By Rasulev Abdulaziz Karimovichand Khujayev Shokhjakhon Akmaljon Ugli
In a state governed by the rule of law, ensuring a balance of power between the state and society is a prerequisite for the establishment of a democratic regime. This requires the strength of civil society institutions, which are the basis of the rule of law. Civil society, in fact, symbolizes conscious compliance with the requirements of the law and has the advantage of influence others in order to ensure the rule of law.
This lever is public control, successfully tested in the history of humankind and functioning in developed countries, or rather, local authorities, mass media and non-profit organizations. Therefore, the state is interested in developing and strengthening this system. In fact, this is the basis of civil society. In this regard, the reform of the Institute of Advocacy as a civil society institution, which by definition is a non-governmental and non-profit organization, is critical for improving the effectiveness of our country’s judicial and legal reforms.
Today, for any state, the advocacy is not only an institution for the protection of human rights and organizations, but also an important participant in the formation of civil society. In many ways, advocacy contributes to raising the level of legal awareness and legal culture of the population. Therefore, the effectiveness of legal regulation of advocates’ activities directly affects the implementation of constitutional rights and freedoms of the individual. In this regard, it is the constitutional guarantee of the independence of the advocacy that is most important.
In the current article 116 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, constitutional guarantees were enshrined to ensure the right of the accused to receive protection, qualified legal assistance at any stage of the proceedings in the investigation and court bodies, as well as the role of the advocacy as an institution providing legal assistance to citizens, enterprises, institutions and organizations. Organizational foundations have been created in the country and a mechanism has been formed to promote the functioning of the legal defense system, especially the creation of an appropriate national infrastructure for advocacy.
Over the years of independence, 3 Laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan, more than 10 decisions of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and several departmental regulatory legal acts have been adopted in order to reform the institute of advocacy, further strengthen the status and provide guarantees to advocates, and increase the reputation and prestige of the advocate profession. In turn, these regulatory documents have formed a kind of practice, prompting advocates to carry out their activities on a professional basis.
However, there are some problems with the functioning of the legal profession. Unfortunately, the number of advocates is insufficient. Today, there are more than 4 thousand advocates in Uzbekistan; there is an average of one specialist per 8.5 thousand residents of the country. For comparison, in European countries, there are 162 advocates for every 100,000 people.
Furthermore, 43 percent of advocates in Uzbekistan work in Tashkent (the state capital), and not a single law firm is registered in any of the country’s 20 districts. These figures clearly show the severity of the problem.
As part of the constitutional reform in Uzbekistan, it is proposed to consolidate the principles of independence and self-government, non-interference in the professional activity of an advocate. These principles are important in the context of ongoing judicial and legal reforms. Thus, in the Strategy of Actions for the Further Development of the Republic of Uzbekistan in 2022-2026 as the most important goal (Goal 19) within the framework of the direction of ensuring the rule of law and strengthening justice, “a cardinal increase in the capacity of the institute of advocacy in the protection of human rights, freedoms and legitimate interests” is indicated.
It should be noted that the independence and self-government of advocacy is an important principle of international standards in the field of human rights and advocacy. The fundamental international human rights instrument is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. His famous article 1 says: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”. For the effective implementation of these, qualified legal assistance is also necessary, which is provided by the legal profession. Therefore, international legal standards in the field of advocacy closely complement international standards in the field of human rights.
One of the most striking examples of international standards are the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers. These principles show the importance of access to advocates and legal services. In particular, the importance of accessibility of the legal profession is indicated, which is ensured by the following measures:
– a guarantee of the right to appeal to any advocate for help to protect and defend his rights and protect him at all stages of criminal proceedings;
– ensuring the provision of sufficient financial and other means to provide legal services to socially vulnerable segments of the population;
– informing people about their rights and obligations under the law and about the important role of advocates in protecting their fundamental freedoms.
A special role should be assigned to the legal community. It is the legal community that should independently solve the issues of professional activity of advocates. One of the striking examples is the experience of the European Union. Thus, in Europe, there is a Code of Conduct for Advocates in the European Union, which applies to cross-border activities within the EU and was adopted in Strasbourg in 1988 by the Council of Advocates and Law Societies of Europe. Therefore, it is mandatory for all advocates from EU countries.
Recommendation No. R. (2000) 21 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the freedom of exercise the profession of lawyer suggests that all necessary measures should be taken to ensure that the freedom to practice the profession of a advocate is respected, protected and promoted without discrimination and unlawful interference by authorities or the public, especially in the light of the relevant provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights.
In this document, the practice of advocacy is considered in close connection with the cultural, social, political and historical context of each society. In any democratic society, advocates are called upon to play a crucial role in the administration of justice, the prevention and resolution of disputes, as well as in the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Decisions regarding permission to practice law or become a member of this professional group should be made by an independent body. Control over such decisions — whether they are taken by an independent body or not — should be carried out by an independent, impartial judicial authority.
Advocacy is the most important legal institution of any state, standing for the protection of the fundamental rights of citizens and their associations. The confidence of every citizen or entrepreneur in their well-being and success largely depends on how strong, organized, and legally protected it is. Therefore, constitutional guarantees of independence and self-government are important both for the advocates themselves and for society.
About the authors:
Rasulev Abdulaziz Karimovich is the Deputy Director of the Research Institute for Legal Policy under the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Doctor of Sciences in Law, Professor.
Khujayev Shokhjakhon Akmaljon Ugli is the Head of the Department of Intellectual Property Law at Tashkent State University of Law, PhD
By Dr. Dorine E. van Norren, independent researcher and civil servant
Few had heard of Rights of Nature fifteen years ago, but recently this new legal paradigm is becoming increasingly popular. That is, mostly in the Global South. Though it started in a few municipalities in the US since 2006 (starting with Pennsylvania), it is mostly the indigenous peoples who have embraced the concept. First in the Western Hemisphere and later in other continents. The Ojibwe in Minnesota declared rights for their wild rice (and related freshwater resources), the Ponca Nation (Oklahoma) claimed rights of Nature for their territory (to halt fracking) (2017). And 200 U.S. and Canadian tribal nations recognized the grizzly bear’s right to exist in a healthy ecosystem (to counter President Trump’s attempt to take it off the endangered species list). The people of Toledo also declared lake Eerie to have rights (later overturned by a federal judge in 2020).
Frontrunners were also Bolivia and Ecuador who enshrined the indigenous concept of Vivir Bien/Buen Vivir in their constitutions in 2008. The Andean concept lived by the Quecha people of Sumak Kawsay was the basis and centers around living in harmony with Nature, that is to say biocentric living. This is in contrast to the Western anthropocentric way of living which puts the human at the centre of the universe, above nature and in control of it. This biocentric belief is shared by most indigenous people.
Bolivia organized the Alternative Climate Summit in 2010, issuing a Universal Declaration (and adopting a national law) for the rights of Mother Earth. Recently (2022), it also gave rights to Lake Titicaca. In 2012 the UN organization for Harmony with Nature was established. At the same time Ecuador adopted the first constitution with a rights of Nature clause (art 71-73) in 2008. Since then Colombia recognized the rights of several rivers (2016). Chile proposed a draft constitution recognizing the rights of Nature (to be voted on in September 2022). The Llaka Honhat community in Argentina won a case in which the InterAmerican court also recognized rights of Nature. And Mexico proposes (biodiversity) policies based on ‘ armonia con la naturaleza). Though not formally recognizing rights of Nature, Costa Rica has put many environmental policies in practice that are in this spirit.
