From Crisis Management to Strategic Partnership:

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
From Crisis Management to Strategic Partnership:

Rebuilding the migration relationship between Morocco and the European Union

By Dr Hakima Elhaite and Dr Anis H. Bajrektarevic

A policy paper inspired by the work of Dr Anis H. Bajrektarevic on the “Diaspora Hedge Fund”

Irregular migration between Morocco and the European Union is not a problem that can be solved through deterrence, nor through a single financial instrument. We propose here the creation of a Diaspora Fund for Moroccans Abroad (MDM), in an operational version adapted to the Moroccan context, inspired by the foundational work of Dr Anis H. Bajrektarevic on the “Diaspora Hedge Fund” concept, itself rooted in his work at the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) in Vienna in the 1990s. This proposal starts from a shared observation: migration must be understood as a movement of capital, knowledge and opportunity, as much as of people. But it can only bear fruit if it addresses a deeper misalignment between three agendas that, today, largely ignore one another: the prospects of Morocco’s youth, the Kingdom’s strategic interests, and Europe’s economic and security needs. As long as these three agendas fail to converge in a shared framework, every migration agreement, including a diaspora fund, will remain fragile, reversible, and hostage to the next diplomatic dispute.

I. Rethinking the diagnosis: why previous approaches have failed

Euro-Moroccan migration policy has long favoured a security-first approach. Between 2001 and 2019, the EU allocated at least €215 million to Morocco for border security projects¹. This spending has since accelerated: an additional €140 million in 2018 alone, including €55 million for the Border Management Programme for the Maghreb region, of which €30 million went to Morocco, with the Ministry of the Interior as the main beneficiary², followed by €222 million committed between 2021 and 2024, and a further €190 million planned by the end of 2027³. In total, Morocco is expected to have received more than one billion euros in European and Spanish funding for border control by 2027⁴. This approach treats the symptom rather than the cause, and feeds a tension that Rabat has voiced publicly: as early as 2018, Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita rejected the idea that Morocco should act as Europe’s outsourced border guard, a position he reaffirmed during the 2021 Ceuta crisis⁵.

Meanwhile, conventional development programmes have too often neglected geographic targeting and local governance. The clearest symptom of this underinvestment is that King Mohammed VI himself noted that diaspora investment accounts for only 10% of national private investment, a level he called unacceptable⁶, even as remittances exceeded $11.7 billion in 2024, or more than 8% of Morocco’s GDP⁷. The idea that these flows are captured by urban networks already close to the central government is plausible and well documented in the broader development literature, but at this stage it remains a qualitative hypothesis rather than a measured fact for the Moroccan case. It deserves to be verified region by region before being presented as an established finding.

Both approaches share the same flaw: they ignore the geopolitical dimension of the issue. Ceuta has seen two major crises in recent years. In May 2021, around 10,000 people crossed the border within 48 hours, amid diplomatic tension over Spain’s decision to admit Polisario Front leader Brahim Ghali for medical treatment. More recently, on 30 and 31 July 2026, the day of Throne Day, a far larger wave occurred: between 60,000 and 80,000 people according to various sources, with a heavy and evolving human toll. Early counts from Reuters and the Associated Press put the death toll at 34 to 41, while later estimates put it at more than 111.

This second crisis illustrates why it would be a mistake to look for a single culprit: it unfolded against a backdrop of shared responsibility and tangled institutional, diplomatic and socio-economic factors on both sides of the border, discussed in detail in section I.1. This does not change the underlying conclusion: a migration agreement that fails to acknowledge the geopolitical and structural dimension of these episodes remains a house of cards, ready to collapse at the next crisis.

I.1, What the official responses reveal: shared responsibility

A review of government statements and international press coverage of the July 2026 crisis reveals a picture shaped by multiple factors, one that would be misleading to pin on a single actor. On the Spanish side, several institutional elements contributed to the vulnerability of the situation: a Supreme Court ruling of 8 July 2026, whose interpretation was distorted and spread through disinformation and human trafficking networks; an extraordinary regularisation drive, with more than one million applications filed by the end of June 2026, which heightened the perceived appeal of Spain; and, according to a Euronews investigation, intelligence warnings received before the crisis whose handling by the Spanish government remains disputed.

Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez himself chose to rule out any deliberate Moroccan involvement, stating that this crisis could only be resolved through cooperation, not through distrust of Morocco, and attributing the episode to disinformation and criminal networks rather than to a decision by Moroccan authorities.

Some media outlets and analysts noted that the episode followed, by ten days, Pedro Sánchez’s official visit to Algiers as part of the normalisation of Spanish, Algerian relations, a coincidence of timing that several commentators considered significant given the precedent of 2021, although no evidence has formally established a causal link. On the Moroccan side, officials and observers instead described authorities as overwhelmed by events, with the surge fuelled by viral social media rumours falsely claiming that Spain would not systematically return people who arrived by sea. A later report by the Spanish police unit CENIF did note a Moroccan deployment noticeably lighter than usual, which, in its own words, went beyond what the security mobilisation for Throne Day would explain. However, the Spanish Interior Ministry itself declined to draw a definitive conclusion, publicly stating that the mastermind behind the surge remained unknown at that stage.

Taken together, these elements point to a crisis of overlapping responsibilities rather than a single cause: a Spanish court ruling whose effects were poorly anticipated, a migratory pull effect reinforced by Spain’s own immigration policy, criminal networks that exploited the confusion, a possible and disputed lapse in Moroccan border security whose scale and intent remain unclear, and, underlying it all, the structural socio-economic causes detailed in section II. None of the parties involved, Spanish, Moroccan or European, can alone account for the scale of this episode, which is precisely the argument for the shared governance architecture proposed in this article rather than for assigning unilateral blame.

On the Moroccan side, the first official statement, issued in early August 2026, was described by the Moroccan press itself as a carefully calibrated communication exercise designed to protect the State’s image: it emphasised social media disinformation and the role of smuggling networks, and reaffirmed Morocco as a reliable and committed partner in the fight against irregular migration, without a single mention of unemployment, social hardship or the domestic economic climate. This silence is not incidental: it reflects a blind spot shared by official communications on both sides, Moroccan and Spanish alike, which both favoured institutional and security explanations over the deeper socio-economic causes that this article seeks to place at the centre of the analysis.

On the European side, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described the images as unacceptable, expressed her full support for Spain, and proposed strengthening financial and technical support to Morocco for border management, confirming the funding trajectory already described above. But the crisis also exposed a rift among member states: 22 countries, led by Italy and Denmark, called for an emergency meeting of interior ministers, while Sánchez accused some partners of an asymmetric response to the solidarity Spain expected. Ceuta thus became the first real test of the EU’s new Pact on Migration and Asylum, a test that exposed the limits of European coordination as much as those of bilateral border management.

II. Solving the problem facing Morocco’s youth without relying solely on diaspora capital

It must be said plainly: Morocco is neither a country at war, nor in a state of internal political instability, nor struck by a major economic or humanitarian catastrophe. This distinction still holds even after the tragedy of Ceuta in July 2026: the severity of that episode’s human toll, at least several dozen deaths, possibly more than a hundred according to the most recent estimates, reflects a one off and dramatic migration event shaped by shared responsibility among several actors (see section I.1), not the collapse of the state or an armed conflict on Moroccan territory. Unlike the departure dynamics seen in Syria, Libya or the Sahel, Moroccan migration is not structurally a flight from violence or state collapse. It is a migration of aspiration, driven by a stable, educated and globally connected youth confronted with a labour market that cannot absorb them at the level they expect.

This distinction changes everything: it means the underlying problem is not securing a fragile country, but making better use of a stable one, even though isolated episodes such as July 2026 remind us that a lack of prospects can, under certain circumstances and combined with institutional factors on both sides of the border, produce mass movements with human consequences as severe as those seen in more classic crisis settings. Figures from Morocco’s High Commission for Planning (HCP) illustrate this clearly: while the national unemployment rate stood at 13% in 2025, it reached 38.4% among people aged 15 to 24 and 25.7% among university graduates⁸, a structural gap between education and opportunity within an otherwise stable context, not a matter of survival or security. A credible retention policy must therefore act on four levers at once:

  • Geographically targeting productive investment on the actual areas of emigration, the Rif, Al Hoceima, Nador, the South East, rather than concentrating it, as is too often the case, on the Casablanca, Tangier, Rabat corridor.
  • Building industrial and technology hubs that meet the real needs of the Moroccan economy, rather than showcase projects designed to satisfy the metrics of international donors.
  • Mobilising the diaspora as a channel for skills and mentorship, through temporary return programmes for professionals, as a complement, never a substitute, for financial investment.
  • Reforming the link between training and employment: Morocco’s problem is not only quantitative, the number of jobs, but qualitative, the mismatch between the qualifications produced and the needs of the market.

Only by demonstrating real, local change, a factory opening, a skilled job created, a young engineer choosing to stay, will the language of capitalising migration stop being a diplomatic formula and become a lived reality.

