Montenegro’s Minister of Justice, H.E. Bojan Božović, paid an assertive visit to The Hague from 21 to 23 April 2026, reaffirming Montenegro’s clear and steady trajectory toward EU membership. Discussions centred on judicial reform, highlighting concrete results already achieved and continued progress in the rule of law chapters, which remain key pillars in the accession process.
Montenegro’s Minister of Justice, H.E. Bojan Božović with Judge Tomoko Akane.
During his visit, Minister Božović held a bilateral meeting with David van Weel, Minister of Justice of the Netherlands, reaffirming the strong and constructive partnership between the two countries. He also met with Judge Tomoko Akane, President of the International Criminal Court, underscoring Montenegro’s firm and principled commitment to international justice and accountability.
Philippe Gautier, Registrar of the International Court of Justice and H.E. Bojan Božović, Minister of Justice of the Republic of Montenegro.
Further high level engagements included meetings with Michael Schmid, President of Eurojust; Nazhat Khan, Deputy Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court; Kevin Hughes, Deputy Prosecutor of the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals, Philippe Gautier, Registrar of the International Court of Justice and Osvaldo Zavala Giler, Registrar of the International Criminal Court. Deborah Ruiz Verduzco, Executive Director of the Trust Fund for Victims at the International Criminal Court.
The Minister of Justice of Montenegro with Nazhat Khan, Deputy Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.
The visit highlighted tangible reform progress and Montenegro’s strong readiness to continue deepening cooperation with international partners, as it advances confidently through the final phase of its EU accession process.
A career diplomat is a professional government officer serving in a state’s foreign service. An honorary consul is a private citizen authorized to perform limited consular functions for a sending state in a receiving state. Both roles are part of international relations, but they are not interchangeable.
The distinction matters because confusion between the two can lead to serious misunderstandings about authority, immunity, documents, and appointment processes. A careful comparison shows that both roles derive authority from governments, but they operate under different legal frameworks and with different limits.
Career diplomat: a government profession
A career diplomat is employed by the sending state’s foreign ministry or equivalent government department. Career diplomats usually enter through a formal public-service process, receive training, and serve across different posts and ranks. Their assignments are made by the sending government.
Career diplomats are governed principally by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. When properly accredited and recognized by the receiving state, diplomatic agents receive broad protections designed to allow the diplomatic mission to function. These protections include personal inviolability and immunity from the host state’s criminal jurisdiction, subject to the structure and limits of the Convention.
Career diplomats also operate under professional restrictions. They are government employees, receive government compensation, and generally may not engage in private commercial activity for personal gain while posted.
Honorary consul: a limited consular role
An honorary consul is different. The person is usually a private citizen with strong local ties, professional standing, and some connection to the appointing state or its interests. The role is normally unpaid or minimally compensated and is honorary by nature.
Honorary consuls are governed principally by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963. Article 68 recognizes that states may employ honorary consular officers. Their functions may include assisting nationals, supporting trade and cultural relations, liaising with the appointing state’s embassy, and performing limited administrative tasks where authorized.
Their immunity is narrower than that of career diplomatic agents. In general, honorary consular officers receive protection for official acts within their authorized functions. Their private conduct remains subject to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the host state. This limited protection is one of the defining features of the role.
Side-by-side comparison
Issue
Career Diplomat
Honorary Consul
Legal framework
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
Status
Professional government officer
Private citizen with limited consular authorization
Appointment
Foreign-service appointment and accreditation
Sending-state commission plus receiving-state authorization
Host-state consent
Agrément and accreditation, depending on role
Exequatur or equivalent authorization
Immunity
Broad diplomatic immunity for accredited diplomatic agents
Generally limited to official acts
Private business
Generally prohibited during posting
Usually permitted outside official functions
Government salary
Yes
Usually no
Treaty negotiation
Only within government authority
No, unless separately and lawfully authorized
Official documents
Issued only by competent public authorities
Cannot privately issue diplomatic status or documents
How the appointment processes differ
A career diplomat is selected and posted through the sending state’s foreign-service system. For senior appointments such as ambassadors, the receiving state must usually provide prior consent. The process is state-to-state and remains confidential in many respects.
An honorary consul is considered through a different route. The sending state identifies a suitable private individual and submits the proposed appointment to the receiving state. If the receiving state consents, it grants an exequatur or equivalent authorization. Without that authorization, the person cannot lawfully act as an honorary consul in the host country.
Both processes are controlled by governments. Neither process can be compelled by a private person, purchased through a commercial arrangement, or guaranteed by an adviser.
Can private individuals become diplomats?
A private individual cannot become a career diplomat without entering the relevant government service and being posted by the government. Career diplomatic status is a public office, not a private credential.
Honorary consular roles may involve private citizens, but that does not make them privately available. A person may be considered only if a sending state chooses to nominate or commission the person and the receiving state authorizes the role. The legal source remains sovereign action, not private initiative.
This is the safest and most accurate way to describe non-career roles: they may involve private citizens, but they are not private products. Any claim that an appointment, passport, immunity, or official recognition can be obtained through a private purchase should be treated with skepticism.