Ecuador, however, remains the only country to constitutionally recognize these rights. To mention a few court cases that ensued. In a recent landmark decision the constitutional court forbid mining in the area of Los Cedros Forest, and courts did so for a few other areas (Llurimagua territory in Imbanbura, the indigenous Sinangoe terrirory & Amazon rivers, Pinas de la Chuva hills). Other cases involved limits on agriculture (pig farming pollution, shrimp farming in a mangrove area, pine tree plantation in a paramo ecoystem) and genetically modified crops limiting ‘food sovereignty’. The first case ever won gave the river Vilcabamba rights over the claimed right to development (road construction) by a municipality. And the Galapagos islands benefitted by enhanced jurisdiction tackling illegal shark fishing. Rights of Nature also included protection of animals, most notably the domesticized monkey Estrellita. In the case of oil spills by Chevron in the Amazon, decided on earlier by conventional environmental law, but disputed by the oil company, defendants recently also successfully invoked rights of Nature.
In the meantime other countries in the world are catching up. Bhutan enshrined guardianship of Nature in its constitution of 2008 (including mandatory forest cover of 60%) that is entirely based on its (Buddhist) Gross National Happiness philosophy. In the front row also sat New Zealand in 2012 giving rights to Te Urewere National Park, mountain and a river in cooperation with indigenous peoples. Uganda adopted a rights of Nature law in 2019. In the same year, the court in Bangladesh recognized rights of rivers and the local court in India of the Yamuna and Ganges rivers (later overturned by the Supreme Court). In Europe the Spanish are writing history giving rights to the Mar Menor lake (2022). In the Netherlands rights are being petitioned for the Waddenzee and the river Maas. The design museum Nieuwe Instituut became a zoöp (zoöperation giving voice to all life).
With this new movement some initial steps have been taken in the fight against climate change and protection of the Earth.
No one can predict the outcome of Putin’s war. As Tatiana Stanovaya of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace writes in the New York Times (19/8/22), Mr. Putin aims to capture and hold on to the Donetsk/Luhansk region, make the rest of Ukraine a puppet state, and establish a new world order in which the “West” is run by people like Orban, Bolsonaro or Trump. Yet in many ways, he has already lost.
First, not just the rich countries of the “West”, are trying to rid themselves of fossil fuels, but most of the world. His war has caused many countries and companies to turbo-charge that effort. In the short run, the world will face severe shortages, and Russia will get more money for less oil and gas. Starting in very few years, however, the demand for fossil fuels will go down sharply. China, India, and North Korea will continue to buy Russian oil and gas, albeit at steeply discounted prices, but they too understand climate change and the risks of depending on Mr. Putin’s Russia.
Secondly, the sanctions are starting to bite. Modern weaponry needs advanced technology which Russia doesn’t have. Its best and brightest were busy hacking, phishing, and influencing Western politics rather than developing world-class technological products and services. Without advanced technology, Russia simply cannot build weapons to match Nato.
Also, the focus on fossil fuels has caused the neglect of developing other parts of the economy, which will be much more difficult now that many parts can no longer be imported.
Thirdly the attempt to weaken Nato has spectacularly failed. Nato is now bigger, and more agile and its membership has increased its military spending massively. Ukraine is a candidate for membership in the European Union.
And most importantly, for many decades to come, not just Mr. Putin, but Russia as a state, has lost all credibility. No one, least of all its neighbors, will feel comfortable having Russia as a partner. The lies, the attacks on Crimea, then the Donbass, and now Ukraine with its brutal wanton bombardments of civilian targets are etched in the minds and memories of leaders all over the world. Even after the guns fall silent, the knowledge of the brutality and the cruelty will remain. Chances are, there will even be a Nürnberg-style trial.
There have been articles about the Russian people during this war they may not call that. They approve of Mr. Putin and his war, they feel hurt about the dismemberment of the Russia of yore, they don’t know any better because the only news they get is government-controlled, etc.
This may be true up to a point, but as the saying goes “You can fool all of the people some of the time, and some of the people all of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time.”
Many Russians have relatives in Ukraine. Their messages, phone calls, and photos of destroyed buildings will eventually sink in. Mr. Putin may hide the casualties by using Wagner proxies, soldiers from remote areas, and using mobile crematoria rather than body bags to hide the tens of thousands of casualties, but eventually, people will wake up. Where is Sacha’s son, where is Katya’s uncle? Why was Uncle Dmitri’s house bombed? Why can’t we buy computers, see Netflix, and eat at a real McDonald’s?
The economy will slow down dramatically, every day more products will disappear from the shelves, paying mortgages for a house abroad will become almost impossible, and Russians will be shamed if they travel abroad.
For a while, Mr. Putin’s PR machine will provide boilerplate answers, but Russians aren’t stupid. Bit by bit their awareness will grow. Even the inner circle will get desperate. Mr. Putin will fall, not Hitler-style hunkering in a bunker but from forces within the country.
Beware of Brutus Mr. P.
He knows, and that perhaps is why he sits so absurdly far away from everyone.
Preferential treatment among trading partners was once a potent tool in the sovereign toolbox. With the raising of tariffs during the Great Depression, policies like the British Empire’s system of Imperial Preferences, which reduced tariffs for members of the Commonwealth, gave an appreciable advantage to certain countries while disadvantaging others. By the end of the Second World War, the desire to reduce trade frictions and end favouritism culminated in the negotiation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), which, in large part, sought to put an end to trade preferences through the most-favoured nation (MFN) obligation.
MFN remains one of international trade law’s core principles. It has, moreover, experienced a kind of rebirth in the public discourse stemming from recent events in Ukraine, with several states revoking MFN as a sanctioning tool. On the one hand, this invocation of MFN suggests that it continues to play an important role in the international arena; on the other, it adds to an already significant list of MFN’s exceptions. Whether it is experiencing a renaissance or requiem, however, understanding MFN continues to be essential for understanding trade relations.
MFN in the context of international trade law
To do so, it is helpful to begin with the framework of rules within which MFN sits –international trade law and the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements.
Modern international trade law developed on the foundation of the GATT 1947 and evolved through a series of negotiations culminating in the Uruguay Round, which established the WTO in 1994. Today, the WTO has 164 member states and covers almost all aspects of global trade.
The WTO consists of several agreements – to which all WTO members are a party – related to trade in goods and services, intellectual property, and trade remedies (i.e., anti-dumping and countervailing duties), among many other areas. The WTO also provides a forum for trade negotiations and a state-to-state dispute settlement mechanism.
What do these agreements actually do? In brief, they set out a series of rules governing trade between states. These rules are a mix of substantive law – e.g., the non-discrimination obligations and bound tariff rates – and oversight over domestic trade-related procedures – e.g., rules for dumping and subsidy investigations undertaken by domestic authorities.
A cornerstone principle…
MFN is one such rule. More than that, it is a core tenet of the WTO that pervades several of its agreements. It has been described as a “cornerstone of the GATT” and “one of the pillars of the WTO trading system”.
But it isn’t, as it sounds, about choosing favourites. To the contrary, MFN is a non-discrimination obligation, a requirement to accord the same treatment to all trading partners. As set out in the GATT, MFN means that any “advantage, favour, privilege or immunity” provided to the goods originating in one WTO member must be given “immediately and unconditionally” to like goods originating in another WTO member.