III. Safeguarding Morocco’s strategic interests: a condition for sustainability

No migration agreement will survive the next crisis unless it explicitly recognises that Moroccan cooperation on border management carries geopolitical, not merely operational, value. Three principles should structure this recognition:

  • A permanent strategic dialogue between Rabat, Madrid and Brussels, rather than a reactive dialogue convened only after each crisis, one that explicitly includes sensitive political issues, foremost among them Western Sahara.
  • Shared governance of the migration and development framework, in which Morocco has a genuine voice, rather than the role of a paid contractor providing a border control service.
  • European diplomatic coherence: positions taken by individual member states on sensitive issues should not, on their own, be able to derail the entire cooperation framework.

It is precisely this disconnect, treating migration as a full geopolitical issue rather than a mere technical matter of flow management, that has been most lacking so far, and that explains the recurring fragility of past agreements.

IV. What Europe must contribute: beyond financing

Europe’s contribution can no longer be limited to one off budget envelopes. Three structural commitments are needed:

  • Reciprocal legal mobility, with structured work quotas, both seasonal and skilled, offering a credible and predictable alternative to irregular migration, along the lines of programmes already tested by Spain in agriculture.
  • A genuinely strengthened advanced status between the EU and Morocco, covering market access, research and education, and above all decoupled from the diplomatic ups and downs linked to Western Sahara.
  • Direct European investment in Morocco’s emigration regions, in partnership with local businesses, rather than funding channelled exclusively through multilateral donors far removed from the ground.

The benefit for Europe is clear: a lasting reduction in irregular migration pressure, a stable partner on its southern border, and access to a skilled workforce and a growing market, within a predictable framework rather than a cycle of migration based pressure tactics.

V. The Diaspora Fund for Moroccans Abroad (MDM): an operational proposal

The four preceding sections converge on a single conclusion: prevention requires regionally targeted productive investment (Part II), which can only be sustainable if Morocco’s strategic interests are recognised within the partnership framework (Part III), and Europe can no longer simply fund border control, it must invest directly in emigration areas (Part IV). One question remains open: through what concrete instrument should this investment be channelled, without repeating the pattern of one off, untargeted funding that has so far characterised conventional development aid? The proposal that follows answers this question.

We propose the creation of a Diaspora Fund for Moroccans Abroad (MDM), a financial and institutional framework designed to convert part of Moroccan diaspora capital into productive investment serving the regions of origin identified in Part II. This proposal belongs to a broader intellectual tradition, that of diaspora bonds already tested by Israel, Ethiopia and Nigeria, and more directly to the “Diaspora Hedge Fund” concept developed by Dr Anis H. Bajrektarevic, building on his work at ICMPD in Vienna in the 1990s. Our contribution is to translate this into an operational version specifically adapted to the Moroccan context, drawing on the lessons from the weaknesses of conventional development instruments already discussed in Part I.

The choice to mobilise this particular lever is not arbitrary: it responds directly to the financial diagnosis set out in Part I. The Euro-Mediterranean migration debate has largely been shaped by an economics of containment, border controls, coercive measures and the rising cost of managing irregular migration, a cost already set to exceed one billion euros by 2027. The experience of Ceuta is a powerful reminder that this logic treats symptoms more readily than causes. A more strategic approach must start with an economics of prevention: if substantial resources are already being mobilised to manage migration pressures, it makes more sense to invest a share of them upstream, in local development, socio-economic inclusion, entrepreneurship and opportunity in the regions migration comes from.

This points to a largely untapped resource already identified in Part I: diaspora capital, whose transfers exceeded $11.7 billion in 2024 but remain mostly directed toward household consumption, with only 10% going into domestic private investment. The challenge is not to divert remittances from their social purpose, but to create additional channels through which part of this transnational financial capacity can become productive, bankable and lasting investment. The MDM Fund we propose rests on three institutional pillars: sovereign guarantees from the Moroccan state, the involvement of multilateral development banks, and dedicated financial vehicles.

We situate this proposal within the broader ambition already set out in Parts III and IV: a renewed Euro-Mediterranean compact, in the spirit of the Marrakech Global Compact, shifting conventional border security subsidies toward high impact development partnerships, a process of capitalising migration that links diaspora, development and opportunity across the Mediterranean.

V.1, Operational version: four conditions for implementation in Morocco

For this framework to work without repeating the weaknesses of conventional development instruments, we propose building it, from the outset, on four operational principles:

  • Regionalisation: explicitly targeting the actual areas of departure, rather than the national territory as a whole, undifferentiated.
  • Local co-governance: involving credible actors on the ground, local authorities, cooperatives, regional business associations, rather than banks and central administration alone, to prevent the fund from being captured by already well connected elites.
  • Complementarity, not substitution: funding additional productive projects, without ever diverting existing remittances from their essential social role, education, health, family housing.
  • Diplomatic integration: making the fund one tool among others within the broader strategic partnership, rather than the sole showcase or political symbol of the migration file, which would otherwise place on it a burden no financial instrument alone can carry.

Designed this way, the MDM Fund stops being a simple transplant of a theoretical model and becomes a credible lever, tailored to the Moroccan context. Without these four conditions, it would remain an elegant financial tool disconnected from the real causes of departure and the real geopolitical balance of power.

VI. Conclusion: toward a partnership rather than a transaction

The measure of success for this approach is not the amount of capital mobilised, but the number of young Moroccans whose prospects have changed locally, without this requiring, at any point, a diplomatic concession wrung from Rabat under the pressure of a border crisis. Sustainability is measured by the structural alignment of interests, not by the repeated management of crises.

Morocco and Europe share, on this issue, more converging interests than their respective diplomatic postures admit. The question is not who needs the other more, but how to build a framework in which stability, regional development and strategic recognition stop being negotiated separately, and finally become the three pillars of a single structure.

Authors :

Hakima El Haite & Anis H. Bajrektarevic

Hakima El Haite is a Moroccan climate scientist, entrepreneur and politician. She is a former President of Liberal International and former Minister of Environment of Morocco.

Anis H. Bajrektarevic, professor of international law, author of 10 books. Co-founder of the Geneva-based Global Academy for Future Governance.

References

1. Statewatch, “Aid, border security and EU-Morocco cooperation on migration control,” 2019, €215 million between 2001 and 2019 for border security in Morocco.

2. Statewatch, ibid., €140 million committed in 2018, including €55 million for the Border Management Programme for the Maghreb (BMP-Maghreb), €30 million of which went to Morocco.

3. Euronews / European Commission, August 2026, €222 million committed between 2021 and 2024, with a further €190 million planned by the end of 2027.

4. Statewatch, October 2022, more than €1 billion in combined EU and Spanish funding for migration control in Morocco, projected through 2027.

5. Morocco World News, August 2026, statements by Nasser Bourita in 2018 and May 2021 rejecting the role of Europe’s “gendarme.”

6. Morocco World News, December 2024, statement by King Mohammed VI on the share of diaspora investment, 10% of national private investment.

7. Africanews / Morocco’s Foreign Exchange Office, 2026, Moroccan diaspora remittances of $11.7 billion in 2024, more than 8% of GDP.

8. Haut-Commissariat au Plan (HCP), “Activité, emploi et chômage,” 2024 to 2025 results, national unemployment 13%, unemployment among people aged 15 to 24 at 38.4%, unemployment among university graduates at 25.7%.

9. Bajrektarevic, Anis H., “Capitalising Migration: The Diaspora Hedge Fund as a New Governance Architecture for Cross-border Development and Migration Governance,” foundational work on the Diaspora Hedge Fund concept and the inspiration behind the MDM Fund proposal developed in this article.

10. Wikipedia (EN/FR), “2026 Ceuta migrant crisis”; Reuters, AP, El País, Euronews, France Info, The Conversation, July and August 2026, the Ceuta crisis of 30 and 31 July 2026: 60,000 to 80,000 entries, with a death toll of 34 to more than 111 depending on the source and the date of the count.

11. France 24, Le Temps, CNews, La Libre, 2 September 2026, report by Spain’s CENIF police unit describing a reduced Moroccan deployment and “permissiveness” during the crisis, and the public pushback against this reading from Spain’s Interior Ministry.

12. Maghreb Online / Maroc Mail, 3 and 4 August 2026, analysis of Morocco’s first official statement on the Ceuta crisis, noting the absence of any reference to unemployment or domestic socio-economic hardship.

13. CNBC Africa / Reuters, 3 August 2026, Ursula von der Leyen’s proposal to strengthen EU support for Morocco; Euronews, 1 August 2026, letter from 22 member states requesting an emergency meeting of EU interior ministers.

14. Le Devoir, Wikipedia (FR), Histoires Crépues, Zoom Algérie, Le JDD, July to September 2026, Pedro Sánchez’s visit to Algiers on 20 July 2026, his statements ruling out deliberate Moroccan involvement, Spain’s mass regularisation drive of more than 1 million applications, and intelligence warnings prior to the crisis according to Euronews.

Does Russia’s future lie beyond its borders? Andreas Umland on the political role of emigration

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Does Russia’s future lie beyond its borders? Andreas Umland on the political role of emigration

Interview with Andreas Umland

In Russia, independent public life has either been crushed or brought under state control. In the current situation, the Russian diaspora is no longer merely a community of people living outside the country: it has become a space where free speech, independent institutions and discussion of Russia’s future are still possible. Andreas Umland – an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and an associate professor of political science at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy – explains why a free Russia is linked, first and foremost, to the diaspora.

