Kosovo at Eighteen: A Nation Built on Hope

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By H.E. Dr. Dren Doli, Ambassador of the Republic of Kosovo to the Kingdom of the Netherlands

As we celebrate the 18th anniversary of the Republic of Kosovo, we mark more than a milestone in the life of a young nation. Eighteen is the age of adulthood—a moment to reflect on how far we have come, to acknowledge those who made our journey possible, and to look ahead with confidence and responsibility.

What began with the international community’s humanitarian intervention has evolved into one of Europe’s youngest and most dynamic democracies. Kosovo’s story demonstrates what can be achieved when the principles of justice, the rule of law, and international solidarity prevail over violence and oppression.

Yet beyond political achievements and economic progress, there is one lesson that has defined Kosovo’s journey above all others: hope.

Hope carried our people through the darkest chapters of our history. It sustained us when our future seemed uncertain and taught us resilience when our very existence was under threat. Hope inspired us to imagine a country where future generations could live in freedom, peace, and prosperity. It also enabled us to build lasting friendships with nations and partners who believed in our cause and continue to stand with us today.

Eighteen years after declaring independence, Kosovo stands as a democratic, sovereign Republic committed to peace, multilateralism, and the protection of human rights. These accomplishments are not an endpoint but part of a longer journey envisioned by previous generations. They honour the sacrifice of all those who gave their lives for Kosovo’s freedom and independence.

Our democratic institutions continue to mature. During the past year alone, Kosovo successfully conducted two rounds of general elections and two rounds of local elections, all free, competitive, and fair. Such democratic continuity reflects the strength and resilience of our institutions. At the same time, our economy recorded GDP growth of 4.5 percent, among the highest in both the European Union and the Western Balkans, demonstrating our determination to build a prosperous future.

Kosovo remains firmly committed to peace, regional cooperation, and good-neighbourly relations throughout South-East Europe. We also remain deeply grateful to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, whose political, diplomatic, and economic support has been instrumental in strengthening our strategic partnership.

The friendship between our two countries has deep roots. During Kosovo’s struggle for liberation, Dutch soldiers serving within NATO stood alongside our people in defence of freedom and human dignity. Many of those veterans continue to support Kosovo today, serving as guardians of historical truth and reminding us that peace is built upon courage, solidarity, and shared values.

Looking ahead, Kosovo’s strategic objectives remain clear: membership in NATO and the European Union. These aspirations are not merely political ambitions; they reflect our identity and our place within the family of democratic European nations.

Hope continues to guide us. It is hope that gives us the determination to keep knocking on every door until our voice is heard. We do not seek special treatment, nor do we ask for what we have not earned. We seek our rightful place in a united Europe because we share its values, its responsibilities, and its vision for the future.

As Kosovo enters adulthood, we do so with confidence, humility, and hope. Our journey has shown that hope is not passive optimism; it is the determination to persevere, to build, and to believe that a better future is always within reach.

Hope never dies. It simply transforms into the courage to keep moving forward.

Do Diplomats Pay Income Tax? The Myth Behind Diplomatic Tax Privilege

Diplomatic tax privilege is often misunderstood. In public discussion, it is sometimes described as if a diplomat simply lives outside the tax system. That is not how the law works.

The better question is not whether diplomats pay tax. The better question is which tax, imposed by which state, on which type of income, and in what capacity the diplomat is acting. Once those distinctions are made, the popular idea of a “tax-free diplomat” becomes far less accurate.

The starting point is the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, especially Article 34. The convention provides that a diplomatic agent is exempt from many dues and taxes in the receiving state. That protection has a specific purpose. It protects the independence of the diplomatic mission. It is not designed to create a private tax privilege for personal enrichment.

The receiving state should not be able to tax a foreign diplomatic agent in a way that pressures, punishes, or interferes with the sending state’s mission. Tax exemption is therefore part of the wider architecture of diplomatic independence. It helps diplomacy function even where political relations are tense.

But Article 34 is not a blank check. It contains important exceptions. A diplomatic agent is not exempt from indirect taxes normally included in the price of goods or services. He or she is not exempt from dues and taxes on private immovable property in the receiving state, unless the property is held on behalf of the sending state for mission purposes. Nor is there a general exemption for estate, succession, or inheritance duties; private income sourced in the receiving state; capital taxes on investments in commercial undertakings in the receiving state; charges for specific services; or certain registration, court, record, mortgage, and stamp duties connected with immovable property.

Those exceptions are not technical details. They show the logic of the system. Diplomatic tax privilege protects official diplomatic activity. It does not turn a diplomat into a private economic actor beyond local law.