Applied to tariffs, MFN means that like goods must be subject to the same duty rate, regardless of their country of origin. Thus, apples imported from Italy are subject to the same duties as apples from Chile; bicycles from Taiwan the same duties as bicycles from France, and so on. Legal disputes occur on issues such as whether two products are truly “like” one another (query whether Fuji apples are “like” Granny Smiths).
… with many exceptions
Like most legal rules, MFN has exceptions. The most significant of which is free trade agreements (FTAs) – e.g., the USMCA or the CPTPP – which have proliferated since the formation of the WTO. Despite providing better treatment to their members than the WTO agreements, FTAs are permitted under the GATT. Why? Because they contribute to the overall goal of lowering trade barriers. As of March 2022, no less than 354 FTAs were in force.
The WTO also permits members to deviate from MFN if, for example, their actions are necessary to protect human, animal or plant life, or are related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources (to name just two of ten such exceptions). A WTO member may also take action it considers necessary for the protection of its “essential security interests”, even if that action violates MFN – e.g., the US’s recent national security tariffs on steel and aluminum.
Anti-dumping and countervailing duties – which may be applied to specific countries where dumped or subsidized goods are found to originate – are yet other deviations from MFN permitted by the WTO.
If these exceptions seem significant, it is because they are. The expansion of FTAs alone has prompted some observers to regard MFN as the exception rather than the rule.
When nations fall out of favour
Nevertheless, MFN has gained a certain prominence of late stemming from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
On March 3, 2022, Canada ventured into the avant-garde by revoking Russia’s and Belarus’ MFN status, triggering the “general tariff” for goods from these countries (while Belarus is not a WTO member, it was granted MFN status under Canadian law). On April 8, the US followed suit, suspending “normal trade relations” (i.e., MFN) with Russia and Belarus. Japan, the EU and UK have also announced intentions to revoke Russia’s MFN status.
This means that Russia and Belarus will face non-MFN tariffs (for Canada, this is generally on the order of between 30-35%) on all of their exports to these countries. For countries such as Canada and the US that have coupled MFN revocation with an outright ban on some of Russia’s most valuable exports (including petroleum), its real economic impact may be limited. Yet, because of MFN’s position at the centre of the WTO, its revocation sends a strong message – there has been a fundamental break from “normal trade relations” between these parties.
Renaissance and requiem?
Though embattled by exceptions and deviations, the invocation of MFN as a kind of “big gun” sanctioning tool underlines its continued relevance for global trade. It demonstrates that MFN remains enmeshed in the WTO and international trade law, so much that it is a synonym for “normal trade relations”. At the same time, it provides further evidence of a willingness to deviate from MFN in order to achieve policy objectives, an apparent turn, in spirit, to the pre-GATT 1947 era when preferences were bestowed upon favoured countries. The relevance of MFN may only prevail so long as countries continue to value equitable treatment and reducing trade barriers above other considerations. For better or worse, this remains to be seen.
About the author:
Philip Kariam
Philip Kariam is an associate at McMillan LLP, where he practices international trade and investment law. His experience includes working as international trade counsel for the Province of Ontario and as a legal consultant for the World Bank.
He holds an LL.M from Georgetown University, a Master of International Affairs from Sciences Po, a JD from Osgoode Hall Law School, and a BASc from the University of Waterloo.
Italy has always been one of my favorite family holiday destinations. All our Italian trips were filled with sunny weather, gorgeous sceneries, warm and friendly people and, of course, delicious food… a real threat to my diet… My fascination for this beautiful country, to which we, as Romanians, are strongly related by ancient historical ties, determined me to learn the language and get in touch with Italian expat communities everywhere we moved.
Although I never met her in person, Francesca Andreini captivated me from the very beginning. A cultivated woman, born in Florence and with various artistic interests, she has managed to define her role into the diplomatic world and find her own path, while accompanying her diplomatic husband.
Francesca Andreini and spouse.
From native Florence and the beautiful, beloved hills surrounding it, to Rome and later on to Syria, Senegal, USA and Thailand, there has been a beautiful life journey sprinkled with family events, parables and experiences that completed the marvelous and accomplished woman (also a mother of three) that she is today.
‘My first jobs were in television production and advertising. At that time, my husband joined the Italian diplomatic service. I was fiercely against it at the beginning, the idea of losing my world, my identity, terrified me, but eventually he managed to persuade me. It was not easy for me to adapt to diplomatic life, to find my own sense of purpose. It was a gradual process.’
It takes strength and a determined mind to be able to adapt to such frequent moves. I have often struggled myself to find a meaningful way to express myself, during the diplomatic postings. What also troubles me is the change of role and identity that you feel when you return to your home country, where you have a different status and a different dynamic of life.
Francesca tells me: ‘I had a desire to build something that was truly mine, that could not be taken away from me at each moving. That’s how I began writing, about 15 years ago. At first, there were stories for a literary review, Zibaldoni, and then my two novels: Nessuno ti può costringere (QuiEdit, 2009) and Primi anni a WDC (Edizioni del Gattaccio, 2015). The latter has also been translated and released in the USA, under the title Under American Skies (New Academia Publishing, 2021). In Rome, I also wrote some screenplays, venturing into a whole new and exciting field. My script, Senza me, received recognition of cultural interest in 2010 by the Ministry of Culture and a grant for its production. In Washington DC I joined a business networking association and co-created ParoLab, a club that promoted Italian literature in the U.S., through a reading group, literary events and book presentations.’
As you are now reading her story, I am sure you can easily understand how active and committed she is to her projects.
‘When I moved back to Rome, my passion for literature translated into creating more cultural events, some literary readings and workshops on creative writing. The latter inspired my video tutorials on “How to overcome writer’s block” (available on YouTube in Italian under the title “Come superare il blocco dello Scrittore”, with English subtitles). In Thailand, I made my past experience available to the Embassy, providing benevolent help on several projects, such as editing an anthology of Italian-Thai short stories and then publishing short videos inspired by them, also producing a documentary about the Italian architectural heritage in Bangkok. In the meantime I’ve been teaching Italian culture and literary history at Chulalongkorn University as a guest lecturer, I’ve continued to contribute to Zibaldoni and have occasionally held some conferences both in Italy and Thailand.’
I can see that her years abroad have been extremely dynamic and fulfilling. But that’s because she made them this way and turned the downsides of diplomatic life into her advantages. Francesca says: ‘I always managed to find my own space, to give life to my own projects. It was indeed very time and energy-consuming having to start all over again at each new posting but, on the other hand, every country I have lived in has taught me something important, offering me precious opportunities of inner growth.
The most common false stereotype is that diplomatic life is easy, with plenty of comfort and luxury.
It is in many ways a difficult life, requiring sacrifices on a personal level, especially from spouses. Giving up your career, the job which defines you socially and provides you with independent revenue, in exchange for a gregarious role, is not easy. The diplomatic career often takes you to countries where daily life is difficult, where there are dangers and diseases you are not used to. And then, there is the difficulty of being far away from one’s country, one’s family and old friends. When my parents grew old and my mother became ill, living on the opposite side of the ocean was a cause for enormous stress for me.
While the role of a spouse is very important, it’s generally underestimated and usually taken for granted that we are there and provide all the support we can to our consorts. We don’t usually receive any kind of training, guidelines or support from our own country. On top of re-organizing the life of the entire family abroad, spouses often have a busy schedule that includes events they hold themselves. In addition, through their informal contacts, spouses are often able to create a network of acquaintances which can be quite valuable for their consorts. In short, being a diplomatic spouse is a real profession that requires care, commitment, time and skills. It is unfortunate that it does not have a proper recognition.’
