Dr. Stanislav Vassilevsky, Counsellor at the Embassy of the Republic of Belarus in The Hague, met and held a discussion with students of Leiden University at the Wijnhaven Campus in Den Haag. The event, which was organized by students, aimed to explore some of the more difficult aspects of practical diplomacy, especially in understanding its role between politically counter-aligned nations.
Dr. Vassilevsky was grateful to have the opportunity to meet with students and students were generally appreciative of the opportunity to direct questions they may have had directly to a representative of a country that has attracted significant controversy amongst the European community.
Economic matters were discussed, with Dr. Vassilevsky giving a brief presentation on the various export products of Belarus and showing their connection to European markets at the time in a variety of industries which, in 2021, had much recovered from a dip in engagement from 2020, though now things have greatly reduced once again. Belarus is a significant exporter of, besides petroleum products, potassium products, wooden materials, and dairy.
Additionally, the prescient political matters in Belarus of Autumn 2021 were also discussed. These included the nature and extent of the 2020 anti-government protests, the associated diverting of a flight over Belarusian airspace, and the, at the time, refugee crisis at the Polish-Belarusian border.
Leiden University, The Hague Campus during Belarusian conference.
Dr. Vassilevsky offered and explained his own insights as well as the perspective of the government that he represents on each of these matters, while engaging with the many questions posed by the diverse audience of students who drew from a wide geographical and cultural background of perspectives.
He offered points and research for consideration and encouraged students to be mindful of and examine the political motivations and biases of media in their own environments and countries, even those that are ostensibly ‘objective’. For example, he asked students to think about similar anti-government protests, which, in some Western nations had been faced with a similar level of government hostility, and questioned the difference in presentation and tone taken when considering movements in one state versus another. Just as Dr. Vassilevsky did with students, some members of the audience reciprocated and attempted to ask questions and bring up points which may help attain a better understanding between opposing perspectives.
Belarus potential exports to Europe.
Points of practicality were discussed as well, such as the diplomatic situation of Belarus with Europe and the Netherlands in particular; the current and future status of the Union State with Russia; and also just about life as a diplomat in The Hague.
It was a friendly and interesting event where almost everyone in attendance walked away with things to think about and discuss. Perhaps we should all take a bit of Dr. Vassilevsky’s advice and remain skeptical, curious, and questioning.
The Republic of Costa Rica holds an important place in the world as one of the most significant national supporters of ecological and animal protections. The protection and preservation of their natural environment and around the world has long been a core tenet within their national politics and diplomacy. This emphasis continues even in the Netherlands as Ambassador of Costa Rica, H.E. Mr. Arnoldo Brenes Castro hosts events on this topic, including one on September 16, 2021, highlighting the harmful practice of “animal selfies” and the importance of reducing direct human (read: tourist) contact with wildlife.
Because of the COVID-19 restrictions in place at the time and the limited space at the Embassy of Costa Rica, only a small group was able to physically attend the presentation, but far more had the good fortune to join digitally. Participating was a representative from Costa Rica’s National Commission on Biodiversity, specifically the head of the “Stop Animal Selfies” campaign; the Embassy staff; a representative from the World Animal Protection organization; and a representative of the Dutch animal rights political party, PvdD.
Objectives
Informe and educate tourists about appropriate wildlife tourism practices through observation and species conservation.
Protect tourists from possible risks associated with direct contact with wildlife.
Protect wildlife from practices that put it at risk, through capturing from the natural environment and mishandling in captivity.
Effectively implement national wildlife regulations.
This event aimed to express the importance of the issue of human contact with wildlife and to share the objectives of Costa Rica’s national campaign on the subject. The project aims to educate tourists about responsible ecological tourism practices which emphasize conservation; to protect wildlife from harmful practices and mistreatment; and to remove Costa Rica as one of the top ten nations in which tourists take photos directly with wildlife. These are important issues for their government and should be for anyone interested in ecological protection.
The campaign also necessarily relies on a social media element, encouraging people to take a selfie with a toy animal and share with the hashtag #stopanimalselfies and with the caption, “I don’t harm wild animals for a selfie” for raising awareness of the issue and their website provides many resources for education on responsible wildlife tourism practices.
The project has been recognized by ecological groups around the globe for its importance, with Roberto Vieto, wildlife manager for World Animal Protection saying, “We congratulate the Costa Rica government for leading this ambitious initiative and pioneering responsible tourism in the region and around the world.”
The event held in the Netherlands was an important opportunity to share and educate a wider community on this subject and, importantly, Ambassador Castro acts not just as an advocate for Costa Rica, but for ecological protection across the globe.
The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague will become a participant in the joint investigation team (JIT) on alleged core international crimes committed in Ukraine. The JIT, which was set up with Eurojust support on 25 March by Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, aims to facilitate investigations and prosecutions in the concerned states as well as those that could be taken forward before the ICC.
ICC Prosecutor, Karim A.A. Khan QC
ICC Prosecutor Mr Karim A.A. Khan QC and the Prosecutors General of the three countries involved signed an agreement on the first-ever participation of the Office of the Prosecutor in a JIT, today. With this agreement, the JIT parties and the Office of the Prosecutor are sending a clear message that all efforts will be undertaken to effectively gather evidence on core international crimes committed in Ukraine and bring those responsible to justice.
The main purpose of the JIT is to facilitate investigations and international judicial cooperation. The agreement with the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC will enable rapid and real-time coordination and cooperation with the JIT partner countries, in connection with investigations conducted by the OTP and competent national authorities.
The OTP is an independent prosecutorial and investigative office established by the Rome Statute of the ICC. On 2 March 2022, following the referral of the situation in Ukraine to the Prosecutor of the ICC by an unprecedented 39 States Parties, Prosecutor Khan announced the opening of an active investigation.
Prosecutor Khan and the Prosecutors-General of Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine at the signing ceremony today.
The need for closer cooperation on investigations into alleged core international crimes committed in Ukraine was underlined last week during a coordination meeting at Eurojust between the JIT partners, the ICC, National Members of EU countries at the Agency and third states with Liaison Prosecutors at the Agency. Since 2018, Ukraine has been one of the 10 non-EU Member States that has a Liaison Prosecutor at Eurojust.
The Agency will support the JIT partners in the entire process with operational, analytical, legal and financial assistance. Eurojust also accommodates the coordination and cooperation between all national investigating and prosecuting authorities that have initiated investigations into core international crimes.
More than 530 people were returned to Uzbekistan in 2019-2021 from disadvantaged regions such as Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
This was noted at the thematic roundtable discussion by Akmal Saidov, First Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Director of the National Center for Human Rights (NCHR).
The roundtable discussion was organized by the Senate of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Commissioners of the Oliy Majlis for human rights and children’s rights, the NCHR, the UN OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia. It was devoted to the issues of strengthening the role and capabilities of national human rights institutions in monitoring and evaluating activities for the reintegration and resocialization of repatriates from conflict zones.
As Mr. Akmal Saidov emphasized, the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan, within the framework of a humane policy, carried out 5 special operations “Mehr” to evacuate citizens of Uzbekistan from the above countries. There are more than 120 women and about 380 children of the total number of those returned.