Consider ordinary consumption. A diplomat who buys groceries, clothing, restaurant meals, or hotel services may still bear taxes embedded in the price. Some host countries operate special exemption systems for eligible diplomats, such as tax exemption cards, refund procedures, or tax-free purchasing mechanisms. But those systems are domestic administrative arrangements. They vary by country and are often shaped by reciprocity. The Vienna Convention does not mean that every purchase by every diplomat in every jurisdiction is automatically tax-free.

Real estate is another useful example. If a mission owns or leases premises used for official purposes, international law gives significant tax protection. But if a diplomatic agent personally owns an apartment, villa, office, or commercial property in the receiving state, the position changes. Article 34 permits taxation of private immovable property unless the property is held on behalf of the sending state for mission purposes. The distinction is simple: official mission use is protected; private ownership is not automatically protected.

The same principle applies to income. A diplomatic agent’s official remuneration from the sending state is generally protected from host-state taxation. But private income earned in the receiving state can be treated differently. Rental income from private local property, fees from a private consulting arrangement, income from a local business, dividends or capital gains connected to local commercial undertakings, or other earnings unrelated to official functions may fall outside diplomatic tax protection.

This is not accidental. Article 42 of the Vienna Convention provides that a diplomatic agent must not practice for personal profit any professional or commercial activity in the receiving state. The rule reflects a basic concern: diplomatic status should not be used to compete with local residents under a privileged legal and tax position.

The home-country issue is separate. Exemption in the receiving state does not decide what the sending state may tax. A diplomat may be exempt from host-state income tax on official salary while still owing reporting duties or tax at home. Some countries tax citizens or residents on worldwide income. Others use residence-based or territorial systems. Some have special rules for public officials posted abroad. Some exempt certain foreign-service allowances but not base salary. The result depends on domestic law, residence rules, nationality, tax treaties, and the employment relationship with the sending state.

This is where public commentary often becomes misleading. A diplomat posted abroad may not pay income tax to the receiving state on official remuneration, but that does not necessarily mean the income is untaxed. The sending state may still tax it. Alternatively, the sending state may exempt it under domestic law. The Vienna Convention does not create a universal global income-tax exemption. It limits what the receiving state may impose.

Status also matters. The broadest protections apply to diplomatic agents. Administrative and technical staff, service staff, private servants, consular officers, consular employees, honorary consuls, locally engaged employees, nationals of the receiving state, and permanent residents may all be treated differently. The Vienna Convention itself distinguishes categories of mission personnel. Consular law has a separate structure under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

Consular officers, for example, may benefit from tax exemptions under consular law, but the structure is not identical to diplomatic law. Honorary consular officers are more limited still. Under Article 66 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, an honorary consular officer is exempt from dues and taxes on remuneration and emoluments received from the sending state for the exercise of consular functions. That is not the same as a general exemption from tax on private income, private business activity, or local investments.

Locally engaged employees are another common source of confusion. A person may work inside an embassy and still not have the tax position of a diplomatic agent. If the person is a citizen or permanent resident of the host country and is employed locally by a foreign mission, domestic law may treat that person much like any other local employee. The building does not automatically confer the tax status of the ambassador.

The United States illustrates the point. The IRS explains that employees of foreign governments may be able to exempt foreign-government compensation from U.S. income tax under the Vienna Conventions, a bilateral agreement, a treaty, or specific U.S. tax law, but the exemption applies only to compensation for official services. It does not apply to other U.S.-source income such as interest, dividends, rents, or royalties. The IRS also distinguishes withholding treatment from ultimate income-tax reporting obligations. For example, certain compensation may not be treated as wages for withholding purposes while still being reportable by U.S. citizens.

That distinction is important because tax privilege is often confused with tax invisibility. Diplomatic or foreign-government status may affect withholding, taxability, filing duties, social security treatment, or residence calculations, depending on the jurisdiction. Those are different questions. They should not be collapsed into one claim that diplomats “do not pay tax.”

For governments, the lesson is administrative clarity. Missions should explain to their personnel which exemptions apply, which do not, and what documentation is required. Host states should apply tax privileges consistently and transparently. Diplomats and mission staff should avoid assuming that protocol status automatically resolves tax exposure.

For the public, the lesson is even simpler. Diplomatic tax privilege is not a personal escape hatch. It is a functional protection for interstate representation. It prevents a host state from using taxation to interfere with a foreign mission. It does not protect private commercial activity, local-source private income, ordinary consumption taxes in every case, or home-country tax obligations.

The myth of the “tax-free diplomat” survives because it is simple. The law is more precise. Diplomats may receive important exemptions from host-state taxation, especially on official remuneration and mission-related activity. But those exemptions are conditional, role-specific, and jurisdictional.

In diplomatic law, the question is rarely “taxable or not taxable.” The real question is capacity. Official capacity is protected. Private capacity is not automatically protected. That distinction is where the tax myth ends and the legal framework begins.

