The 2022  Africa Day Celebration 

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
The 2022  Africa Day Celebration 

Africa Day 2022, Strength, Resilience in Nutrition and Food Security in Africa

By Roy Lie Atjam

On the Occasion of Africa Day 2022, H.E. Ms. Irene F. M. Kasyanju, Ambassador of the United Republic of Tanzania in the Netherlands and Dean of the African Diplomatic Corps, organized a reception in Wassenaar on 31st May 2022.

Scores from the Africa diaspora in the Netherlands and beyond flocked in Wassenaar to celebrate this auspicious day with their brethren, friends and Africa well-wishers. The ambience was excellent.

The program featured speeches, cultural performances, videos, networking and showcasing of the savoury African cuisine.

It was the Moroccan group Gnawa that put on a cultural show. Gnawa is a cultural performance combining African, Arab-Muslim influences and native Berber cultural elements.

The Dean of the African group H.E. Ms. Irene F. M. Kasyanju, Ambassador of Tanzania, delivered the welcome address that went down well with the audience. Ambassador Kasyanju touched on the Ubuntu spirit, Agenda 2063, the Maputo Protocol, CFC* and other African aspects.  

Her Excellency Ms.Carola van Rijnsoever, Deputy Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Welcoming the Guest of Honor Her Excellency Ms.Carola van Rijnsoever, Deputy Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The guest of Honor, Her Excellency Ms.Carola van Rijnsoever, Deputy Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, delivered the keynote address.

In short, this is what she said, the growing, global interest in Africa the beautiful, diverse and dynamic continent, by countries like China, the USA, Russia, Turkey and the Gulf States. Van Rijnsoever explained that the Netherlands places great importance on bilateral ties with African countries. She applauded the high-level participation, of both Europe and Africa in the EU-AU Summit held in Brussels in February this year. “The Netherlands, Europe and Africa are not distant acquaintances. We are close neighbours. And a changing global landscape is making his even clearer. Together, we can find answers to the challenges we all face.”

The Ambassadors of Egypt H.E. Mr. Hatem Abdelkader.

Other speakers were the Ambassadors of Egypt H.E. Mr. Hatem Abdelkader on behalf of the African Unity Chair. A resume of his speech. “59 years ago, on the 25th of May 1963, the founding fathers established the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – then called the Organization of African Unity – that sowed the seeds of our African unity and launched a new era of African synergy trajectory to lay the foundation for continental integration. Our leaders walked their path and established the bridges for Africa to cross to stability, progress, and prosperity.

Today, we harvest the fruits of the efforts of our founding ancestors of the AU after following their steps in a persistent manner all over the past decades. Our continent walks steadily towards the realization of sustainable development and economic growth guided by Agenda 2063. Under this ambitious Agenda, our joint efforts are intensified to transform our continent into a future driven by unity, self-determination, freedom, progress, and collective prosperity.

The year 2022 is the “Year of Nutrition” in Africa to strengthen resilience and food security in the continent. This comes at a time when the threat of food shortages, inflation, and higher consumer prices are looming over the whole world including on our African continent. Here we are today celebrating our Africa day where the spirit of African synergy, profound cooperation and integration are the basis of our continent.

I wish you many happy returns where all the peoples of Africa around the globe are bound together and progressing in line with the vision of our founding fathers.

Long live Africa.!”

H.E. Ms. Salima Abdelhak, Ambassador of Algeria.

H.E. Ambassador Salima Abdelhak of Algeria closed the speeches and rendered the spirit of her fellow Ambassadors through a toast she raised to Africa stating: “Let’s raise a toast to our Mother Africa. May it Be peaceful, prosperous and integrated. May it be driven by its own citizens and May it be a dynamic force in the international arena. To the address of the Guest of honor the MFA Deputy Secretary General, she added “May the partnership Africa / Netherlands be consolidated and Prosperous”

All African Ambassadors

Here is the speech as pronounced by the Dean Ambassador Irene Kasyanju.

“At the outset allow me to welcome you all, and particularly our Guest of Honour, and express my sincere gratitude for your participation in this commemoration of Africa Day 2022. As we say in Swahili Karibuni Sana!

Indeed, I am so delighted and excited to be here and to have finally being able to hold this event in person, after two years of online engagements due to COVID–19 pandemic. This year’s celebration is of particular importance to me as it marks the end of my tour of duty as the Ambassador of Tanzania to the Netherlands. A position I have happily served for over 6 and a half years. This could not have been possible without the unwavering support I received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Group Ambassadors, and the entire Diplomatic Corps fraternity. I do not have a better way to extend my appreciation to you than by saying “thank you so much”.

As we mark the celebration of Africa Day, let me first start by commending the workmanship and dedication of our Experts, whose tireless efforts to coordinate and plan for the past two months made this celebration possible. I thank them wholeheartedly!

On the same level, permit me to extend sincere gratitude to all African Ambassadors for their commitment, guidance, and material support in ensuring this august event become a success. I remain hopeful that, the strong gesture of true friendship and collaboration among the African States demonstrated during the preparation of this event, will continue to radiate in other occasions. This is the Ubuntu spirit we always cherish in Africa.

Africa Day which is celebrated each year on the 25th of May is an important date in the history of our continent as it commemorates the founding of the first Union of African countries (OAU) in 1963, which was later transformed into the current African Union (AU) in order to have a more stable and prosperous Africa. Therefore, we gather to remember that day and to reflect on how far we have gone, what has been achieved, and what needs to be done in the future in order to build the Africa We Want!

This year’s Africa Day Theme: “Strengthening Resilience in Nutrition and Food Security on the African Continent: Strengthening Agro-Food Systems, Health and Social Protection Systems for the Acceleration of Human, Social and Economic Capital Development” is of paramount importance and very pertinent.

The Theme is not only critical to achieving the AU Agenda 2063 and transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future, as envisioned by our Heads of State and Government; but also offers an opportunity to boost intra-African trade through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) which was operationalized in January 2021, and indeed showcase that Africa is the future the world has been waiting for. A continent in which more than half of the Earth’s arable land – roughly 600 million hectares – is located, should not suffer food insecurity or malnutrition. This year’s theme certainly offers an impetus in the pursuit of an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa.

Indeed, Africa is richly endowed with vast human and natural resources which, if harnessed in accordance with our vision, Agenda 2063, will improve the livelihoods of the peoples of Africa. A continent of 1.3 billion plus people, where 60% of our population is represented by our youth, below the ages of 25 and boast a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $ 2.6 trillion across our 55 Member States, if we move together in unity the ‘Africa We Want’, will not be an agenda but a reality.

Cognizance of this endowment, African countries made reasonable progress to align agricultural and other policies, programs, and investments related to food security and nutrition with the Zero Hunger Vision and SDG 2 which aims to end hunger, achieve food security, improve nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture. However, such investment and the gains achieved seriously suffered during the Covid-19 crisis, affecting our health, food systems, and economies, causing children, women, and poor households to suffer the most.

African governments therefore need to enhance the mobilization of financial resources to invest in both food security and nutrition. We need to transform our agriculture and engage our youth and women in the sector for us to yield positive outcomes. African governments should live up to the commitments made in the Maputo Protocol to allocate 10 percent of national budgets to agriculture and rural development policy. This will ensure transformed agriculture through increased investment and agriculture productivity via irrigation and Agri – tech as well as value addition.

 Plainly speaking, Africa needs strategic domestic and international partnerships to ensure access to international finance to fund African innovations and production for enhanced nutrition outcomes among our people. For us in the Netherlands, Institutions such as Common Fund for Commodities (CFC)* can play a significant role in relieving Africa from nutrition insecurity because CFC focuses on strengthening agro-food systems through investing in African Small Holders and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). Our production systems must change and encourage value addition practices to our commodities and minerals and generate real value to boost income for people. We need to invest in food fortification and promote the consumption of nutrients rich food.

The Guest of Honor chatting with H.E. Liguemoh Ondoua Madeleine, Ambassador of Cameroon.

Africa Day is the moment to celebrate the richness of our continent in terms of culture, traditions, history, and more importantly our unity. That unity, among others, is evident in the UNESCO’s decision in November 2021 to set 7th July as the World Kiswahili language Day – the official day to celebrate the Kiswahili language; as well as February’s 2022 African Union’s Heads of State decision to approve Kiswahili, the Pan African language, as an official working language of the bloc. We need to promote this unifying language, spoken by over 100 million people in Africa, for the wider communication and implementation of AU Decisions.

Before I conclude, allow me to leave you with an inspirational quote by Tanzania’s founding Father Mwalimu Dr. Julius Nyerere, the driving force behind the movement and firm believer of promoting Kiswahili for African unity, in his speech given in Accra, Ghana, 6 March 1997, and I quote: “Unity will not make us rich, but it can make it difficult for Africa and the African peoples to be disregarded and humiliated”.

As I conclude, kindly accept my sincere gratitude to you all for participating in this commemoration of Africa Day 2022 here in The Hague. Let’s celebrate together the richness of our continent in terms of culture, traditions, and history. The ambiance around here testifies to that.

