Drawn From The Russia–Ukraine Conflict (I)

“History is the best prophecy, but only for those who know how to read it.”
– paraphrase after Thucydides/Santayana

By Major General (Two Stars) (retd) Corneliu Pivariu

The present paper aims to highlight the main geopolitical and military lessons resulting from the Russia–Ukraine conflict, the largest war fought on the European continent since 1945. Its analysis offers not only an understanding of how international relations are being reshaped, but also of the fundamental changes in the art of war, defense strategies, and the ways societies respond to the pressures generated by war.

To grasp the scale and complexity of the current conflict, it is essential to consider the context of its outbreak. The crisis did not begin with the massive attack of 24 February 2022; it was preceded by the events of 2014: the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the outbreak of the war in Donbas. Between 2014 and 2022, a progressive escalation unfolded, marked by limited clashes, the consolidation of Western sanctions, increased military support for Kyiv, and the radicalization of geopolitical rhetoric in Moscow. The large-scale invasion of February 2022 was the culmination of this evolution. In this regard, the Minsk Agreements[1] I and II are worth noting, as they represent the link between the frozen conflict period (2014–2022) and the outbreak of full-scale war in 2022.

Ukraine holds strategic geopolitical importance for both sides. For Russia, control over Ukraine means securing its western front and maintaining a buffer zone against NATO, as well as consolidated access to the Black Sea. For NATO and the European Union, Ukraine’s independence and resilience are essential for the security of the eastern flank, the stability of the Black Sea region, and the safeguarding of the rules-based international order.

In this sense, the conflict is not merely a military confrontation between two states, but also a test of the global balance of power. The lessons drawn from the war touch both the geopolitical domain — transformations of the world order, the functioning of alliances, strategies for energy and economic security — and the military domain, where technological innovations (drones, hypersonic missiles, information and cyber warfare), logistics, human intelligence, and societal adaptability have played decisive roles. This mixture of old and new has shaped a complex picture of how warfare will unfold in the 21st century, demonstrating that no operational model is robust without continuous adaptability and massive logistical support.

The purpose of this endeavor is to provide a framework for reflection for political and military decision-makers who must prepare European and Romanian society for future challenges. The lessons of the Russia–Ukraine war are not only those of Kyiv or Moscow; they represent warnings and sources of inspiration for the entire international community.

II. Geopolitical Lessons

“The history of Europe is the story of borders that have never remained fixed.”

1. The International Order and Multipolarity

The conflict in Ukraine cannot be analyzed in isolation; it must be understood as part of a broader confrontation between two geopolitical and ideological orientations: globalism — with a dominant component represented by the neo-Marxist current promoted by transnational networks such as the one associated with George Soros — and sovereigntism, reflected in the multipolar vision supported by states such as Russia, China, and other actors challenging the Western-led liberal international order. In this context, Russia’s invasion in February 2022 and the Western response became a defining moment, not only for European security but also for the global balance between these two paradigms.

The Russia–Ukraine war has acted as a catalyst for the transformation of the international order, accelerating processes already visible after the 2008 financial crisis and, more clearly, after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. While the end of the Cold War ushered in a period of American unipolar dominance, the large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 demonstrated that this configuration no longer reflects current realities.

The Western response to the invasion was striking in both scope and strategic coherence, even though it was neither uniform nor immediate. The United States, the European Union, and NATO allies managed to send a common message condemning the aggression and to adopt support measures for Ukraine, proving that transatlantic solidarity remains functional. For the first time since the Cold War, the West acted in concert in the face of a major threat to the international order.

A closer analysis, however, shows that this response was gradual and marked by internal differences. Economic sanctions, financial aid, and military assistance were introduced step by step, depending on each state’s energy dependence and domestic political constraints. While the U.S. and the United Kingdom moved quickly, the European Union revealed hesitations and divergent approaches: Germany oscillated between caution and firmness, France tried to keep a diplomatic channel open, while Hungary openly opposed certain measures.

Paradoxically, the war revitalized NATO, an institution many had considered in decline. Russian aggression led not only to the strengthening of the Eastern Flank but also to the Alliance’s enlargement with Sweden and Finland — a historic step that altered the security balance in Northern Europe. At the same time, rearmament plans and higher defense budgets in most member states point to a long-term strategic realignment.

Yet Western unity remains under significant pressure. The economic costs of sanctions, public opinion fatigue, and electoral dynamics in democratic states risk eroding support for Ukraine in the medium and long term. The essential geopolitical lesson is that the West can build a common front when it perceives a direct threat, but such cohesion is fragile and depends on maintaining political consensus both domestically and across the Atlantic.

At the same time, the conflict revealed that a significant part of the international community — including emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa — refuses to accept the Western paradigm as the sole reference of legitimacy. The strategic neutrality of many states in the “Global South” reflects a realignment of power relations, in which non-Western powers seek to maximize their autonomy and negotiate their interests according to national priorities.

Thus, the war in Ukraine has accelerated the transition toward multipolarity through:

• The weakening of Western dominance: while transatlantic unity has strengthened, the West’s ability to impose rules and sanctions universally is increasingly contested.
• The rise of alternative blocs: the expansion of BRICS, the dynamics of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the strategic rapprochement between Russia and China are clear signs of an emerging multipolar order.
• The fragmentation of the global economy: the partial decoupling of energy and technology markets from the West, along with Russia’s reorientation toward Asia, confirms the trend toward regional economic spheres.

The multipolarity taking shape is not a stable or predictable system but rather a “fluid multipolarity,” characterized by ad hoc alliances, economic pragmatism, and intense competition for resources and technology. This fluidity increases strategic uncertainty, as the rules of the global game are increasingly unclear and contested.