About the author:

Peter Kovacs is Director of Strategy at William Blackstone Internacional, Inc., a Panama-based advisory firm focused on diplomatic protocol, public international law frameworks, documentation readiness, and compliance. His work focuses on non-career diplomatic appointment structures, consular status, jurisdictional analysis, and risk controls for private clients, counsel, and institutions.

Independent Review Examines the Work of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers

On 11 June 2026, the Humanity Hub in The Hague hosted the presentation of the Report Offering a Preliminary Review of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC), published by the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales (BHRC). The briefing was co-hosted by the Ombudsperson Institution of Kosovo and the Embassy of the Republic of Kosovo in the Netherlands.

Authored by Dr. Gus Waschefort and Ms. Lauren Lederle, the report is presented as the first independent review of its kind assessing the work and functioning of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers since their establishment.

Ms. Lauren Lederle and Dr. Gus Waschefort

The event opened with remarks by H.E. Dr. Dren Doli, Ambassador of the Republic of Kosovo to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and Mr. Naim Qelaj, Ombudsman of the Republic of Kosovo.

Ambassador Doli reflected on Kosovo’s experience over the past 25 years in addressing war crimes and crimes against humanity through a combination of domestic and international judicial mechanisms. He emphasized that constructive scrutiny strengthens judicial institutions, noting that an independent assessment can reinforce “the strength of their reasoning, the fairness of their procedures, and the confidence they inspire among those they serve—in this case, the people of Kosovo.”

Mr. Qelaj highlighted that the work of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office raises important human rights questions extending beyond Kosovo, touching on broader issues of democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of fundamental rights across Europe. He explained that the report had been commissioned to provide an independent human rights assessment of these institutions, making it relevant not only to Kosovo but also to the wider European legal community.

The Ombudsman further stressed that the report reflects exclusively the views of its authors and was prepared without any influence from his institution, ensuring its independence. He concluded by observing that judicial independence and democratic oversight are complementary principles, arguing that public confidence in the justice system depends on institutions that are independent, transparent, and open to objective evaluation.

Dr. Waschefort and Ms. Lederle then presented the report’s methodology, principal findings, identified human rights concerns, and recommendations. Their analysis addressed several key issues, including provisional release, the right to a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law, the admissibility of evidence, and the principle of legality. The presentation was followed by an open discussion with participants.

Beyond its examination of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, the briefing provided an opportunity to reflect on the broader role of international courts and tribunals based in The Hague. The discussion explored wider questions surrounding international justice, accountability, judicial legitimacy, and the continuous development of international legal institutions.

The event brought together ambassadors and legal advisers from diplomatic missions in The Hague, alongside academics, journalists, and representatives of Dutch research institutes, NGOs, and think tanks, who actively participated in the exchange of views.

The report is available through the Bar Human Rights Committee website: https://barhumanrights.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/BHRC-Preliminary-Review-of-the-KSC.pdf.

35 Años de ProChile en los Países Bajos: Construyendo Puentes de Comercio, Innovación y Confianza

Por Diplomat Magazine

En 2026, la oficina de ProChile en los Países Bajos conmemora 35 años de presencia ininterrumpida en uno de los mercados más estratégicos de Europa. Durante más de tres décadas, esta representación comercial ha sido un puente entre Chile y el Reino de los Países Bajos, promoviendo el intercambio económico, la inversión, la innovación y el desarrollo de relaciones empresariales de largo plazo. 

Los Países Bajos constituyen una puerta de entrada privilegiada al mercado europeo. Con el Puerto de Róterdam —el más grande e importante de Europa— como eje logístico continental, el país se ha consolidado como un centro neurálgico para el comercio internacional, ofreciendo a las empresas chilenas acceso eficiente a millones de consumidores europeos. 

Desde su establecimiento a comienzos de la década de 1990, la oficina de ProChile en La Haya ha acompañado a cientos de empresas chilenas en su proceso de internacionalización. Lo que comenzó con la promoción de productos tradicionales como frutas frescas, vinos y productos del mar, ha evolucionado hacia una agenda mucho más diversa que incluye alimentos innovadores, servicios globales, tecnología, energías renovables, industrias creativas y soluciones sostenibles. Destacan áreas como hidrógeno verde y materiales críticos, que hoy están presentes en la agenda bilateral comercial, dando cuenta de la necesaria evolución del comercio e intercambio entre ambos países.

La relación económica entre Chile y los Países Bajos se caracteriza por una notable complementariedad. Chile aporta una oferta exportable de alta calidad y reconocidos estándares sanitarios y de sostenibilidad, mientras que los Países Bajos ofrecen experiencia en logística, innovación, agricultura de precisión, economía circular y desarrollo tecnológico.