Why the distinction matters
The coexistence of career diplomats and honorary consuls serves a practical purpose. Career diplomats provide the professional core of a state’s foreign representation. Honorary consuls can extend limited consular support into locations or communities where a full mission would not be proportionate.
Both roles can serve legitimate public functions. But the legitimacy of each depends on accurate legal framing, official authorization, and respect for the limits of the role.
William Blackstone Internacional provides educational and advisory support on these distinctions for clients and professional counterparties seeking to understand diplomatic protocol, public-international legal frameworks, documentation readiness, and compliance-sensitive issues. The firm does not sell, issue, obtain, arrange, or guarantee official roles, passports, credentials, privileges, immunities, visas, or governmental decisions.
The correct question is not whether one role is better than the other. The correct question is what each role legally is, what it is not, and which public authorities have the power to create and recognize it.
About the Author:
Peter Kovacs is Director of Strategy at William Blackstone Internacional, a Panama-based private consultancy focused on diplomatic protocol, public-international legal frameworks, documentation readiness, and compliance-sensitive advisory. The firm does not issue, arrange, or guarantee government documents, appointments, privileges, or outcomes.
Diplomatic and consular appointments are formal public processes. They are not private transactions, not commercial services, and not outcomes that can be purchased or guaranteed. Whether the role is a career ambassador, a diplomatic officer, or an honorary consul, the legal authority comes from governments acting under domestic law, international law, and bilateral practice.
This article explains the main stages of appointment in plain language: nomination, host-state consent, issuance of credentials, presentation or authorization, and formal registration. It also explains the most important principle: sovereign discretion. Governments decide. Private parties do not.
Step 1 – Internal identification by the sending state
Every appointment begins with the sending state, meaning the government that wishes to appoint a representative. For career diplomats, this is usually an internal foreign-ministry process. The government selects a professional officer, determines the proposed posting, and initiates the appointment through official channels.
For honorary consular appointments, the sending state may consider a private citizen with strong local ties, professional standing, cultural or language knowledge, and a reputation that reflects appropriately on the appointing state. But the key point is the same: the decision begins with the government. A private person cannot nominate themselves into public authority, and a private adviser cannot nominate a candidate on behalf of a sovereign state.
Private advisory work, where appropriate, is limited to helping a person understand the legal framework, organize factual information, identify risks, and obtain properly licensed professional advice where required. It cannot create the appointment.
Step 2 – Agrément for ambassadors
Before a proposed ambassador is formally appointed, the sending state must usually request the agrément, or prior consent, of the receiving state. Article 4 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations reflects this requirement.
The process is confidential and diplomatic in character. The sending state communicates the proposed name through official channels. The receiving state reviews the proposal and may accept or refuse. It is not required to give reasons for refusal.
This stage demonstrates the central role of host-state consent. No person has a right to be accepted as ambassador by another state. Consent cannot be demanded, pressured, purchased, or guaranteed by a private actor.
Step 3 – Exequatur for consular officers
For consular appointments, including honorary consuls, the equivalent concept is the exequatur or comparable authorization by the receiving state. Under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, a consular officer cannot exercise official functions in the host country unless the receiving state permits it.
The sending state issues or transmits the relevant commission, and the receiving state decides whether to recognize the person for consular functions in a defined district. If the receiving state does not grant authorization, the appointment has no practical legal effect in that territory.
The receiving state may also withdraw authorization. This reinforces the limited and consent-based nature of consular authority.
Step 4 – Credentials and commissions
Once the required consent has been obtained, the sending state issues the official documents appropriate to the role.
For ambassadors, these are usually Letters of Credence. They are formal state documents addressed from the head of state of the sending country to the head of state of the receiving country. The ambassador normally presents them in a formal ceremony before fully taking up functions.
For consular officers, the equivalent is generally a consular commission or letter of appointment, together with the host state’s authorization. Honorary consuls operate within the scope of that commission and authorization. Their authority does not extend beyond the functions recognized by the relevant governments.
Step 5 – Notification and registration
After credentials are presented or authorization is granted, the receiving state’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is notified and the person is entered into the relevant diplomatic or consular list. These lists are important because they record who is officially recognized in the host country.
Legal privileges and immunities depend on proper status, notification, function, and recognition. They do not arise from a business card, a title used privately, a marketing claim, or a passport document standing alone. The receiving state’s recognition is central.
What private advisers can and cannot do
A private adviser may explain the legal architecture. An adviser may help a client understand the distinction between diplomatic and consular frameworks, identify documentation gaps, review reputational and compliance issues, and coordinate with licensed professionals where regulated work is required.
A private adviser may not sell a diplomatic appointment, obtain an exequatur, issue credentials, create immunity, arrange official recognition, or guarantee that any ministry, embassy, consulate, or foreign government will act. Any statement suggesting otherwise is inaccurate and should be treated with caution.
A conservative advisory model must therefore be built around refusal discipline. Matters involving sanctions exposure, politically exposed persons, source-of-funds concerns, document-integrity issues, bribery risk, misrepresentation, or reputational sensitivity should be screened carefully and declined where appropriate.
Government discretion is the rule
Across every stage – nomination, agrément, exequatur, issuance of credentials, notification, and registration – the decisive authority belongs to governments. This is not an administrative detail. It is the core of the system.