— You said that an independent Russia today exists primarily outside its borders. What has happened to the independent media, human rights organisations, the political opposition and culture within the country itself?

— In Russia, they have either been destroyed or reduced to mere window dressing. The authorities have systematically dismantled everything that might have existed autonomously: editorial offices, civil society organisations, independent platforms, political organisations and cultural institutions. Where some form of activity still formally persists, it exists under conditions of self-censorship and constant fear.

Russia’s true voice exists only abroad. It is only there that one can speak without state permission, publish what cannot be published within the country, and set up organisations without fearing that tomorrow one will be forced to fall silent.

— From you point of view, for a Russian why is freedom precisely related to leaving the country?

—  All those who remain in Russia have been intimidated by the propaganda machine. They do not merely live under an authoritarian system, but within a state that claims control over their speech, their work, their family, their children’s education and even their perception of reality. Only by leaving do they become free. Outside Russia, they gain the opportunity to speak frankly, without weighing up every sentence against the threat of criminal prosecution. It is precisely these people who will build a new, free Russia. This is not a question of geography as such, but a question of liberation from Russian state coercion.

— The Russian authorities continue to hold elections and present them as an expression of the will of the people. But under these circumstances, can we really say that the elections genuinely ensure political representation for citizens?

—No. We do not believe in fair elections in Russia. The system has long since mapped out the outcome. It determines who has the right to participate, who shall be excluded, who is to be imprisoned, who shall be forced to leave, who shall have access to the media, and who is to be erased from the public sphere. Under such conditions, the ballot paper is not a tool for free choice — it becomes part of the scenery. And the people who live in Russia do not count: not because they do not exist, but because the regime has deprived them of the opportunity to be heard and to influence the outcome.

— You refer to Russians who have left the country as the ‘ambassadors of European Russia’. What do you mean by that?

—Those who have left are the bearers of a European-oriented Russia, and they are those whom will be in demand after a change of power. For the most part, they are educated people who had the possibility to leave: journalists, researchers, academics, lawyers, entrepreneurs, creative professionals and activists. These are people for whom freedom of speech, dignity, the rule of law, openness to the world, respect for facts and an aversion to war are second nature.

Their departure is their act of responsibility. They do not want to raise their children in a culture of war and lies. They do not want to perpetuate a society in which aggression is called patriotism and censorship is called the defence of the state. And the more people leave, the weaker the Kremlin becomes. The regime is losing its expertise, its independent voices and its future. Mass emigration is the only referendum they are capable of brining to life.

—Why do you believe emigration represents a political alternative to today’s Russia, rather than simply a community of people who have fled repression?

— Emigration is important not because people who found themselves abroad – for example, in Berlin, Vilnius or London – automatically understand Russia better, but because there they have something that merely exists within the country: the opportunity to act openly and to come together. Russian politicians, journalists, human rights defenders, experts and activists can set up media outlets and organisations, debate, seek allies, work with European institutions and develop alternative programmes — having no threat of criminal prosecution. Any independent organisation within Russia is vulnerable: it can be shut down, declared extremist or ‘undesirable’, thus deprived of funding, and its staff – and even its audience – intimidated.

That is why emigration is the only source of an alternative for Russia. And those are precisely the people that Europe must be ready to support — not out of charity, but because without them, a free Russia would simply lack both the human capital and the institutional foundations necessary for its revival.

Thaçi and Co-Defendants Found Guilty of War Crimes

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Thaçi and Co-Defendants Found Guilty of War Crimes

The Hague, 16 September 2026 — The Trial Panel of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) today pronounced its judgment in the case of Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi and Jakup Krasniqi, finding all four criminally responsible for war crimes committed during the Kosovo conflict.

The Panel found the four accused criminally responsible for arbitrary detention of 385 individuals, cruel treatment of 49 individuals, torture of 303 individuals and murder of 96 individuals.

The accused were found not guilty of crimes against humanity, as the Specialist Prosecutor failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that there was a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. They were also acquitted in relation to a number of specific incidents of war crimes.

The Panel sentenced Hashim Thaçi to 25 years, Kadri Veseli to 18 years, Rexhep Selimi to 13 years and Jakup Krasniqi to 25 years of imprisonment, with credit for time already served.

The judges found that, during the conflict, the four men contributed to a common criminal purpose targeting perceived opponents of the Kosovo Liberation Army’s (KLA) political and military objectives. Those targeted included Kosovo Albanians associated with other political or military organisations, individuals alleged to have links to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or Serbian authorities, and members of ethnic minorities, including Roma and Serbs.

The Panel found that the targeting involved killings, arrests and detention without due process, physical and psychological mistreatment, intimidation and other forms of abuse. With limited exceptions, it found no evidence that the victims had engaged in criminal activity, actively participated in hostilities or posed another legitimate security concern to the KLA. Many were described, often without basis, as collaborators or spies.

The Panel also considered the lasting physical and psychological consequences suffered by victims and noted that some were particularly vulnerable because of their age or because they witnessed the mistreatment or killing of family members.

Individual Roles

Regarding Hashim Thaçi, the Panel found that as a member of the KLA General Staff and head of its Political Directorate, he was a key figure in formulating and implementing the common purpose, including establishing detention facilities, identifying perceived opponents and arranging their arrest and detention and, where necessary, their killing. The Panel also found that Thaçi personally participated in crimes, including the arrest, arbitrary detention and interrogation of 13 parliamentarians, as well as the arrest, detention, transfer and murder of Behajdin Allaqi.

For Kadri Veseli, head of the KLA Intelligence Directorate, the Panel found that his responsibilities included identifying, obtaining information about, monitoring and neutralising persons suspected of being collaborators. It also found that he was personally involved in identifying and targeting opponents, many of whom were subsequently murdered, and noted that intelligence used against many victims consisted largely of unverified rumours.

The Panel determined that Rexhep Selimi, although holding less authority over other KLA members than the other accused, failed to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law in his roles as a member of the General Staff, head of the Operational Directorate and inspector general. The Panel found that he tolerated serious violations and participated in the arrest and detention of 13 parliamentarians, among other contributions to the common criminal purpose.

Regarding Jakup Krasniqi, the Panel found that, as a member of the General Staff and Political Directorate, KLA spokesperson and deputy commander, he played a key role in formulating and implementing the policy of targeting opponents. The Panel concluded that his communiqués, political statements, speeches and orders encouraged or expressed tolerance for crimes against perceived opponents.

Witness Intimidation

The Trial Panel also highlighted the persistent climate of witness intimidation surrounding the proceedings. Several prosecution witnesses recanted earlier statements, changed their accounts or otherwise failed to provide consistent testimony. At the same time, the Panel recognised that most witnesses appeared before it with courage and determination, including several who testified despite intimidation and attempts to discourage them from doing so.

Presiding Judge Charles L. Smith III emphasised that the trial was not about the legitimacy of the KLA or its objective of an independent Kosovo, but about whether certain criminal means were used by members of the KLA in pursuit of those objectives. He also stressed that the proceedings did not concern crimes committed by Serbian forces and paramilitaries against Kosovo Albanians, but were limited to determining whether the crimes charged in the indictment had been committed and whether the accused bore criminal responsibility for them.

Kadri Veseli, in The Hague. 2018.

The Case

The indictment against the four accused was confirmed on 26 October 2020 and subsequently amended. Following their arrests, Thaçi, Veseli, Selimi and Krasniqi were transferred to the KSC detention facilities in The Hague on 4 and 5 November 2020.

The trial began on 3 April 2023. The Prosecution concluded its case in April 2025, followed by the presentation of the participating victims’ case and the Defence cases. Evidentiary proceedings closed on 19 December 2025, with closing statements held from 9 to 18 February 2026.

During the proceedings, the Trial Panel heard evidence from 273 witnesses and admitted 5,467 exhibits. It also took judicial notice of 1,017 adjudicated facts and 29 agreed facts, while the trial transcript reached more than 29,000 pages.

The judgment marks a major judicial development in the proceedings before the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, established in The Hague to adjudicate alleged crimes arising from the Kosovo conflict.

Securing Europe Without Sacrificing Regulatory Certainty

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Securing Europe Without Sacrificing Regulatory Certainty

Europe’s Security Imperative: Protecting Critical Infrastructure Without Undermining Regulatory Certainty

By M. De Lara

Cybersecurity and geopolitical security measures must not undermine regulatory certainty, technical standards, and investment confidence. When Geopolitics Enters Technical Rules: Europe Needs Security—and Must Preserve Certainty and Its Standards Advantage

Geopolitical tensions are increasingly reshaping global trade, technology and industrial cooperation. For the European Union, growing supply-chain dependencies, foreign interference and cyber threats have made the security of critical infrastructure a strategic priority. Europe therefore has legitimate reasons to strengthen its ability to identify and address risks that extend beyond the technical security of individual products and systems.