I wish you all a wonderful Africa Day 2022 celebration.” end quote

* CFC  In a rare display of praise and acknowledgement of the sincere but innovative work of an international organization, the Dean of African Ambassadors in The Hague, H.E. Irene Kasyanju, Ambassador of Tanzania to the Netherlands, congratulated Ambassador Sheikh Mohammed Belal, Managing Director of the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC), for their excellent work for the smallholders and SMEs in Africa and beyond. Ambassador Irene in her Africa Day 2022 welcome address stated that “For us in the Netherlands, Institutions such as Common Fund for Commodities (CFC) can play a significant role in relieving Africa from nutrition insecurity because CFC focuses on strengthening agro-food systems through investing in African Small Holders and Small and Medium Enterprises. Our production systems must change and encourage value addition practices to our commodities and minerals and generate real value to boost income for people. We need to invest in food fortification and promote the consumption of nutrients rich food”.

All attending participants acknowledged the above statement through their acclamation and individual felicitations to Ambassador Belal afterwards. It may be noted that CFC is the only UN- affiliated international organization in the Netherlands.

Constitutional Reforms – Will of the Electorate and Requirement

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Constitutional Reforms – Will of the Electorate and Requirement

By Akmal Saidov

The past week in the life of our Uzbek parliament has been full of significant events for long-term development and strengthening of constitutional and legal foundations, as well as large-scale and rapid democratic transformations in the country.

***

As a result, on May 16, separate meetings of the Oliy Majlis’s (Parliament) two largest factions – UzLiDeP and National Revival (Milliy Tiklanish) Democratic Party were conducted, followed by a joint meeting on May 17 dedicated to the implementation of constitutional reforms in our country and submission of this issue to the Councils (Kengashes) of the Oliy Majlis.

The Councils of the Senate and the Legislative Chamber of the Parliament held a meeting jointly on May 20. The Constitutional Commission was established to develop proposals for constitutional amendments and additions, as well as to implement organisational measures; its composition and tasks were established. This Constitutional Commission was comprised of deputies, senators from all regions, representatives from various social strata, civil society institutions, leading lawyers, political scientists, and other experts (46 people in total).

What is the reason for such a decision of our parliament? Why is a constitutional reform needed, what are its leitmotifs? How and on the basis of what principles will the commission’s activities be organized? This is by no means a complete list of questions posed on the Internet and social networks.

First of all, we should recognise that our President Shavkat Mirziyoyev is the main ideological inspirer for constitutional reform in Uzbekistan, and the general population is the main initiator.

Firstly, during the presidential elections of Uzbekistan in October 2021, at the meetings of all candidates with representatives of the electorate, an important proposal was put forward, demanded by life itself and dictated by the logic of democratic transformations in our country. This is the implementation of constitutional reform.

The first proposal to consider constitutional amendments and additions was made by voters during a meeting with UzLiDeP presidential candidate Shavkat Mirziyoyev in the Karakalpakstan district of Bozatau. In light of an ecological disaster not only on a regional but also on a global scale – the drying up of the Aral Sea – the relevance and immense importance of reflecting environmental human rights in the country’s Basic Law, the rights of current and future generations of the country’s citizens to a favourable environment, which are not reflected in the current Constitution are highlighted.

Consequently, in seven more regions, during the meetings of Shavkat Mirziyoyev with voters of the regions, initiatives were put forward to further strengthen the constitutional and legal foundations for the protection of private property, including land and subsoil, ensuring human dignity, human rights, freedoms and legitimate interests, interethnic and interfaith harmony in the country, enhancing the role and status of the most important national democratic institution – the mahalla, carefully conveying traditional values ​​to future generations, the institution of the family, developing state youth and gender policies, innovative economy and knowledge economy, expanding investment in the economy and social sphere.

Most importantly, these questions were raised by voters: teachers, business owners, farmers, representatives of civil society organisations, national cultural centres, and ordinary citizens. This, in turn, indicates, on the one hand, widespread support for the president’s policy of democratic reforms, implemented within the framework of the New Uzbekistan Development Strategy for 2022-2026, and, on the other hand, voters’ interest in their effectiveness in further deepening and achieving the election program’s goals and objectives.

Similarly, during the meeting of candidates from:

• National Revival Democratic Party (“Milliy Tiklanish”) – proposals were put forward to define the constitutional identity of our country, strengthen and protect national traditions and values;

• Justice Social Democratic Party (“Adolat”) – strengthening the constitutional foundations of the independence of the judiciary, the fairness of laws and judicial decisions, the implementation of the principles of the supremacy of the Constitution and laws, human rights, the fight against corruption;

• People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan – expansion of constitutional and social protection of vulnerable segments of the population, especially persons with disabilities, construction of a socially-oriented state;

• Ecological Party of Uzbekistan – the country’s transition to a “green economy”, improving the situation in environmentally unfavorable regions.

It is important to note that this is the voters’ decision, as stated during elections and meetings with presidential candidates.

Second, based on an in-depth study of voter preferences, President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev emphasized the need for constitutional reform:

• during his inaugural address on November 6 last year. The country’s leader then tasked the scientific, academic, and educational communities with analysing the national and international experience of constitutional development, and requested deputies and senators to carefully evaluate the matter, investigate it, and offer specific ideas;

• in congratulations on the occasion of the 29th anniversary of the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the head of state outlined priority areas for constitutional reform based on the wishes of voters, the needs of ongoing dynamic democratic reforms.

Furthermore, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev included a whole section devoted to the need for constitutional reform in the second revised and expanded edition of his first fundamental author’s monograph “New Uzbekistan Development Strategy” based on a generalisation of all the proposals made during the election campaign. The book outlines Uzbekistan’s top priorities for constitutional reform.

Third, political parties, primarily UzLiDeP and National Revival DemocraticParty (“Milliy Tiklanish”), conducted a thorough study of their electorate’s opinions and wishes regarding the upcoming constitutional reforms.

Over 1.5 million members of these parties and their multi-million electorate not only supported, but also highlighted the need to modernize the Constitution as a necessary condition for achieving the goals of the New Uzbekistan Development Strategy, ensuring sustainable development, and establishing the legal foundations for even more accelerated and dynamic reform across all socio-economic, political, legal, cultural, and humanitarian spheres.

Constitutional reforms: current world trends

It should be noted that there are currently over 500 active constitutions on the “constitutional map of the world”, of which approximately 200 are constitutions of independent states and more than 300 are subjects of federations.

At the same time, the Code of Laws of the Sumerian king Ur-Nammu (The Code of Ur-Nammu) is considered the world’s oldest written constitution – the age of clay tablets exceeds 4 thousand years.

Simultaneously, the Constitution is not a dogma, but rather a plan of action for sustainable development. The possibility to amend or change a constitution is a fundamental feature of all constitutions. It is impossible to create a constitutional text that will always serve society at various stages of historical development.

Thus, the last decade of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century will be remembered as a period of rising to a new level of constitutional reforms, profound qualitative shifts in the constitutional worldview, and the constitutional structure of the world community’s members. Over the last 30 years, more than 100 countries have successfully implemented constitutional reforms, with 57 adopting new constitutions.

Mexico, New Zealand, Brazil, Switzerland, Austria, Israel, Chile, Colombia, Georgia, and India are the top ten countries in terms of the frequency with which constitutional changes and amendments have been adopted.

Furthermore, the majority of constitutional reforms are implemented as part of the modernization of society and the state, or as part of the prevention and neutralisation of the consequences of political, economic, and social crises.

There are almost no original versions of constitutions left in the world today. Even the oldest in the current understanding of the US constitution, 27 fundamental changes were made, Norway – over 200 times (with only about a third of the Basic Law remaining in its original form), and Holland – 24 times (however, in 1983 its text was carefully modernized, affecting almost all positions).

In modern conditions of globalization all over the world there is an intensive search for their own models of constitutional development. At the same time, the Constitution remains one of the key factors in ensuring the political and social stability of the state. The following are the constitutional principles:

firstly, the expansion of fundamental human rights and freedoms (the Constitution of the individual);

secondly, securing the protection of collective rights, the rights of society as a whole, that is, the regulation of civil society institutions, the implementation of social partnership and public control (the Constitution of society);

thirdly, the organization of the system of state authorities and administration; representative democracy combined with forms of direct democracy (elections, referendums, popular discussion); separation of powers, including the principle of checks and balances between the legislative and executive branches, as well as the independence of the judiciary; responsibility and accountability of officials (State Constitution).

Constitutional reform is a legal requirement for both current and future sustainable development. It can be an essential tool for promoting good governance by changing constitutional rules to strengthen checks and balances between branches of government, as well as greater accountability, transparency, participation, and predictability. Changes aimed at improving the quality and efficiency of governance contribute to the political system’s stability, which benefits the economy by providing a stable environment for investment and development.

The study of constitutional changes around the world reveals a distinguishing feature: the need to adapt the state’s Basic Law to the requirements of modernity and its ability to respond to emerging challenges.

The following are the main tendencies in modern constitutional development:

• the complexity of constitutional reforms. They cover the political, economic, social, cultural and humanitarian spheres, as well as the interconnections and interdependencies of constitutional reforms and modernization processes;

• expanding and strengthening the sphere of constitutional regulation, reforming the mechanism of public administration and changing the form of government;

• the development of the constitutional space, the strengthening of legal sovereignty and the definition of the constitutional identity of the state;

• strengthening the judicial protection of human rights and freedoms, expanding the powers of constitutional justice, granting citizens the right to direct access to the Constitutional Court;

• globalization of constitutional law-making, consolidation of universally recognized principles and norms of international law in the national constitutions of the states of the world;

• ecologization of the constitutional development of the state and society, implementation of the principle of accessibility of quality medical care;

• consolidation and development of digital rights, institutionalization of the information society, legal regulation of cybersecurity.

