday, the Premier will meet The Bishop of Rome, Franciscus I in a private audience, and political talks are also planned.

Background North Rhine-Westphalia and Italy

Italy is an important partner for North Rhine-Westphalia. With a trade volume of 23.8 billion euros (2021), Italy is North Rhine-Westphalia’s sixth largest trading partner, ahead of Poland and after the USA. Around 400 Italian subsidiaries with 16,400 employees are based in North Rhine-Westphalia. More than 141,300 Italians live here – one in four Italians living in Germany. There are currently 17 town twinning agreements between North Rhine-Westphalia and Italy, including Cologne with Turin, Unna with Pisa and Oberhausen with Iglesias.

For further information 

Government of NRW: https://www.land.nrw/pressemitteilung/ministerpraesident-hendrik-wuest-empfaengt-den-botschafter-italiens-armando

The Ukrainian region of Kirovohrad in search of partnerships in Brussels to feed the world

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
<strong>The Ukrainian region of Kirovohrad in search of partnerships in Brussels to feed the world</strong>

European Times (17.03.2023) – On 9-10 March, the head of the regional council of Kirovohrad Oblast (region), Sergii Shulga, visited European institutions in Brussels to raise awareness about the future of his region in the EU and the global context. Kirovohrad Oblast is a region in central Ukraine that had a population of about a million inhabitants before the war. Only a limited number of local Ukrainians have decided to leave this highly agricultural region as the population mainly lives off the land but with the war raging in the Donbass, about 100,000 displaced persons have suddenly modified and increased the local demography.

Human Rights Without Frontiers met Sergii Shulga and interviewed him.

HRWF: Russia has invaded parts of Ukraine and has caused a lot of damage. Was your region affected as well?

S. Shulga: Since February 2022, Russia has launched over 20 missile attacks on the Kirovohrad region. Last night, there was a hit on the infrastructure again. But we are strong. And we believe in victory. So after it, we will rebuild our economy.

HRWF: Why did you come to Brussels and who did you meet?

S. Shulga: Up to now, no Ukrainian region has taken the initiative to send its highest representatives to Brussels to contact there the missions of the EU regions and identify possible partners for the reconstruction.

I met and talked with Lucas Mandel, an Austrian member of the European Parliament. He is a reliable supporter of Ukraine. He visited our country a few times. He knows our realities and he is quite supportive of any initiative that can be beneficial to Ukraine.

What is important for us in Ukraine is to have concrete solidarity partnerships, not only with regions but also with organizations of the European Union.

I had a meeting with the Secretary General of the Assembly of European Regions, Mr. Christian Spahr, to discuss some joint cooperation in the Regional Youth Council, where the Kirovohrad Region has delegated two representatives. One of them has recently become the head of the Mental Health Committee.

I also talked with Mathieu Mori, the Secretary General of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. He is a key person for the future development of our network between the Kirovohrad region and the EU regions as he was elected in October 2022 for a period of five years.

As Sweden is currently holding the EU presidency until 30 June, I discussed with the Head of the Southern Sweden Office which represents five regions to envisage potential partnerships. I also had talks with the head of the Lower Austrian Region, the head of the Representation of Carinthia Land as well as representatives of two regions of Slovakia: Bratislava region and Trnava region. The purpose is to put in place various forms of collaboration with our region.

HRWF: What are your current needs?

S. Shulga: The economy of our region is massively of agrarian nature. Ninety-five percent of the income of our region comes from our agricultural activities. In our region, there are 2 million hectares of rich lands to be cultivated. They were rather spared from the war as the Russian shelling was mainly targeting energy infrastructure and housing: no explosions, no mines and no demining necessity, no holes, no tank carcasses, no toxic products or pollution in our fields.