The challenge, however, is to ensure that stronger security measures do not come at the expense of the regulatory certainty that underpins the Single Market. In recent years, Member States have adopted different approaches to non-technical supply-chain risks and high-risk suppliers, creating the risk of fragmentation. The European Commission’s proposed revision of the Cybersecurity Act—CSA 2.0—in January 2026—seeks to address this through a common EU framework for trusted ICT supply chains.

Alongside strengthening ENISA and reforming the European Cybersecurity Certification Framework, the proposal adds a binding “trusted ICT supply chain framework”. This would bring factors such as third-country legislation, foreign influence, ownership and control structures into EU cybersecurity governance.

The regulatory question would therefore no longer be limited to whether a product is technically secure. It would also encompass whether a supplier is considered trustworthy from a geopolitical and institutional perspective.

That shift responds to genuine concerns. Critical infrastructure cannot be protected solely by addressing software vulnerabilities and product performance. Europe must also consider the risks of foreign interference, malicious control and systemic supply-chain dependency.

Yet security policy must answer more than one question. It must define the risks Europe seeks to prevent—but it must also allow European businesses to know whether the technologies they select, the equipment they purchase and the investments they make today will remain lawful, usable and valuable ten years from now.

The key question is therefore not whether Europe should strengthen security, but how it can do so while preserving the clarity, predictability and standards-based system on which long-term investment and the competitiveness of the Single Market depend

How would CSA 2.0 work?

CSA 2.0 would establish a common EU mechanism for assessing and mitigating ICT supply-chain risks.

The Commission, or a group of at least three Member States, could trigger a coordinated EU-level supply-chain security assessment. The Commission could subsequently designate “third countries posing cybersecurity concerns”, identify “key ICT assets” used across the 18 sectors covered by NIS2, and determine high-risk suppliers on the basis of factors including establishment, ownership and control.

The Commission could then require relevant entities to implement measures such as audits, restrictions on data transfers and contractual relationships, and supplier diversification. It could also prohibit the use of components from specified suppliers in key ICT assets and, in certain circumstances, require the phase-out of components already deployed. European Commission proposal for CSA 2.0

The objective is legitimate: to prevent fragmented national responses and build a more resilient Single Market. But the current design raises a fundamental concern:

The proposal creates a potentially powerful decision-making mechanism without providing businesses with equally clear decision-making standards

The greatest industrial risk is an inability to price the future

The proposal contains criteria for concepts such as “key ICT assets”, “significant cybersecurity risks” and “serious and structural non-technical risks”. Yet these criteria do not currently provide sufficiently granular or measurable thresholds for businesses operating across very different sectors.

Which components will ultimately be considered key? Which suppliers may face restrictions? What level of risk will trigger an audit, diversification requirement, procurement restriction or outright prohibition? Much of this would be determined later through risk assessments and implementing acts.

Consequently, even a product that complies with European technical standards and has obtained cybersecurity certification may not remain eligible for use in critical infrastructure. Market access could depend not only on the product’s technical characteristics, but also on its supplier’s ownership, the legal environment of its home country and an evolving geopolitical assessment.

The costliest regulatory burden is not the price of compliance. It is the inability to know whether compliance will still secure access to the market

Critical infrastructure is normally planned over ten- or twenty-year investment cycles. If companies cannot assess the long-term eligibility of suppliers, installed equipment or entire technology pathways, they will respond before any formal restriction is imposed. They may freeze procurement, shorten contracts, reduce research spending, redesign systems or relocate factories, data centres and R&D programmes to jurisdictions offering greater regulatory predictability.

Uncertainty itself creates a regulatory overhang. Corporate boards will avoid technologies that might be restricted in the future. Banks will price additional risk into financing. Insurers will reassess exposure, while smaller suppliers will follow the location decisions of major investors.

The eventual cost is not limited to replacing equipment. It includes stranded assets, factories that are never built, research centres that are located elsewhere, and the talent and supply-chain ecosystems that move with them.

Capital can absorb risk. It cannot price discretion whose boundaries continue to move

Annual business investment in the EU is roughly €2.4 trillion. An ECB study estimates that a typical economic policy uncertainty shock reduces euro-area business investment by around 1.2% at its trough, with the impact persisting for some time. This is not an estimate of the cost of CSA 2.0. It does, however, demonstrate that even a small uncertainty effect across 18 critical sectors could place tens of billions of euros of investment at risk. European Central Bank

Global evidence also shows how quickly investment reacts to geopolitical signals. IMF research finds that, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the number of announced FDI projects between geopolitically distant blocs has declined by roughly 20% relative to investment within the same bloc. Investment losses often occur before formal restrictions are adopted—and once an industrial ecosystem has been established elsewhere, attracting it back is difficult. International Monetary Fund

Nor does excluding suppliers automatically create new European capacity. In markets already characterised by a limited number of specialised vendors, exclusion may further concentrate supply, raise prices, reduce innovation and increase dependence on the remaining suppliers.

A policy designed to strengthen resilience may, if it reduces choice, competition and investment, remove one risk only to create a larger one

Standards are a foundation of Europe’s global competitiveness

Europe competes globally not only through the size of its Single Market, but through its ability to turn technical excellence into common rules.

Over several decades, common technical standards, certification and mutual recognition have helped build the Single Market. Through organisations such as ISO, IEC, ITU and ETSI, Europe has also shaped global industrial development. For European companies, early participation in standard-setting can create technological leadership, facilitate market access and support entire industrial ecosystems.

Standards may be Europe’s most successful invisible export

Studies cited by the European Commission have estimated the macroeconomic contribution of standardisation at around 0.8% in France and 1% in Germany. In Germany alone, standardisation has been estimated to generate annual economic benefits of up to €17 billion. European Commission material on the economic role of standards

The value of standards, however, cannot be measured only in direct economic gains. Their deeper value lies in the expectation they create: comparable risks should be subject to comparable requirements, and products meeting those requirements should receive broadly consistent treatment in the market.

The authority of a standard does not rest simply on the rule-maker’s power to demand compliance. It rests on the rule-maker’s willingness to be bound by the same rule

If products that comply with European standards and pass European certification can nevertheless be excluded through non-technical assessments whose boundaries are not clearly defined, technical compliance will no longer provide a predictable route to market.

Once compliance and market access become disconnected, standards cease to function as a common market passport. They risk becoming technical reference documents that can be overridden by political decisions at any time.

The consequences would extend well beyond individual suppliers. Companies would have less incentive to invest in shared standards and certification. Other regions would accelerate the development of their own standards, assurance regimes and supply-chain ecosystems. The global market could fragment into parallel technical systems that duplicate research, testing and certification while trusting one another less.

European exporters would face the same duplication abroad—and potentially reciprocal restrictions justified by other governments on geopolitical and national-security grounds.

A standard can be overridden by a single political decision. Rebuilding trust in the standards system may take a generation

When rule-makers begin to bypass the rules they have built, the first casualty is not a particular product or supplier. It is the credibility of the rules themselves. If Europe weakens technical standards to gain short-term political discretion, it risks consuming one of its most valuable—and least easily replicated—sources of global competitiveness.

Making security and certainty mutually reinforcing

CSA 2.0 does not need to disregard non-technical risk. It does, however, need clearer limits.

Technical assessment should come first, with non-technical factors serving as a complementary layer. Intervention should focus on the highest-risk scenarios capable of producing systemic consequences. A transparent risk-to-measure framework should distinguish between risks that justify monitoring, auditing or diversification and those exceptional cases that warrant prohibition or phase-out. Clear thresholds, proportionality requirements and realistic transition periods should provide businesses with the greatest possible degree of certainty.

Europe does not need unlimited security discretion. It needs a bounded security capacity capable of addressing the most serious risks with precision.

Geopolitical judgement may be necessary to manage exceptional cases. It should not replace technical rules as the normal basis of market governance. Europe must de-risk—but it must not de-rule.

If regulatory certainty and technical standards lose credibility, Europe will lose far more than individual investments or suppliers. It will weaken one of the deepest foundations of the Single Market—and one of the Union’s most valuable sources of influence and competitiveness in the global economy.

By adressing non-technical criteria in the CSA2 the cybersecurity act that originally was based on technical security standards, by design, can become a trade instrument. Whether this was intently or not is not relevant. It deviates significantly from its main objective, reinforcing Europe’s cybersecurity.

Mexico Celebrates Independence in The Hague

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Mexico Celebrates Independence in The Hague

Mexico’s national celebrations also reached The Hague, where the Embassy of Mexico hosted a diplomatic reception marking the 216th Anniversary of the Independence of Mexico and El Grito de Dolores. The occasion also provided an opportunity to welcome Mexico’s newly arrived Ambassador to the Netherlands, H.E. Alicia Buenrostro Massieu, who presented her Letters of Credence to H.M. King Willem-Alexander on 2 September.

Held at the official residence of Mexico in Wassenaar, the reception brought together a large gathering of ambassadors and heads of mission, senior representatives of international organisations and institutions, judges of international courts, renowned academics, members of the diplomatic community and many Mexicans living in the Netherlands.

For Ambassador Buenrostro Massieu, the celebration had a particular significance as one of her first opportunities to welcome the Netherlands-based diplomatic and international community since taking up her post.