Governments may accept, refuse, delay, or revoke. They may change policy. They may ask for additional information. They may decline without explanation. The uncertainty is not a defect; it is an expression of sovereignty.
For this reason, responsible commentary should avoid language such as obtain, secure, fast-track, acquire, arrange, or guarantee when describing appointments or official documents. Safer and more accurate language is: understand the framework, prepare information, assess suitability, identify risks, and recognize that competent authorities decide.
A legitimate process, not a private product
Diplomatic and consular appointments remain important tools of international relations. Career diplomats provide professional state representation. Honorary consuls can support consular access, trade, culture, and community links in locations where a full mission may not be present.
The legitimacy of these roles depends on state authority, transparency, and compliance with legal limits. They should not be presented as personal mobility products, immunity tools, or commercial status opportunities.
William Blackstone Internacional provides educational and advisory support on diplomatic protocol, public-international legal frameworks, documentation readiness, and compliance-sensitive coordination. It does not sell, issue, obtain, arrange, or guarantee passports, credentials, appointments, immunities, privileges, visas, access to public officials, or governmental decisions.
Understanding the appointment process is the best protection against misunderstanding. The process is formal, structured, and legitimate – precisely because it is controlled by states, not by private actors.
About the author:
Peter Kovacs is Director of Strategy at William Blackstone Internacional, a Panama-based private consultancy focused on diplomatic protocol, public-international legal frameworks, documentation readiness, and compliance-sensitive advisory.
Thursday, 23 April 2026, Free Hanseatic City of Bremen: Swedish Ambassador Veronika Wand-Danielsson paid her inaugural visit to the Senate at Bremen City Hall. She was accompanied by the new Honorary Consul in Bremen, Daniel Günther, who also received his certificate of appointment on this occasion. Both were received by Senator for Economic Affairs, Ports and Transformation, Kristina Vogt, representing Mayor Andreas Bovenschulte. The Ambassador also signed the city’s Golden Book.
The ambassador was visiting Bremen because Sweden is this year’s partner country of the jazzahead! jazz fair, at whose opening Wand-Danielsson participated. However, there are also close economic ties between Sweden and Bremen, largely centered on Bremen’s significant economic activities in the fields of hydrogen, aerospace, and security policy. For example, there is increasingly close cooperation in the area of the hydrogen economy, moving from research activities to industrial implementation.
Ambassador Wand-Danielsson, was subsequently welcomed by Bremen Parliament Speaker Antje Grotheer, for her inaugural visit to the Parliament building. Wand-Danielsson has been in office since September 2023; from September 2014 to August 2020, she represented Sweden as Ambassador to France and Monaco.
Eintrag ins Goldene Buch: Veronika Wand-Danielsso, schwedische Botschafterin
After the traditional signing of the guestbook, the hour-long exchange turned to cultural topics. During the remainder of the conversation, Wand-Danielsson and Grotheer discussed the relationship between Sweden and Germany regarding Ukraine. They noted that solidarity with Ukraine remains a high priority in both countries.
In this context, Grotheer spoke about the close ties between the city of Bremen and its twin city, Odessa, in Ukraine. Wand-Danielsson then spoke about a turning point in Sweden’s approach to defense. She explained that open communication with the public leads to support for military action, and that joining NATO enjoys the backing of approximately 70 percent of the Swedish population. Since 2017, Sweden has reinstated conscription for both men and women.
The discussion then turned to economic issues: Germany is Sweden’s most important trading partner, Wand-Danielsson noted. She added that Sweden is generally concerned about the current economic situation and emphasized the importance of economic independence from the United States.
The Hague, 16 April 2026 – The Ambassador of Portugal in the Netherlands, H.E. Ms. Clara Nunes dos Santos, in partnership with the Fondation Arpad Zsenes Vieira da Silva, represented by its President, Dr. António Gomes de Pinho, proudly hosted an exhibition at the Chancellery of Portugal to mark the 52nd anniversary of the April Revolution, the carnation revolution. This exhibition showcased an impressive selection of graphic works by one of Portugal’s foremost painters of the 20th century, Maria Helena Vieira da Silva, titled “Fruits of Freedom.”
In her powerful opening remarks, Ambassador Clara Nunes dos Santos declared, For my generation, there is no question: if we had to select an artwork that embodies this extraordinary moment in our democracy, it would unequivocally be a painting by Vieira da Silva. The poster displayed here stands as the most significant representation of that remarkable day.
Dr. António Gomes de Pinho and the Ambassador of Ireland, H.E. Ann Derwin. Portuguese Embassy, Anniversary of the Carnation Revolution, exhibition of graphic works Vieira da Silva.
The Ambassador further emphasized, “When considering a literary piece that encapsulates the essence of the Revolution, we would undoubtedly turn to the words of another great Portuguese poet, Sophia de Mello Breyner, whose poem captures the Revolution with clarity: ‘This is the dawn that I awaited, the initial, whole, and clean day, where we emerge from the night and from the silence, And free we inhabit the substance of time.’
Just yesterday, while preparing for the exhibition, I discovered that it was Sophia, a member of Parliament, who asked Vieira da Silva to create a work celebrating the first anniversary of the democratic revolution.
