Highlighting the speech by His Excellency George Vella, President of the Republic of Malta
On May 19th, as part of the Geneva Lecture Series concepted and conducted by prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic, numerous international affairs specialists, faculty fellows, practitioners and diplomats gathered for an event on the hard and soft security issues in the Mediterranean. The speech “Hard and Soft Security Issues in the Mediterranean” given by the President of the Republic of Malta, His Excellency George Vella, was the highlight of this highly mesmerizing two-hour event.
Opening the event, the University Rector of UMEF reminded the audience that “the Country’s meaning, reputation and position is well beyond its physical size: Malta is European, island and Mediterranean country, yet at the very gate of Afro-Asia. Country is enriched by fascinating layers of millennial history (better to say histories), but also with a clear, dynamic and vibrant promise of inclusive and sustainable tomorrow for all generations of Maltese and Europeans. Hence, Malta (with its past) is a journey, but it is a (our common) destination, too.”
During his lecture, President Vella gave a comprehensive analysis and explanation of the key current security issues in the Mediterranean, in which he discussed a variety of topics, such as: the hard security threats -especially Libya, the Middle East Peace Process, an assessment of the developments in Iran, and the matter of small weapons; soft security threats; horizontal issues; the launch of a new European Union Agenda for the Mediterranean, and the role that Malta has played in addressing these security issues in the Mediterranean. Here you may find a synopsis of these main topics discussed by the President of Malta in his speech during the conference.
President Vella began his intervention by stating that developments in the Mediterranean should not only be of concern only to Malta since the repercussions of what happens in the region expand to all other parts of the world. Along with this, the President affirmed that the region is very diverse and not as homogeneous as some may think. He made distinctions between Western, Central, and Eastern Mediterranean perspectives and the changing realities that drive them.
His Excellency then addressed the hard security threats in the Mediterranean through a political sphere, since there are no current military threats in the region.
He began by undertaking the situation in Libya caused by the instability in government leadership, which has caused hardship, uncertainty, and difficulties in managing irregular migration flows transiting in Libya and into Europe. The President stated that “Following several comings and goings, meetings and conferences, lives lost, and constant meddling by external regional players for their own gains, we are now looking at a proverbial light at the end of the tunnel”. He also believes that “The United Nations has admittedly saved the day through careful and patient negotiations, but we should think of a more visible and hands-on stabilising presence of the UN in the country”. His excellency affirmed that it is time for the international community to engage with Libya to demonstrate support for the new transitional government, and the peace that it will bring along with it.
President Vella then proceeded to tackle the Middle East Peace Process in which he stated that as of now there is “no peace and hardly any process to achieve it”. The President addressed the current escalating conflicts between Israel and Palestine with much sorrow for the hardships of the populations involved. He observes that “This is not the time for repetitive, weak statements that are of no substance and are shelved in the bottom drawer. He called upon the international community to act on this matter and in defense of the innocent lives that are being lost every day.
President Vella also briefly addressed the developments in Iran in which he underlined the importance for the new US administration to re-join the Iran Nuclear Deal (the JCPOA) to ensure its full implementation.
Moreover, he tackled the production, procurement, and distribution of light arms and small weapons and ammunitions which he described as the one of the biggest threats to the Mediterranean. He observed that major powers produce and supply weapons and ammunition instead of controlling their sales and flow. He sees this as imminent challenge because “The proliferation of small arms and light weapons leads to conflict, displaced civilian populations, death of innocent people, while creating general instability and humanitarian crises”.
President Vella then took on the topic of soft security threats which he began by affirming that these are just as dangerous and disruptive for the region as the hard ones. The main issues of this characteristic that were addressed by the President included: migration and human trafficking, terrorism and extremism, inequalities and economic disparities, as well as organized crime such as illegal trafficking of drugs, contraband of oil, and money laundering.
Touching upon the migration issues, President Vella urged the EU Member States for “tangible solidarity” in helping to mitigate them as this has not been the case so far.
Further on, he stressed the importance of economic reforms in the region that must owned by the countries themselves, and not outsiders, to promote educational opportunities in hopes to find solutions for these soft security challenges in the future.
Alongside this, His Excellency tackled the matter of ‘horizontal issues’ which also pose threats to the Mediterranean and gave the examples of climate change and the preservation and protection of the marine environment, regarding which he stated that “In order to address this wide range of challenges there has to be a comprehensive strategy that is also effective on the ground and with the population”. He undertook these issues by affirming that they put even more pressure on the already scare resources and drive massive levels of migration in search for higher standards of living.
Additionally, the President of Malta called upon the launch of a new European Union Agenda for the Mediterranean. He stated that many of the already existing proposals have been discussed time and time again but have proven to be “non-starters” or have not had the expected results. It is imperative for goals set on paper to be actually transformed into actions that benefit the population.
Lastly, President Vella addressed the role that Malta has played in addressing these threats. He stated that regional and sub-regional initiatives such as the Union for the Mediterranean are they key to resolving this issue and describes the political climate as a “laboratory for Parliamentary Diplomacy”. Moreover, he affirmed that Malta participates in multiple fora as the 5+5 dialogue, the EU MED 7, and the commonly known Malta Initiative.
The President of the Republic of Malta, His Excellency, George Vella, closed his intervention by stating that the doors to dialogue must always remain open no matter what and that we must speak and listen to one another at all times no that there may be hope in resolving these issues.
About the author:
Isabella Maria Bello Arocha
Madrid-based junior researcher specialized in law and international relations. Covers International Institute IFIMES before the UNWTO and other Iberia-based international organizations.