“This occasion is particularly special for me. I have only recently arrived in the Netherlands, and this is one of my first opportunities to welcome so many friends and partners of Mexico under one roof,” she said.

She spoke of her enthusiasm for beginning her assignment and of the responsibility that comes with representing Mexico in the Netherlands.

“I come with great enthusiasm and a clear sense of purpose. Every ambassador has the privilege and the responsibility of building on the work of those who came before us, strengthening existing ties, identifying new opportunities and creating new bridges between our societies. And that is precisely what I intend to do: to listen, to engage and, of course, to promote Mexico and keep on growing together.”

H.E.Ms. Sally Loo Hui, Ambassador of Panama, H.E. Ms. Gracita R. Arrindel,
Ministry Plenipotentiary of Sint Maarten and H.E. Ms. Sahar Ghanem, Ambassador of Yemen and Dean of the Diplomatic Corps.

Mexico and the Netherlands: complementary strengths

The Ambassador highlighted the long-standing friendship between Mexico and the Netherlands and the opportunities offered by the complementary strengths of the two countries.

“Mexico and the Netherlands, two countries with a long-standing friendship and remarkably complementary strengths, have built a solid relationship based on dialogue, trade, investment, cultural exchange and, above all, mutual respect,” she said.

At the same time, she emphasised that there remains considerable potential to deepen the relationship, particularly at a moment when international cooperation is facing significant challenges.

“Our countries share a strong commitment to multilateralism and to the principles that sustain the international system: democracy, the rule of law, respect for international law and gender equality. We also share the conviction that dialogue, cooperation and common rules remain indispensable to addressing global challenges.”

H.E. Ms. Tomoko Akane, President of the International Criminal Court (ICC), H.E. Mr. Rokuichiro Michii, Ambassador of Japan and H.E. Mrs. Eva Yelina Silva Walker , Ambassador of Cuba.

Addressing the wider international context, Ambassador Buenrostro Massieu called for renewed commitment to multilateral cooperation.

“At a time when these principles are increasingly tested, countries such as ours have a responsibility to work together in their defence,” she stated. “We need to work together on a constructive and efficient multilateralism, one that dignifies, one that respects, that listens and stands on moral values and cares for solidarity and prosperity.”

She also reflected on the importance of the international institutions and rules developed over generations, noting that, despite their imperfections, they have provided an important framework for international cooperation and peaceful coexistence.

H.E. Mr. Shahir Khalid A Al Khaniny, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia and H.E. Mr. Marcin Czepelak, Secretary General · Permanent Court of Arbitration.

New opportunities for cooperation

Looking towards the future, the Ambassador pointed to the transformation taking place in areas ranging from artificial intelligence and emerging technologies to climate change, water management, energy and global value chains.

“Artificial Intelligence and emerging technologies are transforming our society. Climate change is forcing us to rethink how we manage water and energy. Global value chains are being reshaped, creating both opportunities and new dependencies.”

In this changing environment, she sees considerable scope for Mexico and the Netherlands to combine their expertise.

“Mexico and the Netherlands can combine their experience and capabilities to develop solutions that embrace innovation, while remaining grounded in international cooperation and the values we share,” she said.

The economic relationship was also highlighted as an important area for further development. The modernisation of the agreement between Mexico and the European Union, she noted, presents opportunities for increased trade and investment, with potential cooperation in areas including water management, semiconductors and advanced technologies, sustainable agriculture, energy and innovation.

H.E. Dr. Alvaro Gonzalez Otero, Ambassador of Uruguay, H.E. Mrs. Ann Derwin, Ambassador of Ireland and the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, H.E. Ms Sahar Ghanem, Ambassador of Yemen.

Yet the Ambassador stressed that bilateral relations extend far beyond government and economic ties.

“Our relationship is, of course, about much more than governments and economies. It is lived every day by entrepreneurs who invest and create jobs, researchers and universities that exchange knowledge, artists and students who bring our cultures closer together, and all those who create connections between our societies.”

She expressed her intention to travel across the Netherlands, meet different communities and listen to ideas, while inviting Dutch partners to discover Mexico as a country offering opportunities, talent and creativity.

“As Mexico’s Ambassador, I want to meet these communities, travel across the Netherlands, listen to ideas and identify where Mexico can be a partner. And I invite all of you to look at Mexico in the same spirit: as a country of opportunities, talent, creativity, friendship and a great future.”

Corinne Suzanne Cicéron Bühler, Ambassador of Switzerland and H.E. Nicole Shampaine, U.S. Ambassador to OPCW.

A Mexican evening

Following the national anthems and the Ambassador’s address, introduced by Desirée Colomé of the Department of Economic Affairs & Press Attaché, the formal part of the evening gave way to a celebration of Mexican culture and hospitality.

Traditional Mexican dishes were served to guests, while live marimba and guitar music duo from Chiapas brought the sounds of Mexico into the garden of the residence. Songs from the Mexican repertoire added to the festive atmosphere, transforming the reception into a lively celebration of Mexican identity and tradition.

The event was particularly well attended, taking place at the beginning of the new diplomatic season following the summer period, when ambassadors, international officials and members of the diplomatic community return to The Hague.

Isabelle Wittoek, Minister Counsellor of Belgium and Stany Muhizi, Charge d’affairs of Burundi.

As Mexico celebrated its independence, Ambassador Buenrostro Massieu also looked towards the future of Mexico–Netherlands relations.

“Today, as we celebrate Mexico’s independence, we celebrate our history, our identity and the values that have shaped our nation. But we also look forward.”

She concluded by emphasising the strong foundation created by decades of bilateral relations and the responsibility of the present generation to build upon it.

“Our task now is to build upon it, to create new partnerships, address new challenges together and ensure that our friendship continues to deliver tangible benefits for our societies.”

The evening offered a warm introduction to Ambassador Alicia Buenrostro Massieu and her priorities for her tenure in the Netherlands, while bringing together the diplomatic and international community in The Hague to celebrate one of Mexico’s most important national traditions: El Grito de Dolores and the anniversary of Mexican Independence.

Viva Mexico!

Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2026

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2026

“Strength with Unity”

Ní neart go cur le chéile. Strength with unity. We are thrilled to announce Ireland’s presidency of the EU under the motto “Strength with unity.”

Ireland will be focusing on important themes like competitiveness, values, and security throughout the presidency. The presidency will wrap up on December 31, 2026, and then Lithuania will take the reins for the first half of 2027, from January to June

To celebrate this special occasion, the Embassy hosted a delightful diplomatic reception and an art exhibition called “Carrying the Songs.” This wonderful event featured nearly 300 paintings by talented artists from the Netherlands and across Ireland. 

Special thanks went to Ms. Moya Cannon for sharing her beautiful poem, which has been instrumental in this project. The celebration at the Pulchri Studio on July 7, 2026, was truly memorable.

Carrying the songs’s exhibition. Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2026

Many members of the diplomatic community, including Ambassadors, representatives from international institutions, NGOs, the Irish diaspora in the Netherlands, and various other guests attended the celebrations. The 2026 stint however, is another fantastic opportunity to steer the EU forward, using our experience and a spirit of cooperation.

At the opening event H.E. Ambassador, Ann Derwin warmly welcomed everyone, saying, “I am delighted to welcome you all here for the Opening Event of the Irish Presidency of the Council of the EU at Pulchri Studio. Let’s make this an unforgettable journey together!”

The Ambassador went on to say:

“For the next six months, Ireland will be at the forefront of EU decision-making, leading essential negotiations that affect around 450 million people! It’s not our first time at the EU Presidency rodeo—Ireland has proudly stepped up to this role seven times before, often during exciting times of change. The 2026 term gives us another fantastic chance to guide the EU, drawing on our experience and commitment to working together.”

As Ambassador Ann Derwin enthusiastically shared in her opening remarks, “I am delighted to welcome you all here for the opening event of the Irish Presidency of the Council of the EU at Pulchri Studio. Since July 1, Ireland has had the honor of holding the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, and we’re thrilled to roll out an ambitious agenda. We’re focused on boosting the competitiveness of the EU economy, protecting our shared values both at home and abroad, and ensuring the safety of all our citizens.

Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2026 at Pulchri Studio.

You might have noticed that Ireland’s Presidency logo features a stunning spiral structure of galaxies, which was first spotted in Ireland back in the 1840s using the Great Telescope at Birr Castle. This beautiful spiral represents growth and suggests energy and movement—just like our goal to inspire positive change. And here’s a fun tidbit: the sketch of the spiral structure of the Whirlpool Nebula, created in the 1840s, is thought to have inspired Vincent van Gogh’s iconic painting, “The Starry Night.”

The motto, “Strength with unity,” perfectly captures the warm and inviting atmosphere at Pulchri Studio. It truly was a wonderful evening filled with joy and togetherness!

Akhal-Teke Horses Bring Turkmen Heritage to the Netherlands in a Spectacular International Championship

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Akhal-Teke Horses Bring Turkmen Heritage to the Netherlands in a Spectacular International Championship

Kronenberg, 4–6 September 2026

For three days, the Peelbergen Equestrian Centre in Kronenberg became a meeting place for horses, culture and international diplomacy as the World Championship of Equestrian Sports and Beauty Contest among Akhal-Teke Horses brought together breeders, owners, riders, specialists, artists, diplomats and horse lovers from across the world.