The Government of Uzbekistan adopted normative-legal acts for their social adaptation and created republican and territorial interdepartmental commissions, which carried out rehabilitation and social adaptation measures for repatriates, their employment, and placement of children in kindergartens and schools, etc.
On March 15, 2022, within the framework of the 49th session of the UN Human Rights Council, a report was heard by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Fionnuala D. Ní Aoláin, following a visit to Uzbekistan on November 29 – December 7 last year.
She highly appreciated the activities of Uzbekistan Government in the repatriation and reintegration of women and children from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. According to her, the repatriation model created in Uzbekistan and based on the family and community is an example of best practices in repatriation, ensuring the best interests of the child and the full reintegration of women.
NCHR presents Uzbekistan’s experience in the repatriation of its citizens
More than 530 people were returned to Uzbekistan in 2019-2021 from disadvantaged regions such as Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
This was noted at the thematic roundtable discussion by Akmal Saidov, First Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Director of the National Center for Human Rights (NCHR).
The roundtable discussion was organized by the Senate of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Commissioners of the Oliy Majlis for human rights and children’s rights, the NCHR, the UN OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia. It was devoted to the issues of strengthening the role and capabilities of national human rights institutions in monitoring and evaluating activities for the reintegration and resocialization of repatriates from conflict zones.
As Mr. Akmal Saidov emphasized, the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan, within the framework of a humane policy, carried out 5 special operations “Mehr” to evacuate citizens of Uzbekistan from the above countries. There are more than 120 women and about 380 children of the total number of those returned.
The Government of Uzbekistan adopted normative-legal acts for their social adaptation and created republican and territorial interdepartmental commissions, which carried out rehabilitation and social adaptation measures for repatriates, their employment, and placement of children in kindergartens and schools, etc.
On March 15, 2022, within the framework of the 49th session of the UN Human Rights Council, a report was heard by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Fionnuala D. Ní Aoláin, following a visit to Uzbekistan on November 29 – December 7 last year.
She highly appreciated the activities of Uzbekistan Government in the repatriation and reintegration of women and children from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. According to her, the repatriation model created in Uzbekistan and based on the family and community is an example of best practices in repatriation, ensuring the best interests of the child and the full reintegration of women.
By Obid Khakimov, director of the Center for Economic Research and Reforms under the Administration of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
On April 8, 2022 the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed a Decree in which goals are set extensively with specific timeframes for taking measures in a number of key areas of the country’s economic development to create favorable conditions for the development of the private sector, as well as measures to accelerate the process of privatization, the fight against corruption and demonopolization.
It should be noted that this Presidential Decree is directly related to the “Development Strategy of New Uzbekistan for 2022-2026”. If briefly and abstractly, the goals of the Decree are aimed at achieving stable economic growth, increasing the competitiveness of the national economy and reducing the state share in the private sector’s economy. At the same time, it provides the liberalization of the market of goods and services where the state share presents, the creation of equal conditions for business entities, an accelerated transition to market relations, a drastic increase of private investments, further conducting of privatization and poverty reduction.
Cancellation of benefits and exclusive rights
According to the Decree from May 1, 2022 privileges in the form of benefits and exclusive rights for a number of business entities, including foreign ones, will be gradually abolished. In addition, starting from July 1, 2022 customs duty benefits will be provided on the basis of the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan only, meanwhile the getting of the Tariff and Non-Tariff Regulation Council’s conclusion will be considered mandatory.
Auto industry, aviation and railways will be reformed
The reforms will also affect some of the most discussed industries, such as the auto industry, aviation and railways. By August 1, 2022 up to 10% of the shares of UzAuto Motors JSC will be secured for IPO on the local stock market and later a Strategy will be developed for the sale of the remaining share of UzAuto Motors JSC to strategic investors, including UzAuto Motors Powertrain JSC and Samarqand Avtomobil zavodi Ltd. By June 1, 2022 a Strategy for the transformation, development and privatization of Uzbekistan Temir Yullari JSC (railways) will be developed and by September 1, 2022 51% or more of the state share in the authorized capital of Uzbekistan Airways JSC will be put up for auction. In addition, by the end of 2022 the privatization of at least 49% of the shares of Uzbekneftegaz JSC and 51% or more of the shares of Thermal Power Plants JSC will commence that should also attract great attention of the investors and ensure companies’ accelerated modernization.
New opportunities for public-private partnership
The Decree also pays a lot of attention to public-private partnership (PPP). According to the Decree, a drastic increase of the number of PPP projects in the field of drinking water, sewerage, heat supply and landscaping, road construction and aviation infrastructure is expected. In addition, domestic and international freight and passenger transportation by rail will also be transferred to the private sector on the basis of PPP or franchise. But this is not all. At the same time, from September 1, 2022 the priority of constructing new small and medium-sized hydroelectric power plants will be given to the projects with the participation of the private sector, including on the basis of PPP. Accordingly, by implementing such broad opportunities for partnership, all parties, including the end consumer, will receive more benefits and privileges from acting together than if separately.
Non-residents, residents and real estate
As it has already been emphasized, this Decree contains plenty turning points in the reform of many fields and spheres that will directly contribute to economic growth and attraction of investments. The document says that from May 1, 2022 the personal income tax rate on the income of non-resident individuals received from the sources in Uzbekistan will be set at 12% (now it is 20%). In addition, from May 1, 2022 foreign citizens are granted the right, without requiring a residence permit, to purchase real estate in the Tashkent region and in the cities of Tashkent and Samarkand in the equivalent of at least $150 thousand during construction and $180 thousand in operation, while in other regions – at least $70 thousand and $85 thousand respectively. At the same time, it should be noted that the acquisition of these real estate objects is not a basis for foreign citizens to obtain a certificate of permanent registration.
However, when foreign citizens purchase real estate in the Tashkent region or in Tashkent city in the equivalent of at least $300 thousand, they do receive a residence permit in Uzbekistan (now – in the equivalent of at least $400 thousand).
It is also worth noting that the Decree foresees the sale of non-agricultural land through auctions with the possibility of installment payments for up to 3 years. In addition, buyers who have made a one-time initial payment of at least 35% on state assets and non-agricultural lands are granted the right to mortgage property as collateral in bank lending.
The changes also affected the Heads of executive bodies and members of supervisory boards. Starting from April 1, 2022 a person appointed or reassigned as the Head of the executive body cannot become the Head again more than 2 consecutive terms. Also, according to the Decree, from July 1, 2022 at enterprises with a state share, a single policy of stimulating members of the supervisory board and remuneration of labor for members of the executive body will be established, moreover any additional payments to members of the executive body, except for wages and annual bonuses, will be canceled. In addition, it is regulated that the annual expenses of state-owned enterprises for sponsorship must not exceed 3% of the net profit received in the previous year. Another change also affected the sphere of antitrust measures, which will not be applied to entrepreneurs with sales revenue over the past year not exceeded 10 thousand BCV (basic calculated value) or 2.7 billion sums.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the window of opportunities shown by both time and the situation in the world is open and waiting for specific actions. The successful implementation of the measures foreseen by the Decree will not only attract great number of investments in the economy, but will also allow private businesses to take the advantages of all the opportunities that delivered to them thanks to the ongoing reforms.