A visible outcome of the conflict was the expansion of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) through the admission of new members in 2023–2024, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Ethiopia. This diversification reflects the desire of several states to align with an alternative pole to the G7, both politically and economically. Even though BRICS is not a politico-military alliance but rather a cooperation platform, its geopolitical symbolism is strong: it signals that key states in the Middle East and Africa seek a more autonomous position vis-à-vis the West.

India pursued a strategy of “diplomatic balancing”: it refused to explicitly condemn Russia and increased imports of discounted Russian oil, while at the same time maintaining close relations with the U.S. and the EU, strengthening its status as an “indispensable actor” in the Indo-Pacific. This flexibility shows that multipolarity does not mean rigid blocs but selective alliances calibrated to national interests.

China chose to act as an “indirect supporter” of Russia, providing it with markets and diplomatic backing while avoiding a direct breach of Western sanctions. Beijing also attempted a mediator role, launching peace plans and projecting itself as an “alternative” to Western diplomacy. In reality, however, China sought above all to exploit Russia’s isolation for economic and strategic gain, securing preferential access to Russian energy resources and markets.

Turkey represents a special case of a state that repositioned itself with skill. As a NATO member, it supported Ukraine with Bayraktar drones and endorsed Alliance initiatives, while at the same time negotiating agreements with Moscow on grain exports and economic ties. This “double game” allowed Ankara to strengthen its status as a regional power indispensable both to the West and to Russia.

Overall, these developments show that multipolarity is no longer a theoretical concept but a reality in the making, visible in the concrete repositioning of global and regional actors who refuse to relate exclusively to the Western liberal order. For Romania and the Black Sea region, this dynamic has direct implications, as the area becomes an intersection point between NATO, Russia, and new regional power poles.

The international order and multipolarity are defined not only by the objective realities of power but also by the way global actors construct and project their perceptions of those realities. In geopolitics, the difference between reality and perception often becomes a battlefield in itself; yet, even if perceptions can shape events for a time, reality ultimately prevails.

2. The Russia–West Relationship

The war launched by the Russian Federation against Ukraine exposed both the limits and vulnerabilities of the relationship between Moscow and the West, as well as the latter’s ability to rediscover strategic unity in the face of a major threat. Until 2022, Russia had managed to exploit internal divisions within NATO and the EU through influence operations, energy dependencies, and selective diplomacy. However, the large-scale invasion of Ukraine produced the opposite effect: greater cohesion in the West.

This cohesion, however, is not without cracks. Economically, sanctions against Russia revealed differences between European states dependent on Russian gas and those with alternative supplies. Politically, some capitals oscillated between firmness and caution, fearing domestic costs or direct escalation with Moscow. Militarily, although NATO reacted with remarkable speed, major disparities remain between U.S. capabilities and those of European allies — confirming Europe’s structural dependence on the American security umbrella.

For Russia, confrontation with the West exposed both vulnerabilities and strengths. On the one hand, economic and technological isolation highlighted the limits of the selective integration pursued by Moscow for three decades. On the other hand, the Kremlin maintained an active diplomatic front outside the Euro-Atlantic sphere, capitalizing on the frustration of Global South states and consolidating ties with China, Iran, and North Korea. The conflict thus transformed the Russia–West relationship into a pivot of the new global geopolitical confrontation, with reverberations far beyond Europe.

The main lesson is that despite the West’s apparent unity, its relationship with Russia remains asymmetrical and unstable, where immediate interests and public perceptions weigh as heavily as strategic realities. Moreover, this relationship is not merely bilateral but a test of the West’s ability to maintain internal coherence and external credibility in the face of a revisionist power challenging the liberal international order.

a) The Failure of Mutual Deterrence

The invasion revealed that Western deterrence mechanisms failed to prevent the Kremlin from resorting to aggression. Although the U.S. and European allies issued strong warnings, these were not backed by preventive military measures, but only by the threat of sanctions. Russia, in turn, bet on Western disunity and NATO’s inability to react quickly. That calculation proved wrong: the response was prompt, massive, and sustained.

b) NATO’s Response

The North Atlantic Alliance underwent a major transformation:

• It deployed additional troops on the eastern flank, including in Romania and Poland;
• It accelerated Finland and Sweden’s accession, extending NATO’s direct border with Russia;
• It reconfigured its strategic doctrine, designating Russia as the main direct threat to Euro-Atlantic security.

Thus, an organization some had described as “brain dead” (Emmanuel Macron, 2019) proved its vitality through rapid adaptation to the reality of high-intensity conventional war.

c) The European Union and Sanctions

The European Union demonstrated an unexpected degree of unity: by mid-July 2025, it had adopted 18 packages of sanctions against Russia, with a 19th already in preparation.

These measures enabled a rapid reduction of dependence on Russian gas and provided Ukraine with tens of billions of euros in support. At the same time, granting candidate status to Ukraine[2] and the Republic of Moldova was a step of major geopolitical significance — a clear signal of rebalancing in Eastern Europe.

Yet European cohesion, although real and rare, came at a cost. Inflation and rising energy prices fueled social discontent and waves of Euroscepticism and populism in several member states. Coordination was achieved through compromises — as in the case of Slovakia, which lifted its veto in exchange for guarantees in the natural gas sector.

Sanctions were made more effective by targeting the energy sector, the “shadow fleet” transporting Russian oil and gas, and banks and entities in the military and financial domains. In the 18th package, the EU lowered the price cap on Russian oil from USD 60 to USD 47.6 per barrel.

Over the long term, sanctions are likely to have more impact as instruments of economic and political decoupling than as immediate coercion. Russia has turned increasingly toward Asia and the Global South, thereby reducing Europe’s leverage.

d) The Reconfiguration of Transatlantic Relations

The United States has returned to the center of the European security system. Washington provided the most extensive military and financial support for Kyiv, and European leaders, even when reluctant, accepted the essential role of the U.S. as guarantor of defense. This reinforced the transatlantic axis but also highlighted Europe’s strategic dependence on America, especially in military and technological domains.

