Romania Is Summoned by History to Write and Implement a Powerful Strategic Narrative

“After a century of expectations and promises, Romania does not need a new beginning, but a new conscience. A conscience that can turn identity into a project, patriotism into strategy, and memory into vision. This is the true renaissance.”

By Major General (Two Stars) (retd) Corneliu Pivariu

The celebration of 107 years since the founding of the unitary national state finds Romania at a moment of historical inflection[1]. In a world where the architecture of power is being reshaped under the pressure of competition among geopolitical blocs, technological transformations, and the rebalancing of the international order, Romania is compelled by history to rediscover its strategic rationale and to define—lucidly and coherently—its own national narrative, or risk remaining marginal in major decision-making.

After a century marked by survival, adaptation, and successive dependencies, Romania can no longer remain merely a passive subject of regional or global transformations. The time has come for our country to become an actor conscious of itself and of its own potential, able to express its fundamental interests through a strategic language of the present and the future. In the absence of such a strategic narrative, Romania risks diluting its identity in a multipolar context dominated by the competition of perceptions and the confrontation of narratives.

A nation’s strategic narrative is not a mere rhetorical construct, but the coherent expression of a vision regarding its historical mission. It articulates values, interests, directions, and priorities—integrating the internal dimension (identity, culture, institutions) with the external one (regional, European, and global). Without such a synthesis, public policies remain fragmentary, diplomatic responses ad-hoc, and the external perception of Romania—ambiguous.

Today, Romania faces a dual challenge: to consolidate its sovereignty within major alliances while at the same time asserting itself as a factor of balance and stability at the intersection of three zones of tension—Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, and Mediterranean. In an era of competing narratives, a nation that does not tell its own story risks becoming a secondary character in someone else’s.

Therefore, 107 years after 1918, Romania needs not another proclamation of the ideal of unity, but a strategic renaissance: a modernized national conscience that converts the experience of history into geopolitical vision and the aspiration to dignity into capacity for action. Only through an authentic strategic narrative—coherent, realistic, and future-oriented—can Romania regain the status of an actor with relevance and vocation in the regional and global architecture of the 21st century[2]. It remains to be seen whether today’s Romanian political class is concerned with this, understands the historical moment, and the responsibility that falls to it.

The Global Context and the Pressure to Redefine the Nation

In recent years, the world has entered an accelerated phase of strategic reconfiguration. The failure of the post-1990 globalist paradigm, the rise of alternative centers of power, and the fracturing of Western consensus regarding the international order have generated unprecedented competition among development models, values, and forms of political legitimacy. Emerging multipolarity is no longer a hypothesis but a reality that obliges every state to redefine its position and role in the global system.

For Romania, this transition from a unipolar world to a pluricentric one is not only an external challenge but an internal one as well. The country sits at the intersection of three major geopolitical zones—the NATO eastern flank, the wider Black Sea neighborhood, and the eastern frontier of the European Union—becoming increasingly a contact space between divergent interests, and also a potential pivot of regional stability.

The successive crises of the last decade—pandemic, the war in Ukraine, instability in the Middle East, energy fragmentation, and digital transformations—have shown that states lacking a coherent vision and their own strategic narrative are condemned to reaction, not projection. At the same time, they have demonstrated that political survival and economic prosperity today depend more than ever on a state’s capacity to generate trust, meaning, and direction.

In this context, Romania is constrained by objective realities to rethink its development model, its approach to the alliances it belongs to, and especially the mechanisms through which it projects influence in the region. Remaining solely within the paradigm of “strategic partnerships” without an internally articulated national strategic project amounts to relinquishing one’s own voice in the concert of great powers.

National redefinition does not mean a return to isolationism, but the lucid assumption of a distinctive strategic identity—one that combines Euro-Atlantic belonging with the Romanian civilizational specific, the historical experience of surviving between empires with the modern potential of a creative nation. Romania has the unique opportunity to transform its frontier geography into a geopolitical advantage, provided it clearly formulates its interests and builds a narrative capable of sustaining and legitimizing them in the international arena.

Identity, Memory, and Vision: Foundations of a Romanian Strategic Narrative

Every state that aspires to lasting geopolitical relevance grounds its action on three interdependent pillars: identity, memory, and vision. Identity provides internal coherence, memory confers historical legitimacy, and vision projects the direction of the future. In Romania’s case, the weakening of these pillars after 1990 led to a period of strategic indecision, in which belonging to international structures temporarily substituted for the formulation of a national doctrine of its own.

The Romanian identity, rooted in a Latin, Byzantine, and Carpathian confluence, is by its very nature one of synthesis and balance. This identity allowed Romania, over the centuries, to survive between empires and to integrate diverse influences without losing internal coherence. In a fragmented world, this kind of identity can become a strategic resource—a model of cultural and political resilience capable of inspiring stability in a turbulent regional environment.

Romania’s historical memory is, however, ambivalent. On the one hand, it fuels the sense of continuity and legitimacy of the national state. On the other hand, the absence of a lucid assumption of one’s own failures—from periods of economic and geopolitical dependence to internal societal fractures—has led to a form of collective mental and operational blockage. Without strategic reflection on the past, the nation risks repeating errors in new guises.

Vision, as the prospective dimension, presupposes the capacity to transform potential into project. Romania needs a vision that correlates its real resources—geographical, energy, human, and cultural—with a clear direction within the new multipolar order. This vision cannot be imposed from outside nor reduced to mere programmatic documents. It must be the expression of a renewed national conscience that recognizes power no longer derives only from military or economic strength, but also from the ability to generate meaning and build credible narratives.

