New managing director Kasper Vrolijk: “Many people I speak with are surprised to learn we accomplish so much with such relatively small team”
The Asser Institute’s new managing director, Kasper Vrolijk, speaks about his first six months at the institute. With a background in economics and a passion for global affairs, Vrolijk discusses the Asser Institute’s academic excellence, its role in society, and his plans for innovation. “My colleagues are fantastic, and truly dedicated to the Institute and our shared mission. What has surprised me the most, however, is the number and diversity of the stakeholders we are involved with.” An interview.
Can you tell us about your professional journey and what led you to the Asser Institute as managing director?
“My academic background is in Business Administration and Public Policy. An early role at the United Nations fostered a passion for international affairs and global trends. Seeking a deeper understanding of the underlying economic factors, I then pursued a PhD in Economics.
“Throughout my career, I’ve cultivated a keen interest in the intersection of science, policy, and public debate. This led me to the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), a research institute and think tank, where I focused on the transformation of economics and social systems. When I saw the Asser Institute vacancy, the opportunity to work at a globally renowned research institute was immediately appealing. But what truly sets the Asser Institute apart, however, is its exceptional commitment to knowledge dissemination and public engagement. The institute’s diverse valorisation initiatives, from educating professionals to engaging in teaching, and holding documentary screenings and public lectures, demonstrates to me a profound dedication to knowledge sharing and societal impact.”
How does your non-legal background and your PhD in Economics influence your approach to your current role?
“My background in human development and my specialisation in development economics actually connects quite closely with the Asser Institute’s research themes on important global topics such as human rights and artificial intelligence. My background in Economics has further taught me to view things empirically, and to envision different scenarios, which is particularly useful for managing an organisation and thinking about its long-term financial strategy. I intend to leverage my evidence-based approach by ensuring that our activities reflect the Asser Institute’s mission while keeping an eye at the numbers to see what we are achieving and how that fits with our multi-year strategy.”
Can you tell us a bit more about your primary responsibilities? “As the Institute’s managing director, and member of the executive board, my main responsibilities are the Institute’s finance, administration and personnel. In my day-to-day routine, I run the Institute together with my colleague Christophe Paulussen, my fellow board member and the acting academic director. Together, we focus on managing our core asset, which is of course our excellent researchers and support staff, and we also think strategically about the Asser Institute’s future for the coming years, thereby following our mission and vision.”
Developing and implementing a funding acquisition strategy is a significant part of your role. What are some challenges that you face in this and how do you overcome them?
“The Asser Institute’s research portfolio and knowledge base is extremely diverse, so we receive funding from many different sources. We have exceptional research projects that are, for instance, being funded by the Dutch Research Council NWO and the European Union, as well as smaller projects that are funded by The Hague Municipality and Nuffic, the Dutch organisation for the internationalisation of education. This is very exciting and unique, but also brings some challenges when it comes to acquiring and managing projects. Working with many different funders and having a high diversity of projects means that we continually have to find a good balance between the partners we have and projects we engage in, to the end that it feeds into our mission and vision, and that it ensures a financially viable organisation.”
You have worked at the Asser Institute for about half a year now. What is your experience?
“It has been amazing to work at the Asser Institute, and I would say that the Asser community really feels like one big happy family [smiles]. My colleagues are fantastic, and truly dedicated to the Institute and our shared mission. What has surprised me the most, however, is the number and diversity of the stakeholders we are involved with. I have been introduced to people working in academia, the ministries, the courts and tribunals, the embassies, but also to people working within NGOs, the Municipality of The Hague, and fellow-research organisations such as ICCT The Hague.
“Even more astonishing is to meet so many external stakeholders that sometimes know little about the Institute itself, but that have seen or heard about our many activities and free events. Based on our excellent research, training programmes and public events and activities, and given the wide scope of our legal knowledge, people tend to assume that we are a big organisation, with some-three hundred or more employees. They are always very surprised to hear that we are much smaller, with a staff of around fifty people and as visible and energetic as a large organisation. I think that this is really something to be proud of. And it is something that I will continue to cherish, as I am extremely pleased that we can do so many different things with our relatively small but enthusiastic and dedicated team.”
Could you tell us a little bit about your approach to executive education and research valorisation at the Institute?
“When you compare Asser to most universities, which primarily cater to students, I think that the Asser Institute is quite unique in its focus and expertise on delivering excellent executive education. Earlier this year, for instance, we organised specialised training programmes on adjudicating international crimes for judges from Ukraine. But we have also educated high-level legal professionals from West Africa in a French-speaking course on international and transnational criminal law, and we had a Spanish course in international criminal law for legal professionals from Colombia.
“We also conduct excellent academic and policy-oriented research and are leaders in various areas of legal expertise in public and private international and European law. In addition, the Asser Institute also makes sure that our knowledge reaches policymakers, legal specialists, and other groups in society. This is crucial, given the numerous societal challenges that we see today, such as climate change, conflicts, or the rapid developments in artificial intelligence. We therefore also place a large focus on multi-year (research) projects to accumulate expert knowledge and assist institutions and other partners in evidence-based decision-making processes. Our mission is to contribute to the development of international and European public and private law, and to disseminate that knowledge as widely as possible, because we believe in justice, and in ‘law, not war’, if I may quote the late Benjamin Ferencz.”
Despite not being a lawyer, how do you perceive the major challenges and maybe opportunities in international and European law?
“We live in challenging times, with conflicts and human rights violations taking place in Europe and globally. Many of these issues are of course closely related to international and European law. Where there are many heated political and public debates taking place, and misinformation is rife, it is important for us as a knowledge institution to remain independent, highlight international and European legal norms, and share knowledge on how international or European law should be interpreted. And I think it is important that we work with a diverse set of partners – be it governments, NGOs, or other stakeholders – because we need these partners to make sure we can address these societal challenges.”
What role do you believe the Asser Institute plays in society and the international legal community at the moment?
“The Asser Institute was founded in 1965 as an independent inter-university network, in which all Dutch law schools participate. For the last few years, we have been closely affiliated with the University of Amsterdam, and the Amsterdam Law School in particular. But we still cherish our inter-university network, in which we actively promote the collaboration with and between Dutch law schools. For example, we coordinate inter-university research networks such as the Netherlands Network for Human Rights Research (NNHRR) and CLEER, the Centre for the Law of EU External Relations.
“On top of that, we possess a truly international network, exemplified by our connections to the international courts and tribunals and the international organisations here in The Hague, but also by our partnership with foreign institutions, such as the War Crimes Research Office of American University’s Washington College of Law. Our network is truly a unique asset, that I believe really is of value to the diverse Asser community.
“With regards to our role in society, we work on many different themes and issues that are relevant to the public, also by collaborating with government ministries, diplomatic missions and, for instance, the Municipality of The Hague. Whether it is through art exhibitions, our free lectures, or our education programmes, we are often addressing societal issues and interacting with the public, also through partnerships with for instance the Movies that Matter film festival, and with Hague-based art schools and museums.
How do you foster innovation within the Institute and what new initiatives or new projects are you excited about?
“I think it is very important to be innovative as a research institute, especially because our society is constantly evolving. Therefore, it is imperative to always evaluate and question where we stand. I always try to push people to think about the activities we are doing, and to be open to new opportunities and ideas. For an organisation, I think it is crucial to give people the freedom and ability to be creative and try new things. Some of these ideas might work, some might not.”
Kasper Vrolijk, the Asser Institute’s new managing director and member of the executive board since 1 February 2024. Together with Christophe Paulussen, the recently appointed acting academic director and chair of the executive board, Vrolijk is responsible for managing the institute. Read more.
There are similarities between diplomats and ‘chefs’ – as in ‘chef de la cuisine’…
Diplomats (are trained to) look at and understand complex problems, break then down in smaller parts and cook them up to produce opportunities if not solutions.
Chefs (are trained to) look at and understand complex recipes, break then down into essential ingredients and cook them up to produce great-tasting dishes.
In my last column, I argued that complexity doesn’t have to be complicated. Well, one might say – and some readers did – that all sounds nice, but what we really need, is a recipe. A recipe for cooking-up solutions to the increasingly complex problems we either are already facing or see coming.