At the same time, this reconfiguration is not without uncertainty. A recalibration of U.S. engagement in Europe and Ukraine has already begun, driven by the prioritization of competition with China in the Indo-Pacific and domestic fiscal pressures. Support for Kyiv has become more selective and conditional, with Washington sending a clear message to allies: Europeans must shoulder a far greater share of collective security. In this regard, the U.S. call for NATO members to allocate 5% of GDP to defense marks a paradigm shift, signaling that American resources will increasingly be directed toward other theaters[3].

e) Perspectives

In the medium and long term, the Russia–West relationship is undergoing a structural rupture:

• Russia has almost completely decoupled from the West and turned toward Asia;
• NATO and the EU have adopted long-term deterrence and defense policies;
• The world is witnessing the emergence of a hybrid Iron Curtain, less geographical and more economic, technological, and informational.

This does not reproduce the rigid blocs of the Cold War but instead signals a sharper fragmentation of the international system, with antagonistic camps and gray zones where states pursue balancing strategies. The confrontation is no longer purely military but also one of competing political and ideological systems: the Western liberal-democratic model versus the authoritarian model promoted by Russia, with partial support from other powers such as China.

3. The Role of International Organizations

The war in Ukraine was a stress test for the entire international security system. How the main organizations reacted — or, conversely, failed to manage the conflict — offers valuable lessons about both the limits and the potential of multilateral cooperation.

a) The United Nations (UN)

The UN, created to prevent and resolve major conflicts, proved powerless in the face of Russia’s invasion. Moscow’s veto in the Security Council blocked any coercive resolution, gravely undermining the credibility of the collective security mechanism. The General Assembly adopted symbolic resolutions of condemnation, but without practical effect. The situation confirmed that the UN remains trapped in the 1945 architecture, unable to cope with today’s multipolar realities.

b) The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

The OSCE, traditionally a forum for dialogue between East and West, fell into deep paralysis. Its monitoring missions in Ukraine were suspended, while Russia blocked budgets and decision-making mechanisms. The conflict demonstrated that an organization based on consensus lacks effective tools to prevent or manage high-intensity wars.

c) The Council of Europe

The Council of Europe reacted by expelling Russia in March 2022 — an unprecedented move, though largely symbolic. Although normatively important, the Council of Europe has no executive capacity in matters of security, its role being limited to promoting democratic values and human rights.

d) NATO

NATO was the only international organization to demonstrate strategic relevance. Its rapid reaction capability, adaptation of defense plans, and enlargement with Finland and Sweden showed that the Alliance remains the cornerstone of European security. At the same time, NATO avoided direct involvement in the war, maintaining its mandate of collective defense while leaving military assistance to member states acting bilaterally.

e) The European Union (EU)

The EU took unprecedented steps:

• For the first time, it used the European Peace Facility to finance arms deliveries to a country at war;
• It adopted large-scale economic sanctions, coordinated with the U.S. and the G7;
• It opened the accession perspective for Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, strengthening the geopolitical dimension of enlargement.

Thus, the conflict transformed the EU from a predominantly economic actor into an emerging geopolitical actor — though still dependent on the American military umbrella.

Partial Conclusion

The role of international organizations in the Ukraine conflict reveals a dual reality: institutions created in the postwar period (UN, OSCE, Council of Europe) exposed their limits, while newer or more flexible structures (NATO, EU) reinforced their relevance. The key lesson is that the future of the international security architecture will depend increasingly on organizations able to combine political will, economic resources, and military capability.

4. The Effects on European Security

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has produced the most profound reshaping of the European security architecture since 1989. Beyond the immediate impact on Ukraine, the conflict has compelled European states to rethink their strategic priorities, increase defense investments, and accept the accelerated militarization of the continent.

a) The Militarization of Central and Eastern Europe

The countries on NATO’s Eastern Flank — Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states — have become the new center of gravity for European security.

• Poland announced the most extensive military modernization in its history, aiming to build one of the strongest European armies.
• Romania accelerated procurement programs and hosted a growing number of allied troops and equipment.
• The Baltic states called for a permanent NATO presence and additional defense infrastructure.

This shift indicates a movement of the security center of gravity from the Atlantic to Eastern Europe, where risks are perceived as immediate and existential.

b) Redefining Security Frontiers

With Finland’s accession (2023) and Sweden’s accession (2024), NATO considerably extended its direct border with Russia, altering the strategic balance in Northern Europe. In the South, the Black Sea has become a key security zone for the Alliance, with Romania and Bulgaria gaining importance as frontline states. Thus, the “European security frontier” is no longer the Elbe River or the Berlin Wall, but NATO’s eastern line, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

c) Strengthening the Eastern Front[4]

NATO shifted from a posture of deterrence through symbolic presence (multinational battalions) to one of forward defense: allied brigades, air defense systems, logistical hubs, and support infrastructure. In Romania, U.S. and allied military presence increased significantly, with the Mihail Kogălniceanu and Cincu bases becoming strategic nodes.

d) Increased Defense Spending

Most European states have committed to the 2% of GDP defense target, while some (Poland, the Baltic states) have even exceeded it. Germany created a special fund of €100 billion to modernize the Bundeswehr, marking a historic turning point. This trend shows that security has once again become an absolute priority for Europe, after decades of underfunding and complacency in the “peace dividend.”

e) Persistent Vulnerabilities

However, Europe remains dependent on the U.S. for key capabilities: air defense, satellites, fifth-generation aircraft, command, and control. Moreover, divergences among member states — especially between East and West — persist regarding the pace and scope of support for Ukraine.

Partial Conclusion

The Russia–Ukraine conflict has produced a strategic revolution in Europe: the militarization of the East, NATO’s enlargement, the redefinition of frontiers, and the increase in defense budgets. Nonetheless, structural dependence on the U.S. and the lack of a sufficiently integrated European defense industry remain major weak points.