Par Nicolas Boeglin, Professeur de Droit International Public, Faculté de Droit, Universidad de Costa Rica (UCR)
Dans sa décision rendue publique le 21 avril dernier (voir texte intégral en anglais et en français ), la Cour Internationale de Justice (CIJ) a ordonné à la Colombie de cesser toute interférence dans les zones correspondant au Nicaragua dans la mer des Caraïbes depuis sa décision de 2012, et de modifier les régulations qu’elle avait pris, conformément au contenu de son arrêt du 19 novembre 2012 et au droit international coutumier.
Nous avions eu l’occasion d’analyser cette procédure contentieuse engagée par le Nicaragua contre la Colombie devant la justice internationale en novembre 2013, et de mentionner certains détails passés sous silence par certains analystes et collègues colombiens, notamment l’expérience de l’équipe juridique nicaraguayenne dans l’art du contentieux international par rapport à celle de leurs homologues défendant la Colombie (voir notre brève note en espagnol intitulée : ” Nicaragua / Colombia: a propósito de la lectura de la sentencia de la CIJ “).
Le jeu de cartes de cette note avec une première carte illustrant les zones maritimes revendiquées par la Colombie avant 2012 et une seconde carte de la décision de la CIJ de 2012 permet au lecteur non averti de mieux comprendre la portée de la décision de 2012 pour le Nicaragua dans les Caraïbes.
Il est à noter que la plus haute autorité colombienne et l´ensemble de son cabinet ont décidé de se rendre sur l’île de San Andrés pour y entendre la lecture du jugement rendu à La Haye le 21 avril dernier (voir note de presse d´Infobae).
Le contenu de la décision en bref
Comme somme toute assez prévisible, les arguments présentés par la Colombie n’ont pas eu beaucoup d’effet, tandis que le Nicaragua a réussi à consolider et à réaffirmer ses droits sur ces zones maritimes, qui lui ont été accordés par la CIJ en 2012, grâce à cet arrêt.
Les attentes (fausses) créées ces derniers temps en Colombie, notamment à l’égard des communautés insulaires des Raizales, devront maintenant être expliquées par ceux qui en sont responsables au sein de l´opinion publique colombienne . Une situation très similaire avait d´ailleurs déjà été observée en Colombie dans les semaines précédant la lecture de l’arrêt de la CIJ en novembre 2012.
Sur les sept paragraphes du dispositif final de l arrêt, le tout dernier sur les lignes de base droites adoptées par le Nicaragua en 2013 et 2018 permet à la Colombie d’éviter un jugement qui la condamnerait sur l´ensemble du dispositif.
Le dernier point du dispositif final (paragraphe 261) est reproduit ci-dessous, dans lequel il est indiqué que la CIJ :
“1. Dit que la compétence qu’elle a, sur le fondement de l’article XXXI du pacte de Bogotá, pour statuer sur le différend relatif à des allégations de violations, par la République de Colombie, des droits de la République du Nicaragua dans les espaces maritimes que la Cour a reconnus à cette dernière dans son arrêt de 2012, couvre les demandes fondées sur les événements mentionnés par la République du Nicaragua survenus après le 27 novembre 2013, date à laquelle le pacte de Bogotá a cessé d’être en vigueur pour la République de Colombie ;
2. Dit que, en entravant les activités de pêche et de recherche scientifique marine de navires battant pavillon nicaraguayen ou détenteurs d’un permis nicaraguayen et les opérations de navires de la marine nicaraguayenne dans la zone économique exclusive de la République du Nicaragua et en voulant faire appliquer des mesures de conservation dans cette zone, la République de Colombie a violé les droits souverains et la juridiction de la République du Nicaragua dans cette zone maritime;
3. Dit que, en autorisant des activités de pêche dans la zone économique exclusive de la République du Nicaragua, la République de Colombie a violé les droits souverains et la juridiction de la République du Nicaragua dans cette zone maritime
4. Dit que la République de Colombie doit immédiatement cesser le comportement visé aux points 2) et 3) ci-dessus
5. Dit que la «zone contiguë unique» établie par la République de Colombie par le décret présidentiel 1946 du 9 septembre 2013, tel que modifié par le décret 1119 du 17 juin 2014, n’est pas conforme au droit international coutumier, ainsi qu’exposé aux paragraphes 170 à 187 ci-dessus ;
6. Dit que la République de Colombie doit, par les moyens de son choix, mettre les dispositions du décret présidentiel 1946 du 9 septembre 2013, tel que modifié par le décret 1119 du 17 juin 2014, en conformité avec le droit international coutumier, en tant qu’elles ont trait aux espaces maritimes que la Cour a reconnus à la République du Nicaragua dans son arrêt de 2012 ;
7. Dit que les lignes de base droites de la République du Nicaragua établies par le décret no 33-2013 du 19 août 2013, tel que modifié par le décret no 17-2018 du 10 octobre 2018, ne sont pas conformes au droit international coutumier“.
Une lecture complète de l´ensemble de l´arrêt est recommandée afin de mieux apprécier le raisonnement suivi par les juges de la CIJ, mais aussi de mieux comprendre la facilité avec laquelle le Nicaragua a réussi à les convaincre de la faiblesse des arguments présentés par la Colombie.
Photo de la rencontre entre les présidents colombien et nicaraguayen suite à l’arrêt de la CIJ de novembre 2012, qui s’est tenue au Mexique, lors de l’investiture du président Peña Nieto en décembre 2012, extraite de ce communiqué de presse d’Infobae intitulé “Ortega y Santos se reunieron por el fallo de la CIJ”, édition du 1/12/2012.
De quelques points de détail
A noter que le seul juge de la CIJ originaire d’Amérique Latine (Antonio Cançado Trindade, Brésil) n’a pas pris part à cette décision, pour des raisons qui ne sont pas expliquées dans l’arrêt. Le premier jour des audiences tenues en septembre 2021 (voir le verbatim), la Présidente de la CIJ a indiqué que: “For reasons duly made known to me, Judge Cançado Trindade is unable to sit with us in these oral proceedings, either in person or by video link” (page 12). Le fait qu’un juge en exercice à la CIJ ne juge pas soulève toujours quelques questions, que nous avons également eu l’occasion de relever a l´occasion de la récente ordonnance de la CIJ à la Russie exigeant qu’elle cesse immédiatement son agression militaire contre l’Ukraine en mars 2022 (Note 1).
Il convient de noter, en ce qui concerne le point 7 précité, que la Colombie n’a pas vraiment expliqué comment cela affectait ses droits dans la zone économique exclusive (ZEE), un détail que le juge Mohamed Bennouna (Maroc) considère comme suffisant pour que la CIJ rejette la demande de la Colombie ; et qui maintenant, selon lui, crée un dangereux précédent pour la CIJ à l’avenir, du fait de l´existence dans le monde d’innombrables décrets unilatéraux fixant des lignes de base droites pour délimiter la mer territoriale (Note 2) qui ne respectent pas toujours les dispositions de la Convention sur le Droit de la Mer de 1982 (voir le texte de sa déclaration). Soit dit en passant, la Colombie n’a pas encore ratifié cet instrument universel (voir l’état officiel des signatures et des ratifications) : en Amérique Latine, outre la Colombie, seul le Salvador partage cette situation, ainsi que le Venezuela (qui ne l’a même pas signé).