En las últimas décadas, ProChile ha desempeñado un papel fundamental en la organización de misiones comerciales, participación en ferias internacionales, encuentros empresariales y actividades de promoción sectorial. Las exportaciones no tradicionales (no cobre no litio) de Chile a Países Bajos han batido récord durante dos años consecutivos, superando los 1.700 millones de dólares en 2025.

Actualmente, la oficina comercial de ProChile en La Haya continúa fortaleciendo la presencia chilena en Europa bajo el liderazgo del Agregado Comercial Osvaldo Marinao, junto a un equipo multicultural que trabaja estrechamente con empresas, importadores, inversionistas e instituciones de ambos países. Desde sus oficinas en Parkstraat, en el corazón de La Haya, ProChile sigue promoviendo oportunidades de negocio y cooperación entre Chile y los Países Bajos. 

La celebración de estos 35 años, es el reconocimiento a miles de empresarios, exportadores, socios comerciales y funcionarios que han contribuido a fortalecer una sólida relación bilateral. También constituye una oportunidad para proyectar un futuro marcado por la innovación, la sostenibilidad y la creciente cooperación entre dos países que comparten una profunda vocación internacional. 

En un contexto global donde la resiliencia de las cadenas de suministro, la transición energética y la transformación digital adquieren cada vez mayor relevancia, ProChile reafirma su compromiso de seguir conectando el talento, los productos y los servicios chilenos con el mundo, fortaleciendo desde los Países Bajos una de las plataformas comerciales más importantes para Chile en Europa. 

35 Years of ProChile in the Netherlands: Building Bridges for Trade, Innovation and Trust

By Diplomat Magazine

In 2026, ProChile’s office in the Netherlands marks 35 years of uninterrupted presence in one of Europe’s most strategic markets. For more than three decades, this trade representation has served as a bridge between Chile and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, fostering trade, investment, innovation, and long-term business partnerships.

The Netherlands is one of Europe’s principal gateways to international trade. With the Port of Rotterdam—the largest and busiest seaport in Europe—serving as the continent’s primary logistics hub, the country provides Chilean companies with efficient access to millions of European consumers.

Since its establishment in the early 1990s, ProChile’s office in The Hague has supported hundreds of Chilean companies in their international expansion. What began with the promotion of traditional exports such as fresh fruit, wine, and seafood has evolved into a far more diverse agenda encompassing innovative food products, global services, technology, renewable energy, creative industries, and sustainable solutions. Green hydrogen and critical minerals have also become prominent areas of bilateral trade cooperation, reflecting the evolving commercial relationship between the two countries.

The economic partnership between Chile and the Netherlands is built on strong complementarity. Chile offers a high-quality export portfolio backed by internationally recognized sanitary, sustainability, and production standards, while the Netherlands contributes world-class expertise in logistics, agricultural innovation, precision farming, the circular economy, and technological development.

Over the past three decades, ProChile has played a pivotal role in organizing trade missions, coordinating participation in international trade fairs, facilitating business matchmaking, and promoting key export sectors. Chile’s non-traditional exports to the Netherlands—excluding copper and lithium—have reached record levels for two consecutive years, surpassing US$1.7 billion in 2025.

Today, ProChile’s Trade Office in The Hague continues to strengthen Chile’s presence in Europe under the leadership of Commercial Attaché Osvaldo Marinao and a multicultural team working closely with companies, importers, investors, and institutions in both countries. From its offices on Parkstraat, in the heart of The Hague, ProChile continues to promote business opportunities and deepen economic cooperation between Chile and the Netherlands.

The celebration of this 35-year milestone is a tribute to the thousands of entrepreneurs, exporters, business partners, and public officials who have helped build this strong bilateral relationship. It also offers an opportunity to look ahead to a future driven by innovation, sustainability, and ever-closer cooperation between two countries that share a strong international outlook.

At a time when supply chain resilience, the energy transition, and digital transformation are becoming increasingly important worldwide, ProChile reaffirms its commitment to connecting Chilean talent, products, and services with global markets, while strengthening the Netherlands’ role as one of Chile’s most important commercial platforms in Europe.

Kenya: The Origin of Wonder and a Partner for Africa’s Future

By H.E. Ms. Halima Mucheke, Ambassador of Kenya to the Kingdom of the Netherlands

In a rapidly changing global landscape, nations are increasingly measured not only by economic performance but by their capacity to connect people, ideas, markets, and innovation. Kenya exemplifies this dynamic. Widely recognised as the birthplace of the safari and home to some of the world’s most celebrated wildlife experiences, Kenya today is equally distinguished as a regional economic leader, diplomatic centre, and innovation hub.