5. Energy and Economic Implications

The war in Ukraine has had structural effects not only in the military and geopolitical realms but also in the energy and economic dimensions, fundamentally transforming relations between states and the logic of interdependence. Europe, in particular, was forced to make rapid and painful adjustments in order to maintain economic stability and energy security.

a) The Gas Crisis and the Reconfiguration of Energy Markets

By 2021, Russia was supplying approximately 40% of the European Union’s gas needs. The invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines forced Europe to drastically reduce this dependency. In just two years, the EU managed to diversify its sources:

• Massive LNG imports from the U.S. and Qatar.
• Strengthened regional energy interconnections (Poland–Lithuania, Greece–Bulgaria, Romania–Hungary).
• Accelerated transition to renewables, with additional investments in solar, wind, and nuclear energy.

This shift, however, brought higher energy prices and inflationary pressures, with social and political effects on European governments.

b) Russia and the Loss of the European Market

For Russia, the loss of the European market was a strategic blow. The Kremlin attempted to redirect exports to China, India, and Turkey, offering significant discounts. Although this mitigated the economic shock, revenues remained far below those generated by the European market. The result was an accelerated repositioning of Russia as a supplier dependent on Asia, with a reduced capacity to project power through energy instruments.

c) The Reconfiguration of Trade Routes

The war disrupted transport and trade corridors:

• The blockade of the Black Sea affected Ukrainian grain exports, provoking food crises in Africa and the Middle East.
• The EU–Ukraine Solidarity Corridor (road and rail) was created to maintain trade flows, though at higher costs.
• Countries such as Romania and Poland became key logistical hubs for the transit of goods, including grain and energy.

d) Global Economic Impact

The conflict contributed to:

• The fragmentation of the global economy into blocs (the West vs. BRICS+).
• The acceleration of discussions on de-dollarization, with BRICS efforts to create alternative payment mechanisms.
• Increased defense spending in Europe, with effects on public budgets and fiscal policies.

e) Lessons for Energy Security

The main lesson is that unilateral dependence on a single supplier constitutes a strategic vulnerability. Europe learned this lesson at high cost but increased its long-term resilience. At the same time, the war demonstrated that energy remains a top-tier geopolitical weapon, capable of influencing not only economies but also the political orientations of states.

Partial Conclusion

The energy and economic dimension of the Russia–Ukraine conflict has produced a dual transformation: Europe has become less vulnerable to Russia but more dependent on the U.S. and global LNG markets; Russia has lost its dominant position in Europe but has strengthened its partnerships with Asia. Overall, the global economy is experiencing accelerated fragmentation, with long-term consequences for stability and prosperity.

6. The Problem of Ukraine’s Borders

The war launched by the Russian Federation has brought back into focus the fragility of Ukraine’s borders and the dispute over their historical and legal legitimacy. For Moscow, Ukraine’s current borders are the result of arbitrary decisions made during the Soviet period, while for the West they represent a reality enshrined in international law and a fundamental condition for European stability.

The Historical Dimension

Ukraine’s borders were shaped through a process marked by political decisions taken in Moscow. In 1922, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic entered the USSR with its historical borders. Later, the territories changed significantly: in 1940, Northern Bukovina and Southern Bessarabia were annexed from Romania; in 1954, Crimea was transferred to Ukraine by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet as a symbolic gesture. At the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Ukraine proclaimed independence within its existing borders, which were internationally recognized — including by Russia, through bilateral treaties and the Budapest Memorandum (1994), which guaranteed Ukraine’s territorial integrity in exchange for relinquishing its nuclear arsenal.

It cannot be ignored that the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact of 1939 and its secret protocol, by which the USSR and Nazi Germany divided their spheres of influence in Eastern Europe, laid the foundation for the territorial changes of 1940. Although the pact was declared null and void by the international community and by the USSR itself in 1989, not all of its consequences were undone. Thus, some territories annexed at that time — such as Northern Bukovina and Southern Bessarabia — remained part of independent Ukraine after 1991. In Romania’s case, this reality was assumed through the 1997 Treaty of Good Neighborliness with Ukraine, by which Bucharest recognized the existing borders as part of its commitments for Euro-Atlantic integration.

The Political-Legal Dimension

The post-1945 international order was based on the principle of the inviolability of borders, enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the UN Charter. Russia’s contestation of Ukraine’s borders has brought into collision two fundamental principles:

• the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states;
• the right to self-determination, invoked by Moscow in the cases of Crimea and Donbas.

The 2022 invasion showed that Russia chose to impose its own interpretation by force, undermining the normative framework that had guaranteed European peace after the Cold War.

The Geopolitical Dimension

Ukraine’s borders have direct strategic relevance. Control of Crimea ensures dominance in the northern Black Sea and access to maritime resources, while Donbas, rich in resources and industry, represents an energy and logistical pivot. In addition, Ukraine’s western borders make it an essential corridor linking the Euro-Atlantic space with the Eurasian one.

The contestation of these borders is not merely a bilateral issue but a European and global one. If the inviolability of internationally recognized borders becomes negotiable through force, the precedent could destabilize not only Eastern Europe but also other regions of the world, from the Middle East to East Asia.

Conclusion

The problem of Ukraine’s borders is a major geopolitical lesson: it shows how fragile state constructions resulting from historical compromises can be, and how vulnerable the international order remains when its principles are contested through the use of force. The resolution of this dispute will influence not only Ukraine’s future but also the credibility of the entire European and global security architecture.

If the analysis of Ukraine’s borders highlights the fragility of state constructions and the direct implications for European security, at the global level the conflict has also led to strategic repositioning by the great powers, each seeking to maximize its gains in a multipolar world in the making.