The scale of the event reflected the exceptional place occupied by the Akhal-Teke horse in Turkmen culture. Organised through cooperation between the Turkmen side and the Akhal-Teke Horse Association (ATHA) in Europe, the championship brought together representatives of the breed community from Europe and beyond, while a large delegation from Turkmenistan presented the traditions, craftsmanship and equestrian culture associated with the “heavenly horses.”

Peelbergen, one of the Netherlands’ major equestrian centres, provided an impressive setting for an event that combined international competition with scientific exchange, cultural diplomacy, traditional music and dance, craftsmanship and hospitality.

World Championship of Equestrian Sports and Beauty Contest among Akhal-Teke Horses

A breed at the heart of national identity

The Akhal-Teke is immediately recognisable for its fine build, elegant movement and distinctive metallic sheen. Its combination of speed, endurance, agility and intelligence has made it one of the most distinctive breeds in the world.

For Turkmenistan, however, the horse represents much more than sporting excellence. The Akhal-Teke occupies a central place in the country’s history and national identity and has become an important instrument of cultural diplomacy.

The image of the horse appears on the State Emblem of Turkmenistan, while the country has developed extensive institutions and programmes dedicated to its preservation and promotion. In 2026, the national motto itself refers to Turkmenistan as the homeland of the “purposeful winged horses.”

Turkmenistan, the homeland of the “purposeful winged horses.

The Turkmen leadership, under National Leader Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov and President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, has placed particular emphasis on developing the breed, preserving its bloodlines and increasing its international visibility.

That commitment was visible in Kronenberg. The presence of a substantial delegation from Turkmenistan, including representatives connected with the country’s horse-breeding and cultural institutions, gave the championship a significance extending well beyond the competition arena.

From beauty contests to world-class sport

The programme began on Friday, 4 September, with beauty competitions for one-, two-, three- and four-year-old stallions and mares, followed by dressage. At the same time, specialists from different countries gathered in Venray for the international scientific and practical conference “The Akhal-Teke Horse: The Turkmen Art of World-Class Horse Breeding.”

The conference examined the breed from several perspectives, including its history and development, the UNESCO recognition of Akhal-Teke breeding and horse-decoration traditions, its influence on fine and applied arts, veterinary and breeding practices, genetic preservation and the breed’s influence on international equestrian culture.

Saturday was the central day of the championship. The programme included the adult beauty competition, the “Best of the Best Europe” competition, selection of the World Champion, an open conference of the International Akhal-Teke Horse Breeding Association, the Best Decorated Horse competition and show jumping.

Horses and participants representing different countries demonstrated that the Akhal-Teke is not confined to one national equestrian tradition. The championship provided a platform for breeders and owners to meet, compare experience and present horses bred and trained in different environments.

The final award ceremony recognised winners of the beauty and equestrian competitions as well as the associated art competition. The formal programme concluded with a reception hosted by Turkmenistan, accompanied by performances by masters of Turkmen culture and art.

Kushtdepdi dancers.

An exhibition beyond the arena

One of the most striking aspects of the weekend was that the horses were only one part of the experience.

Visitors encountered an extensive presentation of Turkmen equestrian culture, including traditional horse decoration, saddlery and accessories, textiles, clothing and carpets. The exhibition also connected these traditions with contemporary European equestrian services and expertise.

The setting itself added another dimension. Traditional yurts, or öýler, provided spaces for hospitality, tea and informal gatherings, while topchan structures offered a distinctly Turkmen setting. Traditional costumes, musicians, singers and dancers contributed to an atmosphere in which the cultural heritage surrounding the horse could be experienced rather than simply displayed.

Dutar players and Sazandars musicians.

Performances by Turkmen artists included the Galkynyş National Equestrian Games Group, as well as musicians and performers associated with traditional Turkmen culture. The programme officially placed the Galkynyş group alongside the exhibition of Turkmen equestrian art and creative heritage.

For many visitors, this combination of horse, craftsmanship, music, dress and hospitality provided the most memorable aspect of the weekend.

H.E. Dr. Alvaro Gonzalez Otero, Ambassador of Uruguay, H.E. Ms Franca Deza Ferrecchio, Ambassador of Peru, the Mayor of Horst aan de Maas, Ryan Palmen, Emile Roemer, King’s Commissioner of the Province of Limburg and Prof. Mr. Dr. Jan Peter Balkenende, former Prime Minister of the Netherlands and Minister of State.

Limburg welcomes the world

The event also created a bridge between Turkmenistan and the Dutch province of Limburg.

Prof. Mr. Dr. Jan Peter Balkenende, former Prime Minister of the Netherlands and Minister of State.

The conference featured Prof. Mr. Dr. Jan Peter Balkenende, former Prime Minister of the Netherlands and Minister of State, who addressed the gathering on the role of horses and equestrian sport in bringing peoples and countries together. Balkenende noted that the Netherlands, like Turkmenistan, has a deep appreciation for horses and emphasised the potential of equestrian events to promote cultural exchange and international cooperation.

His participation added an important Dutch perspective to a discussion otherwise centred on the international development and preservation of the Akhal-Teke breed.

Balkenende served as Prime Minister of the Netherlands from 2002 to 2010 and was appointed Minister of State in 2022, an honorary distinction recognising senior statesmen.

Emile Roemer, King’s Commissioner of the Province of Limburg, welcomed the international gathering and highlighted the region’s own strong equestrian tradition. In his remarks, he emphasised the role of horses in the lives of young people and the importance of passing traditions from one generation to the next.

He also described Limburg as a place where equestrian sport can become a platform for international encounters, noting that participants had travelled thousands of kilometres from Turkmenistan to meet in Kronenberg.

The Mayor of Horst aan de Maas, Ryan Palmen, whose municipality includes Kronenberg, was also among the Dutch officials participating in the programme. Local involvement reinforced the sense that the championship was not simply an event hosted in the Netherlands, but a meeting between two regions with a strong connection to horses and equestrian sport.

Emile Roemer, King’s Commissioner of the Province of Limburg.

A diplomatic gathering around the horse

The international character of the championship was equally visible among its diplomatic guests. H.E. Mr. Sapar Palvanov, Ambassador of Turkmenistan to Belgium, was present in Kronenberg with his delegation and took part in the high-level programme surrounding the championship.

Ambassadors and representatives from different countries also joined the programme, including diplomatic representatives from Kazakhstan, Peru, Oman, Turkey and Uruguay, alongside representatives from European countries.

The presence of the Ambassador of Uruguay was particularly significant because Uruguay has an established Akhal-Teke association and an active community interested in the breed for competition and exhibition.

The championship demonstrated how a shared interest in horses can create connections that extend beyond sport. Breeders, associations, businesses and specialists involved in nutrition, reproduction, veterinary services, insurance, transportation, training, equipment and horse care all formed part of the wider international ecosystem represented at Kronenberg.

In this respect, the event functioned as both a championship and a professional meeting place.

National leader, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov.

A high-level vision for the future

A particularly notable feature of the gathering was the direct involvement of Turkmenistan’s leadership in the event and its discussions on the future of the breed.

National leader, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, took an active role in the programme and moderated the international conference, where representatives of the Akhal-Teke community, government and local Dutch authorities exchanged views on the development and preservation of the breed.

The discussion brought together figures including Prof. Mr. Dr. Jan Peter Balkenende, former Prime Minister of the Netherlands and Minister of State, Emile Roemer, King’s Commissioner of Limburg; Ryan Palmen, Mayor of Horst aan de Maas; representatives of Akhal-Teke associations from several European countries; and the leadership of the Dutch Akhal-Teke association.

President Berdimuhamedov emphasised the importance of international cooperation among breeders and expressed support for stronger communication and knowledge exchange. He also highlighted the importance of developing comprehensive genetic information on Akhal-Teke horses as a means of supporting the preservation and development of the breed.

The President also referred to the historical reputation of the Akhal-Teke, including the story of Bucephalus, the celebrated Alexander the Great’s horse, whose origins have been linked by some writers to the ancient horse traditions of Central Asia.

Looking ahead, President Berdimuhamedov expressed the intention that an international gathering of this nature could be organised on a recurring basis, potentially every five years. Such a cycle would provide breeders, researchers and equestrian professionals with a regular international platform for dialogue and cooperation.

Akhal-Teke championship 2026

Key Aspects of Presidential Promotion

  • Cultural Diplomacy: The leadership positions the Akhal-Teke breed—often called “heavenly” horses—as a primary symbol of Turkmenistan’s sovereignty, independence, and peaceful foreign policy.
  • Literary and Artistic Tributes: Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov has written multiple dedicated books on the breed, such as The Horse: A Symbol of Loyalty and Happiness, blending philosophy, national pride, and breeding guidelines.
  • Institutional Support: The government established the International Association of Akhal-Teke Horse Breeding and supports the world-renowned “Galkynyş” National Equestrian Games Group, which performs globally.
  • Global Recognition: State efforts successfully inscribed the art of Akhal-Teke horse breeding and traditions of adorning horses onto the UNESCO Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity.
  • National Celebrations: The country observes a dedicated National Holiday of the Turkmen Horse on the last Sunday of April, featuring international beauty contests like “Ýylyň iň owadan ahalteke bedewi”.