En ce qui concerne les prétendus droits de pêche artisanale de la communauté des Raizales défendus par la Colombie devant le juge, le paragraphe 231 du jugement est on ne peut plus clair :
“231. Pour ces motifs, la Cour conclut que la Colombie n’a pas établi que les habitants de l’archipel de San Andrés, notamment les Raizals, jouissent de droits de pêche artisanale dans les eaux situées à présent dans la zone économique exclusive nicaraguayenne, ou que le Nicaragua a, par les déclarations unilatérales de son président, accepté ou reconnu l’existence de leurs droits de pêche traditionnels, ou pris l’engagement juridique de respecter de tels droits. Au vu de cette conclusion, point n’est besoin pour elle d’examiner les arguments des Parties quant au point de savoir si et dans quelles circonstances les droits de pêche traditionnels d’une communauté donnée peuvent survivre à la création de la zone économique exclusive d’un autre Etat, non plus que les violations desdits droits que le Nicaragua, selon la Colombie, aurait commises du fait du comportement de ses forces navales“.
Les paragraphes 219 à 224 donnent un idée des diverses inconsistances provenant des autorités colombiennes elles-mêmes sapant le bien-fondé des arguments avancés par leurs conseillers juridiques à La Haye : des incohérences qui ont, bien entendu, été fort habilement exploitées par leurs homologues défendant le Nicaragua.
Quelques perspectives après cet arrêt
La pratique enseigne qu’après la lecture d’un arrêt de la CIJ entre deux États, les chefs d’État des deux pays peuvent commencer à explorer une sorte de rapprochement, arrêt en main, afin de reconstruire progressivement leurs relations bilatérales, souvent fort détériorées. En Amérique latine, c’est ce qu’ont fait le Salvador et le Honduras en 1992 après avoir entendu un jugement de la CIJ mettant fin à leur long différend territorial (voir le texte de la déclaration conjointe), l’Argentine et l’Uruguay après une décision de la CIJ rendue en 2010 (voir l’article de la BBC), le Pérou et le Chili en janvier 2014 (voir l’article d’El Nuevo Siglo). Même les chefs d´Etat du Chili et de la Bolivie se sont réunis – très brièvement – en septembre 2015 lorsque la CIJ s’est déclarée compétente en rejetant les exceptions préliminaires présentées par le Chili (voir l´article de La Tercera).
De manière générale, on peut considérer que la lecture d’un arrêt de la CIJ sur le fond doit toujours être comprise comme le point d´aboutissement d’un processus et le début d’une nouvelle étape : en effet, pendant plusieurs années, les conseillers politiques et juridiques à La Haye des deux Etats ont construit une stratégie de confrontation, en élaborant des griefs et des revendications devant le juge international, qu’ils ont évoquées devant leurs opinions publiques respectives pour les convaincre de la défense irréprochable des intérêts nationaux qu´ils ont faite. Mais une fois le jugement rendu à La Haye, toutes ces discussions juridiques font partie du passé et en quelque sorte, s´effacent. Dans sa décision, le juge international a donné gain de cause sur certains points de droit à un État et d’autres à l’autre Etat, rejetant certains des griefs de l’un mais aussi de l’autre. C’est donc le texte de sa décision qui doit servir de base pour reconstruire leurs relations malmenées par des années de procédure à La Haye.
C´est dans cette perspective, qui explique l´équilibre subtile que le juge de La Haye cherche toujours à imprimer à ses décisions, que la reprise du dialogue au plus haut niveau constitue un espace politique naturel découlant de la lecture d’un arrêt de la CIJ entre deux Etats (exception faite – et assez remarquée – du Costa Rica et du Nicaragua). Ceci afin de tenter de normaliser progressivement leurs relations détériorées après plusieurs années de joutes juridiques à La Haye : comme tout espace politique, il est soumis aux aléas de la vie politique ; et surtout, à la capacité de saisir l´occasion qu´offre le juge international à deux Etats.
A cet égard, il convient de rappeler que peu après la lecture de l’arrêt du 19 novembre 2012, les chefs d´Etat de la Colombie et du Nicaragua ont eu l’occasion de se rencontrer à l’occasion de l’investiture du nouveau président du Mexique, Enrique Peña Nieto.
La Colombie a ensuite choisi de hausser le ton et ses autorités ont offert au monde un spectacle rarement vu : celui d’un État profondément mécontent par le contenu d ´une décision de la CIJ et adoptant une attitude sans précédent. Quelques semaines après le jugement de novembre 2012, la Colombie a décidé de dénoncer le Pacte de Bogota adopté en 1948 (voir communiqué officiel), devenant ainsi le premier État au monde à dénoncer un instrument international emblématique portant le nom de … sa propre capitale.
Dans le cadre de cette attitude assez particulière, le Présidente de la Colombie a déclaré l’arrêt de la CIJ de 2012 ” inapplicable ” en septembre 2013 (Note 3), tendant de manière prévisible les relations avec le Nicaragua et conduisant les autorités de ce dernier à introduire deux nouvelles requêtes contre la Colombie devant la CIJ.
Sur ce dernier point, il convient de noter que l´autre requête introduite par le Nicaragua en 2013 (voir les détails de la procédure dans ce lien officiel de la CIJ), également liée à la mer des Caraïbes, est toujours en attente de sa résolution. Des dates doivent encore être fixées pour les audiences orales entre les deux États à La Haye, qui constituent la dernière étape de la phase contradictoire de la procédure contentieuse : après quoi, des délibérations auront lieu jusqu´ à la lecture de l´arrêt. Il convient de noter que le délibéré de la CIJ est généralement de 6 mois mais peut prendre jusqu’à 13 mois (c’est ce qui s’est passé dans le cas de la délimitation maritime entre le Pérou et le Chili en 2014). Dans la toute première affaire opposant le Costa Rica au Nicaragua (voir détails procéduraux et arrêt du 13 juillet 2009), la CIJ a surpris de nombreux observateurs avec un délibéré de seulement 4 mois.
L’existence de cette seconde affaire pendante entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie ne devrait pas servir de prétexte pour ne pas initier une phase de rapprochement au plan bilatéral. Les deux États peuvent désormais s’asseoir pour négocier sur les différents aspects de l’arrêt lu le 21 avril 2022. Il convient de rappeler que ce différend maritime entre la Colombie et le Nicaragua a débuté en 1980.
En guise de conclusion
À notre avis, la lecture d’un arrêt de la CIJ devrait toujours être célébrée, car elle consolide l’idée que la force du droit prévaut sur le droit de la force dans les relations entre deux États. Cette affirmation s´avère particulièrement pertinente en 2022 (et en particulier depuis le 24 février), année dans laquelle le monde assiste à une tentative de la Russie de faire prévaloir en Ukraine le droit de la force sur la force du droit, la conduisant à une véritable impasse.
On se doit de saluer la persévérance et la confiance du Nicaragua depuis 2001 dans la justice internationale face aux actions (plutôt inhabituelles) observées, notamment depuis novembre 2012, des autorités colombiennes : ces dernières devraient être en mesure de revoir leur stratégie, évaluer les résultats obtenus et adopter des mesures qui soient plus conformes avec ce qui a été clairement établi depuis 2012 par le juge de La Haye et réitéré une nouvelle fois en 2022.