7. Global Actors

The Russia–Ukraine war has had an impact that transcended Europe’s borders, forcing major global actors to clarify their positions and adapt their strategies. Their stances reflect the dynamics of a multipolar world in which national interests prevail over ideological solidarity.

a) China – Tacit Support and Strategic Opportunism

China avoided condemning the invasion, maintaining an ambiguous discourse: supporting the principle of territorial integrity while also acknowledging Russia’s “legitimate security concerns.” In practice:

• Beijing became Russia’s main economic partner, absorbing energy resources at heavily discounted prices.
• It offered diplomatic support, presenting itself as an alternative to Western mediation (China’s peace plan of 2023).
• At the same time, it avoided direct military involvement so as not to breach Western sanctions.

Lesson: China is exploiting the conflict to weaken the West and draw Russia into its orbit, while avoiding overly close association with an actor perceived as a “long-term loser.”

b) India – Strategic Neutrality and Pragmatism

India pursued a balancing approach:

• It did not condemn Moscow and increased imports of discounted Russian oil.
• At the same time, it strengthened its strategic partnership with the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific.
• It positioned itself as a leader of the Global South, using the war to bolster its international status.

India demonstrates that multipolarism does not mean rigid blocs but rather diplomatic flexibility and the use of regional conflicts to advance its own agenda.

c) The Global South – Between Opportunity and Vulnerability

Many states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America adopted neutral positions or refused to apply sanctions against Russia. The reasons are multiple:

• Dependence on food and energy supplies from Russia and Ukraine.
• Distrust of the West’s “double standards,” condemning this invasion while tolerating other conflicts.
• The desire to secure economic advantages (cheaper raw materials, Chinese investments).

For the Global South, the main lesson is that geopolitical fragmentation offers them room for maneuver but also exposes them to acute vulnerabilities in the face of food and energy crises.

d) Turkey – Mediator and Regional Power

Turkey emerged as an indispensable actor:

• It supported Ukraine by supplying Bayraktar drones and backing NATO enlargement.
• At the same time, it maintained economic and energy ties with Russia.
• It mediated the Black Sea Grain Agreement, consolidating its status as a mediator.

Turkey demonstrates that medium-sized powers can play a disproportionately large role when they benefit from strategic geography and diplomatic flexibility.

Beyond the individual positions of major actors, the overall picture of the conflict highlights structural trends and constants that shape the international order. These crystallize into a few essential conclusions regarding the direction of contemporary geopolitics.

Conclusions on Geopolitical Lessons

The Russia–Ukraine conflict acted as a catalyst for trends already visible globally, bringing to light realities and contradictions that the international community can no longer ignore. The analysis of geopolitical lessons leads to several fundamental conclusions:

1. The Erosion and Frequent Violation of International Law

International legal norms, painstakingly built in the postwar decades, are increasingly ignored, reinterpreted, or applied selectively. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, along with numerous other interventions or military actions in recent decades, demonstrates that international law no longer carries the same binding force. Without effective and impartial enforcement mechanisms, it risks becoming a mere rhetorical instrument. This trend not only undermines the architecture of global security but also accentuates the perception of double standards, which diminishes the legitimacy of international institutions.

2. The Fragility of the International Balance of Power

After the end of the Cold War, the hope for a stable world order proved illusory. The global balance of power is fragmenting, and centers of power are multiplying without clear regulatory mechanisms between them. Strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China, competition between Russia and the West, and the rise of regional powers (India, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Brazil) accentuate the volatility of international relations. Each regional crisis risks becoming a piece in the global game of great powers, increasing the likelihood of escalation and indirect conflicts.

3. The Geopolitical Irrelevance of the European Union

Although the EU has immense economic and institutional critical mass, it continues to be perceived as a secondary geopolitical actor. Internal divisions, the inability to formulate coherent foreign policies, and often uninspired leadership have diminished the Union’s role in the global order. In the context of the war in Ukraine, the EU acted mainly under the umbrella and initiative of the United States, confirming its status as a normative actor but not a strategic one. The absence of a credible common foreign and security policy leaves the Union vulnerable and dependent on the decisions of others.

4. The Weaknesses of the United States

Although Washington has once again become the main guarantor of European security, it is increasingly evident that American power has limits. Domestic political polarization and electoral uncertainties affect the consistency of foreign policy. Moreover, the strategy of simultaneously maintaining supremacy in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific places enormous pressure on U.S. military and diplomatic resources. A crisis of confidence among some allies and public fatigue over long-term external commitments indicate that American hegemony faces gradual erosion.

5. The Rise of China as the Pivot of Multipolarism

Beijing has consolidated its international position through a mix of economic growth, technological expansion, active diplomacy, and military modernization. Unlike the U.S. and the EU, China offers an alternative to the Western liberal order, based on concepts such as “win-win cooperation” and a “community with a shared future.” In parallel, initiatives such as BRICS, the SCO, and the Belt and Road Initiative provide Beijing with instruments of global influence. In the context of the Ukraine conflict, China avoided a frontal stance but exploited circumstances to increase its influence among the countries of the Global South. This gradual rise is profoundly reshaping the world’s power architecture.

6. The Positioning of Major Global Actors

The war in Ukraine is not merely a regional conflict but a pivotal event for the world order. China and India assert themselves as emerging poles, the Global South seeks autonomy from the West, and Turkey confirms the role of regional powers as balancing factors. Multipolarism is no longer an abstract concept but a dynamic reality, visible in the ways global actors calibrate their responses to the conflict.

7. Perceptions and Reality

Another major lesson concerns the relationship between perceptions and reality. Perceptions can shape political decisions and public reactions, generate alliances, and enable rapid mobilizations; but in the long run, strategic reality — resources, geography, demography, and military capabilities — asserts itself. In the case of the war in Ukraine, the perception of a “rapid and united” Western response concealed real divergences between European capitals and between them and Washington, divergences that are becoming increasingly visible as the conflict drags on.