Uzbekistan is in the process of reforming its constitution

Uzbekistan has a long history of implementing constitutional reforms. In particular, 32 amendments and additions to 21 articles of the Constitution were made 7 times as part of the implementation of the tasks of the Action Strategy in five priority areas of development of the Republic of Uzbekistan in 2017-2021.

They concerned, in particular, the activities of the parliament, government and the President, strengthening the independence and development of the judiciary, the system of checks and balances between the branches of government, the democratization of the electoral system and mahalla.

Particular emphasis was placed on a fundamental change in the constitutional structure, political, legal, socioeconomic, cultural, and spiritual spheres, constitutional provision of fundamental interrelated and interdependent democratic political, economic, social, and legal reforms aimed at building a New Uzbekistan, and the establishment of a free and fair civil society.

Simultaneously, the era of globalization, digitalization, climate change, and rapidly changing life poses an increasing number of urgent, extremely important, and urgent tasks for the country’s further modernization, strengthening peace, stability, and national independence.

Thereby, Uzbekistan’s constitutional development is consistent with the global trend of constitutional reform.

Priority directions of constitutional reforms

Tasks that are even more important are outlined in President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s fundamental book, “New Uzbekistan Development Strategy,” raising democratic reforms to a fundamentally different level. It directs society’s legal system, legal knowledge and enforcement, and political and legal culture toward universal human values and sustainable development principles. It is planned to define constitutional standards and rules that will apply to the New Uzbekistan.

First and foremost, this is about fully implementing the primary principle “in the sake of human honor and dignity”. Furthermore, human dignity entails the provision of a peaceful and secure life, citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms, the gradual creation of decent living conditions and modern infrastructure, qualified medical care, quality education, social protection, and a healthy ecological environment for all country citizens.

The following areas of constitutional reform have been identified as priorities:

the first is a change in the previously operating paradigm “state – society – person” to a new one: “person – society – state”, fixing it in constitutional legislation and constitutional practice;

the second is the provision of human interests in the process of economic reforms. This is the most important condition for building a people’s state;

the third – constitutional consolidation of the role and status of civil society institutions, the principle “Society is the initiator of reforms”;

the fourth – the definition of the constitutional foundations for the development of

the institution of the family, the careful communication to future generations of traditional human values, the strengthening of interethnic harmony in the country;

the fifth – the reflection in the Constitution of the state youth policy, comprehensive support for youth – the creators of New Uzbekistan, their rights, interests and obligations;

the sixth – fixing as a constitutional norm the principle “New Uzbekistan is a social state”, taking into account the fact that today Uzbekistan is confidently moving along the path of building a social state and a just society;

the seventh – increasing the effectiveness of the current system of human rights protection, preventing child labor, reliable protection of the rights of persons with disabilities, representatives of the older generation;

the eighth – the inclusion of special environmental provisions in the Constitution, as well as legal rules linked to global climate change;

the ninth – consolidation at the constitutional level of the development of kindergartens, schools, higher education and science, which are interrelated components of the basis of the third Renaissance.

The words of the outstanding statesman and political figure Winston Churchill, “To improve is to change; to be perfect is to change often” have a deep important importance for our President. Indeed, in order to have a Constitution that fulfills the needs of the time, we must take measures and make reforms that are consistent with the current quickly changing reality.

Constitutional Commission: Main Tasks and Principles

The Councils (Kengashes) of the Chambers of the Oliy Majlis determined the following as the main tasks of the Constitutional Commission:

• collection, generalization, formation of proposals and development of an appropriate draft law “On amendments and additions to the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan”;

• requesting documents, expert and other opinions, statistical data and other information from state bodies and other organizations, officials;

• receiving recommendations from research organizations, scientists and experts on proposals for amendments and additions to the Constitution, as well as expert opinions;

• involvement of representatives of state bodies and other organizations in the work of the Constitutional Commission as experts;

• if necessary, the development of proposals for the introduction of amendments and additions to other legislative acts based on the proposals received, which will be submitted to interested state bodies and other organizations for consideration in the prescribed manner;

• sending appeals received from individuals and legal entities about violations of their constitutional rights and freedoms to the appropriate departments for consideration;

The most important principles of the work of the Constitutional Commission are:

firstly, actions must be transparent and accountable. Simultaneously, all conditions will be in place for a public discussion of the most pressing constitutional reform tasks in society, including the participation of international experts and civil society representatives.

A special role in this will belong to the work of the Press Service of the Constitutional Commission, which will provide in a simple and understandable language for an ordinary citizen the need, priorities and main directions of constitutional reforms and novels.

Furthermore, the organization of scientific constitutional forums will continue, based on the positive experience of organizing two earlier international conferences dedicated to diverse tasks of the impending constitutional amendments. All of this demonstrates New Uzbekistan’s openness to both its citizens and the international world in general.

secondly, collegiality. This is ensured by the fact that all members of the Constitutional Commission have a single vote and equal decision-making rights.

thirdly, the President’s idea of “the people are the creators of the law” is being implemented through widespread participation of civil society institutions, academic, research, and analytical centers in the Constitutional Commission’s activities.

The National Centre of the Republic of Uzbekistan for Human Rights, the NGO “Center for Sustainable Development” and the Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan conduct scientific research on the topic “Constitutional reforms: the experience of the countries of the world”. The research is carried out in pursuance of the tasks determined by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev to study foreign and international experience in constitutional development.

In conclusion, the constitutional reforms will undoubtedly serve to implement the tasks of further improving the well-being of the population and the prosperity of the country, strengthening its economic power and competitiveness in the world.

About the author:

Uzbekistan, Akmal Saidov, the First Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis.

Akmal Saidov – is the Chairperson of the Constitutional Commission for the Formation of Proposals for Constitutional Amendments and Additions and Implementation of Organizational Measures

Ukrainian crisis –Meanings, Consequences, Outcome

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Ukrainian crisis –Meanings, Consequences, Outcome

By Covadonga Romero

Three months have now passed since the Russian ‘special operation in’ or ‘invasion of’ (depends which sources you are citing) of Ukraine began. As the international community strives to understand this ‘denazification and demilitarization’ event, its causes and consequences, much has been said about war’s potential to fundamentally change the world order—and about the way it illustrates already ongoing shifts. Yet, every aspect of the global balance of power, security architecture, and geopolitical dynamics is challenged by the conflict.

On May 20, the Habibie Center addressed this topical issue through its Public Lecture Series. In an event titled ‘The Ukraine Crisis and its Implications for the Global Political Chessboard’, the Jakarta-based think tank hosted Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic (Vienna, Geneva, universities of ) for a discussion on the war’s repercussions, both globally, as well as for the Asian continent and its Southeastern theatre.

Prof. Bajrektarevic framed his thorough analysis of the conflict by alluding to the usual pattern of “critical insight formation” around an international crisis. The ‘problem’ and its ‘solution’ are presented as two halves to a whole picture; the latter depends on the lens through which the former is viewed. Within this picture, the lights and shadows consist of the ‘costs’ associated with the problem, and their ‘cost distribution’. The multi-dimensional nature of Russia’s war in Ukraine can be understood through this framework. Depending on where the problem’s centre of gravity is located—the rise of new threats in a multipolar order, the global energy crisis, the deterioration of European security structures—different costs can be identified for various stakeholders.

Clearing points at the entrée, professor stated: “the way we formulate the problem will inevitably determine our answer/s and lead the course of our action”. Hence, “today I will concentrate only on setting the questions we must ask to answer what this crisis is about”, explained professor before getting into a 40-minute questions elaboration.

The first key point that was touched upon was the set of historical drivers that shape Russia’s foreign policy today, and along with it, the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Among these are the competing universalisms of East and West, insofar as these can be viewed as “not Venus and Mars, but rather two Martian worlds.” The beginning of this is marked by the great schism of the 11th century, with the split between the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches in 1054; from this arises the opportunistic use of religion and its different interpretations for ideological purposes, and the struggle between the dominant centre of religious interpretation and its peripheries or challengers. The events of the Age of Discovery—which saw the projection of European civilisation through political, military, and demographic expansion—reflect this, as exclusivity or dominance over religious interpretation was instrumentalised to justify imperialism.

Another historical factor is Russia’s prolonged perception of Europe as an existential threat. Although this is epitomised by the German-led Operation Barbarossa of 1941—which targeted Ukraine as an important economic territory—previous episodes, such as the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War of 1853-1856, European interventionism during the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917-1923, or the humiliation of the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1921, have also had a lasting impression on Russia’s historical memory. On this point, Prof. Bajrektarevic makes note of the symbolic parallels between the Napoleonic and Axis coalitions that have threatened Russia; these are strikingly similar in size and shape, both between themselves and to the European Union, a third ‘coalition’ that governs today’s continental Europe. Finally, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the fragmentation of Eastern Europe is mentioned, as yet another driver of Russia’s contemporary threat perception.

Against this backdrop, Prof. Bajrektarevic gives an overview of the various aspects—politico-military, legal, economic, and ideological—of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war that are worth considering, in terms of the conflict’s global impact. In the politico-military realm, four key ideas stand out. One is the astonishing deficit of the so-called ‘collective’ West in its response, which is limited by the lack of communications with Russia, and therefore a lack of critical insight about Russian intentions and capabilities. This has led to a shortage of sober analysis on the matter, which manifests as a “dangerous security experiment,” whereby the antagonisation of Russia, supported by “state adventurism,” contributes to conflict escalation. Linked to this is an essential question: who are the conflict’s protagonists? Is this a war between Russia and Ukraine, or between the Russian Federation and NATO on Ukrainian soil?