Wise words coming from years of experience and also, no doubt, from a strong and wise philosophy of life… in her own words… ‘my strength is having a soft spot for everything’.
When the sun comes up, the darkness gets bright. We see this nightmare almost constantly. Crises leave a dull que that appears in nightmares that carry throughout the day. People often feel that they are thirsty and run down, with no water to drink, and no one to help but onlookers in despair. Many countries are looking to save themselves from this crisis while slight problems surface daily in the most developed countries. Perhaps the world is getting closer to realizing this dream.
A few months ago, alarming news of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine spread through official news agencies. Many people in the Middle East and Africa were watching this great crisis with concern for their own states. A crisis that may be a terrible spark for much bigger crises such as hunger and war over available resources was not on their mind at first. For example, while the Egyptian government has said it has wheat reserves for the next four months only, the Egyptian people are wondering what to need to do next. The dread of an imminent nuclear war may satisfy a small population in these countries. The last resort is unwelcomed by any means. Without help from developed countries, these hungry and frustrated people may never be able to cope. They do not have an airplane to board, nor hope to even hang on to its wheels. An example of what happened to desperate Afghans fleeing the situation is a statement that appears in the minds of many.
At this point, how important are the people of the Middle East and Africa to developed countries? Many of these people are now drowning in a sea of despair and fear of hunger and war. Many of these people have had the chance to immigrate to developed countries. And the large population in the form of the refugee crisis has caused a new crisis in the world called the refugee crisis. And many cannot even leave their families and go to sea. They break down every day for fear of a worse future. War needs to full-stop and humanity crisis donations need to surface. Wasted money on ammunition for what?
Perhaps a decade ago, the emigration of a person from these countries was accompanied by a small farewell party. There was still hope for improvement. And many were hoping to start small businesses in these countries. But now dreams may seem farther away than ever. Many people in these countries are being deprived of their most basic rights every day. Even having the right to breathe clean air is occasionally gone with the dust crisis that has hit the Middle East and Africa more than ever.
The feeling of betrayal and the unjust distribution of wealth and resources have erased the remnants of hope and aspiration. This frustration is growing. And the broad bureaucratic structures are incapable of solving the current problems and the dire consequences of the Ukraine war crisis, of which hunger is perhaps the most important consequence for the Middle East and Africa. And people are ignored in silence. Focusing on the deprived and harmed is a natural process but not focusing on those being afflicted by the war in Ukraine is worse. Play by play each day we see the news. Yet, what good does this do for the starving and devastated bystanders of this war?
The people of the Middle East and Africa are drowning in fear of the future. More developed countries with smarter policies could help the Middle East and Africa battle the super-challenge of climate change and hungry. Through smarter and more targeted collaborations, especially in the area of climate change crisis, with the Middle Eastern and African universities and educational and scientific assistance to these universities, the Middle East and Africa could highly improve. This improvement may place a smile on the hungry people affected by the Ukraine war. Thus, selling military ammunition, war and even sanctions should be replaced by scientific collaborations and diplomacy. And this even won’t let the next migration crisis be created.
The recent visit of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi to Riyadh in March 2022 and meetings with the Saudi King and other authorities placed Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s relationship back into focus because of their issues and challenges. Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s official and media rhetoric refers to “Iranian, Turkish, and Yemeni threats” to the region’s security, stability, sovereignty, and interests.
Saudi Arabia supported Egypt’s independence and the withdrawal of British forces when they signed a treaty of friendship in 1926. A Defense Agreement was formed and signed between the two countries in 1955. Saudi Arabia backed Egypt during the 1956 aggression. During the October 1973 battle Saudi Arabia provided Egypt’s forces in Sinai with oil support.
Historical Background
After the United States reneged on its pledge to build the High Dam, Saudi Arabia stepped in to support Egypt with a gift of $100 million on August 27, 1956. Until the October 1973 conflict, Saudi Arabia supported Egypt by suspending oil supplies to the United States and Israel in support of Egypt. Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz also visited a trench in Egypt. Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic ties with Egypt on April 23, 1979, following the signing of the Camp David Accords. Former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saudi King Fahd bin Abdulaziz resumed diplomatic ties in 1987 after decades of estrangement.
Saudi Arabia stood by Hosni Mubarak after the revolution in Egypt on January 25, 2011. Mubarak received a phone call from Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, who offered his support and condemned the demonstrations. He also lauded the army’s role in the orderly transition of power following Mubarak’s departure, although ties were tense.
Saudi Arabia supported the alternative administration in Egypt prior to Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s rise to power and shortly after President Mohamed Morsi‘s downfall. To help Egypt, Saudi Arabia sent an estimated $4 billion worth of monetary and in-kind assistance, as well as $2 billion in Central Bank deposits and perhaps an equal number of oil-related commodities.
Egypt-Gulf Cooperation
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates provided Egypt with almost $12 billion in loans, grants, and petroleum after the overthrow of Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi in early July 2013. With regard to the Gulf states’ financial support for Sisi, Sisi talked openly about his desire for $10 billion in payments from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. He also talked about the logistics of transferring the money to Egypt’s army accounts.
Saudi-led “Decisive Storm” military action in March 2015 was supported by Egypt. When Saudi Arabia announced the formation of a 34-country Islamic military alliance to combat terrorism on December 14, 2014, Egypt backed the Kingdom’s military strategy. However, Egypt provided only its assistance in the form of political and media backing, with no involvement on the ground.
A “people revolt” against Bashar al-Assad began in March 2011. In response, the regime’s supporters, including Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, launched an armed conflict with the Arab and Western-backed opposition groups. “We will not remove Bashar from power,” Sisi declared. Syrian revolution is a “sovereign matter” according to Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, who also said Egypt supports a peaceful resolution. Egyptian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ahmed Abu Zeid noted that each sovereign country has its own measurements and assessments and makes decisions based on its own viewpoint.
Increasing Egyptian-Saudi Coordination Post-Arab Spring
Saudi Arabia was relieved by the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood and the imprisonment of late Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, who died in prison, during the Sisi era, which began in mid-2014. Due to Egypt’s new regime’s need for large and urgent doses of support to stop Egypt’s deterioration on all sides, the Egyptian regime and the monarchy in Saudi Arabia has become closer in a dramatic way. This historic opportunity presented itself to Saudi Arabia to correct the course of its relationship with Egypt and to reactivate it, so that it could avoid previous mistakes, one of which was Saudi Arabia’s bet on Mubarak’s steadfastness without providing strong and tangible support to him during the popular uprising.
Since the populist upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen began in late 2010, Saudi Arabia has expressed alarm about the expansion of these movements to the Gulf states. Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf states managed to keep “Arab Spring” repercussions under control through emergency economic, social, and financial policies and measures that eased internal conditions at the same time as boosting support for Arab regimes that resemble the Saudi regime, especially in terms of their association with US political, military, and economic interests.
During the Sisi era visits and unbroken contacts between officials of the two countries have increased to strengthen and support their relations in various fields during this period. The two countries’ relationship is characterized by a high level of coordination and open communication in order to address regional concerns, crises, risks, and challenges. As a starting point, all regional intervention in Arab countries’ affairs is considered as a threat to Arab independence, sovereignty, and national unity, regardless of their source.