The country’s influence is reflected in the role it plays across East Africa and beyond. The Port of Mombasa serves as the principal maritime gateway for several neighbouring countries, while Nairobi has become one of Africa’s leading centres for diplomacy and international cooperation, hosting the United Nations Office at Nairobi alongside numerous international organisations, multinational companies, and development institutions.

Kenya’s active participation in the East African Community and the African Continental Free Trade Area provides businesses with access to a regional market of more than 300 million consumers. Combined with a stable financial sector, expanding infrastructure, and an increasingly favourable investment climate, these partnerships continue to strengthen Kenya’s position as a destination for trade and investment.

The country has also earned international recognition as one of Africa’s leading centres for digital innovation. Kenya pioneered mobile financial services and continues to advance digital inclusion through a vibrant technology ecosystem supported by expanding broadband infrastructure, entrepreneurial talent, and forward-looking public policy. New opportunities are emerging in artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, digital finance, health technology, and education, reinforcing Kenya’s reputation as a creator of solutions with regional and global relevance.

This innovation-driven economy is complemented by sustained investment in transport, renewable energy, and digital infrastructure, while ongoing reforms continue to improve the business environment and foster sustainable economic growth.

Alongside these achievements, Kenya’s natural and cultural heritage remains one of its greatest strengths. From the vast plains of the Maasai Mara National Reserve and the elephant herds of Amboseli National Park, framed by Mount Kilimanjaro, to the white-sand beaches of the Indian Ocean and the historic streets of Lamu Old Town, Kenya offers an exceptional diversity of landscapes and experiences. Equally remarkable is the richness of its many communities, whose traditions contribute to the country’s distinctive cultural identity.

Tourism continues to play a vital role in Kenya’s economy, increasingly shaped by a commitment to sustainability, wildlife conservation, and community development. The country’s internationally recognised conservation initiatives demonstrate how protecting biodiversity can go hand in hand with supporting local livelihoods and creating lasting economic value.

Kenya remains home to the iconic Big Five, the spectacular Great Wildebeest Migration, and some of Africa’s most successful conservation programmes. Beyond wildlife, visitors discover adventure tourism, cultural heritage, world-class conference facilities, and the renowned hospitality for which Kenya is known.

As governments, businesses, and investors seek new partnerships across Africa, Kenya offers an environment where innovation, entrepreneurship, sustainability, and international cooperation reinforce one another. It is a nation that embraces technological progress while safeguarding its extraordinary natural heritage, creating opportunities that extend well beyond its borders.

Kenya’s story is therefore not defined solely by its breathtaking landscapes or remarkable wildlife. It is the story of a confident nation investing in its future while remaining deeply connected to its people, culture, and environment. Whether engaging as an investor, diplomat, entrepreneur, or traveller, those who come to Kenya encounter a country where opportunity and inspiration go hand in hand.

Kenya’s Iconic National Parks and Reserves

Park / ReserveHighlightsRegion
Maasai Mara National ReserveBig Five wildlife and the Great MigrationSouthwest Kenya
Amboseli National ParkLarge elephant herds with views of Mount KilimanjaroSouthern Kenya
Lake Nakuru National ParkRhinos, flamingos, and exceptional birdlifeRift Valley
Tsavo East National ParkRed elephants and vast wildernessSoutheast Kenya
Tsavo West National ParkVolcanic landscapes and rich biodiversitySoutheast Kenya
Samburu National ReserveThe unique Samburu Special FiveNorthern Kenya
Meru National ParkUntouched wilderness and authentic safari experiencesEastern Kenya
Aberdare National ParkForest wildlife, waterfalls, and mountain sceneryCentral Kenya
Nairobi National ParkThe world’s only wildlife park within a capital cityNairobi
Ol Pejeta ConservancyRhino conservation, chimpanzee sanctuary, and eco-tourismCentral Kenya

For further information on tourism, culture, and travel opportunities, visit: https://experience.magicalkenya.com/

Anti-SLAPP Act signed by the President is a victory for media freedom

Article 19 (23.06.2026) – The passing of a law by the President of Poland which will establish stronger safeguards against Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) is a long-awaited victory for media freedom which will provide important legal protections for public interest journalism, the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) said today.

Our organisations welcome the passing of the amendment, which will establish a strong legal basis in Poland to fight SLAPPs. The law covers both domestic and cross border SLAPPs ensuring implementation of both EU Anti-SLAPP Directive and Council of Europe Recommendation Against SLAPPs. Crucially, the Polish law will provide safeguards against vexatious lawsuits filed against journalists and media domestically, as well as other individuals participating in the public debate.