The peculiar nature of military actions in Ukraine adds to the complexity that the country already experiences. A key aspect of this is its political history, from Kiev Russia, to a prosperous period under the Russian Empire, to a Soviet Republic. Furthermore, the way in which current military activity varies across different segments of Ukrainian territory is associated with the country’s demographic makeup. Before February 2022, Ukraine’s ethnic, linguistic, and religious composite was already reflective of various internal struggles, which have only been exacerbated by the conflict. In recent years, these have included an alarming Gini index and HDI score, as a result of depopulation, deindustrialisation, and the dismal state of civil rights in the post-Maidan Ukraine; now, the surge in internally-displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees will precipitate an irreversible change in Ukraine’s ethnic composition and socioeconomic development. Lastly, the landslide victory of President Zelensky, winning over 70% of the electoral vote in 2019, reflects the buildup of a certain political zeitgeist within Ukrainian society since 2014; among Zelensky’s main electoral promises was the peaceful reintegration of the contested Donbas region under the existing machinery of the Minsk talks.

Regarding these politico-military aspects of the Ukraine crisis, Prof. Bajrektarevic points out  the role of the media as an “accelerator of destruction.” Making reference to Herman and Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent, Bajrektarevic underlines the use of fear as a currency of control, and the widespread personalisation of the conflict through a sensationalist “Putin-versus-Zelensky” vision. This comes as a result of broader trends, such as the “long history of censorship in liberal democracies,” and the more recent phenomenon of complete desensitisation to misery by the numbers, epitomised by press coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic. The consequences of the media’s approach to Ukraine as an international crisis are far-reaching, with powerful and shockingly-different narratives being built around the conflict. An example is the issue of foreign aid for Ukraine, where a combination of widespread coverage and lack of transparency has led to a number of questions on the donors and receivers; on the quality and configuration of aid, particularly military aid; and on the potential threat of diverted stockpiles ending up in the black market.

On another note, there are several legal aspects to consider in order to understand the conflict’s evolution and implications. To begin with, the indivisibility of collective security from the very spirit of the UN Charter is presented as a potential issue. In this sense, the negotiations held in Geneva, between the US and Russia reflected the need and acceptance of a détente policy, which soon after officialized in the Helsinki Accords of 1975, and consequently institutionalized by the OSCE’s formation (Budapest) – were listed by professor along with other key elements of the post-WWII security architecture. In regard to previous disarmament and security non-expansion guarantees that are challenged by this conflict, it is worth noting the Reagan-Gorbachev talks in the late 1980s; the vision of a “common European home, from Lisbon to Vladivostok,” now seems but a “lame dream.” The same is true for NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) of 1994, which now stands in contrast to the Alliance’s paradoxical role, having been created for defensive purposes but with thirty years of accumulated offensive history across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. NATO’s interventions, although manifesting in different formats, have all underscored a “continued dismissal of Russian security concerns.”

Furthermore, the issue of “neutrality,” or lack thereof, is a key element of this crisis. To begin with, there is the question of Ukrainian neutrality, pledged in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and abandoned in 2014 with Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. Much like Ukrainian neutrality was among Russia’s demands in negotiations over the Minsk agreements (particularly Minsk II), it is now a key condition for peace in the current context. On the other hand, recent developments such as Sweden and Finland’s NATO applications demonstrate how neutrality is more of a fluid concept than a legal guarantee.

The implications of this period of change for the non-proliferation regime are disturbing, since unpredictability is a strong force of counterbalance against the multiple international treaties on nuclear and biological weapons. Ukraine’s abandonment of neutrality has led to capacity building, training, and an increase in bio-lab activities; Zelensky’s presidential statement at the Munich Security Conference in February 2022 further emphasizes this intention. All in all, it can be said that the notion of collective security, which previously seemed to rest upon a legal system of “confidence-building measures for active peaceful coexistence,” is seeing unprecedented erosion, into a selective one.

The global economic consequences of the Russo-Ukrainian war are presented from the perspective of costs induced and costs paid. Bajrektarevic’s argument highlights “peripheral countries” as those who bear the burden, particularly regarding the sectors that are at stake in this conflict; these include crude oil, natural gas, and wheat, which respectively come first, third and fifth among the world’s most traded commodities. On the other hand, a sector that is seeing growth as a result of this crisis is the global military-industrial complex. The war has accelerated the dismantling of obsolete military weaponry on Ukrainian soil, which is now being replaced with Western military purchases, financed through loans, donations, and lend-and-lease arrangements; in January 2022, a month before Russia’s intervention even began, the United States had already negotiated lend-lease contracts with Ukraine, totaling $30 billion. However, it is to note that gains for the military-industrial complex inevitably come with losses for international security and overall stability.

Another economic aspect, which has received much of the spotlight throughout the past three months, is the West’s sanctions on Russia and its legality. At present, the sixth round of sanctions has been negotiated. The continuity of this process and the short intervals between rounds make it a credible assumption that, for at least the first four rounds, the timeline was planned and expected. Moreover, the strategy within these rounds, including an arbitrary confiscation of overseas deposits and properties, has clearly been geared towards having an impact on the reputation and credibility of sanctions’ originators. On the other hand, a notion that illustrates the global spillover effects of the war in Ukraine is that of secondary sanctions, aimed at those who associate with the Russian Federation or refuse to punish it. The way in which ‘friendly’ and ‘unfriendly’ labels have been put on countries—even traditionally neutral actors—depending on their responses to this conflict is reflective of an overall realignment of the world order; or, at the very least, of the fight for control over the way in which this order is interpreted, and will further evolve.

On the flipside of sanctions, other economic consequences can be found. One is the apparent shift towards de-dollarisation, and even a fragmentation of the global monetary system, so far defined by the ¥€$ (Yen-Euro-US Dollar) domination. The paradoxical resilience of the Russian economy, whose indicators are looking up in spite of sanctions, is a factor behind this; it is also exacerbated by the rise of the “petro-ruble,” along with Europe’s incoherence and panic around energy insecurity. The question of energy has led many countries linked to the Russian Federation’s resources to walk one of two paths: either decoupling and decarbonising, in line with the post-Paris Treaty environmental agenda, or leaning into “preferential prices for friendly countries.” It is largely for this reason -a long with the OPEC solidarity over quotas – that the Russian energy sector remains competitive on the global market, highlighting the important economic role played by third-party countries in this crisis; India stands out as a particular question mark. Beyond this, the overall disruption of global supply chains as a result of war in Ukraine is equally as catastrophic in other sectors; the shortage of wheat exports, in which Ukraine is the main provider for at least 26 countries, has heavily disrupted the global food supply. History shows that a food crisis is not only catastrophic in terms of human security and development, but also as a driver of social unrest and conflict.

The last key theme touched upon by Prof. Bajrektarevic is the conflict’s ideological dimension. The unprecedented nature of a full-scale, traditional war in the European continent as of 2022, and its disruption of the Pax Europaea period that began in 1945, has given rise to a number of reflections and questions. Is it liberal to impose liberal values on illiberal societies? Is the Westernisation of Eastern Europe possible without perpetuating anti-Russian rhetoric? Under this umbrella, several norms, values and key tenets of the Western-led neoliberal institutionalist system—collective security, responsibility to protect (R2P), regime change—are challenged. In trying to make sense of this new reality, Prof. Bajrektarevic makes reference to the “three brave ideas of the 20th century” and their interpretation of territorial competition. First came the egalitarian, non-territorial dogma of the Bolshevik revolution; then, the radicalisation of the material and revival of imperialism through various Fascisms, as well as Nazism; lastly, the ultimate triumph of the non-material and non-territorial idea, through glasnost and Perestroika, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union marking a significant departure from the traditional international conduct.

With the transition into the 21st century, the emergence of “transhumanism” as an alternative (post) capitalistic ideological model where “humans [are seen ] without spiritual dimension, reduced on bio-hackable animal/Bionicle connected to a global IoT network for control and commercial end” gains on ground. This, along with the diminished credibility of Clash of Civilization reasoning, opens a whole new set of questions. The implications of this war for new conflicts within ethno-religious lines span not only the post-1990s “intra-Slavic Guernica”; they also include the wider Islamic world, whereby a break between the Muslim ‘core’ (the MENA region) and the ‘peripheral’ non-Arab Muslim communities in Europe’s south, Caucasus, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. Overall, the question mark next to the promise of democracy suggests that the Russo-Ukrainian war may be the prelude to an inevitable recession, to the return of great power competition. This reflects how the ideological crisis triggered by the conflict is also one of global proportions.

Having laid out all the relevant aspects explored in this lecture, some key takeaways remain. Regarding the potential future outcomes, Prof. Bajrektarevic illustrates the struggle between the ideas of “global realignment” and “decoupling.” Alluding to historical precedent, such as the contrast between the statesmanship of Metternich’s Concert of Europe and the short-sightedness of the Versailles Conference, he argues for the existence of various possibilities—ranging from the total destruction of Ukraine and nuclear war, to sincere peace talks. Finally, following “global repercussions” as the thread that runs throughout his argument, Bajrektarevic’s closing remarks are relevant to Asia-Pacific, and particularly to the Republic of Indonesia, where the Habibie Center is based. Likely outcomes of the conflict’s ripple effect are an overall momentum of destabilization reaching the region at large, thus leading to a reform of the triangular RIC (Russia-India-China) model in continental Asia, and a recession of multilateralism (including ASEAN) in Southeast Asia. Considering the role of Indonesia within this compact, and recalling the previous reflections on loss of neutrality, Prof. Bajrektarevic makes a key recommendation—where Indonesia, ASEAN and Asia must take a side, the side to pick is that of international law, and accelerated multilateralism including the spirt of Non-Aliened movement.