An authentic Romanian strategic narrative must therefore unite these three dimensions in a coherent formula: identity as a moral and symbolic foundation, memory as a lesson and source of wisdom, and vision as an instrument of geopolitical projection. Only through this synthesis can Romania move from mere reaction to strategic action, from imitating external models to asserting its own paradigm. And without balance among these dimensions—between what we have been, what we are, and what we wish to become—the nation risks losing coherence of meaning.

Romania between Belonging and Autonomy: The Dilemma of Strategic Sovereignty

In the 21st century, sovereignty can no longer be understood only in the classical sense—as the absolute independence of political decision—but as the capacity to choose knowingly, to define national priorities within major alliances, and to maintain control over one’s essential processes: economic, informational, energy, and cultural[3].

Through its membership in NATO and the European Union, Romania has made an irreversible strategic choice, anchoring itself in the Western value and institutional space. Yet this belonging does not exempt the Romanian state from the responsibility to formulate its own coherent vision of the national interest, articulated in relation to regional realities. Absent this autonomy of strategic thought, participation risks turning into mere conformity.

True sovereignty does not consist in shunning partners, but in intelligently managing interdependencies. The countries that manage to impose their profile within alliances are not those that refuse cooperation, but those that condition it on their own priorities. Poland, Turkey, or Hungary offer different examples of exercising such selective autonomy, each with its own risks and benefits. Romania, by contrast, has often remained in a zone of strategic ambiguity—prudent to the point of passivity, institutionally integrated yet conceptually hesitant.

Romania’s dilemma is therefore one of calibrating sovereignty. On the one hand, the regional context—the war in Ukraine, energy pressures, economic volatility, and the dynamics of spheres of influence—imposes solidarity with Western allies. On the other hand, long-term national interests—food, industrial, demographic[4], and informational security—require a more nuanced approach and strategically autonomous management.

Strategic sovereignty involves not only protecting territory and institutions but also projecting a national meaning into the world. To be sovereign means, in essence, to have a distinct voice within a chorus of consensuses—to contribute to collective decisions without dissolving one’s own identity. Romania today has every premise to assert this intelligent sovereignty: its geographic position, its membership in solid security structures, its natural resources, and the cultural capital of a nation that has learned to survive through adaptation.

But the time for mere adaptations has passed. In a world undergoing accelerated rebalancing, Romania must become the subject of its own history, not merely the object of others’ histories. Defining and asserting a coherent strategic narrative is the first step toward regaining this sovereignty—not through isolation, but by lucidly assuming the role of a responsible and visionary actor in a changing world order.

Directions for Action and Elements of a Romanian Strategic Narrative

An authentic strategic narrative is not drafted in administrative laboratories; it is built through the convergence of strategic thinking, political will, and the responsible participation of society. Romania possesses significant resources—geographical, energy, human, cultural, and symbolic—but these must be correlated within a coherent project capable of expressing who we are, what we want, and where we are heading.

1. Political and institutional dimension
The first step is to clarify the state’s fundamental interests and articulate a national strategic doctrine that transcends electoral cycles and decision-making fragmentation. A minimal consensus among the main political forces is needed regarding the major directions of development—from security and education to energy and digitalization. Such a consensus does not nullify pluralism; it turns it into constructive competition around a common project: the Romania of the future.

2. Economic and technological dimension
Romania’s economy must move beyond the paradigm of consumption-led dependency and rebuild its own value chains anchored in strategic industries and innovation. The development of infrastructure, the defense industry, energy production, and sustainable agriculture can become the core of a sovereign economic model based on relative autonomy and managed interdependencies. In the 21st century, economic competitiveness equates to national security.

3. Cultural and educational dimension
Without a solid strategic culture, no state can project coherence over time. Romania needs an educational renaissance that forms generations capable of critical thinking, creation, and innovation—not merely reproducing imported models. Promoting culture, the Romanian language, and national values internationally must be regarded as instruments of power (soft power), not as a secondary public-policy domain.

4. Diplomatic and security dimension
Romania should rediscover its role as a bridge between worlds—between East and West, North and South, Europe and the Middle East. Romanian diplomacy has a vocation for balance, but it needs the courage of clarity. In today’s multipolar context, our country can become a vector of regional stability and a promoter of strategic dialogue, provided it sets clear objectives and coordinates its instruments of influence.

The armed forces and intelligence services are pillars of national security and external credibility[5]. Romania is already an active security provider within NATO and its strategic partnerships, but this status must be consolidated through steady investment in defense capabilities, the modernization of the national industry, and more effective integration of the intelligence component into decision-making. Only through real synergy among diplomacy, defense, and intelligence can Romania strengthen its profile as a respected and indispensable actor in the security architecture of Southeastern Europe. Military and diplomatic strength cannot substitute for internal cohesion—they must rest on citizens’ trust and societal resilience.

5. Societal dimension and public trust
No strategic narrative is credible unless it is internalized by citizens. Restoring trust between state and society is the foundation of any durable national project. Romania needs a new social contract built on mutual respect, transparency, and participation. A society that understands its direction becomes, in itself, a geopolitical force.

In sum, a Romanian strategic narrative must blend analytical lucidity with moral inspiration, tradition with innovation, belonging with autonomy. This is not about reinventing an ideology, but about formulating an integrative vision through which Romania can reclaim its natural place in a world undergoing rebalancing.