This column doesn’t so much ‘weave words’ but provides you therefore with a list of 9 ingredients and offers some cooking instructions. Taken together, a recipe for distilling key factors into a clear framework – from establishing a common frame of reference to quantifying “how good is good enough” – to provide a helpful structure, a recipe for tackling big, systemic problems.
By the way, let me share with you that the word ‘list’ in the Dutch language means ‘stratagem’: ‘a plan or scheme to achieve an end’. In other words, a ‘recipe’.
All right, let’s cook!
Part A: The Shopping list – What do we need?
Decades of independent research and trans-disciplinary experience, revealed that there are 9 essential ingredients[1] needed to solve highly complex challenges:
Ingredients:
1: Common Frame of Reference
[Are we sure that all of us see, say, mean and are focused on the same thing?]
2: Lessons Learned
[Let’s utilize what we already know from our own and others’ experience]
3: Policy (intent) and Practice (result)
[Let’s bring them closer together]
4: Fragmentation
[Are there isolated parts or loose ends we need to connect?]
5: Before-During-After
[Prepping, eating and cleaning are one functional unit, right?]
6: Pro-action (instead of Re-action)
[Don’t wait until late but anticipate and act early!]
7: Universal Motivation
[Maintain your focus and sense of urgency at all times!]
8: Return-on-Investment
[Keep comparing ‘cost’ and ‘benefit’, adjust when needed]
9: How good is ‘good enough’?
[Define the end-result and make sure that it is what you want – or will accept].
Part B: How to Cook and Serve? Assigning priorities…
IMPORTANT: Do not, I repeat, do NOT throw all the ingredients at random together as this will create a mess and result in chaos! Instead, before doing anything, ask yourself and your colleagues the following 4 questions:
1: Which complex challenge do we need to tackle first?
(= Primary Concern)
2: Which one of 9 essential ingredients is the most important one?
(= Prioritization)
3: Can we explain the rationale for prioritizing and ranking the 9 ingredients?
(= Motivation)
4: What is our plan-of-action with the ingredient we assigned a ‘Priority 1’?
(= Recommendation)
So, What’s Next?
Ready, steady, cook!
[1] DIEM’s Nine Universal Roadblocks (NUR) Meta-Model
About the author:
Eelco H. Dykstra. Photography by Tom Manning
Once dubbed a ‘Global Nomad’ in East Africa, Eelco H. Dykstra is a seasoned international crisis and emergency expert. As a true ‘Prac-Ademic’, he blends – also in his column “A Thought and a Smile” – his innate optimism with knowledge from his practical experience and rigorous fact-finding.
Aside from being founder/chair of the Daily Impact Emergency Management (DIEM) network and a visiting professor in South Africa, he initiated the ’20/20 Vision’ program for the dual purpose of strengthening value-based resilience and overcoming the obstacles that stand in the way of implementing lessons (to be) learned. Eelco has been a correspondent, written multiple books and articles and continues to work extensively with media, government, business, NGO’s and community-based initiatives. In short, Eelco is a transdisciplinary and trans-cultural multi-tasker – just like diplomats are.
Among his hobbies are cooking and playing the cello – see picture, taken by Tom Manning, during an impromptu performance with the Soweto Youth Orchestra.
Eelco H. DykstraProfessor (visiting), Adaptation and Resilience, University of South-Africa, UNISA. Chair, ’20/20 Vision’ Program: How do we go from ‘Risk’ to ‘Resilience”? Founder, Daily Impact Emergency Management (DIEM) Network www.diem.nuwww.20outof20.vision
Jeffrey Sachs is known for many accolades; among them, he was a special advisor to four consecutive UN General Secretaries and numerous national governments, once hailed as the most important economist in the world by the New York Times, a co-recipient of the Blue Planet Prize for environmental leadership, and a recipient of the Tang Prize for Sustainable Development. Resting on his laurels, however, is the last thing anyone expects professor Sachs to do. On Aug 10, professor’s tireless service to humanity – as he navigated the streets of Stintino, Sardinia in 30-degrees-Celsius heat – can be seen in the generous sharing of his time and expertise: With a multitude of online participants from over 35 countries (of four different continents), who had gathered to hear him at the launch of the prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic’ Certified Economic Diplomat program, a collaborative undertaking with the Institute of Economic and Finance of Ghana.
Professor Sachs kicked off his astute talk by disclosing what he has recently been up to for Africa’s development. Together with the Chief Economist at the African Development Bank, Kevin Urama, the multi-skilled Sachs has been developing a strategy for breaking the poverty cycle in Africa. The team led by the AfDB is set to present their proposal for Africa’s rapid growth at the African Union Summit in February 2025.
In sharing the core strategy, Sachs explicated how Africa can achieve very rapid development in the next 40 years – in the same way China did so during 1980 – 2020 and India is doing so today, starting around 2000.
“Back in 1980, China was impoverished and not even on the world’s radar screen economically. In fact, its poverty rate was higher than in Africa today. However, China opened up and took important policy measures. Over the next 40 years, not only has it become a high-income economy, but also the world’s largest economy in total GDP measured at purchasing-power parity (PPP),” Sachs explained as he held China up as a good model for Africa.
Sachs went on to state that Africa could achieve the same thing that China did. “Africa has 1.4 billion people, roughly the same population as that of China and India. While India is about 15 to 20 years behind China in its economic trajectory, it has also been experiencing very high growth. China started emerging in 1980 and India around 2000. For Africa, that time is now.”
However, Sachs understood it would take more than a big population to drive rapid growth and was careful to highlight the significant distinction between the three entities. “There is one big difference. Following the colonial period, India remained one large country (actually, British India became three countries: India, Pakistan, and later Bangladesh). China, of course, remained one unified state despite encountering Japan’s imperialistic ambitions and the century of reckless behavior by the European powers. Africa, on the other hand, has to deal with the ongoing difficulties associated with its colonial legacy, notably Europe’s division of Africa into 55 states.”
Sachs proceeded to explain that the 55 individual African states are too small on their own to achieve the kind of global role and competitiveness they need. However, if Africa truly creates a political, economic, financial, and eventually monetary union, then it will be able to emulate the great successes of China and India. With a single market, a unified financial system, and increasing monetary integration, Africa will be well positioned to create a truly unified economic space, also deeply interconnected by trans-boundary infrastructure (for power, fiber, roads, rail, shipping, and ecosystem management). Moreover, with a strong union, Africa will be positioned to play a global diplomatic role as well, helping to lead global decision-making in key international forums.
It would serve well at this point, to recall that in Delhi last year, with India’s G20 Presidency, the African Union was made a permanent member of the G20. None could be happier than the 1.4 billion Africans who have finally been given a major voice in deliberations on major global economic issues – and Sachs, who for years, has been advocating indefatigably for the AU to be given a seat at the table.
“An integrated and ambitious African Union (AU) can achieve the kind of growth that China and India have experienced,” Sachs paused before adding determinedly, “I want the AU to be a giant in the same way.”
Like other global leaders, Sachs is a visionary man with ambitious goals, but this is where their similarity ends. Sachs actually knows the roadmap from A to Z and is keenly aware of what Africa needs to achieve this high sustained growth that he wholly believes to be present in the region’s potential.
Sachs explained that Africa needs a large internal market and diplomatic presence, the latter made possible now with its representation at the G20 (which he hopes will soon be relabeled appropriately as the G21) and the UN. Africa also needs high investments across all major classes of capital, with human capital being the most important, hence the need to provide universal quality education. Sachs also indicated that Africa needs rapid electrification and digital access, so that every household can get lit up and online.
Last but hardly least, Sachs said that Africa needs international loan financing with interest rates comparable to those granted to the US. “The irony here is, the US actually has a higher debt-GDP ratio than most African countries (and other G7 countries such as Italy and Japan have even higher debt-GDP ratios), yet the credit rating agencies have assigned African sovereign borrowers very bad credit ratings. However, Africa has higher growth potential than the high-income countries, and typically lower ratios of debt to GDP. The rating agencies are wrong in their methodology, and the methodology and ratings need to be fixed. If Africa cannot borrow on reasonable terms – meaning low interest rates and long-term maturities – then Africa will remain poor,” he advised.
Another trait that distinguishes Sachs from other leaders lies in the consistency of his messaging. Time and again, he has advocated for a multipolar world where parameters for honest dialogues between developing and developed countries could be established, and meaningful strides towards a more prosperous, inclusive and sustainable world could be made.