Espérons que les plus hautes autorités des deux États chercheront un moyen de réorienter leurs relations vers des eaux moins turbulentes : en effet, le Nicaragua et la Colombie sont engagés depuis 21 ans dans des batailles juridiques complexes mais aussi fort coûteuses (Note 4) à La Haye relative à un différend que, d’ordinaire, deux États voisins en mer ayant la volonté de le résoudre, peuvent parfaitement régler par la voie de la négociation.
Au passage, le Costa Rica (Note 5), mais aussi la Jamaïque et le Panama, qui avaient des traités bilatéraux de délimitation maritime avec la Colombie dans la Mer des Caraïbes (Note 6) devraient commencer à penser à adapter leurs traités de délimitation à une nouvelle réalité cartographique : en effet, depuis le mois de novembre 2012, (et malgré l’enthousiasme prononcé de la Présidente du Costa Rica en 2013 pour s´associer aux réclamations de la Colombie – voir article d’El Espectador), l’un de leurs voisins maritimes dans la mer des Caraïbes s’appelle le Nicaragua.
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– – Notes – –
Note 1: Cf. BOEGLIN N., “Ucrania-Rusia: Corte Internacional de Justicia (CIJ) ordena medidas provisionales a Rusia“, DIPúblico, édition du 16/03/2022, disponible ici.
Note 2 : Voir, par exemple, le cas du Décret Exécutif 18851-RE adopté par le Costa Rica en 1988 sur les lignes de base droites dans le Pacifique, qui a fait l’objet d’une note de protestation officielle des États-Unis en 1989 (les deux textes sont disponibles dans ce numéro de Limits in the Seas, une publication fort utile du Département d’État nord américain).
Nota 3: Cf. BOEGLIN N., “La décision de la Colombie de déclarer “non-applicable” l´arrêt de la CIJ: breves réflexions“, Université Laval (Canada), document disponible ici, ainsi que sur le site juridique spécialisé en droit international en France Sentinelle (voir hyperlien).
Note 4 : Le coût exact d’une demande de La Haye, que ce soit pour l ´Etat demandeur ou pour l’État défendeur, est généralement une zone grise sur laquelle les États restent quelque peu imprécis. Pour ce qui est de l´Amérique Latine, une presse un peu plus aguerrie et curieuse que la presse nicaraguayenne (ou costaricienne, ou hondurienne), comme la presse colombienne, a réussi à obtenir des chiffres sur les seuls honoraires perçus par les conseillers internationaux et nationaux pour définir la meilleure stratégie après l’arrêt Nicaragua-Colombie de 2012 (voir article de Semana) ; concernant les actions antérieures à 2012, le même média colombien a accédé à la liste des honoraires perçus par la vingtaine de juristes engagés par la Colombie (voir article). En Amérique latine, certaines informations ont circulé sporadiquement dans quelques médias : il est assez surprenant que ni les salles de rédaction, ni les organes chargés des finances publiques, ni les commentateurs, ni les partis d’opposition n’aient manifesté de curiosité sur ce sujet précis. Ainsi, en Argentine, il a été possible d’avoir accès au ” taux horaire ” des conseillers internationaux engagés pour traiter la demande uruguayenne (voir note de presse 2010). Dans le cas du Chili, en 2015, le Pouvoir Exécutif a dû reconnaître (contre sa volonté) avoir dépensé 20,3 millions de dollars pour faire face à la seule requête introduite par le Pérou devant la CIJ (voir note de presse). Une décision de la Cour suprême du Chili en janvier 2014 (voir texte) a annulé la décision judiciaire précédente ordonnant la divulgation de ces données, mettant ainsi en évidence la résistance de l’appareil judiciaire chilien à rendre certaines choses vraiment transparentes. Dans le cas de la Colombie, afin d’obtenir le retrait de la requête introduite par l’Équateur devant la CIJ relative aux épandages chimiques aériens en 2008, elle a choisi de déposer auprès de l’Équateur en 2013 la somme de 15 millions de dollars (qui comprend notamment les frais de l’Équateur dans la procédure devant la CIJ – voir le point 9 de l’accord entre la Colombie et l’Équateur du 9/09/2013). Le montant extrêmement précis indiqué par le contrôleur général de la République du Nicaragua de 6 169 029 dollars pour faire face à l’unique requête introduite alors par le Costa Rica en mai 2011 (voir l’article d’El Nuevo Diario) est, à notre avis, un indicateur à prendre en considération qui devrait être affiné et complété. Nous serions reconnaissants à nos chers lecteurs de nous envoyer le rapport détaillé concernant ce montant sur cette affaire précise qui s’est conclue en 2015, afin d’examiner les différends éléments contenus pour parvenir à ce chiffre (courriel : cursodicr(a)gmail.com) ; ou plus généralement, tout autre rapport officiel détaillé qu’ils pourraient avoir en leur possession concernant un autre État ayant plaidé à La Haye. En ce qui concerne le Costa Rica, le montant dépensé par l’État costaricien pour couvrir les frais de défense de ce que l´on peut appeler “instances à répétitions” contre le Nicaragua en 2005, 2010, 2014 et 2017, ainsi que pour faire face à la requête introduite par le Nicaragua contre le Costa Rica en 2011 en raison de la construction de la fameuse ” trocha fronteriza ” par le Costa Rica, reste inconnu. L’incapacité démontrée par le Costa Rica pour négocier le montant des dommages environnementaux causés par le Nicaragua sur l’île de Portillos que la CIJ avait retenu dans son arrêt de décembre 2015 (voir texte), invitant expressément les deux États à s’entendre sur le montant (paragraphe 142), a nécessité une deuxième étape procédurale : celle-ci ne s´est achevée qu´en février 2018 par un nouvel arrêt de la CIJ (voir texte), fixant un montant 15 fois inférieur à celui demandé par le Costa Rica (378.000 US$ contre les 6,7 millions de US$ réclamés par le Costa Rica). Nous renvoyons nos chers lecteurs à cette article en espagnol que nous avons rédigé sur cet arrêt de 2018 de la CIJ, intitulé ” Costa Rica- Nicaragua: apuntes sobre la compensación por daño ambiental en Isla Portillos fijada por la CIJ” publié sur le site de HablandoClaro (Costa Rica) et à une analyse précédente également en espagnol publiée sur le site de l´OPALC de SciencesPo/Paris intitulée “Monto por daño causado en Isla Portillos oficializado por Costa Rica “.
Note 5 : Dans le cas du Costa Rica, il a été jugé plus opportun de profiter de l élan produit par les “instances à répétition” contre le Nicaragua concernant le fleuve San Juan caractérisant la période 2005-2017 pour demander à la CIJ en 2014 de déterminer la frontière maritime entre les deux (Costa Rica et Nicaragua) et ce dans les deux océans, affaire qui a été réglé par le juge international en février 2018 (voir l´arrêt de la CIJ).