This vision can be defined by the concept “Carpathian Renaissance — Romania’s Strategic Narrative,” which expresses not only the recovery of a state but the revitalization of a civilizational space.

“Carpathian Renaissance” symbolizes reconnecting Romania to its own sources of strength—geographical, spiritual, and moral—and rebuilding internal coherence as the foundation of external projection. In this paradigm, the Carpathians become the metaphor of the nation’s backbone, the place where identity turns into strategy and memory into vision.

Through this narrative, Romania is not defined in relation to others, but by rediscovering its own geopolitical vocation: to be a center of balance and convergence in Central and Eastern Europe, a bridge of stability between the great zones of influence that meet at its borders.

“Carpathian Renaissance” is, in essence, the project of a conscious, sovereign, and visionary Romania—capable of transforming the experience of history into national strategy and its geographic position into geopolitical advantage.

Only through such a narrative can Romania move from mere adaptation to strategic self-definition, from reaction to projection—becoming not only a beneficiary of its alliances but a contributor to regional and European equilibrium.

“Carpathian Renaissance” expresses the rediscovery of Romania’s strategic conscience—the transformation of national identity and memory into a project of vision, action, and dignity—through which the country reaffirms its vocation as a center of balance, stability, and convergence in Central and Eastern Europe.

The crucial — and ultimately rhetorical[6] — question is this: does the political class in power truly wish, is it capable, and will it commit itself to promoting a new strategic narrative for Romania?

More than a century after the Great Union, Romania is confronted not—first and foremost—with a territorial struggle, but with one of vision and strategic coherence. If in 1918 the priority was achieving unity, today the challenge is redefining the meaning of that unity in a fragmented world dominated by the competition of perceptions and the struggle to control narratives.

History no longer judges only the courage to fight, but the wisdom to build. Romania stands at a decision point between perpetuating inertia and assuming a destiny of its own. In an era in which power is measured by the capacity to shape meaning, a nation that fails to formulate its own story risks becoming a mere footnote in the history of others.

Romania’s strategic narrative must not be a public-relations exercise, but a project of national regeneration. It entails a resetting of priorities, a reprofessionalization of the elite, a recapturing of trust between state and citizen, and a rediscovery of Romania’s mission in the world. That mission is not limited to survival; it extends to active contribution to regional balance and to European civilization.

Romania’s strategic renaissance presupposes an alliance between memory and vision. Memory—to understand where we come from and what sacrifices brought us here. Vision—to know where we are heading and how we can turn potential into durable reality. From this synthesis can be born a new kind of patriotism—lucid, creative, and responsible—capable of turning values into policy and ideals into projects.

In this equation of renaissance, the Republic of Moldova is not merely a matter of foreign policy, but a living part of Romanian national identity. Its future is organically linked to Romania’s—not only through language, culture, and history, but also through geopolitical destiny. Supporting Chișinău’s European path, consolidating institutional, economic, and cultural ties, and continuing to build a Romanian-Moldovan strategic community are not options but a historical duty.

Romania is therefore at a crossroads: either it remains captive to a peripheral role, dependent on others’ decisions, or it becomes an actor with a voice of its own—a state that knows how to think strategically and act consistently. The choice does not belong only to governments, but to the entire nation—to every conscience that understands the future is not inherited, but built. Let us therefore not look only to the political class, but each of us become as active a contributor as possible to building Romania’s future. The examples of the past and the reality of the present oblige us to this.

One hundred and seven years after the forging of the unified national state, Romania should feel, deep within its destiny, that reality is summoning it to begin a new chapter—one born of a convergence of visions and a spiritual and strategic re-binding of all Romanian lands. Such a renewed consciousness, able to transmute identity into purpose, patriotism into strategy, and memory into vision, is the true rebirth of a nation that must rediscover its voice and its meaning in a world that no longer pardons silence.

This is, in essence, the “Carpathian Renaissance”—the moment when Romania rediscovers its strategic conscience and turns memory into vision, patriotism into strategy, and identity into project.

NOTICE: I confirm that this article was conceived, structured, and finalized by the author. AI-based tools (such as text assistants) were used solely to support routine tasks — including preliminary drafting, linguistic refinement, and organizational clarity — without generating independent content, interpretations, data, or bibliographic references. All factual information, sources, and analytical judgments were independently verified and validated by the author. The responsibility for the final version of the manuscript, including its accuracy, originality, and integrity, rests entirely with the author.

Brașov, 29 November 2025

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[1] “Those who do not know their history are condemned to repeat it,” said George Santayana in The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human Progress (1905–1906)—an expression quoted and paraphrased over time by numerous leaders, including Winston Churchill.
It is precisely for this reason that, in a period when our current decision-makers increasingly seek to minimize the role and place of history in the educational process, I recall briefly: during the First World War (1916–1919), Romania suffered human losses estimated at about 800,000 people, of which approximately 335,000 were military deaths. Material damages exceeded 30 billion gold lei (the equivalent of about 10–11 billion USD at today’s rate), including the destruction of industrial, railway, and agricultural infrastructure in the occupied territories.
Romania’s Treasury, sent to Moscow and never returned, is valued at an estimated 16 billion USD today (of which about 12 billion USD represents 93.4 tons of gold).
Nevertheless, the sacrifice made possible the fulfillment of the Great Union ideal of 1918, through which the Romanian national state was completed.
After 1918, two essential moments marked Romania’s modern history:
– The Second World War, in which Romania lost about 800,000 people—military and civilian—and was compelled by the Paris Peace Treaty to pay 300 million USD in war reparations to the USSR (a sum fully paid by 1952, though estimates suggest the total amounted to nearly 2 billion USD). Material destruction is estimated at approximately 460–600 billion USD at today’s value. Romania also lost its historical territories of Bessarabia and Bukovina. At the end of the war, the country fell into the sphere of influence of the then USSR—with the consent, it must be said and reiterated, of Moscow’s wartime allies.
– The second major moment was the events of December 1989, when, following the overthrow of Nicolae Ceaușescu and the Communist Party, Romania returned to the path of a democratic society and market economy. During nearly 50 years of communist dictatorship, several hundred thousand Romanians lost their lives (the exact number is difficult to quantify)—a large part of the intellectual elite, valuable politicians, and generals who could not survive a regime of terror imposed through 41 prisons, 72 forced labor camps, and 63 deportation centers.