Last year, through the ports of Mikolayev, Kherson and Odessa we exported four million tons of our grain, corn, sugar beet and sunflower seeds, mainly to the Middle East and Africa. We all know how difficult the negotiations were to break Russia’s blockade of our ports and how fragile this agreement with Russia remains. Brussels needed to know that he Kirovohrad Region helps feed the world with its rich lands. That is also the reason why I needed to come to Brussels. Ukraine needs to get back its Russian occupied territories, especially along the sea.

HRWF: What will be your objective when you are back in your oblast?

S. Shulga: I would like to organize a conference in Brussels in May to give the opportunity to the Kirovohrad Region to present themselves to the European Union. I informed the Head of the Ukrainian Mission to the EU, Mr. Vsevolod Chentsov, about this project and already invited him. This will be part of the process of opening the road to our EU membership. We need and love the EU but the EU also shows with its massive investments that it needs Ukraine and loves Ukraine.

______________________________

Published by HRWS

Working from home abroad: 5 tips for employers in the Netherlands

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Working from home abroad: 5 tips for employers in the Netherlands

As working from home becomes more and more common, there are also employees who want to work remotely from a country other than where the company is located or as a digital nomad without a fixed workplace. What do Dutch employers have to keep in mind when employees want to work from home abroad?

In 2023, working from home has become rather common. In times of COVID-19, many employees have started working from home. Working from home can even be done while staying abroad. For example, an employee may want to work from home abroad because of personal circumstances such as an illness of the employee himself or family members, or a wedding abroad, as well as to spend the winter in a sunny country.

However, cross-border working from home can have unexpected consequences. Do employees need a permit if they want to work from abroad? Or conversely, do employers need a permit to allow someone to work in another country? Will the home-working country become the new working country? And in which country do social security contributions have to be paid? These are all examples of legal dilemmas employers face when employees want to work from home abroad.

1. Permits

If you have an employee who wants to work from home abroad, you have to keep in mind  that you may need to apply for a work permit for this employee.

First, of course, employees must have a residence permit for the country where they want to work from home. If employees do not have the nationality of the home-working country, they may need to apply for a residence permit. If employees are nationals of an EU/EER member state or Switzerland, they do not need a residence permit to stay in the other member states.

Under the principle of free movement of services, nationals of EU/EER member states and Switzerland can work in other member states. However, if employees wish to work from home in a country outside the EU/EER and Switzerland, it must be considered beforehand whether a work permit is required for that country in addition to a right of residence.

Do employees who are not nationals of the Netherlands or another EU/EER member state want to work in the Netherlands again after working from home? In this event, you may need to reapply for or renew a residence or work permit.

2. Applicable employment law

Working from home abroad may change the law applicable to an employment contract. In principle, employer and employee are free to state in the employment contract which law will apply, also referred to as the choice of law.

If an employee is going to work abroad temporarily, in principle there will be no change regarding the applicable employment law. What is meant by temporary needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis. For example, different rules may apply to digital nomads working consecutively in different countries than to an employee working only in one country.

If employees start working from abroad on a structural basis, the place from which the employees commonly performs their work, “the country of habitual employment”, changes. Despite the choice of law made in the employment contract, based on European legislation, the employer may not deviate from mandatory provisions of the country of habitual employment to the extent that they are more favourable than the chosen law, Such mandatory law regulations may also apply to countries outside the EU.

3. Social security

When working from home abroad, the country in which an employee is socially insured may change. If you employ an employee who wants to work from home abroad, the duration of the remote work is important. If an employee starts working from home abroad temporarily, he or she will, in principle, remain insured in the Netherlands. To this end, the employee can apply for an A1 certificate. This certificate proves that the social security contributions are paid in the Netherlands. This certificate is valid in EU/EER member states and treaty countries.

Based on European legislation, employees are, in principle, socially insured in the country where they work. If you employ employees who habitually work in the Netherlands but live in another EU/EER member state and these employees are going to work from home for 25% or more on a structural basis, they are compulsorily insured in the country of residence. This may result in the employer having to register in the employee’s country of residence to pay social security contributions there.