Egyptian-Saudi Cooperation in the Light of Regional Changes
High-level contacts between Egyptian and Saudi officials have grown since Sisi’s election as Egypt’s president in 2014. A number of summits or Arab or inter-Arab encounters have taken place between Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi and Saudi Arabian leaders. With the tripling of Saudi financial help to Egypt’s administration, these reciprocal trips have solidified Egyptian-Saudi cooperation in a variety of industries; as a result of Iran’s “intervention” in Arab affairs and the necessity of a collective Arab reaction to Iran and its allies in the region and the importance of collaboration in combating terrorist groups in the region.
With the escalation of the so-called “strategic” Iranian threat to security in the region and the Gulf states in recent years, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have seen a remarkable development on several levels in their relationship. This is due in part to Iran’s growing military and economic capabilities, or the gains made by the axis led by Iran in the Middle East. Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s “strategic” relationship changed somewhat during the course of three years, but the consequences were significant. While condemning terrorism, both Saudi Arabia and Egypt focused on Egyptian backing for the Saudi Arabian campaign against Ansar Allah in Yemen and Saudi support for Egypt’s military campaign against takfiri groups in Sinai.
During high-level visits in 2020 and 2021, these concerns were revealed. At the time, Saudi Arabia expanded its financial and investment support to Egypt in exchange for Egypt’s political support of the Kingdom’s fight against “Iranian expansion” through its friends in the Middle East.
Several reports indicated that Egypt and Saudi Arabia have made significant progress in their economic, commercial, tourism, and health ties during the past two years. The Israeli attacks on the Palestinian people and the Al-Aqsa Mosque, meantime, were also condemned by Egypt and Saudi Arabia at the same time.
After the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and its implications on global and regional security and stability, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi visited Riyadh on March 8, 2022, to discuss these issues. The recent Egyptian-Saudi summit, according to former assistant foreign minister Hamdi Saleh, sought a cohesive vision to face the hard circumstances around the world. “There is no clarity of vision following the Russian-Ukrainian conflict,” he said.
Osama Naqli, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Egypt, is certain that the visit would yield beneficial results. More than 70 government agencies and institutions from both countries have signed a variety of agreements, memorandums of understanding, or protocol agreements, giving this relationship a strategic dimension that enhances the goals of joint cooperation between the concerned authorities in the two countries institutionally, he said. Saudi Arabia is the second-largest foreign investor in Egypt’s government and business sectors.
According to Gamal Aboul Fotouh, the Egyptian Senate’s Under-Secretary for Irrigation & Agriculture, the Egyptian-Saudi relations are long-standing and extend into the political and economic realms, with the total trade volume of 8.3 billion dollars between Egypt and Saudi Arabia during the first eleven months of this year, while the Egyptian exports to Saudi Arabia totalled about 2 billion dollars.
Egyptian-Saudi relations were tense, but not hostile, under Sisi and King Salman bin Abdulaziz‘s rule, due to shared interests, challenges, and political visions, particularly in relation to the so-called Iranian threat and the political axis. In the wake of Egypt voting in favour of two different Security Council resolutions, one aimed at stopping the bloodshed in Aleppo but opposed by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, ties between Riyadh and Cairo became unusually tense (on October 8, 2016). Saudi Arabia was furious by Egypt’s backing for the Russian decision, which it viewed as anti-Arab.
Al-Sisi has acknowledged that other countries exert pressure on Egypt. To him, “We will only kneel to God,” he stated at a military training conference. His country’s approach on Syria is autonomous, and he highlighted the importance of finding a political solution. He denied that the suspension of Saudi oil shipments to Egypt had anything to do with Egypt’s vote at the UN Security Council.
As the late Saudi journalist and writer Jamal Khashoggi put it, “I tend to think Saudi Arabia likes Egypt and would want to retain a good relationship with it.” Egyptians’ perceptions of the dangers to Arab national security are at the heart of the matter. “The Egyptians tried to remain neutral” according to Khashoggi. However, neutrality is unacceptable to Saudi Arabia. Even though Egypt does not explicitly back the regimes of Syria and Russia, it indirectly does so. Khashoggi went on to say that “the conflict’s premise is Iran’s win in Syria.” If Egypt adopts a more cooperative stance with Saudi Arabia, these differences will disappear.
Recent Developments in the Egyptian-Saudi Relations
After Egypt’s military overthrew President Mohamed Morsi in a bloodless coup in 2013, relations between Egypt and Qatar have been tense ever since. On the eve of cutting diplomatic ties with Doha on June 5, 2017, Al-Sisi said that the return to the previous situation would not lead to a significant change in Egyptian-Qatari relations. Resumption of aviation traffic and “limited” diplomatic representation between the two countries are the maximum measures that can be done. In fact, many government economists and others close to Sisi predict that Egypt’s investment losses would be exacerbated as a result of the rift, especially since Saudi, Emirati, and Kuwaiti capital have not joined the Egyptian market as planned five years ago.
Due to a decrease in funding and a lack of implementation of numerous projects and files agreed upon during King Salman’s and Crown Prince’s visits to Egypt in April 2016, Egypt and Saudi Arabia face a number of issues, most notably at the economic level. Mohammed bin Salman made the announcement in March of this year. Saudi-funded development projects in Sinai have been put on hold, according to reliable sources.
King Salman Bridge, which was part of a package of projects agreed upon by Egypt and Saudi Arabia in 2016 when they ceded Tiran and Sanafir to Saudi Arabia, has been stalled for two years at the point of comparison between two projects: first, the bridge is based on Tiran Island, and second, the bridge is extended on multiple stages between Ras Sheikh Hamid and Nabq. Egypt and Saudi Arabia also had issues with the renewal of the agreement to supply crude oil from Aramco, given the new contracts Egypt signed with Iraq to avoid a repeat of Saudi Arabia’s supply suspension, which occurred during Egypt’s judicial and parliamentary complications in the period of maritime border demarcation agreement implementation.
When Egypt and Saudi Arabia agreed to a maritime border delimitation deal in April 2016, Egyptians were outraged and the matter was taken to court, which cooled relations between the two countries for months. Egypt’s claim to Tiran and Sanafir originates from the 1906 boundary demarcation agreement, according to lawyers who oppose the deal.
The Egyptian government prioritized “importing” money from abroad in any manner and from any available source during the Sisi era in order to improve the poor economic and social conditions in Egypt. It was predicted that Egypt’s new leadership would gravitate toward Saudi Arabia, which is monetarily the richest Arab country, and cultivate ties with it at various levels, as well as “sell” it positions supporting its policies toward Yemen, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia have established a strong and long-lasting relationship despite their differing views on regional and international issues and some of its foundations being vulnerable. There’s the pillar of money (or petrodollars), which frequently upsets the equilibrium that should exist between states, particularly between Arab and Islamic countries. Economic, commercial, and cultural ties between Egypt and Saudi Arabia have become stronger as a result of their shared strategic objectives and geographical proximity. King Salman Bridge is expected to deliver economic benefits to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, according to officials.
As a result of these disparities, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have very different views and policies on a number of regional and international issues, including as the conflict in Syria, the Saudi-Yemeni war and the conflict in Libya, as well as Iran and Russia’s involvement in the region. However, these differences did not lead to a rift between the two, notably during the reign of Sisi. The 2013 military coup in Egypt resulted in the country losing much of its regional clout and strategic location. Economic hardship, near-total reliance on foreign aid and subsidies, as well as a decline in its political standing are all major roadblocks to its claim to regional leadership, leaving it open to pressure from Saudi Arabia or any other party holding up a card.