The bill was signed into law on 19 June by Polish President Karol Nawrocki after being passed in the Sejm on 16 May. The Act on Special Protection Measures in Civil Proceedings for Persons Participating in Public Debate, known as the ‘Anti-SLAPP Act’, will come into effect soon.

The law includes several progressive elements which media freedom groups have long advocated for, including early dismissal mechanisms for vexatious lawsuits, the introduction of security deposits for claimants, and the reversal of the burden of proof on the claimant in SLAPP cases.

Lawsuits identified as manifestly unfounded and instead aimed at suppressing or disrupting public debate can now be declared an abuse of procedural law by a court and dismissed. However, the effectiveness of this protection will depend significantly on judicial practice. The law also provides detailed definitions for identifying SLAPPs.

These changes will significantly increase the power of the courts to swiftly reject extortionate or censorious lawsuits and protect journalists and media carrying out public interest reporting from costly and time-consuming legal battles.

Regrettably, defamation remains a criminal offence in Poland and the new law does not apply to criminal proceedings. As a result, Article 212 of the Criminal Code remains open to abuse by actors seeking to silence public interest speech and reporting. However, the Ministry of Justice has committed to supplementary reform of the country’s criminal code within the current parliamentary term, which runs until November 2027. In addition, the law falls short of allowing defendants to seek compensation within the same proceedings. Those wishing to claim damages will need to initiate a separate legal process, generating additional costs.

Overall, however, Poland’s legislation now represents one of the most well-designed anti-SLAPP laws in Europe, broadly aligns with Council of Europe standards, and should act as an example for other EU Member States in transposing the Anti-SLAPP Directive, the deadline for which passed on 7 May.

SLAPPs are a form of vexatious legal harassment commonly filed by powerful companies, businesspeople or politicians which aim to silence legitimate public interest speech, including journalism. In recent years, the MFRR has documented how SLAPPs have become a powerful tool used by political actors in Poland for attempting to muzzle investigative reporting and intimidate watchdog journalism.

Poland has long been one of the EU countries to experience the highest numbers of SLAPPs, according to the Coalition Against SLAPPs in Europe (CASE). The vast majority of SLAPPs in Poland are filed domestically, underlining the importance of the bill going beyond the EU minimum standards and extending to domestic cases.

MFRR partners have long advocated for the passing of such legislation, including with the Ministry of Justice during a mission to Warsaw in 2024. Since 2020, MFRR partners have monitored and documented different forms of legal threats and SLAPPs in Poland.

With wider media reforms by the Tusk government currently delayed due to political deadlock, the Anti-SLAPP Act represents one of the most positive elements of the current government’s press freedom record to date.

The passing of the bill should provide impetus for wider media freedom reforms in Poland under the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA). MFRR partners welcome the approval of the Anti-SLAPP Act by President Nawrocki, who our organisations previously called upon to support such reforms, as well as the cross-party support for this bill in Poland.

MFRR partners hail the work of consortium member ARTICLE 19 Europe, which played a key role in the Polish anti-SLAPP working group, along with the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and the Citizen Network Watchdog Poland, and all those who participated in the development and passing of this law.

MFRR partners will monitor implementation of the anti-SLAPP law, continue to document SLAPPs and other forms of abusive lawfare against media actors in Poland, and push for the full decriminalisation of defamation, in line with European standards.

Signed:

  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • ARTICLE 19 Europe
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT)

Brotherhood across Borders in Belgium

By Anton Lutter

The Philippine Independence Day celebration in Vilvoorde was held on Saturday, June 20, 2026. The event featured  – at the Three Fountains Domain Fontigny –  a full day of cultural performances, Filipino cuisine, and festive activities. It also included an official Overseas Voting Registration drive conducted by the Philippine Embassy, providing attendees with the opportunity to register for overseas voting.

The Belgium Area of Knights of Rizal attended with al large delegation and presentation stand under the leadership of Sir Geert Verhagen, KGOR Area Commander of Belgium. Also in attendance were the European Regional Commander Sir Johnny Villa, KGOR and former Regional Commanders Sir Tony Guansing, KGCR and Sir Albert Arevalo, KGOR.

H.E. Mr. Jaime Ledda, Ambassador of the Philippines to Belgium, Luxembourg and European Union.

Philippines Ambassador to Belgium, Luxembourg and the European Union H.E. Mr. Jaime Ledda, cited the message by President Ferdinand Marcos jr on the 128th Anniversary of the Proclamation of Philippines Independence (12 June): “ As we honor this day, we are reminded that freedom is not merely a legacy we inherit but a responsibility we must uphold. While our forebears fought colonial oppression through revolution, reform, and intellectual resistance, we face challenges of a different kind today.