Note 6 : La carte indiquée dans cet article permet de mettre en lumière quelques aspects concernant la délimitation maritime de la Mer des Caraïbes en Amérique Centrale. Dans le cas du Panama, il s’agit d’un traité signé avec la Colombie en 1976 (voir texte et carte disponibles dans ce numéro de Limits in the Seas). Dans le cas du Costa Rica, il s’agit d’un traité similaire de 1977 qui n’a jamais été ratifié par le Costa Rica (voir le texte et la carte disponibles dans ce numéro de Limits in the Seas) : les deux traités négociés par la Colombie ont été signés avant que la notion de zone économique exclusive (ZEE) ne soit consacrée en tant que telle dans la Convention sur le Droit de la Mer de 1982. Dans le cas de la Jamaïque, le traité signé avec la Colombie date de 1993 (voir texte) et les cartes (voir cartes et texte en annexe 2 – pp.12-15 de ce numéro de Limits in the Seas).
The coronavirus pandemic has revealed all the benefits and accelerated the processes of digitalization around the world. On how to build an effective digitalization policy, and what steps are being taken in Uzbekistan in this direction, “Dunyo” IA correspondent talked with Farrukh Khakimov, Head of Department at the Development Strategy Center.
– For developing countries and for Uzbekistan, in particular, digital transformation has a potential to further modernize society and integrate national economy into the global processes, – says the expert. – In this vein, in the framework of the ongoing reforms and in the new Development Strategy of Uzbekistan for the coming five years special attention is being paid to digitalization of major spheres and to build a true information society in the country.
Uzbekistan prioritized digitalization and development of information-communication technologies (ICT) yet in early 2000s. For instance, Uzbekistan has been implementing an integrated program of National Information and Communication System Development 2013-2020, the National Action Strategy on Five Priority Development Areas 2017-2021, the “Digital Uzbekistan – 2030” Strategy and the latest the Development Strategy of New Uzbekistan for 2022-2026 to implement digital transformation in national economy, industry and society in general.
Consequently, in a relatively short period of time, Uzbekistan has achieved visible results in the sphere of digitalization and ICT development. In particular, substantial progress has been observed in introducing e-government and ICT in public sector for the last few years, when in 2013 was launched “Single portal of interactive government services” – central e-government service of the country.
Moreover, digital and IT infrastructure of the country has remarkably improved, considerable amount of resources were invested which built solid foundations for better ecosystem of the ICT.
As a result, in the country, according to the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Statistics, in the field of Information and communication during 2017-2021, the gross value added increased more than 2 times and reached 11.8 trillion UZS (more than 1 billion US dollars) in 2021.
In addition, since the creation of IT parks in Uzbekistan, the industry’s export volume has grown 50 times and reached 46 million US dollars. The number of park residents increased from 147 to 500, more than 300 new companies were opened and 8,500 highly paid jobs have been created. Currently more than 11 thousand young people work in IT parks.
The total length of fiber-optic communication lines in the country has been remarkably expanding since 2017. For instance, during 2017-2022 it has increased almost 6 times and reached 118 thousand kilometers as of January 2022.
Since 2017, the overall bandwidth speed of the international networks has been increased more than 28-fold – from 64.2 to 1800 Gbit/s in January 2022.
As of January 2022, in Uzbekistan following the public administration reforms and digitalization of the sphere 56% public services provided through the portal of interactive public services (e-government portal). The number of public services on the e-government platform of the country (my.gov.uz) reached 307 and 1.3 million citizens are actively using such electronic public services. Whereas, the total number of Internet users in Uzbekistan reached 27.2 million.
At the same time following the revealed vulnerabilities and challenges in the sphere, the government has revised and upgraded its national digitalization strategy under the impact of the global pandemic.
Meanwhile Uzbekistan recognized the power of digitalization in transforming society, whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has made that transformation essential.
In this vein, the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s Decree on October 5, 2020 has approved countries Strategy “Digital Uzbekistan – 2030” and “Roadmap” for its implementation. According to the document from all state obligatory payments such as fees and fines are being made through provided online payment-services. Furthermore, in line with the Strategy “Digital Uzbekistan – 2030” more than 400 information systems, electronic services and other software products in various areas of socio-economic development are being carried out automatically.
Among expected results of “Digital Uzbekistan – 2030” Strategy are high-quality and inexpensive Internet and mobile communications, the reduce of the digital divide between cities and villages.
Adoption of the “Digital Uzbekistan – 2030” Strategy and the “road map” for its implementation in 2020-2022 creates, first of all, a legal basis for the transition to a digital economy. The document includes such priority areas as the development of digital infrastructure, e-government, the national digital technology market, education and advanced training in the field of information technology.
The strategy considers approval of two programs: digitalization of regions and digitalization of industries. Thus, two approaches are considered as territorial and industrial. Undoubtedly it will provide the most comprehensive coverage and effective implementation of the document.
The most important conditions and guarantees for the successful implementation of the Strategy is to ensure funding and increase the digital literacy of the population. So, according to the document, the Ministry for Development of Information Technologies and Communications of the Republic of Uzbekistan, together with other relevant governmental bodies will take measures to complete the digitalization of preschool education, health care and secondary schools by the end of first stage of the implementation period.
The implementation of the Strategy will ensure the provision of high-quality digital services to the population, reduce corruption, increase the level of citizen involvement in government decision-making processes, modernize the system of higher and secondary education in order to ensure the competitiveness of citizens not only within the country, but also in the regional and global labour markets.
The Strategy contributes the implementation of other national strategic documents and programs and, first of all will be important for achieving the national goals and objectives in the field of the UN Sustainable Development Goals for the period up to 2030, as well as the Development Strategy of New Uzbekistan for 2022-2026.
The Development Strategy of New Uzbekistan for 2022-2026 which has been adopted on January 28, 2022 covers seven priority areas of further reforms regarding a good governance, public administration, the rule of law, economic development, social policy, spiritual enlightenment, security as well as an open, pragmatic and active foreign policy. In turn, the seven priority areas identify hundred target goals to be achieved by 2026.
Digitalization of several important spheres such as public services both at central and local levels by improving “e-government”; the judicial system; law enforcement; the traffic control system; healthcare system; social services as well as social protection, banking and agriculture sectors and other main spheres of the national economy have been targeted in the new Development Strategy.
In particular, improvement of the e-government of Uzbekistan and bringing the share of electronic public services to 100 %, implementation of “Mobile ID-identification” system of a person in the provision of public services, introduction of “digital passport of citizens” and “digital authority” project have been prioritized to digitalize public administration and optimize administrative procedures at central and local levels.
By maintaining stable growth rates of it is planned to reach 4,000 US dollars GDP per capita and join the group of countries with “upper-middle income” by 2030. In this regard, the development of the digital economy is also defined as the main “driver” with an increase in its share by at least 2.5 times by the end of 2026. Moreover, it is planned to expand the volume of the software products industry 5 times, and software export – 10 times, up to 500 million US dollars, the level of digitalization of production and operational processes in the real sector of the economy, in the financial and banking sectors to 70% by the end of 2026. Moreover, digitalization of urban planning and construction, development of cities in accordance with the concept of “Smart City” has been prioritized.
Certainly, in the context of the global pandemic and in general digital technology and services play a central role in recovering from the pandemic and also building resilient economies. Therefore, expanded digitalization and digital transformation should be the main priorities for developing countries, like Uzbekistan. For the last decade, Uzbekistan has achieved remarkable results in the sphere of digitalization and ICT development, especially, in provision of digital public services. Meanwhile, along with ongoing cooperation with South Korea, Russia, Estonia, China it is necessary to attract more technologically advanced countries such as Germany, United Kingdom, United States, Singapore, Japan and others to ICT sector of the country by diversifying geography of international partners. Investing in digital eco-system, ICT infrastructure and qualified IT services will further facilitate modernization of national economy and accelerate inclusive growth in all spheres.