In conclusion, the geopolitical lessons of the war show that the world is undergoing an accelerated and chaotic transition toward multipolarism. No global actor holds a monopoly on power or legitimacy anymore, while competition among great powers unfolds simultaneously on the military, economic, technological, and ideological planes. In this context, medium and small states, such as Romania, are compelled to navigate cautiously between opportunities and risks, constantly adapting their strategies so as not to become collateral victims of great power rivalries.

Geopolitical Lessons for Romania

1. The Importance of Strategic Positioning

The war confirmed that Romania lies in a geopolitical contact zone between rival blocs: NATO/EU and the Russian sphere of influence. This position offers advantages (increased attention from allies, security opportunities, and investments) but also risks (the possibility of becoming a theater of war or a target of hybrid pressure). Romania must transform this position into a strategic asset rather than a vulnerability.

2. The Need to Consolidate National Security

Russia’s aggression demonstrated that external guarantees, even those of NATO, do not exclude national responsibility. Romania must increase its internal resilience, modernize its army and defense industry, and secure its critical infrastructure (energy, transport, communications, natural resources). Without these measures, exclusive reliance on allied support could prove risky.

3. Vulnerability to Competition over Energy and Resources

Energy and resources have become geopolitical weapons. Romania, although it has resources in the Black Sea and significant agricultural potential, remains vulnerable due to the absence of a coherent strategy for their exploitation. The lesson of the conflict shows that energy and food security are direct dimensions of national security.

4. The Limitations of the European Union and Romania’s Adaptation

The EU’s geopolitical irrelevance shows that Romania cannot rely solely on the “Brussels umbrella.” A dual strategy is needed: active involvement in EU decision-making to defend national interests, and the consolidation of bilateral relations with key actors (the U.S., Turkey, Poland, France, the United Kingdom). At the same time, Romania must pay close attention to the evolution of EU–China relations, which will decisively influence the continent’s economic and political future. A lucid stance that avoids both excessive dependence and unnecessary confrontation with Beijing could become a strategic advantage for Bucharest.

5. Relations with the United States – Between Opportunity and Risk

The U.S. remains the guarantor of Romania’s security, but America’s internal weaknesses and the possibility of selective retrenchment compel Bucharest to diversify partnerships and strengthen its own defense capacity. Romania must prepare both for the scenario in which American commitment is maintained and for a potential rebalancing of Washington’s priorities toward the Indo-Pacific.

6. Multipolarism and Opportunities for Balancing

The emergence of a multipolar system — in which China asserts itself as the main counterweight to the United States, and India, Turkey, and other regional powers expand their influence — creates new room for maneuver for medium-sized states. Romania must recognize that, although firmly anchored in NATO and the EU, it cannot afford to ignore China. Pragmatic dialogue with Beijing, managed in coordination with Western partners, can provide economic and technological opportunities as well as a better understanding of the major directions of world order.

Thus, Romania emerges as an actor that does not break away from its alliances but does not close its eyes to the dynamics of multipolarism.

7. Perceptions vs. Reality – Strategic Communication

The experience of the conflict showed that perceptions can obscure realities. Romania must avoid excessive dependence on external narratives and invest in its own analytical, strategic communication, and intelligence capabilities in order to distinguish between perceptions and realities.

📌 In summary: The fundamental lesson for Romania is that it cannot remain merely a passive recipient of security; it must assume an active role, strengthening its internal capacities and capitalizing on the geopolitical opportunities created by multipolarism, without straying from its Western alliances.

This is the only way Romania can transform its vulnerabilities into strategic assets and avoid the risk of becoming merely a battleground between great powers in a world undergoing profound change.

If the geopolitical lessons highlight the structural transformations of the world order, the military lessons shed light on the concrete ways in which these transformations manifest on the battlefield and on the practical insights that can be drawn from the Russia–Ukraine confrontation.

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[1] The Minsk Agreements I (September 2014) and II (February 2015) were regarded as a politico-diplomatic solution to the Donbas conflict, but they largely remained on paper. In practice, Ukraine used the post-Minsk period to reorganize its army, receiving training and equipment from the U.S., the United Kingdom, Canada, and other NATO partners, while Russia consolidated the separatist forces, maintaining de facto control over Donbas and preparing for a later confrontation. The claim that Minsk provided Ukraine with time for military preparation was confirmed in 2022 by Angela Merkel and François Hollande (the main architects of the Agreements).

[2] Ukraine’s candidacy for EU membership is not rejected by Russia, unlike accession to NATO, which is vehemently opposed by Moscow and perceived as a threat to its national security. Personally, I consider that, under the current circumstances, Ukraine’s admission into the EU, even in a more distant future, is highly unlikely—both due to Ukraine’s internal issues and to probable developments within the EU.

[3] The proposal for NATO member states to reach the threshold of 5% of GDP for defense spending was advanced by U.S. officials during the preparatory discussions for the NATO Summit in Washington (July 2025), being presented as a possible future reference target.

[4] As in my previous work “Geopolitical Evolutions in the First Quarter of the 21st Century. Romania in This Context. Forecasts for 2050” – August 2025 (see also Diplomat Magazin – Geopolitical Evolutions in the First Quarter of the 21st Century), I prefer using the term “front” instead of “flank” (employed so far in all public documents), as it is more consistent with military terminology. Moreover, this aspect has also been noted by other internationally recognized geopoliticians.

By Major General (ret) Corneliu Pivariu

Dorian Vlădeanu’s[2] essay EU vs UE explores the defining tension of contemporary Europe: the opposition between the EU – the European Union as an institutional, technocratic, and normative structure – and EU – a United Europe as a political, cultural, and identity-based ideal. The wordplay, seemingly simple, carries a double meaning: in English, “EU” designates the European Union, while in Romanian eu is the personal pronoun “I,” symbolizing both the individual and the historical dream of a United Europe.