On the International Women’s Day, a large number of international affairs specialists gathered for the second consecutive summit in Vienna, Austria. This leg of the Vienna Process titled: “Europe – Future – Neighborhood at 75: Disruptions Recalibration Continuity”. The conference, jointly organized by the Modern Diplomacy, IFIMES and their partners, with the support of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, was aimed at discussing the future of Europe and its neighbourhood in the wake of its old and new challenges.[1]
Along with the two acting State Presidents, the event was endorsed by the keynote of the EU Commissioner for European Neighbourhood and Enlargement, Excellency Olivér Várhelyi. Besides discussing the strategic neighbourhood and the Union’s approach to it, underlaying leitmotif was deliverability of the Union’s ambitious New Green Deal for Europe. Numerous panellists (nearly all of the Conference’s Panel II and III) warned that there will be no success in the EU Green Deal without balanced and politically unbiased approach to Energy, Infrastructure and Transport. Senior researcher and geoeconomics specialist from Ukraine, Maria Smotrytska, elaborated on the topic of greening, as follows:
Today the whole world is aware of the global problem of climate warming. Due to the increase in the concentration of greenhouse gases and harmful emissions into the atmosphere, this problem is getting worse every year. And the main question is how we can answer the fundamental challenge of global warming. The core issue is decarbonisation, but to ensure the economic growth in countries around the world, the link between the development of transportation and solution of the problem of global warming should be considered as the main.
The most inhabitant part of the world and the largest landmass of the Globe is Eurasia. Thus it is the biggest producer of CO2 and, hence, the most polluted part of the world. But we cannot leave it as it is right now. Also important to understand that the biggest countries-producers (Far East) and countries-consumers (West Europe) are located on the edge of the Eurasia. These countries drive world’s economies and may play crucial role in improving ecology and environmental standards.
Transportation logistics between Far East and Western Europe is vital for world’s economic development, but today we do not have reliable technologies and transport lines. Due to this it is necessary to think on few aspects, which may determine the development of environmental friendly economies in future :
reliable transportation (safe and environmentally friendly) ;
cheapest modes and transshipment lines ;
fastest modes of transportation
The most reliable mode of the transportation is railway. It has certain advantages (compared to air and maritime transport) in the following areas: regularity (rhythmicity), reliability (guaranteed on-schedule delivery and cargo preservation) and the ability to deliver the cargo to any destination.
When comparing cargo transportation from the Far East to West Europe by sea and by rail, the delivery time is often the key argument in favor of the railway. At the same time, the amount of 14 – 15 days is often mentioned. In practice, it takes longer: 35 – 50 days by sea, 28 – 32 days by rail, 6 days by plane and 4 days by roads (See Figure 1). This difference in numbers is caused by the need to form a train, delays at some stations, etc.
Underlining the reliability of the railway transshipment lines in terms of friendly environmental standards it is assumed that carrying a TEU between the Far East and West Europe using diesel trains would result in emissions of around 0.7 tonnes of greenhouse gas emission. However, the emissions from electric trains could be lower, possibly even falling to zero if they were powered entirely by renewable sources. This suggests that, by using railway mode, the Eurasian transshipment lines are likely to be beneficial to the environment.
While in theory, the implementation of railway electrification and the use of renewable energy sources can reduce greenhouse gas emissions, perhaps even to zero, in practice this process can take decades that our planet is unlikely to have.
This fact makes us think about other possible modes of transportation that are both “convenient” (speed, regularity and accuracy of delivery), and beneficial to the environment.
The cheapest mode of transportation is by the sea, but it also has some pros and cons. Thus, the warm waters (red) shipping line from Far East to theport ofRotterdam in Netherlands today has great logistics prospects. Currently, 80% of cargo from Far East to Europe goes through the Atlantic ocean to the ports of Northern Europe. The warm waters shipping line through the Arabian sea and the Suez canal to the Balkans reduces the transport time by 7 – 10 days: this is so far the shortest sea route from Far East to Europe. Thus, the cheapest in the cost, this transshipment line is not beneficial in terms of second criteria – time-frame (See Figure 1).
Another waters shipping line (cold waters – blue line), which emerged as a result of the rapid melting of the North polar icecap, opens the prospects of shortened transport waterways in the ice-free areas. There are basically three possible routes, each of significance :
The Northwest Passage, connecting the American Continent and Far East Asia;
The Northern Sea Route, offering a shorter way from West Europe to Far East along the Russian Arctic coastline ; and
The Arctic Bridge, connecting Canada and Russia (See Figure 2).
Geographically the position of the North waterways is very beneficial since they are cutting the distance between the edges of two continents, making it shorter by about 40% in comparison to the traditional, warm seas transport routes via the Suez or Panama Canal. The Arctic Bridge for now is a seasonal route. Nevertheless, the observation shows that it might be in reach earlier than expected due to climate change.
Thus, in terms of logistics, the cold waters shipping line (blue) will allow to deliver cargo to West Europe by sea faster than the 48 days (that it takes on average) to travel from the Northern ports of Far East to Rotterdam via the Suez canal, considering that the passage of a cargo ship along the North sea route is 2.8 thousand miles shorter than the route through Suez canal (See Figure 1).
The criteria of reliability also plays a positive role. In regards with the environmental issue, this means that, if maritime services lose their most time-sensitive cargo to rail, they might in practice sail their ships slower, extending transit times but reducing fuel costs and hence prices, and decreasing greenhouse gas emissions.
In addition to the time-frame criteria, a cold water shipping line is beneficial in terms of capacity. It is usually characterized as the shortest sea route between West Europe and Far East, the safest (e.g. the problem of Somali pirates) and has no restrictions on the size of the ship, unlike the route through the Suez canal. Current data makes it clear that the cold water transshipment line will allow to deliver cargo to Europe faster by sea, reducing the route by 20 – 30%, and hence being more environmentally friendly (by using less fuel and decreasing CO2 emission) and saving human resources. Nevertheless to capitalize on that opportunity requires much work in terms of improved navigation procedure and installation of safety-related infrastructure.
For now it can be seen that there are two possibilities for developing transport systems and economies in accordance with green standards :
Transcontinental railroad system (which requires huge amount of investments);
Optimization of the cheapest mode of transportation (maritime warm waters transshipment lines).
But while thinking on the best ways of the decarbonizing of transport connections, all the existing risks should be taken into account. The current warm waters transshipment lines present certain dangers, being high congested and unsafe (both for trade security and environment), and hence rather vulnerable. Due to this fact, it is crucial to consider other alternatives of connecting the biggest countries-producers (Far East) and countries-consumers (West Europe).
While summing up the data on the logistics, it may be seen, that Blue shipping line along with Green one (See Figure 1) will dramatically reduce the time between the most-producing countries of G-7 and advanced OECD markets. But to reach consensus in timing, price and environmentally friendly standards the growing push to decarbonize economies, implement the green construction methods should be done. Unfortunately this approach may take decades to be adopted, which our planet may not have. And understanding of this fact should underlie the development to all the countries of the Globe without exceptions.