About the author:

Covadonga Romero – International Relations specialist (Madrid-based IE University, Spain) with a concentration on Peace, Conflict and Security. Foreign policy analyst and writer at RAIA Group.

Life in the time of mania

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Life in the time of mania

By John Dunkelgrün

Every now and then societies succumb to a collective madness, often accompanied by a general suspension of disbelief. “Witches” were tortured, burnt at the stake, or killed in mind-numbing trials by water or fire. Tulips became a mania in Holland in the 17th century and the South Sea Company in Britain in the 18th.

In the 20th century, the worst madness that ever took hold of a country was National Socialism with the adoration of Adolf Hitler. Then came the anti-communist witch hunt in America that only ended when Joseph Welch challenged Senator Joe McCarthy with a loud “Have you no sense of decency?”. It was followed by murderous manias in Africa and Cambodia. Then the British fell for the lies of power-hungry politicians – aided by Russian propaganda – to leave the European Union, which is the greatest advance in security and prosperity the continent has ever seen. “Take back control!” became their rallying cry without specifying what control would be taken back.

Then came the unraveling of the morals of the Republican Party, whose guiding light now seems to be “Right or wrong, my Party.” It became s shoo-in for Donald Trump whose lies of a ‘stolen election’ and discrediting of anything he doesn’t like are swallowed by millions with religious fervor.

Mass killings in the United States have exploded because of the ubiquitous availability of very dangerous weapons. Kids not old enough to buy alcohol legitimately can buy military weapons not usable for anything else but the killing lots of people quickly. There is ample evidence that restricting the availability of firearms in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada resulted in dramatic drops in deaths by shooting. Ted Cruz knows it, Greg Abbott knows it, and Ron de Santis knows it. The entire leadership of the NRA knows it. But fear of a boycott by voters crazed by gun mania or of losing profits by even the slightest forms of gun control, keeps them spouting lies like a fire engine spouts water. Together they are responsible for tens of thousands of deaths every single year, about the same number of deaths per year as the entire Vietnam war, most probably of more than all of Putin’s war in Ukraine.

What will finally break this deadly mania? When will politicians and gun paddlers be confronted with their “Have you no sense of decency?” Senator Chris Murphy’s brave “What are we doing?” speech, passionate as it was, should have done it, but unfortunately did not. For now, greed and FOLVES, the fear of losing votes, continue to muzzle the voices of conscience.

War between Russia and Ukraine: Analyzing Information and International Relations

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
War between Russia and Ukraine: Analyzing Information and International Relations

Interview with Professor Maria Repnikova

In this exclusive interview, Professor Maria Repnikova (Georgia State University, United States) addresses Russia’s War in Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022. She highlights the role of information and the field of international relations. This expert focuses specifically on various aspects linked to the aforementioned military conflict, such as propaganda, psychological warfare, the communication skills of the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine, respectively Putin and Zelenskyy, and U.S. support of Ukraine. Repnikova also provides a few considerations regarding World War II and Russia’s military cooperation with China, India and Iran.

On February 24, 2022, Russia began what it calls a special military operation in Ukraine, but which other countries generally regard as a war. In this piece, in the form of an interview, Professor Maria Repnikova examines said military conflict, while stressing the relevance of information and various aspects in the sphere of international relations.

Information and Media

Though the hybridization of war already existed prior to 2022, according to Maria Repnikova this conflict between Russia and Ukraine entails the added importance of information. In this regard, Repnikova highlights sharp power. According to this academic, the restrictions on independent journalism that has been taking place in Russia, in the last 20 years, have been heightened with this war. Maria Repnikova points out the closure of websites of several independent media, as they were accused of being foreign agents. This analyst remarks that, despite Russia’s attempts to censor or limit social media, Telegram still remains quite open and accessible, unlike in China, with Weibo (the Chinese version of Twitter), which is highly censored. Repnikova underscores that Russian President Vladimir Putin needs Telegram to operate, in order to engage in propaganda. She feels that, in Russia, some news outlets, such as Meduza, can still be accessed and are broadly used, without causing major disruptions, that is, without entailing a great deal of domestic opposition to Putin’s decisions.

Game theory applies to international relations and to war. Recently, in April 2022, Russia tested a new nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile, which that nation disclosed through the media. This disclosure, according to Maria Repnikova, needs to be viewed in light of information warfare, with the aim of deterring countries from direct intervention against Russia, through military involvement in Ukraine. From the standpoint of the interviewee, as concerns nuclear weapons, there is a certain unpredictability with regard to Putin’s decision. 

Repnikova states that the conflict under analysis comprises an aspect of psychological warfare, involving manipulation of emotions. This scholar points out Russia’s domestic psychological warfare, by citing, as an example, the accusation of treason and anti-patriotism toward Russians who are against the war. To Maria Repnikova, criminalizing opposition to the war is a way of limiting protests. She considers that leading people to be fearful of opposing the Kremlin’s decisions is part of psychological warfare.

Storytelling is a keyword in various contexts of communication such as propaganda. From Repnikova’s standpoint, a clash of narratives takes place via domestic and international media: on the one hand, Russia disseminates its greatness and, using arguments presented as historical, including from the Soviet era, seeks to convince recipients that the existence of an independent Ukraine makes no sense; on the other hand, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy uses his considerable communication skills to send messages to various parts of the world, regarding his country’s independence, strength, resistance and resilience. 

Leadership is related to communication skills. This war between Russia and Ukraine comprises two main players: Putin and Zelenskyy. They have distinct verbal and nonverbal communication styles. According to the interviewee, Zelenskyy’s communication skills, in some regards, include his ability to adapt the message to multiple target audiences, as well as to interact with different people, such as the presidents of several countries and French students.

Maria Repnikova characterizes Zelenskyy as someone attractive who communicates spontaneously, who generates emotions and who appears informally dressed among civil and military Ukrainians. She underlines the differences in relation to the President of Ukraine by describing Putin as someone living in an immense golden palace and who celebrates Easter with a very formal and very removed appearance. From an iconic standpoint, Repnikova highlights the long table used during Putin’s official meetings with foreign leaders. She believes that, while Putin’s discourses are well thought out, they are quite formal. 

Recently, Ukraine and some Western nations boycotted a few Russian media, such as RT and Sputnik. Russia, for its part, banned certain Western media, such as BBC and Voice of America. Currently, countries that are against Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine speak of Russia’s propaganda machine. In this regard, Maria Repnikova considers that, in comparative terms, in the so-called Western world, there are some media in the public sector that convey narratives of the State that created and sustains them.

This, according to Repnikova, occurs, for instance, with the U.S.’s Voice of America, which is linked to the State Department and comprises a diplomatic purpose. This analyst adds that, in the private sector, in general, though commercial media do not suffer greatly from state meddling, they can be influenced by their advertisers, investors and audiences, without constituting propaganda. Even if it is acknowledged that certain Western media serve propaganda-related purposes, Maria Repnikova feels that, comparatively, this still occurs more in state-controlled media environments in countries such as Russia and China.
 

As concerns war journalism, Repnikova does not overlook the debate calling journalists’ objectivity into question, when there is an emotional involvement with one of the parties at issue or when journalists provide coverage on their own country. She thinks that journalists need to diversify their sources and carefully confirm the information they obtain.
Also within the field of journalism, Maria Repnikova states that, to the Ukrainian government, it’s very important to be able to influence the news agenda of Western mainstream media, by raising their audiences’ awareness, in order to garner military and economic support. This academic feels that the public’s interest in the Russia-Ukraine War could wane over time, due to a certain trivilialization of the conflict and the emergence of new national and international news items with high media impact. This, in Repnikova’s opinion, would benefit Russia.


Evoking World War II

Within the context of the war under analysis, Russian troops displayed the flag of the Soviet Union on Ukrainian soil. To the interviewee, displaying said symbol in Ukraine means restoring Russia’s glorious past under the Soviet empire. Maria Repnikova underpins another relevant symbol: Russian troops recaptured a World War II memorial in Ukraine, while stating that, from that point onward, Ukrainians could celebrate the end of that historical event.

This academic considers that the legacy and echoes of World War II are highly important for Russia’s defense policy as well as for the domestic legitimacy of the Putin regime. The way Repnikova sees it, annual commemorations in Russia marking the Soviet victory in World War II serve to put current Russian power on display: military parades showing sophisticated weaponry help bring the government closer to the people while exalting patriotism. According to Maria Repnikova, the Kremlin somehow presents the current military conflict in Ukraine as Russia’s continuing the Soviet Union’s  World War II-era glory.


Russia’s relations with China, India and Iran

Repnikova has no doubts that China is carefully monitoring ongoing events in Ukraine, while seeking to gauge how the West would react to Chinese military intervention in Taiwan. She thinks that, for now, China at least is cautious in facing a future where the war in Ukraine would make the West stronger and more united, while weakening Russia and leaving China a little more isolated. However, Repnikova maintains that the advantages and drawbacks have yet to be cleared up, even though there are those who feel that China can derive economic benefits from this conflict. In the opinion of this scholar, China wishes to remain on good terms with the West, in order to achieve domestic legitimacy and not have to deal with other problems, on top of those that are domestically worrisome, such as COVID-19.