This coincidence struck me profoundly, and it is essential that we take a moment, especially in these challenging times, to reflect on the critical importance of liberty and democracy.
I want to thank each of you for being here today, and I hope you will appreciate this remarkable showcase of a truly great Portuguese artist. When you visit Lisbon—note that I say “when,” not “if”—make sure to take the time to visit the outstanding foundation named after Vieira da Silva and her husband, Arpad Szenes, who hailed from Hungary.
It is my distinct honor to introduce Dr. António Gomes de Pinho, the President of the Arpad Szenes Vieira da Silva Foundation, who will share more about the foundation. Following his insight, Mrs. Sandra Brás Santos, the museum curator and a recognized expert, will provide further details about the remarkable artworks featured in this exhibition.
We have assembled a selection of 13 graphic works by one of the foremost Portuguese painters of the 20th century, Maria Helena Vieira da Silva, under the title “Fruits of Freedom.”
Enjoy the drinks and savory Portuguese snacks, including the exceptional bolinhos de bacalhau.
The exhibition remains open for visits on weekdays between 10.00 and 16.00 hours until 30th April 2026.
When I arrived at the Polish Embassy in The Hague, the first thing that struck me was the building itself: elegant, historic, steeped in diplomatic tradition – like a place that remembers Europe’s past.
And yet, in many ways, it also frames Poland’s future. Because the Poland of today is no longer seen only through the prism of history. It is increasingly viewed as one of Europe’s most dynamic economies — a European tiger, ambitious, resilient, and eager to play a greater role not only in politics and security, but also in science, technology, and innovation.
Poland surprises with its energy, its scale of transformation, and its growing confidence on the international stage. And it is precisely at this intersection of history, strategy, and modern ambition that I met Ambassador Margareta Kassangana.
Diplomat Magazine:Ambassador, meeting here in this beautiful historic embassy building, I think about how much Poland’s image has changed in recent years. Do you feel that shift is also visible here in The Hague?
Ambassador Margareta Kassangana: Absolutely. And I think it is one of the most interesting developments in how Poland is perceived internationally. Of course, history remains an important part of our identity, but today’s Poland is also a country of remarkable economic dynamism, resilience, and ambition. We are not only a key political actor in Europe, but also a country that is becoming more visible through innovation, scientific progress, and strategic thinking. From The Hague, this transformation is very tangible. Our partners increasingly look at Poland not just as an important country on NATO’s eastern flank, but as a state that wants to help shape Europe’s future — politically, economically, technologically, and institutionally.
In the past, we mainly learned from our Dutch partners. Today, however, this relationship has become much more balanced, and in many areas we are equally eager to share our own experiences. This evolution is clearly reflected in one of our most enduring cooperation mechanisms – the Utrecht Conference. Originally established as a platform to support Poland’s preparations for accession to the European Union, it has transformed into a forum for mutual exchange of knowledge and best practices between our countries. This shift marks a significant change and is a source of great satisfaction, highlighting how much we have developed over the past years.
Let’s begin with bilateral relations. Poland and the Netherlands seem to have grown even closer in recent years, especially in security and defence. What is driving that deepening partnership?
In an increasingly unpredictable world, trusted partnerships matter more than ever. Few bilateral relationships in Europe illustrate this truth as clearly as the ties between Poland and the Netherlands. Already robust, Polish–Dutch ties have deepened significantly over the past three years, particularly in the fields of security, defence, and strategic cooperation.
The current political and security environment has once again underscored the importance of reliable allies. Intensive contacts between Warsaw and The Hague have confirmed that we approach the key issues on the international agenda with strikingly similar perspectives. Poland and the Netherlands are not only close partners; they are among the frontrunners of security cooperation in Europe, sharing a common vision of the continent’s security architecture.
This alignment is not merely rhetorical. It is reflected in concrete actions. When Russia violated Polish—and NATO—airspace in September 2025, the swift and resolute response by Dutch pilots sent a powerful signal. It was a vivid demonstration of partnership and unity at a moment of heightened tension. In challenging times, Poland and the Netherlands can count on one another.
So this is a partnership built not only on interests, but also on trust?
Indeed. Trust is the key word here. And that trust is strengthened by the fact that our relationship is rooted in something deeper than current events. It is built on a shared history and on values that were tested under the most difficult circumstances.
During the Second World War, Polish and Dutch soldiers fought side by side against Nazi Germany. On Dutch soil, general Stanisław Maczek and general Stanisław Sosabowski played an important role in the liberation of towns and villages. Their legacy still lives in Dutch memory, and it continues to shape the emotional and political fabric of our relationship.
This is why remembrance is not just symbolic. It has real diplomatic meaning. In May 2025, Prime Minister Donald Tusk was invited by Prime Minister Dick Schoof as guest of honour to deliver the liberation speech during the 80th anniversary commemorations marking the end of the Second World War. Later that same year, both prime ministers met in Poland to witness the signing of a bilateral Memorandum on Developing Defence Cooperation. That moment captured something essential: history and future ambition can reinforce one another.
Europe is again facing a moment of profound insecurity. How do Poland and the Netherlands respond to that together?