[2] In the last 35 years, various national programs have been made public, many of them intended to unite society as a whole. However, only the Snagov Pact (June 21, 1995) represented the sole national political agreement signed by all parliamentary parties in Romania, under the aegis of President Ion Iliescu, which consecrated the consensus on the strategic objective of European integration. The document — The Snagov Declaration on the National Strategy for Preparing Romania’s Accession to the European Union — constituted the first and (so far, one hopes not the last) example, after 1989, of cross-party unity around a project of national interest.
Why, then, is today’s Romanian political class unable to demonstrate that it is capable of a new consensus?

[3] Unfortunately, it is precisely in these areas — economic, energy, and informational — that Romania has yielded an excessive degree of control to foreign entities. The country faces a systemic dependency on the European Union and the United States, with strategic vulnerabilities in energy, technology, and finance. In agriculture, Romania does not suffer from a lack of resources, but from a lack of control over its own food chain — from seed to shelf.
The only sectors where partial autonomy is still preserved are natural resources (gas, agriculture) and logistical potential (Corridor IV, the Black Sea).

[4] According to Eurostat (2025) and the National Institute of Statistics, Romania’s population has declined from 22.8 million inhabitants in 1990 to 18.9 million in 2025, representing a net loss of more than 4 million people. The fertility rate stands at 1.6 children per woman — far below the demographic replacement threshold of 2.1 — while over 22% of the population is aged above 65. Approximately 5 million Romanian citizens live and work abroad, mainly in Italy, Spain, Germany, and the United Kingdom, most of them of working age.
United Nations estimates (World Population Prospects, 2024 revision) anticipate that, unless the trend reverses, Romania’s population could fall below 16 million by 2050, with major structural effects on the labor market, social sustainability, and national security.

[5] It is worth emphasizing that the new National Defense Strategy of Romania 2025–2030 was presented to the public by the President only on November 12, approved by the Supreme Council of National Defense (CSAT) on November 24, and subsequently adopted by Parliament on November 26. The White Paper on Defense is still in the process of being updated by the Government.
Until their full implementation, Romania continues to operate strategically on the basis of documents prepared for the 2020–2024 period, even though the security environment has changed profoundly since 2022. Under these conditions, a growing gap can be observed between declarative planning and the real capacity for implementation. Despite the increase of the defense budget above the 2% of GDP threshold, external technological dependence, the vulnerability of the national defense industry, and institutional fragmentation continue to limit the country’s strategic autonomy. Romania therefore remains a provider of security through participation, but still insufficiently through its own initiative.

[6] The most recent national polls indicate an extremely low level of public trust in the political system. From an analytical perspective, based on INSCOP and IPSOS data, it is reasonable to estimate that only about one quarter of Romanians still trust the central political institutions, while confidence in the “political class” as a whole is likely even lower — around 15–20%. In parallel, between two thirds and 70% of citizens believe that Romania is heading in the wrong direction, according to INSCOP and CURS surveys conducted in the autumn of 2025. Taken together, these figures point to a prolonged crisis of democratic legitimacy and institutional performance.

According to the “Democracy Index 2024” published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, Romania ranks 72nd globally and is classified as a “hybrid regime” (the only EU member state in this category). The country is immediately preceded by the Republic of Moldova (71st) and followed by Papua New Guinea (73rd). The report marks a deterioration compared to 2023, when Romania was positioned around 60th. The shift into the hybrid-regime category reflects a weakening of government functioning, an erosion of political culture, and a noticeable decline in civil liberties.

“Syria is becoming the new laboratory of power in the Middle East, as Lebanon appears to be losing its traditional strategic role.”

By Major General (two stars) (ret) Corneliu Pivariu

Syria 2025 – Strategic Context

In 2025, Syria re-emerges at the center of the Middle East strategic equation, yet in a radically different form from what the international community had grown accustomed to over the last quarter-century. The collapse of the order established by the Assad regime, the disintegration of the regional networks that supported it, and the rapid realignment of external actors have transformed the Levant into a fluid space undergoing a profound transition—one that is reshaping not only regional balances but also the parameters of global security. Syria is no longer the epicenter of a frozen conflict, but rather the pivot of a broader strategy through which Washington seeks to rebalance the Middle East amid its gradual withdrawal from acting as the direct guarantor of regional order.

Three recent developments have accelerated this paradigm shift.
The first is the end of the confrontation in Gaza[1], a moment that reconfigured the regional balance of power and decisively weakened Iran’s influence in the Levant by destroying a significant part of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure and eliminating the operational Iranian logistic corridor through Syria—its essential mechanism for supply and strategic projection.