Director General of APC-Colombia Ángela Ospina de Nicholls and the Executive Director of AUDA-NEPAD Ibrahim Mayaki.
Johannesburg, South Africa. June 9, 2021. The Presidential Agency for International Cooperation, APC-Colombia, signed a Financial Contribution Agreement with the Development Agency of the African Union, AUDA-NEPAD, within the framework of South-South Cooperation, for development of technical cooperation projects in Africa and Colombia.
The Agreement was signed by the general director of APC-Colombia Ángela Ospina de Nicholls and by the executive director of AUDA-NEPAD Ibrahim Mayaki, with the accompaniment of the Colombian ambassador to South Africa, Carlos Andrés Barahona Niño.
This agreement paves the way for the exchange of best practices, building lasting local capacities and technical assistance in different areas such as entrepreneurship and orange economy, environment, risk management, climate resilience, emerging technologies and research, agriculture, food security, among other.
The identification of these areas was developed in several months of work by AUDA-NEPAD, APC-Colombia and the support of the Colombian embassy in Pretoria. The signing of the Financial Contribution Agreement is considered a historic milestone and a very important step for South-South Cooperation between Colombia and the African region, since it will allow the allocation of significant financial resources for multidisciplinary projects.
Financial Contribution Agreement between Colombia and the African Union.
This agreement also supports the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda, and the 2063 Agenda of the African Union, to promote innovation and research through the collaboration of public entities to develop projects that meet the needs of communities, in in order to improve the quality of life of African and Colombian citizens. The signing ceremony was held at the AUDA-NEPAD headquarters in Johannesburg and had the virtual participation of the director of international cooperation of the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Álvaro Calderón Ponce de León.
Issued by APC-Colombia, AUDA-NEPAD and the Embassy of Colombia in South Africa.
Prior to the 1992-1995 Balkan war, the European Community delegated the British and Portuguese diplomats, Lord Carrington and Jose Cutileiro, to design a suitable scheme for ethno-religious partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in February 1992 they launched the Lisbon Conference, with the aim of separating Bosnian ethno-religious communities and isolating them into distinct territories.
This was the initiation of the process of partition, adopted in all subsequent plans to end the war in Bosnia. However, such a concept was stipulated by Carrington and Cutileiro as the only available when there was no war to end, indeed, no war in sight; and, curiously, it has remained the only concept that the European Community, and then the European Union, has ever tried to apply to Bosnia.
Contrary to the foundations of political theory, sovereignty of the Bosnian state was thus divided, and its parts were transferred to the three ethno-religious communities. The Carrington-Cutileiro maps were tailored to determine the territorial reach of each of these communities. What remained to be done afterwards was their actual physical separation, and that could only be performed by ethnic cleansing, that is, by war and genocide.
For, ethno-religiously homogenous territories, as envisaged by Carrington and Cutileiro, could only be created by a mass slaughter and mass expulsion of those who did not fit the prescribed model of ethno-religious homogeneity. The European Community thus created a recipe for the war in Bosnia and for the perpetual post-war instability in the Balkans. Yet, ever since the war broke out, the European diplomatic circles have never ceased claiming that this ‘chaos’ was created by ‘the wild Balkan tribes’, who ‘had always slaughtered each other’. There was also an alternative narrative, disseminated from the same sources, that Russia promoted the programme of ‘Greater Serbia’, which eventually produced the bloodshed in Bosnia and Kosovo.
Facts on the ground, however, do not support either of these narratives. All these ‘tribes’ had peacefully lived for centuries under the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, until nationalist ideas were imported into Serbia and Greece at the beginning of the 19th century. On the other hand, Russia’s influence in the Balkans could never compete with the influence of the Anglo-French axis.
The latter’s influence was originally implemented through the channels of Serbian and Greek nationalisms, constructed on the anti-Ottoman/anti-Islamic and anti-Habsburg/anti-Catholic grounds, in accordance with strategic interests of the two West European powers to dismantle the declining empires and transform them into a number of puppet nation-states. In these geopolitical shifts, nationalist ideologies in the Balkans utilized religious identities as the most efficient tool for mobilization of the targeted populations and creation of mutually exclusive and implacable national identities.
The pivotal among these nationalist ideologies has been the Serb one, built on the grounds of Orthodox Christianity, with its permanent anti-Islamic and anti-Catholic agenda. The existence and expansion of Serbia was always explicitly backed by London and Paris – from a semi-autonomous principality within the Ottoman territory in the 1830s and the creation of the Kingdom of Serbia in 1882, through the 1912-13 Balkan wars and World War I, to its expansion into other South Slavic territories in the form of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), promoted at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919.
Eventually, the Serbian elites – supported by the Anglo-French axis, again – used the dissolution of the communist Yugoslavia as an opportunity for implementation of the 19th-century ‘Greater Serbia’ programme, that is, Serbia’s expansion in all the Yugoslav territories populated by the Orthodox Christians. However, this time ‘Greater Serbia’ was used as a catalyst in a bigger geopolicial reshuffling advocated by the UK and France – the simultaneous implementation of four ethnnically homogenous greater-state projects, including ‘Greater Serbia’ (transferring the Orthodox-populated parts of Bosnia, plus Montenegro and the northern part of Kosovo, to Serbia), ‘Greater Croatia’ (transferring the Catholic-populated parts of Bosnia to Croatia), ‘Greater Albania’ (transferring the Albanian-populated parts of Kosovo and Macedonia to Albania) and ‘Greater Bulgaria’ (transferring the Slavic parts of Macedonia to Bulgaria).
Since 1990s, ethno-religious nationalisms in the Balkans have served only this geopolitical purpose – creation of ethno-religiously homogenous ‘greater’ states, including the disappearance of Bosnia and Macedonia, whose multi-religious and multi-ethnic structure has been labelled by the British foreign policy elites as “the last remnant of the Ottoman Empire“ that needs to be eliminated for good.