Saudi-Egyptian relations were exacerbated by the military participation of Syria and Russia. Russian policies in Syria and connections between Iran and Russia were a concern to Saudi Arabia. As Tehran’s most important international backer, Moscow provided military backing for the Assad regime in Syria, and was Tehran’s guarantor for the nuclear accord.
The tumultuous global oil market over the last two years is a source of friction between the United States and Russia. As part of the struggle over quotas and prices, Saudi Arabia is wary of Russian and Iranian attempts to impose limitations on it. Egyptian diplomacy has moved closer to the Russian position since the July 2013 coup in Syria, restricting its focus to terrorism. Cairo, on the other hand, paid no attention to the crisis between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which was expected to resolved by Assad’s ouster. It is seen acceptable by the Sisi regime to maintain the old regime if Assad survives.
Egypt’s “very pragmatic” policy toward the Saudi regime, which aims to attract Gulf funds and investments into Egypt, especially at a time of financial affluence in the Kingdom and Saudi openness to Western countries in the economy, politics, culture, and the arts, also condones Saudi Arabia’s clumsy policies toward Lebanon, Syria, Libya, Sudan, and the Gaza Strip (up to most African and Asian countries). As a result of shared values and interests, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have a strong connection. It is necessary to coordinate efforts across various fields in order to protect the national security and economic interests of Arab countries, and to reorient the enormous capabilities of Arab peoples and countries in their natural historical direction, with full cooperation with neighbouring or distant countries.
About the author:
Dr. Mohamad Zreik
Dr. Mohamad Zreik has PhD of International Relations, he is independent researcher, his area of research interest is related to Chinese Foreign Policy, Belt and Road Initiative, Middle Eastern Studies, China-Arab relations. Author has numerous studies published in high ranked journals and international newspapers.
Noted French chemist, Louis Pasteur, best known for his work on vaccines and pioneering Pasteurization process, famously remarked after Napoleonic wars that “science and peace will triumph over ignorance and war.” Pasteur’s belief in the ability of science to provide answers and building bridges of peace between nations is historically shared by many. Similar claims have supported the development of the contemporary science diplomacy discourse. The scientific values of ‘transparency’ and ‘universality’ have been a driving force in furthering trust and development between nation states.
The continuing scourge of wars, including Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine, nevertheless, casts a shadow over Pasteur’s eternal hope that humanity will someday leave deadly wars behind and dwell in peaceful co-existence. Especially the war in Ukraine has proved that Europe’s post-Cold War science diplomacy has failed. Facing Putin’s military one-upmanship and abuse of international law, western nations have been quick to make science a tool of political sanctions.
Following the launch of Russia’s special military operations on February 24th, many leading European scientific agencies decided to cancel or put joint projects on hold. The European Space Agency (ESA) cancelled the prestigious Luna 25, 26 and 27 moon missions that were in cooperation with the Russian agency, Roscosmos. The European Commission declared a wide range of sanctions, including the end of Horizon Europe funding to the Russian institutions. Their aim has been to punish and isolate Moscow from major scientific and technological innovations.
Short of severing all the ties and scientific contacts, the policymakers in Europe also expressed the need to keep some scientific channels of communication open to bring an early end to the conflict. While sanctioning Kremlin, the scientific community across the North Atlantic region has been unequivocal in its support of individual Russian students and scientists working in the Western institutions and in extending solidarity to their counterparts in Russia opposing Putin’s aggression. Nevertheless, scientific sanctions to punish nations that endanger international peace and stability through their actions, have been part of Western statecraft for much of modern history.
Science Diplomacy & Sanctions During Cold War
The idea of scientific collaborations became central in attemts to construct a stable international order after the end of Second World War. Scientific collaborations during the Cold War offered a vital instrument for American administrations to further political cooperation with the Soviet Union. The US scientific initiatives proved critical in breaking the political ice after the Cuban missile crisis and ushering in the era of détente. The scientific ties enabled the two sides to embark on projects like the Apollo-Soyuz mission, which became a symbol of goodwill and bonhomie amidst a deep-seated ideological contest. The signing of the U.S.-USSR scientific cooperation agreement in the early 1970s boosted political cooperation, helping the two sides to ease tensions.
Similarly, science diplomacy was vital for managing the burgeoning U.S.-USSR arms race. This led the two sides to sign many pathbreaking arms control and disarmament agreements. Despite Cold War stories of strained relations, the two countries worked often together to strengthen the global nuclear safety and security frameworks. Indeed, scientific exchanges enabled the two great powers to pursue normal ties during the phase of détente. But the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 proved detrimental to the spirit of scientific collaborations.
The Afghanistan War turned out to be a high-stake ideological contest. It forced the U.S. to impose stringent scientific and economic sanctions on the USSR. It was the time that the National Science Foundation and the U.S. National Academy cancelled many ongoing programmes with their Soviet counterparts. The U.S. State Department too joined hands in refusing visas to Soviet scientists. The reason was to coerce the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. In the early 1980s, the Reagan administration imposed additional science and technology sanctions to the Soviet Union as a response to the Polish Government of Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski’s declaration of martial law.
Interestingly enough, to Under Secretary of State in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, sanctions actually constituted an “astonishing ignorance of past experience” and was highly inefficient. To its usual political tactics, the U.S. imposed stringent scientific sanctions on countries like India, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea for violating the global non-proliferation nuclear order. Following the May 1998 nuclear explosions in South Asia, the United States banned the export of lab materials and equipment to these countries and put travel restrictions on their scientists.
Despite high hopes, scientific sanctions had limited influence in settling political conflicts. Often, they had opposite results. Throughout the 1980s the Soviet Union strengthened its aggressive imperialist policies and made technological choices that disengaged them from the west. Ineffective or not, science diplomacy in the form of scientific sanctions has been a part and parcel of western statecraft throughout the Cold War.
The promise of science diplomacy in the Post-Cold War era
The end of Cold War ushered in new phase of global science diplomacy. Marked by America’s post-Cold War unipolar phase, it stood on two dominant exigencies. First, science emerged as a vital engagement tool for West in its post-Cold War global outreach. Resolving differences and forging new political coalitions worldwide have been the key aims for those who promoted global science diplomacy advocacy throughout the past two decades. For example, leading Anglo-American institutions, such as the American Association of Advancement of Science (AAAS) and the Royal Society in the U.K. have been trying to build trust and international cooperation based on the supposedly “universal” and “rational” character of science.
Second, science diplomacy assumed immense significance in the wake of promoting Europe’s research and innovation competitiveness across the Afro-Asian regions. Securing new markets in the emerging economies of these nations became Europe’s main concern. Creating new markets, technologies, and solutions significantly overlapped with innovation diplomacy. This meant new ideas for building new research partnerships and harnessing various emerging technologies. With the end of the Cold-war bipolar rivalry, the rising global attention to the crisis of global commons necessitated deepening international cooperation through a global evidence-based policy approach.
The international scientific collaborations forged in the wake of addressing transnational challenges such as HIV-AIDS, Ebola epidemic, ozone depletion, melting of glaciers, and biodiversity losses. These symbolized the coming together of the world for solving common global challenges and building the bridges of peace and prosperity. The success of various science diplomacy initiatives with countries of the Middle East, Africa, China, and Russia, corroborated the liberal-internationalist premise of scientific ties. The emergence of science and innovation elites as peacemakers was a truly unique feature in this international diplomacy. It offered a mechanism to manage political differences and compelled policymakers to put knowledge above narrow sectarian differences.