“I want a world of regions dealing with one another. We are one world, interconnected, and we ought to make peace. The mindset of the US is such that it has to be number one and everyone has to follow what it says – that creates a lot of friction,” Sachs lamented.
“I like the BRICS. Now expanded to ten countries, it comprises around 46% of the world population and 36% of the world GDP (PPP). It’s a very good group that has come about because its members do not want to be bossed around by the US,” he added.
As Sachs brought his talk to a conclusion, a smile beamed widely across his face, with illuminating rays of hope for Africa to match, in a way that could only be described as contagious and inspiring. Sachs left the audience with an earnest and heartening reminder: The world is much safer if we cooperate with one another.
In an era where artificial intelligence (AI) is reshaping the global landscape, data has emerged as a crucial asset, akin to oil in its value and potential. However, as AI technology advances at a breakneck pace, Africa faces daunting challenges that could either propel the continent forward or deepen existing inequalities. Dr. Jovan Kurbalija, a leading authority on digital governance, underscores these critical issues at the Economic Diplomat Programme Top-Heads-Talk lecture (oganised by the prestigous Ghana’s Institute IEF in collaboration with prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic and his European partners), urging Africa to reclaim control over its data, knowledge, and wisdom amidst the transformative era of the second and thrid decade of XXI c.
Africa stands on the precipice of a technological revolution that could redefine its future. Dr. Kurbalija starts his talk, warning that without a decisive strategy, the continent risks being left behind in the global AI race. Central to this challenge is Africa’s underdeveloped data infrastructure. Despite its vast potential, the continent has fewer data centers than even the Netherlands, compelling many African nations to entrust their data to foreign facilities. This dependency raises profound concerns about data security and limits Africa’s capacity to leverage its data for economic advancement.
The backbone of Africa’s internet infrastructure lies in the global network of submarine cables. These vital underwater cables are responsible for approximately 99% of international data traffic, acting as the lifeline of global communication.
Yet, Africa’s reliance on these cables presents a complex challenge. Dr. Kurbalija highlights that “the entire continent has fewer data farms than the Netherlands” and points out that “Africa’s data is stored abroad, raising significant security and privacy concerns” (Kurbalija, 2024). The continent’s connectivity depends on a few major coastal hubs—South Africa, Egypt, and Kenya—making it vulnerable to disruptions caused by natural disasters, human interference, and geopolitical conflicts. To address these vulnerabilities, Africa must invest in expanding and strengthening its digital infrastructure.
Dr. Kurbalija advocates for a paradigm shift towards data sovereignty, emphasizing the imperative for nations to preserve sensitive data on health, identity, and security within their own borders. He argues, “The continent needs urgent action to safeguard and promote its data, knowledge, and wisdom for the AI era as part of the common cultural and knowledge heritage” (Kurbalija, 2024). For Africa, asserting data sovereignty is not merely a matter of security but of economic empowerment. Establishing local data centers and implementing data localization policies can not only enhance security but also drive innovation and foster economic growth. As Kurbalija asserts, “Data localization policies can help African countries to use their data to foster local innovation and economic growth” (Kurbalija, 2024).
Creating a truly inclusive digital future goes beyond mere infrastructure improvements. It requires ensuring equitable access to digital tools and resources. Investing in education and training programs is essential to equip Africans with the skills needed to navigate and excel in the AI-driven landscape. Moreover, promoting local content creation and forging partnerships with global tech companies will help amplify African voices and bridge the digital knowledge gap.
A robust framework for internet governance is crucial for Africa’s digital future. Internet governance is a multifaceted issue that demands collaboration among governments, businesses, civil society organizations, and individuals. According to the report on Africa’s digital voices, “Internet governance requires a collaborative approach involving multiple stakeholders to ensure fair and equitable regulations that support digital development goals” (DiploFoundation, 2022). For African nations, a strong presence in international internet governance discussions is essential to ensuring that policies and regulations support their digital development aspirations.
As Dr. Jovan Kurbalija’s talk concluded, he highlights how the insights into digital governance provide a strategic roadmap for Africa to navigate its challenges and opportunities in the AI era. By prioritizing digital (self-)awearness, along with data sovereignty, fostering inclusive digital development, and engaging in collaborative internet governance, Africa can harness AI’s potential to drive meaningful progress, enhance the quality of life for its citizens, and establish itself as a self-reliant player in the global digital economy.
Truly, it was and still is a great privilege to be amongst distinguished thinkers and architects of the future we all co-create. Admitting worries for common good since contemporary world tensions and energetic crisis are colliding with humanitarian questions, we reflect assurance, decision. Hope.
This is how the IEF program and this great guest, in a serie of remarkable speakers, impresses each and every of us participants.
Sources:
Governing Digital Optimism, Prof. Lucija Mulej, Ph.D
Valentina Carvajal Caballero, Colombia ’s Universidad de Los Andes.
Valentina Carvajal Caballero of the Colombia ’s Universidad de Los Andes, is specialising in communication and digital media.
As an Information Officer at IFIMES, she applies her expertise in research and digital transformation to advance the organization’s goals. Founder of Clan Nativus Phydigital Agendas, Valentina combines her entrepreneurial drive with a deep understanding of Latin American digital landscapes to promote positive change through technology.
As nations increasingly integrate artificial intelligence (AI) into military operations, the implications for global security and strategic stability are profound. The adoption of AI technologies in defense is not merely a technological upgrade; it signifies a fundamental shift in how military decisions are made, executed, and perceived. This transformation prompts a reevaluation of existing geopolitical paradigms, raising critical questions about accountability, ethics, and the balance of power in international relations.
AI’s potential to enhance decision-making in military contexts is significant. Algorithms can analyze vast amounts of data in real-time, enabling commanders to make informed decisions faster than ever before. As noted by the U.S. Department of Defense, “AI has the potential to revolutionize the battlefield, providing our forces with unprecedented situational awareness and operational effectiveness” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2020). This ability to process information swiftly can lead to more effective strategies, better resource allocation, and ultimately, a higher likelihood of success in military operations.
However, the integration of AI into the military also raises serious ethical and strategic concerns. One of the most pressing issues is accountability. As autonomous systems become more prevalent, it becomes increasingly difficult to ascertain responsibility for decisions made by these machines. Dr. Stuart Russell, a prominent AI researcher, warns, “If we delegate decisions to machines, we must ensure that those machines operate within ethical and legal frameworks that reflect our values” (Russell, 2021). The potential for unintended consequences, especially in high-stakes environments, necessitates a robust oversight mechanism to prevent misuse and ensure compliance with international law.
Moreover, the race to develop advanced military AI capabilities could exacerbate existing tensions between global powers. Nations that excel in AI technology may gain a significant strategic advantage, leading to an arms race reminiscent of the Cold War. As Chinese military strategist Zhao Tianjun stated, “Whoever masters AI will dominate the future battlefield” (Zhao, 2022). This sentiment underscores the urgency with which countries are investing in AI research and development, often prioritizing speed and capability over ethical considerations.
The proliferation of AI in military applications also raises concerns about escalation and conflict dynamics. The speed of AI-driven decision-making could lead to rapid responses in crisis situations, potentially diminishing the time available for diplomatic solutions. According to the RAND Corporation, “The introduction of AI into military operations could fundamentally alter the calculus of deterrence and escalation” (RAND Corporation, 2021). As states grapple with these new realities, the risk of miscalculation during crises increases, heightening the possibility of unintended conflict.
To navigate these challenges, it is crucial for nations to engage in dialogue and establish norms governing the use of AI in military contexts. International frameworks that address ethical considerations and accountability mechanisms must be developed to mitigate the risks associated with autonomous military systems. Furthermore, fostering collaboration between militaries, academia, and the private sector can lead to more responsible and transparent AI development.
In conclusion, while the integration of artificial intelligence into military decision-making holds the promise of enhanced operational effectiveness, it also presents significant ethical and strategic challenges. As the global landscape shifts, it is imperative for policymakers to approach AI in military contexts with caution, ensuring that technological advancements do not outpace our ability to govern them responsibly. The future of warfare may be shaped by AI, but it is humanity’s responsibility to wield this powerful tool wisely.