Maria Repnikova underscores that China’s official position in relation to Russia’s war in Ukraine is that of neutrality, standing in favor of peace. This analyst points out that, in English-language Chinese state media, such as the Xinhua news agency, calls have been made for negotiations between the warring parties, at times referring to China as a mediator of the conflict.
Generally speaking, there are simulations, deceptions and surprises within the context of war. In relation to this armed conflit in Ukraine, could Russia, on top of its military strengths, still end up having a few political and diplomatic assets, in terms of garnering some international backing, considering its influence, for instance, in Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia and the Middle East? To this end, Repnikova states that it’s still a bit too early to actually determine the extent of Russia’s victories.

This academic adds that, to date, it seems, at least, that Russia is not losing in the Global South, to the extent that some of these countries have yet to speak out against Russia, thus maintaining a certain neutrality. Still, according to Repnikova, it remains to be seen whether African governments will blame Russia or NATO for certain outcomes of the war, such as food shortages, including cereal, and economic problems, which are currently being felt in their countries and which could worsen as the conflict continues. In this scholar’s understanding, it’s important to know whether Russia has something more to offer African countries besides arms and narratives.

The 12th Edition of Indo-Russia joint military Exercise INDRA 2021 was held in August 2021, in Volgograd, Russia. In September 2021, with the Armed Forces of Russia and of other countries, India also took part in the Zapad-21 military exercise, conducted on Russian and Belarusian soil. In the opinion of the interviewee, Western media need to be more attentive to relations between said countries. Repnikova stresses that, worldwide, India is one of the biggest importers of Russian arms. From her standpoint, Russia seeks to strengthen its involvement with India, in order not to rely too heavily on China. This situation is characterized by Repnikova as being complex, given that there are some tensions between India and China. This occurs, for example, on the border between the two countries.

Also in the domain of international cooperation, in January 2022, the Navies of Russia, Iran and China conducted joint military exercises in the Indian Ocean. This, from Repnikova’s perspective, is of symbolic value, to show unity vis-à-vis the West’s military might. However, this analyst doubts that said countries currently have a military alliance whereby they are willing to jointly face enemies. In this regard, Maria Repnikova acknowledges that the future could bring surprises.


The U.S.’s backing of Ukraine

The interviewee feels that the U.S. Administration has dealt with this war between Russia and Ukraine in the best possible way, to avoid a direct military showdown with Russia that the American people don’t want and that Congress would approve only in the event of a certain escalation in the conflict. To Repnikova, not overstepping the fine line between American backing of Ukraine and its direct involvement against Russian troops is a huge challenge. Among several aspects, this scholar underscores the support given by the U.S. in terms of sharing intelligence, to enable the U.S. to anticipate the moves made by the Russian Armed Forces. Maria Repnikova thinks that the United States, together with its Western allies, have greatly helped Ukraine, in military and economic terms, as well as in the field of information, thereby mobilizing public opinion.
 

New world order

Repnikova considers that it’s too early to present the characteristics of a definitive new world order, before the end of the war between Russia and Ukraine. Still, this scholar maintains that we will likely see greater unity between the U.S. and Western Europe, greater integration of China in the Global South, distancing itself from the West, as is somehow the case right now, along with the weakening economic power of an anti-Western country: Russia.


Conclusion

These days, the hybridization of war amounts to a certain complexity, according to increasingly diversified domains involved in a military conflict. In 2022, the war between Russia and Ukraine is proof of the importance of information regarding civilians and troops, with its psychological aspect and by applying war game theory, in both the domestic and international spheres. To the various warring parties, it becomes relevant to influence perceptions, emotions and public opinion, through the media, increasingly including social media. In Russia, despite attempts at media control, the Kremlin allows Telegram to keep running, to the extent it also serves to disseminate Russian propaganda. For Ukraine, while it’s pivotal to keep this war at the top of the news media agendas, this could be more difficult as the conflict drags on and other high-interest topics emerge in the media.


Warranting particular attention, as part of information warfare, is the ability of the two leading players, Putin and Zelenskyy, to wield influence on domestic and international audiences by using the media and different verbal and nonverbal communication styles. As for characterizing both presidents, Zelenskyy can be regarded as a skillful communicator, while Putin is shown to be unpredictable. Within a military context, this unpredictability is viewed as a positive side of Putin, to the extent the enemy is left wondering about the other party’s decisions and actions.


The impact of symbols in a war is visible, for instance, when we see that the Soviet flag was displayed in Ukraine by Russian troops in 2022. This, while keeping alive the memory of Russia’s glorious past, within the Soviet sphere, is also somehow linked to evoking World War II. This is somehow shown by Russia to justify the current military clashes, as concerns one of its political and ideological goals: denazification of Ukraine. In the present, History could serve to motivate civilians and troops. 


It’s still unclear whether the Russia-Ukraine war is beneficial or harmful for the Chinese economy. In the international context, China has been publicly in favor of peace and willing to mediate the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Certainly, there are those in Beijing who look at the West’s reactions to what is currently happening on Ukrainian soil, in order to draw conclusions as to the possible outcomes of Chinese military intervention in Taiwan. 


Also in the field of international relations, while Russia conducted military maneuvers with China, India and Iran in 2021 and 2022, this doesn’t mean that said countries have a military alliance in place or that they will actually engage in joint combat. This situation needs to be duly monitored, since the future could bring changes.


It’s expedient to point out that, to date, some Global South countries have remained neutral with regard to the Russia-Ukraine war. However, said neutrality can be shaken by economic problems and food shortages, in Africa, due to the continuing military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In life in general as well as in war, (short-, medium- or long-term) time management is crucial.


The U.S.’s military backing of Ukraine, together with its allies, namely, for instance, arms and intelligence, requires careful consideration, so as not to transition to direct confrontation with Russia.
At the moment, though it’s unwise to make definitive considerations, with regard to a new world order stemming from the war under analysis, it’s now possible to uncover  a few situations: greater unity between the U.S. and Western Europe, China’s growing investment in the Global South and Russia’s greater antagonism toward the West.


References

– Georgia State University College of Arts & Sciences / Maria Repnikova. Retrieved  25.5.2022 from https://cas.gsu.edu/profile/maria-repnikova/ 

Interview

This interview was conducted, via Zoom, on May 19, 2022 Published by Marinho Media Analysis

http://www.marinho-mediaanalysis.org/articles/war-between-russia-and-ukraine-2022-analyzing-information-and-international-relations

This piece was also published on the following site:

International Affairs Forum – Center for International Relations (Washington D.C., United States of America) / June 1, 2022

https://www.ia-forum.org/Content/ViewInternal_Document.cfm?contenttype_id=5&ContentID=9366

About the authors:

Professor Maria Repnikova

Maria Repnikova is an expert in the following topics: Russia, China, global communication, political communication and media activism (Georgia State University College of Arts & Sciences / Maria Repnikova). 

Jorge Marinho

Jorge Marinho is a Research supervisor. PhD in Communication Sciences, BA in International Journalist

Júlio Ventura

Júlio Ventura – BA in Law, MA student in Political Science and International Relations at the Portuguese Catholic University (Lisbon, Portugal)

Guilherme Guimarães

Guilherme Guimarães – BA in Law, MA student in International Law at the Portuguese Catholic University (Porto, Portugal)

OPEC and International Law

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
OPEC and International Law

By Eugene Matos and Adrian Zienkiewicz

OPEC is a leading international organization driving the prices of petroleum worldwide. Just like a blowout from an oil well, the price of black gold skyrocketed through the influence consolidated by OPEC to then find itself oscillating due to global changes in economic models, extraction processes, political mentalities and supply. Many countries experienced an energy crisis in 2021, and although there is greater diversity in primary energy production, a total transition away from oil is impractical, if not impossible, for the next few decades. That is where OPEC’s relative power shines through as its members’ proven crude oil reserves account for nearly 80% of global reserves as per OPEC’s 2018 reports. How is OPEC perceived through the scope of international law?

OPEC is often described as an intergovernmental cartel, since its thirteen independent members work together to maintain control over the market, all whilst increasing their revenue. What leads to this attribution is its fascinating decentralized nature, as all members retain their state sovereignty and policy is expressed through resolutions. These resolutions, which are analogous to treaties that operate on the basis of pacta sunt servanda, are passed unanimously under article 11 c) of the OPEC Statute, but there are no monitoring mechanisms for noncompliance.

Production policy is not articulated through these resolutions, further emphasizing the need for members to act in good faith and cooperate more efficiently with shifting supply and demand. As listed in article 9 of the OPEC Statute, OPEC’s governing bodies operate in voting policies and managing the organization. Although the Secretariat exists as a quasi-executive organ, its role also consists of preparing the Conferences represented by the members’ delegates. State sovereignty and autonomy principles are supreme, and understanding the organization’s existence through mutual self-serving economic interests means that there are no inherent or desired supranational qualities.

OPEC has never managed to develop its own court to settle disputes related to petroleum matters, and there is no solitary codified regulation, as all points are brought before the Conferences. OPEC can be characterized as a legal entity holding diplomatic and political advantages, as it benefits primarily from the principle of sovereign immunity, one that, according to article 6A of the OPEC Statute, is from every form of legal process unless “expressly waived”.