The spiral of great power competition, however, continue to hover over science diplomacy’s liberal-internationalist premise. The emergence of a stronger Sino-Russian alliance in the past decade seeks to counter NATO’s centrality in Europe. Similarly, the democratic governance in West faces serious threat from rising authoritarian ideologies, anti-science campaigns, fake-news, and external interference in elections. As a result, the European Commission as a whole and but also individual member states have been recalibrating their science diplomacy strategies and the nature and extent of its global scientific collaborations. Germany’s 2020 science diplomacy strategy paper, for instance, explicitly outlined the need to put science in service of promoting “democratic actions” and supporting the members of the scientific community facing persecution under authoritarian regimes. The growing realism in EU’s global scientific collaborations is also evident from its adoption of stringent regulations to screen investment proposals especially from countries like China.
Emerging Outlook for E.U.’s Science Diplomacy
With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European science diplomacy stands at a crossroads facing the inextricable Janus face of sanctions and scientific cooperation. Science diplomacy has indeed both a coercive and collegial side corresponding to times of war and peace. The balance between the two is particularly stark as European policymakers feel uneasy to re-position science diplomacy in their foreign relations and statecraft.
The liberal internationalist premise of science diplomacy, which became dominant in the post-Cold war years, also faces serious scrutiny. Science diplomacy practitioners have been drawing serious flak for exaggerating the value of scientific collaborations’ while overlooking hierarchies and wranglings within the science and academe. The conceptual churning is going to influence the future trajectories of science diplomacy. In this context, it is worthwhile to reflect on emerging concerns and priorities for EU’s science diplomacy programmes.
On the one hand, many European leaders view scientific sanctions as a much-needed political instrument. But it remains to be seen whether the sanctions will force Putin to return to the negotiating table. It is also best not to lose sight of its attendant risks. The traditional carrot and stick approach to scientific collaborations have run its course in today’s globalized world. Crises like economic slowdowns, pandemics, and climate change prove the claim.
Amidst such occurrences, sanctions demand a more reasoned and calibrated approach than witnessed. The European sanctions against joint scientific projects with Russia dealing with climate change in the Arctic appear rather misplaced and may prove counterproductive. Similarly, what seems as a shortage of high-tech military equipment and the successful disruption of the Russian military supply chain, results to the use of less accurate weapons, and thus, more civilian casualties. Besides, there are concerns that diplomatic isolation might prompt Putin to escalate the war and turn nuclear.
On the other hand, the war in Ukraine forces E.U.’s policymakers to become more conscious and clearer of science’s political power. On a global level, concerns over Europe’s technological sovereignty have rendered EU’s scientific collaborations more restrictive. The need to promote scientific cooperation to address global challenges and the openness of science are seriously undermined by the necessity to protect strategic research. Maintaining Europe’s technical edge and sovereignty over the US and China, is forcing the E.U. to engage with countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and India is evident of this shift.
In sum, E.U.’s science diplomacy strategies face a tightrope walk as they seek to balance a set of conflicting priorities. The value of scientific collaborations in serving public goods hardly needs reiteration. However, the Ukraine war constricts the space for European governments to foster such partnerships. The mantle of science diplomacy today is likely to rest more heavily on the shoulders of individual scientists, autonomous institutions, and non-state actors.
The challenge for these actors in promoting intentional peace and cooperation is onerous. Yet, their value in furthering dialogue and collaboration is of immense value, as seen historically. In turn, it only corroborates the Louis Pasteur’s abiding hope that “Science and Peace will (eventually) triumph over Ignorance and War…”
About the authors:
Prof. Dr. Maria Rentetzi
Prof. Dr. Maria Rentetzi is professor and chair of Science, Technology and Gender Studies at Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg (FAU).
As a recipient of an ERC consolidator grant, she is leading the development of “The Diplomatic Studies of Science,” a highly interdisciplinary field of research at the intersection of science and technology studies, history of science, and international affairs.
Dr Kapil Patil
Dr Kapil Patil is Postdoctoral Fellow with Chair of Science, Technology, and Gender Studies.
His research focusses at the intersection of science, technology and innovation policy, international relations, and diplomatic studies.
By Dr. Mirzatillo Tillabaev, First Deputy Director, National Human Rights Center of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Doctor of Law
States in many parts of the world regularly amend constitutions, and in some cases draft completely new constitutions. This may be due to various political, economic, social or other reasons. The national constitution of a country is the framing legal document, which captures the basis of the social contract between the state and the people it is supposed to serve.
Whatever the reason, one of the key elements of any constitutional reform is to ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are promoted, respected and protected. Constitutional guarantees of human rights across the spectrum of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and the mandating of courts and national human rights institutions to protect those rights, are vital steps in promoting a human rights culture.
The United Nations notes that “constitution making is a sovereign national process and that, to be successful, the process must be country-led and driven. There is no “one-size-fits-all” constitutional model or process and that national authorship should include the participation of state structures, political parties, civil society and the general public.”
The need for broad participation in the constitution-making process is also noted in article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Therefore, a constitution has the highest degree of political and legal legitimacy if it is the result of popular participation.
The process of preparing proposals (more than 62 thousand), the work of the Constitutional Commission, as well as the nationwide discussion of the draft Constitutional Law clearly show the importance of broad public participation, civil society institutions in this process.
The constitutional reform of Uzbekistan is aimed at implementing the priority principle “In the name of the honor and dignity of man.” Moreover, human dignity is the provision of a peaceful and safe life, fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, the gradual creation of decent living conditions and modern infrastructure, qualified medical care, quality education, social protection and a healthy ecological environment for every inhabitant of the country.
The following priority areas for constitutional reforms in the field of human rights protection and the human dimension have been identified:
The first is to change the previously existing paradigm “state – society – person” to a new one: “person – society – state”, fixing it in constitutional legislation and constitutional practice.
The second is the constitutional consolidation of the role and status of civil society institutions, the principle “Society is the initiator of reforms”.
The third is to increase the effectiveness of the current system of human rights protection, reliable protection of the rights of persons with disabilities, women, children, and youth.
Uzbekistan has ratified, and thereby committed itself to comply with, seven of the nine main existing international human rights treaties, namely: the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
In addition, as an OSCE participating State, Uzbekistan is committed to fulfilling core OSCE commitments in the human dimension, including commitments in the areas of pluralistic democracy, the rule of law and democratic institutions; the independence of the judiciary; independent national human rights institutions; fulfillment of international obligations; protection from arbitrary arrest or detention; the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the right to a fair trial and effective remedies; tolerance and non-discrimination; gender equality and other areas.
All these documents served as the basis for the improvement and preparation of the draft Constitutional Law.
First of all, it should be noted that the draft Constitutional Law includes a number of new positive changes that are not in the current Constitution. In general, despite the fact that the draft Law provides for changes more than 60 articles and 6 new articles, of these, changes to 28 articles and all 6 new articles relate to human rights and the human dimension.
For the first time at the constitutional level, the principle of international law is fixed – respect for human rights and freedoms (Article 17).
Title II of the Constitution contains a list of human rights and fundamental freedoms, to which several new provisions have been added.