We must protect truth from distortion, harness technology wisely, and restore trust in a time increasingly marked by division and distrust. How we respond to these demands will shape the course of our nation and define what we pass on to future generations. As we continue to write our national story, we pay tribute to the heroes who secured our liberty and to the countless Filipinos who have devoted their lives to advancing the common good. May this occasion deepen our understanding of the past and inspire a renewed sense of duty to our country.

Through active citizenship, good governance, and solidarity, may we continue building a Bagong Pilipinas worthy of the sacrifices that secured our sovereignty and of the dreams and aspirations that gave birth to our Republic. I wish everyone a meaningful Independence Day celebration”

Ambassador Ledda welcoming all guests including Knights of Rizal from Netherlands. Between 2013-2020  he served as ambassador in the Netherlands where in his residency the first chapter of Knights of Rizal was chartered in 2015, initiated by the current Area Commander in the Netherlands Sir Anton Lutter, KCR.

The Dutch delegation in Vilvoorde included former – Deputy Area Commander Sir Chris Kopp, KCR, Amsterdam Chapter Commander Sir Mark Hernandez, KCR and The Hague Chapter Chancellor Sir Eduard Slootweg, KR. The friendship between the Belgians and Dutch is well known, highlighted recently by a visit of Belgian knights to the Philippines Embassy in The Hague.

When Military Alliances Turns into a Battlefield

The Legal Risks of Foreign Bases

By Ayesha Asim

In international politics, geography is rarely just geography. A military base located on the territory of one state can become a strategic asset for another, but it can also transform the host country into a potential frontline during times of conflict.

Across the Middle East, foreign military presence has long shaped regional security dynamics. The United States maintains a network of military facilities, airfields, naval support points, and logistical hubs across several Gulf states, including Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. These installations form a central part of Washington’s regional defence structure.

Yet beneath these security arrangements lies a complex question of international law: when a state allows its territory to be used for military operations against another country, does it assume any legal responsibility for the consequences?

The question has gained renewed attention amid rising tensions between the United States and Iran, but the underlying legal issue extends far beyond any single conflict. It concerns a broader dilemma faced by states hosting foreign military forces: how far does responsibility extend when national territory becomes part of another state’s military operations?

The starting point of this debate is Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, this principle has remained one of the foundations of the international legal order.

International law recognises two primary exceptions to this prohibition. The first is the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter following an armed attack. The second is the use of force authorised by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII.

Where military action falls outside these exceptions, its legality becomes highly contested.

This raises an important question for states that host foreign military forces. If another country launches attacks from their territory, and those attacks are considered unlawful, could the host state also face international responsibility?

One of the most relevant references comes from United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 of 1974, which defines aggression. Article 3(f) identifies as an act of aggression:

“The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State.”

Although General Assembly resolutions are not legally binding in the same way as treaties, Resolution 3314 has played an important role in shaping international legal discussions on aggression and state responsibility.

The principle behind this provision is significant: a state does not necessarily have to fire the first shot to become legally relevant. Allowing its territory to be used as a platform for unlawful military action may create questions of responsibility, particularly where the state has knowledge of, and facilitates, those operations.

Recent conflicts demonstrate how complicated this issue can become.

During Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Belarus allowed Russian forces to use its territory for military operations, including troop movements and missile launches. Ukraine and several Western governments argued that Belarus had become a facilitator of Russia’s military campaign, even though Belarus did not conduct the main combat operations itself.

A similar debate emerged during the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Several Gulf states provided logistical support, access, and military infrastructure for coalition operations. Because the legality of the invasion remains disputed among international lawyers, questions were raised regarding the position of states that enabled those operations through their territory and facilities.

The issue also appeared during counterterrorism operations in the region. States providing airspace access, intelligence cooperation, or logistical assistance to foreign military campaigns have often faced domestic criticism and security risks because armed groups may view them as participants rather than neutral actors.

However, hosting foreign military forces does not automatically make a state a party to every operation conducted by those forces. Governments usually distinguish between allowing another country to maintain military facilities and directly controlling decisions about the use of force.

Many defence agreements are structured around this distinction. A host state may argue that it does not plan, approve, or command specific operations carried out by foreign forces based on its territory.

International law, however, focuses not only on formal arrangements but also on conduct. Questions may arise regarding whether the host state knew about particular operations, whether it assisted, and whether that support contributed to an unlawful act.

The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility address this issue through the concept of aiding or assisting another state in committing an internationally wrongful act. Under Article 16, a state may incur responsibility if it knowingly assists another state in carrying out conduct that violates international law.

The most sensitive issue concerns possible retaliation.

If a military facility located in another country is used to launch attacks, can that facility become a lawful target during an armed conflict?

Under international humanitarian law, military objectives may be targeted when they make an effective contribution to military action and when their destruction offers a definite military advantage. A base actively used for launching attacks may therefore be considered a military objective.