References:
1. U.S. Department of Defense. (2020). “AI Strategy.”
2. Russell, S. (2021). “Human Compatible: Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of Control.”
3. Zhao, T. (2022). “The Future of Warfare: AI and Geopolitical Power.”
4. RAND Corporation. (2021). “Artificial Intelligence and Military Strategy.”
In an increasingly interconnected world, the art of diplomacy stands as a cornerstone for maintaining peace, fostering international cooperation, and addressing global challenges. The complex interplay of negotiation, communication, and relationship-building that characterizes diplomacy is a formidable challenge. Central to the effectiveness of diplomats is the rigorous training that prepares them for the complex realities of their roles. This essay explores how diplomacy and diplomatic training are intertwined, highlighting their mutual importance in achieving worldwide success.
The Essence of Diplomacy
At its core, diplomacy is the practice of managing international relations through dialogue, negotiation, and collaboration. It involves a wide range of activities, from peace negotiations and trade agreements to cultural exchanges and conflict resolution. The primary goal of diplomacy is to advance a nation’s interests while fostering peaceful and constructive relations with other countries.
Diplomats serve as their country’s representatives abroad, acting as intermediaries who bridge cultural, political, and economic divides. Their work requires not only a deep understanding of their own nation’s policies and goals but also a keen awareness of the global landscape and the perspectives of other nations.
The Role of Diplomatic Training
Diplomatic training is essential for equipping individuals with the skills and knowledge needed to navigate the complex world of international relations. This training encompasses a broad array of topics, including international law, economics, political science, languages, and cultural studies. It also involves the development of skills and competences such as negotiation, intercultural communication, public speaking, and conflict resolution.
Institutions and programs dedicated to diplomatic training, such as diplomatic academies and international relations schools, play a crucial role in preparing diplomats for their responsibilities. These institutions vary in their focus, methodologies, and target audiences, but they share common objectives of fostering professionalism and proficiency in diplomacy.
The Interplay Between Diplomacy and Training
The relationship between diplomacy and diplomatic training is symbiotic. Effective diplomacy relies on well-trained diplomats who can adeptly manage the nuances of international relations. Conversely, the evolving demands of global diplomacy continually shape the focus and content of diplomatic training programs. Similarly, the rise of digital diplomacy and the use of social media in international relations have prompted training programs to incorporate digital communication strategies.
In the swiftly changing domain of modern diplomacy, the importance of diplomatic training in skills and competences cannot be overstated. Skills development in diplomatic training is essential for diplomats to effectively engage in negotiations, mediation, and dialogue across diverse cultural contexts, promoting national interests and fostering international cooperation. These skills enable diplomats to build relationships, manage crises, and represent their countries adeptly on the global stage.
The Growing Importance of Diplomatic Training
The evolving international landscape has underscored the growing importance of diplomatic training. Several factors contribute to this increasing necessity. Global challenges have become more complex. Issues such as climate change, cybersecurity, migration, and pandemics require sophisticated, coordinated responses that only well-trained diplomats can provide. Also, the rise of digital diplomacy and the widespread influence of social media demand that diplomats are proficient in new communication technologies and strategies. Furthermore, emerging powers, shifting alliances, and regional conflicts necessitate a deep understanding of new political dynamics and the ability to adapt to changing circumstances.
The dynamics between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries within governments are rapidly evolving. Ministries responsible for areas such as agriculture, energy, transport, justice, and economics are reevaluating the balance between domestic priorities and international engagement. The concept of “fast diplomacy” is nowadays more applicable than ever. The concept underscores the necessity for diplomats to adapt to rapid changes and act swiftly to address emerging challenges, reflecting the dynamic nature of today’s interconnected world. This necessitates acquiring new competencies and adjusting behaviors accordingly.
Increased Awareness of Diplomatic Training
Enhanced investment in diplomatic training is evident through several key initiatives. One significant example is the expansion of diplomatic academies. Many countries are broadening the scope and resources of their diplomatic training institutions.
Additionally, governments are increasing funding for diplomatic training programs. This financial commitment underscores the recognition of the long-term benefits of having a well-trained diplomatic corps, ensuring that diplomats are equipped with the latest knowledge and skills required to address complex international issues effectively.
Moreover, there is a growing emphasis on continuous professional development for diplomats. Training programs are evolving to offer ongoing learning opportunities, ensuring that diplomats remain updated on emerging global trends and best practices. This focus on lifelong learning is essential for maintaining a dynamic and proficient diplomatic workforce.
The Didactics of Diplomatic Training
Didactics, the art and science of teaching, plays a crucial role in diplomatic training. Effective diplomatic training programs use a variety of didactic methods to ensure that trainees can internalize and apply their learning in practical contexts. These methods include interactive lectures and seminars, case studies, simulations and role-playing.
Experiential learning through internships, fieldwork, and on-the-job training provides hands-on experience that is essential for understanding the everyday realities of diplomatic work.
A training program linked to career development is crucial for diplomatic training as it ensures ongoing professional growth, retention, effective performance, adaptability and strategic goals. Additionally, opportunities for participants to build networks with peers, mentors, and professionals in the field facilitate knowledge sharing and collaboration, providing ongoing support and insights throughout diplomats’ careers.
The Role of the Clingendael Academy
The Clingendael Academy, based in The Hague, Netherlands, plays a significant role in world wide diplomatic and international relations training. As the diplomatic and international training institute of the Netherlands, it offers a range of training programs tailored to the needs of diplomats and international professionals.
Clingendael Academy’s approach combines thematic insights with practical skills development, leveraging its expertise and network of diplomatic practitioners and experts. Its contributions to diplomatic training extend beyond the Netherlands, with international participants benefiting from its specialized programs and workshops.
In addition to the diplomatic domain, the Clingendael Academy also operates in other sectors such as security and defense, the humanitarian field, peace negotiations, European policies, economics and trade, and sustainable development.
Other services provided by the Academy are institutional development of foreign diplomatic and defense schools, capacity building in educational processes, training-the-trainer programs and advising and consultancy.
The Clingendael Academy Approach
The Clingendael Academy distinguishes itself in several ways. The Clingendael Academy operates with a training philosophy that integrates content, competencies, and work processes. Content involves essential themes that are vital to the working fields of the Academy’s various training audiences. Competencies are crucial qualities and skills that enable the Academy’s various training audiences to achieve their goals and represent their interests as effectively as possible. Work processes are guidelines on how to complete specific tasks and activities expected of individual trainees in their respective professional environments. Applying this model to each target group ensures that it meets their specific learning needs.
Furthermore, Clingendael Academy maintains an internal capacity to develop practical case studies, role-playing scenarios, and simulations. The Academy employs in-house trainers specialized in various diplomatic skills. Staff members collaborate in flexible teams where each individual plays a role in acquisition processes and innovative developments. Additionally, every staff member undergoes an internal educational management program aimed at developing them into professionals in diplomatic training.
Conclusion
In conclusion, diplomatic training is indispensable for the future of diplomatic services, equipping diplomats with the competencies, adaptability, and strategic insights needed to address global challenges, leverage technological advancements, and promote international cooperation effectively. As the demands of global diplomacy continue to evolve, investing in comprehensive and innovative diplomatic training programs remains crucial for preparing diplomats to navigate an increasingly complex international landscape with skill, professionalism, and foresight.
The Hague has traditionally been known as an international city and centre of international law. Since the late 16th century, when the government of the Dutch Republic of the Seven United Provinces was established here, the city has welcomed foreign diplomats. Over the years, the international character of The Hague has grown. When people think of the city today, they readily associate it with the numerous international organisations based here, such as the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, Europol and Eurojust. The OPCW, NGO’s and almost all the foreign embassies and consulates can be found here.
At the request of the municipality of The Hague, for the seventh time since 2005, the research bureau Decisio examined the economic impact of the international non-profit sector based in The Hague and its surrounding region. This sector includes intergovernmental and European organisations, NGOs, embassies and consulates, cultural and knowledge institutions, as well as international schools, expat- and service clubs. As a municipality, therefore, we looked not just at the presence of the embassies and consulates but also considered the entire international community as a whole in The Hague and its environs.
Decisio’s survey revealed that international organisations play a significant role in The Hague’s economy. The organisations included in the research collectively spend nearly €2.7 billion and create almost 20,000 direct jobs. The number of organisations has slightly increased since 2019, now reaching 491 in total. The sector is substantial, with a total added value of €5.6 billion in spending, but no further economic growth was observed in 2022.