The only major foreign power that has opposed these geopolitical redesigns is the US, which has advocated the policy of inviolability of the former Yugoslav republics’ borders. Yet, the US has never adopted a consistent policy of nation-building for Bosnia and Macedonia, which would be the only one that could efficiently counter the doctrine of ethno-religious homogeneity promoted by the UK and France and supported by most EU countries.
Dr. Zlatko Hadžidedić is the founder and director of the Center for Nationalism Studies, in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (www.nationalismstudies.org).
Prof. Dr. Zlatko Hadžidedić is the founder and director of the Center for Nationalism Studies, in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (www.nationalismstudies.org).
The article provides an analysis of the likely goals and positions of Russia and the United States on nuclear arms control. The U.S. administration aims to reach an agreement with Russia to control all of the parties’ nuclear arsenals, including non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), as well as China’s involvement in nuclear arms negotiations bilaterally or multilaterally in order to establish control over China’s nuclear arsenal. Russia’s likely position in the negotiations is a solution of the problem of missile defense, strategic high-precision non-nuclear weapons and space weapons. The authors believe that without a high level of trust between the parties, there are rather few good prospects for the continuation of the arms control dialogue for the foreseeable future.
On February 3rd, 2021, Russia and the United States exchanged diplomatic notes of an agreement extending the New START Treaty (Russia calls it START-3) for the next five years. The Treaty was signed by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and US President Barack Obama in April 2010 and entered into force on February 5, 2011. The Treaty itself, in Article XIV, provides for the possibility of a one-time extension for a period “not exceeding five years” following joint consideration and agreement. It should be noted that until the end of the US presidential election and the Joe Biden administration came to power, the prospects for extending the Treaty looked more than dubious. Throughout most of 2020, the Donald Trump administration linked its consent to the extension on such terms that even optimists came to the sad conclusion that Russia and the United States would be left without the last agreement in the field of strategic nuclear arms control for an indefinite period of time in the future. Now, at least for the next five years, the parties will have a high degree of predictability in the development of their strategic nuclear arsenals, with a real opportunity to verify that their commitments under the current Treaty are being fulfilled.
The extension of the New START raised new questions for politicians and experts in the two countries. The main one is whether this achievement should be regarded as the beginning of a new period in Russia-US relations in the field of arms control, or whether it should be regarded as the end of the process and no new agreements in this area should be expected. There are opposing views on this issue. Without claiming to cover all the nuances of the problem, we will try to assess what approaches might underlie future nuclear arms control agreements and how acceptable they might be to each of the participants.
Arguments against the extension of the New START in the US
The extension of the New START has drawn a line under the debate about the extent to which the United States was interested in maintaining the agreement. However, the fact itself does not mean that the arguments of the New START opponents have completely lost their force and ceased to have an impact on US security policy. On the contrary, the Biden administration may have to take into account the sentiments of part of the political and military establishment in the near future when elaborating its position on further steps in the nuclear arms control area, taking into account that the new US administration made it clear from the very beginning that arms control would be among its priorities. Both President Biden and Secretary of State Anthony Blinken have stated this [Blinken 2021].
It should be noted that while in Russia the extension of the New START was generally received positively both in official and expert circles, in the United States doubts were expressed as to whether it was worth agreeing to its unconditional extension without any additional demands. On 3 February 2021, the US Department of State published a document in which the arguments of those opposed to the extension of the Treaty were referred to as “myths” [The New START…2021]. Among the list of such “myths” which were cited and “debunked” by the State Department, there are clearly far-fetched and incomprehensible opinions, such as that the New START is allegedly a Cold War relict and does not correspond to the current strategic situation. In addition, the State Department argues with the argument of the treaty’s opponents that the extension of the treaty allows China to continue building up its nuclear arsenal while allowing Russia to retain superiority in non-strategic nuclear weapons. It is not difficult to see that such “myths” have nothing to do with the New START Treaty itself or with the fact of its extension. It is therefore not difficult for the US diplomatic establishment to debunk them.
Nevertheless, a number of arguments of the Treaty opponents demanded from the State Department fairly reasonable objections and even a partial acknowledgement of their validity. One of these serious objections was the reproach to the American leadership for not making full use of the Russian Federation’s agreement to freeze all of the parties’ nuclear arsenals “in exchange” for a one-year extension of the New START. As it is known, such a consent was expressed in a Russian Foreign Ministry document published on October 20th 2020 [Foreign Ministry Statement…2020]. Russia made it quite clear that on its part it was a political commitment that should not be accompanied by any additional requirements. Despite Moscow’s position, the US side interpreted it as Russia’s willingness in principle to conclude a separate agreement to “freeze” the number of all nuclear warheads of the parties. This agreement, according to the United States, should have included the provision of the relevant exchange of information and the elaboration of the measures to verify the fulfillment of such an obligation. The refusal of the Biden administration to continue pressure on Russia in favor of such an agreement is now being blamed by its rivals.
The US State Department claimed that there was not enough time to work out such an agreement, as there were only a little more than two weeks between the inauguration of the new US president and the expiration of the New START. The State Department also said that Russia had refused to negotiate on the issue, arguing that a verification agreement was “an additional condition” for reaching an agreement on the New START extension, which was “unacceptable” to Russia. According to the State Department, the New START extension gives the United States the necessary time to address the concerns in this area.
Interestingly enough, the State Department makes no mentioning of the issues that may be (and are) of concern to the Russian side. All the “myths” it exposes are directly related to US security interests. The State Department does not even hint that the U.S. side would be willing to at least consider the Russian position on a number of issues that Moscow has repeatedly raised in official and unofficial contacts over the years. These concerns are reflected in a number of official Russian documents – the Military Doctrine, National Security Strategy, and others.
It is not yet clear how seriously the US leadership is prepared to engage in constructive negotiations on the whole range of strategic stability issues. Nevertheless, if any discussions on possible new nuclear arms control agreements do begin with the new U.S. administration, the sides will in any case have to not only discuss, but also take seriously mutual interests and concerns in order to find the necessary compromise in order to achieve practical results. Otherwise, there is no prospect for a successful continuation of the arms control policy.