However, this does not provide unlimited permission for attacks. Any military response must still comply with the fundamental principles of distinction, proportionality, necessity, and precautions in attack. Civilian populations and civilian infrastructure remain protected under international humanitarian law.

A further legal debate concerns the position of the host state itself. If a government knowingly allows its territory to be used for offensive military operations, another state may argue that the host country has become involved in the conflict. The host government, however, may reject this interpretation and maintain that foreign military presence does not automatically remove its status as a non-belligerent state.

Ultimately, international law often faces a gap between legal principles and political reality. Powerful states frequently rely on broad interpretations of self-defence, while international institutions may struggle to respond effectively because of geopolitical divisions and Security Council dynamics. Nevertheless, one principle remains clear: military partnerships bring not only strategic benefits but also legal and political consequences.

For states hosting foreign bases, the challenge is balancing security cooperation with the risk that their territory may become part of conflicts they did not choose. A military installation may protect during times of peace, but during escalation, it can also turn into a potential target. In modern warfare, strategic geography rarely remains neutral. The presence of foreign forces can reshape not only regional security calculations but also the legal responsibilities of the states involved.

About the author:

Ayesha Asim is a legal academic, researcher, and PhD Scholar in Law. She holds an LLM in International Law (Gold Medalist) and has experience in legal research, teaching, and advisory roles. Her areas of interest include international law, humanitarian issues, and other contemporary legal challenges. You can reach her at ayeshamalyc09@gmail.com

Privacy of ill employees

Employees have a right to privacy in their private lives. This also applies to sick employees. However, they must also comply with their reintegration obligations and provide accurate information about their illness. What options does the employer have to check whether they are actually doing this?

By Jan Dop

If there are serious doubts about whether an employee is ill, employers may engage an investigation agency, provided that the infringement of the employee’s right to privacy is limited. If the findings of the investigation agency show that an employee is not telling the truth about their limitations and ability to work during illness, they risk dismissal. This is also evident from a recently published ruling by the Rotterdam District Court.

Ill or not ill?

Shortly after the end of his probationary period, a lorry driver reported sick because he had twisted his knee. The employer then came by to bring him a bouquet of flowers, but the employee did not open the door. The employee was also not at home during a second visit on the same day. More than a week later, he wrote to his employer in WhatsApp messages that he was unable to leave the house and had to walk with crutches.

The employer was suspicious, went to the employee’s home again and saw the employee walking down the stairs without crutches and driving a car. This was before a visit to the company doctor, where the employee reported that he was unable to walk without crutches and unable to drive himself.

Based on these findings, the employer engaged an investigation agency. The agency found that the employee was outside several times a day, walking up and down stairs or running at a brisk pace, and walking dogs in his slippers, with a large dog pulling hard on the leash. He also went to shops, walked across an uneven football pitch and drove a car. All this without crutches and without any visible limitations. The employer then dismissed the employee with immediate effect on the grounds of incorrect and incomplete statements about the severity of his limitations and his ability to work during illness.

The employee argued in court that the summary dismissal was unjustified. He was genuinely ill and limited in his abilities. What he had done and what the investigation agency had seen was more than he could handle. The court dismissed this argument. Even if this was true, he was still capable of more than he had told his employer and the company doctor. Moreover, after twisting his knee on the last day of his probationary period, he had still worked for another day without his colleagues noticing that he had physical limitations.

Violation of privacy?

The employee tried another way to get the summary dismissal reversed. He argued that bringing in the investigation agency was an unacceptable violation of his right to privacy. He didn’t convince the magistrate: the employer had good reason to doubt the limitations claimed by the employee, which could justify the investigation. Although an employer should be cautious about approaching a sick employee themselves, the initial visits were certainly permissible: the employer did not intend to observe the employee, but only wanted to cheer him up by bringing him a bouquet of flowers.

The employer should perhaps not have visited the employee’s home again after that, but was entitled to use the findings in its decision to engage an investigation agency. In this case, the employer’s interest in uncovering the truth outweighs the employee’s right to privacy. Finally, the seriousness of the infringement was limited: the employer observed the employee on public roads for a short period of time, namely four days.

Everything showed that the employee did not have the physical limitations he claimed to have. The employee therefore made incorrect and incomplete statements about his incapacity for work. In doing so, he also acted in breach of his reintegration obligations during illness. According to the subdistrict court, this justifies summary dismissal. That dismissal therefore remains in force. The employer is also not required to pay a transition allowance.

Contact an employment lawyer

Are you involved in a dispute with an employee who is unable to work? Or do you have other questions about employment law? Please contact the Embassy Desk of Russell Advocaten. We are dedicated to helping you! jan.dop@russell.nl +31 20 301 5555