The figures in this edition of the survey were somewhat distorted by some notable factors, including the crisis caused by the pandemic and its effect on international organisations in The Hague and the urban economy. However, international organisations in The Hague are expected to remain stable or see some slight growth until 2025.
The impact of the international community on the city of The Hague, however, goes beyond the economy. The presence of this community stimulates the city’s cultural climate, attracting international exhibitions and new talent for the Royal Academy of Art and the Royal Conservatoire.
And on the subject of education: there are 10,000 children attending 20 international schools in the area of Leiden, The Hague and Delft. The Hague is proud of the diversity of its international schools, as this is an important factor in attracting international institutions and businesses to our city and region. More and more children of international parents also attend Dutch schools. A positive development that fosters the integration of the international community in The Hague.
There are 8,000 international students pursuing higher education in The Hague, with 30,000 throughout the province of South Holland, representing a quarter of the total in the Netherlands. With most international students attending The Hague University of Applied Sciences, the University of Leiden and the University of the Arts The Hague – the umbrella organisation of the Royal Academy of Art and the Royal Conservatoire, The Hague. Every year another 2,500 come to the city. Together with the teaching institutions, we have an urban introduction programme to welcome them and enable students from different education organisations to meet each other and get to know the city.
The corps diplomatique is at the heart of The Hague’s international community. The embassies and consulates have enabled The Hague’s international community to thrive over the last few decades. Although the vibrant international allure of our city is not always seen as a positive thing.
For a significant proportion of The Hague’s inhabitants, this is a world far removed from their everyday reality. The importance of the international community to The Hague itself, is not evident to everyone. Not least, because it adds to the pressure on the housing market and house prices, as well as our education institutions. And when a not-too-clear distinction is made between the different groups of temporary and permanent migrants, other metropolitan problems are also partly blamed on the international community.
It calls for us to continue working together to bring the international community closer to The Hague’s ordinary citizens. By making international work accessible to The Hague’s residents, along with initiatives and events that bring people together. That quest for connection could be organised, but could equally well be individual and spontaneous. For example, English is spoken in the hospitality sector. In The Hague this is largely because of the international residents. In other Dutch cities, due to tourists. It is appreciated everywhere when international hospitality industry staff do their best to speak at least some Dutch. In the same way we too, can show our goodwill in many places and be true citizens of The Hague together.
The Embassy of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay marked his country’s Independence Day with a grand and festive reception. Held on August 27 at the Leonardo Royal Hotel in The Hague, the event drew over 200 distinguished guests from various sectors of Dutch society.
Ambassadors, chiefs of international missions, diplomats, academics, business leaders, and representatives from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, along with members of the Uruguayan community, all responded to H.E. Ambassador Dr. Álvaro González Otero’s invitation to celebrate ‘Día de la Independencia’—Uruguay’s National Day, commemorating its independence from Brazil in 1825.
H.E. Dr. Álvaro González Otero, Ambassador of Uruguay. National Day 2024 The Hague.
After nearly 200 years of conflict and civil unrest under Spanish and then Brazilian rule, Uruguay has emerged as a country renowned for its welcoming people, stunning landscapes, first-class meat production, and high-quality wine. In recent decades, Uruguayans have enjoyed a stable democracy, a steady improvement in living conditions, and overall well-being.
In a packed room with an animated audience, Ambassador González Otero took the microphone to thank all the attendees for their sincere affection for his people and country. He then proudly expressed:
“Two years have quickly passed since I arrived in this lovely kingdom. Since then, we have started to shift the focus of the Embassy, placing more emphasis on our bilateral relations. The Netherlands and Uruguay have more in common than people might imagine. We share international principles, landscapes, agricultural production, developed services, qualified exports, and a progressive lifestyle.
We also share strong commitments to the well-being of our citizens and visitors, the protection of human rights, environmental sustainability, progressive social policies, and significant efforts towards renewable energy and climate action. Both countries also emphasize education, democratic governance, and active participation in international organizations promoting peace and development. So, we will keep working to boost our bilateral relations.”
Uruguay National Day, August 27 at the Leonardo Royal Hotel in The Hague.
Ambassador González Otero then listed some of the most relevant initiatives undertaken by the Embassy over the last few months:
– Uruguayan participation in the World Hydrogen Summit 2024: Led by the Minister of Industry, Energy, and Mining, Ms. Elisa Facio, with over 50 representatives from various sectors of the public and private sectors.
– Active participation in the “26th World Energy Congress.”
– Cooperation Project with Delft Institute for Water Education: Since 2011, Uruguayan professionals specializing in water resources have participated in the Delft Institute program for advanced training. Initially, the program began with 40 scholarships, resulting in 37 professionals successfully completing their studies. This early success led to the program’s relocation and implementation at the Technological University of Uruguay, now featuring regional participation. The program has since had two new editions in 2022 and 2024, expanding to include 17 professionals from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Peru. This development has transformed Uruguay into a regional hub in the field of water resource education.
– Uruguay’s status as one of the 32 signing states of the Ljubljana – The Hague Convention in February 2024.
– Positioning Uruguay as a potential living and working destination for Dutch farmers.
– Interactions with RVO and Port of Rotterdam related to port cooperation.
– Exploring and initiating new cooperation projects with Westland Municipality and Wageningen University.
– Meetings with private sector actors related to agribusiness.
– Preparation for the Capitan Miranda’s visit to Amsterdam: Uruguay’s school tall ship has already confirmed its participation in Sail Amsterdam 2025.
– Multilateral achievements: The Embassy has made progress in multilateral areas, including ongoing contributions and work with international organizations based in The Hague: the ICJ, ICC, OPCW, HCCH, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Additionally, a closer relationship with The Hague Academy of International Law has been pursued. Significant advances have also been made through the coordinated work of the GRULAC Group in relation to various international organizations.
H.E. Mr. Fernando Arias, OPCW Director General , Ambassador Gonzalez Otero and Mr Arias spouse, Patricia van Oordt.
Following his remarks, Ambassador González Otero invited the audience to watch a short video about Uruguay, which made a great impression on those present. He expressed, “Uruguay is an exceptional country that has developed a dynamic and robust culture, shaped by a fascinating blend of gaucho traditions, European influences, and the unique Rioplatense spirit. Tango, folklore, candombe, and milonga are examples of its rich artistic musical expression. Uruguayan gastronomy, featuring high-quality meat, wine, and dairy products, especially the beloved ‘dulce de leche,’ delights palates and consistently wins prestigious awards worldwide.”
“The work we have done does not mean we are satisfied; we want to continue advancing in a deeper process. The bilateral relationship is already strong, but the potential to strengthen bonds in several key areas is even greater.”
The Ambassador of Uruguay, H.E. Alvaro Gonzalez Otero and the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Graciela Gatti Santana with her husband Mr Gustavo Segovia.
The event was conceived to showcase the rich and diverse culture of Uruguay, a nation with a population of approximately 3,495,527 as of 2022.
The national anthems of Uruguay and the Netherlands were performed by the Uruguayan opera singer Sara de los Campos. After the ambassador’s speech, the Embassy paid tribute to two influential musicians: José “El Sabalero” Carbajal and Jaime Roos, who both lived in the Netherlands. Jaime Roos settled in Amsterdam in 1978, where he played bass in several salsa, rock, and jazz groups. He had a son and remained in the Netherlands until 1984 when he returned to Uruguay.
Carbajal spent his days in the Netherlands with his wife, Anke van Haastrecht, and their two children. Anke was invited to share some special stories from their life together.
Uruguayan opera singer Sara de los Campos.Uruguayan drummers Luis Gradin, Marcelo Terra, and Nicolás Sánchez.
The enthusiastic audience enjoyed an authentic performance by talented Uruguayan drummers Luis Gradin, Marcelo Terra, and Nicolás Sánchez. The celebration continued with Uruguayan wine, classic savory empanadas, and dulce de leche, which delighted the crowded room and completed the great celebration.
Ambassador González Otero concluded the event by thanking his Embassy team: Counselor Pablo Bayarres, Chancellor Gustavo Morales, his assistant Juan Diego, and Martha Hernández and Sofía Anastasiou. He then led a warm toast for the people of the Netherlands, Uruguay, and the necessary and desired peace in the world.