Possible approaches to nuclear arms control by the Biden administration
According to initial statements by the representatives of the new US administration, it intends to focus its nuclear arms control policy on two main issues. The first one is to reach an agreement with the Russian Federation on the control of all nuclear arsenals of the parties, including tactical (or, more correctly, non-strategic) nuclear weapons. The second is to engage China in bilateral or multilateral nuclear arms control negotiations in order to establish control over China’s nuclear arsenal in some form ensuring full information about its status and prospects for development. [Renewing America’s … 2021].
It is symptomatic that neither the first, nor the second option yet have the objective of reducing nuclear arsenals. It is primarily a question of agreeing on a verification system and ensuring predictability of the development of Russia’s and China’s nuclear forces. In his seminal paper ‘Binarization of Foreign Policy Conduct’, although discussing the other world’s theater, prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic gives an accurate diagnosis for this issue too: “Confrontation is what you get, and cooperation is what you are fighting for.“
US-Russia
Despite the apparent logic and even simplicity of the approach to controlling all Russian and US nuclear arsenals, success in reaching such an agreement is more than doubtful. Before entering into a formal dialogue with the Russian Federation, the United States will have to address a number of difficult issues directly related to the country’s initial position to be brought forward as the subject of discussions.
Putting aside the political context of the issue and assuming that Russia and the United States agreed in principle to establish control over all nuclear warheads in their arsenals, the parties will have to solve a number of extremely difficult problems. These problems are not only of a technical nature but also of a military-political and military-strategic nature. In particular, the authors believe that before the beginning of negotiations the sides should agree on whether tactical (or non-strategic) nuclear weapons should be “equated” to strategic ones in a new agreement and if not, by what criteria should these weapons be divided into the two categories? On the basis of the yield of the warhead, or on the characteristics of the vehicle on which this warhead can be deployed?
In all previous nuclear arms control treaties, including the New START, the reference was primarily made to delivery vehicles, which from a military strategic point of view is quite reasonable and accepted by both sides. But the question remains open; whether the same logic can be applied to non-strategic systems. In the field of strategic weapons, parties have identified intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers (HB) as such carriers. These systems are mainly the ones to be controlled. In the case of NSNWs, the range of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles to be controlled will expand dramatically and may include many missiles (both ballistic and cruise missiles) and a significant list of aircraft which normally perform conventional missions, i.e., are “dual-use”. Until a certain period of time, heavy artillery could also perform “nuclear functions”. Thus, control of NSNWs should imply control over a wide spectrum of conventional arms of the parties capable of carrying nuclear weapons. From a practical point of view, the approach seems unrealistic.
Proceeding from the above, the authors of this article come to the logical conclusion that there is only one way for the parties to establish control of NSNWs – to control only nuclear warheads and to give up the control over delivery vehicles. In such a case it would be no longer a control of “nuclear weapons”, but the control of nuclear warheads. Hence, the whole system of “nuclear arms control” breaks down into at least two parts – strategic arms control and nuclear warheads control. Clearly, the transition from the control of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles to the control of nuclear warheads represents rather a complex task, which would require considerable time to generate and agree upon specific measures allowing the parties to be fully assured of compliance with their obligations.
Even with the strategic arms covered by the New START, issues are not straightforwardly sorted out. Thus, in accordance with the established practice of US-Russian arms control agreements, all of the parties’ nuclear weapons are divided into two major categories: deployed (i.e. ready to use) and non-deployed.[2] Separate limitations are imposed on each of these categories. For example, the New START Treaty sets 700-unit levels for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers, as well as a separate 800-unit level for deployed and non-deployed delivery vehicles. There is also a level of 1,550 for warheads on deployed strategic launchers. However, the Treaty is silent about the permitted number of non-deployed warheads. This raises another question: which nuclear warheads are to be controlled: all, separately strategic and separately non-strategic, or separately deployed and separately non-deployed? Or is it necessary to introduce separate sub-levels for these categories of nuclear warheads? The Russian side proposes to focus on the “deployed part” of the nuclear arsenals of the sides [Introductory remarks … 2021]. The US position on this issue is still unclear.
The issue of drawing the line between strategic and non-strategic nuclear warheads seems likely to be the most difficult. Probably it is impossible to do this at all. For example, the same nuclear bomb can be deployed on both heavy and other types of bombers that are not strategic. It should be added that low-yield nuclear warheads are already deployed on strategic nuclear weapon carriers, the Trident II SLBMs. In addition, the United States arsenal contains nuclear warheads with a variable yield. Hence, the criterion of yield to divide warheads into “strategic” and “non-strategic” is unacceptable. Therefore, dividing nuclear warheads into these two categories could only be done on the basis of other parameters.
In case the parties agree on controlling nuclear warheads on a deployed – non-deployed basis, they also would have to solve a number of important problems. One of them is how to count nuclear bombs and cruise missiles ready for deployment on the parties’ heavy bombers. In “real life”, these weapons are not deployed. Russian and US heavy bombers implements their missions on a regular basis in various regions of the world. According to public reports, they do not carry nuclear weapons on board. In other words, weapons that can be deployed on HBs should be included in the category “non-deployed nuclear warheads”. The same should apply to US NSNWs stored at bases in five European NATO countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey), although they are ready for immediate deployment on combat aircraft. The appropriate drills for transporting U.S. nuclear weapons from underground bunkers and placing them on aircraft are regularly conducted by NATO forces as part of the Steadfast Noon military exercise. [Samozhnev 2020].
On the other hand, under the New START, each heavy bomber is counted as one launcher and one warhead and is thus “partially” included into the “deployed” category in terms of the number of warheads allowed. This seemingly unimportant issue still needs to be resolved and could have an impact on the success of a future agreement. It is directly related to the issue of “upload capacity” – the ability to quickly build up the number of deployed nuclear warheads on strategic and other carriers through the availability of nuclear bombs and missile warheads in storage facilities ready to be mounted on carriers. Thus, if the “deployed – non-deployed” nuclear warheads approach is adopted for the purpose of an agreement, the parties will most probably have to introduce at least one more sub-level of warheads that are “in active reserve”, which would further complicate such negotiations.