The meteoric rise on the global stage that OPEC experienced in the 1970s accompanied a fair share of lawsuits through antitrust arguments. This was seen especially in the U.S., where the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 contended with OPEC’s legal status, opening the doors to several legal actions and culminating with International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v OPEC. IAM was concerned with the high prices of petroleum during the latter half of the decade and possessed a personal interest as this would affect its profits. It was argued that price setting breached U.S. antitrust laws. The court ultimately sided with the defendant, since deciding on the legality of a sovereign act would have politically sensitive and unintended effects. On appeal, this decision was affirmed and even cited the act of state doctrine, which expresses the sovereignty of states and non interference, and arguments in favor of the Sherman Antitrust Act fell.

American citizens would have been able to successfully sue through State courts, and even though the “action of sovereign nations coming together to agree on how each will perform certain sovereign acts can only, itself, be a sovereign act”, this could have only increased in volume and possibly included situations of vexatious litigation. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California nevertheless settled in 1993 that violations to the Sherman Act can be used to make a sovereign entity liable if it intends to restrict trade. This has not yet been utilized against matters involving OPEC.

Besides, Illinois Brick Co. v Illinois decided that violations to antitrust laws can be remedied only to direct and not indirect actors of a particular sector. Direct suppliers of petroleum could theoretically proceed through litigation, but the complexity and intertwining nature of the sector makes it that OPEC isn’t challenged this way. OPEC adapts to market trends and establishes accommodating prices to the members’ and most of the supply chain’s advantage.

Prewitt v OPEC was another high profile U.S. case that elaborated antitrust breaches through the Clayton Act, referred to Austrian law (seeing how the seat of OPEC is in Vienna) and mentioned the federal International Organizations Immunities Act which OPEC is not designated by. No matter the difference in how the U.S. government officially perceives OPEC, the organization is heavily protected by international principles. United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 1803 (XVII) and 3281 (XXIX) point to the sovereign control over resources. OPEC is an organization of several independent, sovereign countries, and thus legal actions would not hinder their operations or exporting capacities. The organization is by all means a monopoly, but claims of significant predatory practices have not been satisfied.

The defense through the foreign sovereign compulsion principle, which posits that a defendant could have been compelled to breach antitrust laws, has rarely been used. Its use against OPEC has never been raised and would otherwise be irrelevant, as the only successful application was seen in Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo bearing specific circumstances. Successful legal action against OPEC in national jurisdictions would have to compete with international tenets.

In the U.S. again, the judicial path is narrow, and the violations and legal remedies available would have to be specific. Although the U.S. enjoyed greater levels of petroleum production throughout the 21st century, legislative proposals for expanding antitrust laws to target OPEC exist. “NOPEC”, an amusing pun to the organization, is an unenacted bill that was most recently debated in the House Judiciary Committee in 2021. With OPEC’s unique status, the recourse through international apparatuses is unclear and OPEC is not challenged.

About the authors:

Eugene Matos De Lara

(MA, MBA, LL.L, JD, LLB, BA.pol.pad, BA.dvm, BA.sc PMP) is an officer with the Canadian Armed Forces, currently working for the International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan studies, based in Ljubljana, and the Geneva Desk for Cooperation. Multilingual internationally published legal graduate with an extensive corporate legal background, and exposure to private international law, international relations, politics, public administration and public affairs.

Adrian Zienkiewicz

Co-Author Adrian Zienkiewicz

(LL.B., J.D.) is a law student at Université de Montréal and an officer in the Canadian Armed Forces. He has a marked interest for all spheres of public international law. Environmental and Energy Law are his real passions.

Trust Fund for Victims: Making reparative justice a meaningful reality for victims

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Trust Fund for Victims: Making reparative justice a meaningful reality for victims

By Ms. Minou Tavárez Mirabal, TFV Board Chair

It is impossible to fully undo the harm caused by the most serious human rights violations in the world – crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes and crimes of aggression. However, it is possible to recognise victim survivors for the harm or damage they suffered and to redress them. It is possible to make their right to reparations a reality.

The international community made a commitment to justice for victims of these most serious crimes by adopting the Rome Statute in 1998. The Statute created the International Criminal Court (ICC) for prosecuting those responsible for these crimes and provided for a Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) of the crimes under the Rome Statute and for their families, to make the funds of the convicted persons and additional voluntary contributions available for the benefit of the victims. The TFV implements awards of reparations ordered by the ICC against the convicted person, and provides assistance to victims in ICC situation countries.

While the TFV Secretariat is funded by regular assessed contributions by States Parties, the reparations and assistance programmes have been funded through voluntary contributions from States Parties to the Rome Statute and private donations, as all to date convicted persons were held not to have the funds to pay for reparations themselves. A very limited source of funds to date have been fines imposed as a penalty in the Bemba et al. case on persons convicted for having committed offences against the administration of justice.

Minou Tavárez Mirabal

Governance

The TFV, established by the Rome Statute, is led by a Board of Directors, elected and accountable directly to the Assembly of States Parties (ASP).

The Board of Directors represents each of the five regional groups. On 6 December 2021, the seventh Board of Directors of the TFV was elected for a three-year term (2021 – 2024) (LINK), and so the Board is composed of Ibrahim Sorie Yillah (Sierra Leone), representing the African States, Sheikh Mohammed Belal (Bangladesh), representing the Asia-Pacific States, Andrés Parmas (Estonia), representing the Eastern European States, Kevin Kelly (Ireland), representing the Western European and other States and myself (Dominican Republic), representing the Latin American and Caribbean States.

As per the relevant ASP Regulations (ICC-ASP/4/Res.3), the TFV, through its Board, is mandated to fundraise for its activities, decide on the use of funds, implement reparation awards ordered by the Court, conduct outreach, consult with victims, experts. For its proper functioning, the Board of Directors is assisted by a Secretariat that carries out the day-to-day activities of the TFV relevant to fundraising, fund management and all implementation-related activities.

The Secretariat operates under the full authority of the Board of Directors, is headed by an Executive Director and currently consists of about 25 staff members. For administrative purposes, the Secretariat and its staff are attached to the Registry of the Court. The TFV operates in The Hague and in ICC situation countries with staff members at currently five ICC Country Offices. The TFV collaborates with numerous sections within the ICC in the delivery of its activities. 

Minou Tavárez Mirabal

Strengthening the Board and the Secretariat of the TFV

The Board is conducting an ambitious program of work to address the challenges faced by expanding reparations and assistance programs, as well as ensuring transparency and accountability to States Parties, the Fund’s donors and, most importantly, to victims of crimes so that their human rights are not violated again.

Accordingly, instead of the mandated annual meeting, the Board is meeting every month remotely to drive strategic planning, institutional development and provide direction to the activities of the Secretariat. The Board will prioritize fundraising and convening increased political support to the essential work of the Trust Fund.

Also in 2022, the Board has, in agreement with the current Executive Director, initiated a transition in the Secretariat of the TFV, with the position of Executive Director becoming open for recruitment. The Executive Director Pieter de Baan, who has been in office since 2010, has led the set up of the TFV, several cycles of assistance programmes in Uganda and DRC and the programmes described below. This important transition will bring new opportunities to further develop the TFV.

Reparative Justice for victim survivors

Reparations are ordered by the ICC and implemented by the TFV (Article 75.2 of the Rome Statute) following a judicial process and are directly related to the criminal responsibility of a convicted person established by the ICC. The ICC has issued four reparation orders in the Lubanga, Katanga, Al Mahdi, and Ntaganda cases. A fifth reparation order is expected in the Ongwen case later this year.

In the Katanga case, the TFV complemented the awards for individual reparations for 297 victims of the case in 2017 and 2018, with the voluntary contribution of the Netherlands.  Implementation of the collective awards for education support and income-generating activities ended  in early 2022. The last collective awards relevant to psychological rehabilitation and housing assistance will be completed in 2022.

In the Lubanga case, the TFV has launched the reparation programme with a consortium to implement the collective service based awards for the benefit of the more than 2,000 former child soldiers and their families. In 2021, a five-year programme started that requires additional funding of about EUR 4.5 Million. In 2022, the TFV has started the implementation of the symbolic award intended to build multi-functional spaces to be used for peacebuilding and culture activities among the community members.

In the Al Mahdi case, the reparation programme started with the payment of individual compensation awards as of January 2021 and nearly 800 individuals have received the award to date. In March 2021, the TFV in collaboration with the Presidency of Mali, hosted a high level ceremony in Bamako, with the participation of the ICC Prosecutor, to award a symbolic euro to the government of Mali, in relation to moral harm suffered by the Malian population, and to UNESCO, in relation to moral harm suffered by the international community for the destruction of the world heritage sites in Timbuktu.

In the Ntaganda case, the TFV started in 2022 to provide a limited number of priority victims in urgent need with initial reparation measures through its existing partners in Ituri Province, DRC.

In addition to implementing reparation awards ordered by the ICC, since 2008 the TFV has provided support in the form of administrative, non-judicial reparations to individuals who have suffered harm from crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC. Victims receive medical treatment, trauma counselling as well as socio-economic support. Through its implementing partners, the TFV also establishes community dialogues and conducts peacebuilding activities. 

Currently, the TFV is implementing such assistance programmes in the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda. The TFV will launch in 2022 new programmes in Georgia, in Mali and in Kenya.

Minou Tavárez Mirabal

Call for action for victim and survivors of atrocity crimes

Hundreds of thousands of individuals have suffered from armed conflict. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing conflict exacerbates pre-existing conditions of their physical and mental wellbeing. Victims and survivors of atrocity crimes have the right to receive reparations for the harm they have suffered.