En un documento remitido el pasado 23 de agosto a la Sala de lo Preliminar de la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI), el Fiscal de la CPI ha reiterado su solicitud de órdenes de arresto contra dirigentes israelíes (su Primer Ministro y su Ministro de Defensa) y contra tres líderes del Hamás.
Este documento permite además al Fiscal de la CPI, responder a algunos de los escritos remitidos a la CPI por parte de Estados, organizaciones internacionales, ONG y académicos, entre los cuales algunos (muy pocos en lo que concierne a Estados) que cuestionaron su actuar desde el punto de vista jurídico, a partir de interpretaciones jurídicas antojadizas.
Como bien se sabe, la CPI fue establecida en 1998 mediante la adopción del Estatuto de Roma, un instrumento internacional que registra 124 Estados Partes (véase estado oficial de firmas y de ratificaciones). En América Latina, el último Estado en haberlo ratificado fue Guatemala en el 2012, al tiempo que Cuba y Nicaragua persisten en no firmar este instrumento.
Como se puede observar mediante una breve búsqueda en la red, es realmente muy poca la difusión que se ha hecho al contenido de este documento en los grandes medios de prensa internacionales desde el 23 de agosto pasado.
El drama indecible que se vive en Gaza
Se recomienda la lectura del último informe de situación elaborado por Naciones Unidas al 30 de agosto del 2024 (véase enlace).
En el penúltimo informe (al 26 de agosto de 2024, véase enlace) se lee que el bombardeo incesante sobre la población civil de Gaza por parte de Israel no ha sido interrumpido, con nuevos dramas vividos en Gaza en los últimos días de manera constante:
“Between the afternoons of 23 and 26 August, according to the Ministry of Health (MoH) in Gaza, 170 Palestinians were killed and 390 were injured. Between 7 October 2023 and 26 August 2024, at least 40,435 Palestinians were killed and 93,534 were injured, according to MoH in Gaza.
The following are some of the deadly incidents reported between 22 and 25 August:
On 22 August, five Palestinians were reportedly killed and others injured when a house was hit in the vicinity of Bani Suheila square, east of Khan Younis.
On 23 August, five Palestinians were reportedly killed when a vehicle was hit southeast of Khan Younis.
On 23 August, four Palestinians were reportedly killed and others injured when a house was hit in northwestern An Nuseirat Refugee Camp, Deir al Balah.
On 24 August, four Palestinians were reportedly killed and others injured when a house was hit in Maan area, east of Khan Younis.
On 24 August, 11 Palestinians, including women and children, were reportedly killed and 30 others injured when a house was hit in Al Amal neighborhood, west of Khan Younis.
On 24 August, at about 12:10, eight Palestinian men were reportedly killed when a vehicle (tuk-tuk) was hit in northwestern Rafah.
On 25 August, eight Palestinians were reportedly killed and others injured when a house was hit south of Deir al Balah”.
Es de notar que el saldo mortífero de más de 40.000 personas en Gaza se sitúa, para algunos especialistas, muy por debajo de la realidad. En efecto, en un reciente artículo publicado por un renombrado especialista militar invitado en un sinnúmero de espacios informativos en Francia, y titulado “Guerres en Ukraine et en Israël, (enfin) des voies de sortie en perspective?”, se lee que la cifra real podría corresponder a unas 100.000 personas fallecidas en Gaza desde el 7 de octubre del 2023:
“les évaluations des dégâts des bombardements montrent – même en hypothèse basse – que le bilan projeté se situe plutôt autour de 100,000 morts et donc de 350,000 blessés (le ratio de 3,5 est la « norme »), soit 20% de la population palestinienne de Gaza « au bas mot » (450,000 / population initiale de 2,3 millions), blessée ou tuée par cette guerre démesurée”.
La ausencia de datos verificables responde en gran parte a la ausencia de un personal de agencias humanitarias desplegado en toda Gaza, y a la ausencia de medios de prensa que puedan documentar e informar a la opinión pública internacional sobre la realidad que se vive en Gaza y sobre el alcance exacto de los bombardeos aéreos a los que Israel somete a la población civil de Gaza. A ese respecto, el asesinato deliberado por parte de Israel de periodistas, camarógrafos, asistentes de medios de prensa llevó a unas 60 organizaciones que velan por la protección de los periodistas a elevar el tono y a exigir a la Unión Europea (UE) tomar acciones (véase carta colectiva con fecha del 22 de agosto del 2024). En dicha misiva, se lee que:
“Journalists play an indispensable role in documenting and reporting on war crimes and other human rights violations. The cumulative effect of these abuses is to create the conditions for an information void, as well as for propaganda and mis- and disinformation. While Israel contends that its actions are to keep its people safe, history shows that censorship and denial of the right to information is a flawed path to peace or security. We, therefore, write to you today to call for the suspension of the Israel / EU Association Agreement on the basis that it has violated international human rights and criminal law and for the adoption of targeted sanctions against IDF officials and others responsable”.
Al 23 de agosto del 2024, según el Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), el número de periodistas asesinados en Gaza por las fuerzas militares de Israel desde el 7 de octubre del 2023, asciende a 116 profesionales de la comunicación (véase informe).
En cuanto al personal humanitario de Naciones Unidas en Gaza, el pasado 19 de agosto se conmemoró, en el Día Internacional de la Acción Humanitaria, la muerte de 280 funcionarios de Naciones en Gaza desde el 7 de octubre del 2023 (véase comunicado): un saldo jamás alcanzado en ningún teatro de operaciones en los que personal de Naciones Unidas ha estado presente.
En otro ámbito relacionado a las exacciones que se comete en Gaza, este 26 de agosto, fue la ONG Human Rights Watch la que publicó un detallado informe sobre la tortura a la que fueron sometidas personas trabajando en hospitales en Gaza, capturadas por Israel (véase informe).
Tuvimos recientemente la oportunidad de detallar estos y algunos otros aspectos del drama indescriptible que se vive en Gaza, así como de analizar la fracasada estrategia militar en Gaza en una emisión del programa Desayunos de Radio UCR (véase enlace a emisión del 21 de agosto titulada “¿Qué está pasando en Gaza?“).
Si bien la atención se ha centrado en la situación en Gaza, el última informe de Naciones Unidas sobre la situación en Cisjordania (véase informe al 28 de agosto del 2024) revela el clima de impunidad ante las exacciones de todo tipo cometidas por colonos contra familias palestinas y sus bienes, ante la pasividad de las fuerzas de seguridad israelíes, con un saldo de 622 personas fallecidas desde el 7 de octubre del 2023 en Cisjordania y en Jerusalén Oriental.
Las conclusiones del Fiscal en breve
En un extenso documento de 49 páginas (véase texto completo), el Fiscal de la CPI rechaza varias opiniones enviadas por algunos Estados y entidades a la CPI sobre algunas supuestas limitaciones que derivaría para la CPI de los acuerdos de Oslo, y concluye que:
“113. In addition to being manifestly out of time, Israel’s letter neither mentions article 18 nor satisfies the legal requirements of a deferral request under article 18. Merely asserting the capacity of the Israeli justice system and that some investigations are ongoing is not sufficient. The requesting State bears the burden of proof and must demonstrate that its proceedings sufficiently mirror the scope of the Prosecution’s intended investigation. It must provide information of a sufficient degree of specificity and probative value to demonstrate an advancing process of relevant domestic investigations or prosecutions, including patterns of criminality and high-ranking officials. Israel did not provide any such material that would meet this burden. Nor, as outlined above, does any such information appear to exist.
IV. RELIEF REQUESTED
114. The Prosecution respectfully requests the Pre-Trial Chamber to:
– dismiss in limine the observations unrelated to the Oslo Accords; and
– urgently render its decisions under article 58, on the basis of the Prosecution’s Applications, these submissions, and the Article 19(3) Decision“.
En la parte inicial de su opinión, se lee que para el Fiscal de la CPI, los argumentos según los cuales Israel ha procedido a investigar las exacciones de sus fuerzas militares en Gaza no son de recibo:
” 8. (…) As the Prosecution has concluded, and as is evident from the public record, there are no domestic proceedings at present which deal with substantially the same conduct and the same persons as the cases presented to the Chamber pursuant to article 58 of the Statute. There is no information indicating that Benjamin NETANYAHU or Yoav GALLANT, Israel’s Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, respectively, are being criminally investigated or prosecuted, and indeed the core allegations against them have simply been rejected by Israeli authorities“.