If you employ an employee who wishes to work from home temporarily in a country that is no EU/EER member state, the employee’s social security position is determined by social security treaties that have been concluded, or if there are none, on the basis of the national social security legislation of the Netherlands and the country where the employee is going to work temporarily. Due to the concurrence of social security systems, the employer may have to pay social security contributions in more than one country.

4. Duty of care

Employers have a duty of care to their employees. This legal duty of care for the employee’s health and safety does also apply if the employee travels abroad to work from home. This means that the employer must ensure the best possible working conditions in the employee’s home working environment.

5. Information obligation

Furthermore, if an employee is going to work abroad for longer than one month, the employer is obliged under Dutch law to provide the employee with a statement containing information about the following:

  • The country where the work is to be performed
  • The duration of that work
  • The accommodation
  • The applicability of the Dutch social security legislation, or a statement of the bodies responsible for implementing this legislation
  • The currency in which payment will take place
  • The allowances to which the employee is entitled, and
  • The manner in which the return is arranged

Conclusion

So there are more difficulties to working from home abroad than appears at first sight. We therefore recommend employers and employees map out in advance the possible consequences of employees working abroad and whether steps/measures need have to be taken to make working from home possible.

Employment and expat lawyers

Jan Dop

Do you have employees who wish to work from home abroad or work remotely, and do you want to know what the consequences are and which measures you have to take beforehand? We will be happy to give you advice. If necessary, for that, we can call upon our colleagues from the PrimerusTM network, “The World’s Finest Law Firms”.

Please contact us, also for other questions about employment law and dismissal or if you need legal assistance in a dispute with personnel:

President of Costa Rica visits International Criminal Court

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
President of Costa Rica visits International Criminal Court

On 22 March 2023, H.E. Mr Rodrigo Alberto Chaves Robles, President of Costa Rica, visited the International Criminal Court (ICC), where he was received by ICC President Judge Piotr Hofmański, ICC Registrar Mr Peter Lewis and ICC Registrar Elect Mr Osvaldo Zavala Giler. As part of the Costa Rican delegation was also the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr Arnoldo André Tinoco and H.E. Mr. Arnoldo Brenes Castro, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the Netherlands.

H.E. Mr. Arnoldo Brenes Castro, Ambassador of Costa Rica, H.E. Dr. Arnoldo André Tinoco, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, the President of Costa Rica, Rodrigo Chavez Robles, the ICC President Judge Piotr Hofmański and the ICC Registrar Peter Lewis .

Thanking President Chaves for his visit and for Costa Rica’s multifaceted and sustained support of the Court, President Hofmański stated: “The leadership Costa Rica has shown during the first two decades of the ICC is of immense importance for international criminal justice. As the Court faces a heavy workload, the commitment and cooperation of the States Parties to the Rome Statute remains as important as ever for the delivery of the ICC’s mandate.”

Mr. Rodrigo Chavez Robles, President of Costa Rica and ICC registrar elect, Mr. Osvaldo Zavala Giler.

Costa Rican President H.E. Mr. Rodrigo Alberto Chaves Robles stated: “In these times of great global challenges, it is essential to have an independent and impartial International Criminal Court to guarantee that the worst international crimes do not go unpunished. Costa Rica reaffirms its unwavering commitment to international criminal justice, the integrity of the Rome Statute and the protection of the judicial independence of the International Criminal Court. It is equally essential to ensure justice for victims, including through assistance, especially to the most vulnerable, as well as the rehabilitation of those who have suffered physical and psychological trauma. We must continue to vigorously promote the Rome Statute to achieve its universality.”

The visit of President Chaves to the ICC highlights Costa Rica’s commitment to the Court and the joint efforts deployed in the fight against the impunity of the perpetrators of the most serious crimes that affect the international community as a whole. Costa Rica signed the Rome Statute on 7 October 1998 and deposited its instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute on 7 June 2001.

The President of Costa Rica, Rodrigo Chavez Robles and the ICC President Judge Piotr Hofmański after meetings.

1...109110111...857Page 110 of 857