In our view, there is no point in saying that an agreement can be reached on the overall level of nuclear warheads without dividing them into deployed and non-deployed ones. After all, according to the U.S. side, such an agreement must be “verifiable”, that is, accompanied by an appropriate control system. However, such a system will differ sharply in relation to the same deployed and non-deployed nuclear warheads, to the warheads that are in “active reserve” and to those that are in storage (in storage facilities) awaiting shipment to the troops or to the plant for dismantlement. Accordingly, parties will in any case have to introduce separate categories for “non-deployed” systems, both according to their individual types (warheads, bombs, etc.) and according to the stage of the life cycle they are in. In addition, it will be necessary to develop a system for controlling the movement and transportation of nuclear warheads to different destinations and by different modes of transport.
Again, we emphasize that the above reasoning refers to a scenario where both sides have reached a full understanding of the desirability of working out a “verifiable” agreement on the control of the nuclear warheads. It should also be noted that the authors have touched upon only a small part of the problems that the sides will face in trying to achieve this goal. Not to mention a host of technical issues, the sides will have to overcome many organizational hurdles related to the high level of secrecy in the nuclear sphere, as well as to achieve an unprecedented level of trust, which was not present even in the “best days” of U.S.-Russian relations.
Consequently, the enthusiasm of the previous US administration, who thought that such an agreement could be worked out in two or three months, is completely incomprehensible. In our estimation, two to three years would not be enough, given the fact that the basic control provisions have to be tested by experimentation and only then fixed “on paper”. All negotiations are likely to take even longer. Thus, statements by the new US administration regarding a five-year extension of the New START (which it believes gives enough time to prepare a new agreement) can also be considered overly optimistic. Under the current circumstances, the authors believe that parties could return to the idea of freezing their nuclear arsenals in the form of a “political commitment without additional conditions”, as Russia proposed in 2020. Such statements by the United States and Russia are the realistic maximum that the parties can count on in the foreseeable future in moving towards nuclear arms control.
US-China
The prospects for the second, the Chinese track of nuclear arms control policy announced by the new US administration, are not encouraging for a considerable part of the expert community. It should be noted that despite the best efforts of the previous US administration Russia refused to join the US in pressuring the Chinese leadership to engage the PRC in the nuclear arms negotiations. In his speech in February 2021, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated this position: “We will never persuade China”. He also said that Russia could not imagine multilateral talks without the participation of Britain and France. [Speech by the Minister … 2021].
As for the United States, it remains to be seen what approach it might take to meet the challenge. The Trump administration mainly tried to use “forceful” methods in its attempts to “bring China to the negotiating table”. The U.S. accused China of seeking to dramatically increase its nuclear arsenal, to acquire the capability to wage a “controlled” nuclear war, to increase the counterforce capabilities of its nuclear forces, and to be reluctant to disclose information on the status and plans for development in this area. In the United States there existed (and still exists) a view that the creation of additional military threats to China, such as the threat of the deployment of US medium-range missiles in the region, may play a role in changing China’s position on the negotiations. The United States also put pressure on Russia, literally demanding that it “force” the PRC to enter into negotiations (Gertz 2020). Some experts suggested other “soft” ways to put pressure on China, including recognizing its “great power” status, opening up the prospects of improving strategic relations with the US while negotiating on nuclear arms, and making attempts to prove that China’s joining the nuclear arms control system could generate serious military and political benefits for the country.
As it is known, all the US attempts have yielded no success. China stubbornly refused not only to engage in nuclear arms control talks, but also to be transparent in that area, including in sharing data on the conditions of its nuclear arsenal and even in providing official information on the number of its nuclear forces. China’s leadership did not give reasons for its refusal, but it may be assumed that it has its roots in the decades-long nuclear policy of the country dating back to the time of Mao Zedong. In particular, there is the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons, which China would most probably have to abandon if it chooses to negotiate and to disclose full information about its nuclear forces, thus sharply increasing their vulnerability to a hypothetical nuclear strike [Savelyev 2020].
China’s condition for joining the talks has been repeatedly expressed by its officials – to further reduce the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the US to a level comparable to that of China[3]. It appears that China will continue to adhere to this position, and it is unlikely that the US could find serious tools to fundamentally change this situation. Therefore, one can conclude that the nuclear arms control priorities announced by the new US administration, both in the Russian and Chinese sectors, do not yet have serious prospects. This conclusion is supported by the fact that Russia has its own views on arms control priorities, which in many cases do not coincide with the American vision of the problem.
Russia’s priorities
After the New START was extended, there were almost no spheres of “congruent” interests left in the field of arms control in terms of their priorities between Russia and the US. However, this discrepancy does not appear to be an insurmountable obstacle for continuing nuclear arms control dialogue, or even negotiations, with the Biden administration. In any case, both Russian and American sides do not rule out this scenario.
The basic contours of a possible Russian position on nuclear arms control negotiations were outlined in the abovementioned statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry of October 20, 2020 and in a number of other documents published after the new US administration came to the White House [Opening address …2021; Statement by the Minister …2021]. These and other official documents talked about the possibility of “comprehensive bilateral negotiations on future nuclear missile arms control, with mandatory consideration of all factors affecting strategic stability” [Statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry …2020]. This wording cannot be said to give complete clarity about the possible negotiating position of Russia, especially since the statement was “linked” to the proposal to extend the New START for one year and the “freezing” of nuclear arsenals of the parties. Since the issue of “freezing” was virtually removed from the agenda of U.S.-Russian relations, and the New START was extended for five years without additional conditions, the said position of the RF, according to the authors, can be substantially adjusted in the future. Nevertheless, one can make a number of conclusions on the basis of the Foreign Ministry’s Statement, albeit tentatively.
First of all, we should note that in contrast to Russia’s position stated earlier that after the New START “further steps in nuclear disarmament should be comprehensive in nature and all nuclear-weapon states should be involved in the process…” [Vladimir Putin…2012], Russia now also allows for bilateral negotiations with the United States. However, the wording “talks on future control” is not quite clear. If to approach it “strictly”, we cannot talk about the negotiations themselves with the aim of working out a specific agreement, but about “negotiations about the future negotiations”. In our view, it would then be appropriate to speak of bilateral consultations or discussions on the parameters of such negotiations.