En otra parte de su escrito, se indica que para el Fiscal de la CPI:
“93. In any case, and additionally, the available information does not show that Israel is investigating substantially the same conduct as the ICC. For instance, the information available does not suggest that the above inquiries relate to the conduct underlying the war crime of starvation and/or related crimes. Likewise, the available information does not suggest any inquiry into patterns of criminality, or the potential responsibility of high-ranking officials, which may among other considerations signify the investigation of contextual elements of crimes against humanity. Indeed, significantly, on 28 May 2024 the MAG categorically rejected the commission of these crimes without any indication or implication that such conclusions resulted from a full and rigorous investigation, or indeed any investigation at all”.
Breve contexto procesal
De esta manera, el plazo otorgado por la Sala de lo Preliminar de la CPI para la recepción de opiniones legales llega a su fin, debiendo ahora la Sala de lo Preliminar tomar una decisión definitiva sobre la solicitud de arresto que recibió desde el 20 de mayo del 2024 por parte del mismo Fiscal de la CPI.
Este plazo adicional de tiempo se debe a una maniobra inicial del Reino Unido de carácter dilatorio registrada en junio del 2024, que abrió un compás de espera para que los jueces de la CPI recibieran opiniones jurídicas variadas enviadas por Estados, organizaciones internacionales, ONGs y académicos. En razón del resultado de las elecciones en el Reino Unido del 4 de julio del 2024, sus nuevas autoridades consideraron innecesario continuar la gestión, y no remitieron ninguna opinión jurídica a la CPI en nombre del Reino Unido.
Con relación a América Latina, habíamos tenido la oportunidad de referir a las opiniones jurídicas enviadas por Estados de América Latina a la CPI en una nota anterior editada el 6 de agosto del 2024, y titulada “América Latina ante el drama en Gaza: a propósito de las observaciones enviadas por Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia y México a la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI)“.
Si algunos de nuestros estimables lectores no encuentran enlistado a su país de origen, es muy válida la interrogante sobre el punto de saber a qué puede estar obedeciendo semejante omisión e inacción por parte de sus autoridades nacionales. Hacemos a un lado el caso particular de nuestros lectores argentinos, como se explicará a continuación.
En el caso específico de Ecuador, el reciente acuerdo con Israel (abril del 2024) denota un acercamiento – bastante insólito – de un Estado de América Latina con las actuales autoridades de Israel (véanse comunicado oficial de Ecuador y nota de prensa de El Telégrafo, de abril del 2024).
En el caso de Paraguay, un reciente anuncio oficial sobre la idea de trasladar nuevamente su Embajada de Tel Aviv a Jerusalén evidencia la cercanía actual de sus autoridades con las de Israel (véase nota de MercoPress de julio del 2024). Cabe recordar que en mayo del 2018, Paraguay anunció trasladar a Jerusalén su Embajada (véase comunicado oficial del 9 de mayo del 2018), decisión revertida unos meses después por las nuevas autoridades guaraníes (Nota 1).
Es de señalar que la comunicación remitida por Colombia a la CPI fue precedida por las de España (véase documento), Irlanda (véase documento), así como de Noruega, presentada el 5 de agosto (véase documento completo) que apuntan en la misma dirección, así como por la remitida por Palestina (véase documento): la justicia penal internacional está jurídicamente plenamente habilitada para aplicarse en el territorio palestino ocupado, sin limitación de algún tipo.
Como dato de interés, pasado por alto por la gran mayoría de artículos de prensa y de comentarios firmados por analistas, editorialistas y especialistas, Israel optó por no remitir ninguna opinión escrita a la CPI.
También cabe mencionar la opinión jurídica remitida a la CPI por los 30 expertos de derechos humanos de Naciones Unidas que enviaron una opinión conjunta a los jueces de la CPI (véase documento, cuya lectura completa se recomienda), y que concluyen señalando de manera enfática que:
“23. The Mandate Holders recognize the Court’s role in ensuring international justice as a critical component of preserving international order through the protection of the interests of victims of international crimes. People around the world, especially youth, advocating for the application of international law, are watching closely, hoping the promises of international peace are not devoid of meaning.
24. In light of the expert opinions shared in this document, the Mandate Holders urge the Court not to further delay the delivery of justice in the occupied Palestinian territory, through the prosecution of alleged criminals. The significant effects of this failure would be felt far beyond the tormented land of Palestine”.
Pese a no haber continuado la gestión iniciada por las autoridades del Reino Unido en junio del 2024, el carácter dilatorio de la maniobra británica explica que desde la solicitud de emisión de órdenes de arresto con fecha del 20 de mayo por parte del Fiscal, la CPI todavía esté analizando dicha solicitud.
El plazo de tiempo puede ser comparado con la órden de arresto contra dos altos funcionarios en Rusia (incluyendo a su Presidente) emitida por una Sala de lo Preliminar de la CPI el 17 de marzo del 2023 (véase comunicado oficial de la CPI), precedida por una solicitud del Fiscal con fecha del 22 de febrero del 2023.
El caso particular de Estados Unidos
Alegando una supuesta limitación a la jurisdicción de la CPI, Israel ha podido contar con un documento oficial remitido por Estados Unidos (véase documento). La particularidad consiste en que este documento proviene de un Estado que no es Estado Parte al Estatuto de Roma de 1998 que crea la CPI.
También remitieron un documento que intenta restringir la jurisdicción penal internacional en Gaza de la CPI los siguientes Estados europeos, que sí son Estados Partes al Estatuto de Roma: Alemania (véase documento), Hungría (véase documento) así como la República Checa (véase documento).
Esta vez, no remitieron ninguna opinión favorable a Israel a los jueces de la CPI Estados que, usualmente, son muy solícitos cuando se trata de Israel y de la justicia penal internacional: Australia, Austria, Canadá, Guatemala, Uganda y Reino Unido así como algunas de las islas del Pacífico (Islas Marshall, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau y Papúa Nueva Guinea). Se trata de un pequeño grupo de Estados que usualmente aparece votando con Israel y con Estados Unidos en Naciones Unidas y que tampoco apareció en diciembre del 2023 al votarse una resolución en el seno de la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas sobre el derecho a la autodeterminación del pueblo palestino: véase resolución A/Res/78/192), que registró 172 votos a favor, 10 abstenciones y únicamente 4 votos en contra (Estados Unidos, Israel, Micronesia y Nauru).
Los párrafos 16-26 del escrito remitido por Estados Unidos (véase documento) constituyen un intento para desacreditar la solicitud del Fiscal de la CPI con base en una interpretación de las disposiciones del Estatuto de Roma al que Estados Unidos… no es Estado Parte.
Un Estado no Parte a un instrumento internacional emblemático como el Estatuto de Roma… ¿explicando cómo se deben de interpretar sus disposiciones a los jueces de la CPI? ¿Cómo así? Como se lee.
La profunda soledad de Argentina
Por parte de América Latina, como gesto notorio en apoyo a las tesis jurídicas favorables a Israel sobre una supuesta limitación a la jurisdicción de la CPI derivada de los acuerdos de Oslo de 1993, encontramos el único escrito remitido por Argentina (véase documento): como detalle de cierto interés, el documento viene firmado por la titular de la diplomacia argentina, a diferencia de los demás escritos remitidos por Estados a la CPI, firmados ya sea por un funcionario diplomático subalterno de relevancia relativa (caso de Alemania, Estados Unidos, Hungría, Irlanda, Noruega, República Checa), por el Chargé d´Affaires de turno en la legación diplomática en La Haya (Colombia, Brasil) o bien por el representante diplomático en La Haya: es el caso de Bolivia, España, así como del documento suscrito conjuntamente por Chile y México (véase texto).
En el caso de República del Congo, el texto remitido viene también firmado por un ministro: el Ministro de Justicia.
Sería de interés conocer las razones exactas por las que la diplomacia argentina y la congolesa optaron por enviar un documento de esta naturaleza firmado de puño y letra por un funcionario con rango de ministro.
Con relación al “aporte” de Argentina en favor de las tesis jurídicas favorables a Israel en este mes de agosto del 2024 (véase documento), es de notar que, en el marco de un ejercicio similar, fue Brasil en el 2020 el que explicó que la CPI no podía ejercer su jurisdicción con relación a las exacciones cometidas por Israel en el territorio palestino ocupado (véase el documento suscrito por un funcionario subalterno): una “coïncidencia” entre el Brasil de Bolsonaro y la actual Argentina de Milei que merece ser mencionada.