We respond with clarity. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its broader imperial ambitions are a direct threat to European stability. Poland and the Netherlands both understand that supporting Ukraine it is a matter of principle and security. Our countries remain united in defending Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. That support takes many forms — political, military, humanitarian — and it reflects a broader understanding that the security of Europe is indivisible. What happens in Ukraine affects all of us.
But your work here is not only about defence and geopolitics. There is also a strong economic dimension to Polish–Dutch relations.
Yes, and it is a very important one. The Netherlands is one of Poland’s most significant economic partners. It is among our top export destinations and key suppliers of goods, but the real story is not only about trade volumes. It is about where this relationship can go next.
There is enormous potential in high-tech and innovation-driven sectors: IT and ICT, semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, space innovation and also the energy transition. We see promising areas for cooperation in offshore wind, hydrogen technologies, and grid modernisation. These are sectors that are not just commercially attractive — they are strategically vital.
In today’s geopolitical reality, that matters enormously. Energy, defence, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, IT/ICT — these are no longer neutral economic fields. They are part of how Europe thinks about resilience, strategic autonomy, and risk reduction. So we need to look at economic cooperation through a broader lens than simple market efficiency.
We covered security, politics and economy but there is also a very human layer to this relationship, isn’t there?
Absolutely. One of the greatest strengths of Polish–Dutch relations is the people-to-people dimension. Around 400,000 Poles live in the Netherlands today, including many migrant workers. Their contribution to Dutch society and the Dutch economy is substantial and widely recognised.
They are often valued for their professionalism, expertise, work ethic, and reliability. But beyond economics, they also form a living bridge between our societies. They connect our cultures, our workplaces, and our everyday experiences in a way that diplomacy alone never could.
You’ve said before that what makes this embassy truly unique is its multilateral dimension. Why is that so central for you personally?
Because this is exactly what makes this posting so distinctive — and, for me, especially meaningful. The Polish Embassy in The Hague is not only a bilateral embassy. It is also a major multilateral platform. And that dual function is what defines much of my work.
The Hague is one of the world’s most important centres of international governance. Here, diplomacy intersects with international law, accountability, disarmament, and justice. Therefore, alongside the bilateral diplomacy I am also deeply engaged in a wide range of multilateral formats.
That includes, among others, the work with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), engagement with the International Criminal Court (ICC), and broader involvement in the ecosystem of international courts and legal institutions based in The Hague. These are not marginal activities. They are central to Poland’s foreign policy and to our understanding of international responsibility.
Ambassador Kassangana, speaking during her interview for Diplomat Magazine.
That sounds like a very demanding diplomatic environment.
It is. But it is also incredibly stimulating. This overlapping world of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy — this constantly interpenetrating reality — is both a major challenge and a source of momentum. It requires agility, strategic coherence, and a very broad perspective.
One day you are working on political dialogue with the Dutch authorities, economic cooperation, or defence matters. The next, you are engaged in discussions on chemical disarmament, accountability for war crimes, support mechanisms for Ukraine, or developments in international law. These spheres increasingly overlap. Security, law, politics, technology, humanitarian responsibility — they all interact.
And that is precisely why I find this role so compelling. The complexity is demanding, of course, but it is also a driving force. It pushes us to think in an integrated way.
Let’s stay for a moment with the multilateral side. Where is Poland most active here in The Hague?
Poland is very active in several key formats. At the OPCW, for example, we play an important and visible role. Every year, Poland presents to the UN General Assembly a resolution on the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. That is an important expression of our long-standing commitment to chemical disarmament and non-proliferation.
At present, Poland is also a member of the OPCW Executive Council, where I hold the position of Vice-Chairperson from the Eastern European Group. More recently, Poland finalised a voluntary financial contribution to support the OPCW’s work related to Syria and Ukraine. This reflects not only our political commitment, but also a practical willingness to help the organisation carry out its mission.
At the same time, Poland is highly active in the world of international justice. This engagement has been recognised in our work with the International Criminal Court. I currently serve as Vice-President of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, which is both an honour and a responsibility. It is a sign that Poland is seen as a serious and constructive actor in these debates.
And, of course, Poland strongly supports international efforts aimed at helping Ukraine secure justice and redress. That commitment was clearly reflected in our accession, in December 2025, to the Convention establishing the International Claims Commission for Ukraine.
Listening to you, one has the impression that this embassy operates almost like several institutions in one.
In a sense, yes. And that is exactly why it is such a fascinating place to work. However, not only it requires diplomatic skills, but also high flexibility. You need to be able to move between very different registers: history and memory, defence cooperation, innovation policy, labour mobility, chemical disarmament, international criminal justice, and support for Ukraine. Yet these issues are increasingly interconnected, so the ability to see the bigger picture becomes essential.
Finally, if you had to describe today’s Polish presence in The Hague in one sentence, what would you say?
I would say that Poland in The Hague is a country that honours history, acts with determination in the present, and is increasingly ready to shape the future — both through strong partnerships and through serious multilateral engagement.
Ambassador Giorgio Novello, former Ambassador of Italy to the Netherlands, returned to Rome one year ago, where he continues his distinguished work as Italy’s National Coordinator for International Criminal Justice.
Looking back on his time in the Netherlands, Ambassador Novello holds dear the unforgettable memories of more than four remarkable years spent in The Hague alongside his wife, Biancamaria.