ByMukhsinjon Kholmukhamedov,Deputy director of the Center for Economic Research and Reforms under the Administration of the President of Uzbekistan
The video conference held on April 15, 2022 under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev was devoted to the issues of ensuring price stability in markets by increasing food production within the framework of food supply security of the country, as well as additional support for entrepreneurs.
It should be noted that during the reforms in the country, the business sector has traditionally been given increased attention. This is evidenced by the dynamics of growth of registered small business enterprises in Uzbekistan, when in 2021 there were 503 thousand companies (in 2016 – 278 thousand), and now there are about 1.5 million entrepreneurs who have created about 5 million jobs.
On August 20, 2021, during the first open dialogue with entrepreneurs, a large number of issues were raised in the sphere of taxation, land use, business facilitation, support for exports and other issues of concern to entrepreneurs. At that time, more than 15,000 appeals, questions and proposals from business were received in such areas as: financing and crediting of business, taxation, allocation of land, accessibility of infrastructure, obtaining licenses and permits. Then, following the results of the meeting, appropriate instructions were given and specific tasks were set.
During the video conference on April 15, 2022, additional measures to support entrepreneurs were also discussed. The President put forward a number of initiatives aimed at reducing the tax burden, inspections and requirements for entrepreneurs, simplifying the issuance of permits, supporting exporters, refunding VAT and increasing the attractiveness of credit, as well as critical comments on the work of state bodies at the local level to solve existing problems in the sphere of development of entrepreneurship and specified deadlines for their solution.
Taxes, inspections and authorizations
It is noteworthy that in the past three years the number of taxes in the country has been reduced from 16 to 9, and the rates of property, income and social taxes have been reduced by half. The meeting announced the simplification of the tax administration and inspection system for entrepreneurs from June 1, 2022. Thus, with the conversion of the property tax system to market principles, the practice of applying additional high tax rates to inefficient facilities will be abolished. In addition, innovations have also affected VAT, namely, enterprises with a turnover of more than 1 billion sum will automatically – without prior analysis and verification – be assigned the status of VAT payer, and taxpayers in the high-risk zone will be notified of this prior to the suspension of the VAT certificate.
Moreover, 22 types of audits would now be conducted only with the permission of the business ombudsman to prevent undue interference with business activities. In the same time, the task was foreseen to simplify the requirements for the issuance of various permits. For example, if we analyze the 200 sanitary standards in force today, it turns out that it is simply impossible to comply with 20. This is especially true for sanitary requirements for catering establishments, as well as for delivery services. Thus, as the main problems related to catering, attention was paid to the outdated legislation, a large tax burden (catering pays 7-9 types of taxes), which is why part of this business goes into «shadow», as well as numerous inspections, that create an enabling environment for corruption. To solve these problems, approaches will be revised, and outdated points and requirements in the legislation will be canceled.
In support of exporters
Support for exporters will be strengthened, in particular, by solving the problem of VAT refunds. Thus, for exporters, a simplified mechanism will now be used, namely, when 80% of VAT will be paid back within 7 days without additional checks (previously 60 days and the 7-day fast refund was available only for some categories of exporters). The last year’s open dialogue with entrepreneurs set a task to introduce the procedure of VAT refund without additional documents, which will greatly facilitate the provision of reports for more than 14 thousand entrepreneurs. Obviously, the task will finally be accomplished this year.
Also in addition to this innovation should be recalled the Presidential Decree «On additional measures to support participants in foreign trade activities», signed on April 6, 2022, according to which until April 1, 2023 local enterprises, High value-added exporters will receive subsidies for transport costs, where they will account for 50% of transport costs for exports to the near abroad and 70% for exports to the EU. This will reduce logistics costs, increase the volume of exported products with high added value and increase its competitiveness in foreign markets. In addition, the meeting mandated the establishment of a permanent headquarters to liaise with exporters to address emerging issues immediately and in a timely manner. There will be a call center at the headquarters where you can reach the short number 1094.
Access to land and credit
At the meetings in the regions, entrepreneurs voiced more than a thousand problematic issues, among which the most often related to affordable credit, tax administration, as well as land allocation. Separately focus was on the issue of sale of land plots from e-auctions. Despite the fact that 35,000 plots of land were included in the electronic system, not a single land plot in Navoi, Syrdarya, Tashkent regions and the city of Tashkent was put up for auction. Khokims have been instructed to treat this issue with all seriousness and responsibility.
Last year the President instructed to auction objects of state property together with the land on which they are located as a single property complex, and entrepreneurs who bought the building, will also be able to own the land adjacent to it on the right of private property. A working group has already been established under the Cabinet of Ministers, which will coordinate the identification of vacant areas in the context of makhallas, the formation of projects involving professional organizations and the implementation of land plots.
In addition, the Head of State instructed to allocate additional funds to the State Fund for Support of Entrepreneurship and to increase the effectiveness of financial assistance. Thus, in the services sector, the National Bank of Uzbekistan will attract $200 million, which will be directed to entrepreneurs. The amount of the loan will be up to 5 billion sums, and the loan rate will not exceed 18% taking into account compensation from the fund. At the same time, $300 million will be allocated to finance small and medium-sized business projects in the regions. These funds will be placed in national currency at a 10% rate for a period of 7 years in banks offering the best conditions for entrepreneurs. At the same time, the rate of the credit provided to the entrepreneur will not exceed 14%. Non-bank financial institutions will also be given opportunities to finance business – this will be provided for in the new law. Mechanisms for crediting entrepreneurs in national currency are also being introduced, regardless of the currency in which banks attract resources, and tax benefits for entrepreneurs registered in economic zones will also remain. Special attention will be paid to the necessity of rational use of funds and only to the projects that will pay off, increase incomes and create jobs.
Business activity indicators continue to grow
It should be noted that over the years of the reforms, about 2 thousand laws, decrees and resolutions aimed at supporting the development of private business have been adopted. Special attention was paid to the elimination of numerous administrative barriers to business. 114 licenses and permits for 33 types of activities were canceled, procedures for obtaining permits were simplified and the terms of their issuance were reduced by an average of 2 times. Unnecessary checks have also been canceled, restrictions related to the turnover of cash, currency and raw materials have been lifted. The positive effects of these reforms can be clearly seen in various economic indicators calculated monthly by the Center for Economic Research and Reforms, such as the Business Activity Index (IDA) and the Business Climate Index, implemented according to the methodology of the analog of the Business Climate Index of the IFO Institute in Germany (IFO Institut). Thus, in March 2022, IDA in the regions and the capital increased by 2.6% compared to the previous month, and the consolidated indicator of the business climate in February 2022 was 60 points, which assesses the state of the business climate in the country as positive.
Speaking about key business indicators in the regions and the capital, the volume of tax revenues in the period from January 1 to March 31, 2022 increased by 17.4% compared to the same period last year. This growth was achieved due to positive changes in the economy, the conjuncture of prices on the world gold market, improvement of the tax administration system, including the introduction of new administrative tools, digitalization and automation of processes, legalization of business activities and simplification of the procedure for compliance with the requirements of tax legislation. As for the receipts of customs payments for this period, they increased by 45.7%. This increase is due to an increase in the volume of taxable imports and the exchange rate, measures taken by customs authorities to simplify customs procedures, accelerate the release of goods into free circulation and the introduction of new methods of customs administration.