Cabe precisar que recientemente en Brasil se descubrió la existencia de una “nube” electrónica albergada en Israel con los datos personales de más de 30.000 brasileños (véase nota de prensa de Página12 de enero del 2024): al parecer, el programa Pegasus y otros programas informáticos que Israel ha obsequiado a los Estados árabes que aceptaron normalizar sus relaciones en el marco de los denominados “Acuerdos de Abraham” del 2020 (y que permiten espiar y vigilar conversaciones de opositores políticos) – véase artículo del New York Times del 2022 y véase nota del MERP del 2023 – también fue obsequiado al Brasil del Presidente Jair Bolsonaro. Desde una perspectiva de derechos humanos, este informe de la ONG Amnistía Internacional analiza el riesgo que significa, para opositores políticos, sindicalistas, periodistas críticos y activistas en general u organizaciones sociales, el programa Pegasus. En el 2022, la misma Human Rights Watch denunció que su personal fue objeto de vigilancia recurriendo a este programa informatíco israelí (véase nota).
Volviendo a la CPI, en aquella ocasión (2020), la argumentación jurídica de Brasil, al igual que la de Alemania, Austria, Hungría, República Checa y Uganda fue rechazada por la Sala de lo Preliminar en una histórica decisión del 5 de febrero del 2021, que tuvimos la oportunidad de analizar en su momento (Nota 2).
En este mes de agosto del 2024, Argentina es el único Estado de América Latina en haber hecho llegar a la CPI un escrito para intentar favorecer a Israel ante los jueces de la CPI.
No está demás señalar que al votarse en la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas una resolución en mayo del 2024 sobre los derechos de Palestina como futuro Estado Miembro de Naciones Unidas, Argentina volvió a “destacarse” en América Latina al ser el único Estado de la región en votar en contra, conjuntamente con 8 Estados más: Estados Unidos, Hungría, Israel, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papúa Nueva Guinea y República Checa (véase al respecto nuestra nota titulada” Palestina: a propósito de la reciente resolución sobre derechos de Palestina como futuro Estado Miembro de Naciones Unidas” editada el 10 de mayo del 2024).
CPI e Israel: una vigilancia extrema
Nótese que en mayo del 2024 un grupo de periodistas en Israel dieron a conocer un programa específico de escuchas e intercepción de los servicios de inteligencia israelíes dedicado únicamente al personal de la CPI y al contenido de sus computadoras: el artículo titulado “Surveillance and interference: Israel covert war on the ICC exposed” publicado por el medio Magazine+972 el 28 de mayo del 2024 constituye un reportaje de lectura muy recomendada, en el que se puede saber cómo desde casi 10 años Israel ha estado vigilando constantemente a la CPI y a su personal.
Entre otros detalles, se lee que:
“The former prosecutor was far from the only target. Dozens of other international officials related to the probe were similarly surveilled. One of the sources said there was a large whiteboard with the names of around 60 people who were under surveillance — half of them Palestinians and half from other countries, including UN officials and ICC personnel in The Hague”.
También se indica que por cada caso llevado a conocimiento de la CPI “interceptado“, Israel preparaba información detallada en aras de hacer valer sus propias investigaciones internas llevadas a cabo, todo ello en aras de poder invocar ante el Fiscal y los jueces de la CPI el principio de complementariedad:
“If materials were transferred to the ICC, it had to be understood exactly what they were, to ensure that the IDF investigated them independently and sufficiently so that they could claim complementarity,” one of the sources explained. “The claim of complementarity was very, very significant”.
Ante la reprobación general y la falta de transparencia de las mismas autoridades de los Países Bajos (véase nota de The Guardian del 31 de mayo del 2024 informando de una iniciativa de un legislador), finalmente, las autoridades de los Países Bajos convocaron a los representantes de Israel en la capital holandesa para solicitarles aclaraciones y manifestarles su profunda indignación ante semejante actuar (véase nota de The Guardian, del 24 de junio del 2024): este programa de escuchas e intercepciones israelí viola las reglas más elementales que protegen a las organizaciones internacionales y a sus funcionarios, vigentes en el ordenamiento jurídico internacional.
A modo de conclusión
Pese a la gravedad de las revelaciones hechas desde Israel por periodistas israelíes extremadamente bien informados que también dieron a conocer la existencia del programa de inteligencia artificial “Lavender” (Nota 3), el tiempo tomado por las autoridades de los Países Bajos para proceder a convocar a los diplomáticos de Israel evidencia algún tipo de resistencia en el seno de su aparato estatal.
Por lo pronto, finalizado el plazo de recepción de opiniones jurídicas, son los tres jueces de la Sala de lo Preliminar de la CPI los que deberán anunciar en los próximos días (o semanas) su decisión final con respecto a la solicitud hecha el 20 de mayo por parte del Fiscal de la CPI, con relación a dos altas autoridades en Israel (su Primer Ministro y su Ministro de Defensa) y a tres dirigentes del Hamás (de los cuales uno fue asesinado en Teherán por Israel el pasado 31 de julio).
Sobre el autor:
Dr. Nicolas Boeglin.
Nicolas Boeglin, es Profesor de Derecho Internacional Público, en la Facultad de Derecho, de la Universidad de Costa Rica (UCR). Contacto: nboeglin(a)gmail.com
– -Notas – –
Nota 1: sobre la decisión de trasladar la embajada de Tel Aviv a Jerusalén por parte del Presidente Cartes en Paraguay en mayo del 2018, y luego la decisión del nuevo Presidente Mario Abdo Benitez de regresarla a Jerusalén unos meses después, véase nuestra nota: BOEGLIN N., ” La valiente decisión de Paraguay de restablecer su Embajada en Tel Aviv: una breve puesta en perspectiva“, editada el 11 de septiembre del 2018.
Nota 2: Véase nuestra notaBOEGLIN N., “Corte Penal Internacional (CPI) / Palestina: ¿el fin de la impunidad para los autores de crímenes de guerra cometidos en Palestina?“, editada el 5 de febrero del 2021.
Nota 3: Este mismo grupo de periodistas de investigación israelíes dieron a conocer al mundo la existencia del programa de inteligencia artificial “Lavender” mediante el cual Israel procede a escoger a las personas que elimina en Gaza: véase artículo publicado el 3 de abril del 2024 en el medio digital Magazine +972, titulado ” ‘Lavender’: The AI machine directing Israel’s bombing spree in Gaza“, cuya lectura completa se recomienda. En Francia, la ONG denominada AURDIP tuvo la generosa idea de traducir este artículo al francés, cuyop texto está disponible en este enlace.
Step into a Celebration of Unity, Heritage, and Cultural Diversity
Prepare to be transported across the globe as the Embassy Festival returns for its 12th edition on September 7th, 2024. The historic Lange Voorhout in The Hague will come alive with the sights, sounds, and flavours of diverse cultures, all coming together to create a unique celebration of unity and heritage. With 47 cultures participating, this festival offers a rare opportunity to experience the entire world in a single day!
Feel the Beat, Taste the Flavours
This year, we’re bringing you closer to the heart of the performances with more intimate and personal experiences. In both the Creative Arena and Performance Space, audiences will enjoy a closer connection with the artists. Surrounding these stages, more than 47 countries will showcase their rich heritage through unique culinary tastings and cultural displays at the International Market.
Explore the Festival with the Activity Passport
This interactive and educational passport is free for everybody, inviting both young and old to engage with different cultures through various activities. As you explore the festival and collect stamps in your passport, you will not only learn about the diverse traditions and heritage of the participating cultures, but you will also have the chance to win special prizes.
Experience the Culture Parade
A highlight of the festival, the Culture Parade will take place at 15:05. This vibrant parade will see participants proudly displaying their traditional costumes, colours, and flags, creating a special experience that resonates with both young and old. Make sure you do not miss this captivating celebration of global unity.
Event Details
· Embassy Festival 2024:
· Date: September 7th, 2024
· Time: 12:00 – 20:00
· Location: Lange Voorhout, The Hague
· Entry: Free for everyone
· Website:www.embassyfestival.com Join us for a day of cultural discovery, unity, and celebration at the Embassy Festival 2024!