The proposed project significantly strengthens the guarantees of human and civil rights and freedoms:
1. In the Republic of Uzbekistan, the death penalty is prohibited (Article 24), thereby implementing the provisions of the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
2. At the constitutional level, the institution of “habeas corpus” is guaranteed, i.e. arrest, detention and detention or other restriction of freedom is allowed only by a court decision, until a court decision a person cannot be detained for a period of more than 48 hours (Article 25);
3. The presumption of innocence becomes a constitutional principle, i.e. all doubts about guilt, if the possibilities are exhausted eliminate them, must be resolved in favor of the suspect, the accused or the defendant. Also, doubts arising from the application of the law must be resolved in favor of the suspect, accused or defendant (Article 26);
4. The “Miranda Rules” also receive constitutional status (Article 26), in particular:
– the rights and grounds for his detention must be explained to a person during detention in a language that he understands;
– a suspect, accused or defendant is not required to prove his innocence and may at any time exercise the right to remain silent;
5. A new article is introduced stating that every person has the right to compensation for harm caused by illegal actions or inaction of state bodies or their officials (Article 26-1);
6. New rights are guaranteed in the field of ICT, in particular, everyone has the right to access the worldwide information network Internet and use it freely, the state guarantees the protection of personal data (Article 29);
7. For the first time, environmental rights are fixed, everyone has the right to a healthy and favorable environment, reliable information about its condition and compensation for damage caused to his health or property by an environmental offense (Article 40-1);
8. For the first time, the Constitution guarantees the right to appeal to national and international human rights institutions (art. 44);
9. At the constitutional level, the institution of a constitutional complaint is fixed, i.e. the right of citizens to apply to the Constitutional Court (Article 109);
10. The institution pro bone, free legal aid (art. 116) receives constitutional status.
Article 27 of the Constitution contains a narrow definition of the right to protection of personal and family life, since this right is limited to “personal and family secrets” and a narrow interpretation of the inviolability of “home”. The proposed changes are complemented by “the right to the protection of personal data”, as well as “everyone has the right to the inviolability of the home. Deprivation of dwelling is not allowed, except by a court decision.
In addition, article 28 of the Constitution provides for the right to freedom of movement and residence in the territory of Uzbekistan. The draft proposes to consolidate the right to travel outside the country, as well as unimpeded return to one’s own country, enshrined in paragraphs. 2 and 4 of Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and paragraph 20 of the 1989 OSCE Vienna Document
The draft Constitutional Law also enshrines the principle of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child “the best interests of children must always be taken into account in all decisions concerning them”. Based on this, changes are proposed to Art. 37, 64 and 65 of the Constitution.
At the constitutional level, the principle of the UN Sustainable Development Goals “Leave no one behind” is enshrined, in particular, the state creates equal conditions for the realization of the rights and legitimate interests of persons with disabilities (Article 39).
Thus, many of the innovations contain changes aimed at implementing international obligations, recommendations of international bodies (UN Special Rapporteurs, OSCE) and raising the norms enshrined in individual laws to the constitutional status. The changes were developed after an open and free public discussion, which ensured broad public participation and meaningful discussions.
Transparency, openness and inclusiveness, as well as broad public discussion, are the main requirements of the democratic process of developing constitutional proposals in Uzbekistan. Compliance with these requirements allows us to note that the constitutional reform is positively perceived by society as a whole, and expresses the will of the entire people of Uzbekistan.
From an early age Ayuna Asalkhanova had a passion for fashion. She knew that one day she wanted to own her own business. ALIDA, her newly launched fashion brand, was born out of the realisation that the pandemic would forever change the way we look at our wardrobe. The budding designer grew up in different parts of Russia, China, Spain and Germany but she spent her teenage, and formative years in Brussels.
Ayuna enjoyed an upbringing where science and education was central, but unfortunately where creativity wasn’t really encouraged. Everytime she brought up her desire to work in the fashion industry, she was met with the same sentence; ‘Fashion is a business’. This stuck with her and essentially influenced her future choices in life. After she graduated from high school in Brussels she scored herself an internship at Chanel. She went on to study Economics at Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Digital Business Management at IE Business School in Madrid.
ALIDA- Haute Couture
Like many of us, 2020 was a year of reflection for Ayuna. She quickly realised there was a gap in the market when it comes to versatile garments. To find a piece of clothing that works as loungewear as well as for a night now (albeit with the right accessoires) is near to impossible. The fashion industry is an ever-innovating one. The brick-and-mortar approach is outdated and the market has moved almost primarily online for up and comers. Traditional stores and boutiques are using more and more social media as a channel to sell the garments. The digital age has been truly brought upon the fashion industry, and is here to stay. After thoroughly analysing the market it became quite clear that putting everything together, the vision she had for her own brand, was spot-on. Innovation is key, but Ayuna decided to stay true to her own vision, hence why production was kept local and why the pieces are so easy to style to one’s personal taste.
The brand’s moniker is derived from Ayuna’s own name and the name of her beloved grandmother. Her grandmother Lydia, a Medical Doctor & Professor of Oncology, instilled in her granddaughter a love for sourcing noble materials. She taught her granddaughter that to dress well is to elevate one’s experience on a daily basis. This was the main inspiration for the brand; sharing with other women the feeling of intimate luxury without compromising on quality. Putting no time to waste, Ayuna started sketching her designs by hand. One palazzo trousers and a kimono later, and Alida was born.
ALIDA
ALIDA is entirely handcrafted in Belgium. The choice to produce in Belgium was not a particular hard one. The country’s long standing tradition in the textile industry is well-known. Thanks to its impeccable reputation, Belgium has attracted a lot of attention for their local fashion scene that emerged in the 20th century (e.g. the Antwerp Five). This resulted into a thriving place to create haute couture. This is where ALIDA fits in perfectly. Haute Couture is ingrained in our brand DNA.
ALIDA combines a strong aesthetic identity with high-end production values and artisanal manufacturing, inviting the person wearing our garments to experience the finest of custom high-end luxury, whilst exuding a refreshing, modern spirit. The timeless design of our sets ensures longevity, these are intergenerational garments to be worn and loved forever. Production takes place entirely in Belgium. Our production was carefully chosen for their reputation within the Belgian fashion industry. These exceptional local artisans work with Belgian Royal Court Suppliers, international fashion brands and celebrated designers like NATAN, Carine Gilson and Jean-Paul Lespagnard to name a few.
ALIDA- Haute Couture
All the designs are hand-drawn by Ayuna who knows every seam and pattern by heart. We pride ourselves in our production house’s craftsmanship. The pieces produced are limited in stock and are made-to-order to prevent overproduction, in aims of preserving the environment by limiting textile waste. In production, we use natural, toxin-free dyes on our biodegradable silk as we stand firm in our commitment to be kind to the earth.
Understandably, a lot of designer houses have opted to move their production overseas. Ayuna consciously chooses to keep everything local. She stands firm behind her decision. She believes in supporting her hometown’s local economy and keeping resources within her community. It also makes it easier to control the quality of the finished garments. Every piece is made from naturally sourced silk (OEKO-TEX standard 100). Being called the queen of textiles, silk compliments all bodies as it lays organically on the skin. Our true silk is smooth to touch. ALIDA opted for a 22 mommes design, which means the silk is heavier and firmer than what other brands bring to the public.
Wearing ALIDA is an invitation to unleash one’s creativity and empower women to take control of their own personal style. All of the brand’s colours are interchangeable and styled by the right accessoires, right for every occasion.