The second development is Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s visit to Washington[2], the first official visit of a Syrian head of state[3] to the United States since Syria’s declaration of independence following the end of the French Mandate. It signals clearly the new Syrian leadership’s orientation toward international legitimacy through distancing from Tehran and repositioning itself closer to Washington and Ankara.

The third major paradigm shift, with direct impact on the Syrian file, is Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to the United States—a visit that marked Riyadh’s re-anchoring in its strategic relationship with Washington[4] after years of ambiguity, bilateral tension, and attempts to rebalance toward China. Saudi Arabia is once again assuming its role as a pivotal actor in the Middle Eastern security architecture and, implicitly, as the principal Arab guarantor of Syria’s reintegration after Assad. In the post-Gaza context and amid Damascus’s repositioning, Saudi Arabia’s return to the U.S. strategic orbit consolidates the emerging regional framework, limits Iran’s maneuvering space, and counterbalances Turkey’s growing influence over northern Syria.

This geopolitical shift reflects a pragmatic strategic logic: if the United States seeks to reduce its direct military footprint, it must build a regional system of responsibility-sharing in which local actors assume part of the burden of stability and security. From this perspective, a stabilized, reoriented Syria—integrated into a framework of cooperation with Turkey, Israel, and the Arab states—becomes a key element for preventing Iran’s return, reducing the need for direct U.S. presence, and facilitating the emergence of an autonomous regional architecture.

Parallel to this external repositioning, Syria faces severe internal structural fragility. The collapse of the Assad regime did not produce a robust institutional transition, but rather created a power vacuum managed through an arrangement dependent on Ankara. This reality reflects the Syrian state’s inability to function independently after more than four decades of personalized rule and deep reliance on Iranian military, financial, and ideological support. Iran’s strategic setback after Gaza, amplified by growing international isolation, has left Syria without its principal external pillar of support, forcing the search for alternatives.

Thus, in 2025 Syria finds itself in a dynamic process of accelerated repositioning: between the need for external legitimacy, Turkish pressure, Washington’s expectations, and the constraints imposed by Israel—all superimposed on the reality of an economy in collapse, an exhausted population, and a political elite only now emerging following the disappearance of the old system.

In this context, Russia’s influence has diminished drastically. Unlike in 2014–2018, when Moscow could project power, manage Syrian airspace, and protect the Assad regime, Russia in 2025 is a militarily weakened, internationally isolated, and financially strained actor, preoccupied with its own front in Ukraine. Its role has become secondary—almost symbolic—and its ability to shape Syria’s trajectory has declined in parallel with the deterioration of its global position.

At the same time, Iran is experiencing its most severe strategic setback in two decades, having lost its operational levers in Syria and the critical connections that sustained Hezbollah. The elimination of the land corridor between Tehran and the Mediterranean, the destruction of missile depots in Lebanon, the weakening of Quds Force capabilities, and regional isolation have dismantled what was once the “axis of resistance.” The new Syrian leadership neither seeks nor is capable of returning to such an arrangement.

By contrast, Israel enters a phase of reorganized power, with its priorities recalibrated around two objectives: preventing Iran’s return to Syria and managing the risks associated with Turkey’s rise as the dominant actor in northern Syria. The emergence of a Sunni Syrian regime supported by Turkey is not a comfortable scenario for Tel Aviv, but it is considerably preferable to an Iranian one. Consequently, Israel is pursuing a pragmatic understanding with Ankara and Washington, aimed at ensuring a minimum framework of stability and preventing the military strengthening of potentially hostile groups.

Overall, Syria in 2025 becomes the testing ground of a strategic experiment: can a former clientelist dictatorship, devastated by a decade of war, be integrated into a new regional architecture that allows the United States to gradually withdraw without creating a new security vacuum?

This is the central question guiding the calculations of regional and global actors:

– Turkey sees Syria as the main arena for its neo-Ottoman project;
– the United States seeks a viable model of burden-sharing;
– Israel aims for a non-Iranian buffer zone;
– the Arab states want Syria reintegrated into a predictable order;
– Russia and Iran strive, each in its own way, to limit their losses.

Consequently, Syria is no longer merely a crisis file—it is a geopolitical key to understanding the future order of the Middle East.

Main Strategic Directions of the Syrian Transition

Identity, Religion, Legitimacy, and the Disintegration of the Iran–Syria–Hezbollah Axis

The reconstruction of post-Assad Syria cannot be understood without examining the new identity and religious equation that is beginning to take shape as the Iran–Syria–Hezbollah axis — the structure that sustained Iranian influence in the Levant for more than two decades — progressively erodes. For years, the Assad regime relied on three external pillars: Iranian military and financial support, Hezbollah’s capabilities, and the political-military umbrella provided by Russia. Within only a few years, all of these pillars have been deeply weakened, but Iran is the actor that has suffered the most severe setback, with structural implications for Syria’s future.

The confrontation in Gaza accelerated this transformation. The degradation of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure[5] — the elimination of missile depots, the loss of its leader and of many senior and operational cadres, and the disruption of logistical flows — has turned the organization from an offensive actor into a defensive one focused on survival. This evolution decisively limits Tehran’s ability to project strategic influence to the Mediterranean and directly affects its leverage in Syria.