Though now based in Rome, Ambassador Novello remains closely connected to the Netherlands and sends his warm greetings to all the Dutch, Italian, European Union, and international friends he met during his tenure. He extends a particularly heartfelt message to his dear friends in the Jewish community of The Hague, with whom he continues to maintain close and valued relations.
He also conveys his sincere appreciation and warm regards to the editorial team and readers of Diplomat Magazine, which he considers a vital meeting point and a true source of friendship within The Hague’s diplomatic community.
From 16 to 18 April 2026, Rwanda Coffee – A Second Sunrise was featured at NDSM in Amsterdam. The initiative came from the National Agricultural Export Development Board in Rwanda. It brought Rwanda’s specialty coffee story to buyers, roasters, baristas and coffee lovers in one of Europe’s most useful coffee markets. Kawah Coffee was represented at the Rwanda stand as part of that presence.
A strategic market in Europe
The Netherlands is not Rwanda’s largest bilateral coffee buyer. Still, it offered something just as valuable: visibility, premium positioning and access to European relationships. That made Amsterdam a practical place to strengthen ties with importers, specialty roasters, traders and hospitality buyers.
H.E. Ambassador Lambert Dushimimana ( center) with Starbucks coffee team.
H.E. Ambassador Lambert Dushimimana put it this way: “The Netherlands is a strategic market for Rwanda Coffee, not only as a sales destination, but as a platform for visibility, premium positioning and direct relationships with European buyers. Rwanda’s coffee profile aligns strongly with Dutch demand for quality, sustainability and traceability, and we see clear room to grow our market share further.”
Rwanda Coffee at NDSM in Amsterdam.
A sector with momentum
Rwanda came to Amsterdam on the back of a strong year. In 2025, the country exported 23,860 tonnes of coffee and generated US$148.6 million to US$150 million in export revenues, the highest level on record.
Rwanda at NDSM in Amsterdam.
“That growth reflected a broader shift in the sector. Rwanda was moving from volume-based trade toward value-based growth. High-quality Arabica coffee, especially Bourbon varieties grown at high altitudes in volcanic soils, remained central to that story. NAEB’s support, together with investments in quality infrastructure, farmer training and traceability, continued to sharpen Rwanda’s global specialty position,” said Claude Bizimana, Chief Executive Officer of NAEB.
Culture and ancient traditions have always represented the identity of the Ladins, the people who inhabit these valleys. In the heart of the Dolomites a UNESCO World Heritage site, Alta Badia stands out as an authentic destination, where customs and traditions continue to be part of everyday life. Local residents place great importance on sharing these values with visitors and, also for summer 2026, they are once again offering the Nos Ladins – We Ladins events. These are special opportunities to spend time with local people and enjoy genuine experiences.
Alta Badia (South Tyrolean Dolomites/Italy) – Gaining a deeper understanding of the culture, traditions and habits of the place where you spend your holiday means enriching your journey with authentic emotions and lasting memories. This is exactly what the Nos Ladins – We Ladins events offer. The protagonists of summer 2026 are five individuals, each with their own life story, united by their belonging to Ladin culture and a strong connection to their homeland. Thanks to this initiative, guests of Alta Badia will have the opportunity to spend a few hours like true locals. They will be able to come into direct contact with people, places and traditions that represent the essence of the region’s history and culture. No one can tell the story of these lands more authentically than those who live here every day. This edition will also introduce new personalities, ready to further spark participants’ interest through a variety of activities scheduled from June to September.
ALL EVENTS
NEW: LIFE ON THE FARM
Alisa, together with her husband Daniel, has brought new life to an old abandoned barn in Colfosco, transforming it into an educational organic farm immersed in the nature of the Dolomites. Since 2019, they have been passionately caring for llamas, alpacas, Tibetan goats, chickens and bees, in full respect of the environment and mountain traditions. During the experience, scheduled for July 14 and 28, Alisa welcomes guests to her farm and shares stories about daily life between nature and work. Participants can get up close to the animals and discover the activities that shape daily life on the farm. There will also be a presentation of locally produced goods, an expression of the strong bond with the territory. An authentic opportunity to experience and understand the true essence of mountain life.
NEW: STORIES IN IMAGES
Freddy Planinschek, born and raised in Alta Badia, is one of the photographers who has best documented this region over time. Through his lens, he has captured events, moments of life and the changes in the valley, creating a valuable visual memory. His images tell stories of people, traditions and landscapes, preserving the identity of an evolving territory. During the meetings on July 17 and 31 and September 2, he accompanies guests on a journey between past and present, showing how mountain life has changed over time. The photographs thus become true narratives. An authentic experience to discover Alta Badia through the eyes of someone who has lived and documented it for years.
NEW: ALPINE PASTURE LIFE
Daniel discovered the world of grazing at a young age, following his father through the pastures and learning about the life of a shepherd. What began as curiosity grew over the years into a true passion, nurtured through early experiences with his dog and animals. Since 2022, he has devoted himself entirely to this activity, turning it into his profession. During the experience, accompanied by a guide and Daniel, participants spend a day on the alpine pasture among herds and nature. In the morning, they follow the flock to the grazing areas, where they take a relaxing break immersed in tranquillity. An authentic opportunity to discover the rhythms of mountain life and the work of a shepherd. The dates are July 22 and August 25.