Thus, the title suggests a conflict between two realities: on the one hand, a United Europe as a project of solidarity and shared destiny; on the other hand, the European Union as a bureaucratic and institutional mechanism. The individual – the citizen’s “I” – finds himself caught between these two levels, but often feels more excluded than represented.

To understand this contrast, one must recall that the idea of a “United Europe” long predates the European Union: from the Roman Empire, which imposed the first form of political unity, to medieval visions of a common Christendom, to humanist and Enlightenment projects envisioning a Europe of reason and progress. In the 20th century, after the tragedy of the two world wars, the ideal materialized in the Schuman Plan and the European Coal and Steel Community, and later in the founding treaties. In this sense, a United Europe means values and a shared identity, whereas the European Union – a product of the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties – has increasingly become an institutional apparatus.

1. Crisis of Legitimacy and Democratic Alienation

The European Union today faces a crisis of democratic legitimacy. Mechanisms of public consultation and civic involvement appear, in many cases, formal and lacking authenticity. Citizens are invited to participate, but the decisions often seem already made.

A relevant example is the low turnout in European Parliament elections. In 2014, turnout was only 42.6%; in 2019, although it rose to 50.7%, it remained well below the levels typical of national elections. This absence signals the perception that EU institutions are remote and do not directly affect people’s daily lives. In many countries, campaigns for European elections were dominated by national themes rather than European ones, underscoring the fundamental rift between citizens and Brussels.

Moreover, the technocratic language of European documents – full of legal and economic terms – distances citizens even further. Communication is perceived as abstract, inaccessible, and lacking empathy. Europe appears as an efficient mechanism, but one emptied of meaning. The individual no longer recognizes himself in this construct, fueling democratic alienation.

The debate over the “democratic deficit” of the Union, present since the 1990s, remains relevant. The fact that the EU’s executive (the Commission) is not directly elected by citizens but appointed through negotiations between governments and Parliament amplifies the sense of distance. In the eyes of many, the Union’s democratic legitimacy is indirect and insufficient.

2. A United Europe – The Ideal Lost Between Treaties and Regulations

The essay draws a clear distinction between a United Europe as an ideal and the European Union as an institution. The former presupposes solidarity among peoples, a shared identity, and common values. The latter often reduces itself to directives and norms.

This difference explains why citizens no longer feel that “being European” carries a mobilizing meaning. Common symbols – the blue flag, the Ode to Joy as anthem, Europe Day – have failed to create an affective identity comparable to the national one. The euro, as a shared currency, has brought obvious economic benefits but has not become an emotional symbol, as the dollar is for Americans.

Brexit is the most telling example: many Britons felt the Union was a bureaucratic construct, devoid of the identity dimension of a “United Europe.” Debates in France and the Netherlands, where the European constitutional treaty was rejected by referendum, reveal the same trend: the institution fails to inspire attachment.

Thus, instead of expressing a community of destiny, the “EU” has come to be perceived as an impersonal supranational entity. “A United Europe” remains an invoked ideal, while the “European Union” dominates through its norms and procedures.

3. Social and Political Effects of the Rift

This rift produces tangible consequences:

• electoral absenteeism – a sign of disengagement and mistrust;
• the rise of sovereigntist currents, emphasizing the recovery of decision-making at the national level;
• the weakening of European cohesion, as opposition grows between integrationists and sovereigntists.

The European citizen feels reduced to the role of “taxpayer” or “policy beneficiary,” but not of a genuine political partner. The void of meaning left by European institutions is filled by sovereigntist forces, promising a return to the familiar framework of the nation-state and greater decision-making autonomy.

Examples abound: in Hungary, Viktor Orbán claims a “national sovereigntism” in opposition to Brussels; in Poland, conservative governments argue that fundamental decisions must remain in Warsaw; in France, Marine Le Pen advocates a Europe of nations rather than supranational integration; in Italy, Giorgia Meloni builds her message around defending national identity and reclaiming sovereignty. Brexit, likewise, was essentially an act of political and economic sovereigntism.

These tendencies show that, in the absence of a convincing narrative, the Union is contested not only in terms of efficiency but also legitimacy and meaning.

Another important factor accentuating the rift between citizens and EU institutions is the ideological orientation assumed by the Union’s leadership in recent years, which many associate with cultural neo-Marxism, the “woke” phenomenon, and the insistent promotion of the LGBTQ+ agenda.

Instead of placing solidarity, security, and economic prosperity at the forefront, Brussels gradually brought to the center of its official discourse a set of controversial cultural and identity themes that divided European societies:

• redefining gender roles and promoting “political correctness” policies perceived as excessive;
• emphasizing diversity and inclusion at the expense of traditional European cultural values;
• conditioning certain funds or policies on the adoption of LGBTQ+ rights legislation.

In states such as Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, or Italy, reactions were highly critical, these policies being considered intrusions into national and cultural sovereignty. Particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, where national and religious identity plays a major role, the “woke” and LGBTQ+ agendas have fueled the perception that the Union promotes an ideological direction alien to European traditions.

Thus, sovereigntist currents have found fertile ground, presenting themselves as defenders of cultural identity and national autonomy against Brussels’ pressures. This confrontation is no longer merely political or economic but also cultural and identity-based, deepening polarization and further weakening the Union’s cohesion.

4. The European Union Between Institution and Community

Today’s real tension is not between East and West, or North and South, but between the EU – the institution – and EU – a United Europe as an ideal. The former is governed by treaties and rules; the latter is inspired by values and a sense of belonging.

The Union remains caught between two political models: federalism – in which the central authority has direct power over citizens – and confederation – in which states retain full sovereignty. This structural ambiguity makes the Union appear as neither one nor the other: too strong to be merely an alliance of states, but too weak to be a true federation.