At the same time, Syria is undergoing a subtle but profound shift in internal legitimacy. After five decades of political and institutional dominance by the Alawite minority, the new geopolitical and demographic environment favors the emergence of a pragmatic Sunnism, less ideologically charged, oriented toward stability, regional reintegration, and international recognition. Within Syria’s elites, a slow but perceptible consensus is emerging: the survival of the state requires an identity reset in which sectarianism can no longer serve as the exclusive foundation of power.

The new confessional balance does not imply the marginalization of minorities, but rather a return to the natural structure of Syrian society, in which the Sunni community represents nearly two-thirds of the population. The emerging model is one of pragmatic governance, oriented toward consensus and stability, where religion reduces its role as an instrument of domination and takes on a function of communal identity managed through coexistence.

This reshaping of legitimacy has generated the emergence of new aspirational groups inside Syria: Sunni economic elites from Aleppo and Hama, moderate administrative cadres from Damascus, and technocrats marginalized over the past two decades. Together, they form the nucleus of a new political class interested in Syria’s reintegration into the Arab system and in rebalancing its relations with Turkey, the Arab states, and the United States.

Overall, this axis reveals the foundational elements of Syria’s transformation: the dissolution of the Iranian model of control, the rise of a moderate Sunni political identity, and the emergence of an elite seeking integration into the regional order rather than resistance against it.

The Military-Strategic Dimension of Syria After the Collapse of the Assad System

If identity and legitimacy define the symbolic framework of change, the military dimension is the arena where transformation manifests most directly. Post-Assad Syria is a state in which the traditional army has been practically dismantled, and the positions it once occupied have been filled by external actors with divergent agendas.

The first fundamental element is Iran’s retreat. For the first time since 2013, Tehran no longer has the operational capacity to maintain military infrastructure in Syria. The Iraq–Syria–Lebanon logistical network has been largely neutralized, the Quds Force no longer enjoys freedom of movement, and pro-Iranian militias have lost cohesion. Without a strong Syrian ally and an efficient proxy network, Iran has become a marginal actor.

Russia, for its part, has drastically reduced its military presence. The Hmeimim airbase[6] functions more as a vestige of a bygone era than as a genuine center of power. A similar situation exists at the Tartus naval base[7]. The resources required for major operations are lacking, and Moscow’s influence on internal dynamics is minimal. Syria is no longer a primary strategic theater for Russia but rather a secondary file managed with minimal resources.

In this vacuum, Turkey has become the de facto main military actor in northern and northwestern Syria. Ankara controls key territories, manages local militias, oversees security infrastructures, and supports the reorganization of Syrian forces aligned with the al-Sharaa regime. Its regional ambitions transform Turkey into the informal architect of the new security order in northern Syria, making its role indispensable in the current strategic environment.

Israel, in parallel, has acquired extensive operational freedom in southern Syria[8], which it uses not only to prevent the reinstallation of Iranian infrastructure and maintain a strategic buffer zone, but also to indirectly influence Syria’s internal dynamics. Through selective support to certain local communities — particularly segments of the Druze in Jabal al-Druze and in areas near the border — Israel seeks to exert pressure on Iranian presence and on the regime’s capacity to control the south. This type of influence projection, tacitly tolerated by Washington and Ankara, represents one of the major strategic evolutions in the Levant, as it combines freedom of military action with tools of political and social shaping at the local level.

The United States, finally, applies in Syria a strategy of “outsourcing order.” The stabilization of the country is delegated to a network of local actors — Turkey, Israel, and the Arab states — each with complementary roles. Washington does not seek to return militarily but to turn Syria into a laboratory for a new security model based on genuine burden-sharing.

This direction shows that Syria is no longer a chaotic battlefield but a strategic space in which regional actors exercise differentiated influence and overlapping interests.

Economic Reconstruction: Between Systemic Destruction and the Competition of External Actors

Syria’s economy enters the post-conflict phase in a state of structural collapse. After fourteen years of war, over 40% of urban and industrial infrastructure is destroyed, energy and transport networks function only partially, and total economic losses are estimated at 325–400 billion USD. The Syrian currency has lost 99% of its value. Agriculture — once one of the main sources of export before 2011 — has suffered a dramatic decline, with uncultivated land, devastated irrigation systems, and a significant reduction of the workforce due to mass migration. The chemical, textile, and pharmaceutical industries, once competitive, have been reduced to scattered enclaves controlled by various local actors.

In this context, Syria’s reconstruction is not merely a financial process but a strategic arena where regional and global interests collide. Iran, Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and, in specific sectors, China, seek preferential access to infrastructure projects, energy, ports, rail networks, and urban reconstruction. Yet many plans devised between 2017 and 2021 have become obsolete due to territorial changes or internal political instability. Damascus, confronted with severe international sanctions and a weakened administration, lacks the capacity to coordinate a coherent national reconstruction program.

Realistic estimates indicate that the reconstruction process[9] will require at least 15–20 years, beginning only once political and security stabilization is achieved — conditions that remain uncertain. In the absence of a broad international agreement and a functional institutional framework, Syria risks a “fragmented reconstruction” model, in which each external actor invests only in areas under its own control or influence. This would perpetuate the country’s economic fragmentation and turn reconstruction into a long-term geopolitical instrument.

The Regional Balance: The United States, Turkey, Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia in the Game of Redesigning Syria

This axis concentrates the essence of the 2025 strategic dilemma: how can Syria become the pivot of a new regional system when the ambitions of the actors involved differ and their interests overlap only partially?