COOKING CLASS IN THE MOUNTAINS
A passion for cooking and a love for the mountains come together in the story of Davide, a personal chef who organizes gastronomic events at 1,850 meters, where each dish tells the story of Ladin tradition with a contemporary twist. After a guided hike along the artists’ trail, participants reach a mountain hut surrounded by nature, where Davide leads a cooking class dedicated to a Ladin dish, revealing secrets and practical tips for preparing it at its best. After the lesson comes the most anticipated moment: the tasting. The sessions with Davide take place on July 29, August 5, August 27 and September 9, from 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.
VISIT TO THE DAIRY
Fabian was born with a passion for cooking. After years of experience as a chef, he decided to dedicate himself to cheese production on the family farm. On June 24, July 1 and July 8, from 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., participants in Nos Ladins – We Ladins can enjoy a true journey into the heart of dairy tradition. The visit begins with the discovery of the farm, an authentic place where time seems to have stood still. Here, guests enter the world of cheese production in an award-winning dairy, observing the various stages of processing up close and visiting the rooms where this excellent product is created. The experience concludes with a tasting of artisanal cheeses, allowing participants to savour the genuine flavours of the mountains.
For further information: Alta Badia Tourist Information Offices – www.altabadia.org – Phone: +39 0471/836176-847037 – Email: info@altabadia.org
The leader of the Tisza-Respect and Freedom Party and member of the European Parliament, the centrist-conservative Magyar Péter, once a close ally and high-profile figure within the Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance Party of the Bismarckian Prime Minister Orbán Viktor, has achieved a sensational and historic victory in the Hungarian parliamentary elections on 12 April, having secured around 55.25% of the vote and having won a supermajority of 141 seats in the National Assembly.
Through his political platform, which aims to restore the rule of law, strengthen democratic institutions, rebuild public services, reinstate media pluralism and reorient Hungary towards the European Union and NATO, Magyar succeeded in ending Fidesz’s 16-year rule in Hungary.
But if we were to try to look at it more carefully and with cooler emotions, we would notice that, despite the measured and balanced political rhetoric, Magayr and his Tisza Party’s program are very similar to those of outgoing Prime Minister Orbán and his Fidesz Party,
A careful observer would had maybe note that the political objectives of Fidesz and Tisza parties are curiously in many aspects the same (especially when it comes in protecting the Hungarian national sovereignty), differing only in what tools their leaders will use in order to achieve them.
To better understand what changes (if any) there may be in Hungary’s internal and external political course, let us endeavor to analyze the three most delicate and challenging issues that the new Hungarian prime minister is expected to face and what’s his approach on them:
Hungarian demographics and illegal migration
As Magyar Péter has pledged to his electorate a more pragmatic and less confrontational approach to the European Union on various issues, his positions on the key matters of Hungary’s national sovereignty – particularly border control and demographics – remain in line with the anti-immigration and ‘pro-family’ policy developed by the outgoing Prime Minister Orbán Viktor (some time even appearing more ‘radical’ than its predecessor), which we can observe in the following points:
Firstly, Magyar’s political program includes well-planned measures to incentivize Hungarians living abroad to return to Hungary, presenting this as an indicator of the restoration of citizens’ trust in the Hungarian state, and which will be achieved through restoring the rule of law, cutting corruption and improving the performance of public sectors (such as healthcare and education), consequently making Hungary a more attractive country in which to live and build the future.
At the same time, he has emphasized the continuation of support for Hungarians abroad (the autochthonous Hungarian minority and Hungarian diaspora) through the continuation of the policy of dual citizenship, the right to vote and preserving cultural heritage (language, traditions, costums, religion).
Secondly, in parallel with this ambitious program to repatriate Hungarian citizens to their country, Magyar has pledged to adopt a ‘very strict stance’ against illegal migration, including strengthening the southern border fence with Serbia built in 2015 and refusing the migrant relocation quotas mandated by the European Union.
Meanwhile, he also announced that, from June 1, 2026, all work permits for non-European migrants will be terminated, with the aim of reducing the number of new arrivals in the country to zero and stimulating the domestic labor market with new jobs for Hungarian citizens.
Thirdly, in a marked departure from Prime Minister Orbán, Magyar has stated that he intends to extradite high-profile political figures who have been granted political asylum by the previous government – such as former Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, former Polish Justice Minister and Prosecutor General Zbigniew Ziobro and former Polish Deputy Justice Minister Marcin Romanowski – to their countries of origin.
Thus, by putting an end to Hungary’s role as a ‘bastion of freedom’ and a ‘Christian stronghold’ that protected conservative European politicians from perceived ‘political persecution’ and ‘liberal repression’ of EU-aligned governments.
Lastly, while publicly criticizing Brussels’ past ‘mismanagement’ of migration, Magyar has signaled a willingness to find compromises to end the one-million-euro-a-day fine that Hungary has been paying for breaching the European Union’s asylum rules-a move which would liberate Hungary from financial burden and help stabilize its public finances, without forcing the country to make major concessions at the expense of national sovereignty.