The people behind the horses

The international community represented at Kronenberg extended well beyond breeders and competitors. The event brought together owners, trainers, veterinarians, nutrition specialists, insurers, transport providers, equipment manufacturers and other professionals whose expertise supports the modern equestrian world.

This breadth was reflected in the exhibition, where visitors could discover everything from horse decoration and saddlery to clothing, carpets and other elements of Turkmen craftsmanship.

The event also illustrated the international journey of the breed. Among the stories represented was that of the Akhal-Teke community in the Netherlands, where the breed was introduced and subsequently developed into an organised national association. The personal commitment of breeders and enthusiasts has played an important role in establishing networks that now connect Akhal-Teke owners across Europe and beyond.

Turkmenistan Traditions.

Heritage recognised by UNESCO

The international status of Akhal-Teke traditions is reinforced by their recognition by UNESCO. The art of Akhal-Teke horse breeding and the traditions of horse decoration were inscribed on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, recognising knowledge and practices surrounding the breeding, care, training and decoration of the horses.

The UNESCO recognition is important because it places the tradition within a wider framework of living cultural heritage rather than treating the Akhal-Teke simply as a sporting breed.

This was precisely the message communicated in Kronenberg: the beauty of the horse cannot be separated from the people, knowledge, craftsmanship and traditions that have surrounded it for generations.

A new chapter for the “Heavenly Horse”

By Sunday, the competitions and exhibitions had come to a close, but the significance of the gathering extended beyond the final awards.

For Turkmenistan, the championship offered an opportunity to present one of its most recognisable national symbols to an international audience. For the international Akhal-Teke community, it provided a rare opportunity to bring together breeders, owners, riders and specialists from different countries on one stage.

For the Netherlands, and particularly Limburg, it demonstrated how a region with a deep equestrian tradition can serve as a meeting point for international sport and cultural exchange.

Horse decorations by Turkmenistan traditional artisans.

And for those who attended simply because they love horses, the weekend offered an unforgettable opportunity to see the Akhal-Teke at close range: refined, athletic, agile and distinguished by the remarkable sheen of its coat.

The World Championship in Kronenberg thus became more than a competition to became a living heritage and a meeting between cultures, generations and equestrian traditions.

As the horses left the arena and the international guests departed Kronenberg, one message remained particularly clear: the Akhal-Teke may have its roots in the ancient lands of Turkmenistan, but its future increasingly belongs to an international community united by admiration for one of the world’s most extraordinary horses.

—

Diplomat Magazine was a media partner of the event, alongside Al Jazeera Europe Today, EU Reporter, The Gulf Observer and Eurasia Focus.

International Drug Trafficking Network Disrupted: Seven Arrests

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
International Drug Trafficking Network Disrupted: Seven Arrests

The Hague, 31 August 2026

Cooperation on a complex international criminal investigation has led to the interception of drug shipments worth an estimated EUR 25 million and the arrest of seven suspected members of a drug trafficking network in Romania. The network provided drug transportation services to other criminal groups as a form of “crime as a service”. Eurojust coordinated judicial cooperation between the authorities involved at various stages of the investigation.

On 24 August, Romanian authorities searched 16 premises across the country, collecting evidence indicating that the network had been operating since September 2023. Organised in a pyramid structure, the group generated significant profits by providing drug transportation services to other criminal organisations.

The network transported large quantities of drugs from Spain to destinations across Europe, using trucks equipped with concealed compartments. To conceal the proceeds of their criminal activities, the suspects allegedly established legitimate companies as fronts.

The group also provided legal assistance to truck drivers arrested while transporting drugs and attempted to gain access to the relevant criminal case files, reportedly to prevent investigators from establishing links to the network’s leadership.

When Romanian authorities began investigating the network, they cooperated with counterparts in France, Germany, Italy and Spain through Eurojust to intercept drug shipments. Four shipments containing 114 kilograms of cocaine, 228 kilograms of cannabis and 1,300 kilograms of hashish were intercepted. The drugs had an estimated market value of approximately EUR 25 million.

Romanian authorities also worked with their French counterparts through Eurojust to obtain evidence from the encrypted communications platform Sky ECC. The messages can now be used in subsequent criminal proceedings.

The evidence collected during the 24 August operation will be analysed as the investigation continues. Seven suspects were arrested during the action, including a Europol high-value target. All seven are currently in custody.

The operation involved the following authorities:

  • Romania: Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT) – Central Structure, Section for Fighting Drug Trafficking; Financial Investigation Service for Organized Crime Groups within the Directorate for Combating Organized Crime; Special Interventions and Actions Service of the General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police.
  • France: Public Prosecution Office of Perpignan; Public Prosecution Office of Paris (PNACO).
  • Germany: Public Prosecution Office of Heidelberg.
  • Italy: Public Prosecutor’s Office of Bologna.
  • Spain: Public Prosecution Office of Tarragona; Public Prosecution Office of Málaga.

Air Europa: Connecting Europe and the World from Madrid

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Air Europa: Connecting Europe and the World from Madrid

Celebrating its 40th anniversary this year, Air Europa has developed a distinctive international profile, with Madrid serving as a strategic hub connecting Europe with Latin America and an expanding network across Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Its transatlantic reach has also given the airline a particularly relevant role in connecting Spain and other European markets with Latin America.

In this interview with Diplomat Magazine, Alcino Ribeiro, General Manager of Air Europa for France and Benelux, discusses the airline’s engagement with the diplomatic community, the importance of international air connectivity and the company’s plans for fleet renewal and network expansion. He also reflects on the balance between growth, innovation and sustainability, while emphasising an approach that has been part of Air Europa’s identity since its beginnings: “human, close and agile.”

Engaging with the Diplomatic Community

How does Air Europa work with embassies and the diplomatic community in the Netherlands?

Both in the Netherlands and in all the markets where we operate, our local office and teams work constantly to strengthen relations with local representations, including embassies, tourism offices and professional players in the sector, particularly tour operators and travel agencies.

We regularly organise events bringing these stakeholders together to promote the destinations we serve and create synergies between different entities. These initiatives also provide visibility to many countries whose representation in certain markets, such as the Netherlands, may be more limited.

We frequently associate destinations with our professional workshops or organise meetings and presentations at embassies, inviting leading distributors and professionals specialising in the destination. All of this contributes to strengthening market knowledge, encouraging exchanges and building lasting links between the stakeholders involved.

Air Europa also maintains a very close relationship with ambassadors and the diplomatic community. Beyond certain facilities or commercial gestures that we may offer in some cases, what our counterparts truly value is our proximity, personalised attention and the flexibility with which we try to respond to their international travel needs.

This human, close and agile approach has been part of Air Europa’s DNA since its origins, and it is precisely what enables us to build lasting relationships of trust with the diplomatic community and international institutions.

A Strategic Position Between Europe and Latin America

Air Europa has a strong presence between Europe and Latin America. How is the network evolving, and which markets are most important for future growth?

In addition to our purpose of connecting people around the world, we are working to become the airline of reference between Europe and Latin America. We have an extensive network covering the main destinations in Central America and the Caribbean, as well as the Southern Cone.

Our strategic position at Madrid-Barajas allows us to offer passengers a wider range of connections. We currently operate two daily frequencies between Amsterdam and Madrid, providing easy connections with the rest of our network in Africa, the Middle East and, particularly, Latin America.

This, together with key aspects such as service quality and our Business Class, represents an important part of the value we provide.

We have also expanded our possibilities with the opening of the Madrid–Istanbul route in May last year, and from June we will do so again with the first direct flights to Johannesburg, opening new possibilities for both tourism and business travel to South Africa.

Growth and Fleet Renewal

What are the company’s main priorities as it looks ahead?

Our Strategic Plan remains firmly focused on the growth of our operations. The first step is the incorporation of new aircraft and the renewal of the fleet.

Last year, we incorporated new Boeing 787 Dreamliner aircraft and our first Boeing 737 MAX aircraft, of which we will receive another ten in 2026. In addition, the agreement reached with Airbus guarantees the progressive incorporation of up to 40 A350-900 aircraft for our long-haul routes.

This fleet expansion is enabling us to increase frequencies in Europe and across the Americas, while continuing to add new destinations. Johannesburg will be joined this year by Geneva and, as new summer routes, Bologna and Tangier. We will also resume operations to Tunis, Marrakech, Alghero and Athens.

Our aircraft are also central to our sustainability objectives. Their efficiency has enabled us to reduce emissions by 23% since 2015, a figure we aim to increase to 30% by the end of 2030.

The Passenger Experience

How is Air Europa approaching innovation and the passenger experience?

We continue to work to provide the best possible customer service. From the personal attention our customers value to improvements in the booking and purchasing processes through our website and app, we continue to develop initiatives aimed at making the flight the best part of the journey.

We are also continuously expanding our in-flight entertainment offering and making gastronomy one of our distinguishing features. We have recently introduced creations by Mario Sandoval to our Business Class menus on continental routes, while continuing our collaboration with Martín Berasategui on long-haul routes.