For the United States, Syria is the testing ground of a new paradigm: if a devastated state can be reintegrated through coordinated regional efforts, then the American withdrawal can continue without the risk of creating a new vacuum. The Syrian president’s visit to Washington symbolizes this pivot and Syria’s re-entry into the Western sphere.

For Turkey, Syria represents the core of its geopolitical project. Ankara does not seek total control but structural influence: reorganizing security policies, supporting Sunni networks, and maintaining key positions in the north allow it to shape Syria’s political and military architecture.

Israel views Syria as a space of controlled risk. Although a Sunni state supported by Turkey raises questions about long-term stability, it is preferable to an arrangement dominated by Iran. Thus, Israel pursues a strategy of minimal stabilization without political or military dependence.

Iran is the major loser. Economically weakened, internally contested, and deprived of the ability to project power in Syria and Lebanon, Tehran no longer possesses the essential instruments required to influence the Levant.

Saudi Arabia, supported by Pakistan, seeks to balance Turkey’s rising influence — not through military means but through economic resources and Arab legitimacy, both essential for the reconstruction process.

This direction shows that Syria is not merely the intersection point of competing interests, but the pillar on which the emerging new regional order is being tested.

Strategic Conclusion: Syria as a Pivot of the New Regional Order

In a remarkably short period, Syria has evolved from a collapsed state manipulated by external powers into the pivot of a regional strategy aimed at redefining the balance of power in the Middle East. This transformation does not stem from internal reforms, but from the convergence of three dynamics: the weakening of Iran and Russia, the pragmatic repositioning of Syria’s new leadership, and the shift in the American security paradigm toward the outsourcing of order.

For Washington, the success of integrating Syria into a regional cooperation system — led by Turkey and secured by Israel and the Arab states — represents the decisive test of a new model of controlled withdrawal.
For Turkey, Syria is the center of its regional ambitions.
For Israel, it is a space of manageable risk.
For Saudi Arabia, a field of counterbalancing.
For Iran and Russia, an almost irreversibly lost file.

For Syria itself, this is a rare opportunity to transform the external context into minimal internal stabilization and a gradual reintegration into the regional order.

In this sense, Syria becomes not just a foreign policy file, but an indicator of the future regional order in the Middle East — a test of the ability of local and global actors to sustain stability within an international system undergoing reconfiguration.

Brașov, 24 November 2025

Selective Bibliography

1. International Crisis Group. Syria: Shoring Up Fragile Lines of Authority. ICG Middle East Report, 2024.
2. UNESCWA & World Bank. Syria Damage and Needs Assessment (DANA): 2024 Update. Beirut/Washington, 2024.
3. UNICEF. Syria Humanitarian Situation Report. June 2025.
4. Institute for the Study of War (ISW). Iran’s Declining Influence in Syria and the Fragmentation of Its Regional Network. ISW Report, 2024.
5. Carnegie Middle East Center — Aron Lund. The Remnants of the Syrian State: Power, Fragmentation and Survival. Carnegie, 2023–2025.
6. Chatham House — Lina Khatib. Syria’s New Political Landscape After Assad. Middle East Programme Paper, 2025.
7. RAND Corporation — Jeffrey Martini et al. Turkey’s Strategy in Northern Syria: Objectives, Constraints and Prospects. RAND, 2024.
8. IISS – International Institute for Strategic Studies. Middle East Strategic Survey 2025. London, 2025.
9. Middle East Institute (MEI) — Charles Lister. The Future of Syria After Iran’s Strategic Retreat. MEI Policy Paper, 2025.
10. Reuters / AP News Dossiers. Saudi Arabia–U.S. Strategic Reset & the Regional Implications for Syria. News Analysis Series, November 2025.

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[1] The confrontation in Gaza ended with the acceptance, in early October 2025, of the preliminary agreement that established a ceasefire, a prisoner exchange, and the beginning of a gradual demilitarization process. This arrangement was later formalized through the UN Security Council Resolution of 17 November 2025 (13 votes in favor and two abstentions—Russia and China), which set an international stabilization framework for the Gaza Strip, including the creation of a transitional authority, the deployment of an international security force, and the cautious opening of a political horizon regarding the future status of the Palestinians. The situation, however, remains far from definitively resolved.

[2] In his first public interview during the Washington visit (Washington Post, 11 November 2025), Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa outlined the strategic axes of the new Syrian leadership and the parameters of a potential “conditional normalization” with the United States. His stated objective: rebuilding bilateral relations and lifting sanctions—talks that have been “ongoing” for several months. He confirmed the existence of approximately 250,000 missing persons and announced cooperation with the United States, including the handover of a recently released individual.

Al-Sharaa presented his past as a combatant as an act of “defending the country” and described the difficult transition after decades of dictatorship, emphasizing Syria’s tradition of religious coexistence. He proposed that U.S. forces in the east monitor the integration of the SDF into state structures, after which Syria would take full responsibility for territorial security—an arrangement requiring guarantees for the Kurds and Turkish approval.

Regarding Israel, he accused it of violating the 1974 disengagement agreement, expelling the UN mission, expanding territorial control, and carrying out over 1,000 airstrikes after 8 December, including one targeting the Presidential Palace. He stated that Syria did not retaliate in order not to jeopardize reconstruction. He declared that Iran and Hezbollah had been removed from Syria, and that direct negotiations with Israel—mediated by the United States—were underway; Damascus’s condition is a return to “pre-8 December” lines.

His positioning toward Russia remained ambiguous: while he claimed that Syria had been “at war with Russia for ten years,” he also acknowledged dependence on Russian diplomatic support in the UN and the need to maintain a pragmatic relationship, including regarding the Assad file.