Thanks to the support received from the TFV’s donors and implementing partner organisations, more than 1,600 individual beneficiaries to date received a variety of reparation measures, and the population of Mali and the international community received symbolic reparations for the destruction of world heritage sites in Timbuktu.  In addition, the Trust Fund has provided to tens of thousands of victims in the DRC and northern Uganda since 2008, and more recently in the Central African Republic and Côte d’Ivoire as part of its non-judicial mandate (assistance programmes). In 2021 alone, the Trust Fund provided reparative measures to more than 17,000 direct beneficiaries across those programmes. 

Additional funds are needed to allow the Trust Fund to treat victims in one case and one situation country equally and provide them all with a similar kind of reparations. Continuity is essential to ensuring a lasting effect of reparations and to avoiding re-traumatization of victims.

The TFV therefore calls for support politically, morally, and financially from governments, individuals, academics and private sector, to amplify the voices of victims and survivors at the centre of the Rome Statute system, to ensure their rights to receive reparations can be realised.

For more information about the Trust Fund for Victims, please contact: trustfundforvictims@icc-cpi.int or visit: www.trustfundforvictims.org

TFV donor countries:

Andorra, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,  Luxembourg, Mali, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines (before withdrawal from the ICC), Poland, Portugal, Republic of Congo, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, and Uruguay.

TFV implementing partner organisations:

Association des Femmes Juriste de Centrafrique (AFJC), Comité Inter Africain pour les Femmes de Centrafrique (CIAF), DanChurchAid (DCA), Mukwege Foundation, Medicins d’Afrique Centrafrique, AVSI Foundation, Développement Rural à l’Ouest – La Lutte Contre le Faim (DRAO-LCF), West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP-CI), Association des Mamans Anti-Bwaki (AMAB), Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI), Sociétés des Missionnaires d’Afrique (SMA), Solidarité pour la Promotion Sociale et la Paix (SOPROP), Appui aux Femmes Démunies et Enfants Marginalises (AFEDEM) -R.D. Congo, Médecins du Monde Belgique (MdM), World Relief, CIDEAL, CFOGRAD, UNESCO, AVSI Foundation, Centre for Children in Vulnerable Situations (CCVS), Center for Victims of Torture (CVT), Health Right International (HRI), Transcultural Psychological Organisation (TPO).

Minou Tavárez Mirabal

A world for everyone to live with dignity

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
A world for everyone to live with dignity

On the occasion of the presentation of arguments for the “Status and use of the waters of the Silala” before the International Court of Justice in The Hague last April, the Foreign Minister of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Rogelio Mayta, spoke with Diplomat Magazine about People’s Diplomacy.

Minister Mayta explained that Bolivia seeks to consolidate its participation in the international agenda through the deployment, strengthening and visibility of People’s Diplomacy for life. This entails strengthening ties with countries of the world, within the framework of the proactive and purposeful role that has characterized Bolivia’s foreign policy since 2006.

“Bolivia proposes a world for everyone to live with dignity, where no one is marginalized and everyone feels included in a world tailored to all”, the Foreign Minister pointed out.

The global agenda and the current world crises demand responses with a strong component of interrelationship across countries. This world scenario presents countries with the challenge of establishing dialogue among blocs of States with expeditious decision-making procedures, while at the same time incorporating the interests of the peoples concerned, especially those most in need.

“Bolivia will continue to propose to the international community to strengthen and expand the rights of Mother Earth, the rights of indigenous peoples and nations, and the right to international peace,” Foreign Minister Mayta stressed.

The foreign policy of the Plurinational State of Bolivia is committed to establish good relations with the nations of the world based on respect for the self-determination of peoples, the sovereignty of States and non-interference in internal affairs. In the same way, it privileges the recognition of the principles of international law and promotes equal treatment of the States with which Bolivia interacts.

Leonardo’s Faces – Joshua Noordwijk

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Leonardo’s Faces – Joshua Noordwijk

The Leonardo Royal Hotel Den Haag Promenade is represented by both new and more experienced employees working together with passion as one team, to deliver great service and to depict the hotel’s values. In these monthly written pieces, there is a focus on their values and their approach to our international clients.

Who are the employees as an individual? Allow us to introduce you to introduce Joshua Noordwijk.

  • Nationality: Dutch & Surinamese
  • Function: Commercial Management Trainee     
  • Department: Booking Office

“I started working for the Promenade Hotel at the 22nd of January in 2018″ Said Joshua. “I started working at the Front Desk as a receptionist of the former Crowne Plaza Den Haag – Promenade. Originally, I was hired with the intention that I would become the Concierge of the hotel. However, due to a change of plans, this did not happen. Despite that, I continued working at the hotel during the past years, while I was doing my International Hospitality Management bachelors in Leeuwarden. Last February, I started my 10-month internship, for which I switched my Front Desk position to Commercial Management Trainee.

What was your first impression of the Promenade Hotel?

My first impression of the hotel was very good. I came back to the Netherlands after an internship in London, and I was looking for a new luxurious hotel to work for. I started looking for a suitable hotel in The Hague, and the Promenade Hotel immediately stood out for me. The appearance of the big lobby, the beautiful and convenient location and of course the extensive Promenade Healthclub & Spa make the hotel really impressive.

What makes the Promenade Hotel suitable for welcoming people from all around the world?

The hotel has such a rich international history and has welcomed many (famous) internationals already. The team is also very international, which also creates a welcoming atmosphere for international guests. Additionally, I believe that our new restaurant concept ‘LEO’S International Flavors’ makes the hotel even more suitable, as it really gives the guest the chance to choose dishes from all over the world.

What do you value most in the organization of diplomatic events at the Promenade Hotel?

What I value the most is to see how all departments work together to create the best possible event. From the Booking Office to Housekeeping, and from the Kitchen staff to the Front Desk; all departments play their part to achieve the same goal during these diplomatic events. It really creates a good atmosphere that guests also experience.

What did you learn so far by working with diplomats? Some tips, rules or values to share?

What I especially learned by working with different diplomats are the cultural differences between the different nationalities that visit the hotel. I always find it very interesting to see what habits and values are attached to certain cultures. Experiencing the various food festivals also contributes to this.

Which Food Festival has been your favorite so far or would you like to experience?

There have been many Food Festivals during the previous years. However, for some reason the Tunesian, Vietnamese, Italian and Peruvian Food Festival especially made a good impression to me. As far as I can remember, these were very successful editions. I would love to see a Surinamese Food Festival with all popular dishes from Suriname.

What local food(s), from abroad, have you tried already?

I have tried many different cuisines and food in my life. I am a big fan of the Italian cuisine since I love pizza and pasta, but I also love Mexican dishes like Fajitas or Enchiladas. Furthermore, I love Indian food like Butter Chicken and of course Surinamese Roti.

What is your favorite drink or dish at LEO’s International Flavors?

Since LEO’S International Flavors offers so many different dishes I still did not try all of them. However, I’m a big fan of the Japanese Beef Tataki. This has always been one of my favorite starters and I really like how they present it at LEO’S. In addition, I really love the South-Korean Sticky Chicken with noodles. My favorite drink on the menu would be the Carmenere Gran Reserva, which is a Chilean red wine.

What sustainable development goal do you value most? Why this one?

The sustainable development goal that I value the most is ‘Climate Action’. I think it is important that the world takes urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts. The world is warming up and the sea levels have risen a lot, the whole world experiences the effects of climate change. Therefore, I think it is important that the world takes action to minimalize the consequences of climate change.

What piece of good advice did you receive, and from whom, that you would like to forward?

One piece of advice that I follow for myself is to enjoy life every day. You never know if tomorrow may come so I think it is important to make the best out of every thing and enjoy the little things in life.

Anglo-American Axis Needs Common Market, not Common Alliance

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Anglo-American Axis Needs Common Market, not Common Alliance

By Chan Kung

With the eruption of the war in Ukraine, and considering the post-war situation, the alliance system in the West and its future should be something worthy of concern.

Anglo-American Axis is a concept that I proposed well before Brexit, and such an axis has already been fully formed today. With Brexit, the United Kingdom is now no longer part of the continental European alliance. It has instead re-aligned with the United States, and reverted to being a maritime nation that it used to be.

Such an axis would not be moved by the independence inclination of France, the wish of Germany to become the leader, nor the ambition of Turkey to be a regional hegemon. It cares even less about countries like Israel, Iran, and India. What the Anglo-American Axis focuses is to control the high ground of fundamental values, so that it can win the historic future as long as civilization continues to progress. Wars in other regions do not carry much significance to it. For NATO to play a role, it must negotiate conditions with the United States. It is not the Anglo-American Axis that needs NATO, but that NATO needs the Anglo-American Axis.

The United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, the former members of the Commonwealth, have formed the largest single market in the world, with a coordinated monetary policy for the U.S. dollar and British pound. Such a market can consider certain African and South American countries, as long as they remain stable, and this usually means some “friendly dictatorships with open economies”, similar to Chile in the past.

Civilization is a dynamic force. Although many have studied monetary issues and finance, they fail to link these with civilization. In fact, these are appendages of civilization, and they are products of it. Humanity will inevitably move towards civilization.

About the author:

Chan Kung

Chan Kung- Founder of ANBOUND Think Tank (established in 1993), Mr. Chan Kung is one of China’s renowned experts in information analysis. Most of his outstanding academic research activities are in economic information analysis, particularly in the area of public policy.

1...156157158...858Page 157 of 858