These initiatives are complemented by the multiple benefits and advantages we continue to add to our Air Europa Suma loyalty programme.

Forty Years of International Outlook

Air Europa is celebrating its 40th anniversary. What distinguishes the company in an increasingly competitive international market?

We are celebrating our fortieth anniversary this year and, since our origins, we have maintained a clear international outlook. We have succeeded in establishing our own distinctive position in the market.

We have a strong level of brand recognition in Latin America, which makes us a strategic player in transatlantic connectivity — an advantage that we will continue to strengthen.

Our recent experience has enabled us to optimise our operations and adapt rapidly to a constantly evolving market full of challenges.

Looking Beyond the Current Network

What is Air Europa’s long-term vision for its international development?

Our long-term vision is to offer the best possible connectivity. Our reach continues to grow, responding to a market that demands greater variety and availability of options.

The agreement reached last year with Turkish Airlines reinforces precisely this strategy and allows us, from the Istanbul hub, to continue expanding our horizons across both Africa and Asia.

In addition to the offering and the quality of the product we can provide, at Air Europa we maintain a human, close and agile approach that has been part of the company’s DNA since its origins.

It is precisely this philosophy that enables us to build lasting relationships of trust, both with our professional partners and institutional representatives, and with each of our individual customers.

Air Europa: conectividad, expansión y una visión internacional desde Madrid

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Air Europa: conectividad, expansión y una visión internacional desde Madrid

Con cuatro décadas de trayectoria, Air Europa se ha consolidado como una de las aerolíneas españolas con mayor proyección internacional y como un importante enlace entre Europa y América Latina, además de ampliar progresivamente su presencia hacia África, Oriente Próximo y Asia. Su posición en el aeropuerto Adolfo Suárez Madrid-Barajas le permite articular conexiones entre distintos mercados y responder a una demanda cada vez más orientada hacia una mayor variedad y disponibilidad de destinos.

En esta entrevista con Diplomat Magazine, Alcino Ribeiro, General Manager de Air Europa para Francia y Benelux, aborda la relación de la compañía con el cuerpo diplomático, el papel de la conectividad aérea en las relaciones entre Europa y América Latina y los principales proyectos de expansión y renovación de la flota. También explica cómo la compañía busca combinar crecimiento, innovación y sostenibilidad, manteniendo un enfoque que, en sus palabras, debe seguir siendo “humano, cercano y ágil”.

Relación con el cuerpo diplomático

¿Cómo valora Air Europa la colaboración con las embajadas de países latinoamericanos acreditadas en los Países Bajos y qué iniciativas desarrolla con el cuerpo diplomático?

Tanto en los Países Bajos como en todos los mercados donde estamos presentes, nuestra oficina local y nuestros equipos trabajan constantemente para fortalecer las relaciones entre las representaciones locales —como embajadas, oficinas de turismo y actores profesionales del sector, especialmente tour operadores y agencias de viajes.

Organizamos regularmente eventos que reúnen a estos interlocutores con el objetivo de promover los destinos a los que volamos y crear sinergias entre las diferentes entidades. Estas iniciativas permiten además dar una excelente visibilidad a muchos países cuya representación en algunos mercados, como en los Países Bajos, puede ser más limitada.

Con frecuencia asociamos destinos a nuestros workshops profesionales o incluso organizamos encuentros y presentaciones en embajadas, invitando a los principales distribuidores y profesionales especializados en el destino. Todo ello contribuye a reforzar el conocimiento del mercado, impulsar los intercambios y crear vínculos duraderos entre todos los actores implicados.

Air Europa mantiene además una relación muy cercana con los embajadores y el cuerpo diplomático. Más allá de determinadas facilidades o gestos comerciales que podamos ofrecer en algunos casos, lo que realmente valoran nuestros interlocutores es nuestra proximidad, la atención personalizada y la flexibilidad con la que tratamos de responder a sus necesidades de viaje internacionales.

Ese enfoque humano, cercano y ágil forma parte del ADN de Air Europa desde sus orígenes y es precisamente lo que nos permite construir relaciones de confianza duraderas con el cuerpo diplomático y las instituciones internacionales.

Una red con vocación global

Air Europa desempeña un papel importante en la conectividad entre Europa y América Latina. ¿Cuál es actualmente el alcance de su red y qué mercados considera estratégicos para el futuro?

Además de nuestro propósito de conectar a personas en todo el mundo, trabajamos para ser la aerolínea de referencia entre Europa y América Latina, donde contamos con una red muy amplia que cubre los principales destinos tanto en Centroamérica y Caribe como en el Cono Sur.

Es esta posición estratégica desde el hub de Madrid-Barajas la que nos permite ofrecer un mayor alcance a nuestros pasajeros. Actualmente contamos con dos frecuencias diarias entre Ámsterdam y Madrid, lo que permite conectar fácilmente con el resto de nuestra red en África, Oriente Próximo y, especialmente, América Latina.

Lo anterior, junto a aspectos clave como la calidad de servicio y nuestra clase Business, representa una parte fundamental del valor añadido que aportamos.

Además, hemos ampliado nuestras posibilidades con la apertura de la ruta entre Madrid y Estambul, en mayo del pasado año, y volveremos a hacerlo desde junio con los primeros vuelos directos a Johannesburgo, con todo lo que ello supone tanto para los desplazamientos turísticos como de negocio en Sudáfrica.

¿Cuáles son actualmente los proyectos más ambiciosos de Air Europa en materia de expansión, innovación y experiencia del pasajero?

Nuestro Plan Estratégico sigue centrado, de forma decidida, en el crecimiento de nuestra operativa. Para ello, el primer paso está siendo la incorporación de nuevas aeronaves y la renovación de la flota.

El pasado año incorporamos nuevas unidades del Boeing 787 Dreamliner y nuestros primeros Boeing 737 MAX, de los que recibiremos este 2026 otros diez. Además, el acuerdo cerrado con Airbus nos garantiza la incorporación progresiva de hasta 40 A350-900 para nuestras rutas de largo radio.

Gracias a este proceso de ampliación de flota, estamos pudiendo incrementar las frecuencias, tanto en Europa como en toda América, al igual que seguimos añadiendo nuevos destinos a los que volamos directamente. A Johannesburgo se unirán este año Ginebra y, como nuevas rutas estivales, Bolonia y Tánger. Estos nuevos destinos de verano se sumarán igualmente a Túnez, Marrakech, Alghero y Atenas, donde también volvemos a operar.

Nuestros aviones no solo son fundamentales en la operativa, sino también en nuestros objetivos de sostenibilidad. Su eficiencia nos ha permitido reducir desde 2015 un 23 % de emisiones, porcentaje que tenemos previsto elevar al 30 % antes del fin de 2030.

Por último, seguimos trabajando para proporcionar el mejor servicio al cliente. Desde la atención cercana que tanto valoran nuestros usuarios hasta las mejoras introducidas en los procesos de reserva y compra vía web y app, seguimos desarrollando iniciativas para hacer del vuelo la mejor experiencia del viaje.

Además de ampliar continuamente la oferta de entretenimiento a bordo, estamos convirtiendo la gastronomía en una de nuestras señas de identidad. Acabamos de incorporar las creaciones de Mario Sandoval a nuestros menús Business en rutas continentales, mientras seguimos colaborando con Martín Berasategui en las rutas de largo radio.

A todo ello se suman los múltiples beneficios y ventajas que incorporamos de forma continua a nuestro programa de fidelización Air Europa Suma.

Air Europa cumple 40 años. ¿Cómo se posiciona la compañía ante un sector cada vez más competitivo y qué papel aspira a desempeñar como aerolínea europea con vocación internacional?

Celebramos este año cuarenta años y, desde nuestros orígenes, mantenemos una clara vocación internacional. Hemos logrado encontrar una posición propia y diferencial en el mercado.

Contamos con un reconocimiento de marca notable en Latinoamérica, lo que nos convierte en un actor estratégico en la conectividad transatlántica, una ventaja que seguiremos reforzando.

Nuestra experiencia reciente nos ha permitido optimizar la operativa y adaptarnos con rapidez a un mercado en constante evolución y lleno de desafíos.

Una visión basada en la conectividad

¿Cuál es la visión a largo plazo de Air Europa y qué elementos considera fundamentales para seguir reforzando su posicionamiento internacional?

Nuestra visión a largo plazo pasa por ofrecer la mejor conectividad posible. Cada vez contamos con un alcance mayor, y eso responde a un mercado que demanda variedad y disponibilidad en la oferta.

El acuerdo alcanzado el pasado año con Turkish Airlines refuerza precisamente esa estrategia y nos permite, desde el hub de Estambul, seguir ampliando horizontes tanto en África como en Asia.

Además de la oferta y de la calidad del producto que podemos ofrecer, en Air Europa mantenemos un enfoque humano, cercano y ágil que forma parte del ADN de la compañía desde sus orígenes.

Es precisamente esta filosofía la que nos permite construir relaciones de confianza duraderas, tanto con nuestros partners profesionales y representaciones institucionales, como con cada uno de nuestros clientes individuales.

1234...913Page 3 of 913