Nor does the wording “nuclear missile arms control” provide complete clarity. This category could include both strategic and non-strategic means of nuclear attack. However, it does not cover all nuclear weapons, e.g. nuclear torpedoes, bombs, nuclear-armed underwater drones, which the Russian President spoke about on March 1st, 2018. [Address…2018]. Consequently, one can conclude that the question of the Russian Federation agreeing to control all of the parties’ nuclear weapons remains open.
It is not quite clear what meaning is embedded in the notion of “comprehensive negotiations”, and in what exactly should this “comprehensiveness” manifest itself? The country’s official position on these issues is formulated only in very general terms. Still, examples of a comprehensive approach to security issues can be found in the history of Soviet-American negotiations. Thus, the very first strategic arms limitation treaty, SALT-1, was so comprehensive. From 1969 to 1972, the parties simultaneously worked out two agreements: the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty (ABM Treaty) and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Both documents were signed at the same time, on 26 May 1972, and went down in history as SALT-1.
This is not the only example. Thus, in the second half of the 1980s, the USSR and the US were engaged in comprehensive negotiations in three areas – strategic offensive weapons (START), intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF) and defense and space. The Soviets insisted that all three agreements must be signed simultaneously, establishing a clear link between the three “building blocks” and stressing the need to reach agreement on defense and space as a condition for signing the START-1 and the INF treaties. Initially, the US accepted this condition, on which the negotiations themselves were dependent. However, as we know, the INF Treaty was negotiated much earlier than the other documents. After serious consideration, the USSR leadership decided to withdraw this treaty from the general “package” and sign it earlier, in 1987. Then, a few years later (in 1991), the START-1 was negotiated, while the defense and space negotiations saw no progress. Given the lack of any prospect of an agreement on space-based missile defense systems and “space strike weapons”, and the fact that the ambitious SDI program by that time was virtually ceased to exist and had been replaced by the more modest Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS), the USSR once again removed the “linkage” of the remaining two parts of the negotiating “package”. At the same time, the Soviets made a statement regarding the need to retain the ABM Treaty as a condition for reductions under START I.
Thus, there do not appear to be any formal obstacles to holding “comprehensive bilateral negotiations”. All that remains is to determine what part this “complex” might consist of. In the aforementioned statement, the Russian Foreign Ministry puts forward a condition for future negotiations on “nuclear missiles”. They can only take place “with mandatory consideration of all factors affecting strategic stability”. As in previous cases, the above wording does not give complete clarity about how Russia believes the talks should be conducted. After all, any arms control negotiations have an explicit subject matter. In this case it is “nuclear missiles”. Strategic stability does not fit within the framework of such talks. The only thing that can be done is to agree on the wording that the concluded agreement promotes strategic stability and to fix it in the preamble of the future treaty. It seems unlikely that this approach would suit the Russian side.
Another option would be to insist on a comprehensive approach to negotiations that would cover the whole range of factors that, in Russia’s view, affect strategic stability. Once again we emphasize that what has been written above does not constitute a specific proposal by the authors on the formulation of Russia’s approaches and position on this issue. The authors’ reasoning is just an attempt to follow the logic of statements made by Russia’s top leadership on the issues of strengthening security and strategic stability, including those represented in official documents adopted at the highest level, including the Military Doctrine and the National Security Strategy of the RF (as mentioned above). It follows from these documents that the main factors affecting strategic stability, apart from nuclear weapons, include missile defense, strategic long-range high-precision non-nuclear weapons (including non-nuclear prompt global strike weapons) and space weapons. Thus, an “integrated” approach to negotiations could be to conduct several negotiations in parallel – in each of these areas under a single title. For example, “Negotiations on (missile and) nuclear arms limitation and strengthening strategic stability”.
The likelihood of such negotiations is negligible, which refers primarily to the three “building blocks” of factors affecting strategic stability. Nevertheless, it seems to make sense to consider, at least in general terms, some aspects of imposing limitations on the named weapons systems in order to assess the possibility of such negotiations, if not at present, then in the future.
Strategic high-precision non-nuclear weapons
From the verification point of view, the most “promising” is the resolution of the issue of strategic high-precision non-nuclear weapons. With the extension of the New START, a number of such systems are directly subject to it. This is particularly true for the replacement of nuclear warheads with non-nuclear warheads in existing ICBMs and SLBMs. In other, less clear-cut cases (e.g., deployment of new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles in open positions, which has been suggested as one of the options for building a non-nuclear US prompt global strike system) [Myasnikov 2010], the issue may be addressed in the Bilateral Consultative Commission operating within The New START framework. In any case, according to the authors, the conclusion of a separate treaty on strategic non-nuclear weapons is not required, since many limitations of such weapons are already covered by the provisions of the acting New START Treaty.
Space weapons
With regard to the issue of space-related arms control, it is even more problematic, in our view, than for non-strategic nuclear weapons, to reach any comprehensive agreement in this area. What the authors have in mind here is not the difficulty of making a political decision to carry out such negotiations, but rather the definition of the subject matter of the negotiations themselves and the issues of verification. For example, whether such negotiations will deal with “space weapons” issues in general or go through three possible tracks: anti-satellite weapons, space-to-Earth weapons and the space element of advanced BMD systems.
If it comes to “space weapons,” the parties should understand that a complete ban on “space weapons” is unfortunate due to the fact that many existing weapons systems (for example, ICBMs and SLBMs) have the potential to engage satellites in orbit. But before that the parties must come to a joint vision of what they understand by the terms “space weapons,” “weapons in space” and a number of other concepts, including “weapons” as such. Without such an agreement, it is almost impossible to negotiate any restrictions or bans on an activity when the subject matter of the negotiations itself is not clearly outlined.
Here it should also be kept in mind that a number of possible “space weapons” systems, unlike NSNWs, do not currently exist, and such negotiations can only talk about preventing (prohibiting) their creation or development. But here the negotiators can expect another “technical trap”, which the Defense and Space Talks fell into in the second half of the 1980s. The parties spent quite a lot of time trying to draw a clear line between “creation” and “development”. The parties tried to became clear what is “experiment” versus “test”, “experimental device” versus “prototype”, what is a “laboratory” (a room with or without walls) and whether it could be in space, as well as a host of other technical issues. Solving a set of these questions is an extremely difficult task. In any case, many of these remained open after six years of concrete discussions in Geneva (1985-1991). As the practice of such negotiations shows, it is impossible to avoid discussing all these technical problems. Otherwise, lack of clarity on certain aspects of a future agreement leads to increased suspicions between the parties and, as a consequence, undermines the treaty itself.