[3] The unusual perfume incident—in which the U.S. president sprayed fragrance on Ahmed al-Sharaa in the Oval Office—was interpreted differently across the main capitals. In Washington, it was seen as a blend of the American president’s trademark informality and a symbolic gesture of rapprochement, though some analysts perceived nuances of protocol dominance. In Damascus, the moment was viewed as a confirmation of Syria’s international reintegration, even if the unconventional style appeared to some to downplay the gravity of the strategic context. In the Gulf capitals, the scene was interpreted as a signal of thaw between Washington and Damascus, with implications for the regional architecture, though not without skepticism about the balance between symbolism and substance. In Moscow, by contrast, the episode was seen as a sign of Russia’s waning influence in Syria—a symbolic assertion of American dominance over a leader whom the Kremlin had long considered, at least implicitly, within its sphere of influence, further confirming Russia’s marginalization in the Levant.

[4] The official visit of Mohammed bin Salman to Washington marked the consolidation of the Saudi-American strategic relationship, with the U.S. announcing its intention to sell F-35 aircraft to Saudi Arabia and to designate the kingdom as a “major non-NATO ally.” Discussions included cooperation in defense, advanced technologies, civilian nuclear energy, and investment in critical infrastructure. Although no immediate normalization with Israel was announced, the visit signaled MBS’s return to the diplomatic center of gravity in Washington and reaffirmed Saudi Arabia’s indispensable role in the Middle Eastern security architecture.

[5] In September 2024, a two-stage attack against Hezbollah took place. On 17–18 September, explosions in pagers and radio devices used by the group—attributed by Israeli media to Mossad—injured around 1,500 fighters and disrupted Hezbollah’s communication network. On 27 September, an Israeli airstrike in Beirut’s Dahieh suburb targeted Hassan Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader, killing him along with several senior commanders and nearly half of the group’s military council.

[6] In autumn 2025, Russia resumed regular military flights to the Hmeimim Air Base after a months-long pause, sending heavy transport aircraft (Il-62, An-124) and new equipment shipments via the Tartus–Latakia logistical route. Moscow is attempting to consolidate its presence in Syria while negotiating the long-term status of the Hmeimim and Tartus bases amid a shifting Syrian political context. Though the infrastructure remains operational, the base faces growing vulnerabilities: logistical pressure, the risk of attacks, and uncertainty surrounding bilateral agreements with Damascus.

[7] By 2025, the status of the Russian base at Tartus had become uncertain after the new Syrian government annulled the commercial management agreement for the port and launched renegotiations over Russia’s access rights. Satellite imagery from early 2025 shows the withdrawal of part of the Russian equipment and reduced logistical activity, and Russia’s naval presence has shrunk to 1–2 support and patrol vessels, without major deployments of the Black Sea Fleet or the Mediterranean Squadron. Although the base remains functional, its strategic role is in decline, and Russia operates there in a restricted posture under the pressure of political negotiations with Damascus.

[8] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to southern Syria on 19 November 2025, in areas under Israeli control, brought back into focus the issue of the occupied territories and the expansions carried out after the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime on 8 December 2024. The Golan Heights were occupied by Israel in June 1967, and the de facto annexation was formalized through the Golan Heights Law of 14 December 1981, recognized internationally only by the United States.

After 2024, Israel expanded its military presence beyond the 1974 ceasefire line, occupying significant segments of the buffer zone previously monitored by UNDOF, including parts of Quneitra, Daraa, Suweida, and the Yarmouk basins. Estimates range from 400 km² (The Guardian) to 600 km² (Etana), in addition to the approximately 1,200 km² previously controlled in the Golan.

A distinct strategic element is Mount Hermon. Israel already controlled the southern slopes, but after December 2024 it established new military posts on the Syrian side, reinforcing a dominant position over the Syrian-Lebanese borders and regional logistical corridors. The presence of Israeli officials in these areas, including Netanyahu, is perceived in Damascus as political legitimization of a contested status quo and a direct violation of Syrian sovereignty. For Israel, control over southern Syria and Mount Hermon is presented as a security asset meant to prevent the regrouping of Iranian or pro-Iranian forces; for Syria, however, accepting these realities would amount to a severe loss of sovereignty with major internal repercussions.

[9] Aleppo and Homs have become emblematic of the scale of urban destruction in Syria. In Aleppo, years of siege and bombing (especially 2012–2016) turned entire districts—particularly the eastern part—into fields of ruins: international assessments indicate tens of thousands of damaged or collapsed buildings, with massive destruction in the old city, where much of the souk, mosques, and historic buildings are either severely damaged or completely destroyed. Reconstruction of basic infrastructure (water, sewage, healthcare, transport) is progressing slowly, unevenly, and underfunded, preventing a significant portion of the displaced population from returning under minimally safe and decent conditions.

Homs, the third-largest city, suffered a similar fate: prolonged bombardments leveled entire districts, with tens of thousands of buildings either destroyed or severely damaged. Previously dense areas have been reduced to hollow structures—roofless, without utilities, with streets blocked by debris. Even though the frontline has vanished, the “post-war war”—lack of funding, sanctions, investor distrust, and legal insecurity—means that reconstruction remains more declared than real. In both cities, the destruction is not only physical but also social: the rupturing of community ties, the exodus of the middle class, and the loss of human capital further complicate any realistic short- or medium-term urban recovery strategy.