The volume of exports of goods has increased by 12.2% since the beginning of the year compared to the same period last year. It is due to the growing growth rates of exports of industrial goods, food products, chemicals and agri-food products. Not to forget about the volume of loans issued by commercial banks during this period, which increased by 8.5% compared to the same period last year due to lending to large projects in the real sector of the economy. It is also worth noting an increase in the volume of transactions on the Uzbek Republican Commodity Exchange by 43.8%, due to an increase in sales of such goods as gasoline, diesel fuel, rolled ferrous metals, cotton fiber, construction materials, etc.
Khokimiyats and public councils are given tasks
A large number of unjustified inspections of the activities of entrepreneurs by some khokimiyats were critically evaluated. Thus, 11,000 checks were carried out in Tashkent, 8,000 in Tashkent region, 7,000 in Fergana region and 6,000 in Surkhandarya region. Khokims were instructed to hold meetings with entrepreneurs within a week and solve their problems. Also, despite the measures taken, there are still a number of complex and important tax administration and burden sharing issues that require careful and constructive consideration. Therefore, a Public Council shall be established under the State Tax Committee, where regular meetings will be held with members of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Chamber of Tax Advisers, the Chamber of Auditors and the National Association of Accountants and Auditors, as well as scientists, entrepreneurs and public figures. In addition, in order to continue the dialogue with the business on the measures taken and on new software products, the Ministry of Finance and the State Tax Committee together with the professional organizations will hold regular meetings with entrepreneurs, as well as discuss their proposals and issues, including those coming through telegram channels to tax authorities.
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Transformations aimed at eliminating numerous administrative barriers to business, non-interference in entrepreneurial activity and, in general, improving the business climate, will lead to significant positive changes both in the country’s economy and in business development. Active implementation will allow accelerated achievement of the large-scale goals set in the “Development Strategy of New Uzbekistan for 2022-2026”.
This week I conducted my first official visit to Nigeria, on the invitation of the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice.
I wish to thank the Nigerian authorities for hosting me and my delegation, and for their expressed commitment to ensuring justice for Rome Statute crimes in partnership with the International Criminal Court. My message was clear: accountability for atrocity crimes is essential. Impunity cannot be an option, and my Office will continue to fulfil its statutory obligations in relation to the situation in Nigeria, in cooperation with relevant national authorities.
This visit was driven by the need to continue my Office’s engagement with the Nigerian authorities and clarify the status of the situation in Nigeria following the conclusion of its preliminary examination by my predecessor in December 2020.
During my visit I was pleased to meet with their Excellencies Mr Muhammadu Buhari, President of the Federation, Prof. Oluyemi Oluleke Osinbajo, Vice President of the Federation, Hon. Geoffrey Jideofor Kwusike Onyeama, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr Benjamin Ogu Okolo, Acting Solicitor General of the Federation and Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Justice in the absence of Hon. Abubakar Malami SAN, Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice.
In these discussions, I recalled that the legal criteria to open an investigation into the Situation in Nigeria were met in relation to allegations of crimes committed in the course of the non-international armed conflict between the Nigerian security forces and Boko Haram. We were in agreement that the principle of complementarity enshrined in the Rome Statue required such crimes to be addressed through domestic proceedings, or failing that, by my Office. We explored in this context different avenues to close the impunity gap and deliver on the legitimate expectations of justice from victims and survivors on all sides.
We also discussed ways in which crimes committed by non-State armed groups associated with Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”), Al-Qaida, including Boko Haram, could be effectively addressed through joint efforts by the numerous affected States within the regions of West Africa, the Sahel and beyond. It is clear that the actions of such entities do not respect geographic borders. International cooperation, collective action are therefore essential in ensuring those responsible for atrocities are held to account in accordance with the rule of law.
During my visit I have furthermore shared with the Nigerian authorities my vision on the role regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the African Union could play in the global fight against impunity for serious international crimes in partnership with my Office.
In all discussions, I reminded Nigerian authorities of their legal obligations under the Rome Statute to conduct effective, genuine and meaningful national investigations and prosecutions with respect to the potential cases identified by my Office, particularly in relation to members of the Nigerian security forces. I have pledged in this regard to provide Nigerian judicial authorities with the necessary technical assistance and knowledge transfer within the available means of my Office. As I have repeatedly stated, the meaningful realisation of the vision set out in the Statute can only be achieved by deepening cooperation and by finding common ground wherever possible, even in difficult circumstances. I will therefore continue to look for ways and means to engage in dialogue to promote complementarity, whether at the current threshold where we stand or in the context of an opened situation.
We have furthermore agreed with Nigerian authorities on the next immediate steps to inform any future decision I will be making on the situation. I have proposed clear timelines in this respect and welcome Nigeria’s commitment to conclude a formal agreement with my Office on these issues in the near future.
I trust that this visit opens a new chapter of enhanced collaboration and cooperation between Nigeria and my Office that will serve the interests of the victims of alleged crimes committed in Nigeria and beyond. After over a decade of communications and exchanges between my Office and Nigerian authorities we need to now move with urgency to deliver on our joint commitments to justice and translate these into concrete actions.
IHE Delft Interview with Mr. Al-Hamdani, Alumnus & Water Resources Minister of Iraq.
Iraq needs to develop capacity so that it can handle water-related challenges arising from climate change and the absence of agreements with upstream countries, Iraqi Water Resource Minister Mahdi Rashid Al-Hamdani said during a visit this week to IHE Delft – his alma mater.
The visit by Minister Al-Hamdani and a delegation from the Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) focused an ongoing capacity development project and explored opportunities to further strengthen collaboration between MoWR and IHE Delft as well as other institutions in the Dutch water sector.
“Iraq is an arid country, located downstream from two main rivers – Tigris and Euphrates. This means that more than 80% of our water comes from upper-basin countries like Turkey, Syria and Iran. However, currently there is no international agreement to manage and share water, between these riparian countries,” the minister said at a livestreamed seminar at IHE Delft.
Droughts resulting from climate change has worsened the situation, he said, noting that the country needs capacity to ensure equitable water access for all parts of Iraq, including those south of Baghdad.
Collaboration Needed
IHE Delft, the MoWR and other partners are working together to enhance the capacity of the water sector in Iraq through tailor-made trainings and research initiatives. The project, initiated in 2019, is funded by the Dutch Foreign Ministry under IHE Delft’s Water and Development Partnership programme.
IHE Delft Rector Eddy Moors said Iraq’s situation underlined the need for different sectors to collaborate: the water needs of the country’s agriculture sector, which is working hard to improve food security, must be balanced with needs to reduce water use. “I admire the ambition of Iraq to improve water use efficiency by more than 30 percent in the coming decade,” he added
Since graduating from IHE Delft in 2007 with an MSc in Water Management, Minister Al-Hamdani has fostered close collaboration with the Institute.“Since I’m an IHE alumni, I have a good understanding of what IHE can do for our country. The cooperation with IHE is central to our efforts,” he said. Currently, 18 IHE Delft alumni work at MoWR.