If the European Union is perceived solely as a legal and administrative mechanism, it risks losing touch with its original foundation: the community of destiny. A treaty can be renegotiated, but values must be lived and shared.

5. Directions for Reconstruction: From Technocracy to a Living Community

To overcome this crisis, the author proposes several directions:

• Placing the citizen back at the center of European decision-making, as participant rather than spectator;
• Democratizing European institutions, by strengthening the role of Parliament and ensuring transparency;
• Developing a political discourse that is accessible and human, capable of inspiring rather than merely informing technically;
• Respecting subsidiarity and cultural diversity, as an alternative to excessive uniformity;
• Creating a common narrative that transcends the economic dimension and reaffirms the civilizational meaning of Europe.

These directions are not merely theoretical: positive examples already exist. The Erasmus+ program has created a generation of young Europeans with shared experiences; the Union’s response to the pandemic, through joint vaccine procurement, showed solidarity in practice; and measures to support energy security in the face of the war in Ukraine demonstrated that collective action brings tangible benefits.

Thus, the Union should not be abandoned but re-anchored in the ideal of a United Europe.

Conclusions

EU vs UE is a diagnosis of Europe’s contemporary dilemma: the conflict between a United Europe as a communal ideal and the European Union as a bureaucratic mechanism.

Without genuine reconciliation, Europe risks remaining a functional construct but one devoid of soul. Sovereigntist currents are not merely conjunctural opposition; they are signals of the need for meaning, identity, and participation. They show that the European project can no longer be just technocracy – it must once again become a living community.

In a multipolar world, faced with competition from the United States, China, and Russia, the European Union cannot afford to remain merely a regulatory apparatus. Its survival and relevance depend on its ability to reconnect institutions with citizens and to transform “EU” once again into an authentic expression of “EU” – both the individual and the United Europe as an ideal.

Only then will the European citizen be able to say sincerely: Europe is mine, too.

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1. The essay was drafted by Professor Dorian Vlădeanu in a nearly finalized form, without conclusions, as early as the end of June 2023, as part of a broader joint project. The illness he faced did not allow him to complete it. With the family’s permission, I have finalized it, and it will be published in a forthcoming book. Here I have presented an extended and updated summary prepared entirely by myself.

2. Dorian Vlădeanu (13 November 1955 – 22 May 2024) – Graduate in economics, automation, and computer science; Ph.D. in economics; author of more than 100 works in the field of macroeconomics. He developed the first national strategy in the field of community public services. Author, co-author, and coordinator of the first generation of legislation prepared by the Government of Romania on public services (2002–2004). Co-author of my book Geopolitics Before and After Covid-19, 2017–2020 (Marist Publishing House, 2020).

 

By Anton Lutter

Dr. Jennifer Geerlings-Simons (71), a Surinamese physician and politician, made history on July 6, 2025, when she was elected as the country’s first female president. Her election came after a coalition deal between 6 six parties was struck in the National Assembly, following inconclusive May polls. Geerlings-Simons, who is a member of the National Democratic Party (NDP), ran unopposed and was elected with a two-thirds majority.

Born on September 5, 1953, in Paramaribo, Surinam, Geerlings-Simons began her career as a physician, specializing in dermatology and later working on the National HIV/AIDS program. She entered politics in 1996, serving multiple terms in the National Assembly. From 2010 to 2020, she was the Chairperson of the National Assembly, the second woman to hold that position. In July 2024, she became the leader of the NDP, which was founded by the late former President Desi Bouterse.

Geerlings-Simons takes office at a crucial time for Suriname. The country is facing economic challenges, including widespread frustration over austerity measures implemented by the previous administration. However, with offshore oil production expected to begin in 2028, there is also the promise of future wealth. Geerlings-Simons has stated that she will focus on stabilizing state finances and has pledged to boost revenues by tightening tax collection. She is tasked with steering the nation through this period of economic fragility, balancing public discontent with the potential for future prosperity.

The President in her inaugural speech:

“We know that we must now work to restore our public health, restore and improve our education system, and also strengthen productive sectors such as the vital agricultural sector and tourism, which will provide many with high-quality jobs and are crucial for the diversification necessary for greater economic resilience. We have found that this is easier said than done in a country that has so far relied heavily on mining: first bauxite, and now gold and oil.

We must now demonstrate, by working in new ways, that we are capable of broadening our economic base. We are taking over a country that still faces significant economic challenges today, but with bright prospects for the future if we can bridge the initial difficult years.

Fiscal discipline is desirable at every stage of our development, but will be especially important in the coming years. Yet, we must invest in our children and young people, preparing them for a successful life and a meaningful contribution to our society and economy. We must also invest in our public health and ensure that poverty does not suffocate our people. Increasing the state’s income without further impoverishing ordinary citizens is the government’s goal, and cooperation from the people and all sectors is required.

We are on the verge of a development driven by the oil and gas industry that will become a reality for Suriname within a few years. This industry can bring many benefits to our country. However, there are plenty of examples around the world of countries where the development of this sector has made only a few wealthy, while the rest of the country remains in poverty. The incoming government has the task of ensuring that profits from the oil and gas sector improve the living standards of all Surinamese people in Suriname.

We have little time left to prepare for this new phase in our economy. Much remains to be done, and this can only be achieved successfully with the participation of all Surinamese people, both within Suriname and internationally. The government will have to implement the special programs and establish the institutions that can truly achieve them. The continued decentralization of government will support these efforts. We will begin this process this year”

Her election has been recognized by international bodies, including the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA), as a historic achievement for the country. Geerlings-Simons will be joined by her running mate, Gregory Rusland of the National Party of Surinam (NPS) who was elected as vice-president. The inauguration of President Geerlings-Simons took place on July 16, 2025.