Budapest relations with Moscow, Kiev and Beijing
Upon entering the Prime Minister’s office at the Carmelite Monastery, Magyar has pledged to rebuild and strengthen Hungary’s relations with the European Union, Visegrád Group and NATO, thus signaling a ‘de-Orbánization’ of Hungarian foreign policy.
Two of the most delicate and significant challenges of Magyar’s diplomatic approach would be the country’s complex relations with Russia, Ukraine and the People’s Republic of China, which present a curious mix of criticism (miscalculations or failures of the Prime Minister Orbán government) and a pragmatic stance (geographical realism and economic necessity):
While criticizing the previous government’s failure to diversify energy sources, a move that left Hungary after 2022 with no choice but Russian energy supplies, Magyar has preconize to construct a ‘pragmatic dialogue’ with Moscow and to continue importing ‘Russian cheap oil and gas’ until 2035 (a date considerably later than that announced by Brussels, which aims to break away from Russian energy sources by 2027).
At the same time, he has also expressed support to continue the Paks II nuclear power plant project, but has pledged to review and potentially renegotiate the financial and contractual details of the agreement signed with Russia’s State Atomiс Energy Corporation ‘ROSATOM’, over concerns about the financial sustainability of the €12.5 milliard project and the massive Russian loan financing the project, which is considered a potential trap for the Hungarian national finances.
On the other hand he has made it clear that Budapest will neither send its own troops, weapons nor taxpayers’ money to Ukraine, nor will it allow Hungarian territory to be used as a transit country for arms shipments – thus emphasizing the desire to keep Hungary out of the direct or indirect conflict with Moscow that could possibly damage its energy supplies from Russia.
But he appears more open to reaching a compromise with Brussels’ over the European funds for Kiev, which would lead to the resumption of Russian oil and gas supplies via the ‘Druzhba’ oil pipeline, even though it’s not clear how Kremlin will interpret this move.
Meanwhile, unlike his distant stance towards Moscow, Magyar, like many European leaders lately, appears more open to maintaining economic relations with Beijing, albeit with more careful scrutiny and based on ‘pragmatic cooperation’.
Although he has publicly criticized the impact that Chinese factories and plants (as well as those from South Korea) have had on Hungary’s ecological systems, he does not appear to intend to ‘dismantle’ the existing Chinese industrial projects (such as CATL in Debrecen and BYD in Szeged), but has promised to review the contracts with them and to ensure they bring as many benefits as possible to the Hungarian people and to the Hungarian economy.
Magyar has also announced his plans to support European Union initiatives (such as the “Made in Europe” draft law), which could require Chinese and all other foreign investors in Hungary to employ at least 50% of their projects’ workforce from the domestic Hungarian labor market.
Thus, based on this complex stance, we can assume that, rather than a complete reversal of Prime Minister Orbán’s ‘Eastern Opening’ policy, Magyar’s foreign policy towards is based on the ‘Hungary First’ principle, which aims to maximize the benefits for Hungary from its pragmatic relations with Moscow and Beijing.
Approach to Israel
Despite the rise of anti-Israeli sentiment among the European public and the growing criticism and condemnation from European leaders regarding Israel’s genocidal war in Palestine, Magyar has promised that he will continue the policy of ‘zero tolerance’ towards anti-Semitism and ensure the safety of one of Europe’s largest Jewish communities, living in Hungary.
He has also emphasized that Israel is and would remain a key economic partner of Hungary, and that the relationship between the two countries would be ‘pragmatic’ and based on Hungary’s national interest.
Meanwhile, despite an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court (ICC), during a telephone conversation with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who congratulated him on his victory in the parliamentary elections, Magyar invited him to Budapest for the 70th anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising in October 2026, while Netanyahu invited him in Jerusalem.
At the same time, Magyar has publicly confirmed that he would continue to block the EU’s proposals to impose sanctions on Israel, even though his government will consider each EU decisions “on a case-by-case basis”, but without giving sufficient explanation as to how this evaluation process will be carried out.
Even though it’s still early to draw conclusions, it’s becoming obvious that although Budapest’s rhetoric towards Tel Aviv may or will become more restrained, Hungary will continue to remain one of the most Israel-friendly states in Europe, together with Germany, Italy and the Czech Republic.
Conclusions
As we are now less than 20 days away from 9 May 2026, when Magyar Péter will be officially sworn in as the new Prime Minister of Hungary, many analysts, experts, opinionists, political scientists, academics and journalists are analyzing what the Hungarian people and the European political community will expect from the former Fidesz politician.
It is certain that a reform process (so urgently needed in the country at this moment) will take place in Hungary and with it a new era will begin on the Hungarian political scene and an old one will close.
But, although the ‘revolutionary euphoria’ there are still many questions and uncertainties on how closely this process will align with the expectations of the electorate and Brussels’ political elites.
As tone in Budapest seems set to change, but as the German idiom goes, ‘Der Ton macht die Musik’ – so it remains to be seen how the Magyar’s political rhetoric will impact the Hungarian politics and more broadly the political landscape of Central and Eastern Europe, and if he will be a liberator of Hungary from the Fidesz or a continuator of Prime Minister Orbán’s political legacy.