The list of problems to be solved if an agreement to enter into “space negotiations” is reached could go on and on. Not all of them will be easy to solve, even if the parties have the political will to conclude such an agreement. Inevitably there will be the issue of “space weapons” of the third countries, in particular China and some NATO states, of “dual-use” assets such as “space debris collectors” and maintenance and repair satellites, and a whole range of others. It remains to be seen whether it is even possible to agree on all these issues from a purely technical point of view.
Missile defense
It is obvious that for Russia the problem of missile defense is the most pressing in terms of ensuring its national security. Almost immediately after the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Russia made persistent attempts to return to at least some limitations on defensive means or to neutralize the effectiveness of US missile defense systems, increasing the potential for missile defense penetration during the development and modernization of strategic offensive systems. It appears that should the U.S.-Russian arms control dialogue resume, the Russian position will in some form require that defensive systems to be taken into account in the strategic balance of the parties. Such limitations are believed to contribute to strategic stability, and consequently to security at all the levels of confrontation – from regional to global.
The ABM Treaty was supposed to place restrictions on systems “to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight paths”. All other missile defense systems were not subject to limitations. In 1997, the parties were able to agree on specific characteristics of BMD systems (the so-called “New York Protocols”) that would allow these systems to be classified as “strategic” and “non-strategic”. That had to be done in order to strengthen the ABM Treaty regime, which the Russian side viewed as a prerequisite for the entry into force of START II. And while both sides did not formally accept this “separation” of strategic and non-strategic BMD systems, it was nevertheless present in discussions of issues connected with the consequences of US deployment of BMD in Europe and Asia. In any case, US representatives have repeatedly stated that “theatre missile defense” in Europe “does not threaten” the deterrence potential of Russian strategic forces, is not capable to intercept ICBMs and SLBMs, and is intended exclusively to protect US allies from threats from such countries as Iran and North Korea.
However, the situation with the issue of this “separation” changed dramatically in November 2020 after the successful test of the US SM-3 Block IIA anti-ballistic missile, which for the first time shot down an intercontinental ballistic missile target from a ship equipped with the AEGIS anti-missile system [US Successfully….2020]. The anti-missiles are being built as a part of a joint US-Japanese project [Tosaki 2019]. They are designed to be fired from the Mk 41 all-purpose launchers that equip US cruisers and destroyers of certain classes and Aegis Ashore ground systems in Poland and Romania.
This test made it very difficult, if not impossible, for Russia and the U.S. to reach any kind of agreement on limiting their missile defense systems. Thus, Russia had every reason to demand that theater missile defense systems be taken into account in the overall balance of such armaments of the parties. Russia’s position could apply not only to missile systems directly tested as strategic missile defense, but also to missile launchers without regard to what kind of missile system they contain. In addition, the system of control of such weapons is dramatically complicated because they are deployed not only on US ships, but also on the territories of other countries. One can only speculate whether the U.S. conducted this test solely to test the technical capabilities of the new anti-missile system or whether it was a deliberate step aimed at eliminating any prospect of reaching an agreement in this field.
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The above brief overview of the main arms control areas that can contribute to confidence-building, strategic stability and international security shows the dramatic complexity of the “technical side” of control, which may require enormous effort by the parties and a considerable period of time to agree on all provisions of the future agreements. The divergence of Russian and US interests regarding arms control priorities is quite obvious. Thus, for the US, the main focus is on establishing control of all nuclear arsenals of the parties (including China). For Russia, it is the control of strategic offensive and defensive weapons (both nuclear and non-nuclear), addressing the problem of “space weapons” and some others. In such a situation, it would seem possible to seek a compromise solution, including comprehensive and interrelated negotiations on a number of the above areas simultaneously. Consequently, both Russia and the United States would have to make mutual concessions, the nature of which could be determined both during the negotiations themselves and even before they began. However, in the current situation of strained relations between the two countries, one can hardly expect any progress in this area in the near foreseeable future.
We can conclude, that arms control can no longer play the role of a “driving force” to improve international relations. On the contrary, without such improvement, arms control negotiations are hardly feasible, since arms control steps require a very high level of trust between the parties. Hence, the focus should, in our view, be on the unconditional fulfillment of all the obligations undertaken by the parties under the extended New START, using this agreement as a “point of reference” in US-Russian relations and without waiting for its expiration date, trying to continue on the nuclear disarmament path.
Previous published by (C) 2004 IFIMES
About the authors:
Dr. Alexander G. Savelyev
Dr. Alexander G. Savelyev is Chief Research Fellow at Centre of International Security, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow.
Olga M. Naryshkina
Olga M. Naryshkina is Senior Tutor at Department of International Security, Faculty of World Politics, Moscow State University.
By Dr. Mohammad Faisal, Ambassador of Pakistan in Germany
In a world of converging interests, it has become essential for states to harness synergies for the benefit of their peoples. This interdependence, irrespective of the level of development of countries, has become the need of the hour, as the world comes together to address and ameliorate the social and economic chaos created by the COVID-19 pandemic.
It is in the spirit of convergence and interdependence that both Pakistan and Germany accord heightened significance to the 70th anniversary of their diplomatic relations. A flurry of activities has been planned to commemorate this special year.
These activities formally kickstarted with the visit of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, to Berlin from 11-13 April 2021 and was reciprocated soon after by the German Foreign Minister on 28-29 April 2021. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan’s visit to Berlin took place after nine years and was an effort to re-energize the longstanding bilateral ties, while turning a new page with diversified and meaningful cooperation in the fields of trade and investment, technology transfer, education, health, legal migration, climate, energy, and culture.
Germany has emerged as an attractive destination for students from Pakistan, especially those interested in higher studies. Currently more than 5,000 Pakistani students are studying in various educational institutions throughout Germany. Since 2004, the cooperation between Higher Education Commission of Pakistan (HEC) and German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) has translated into more than 300 young Pakistani academics gaining doctorates at German universities.
These PhDs are now bringing expertise to teaching and research across various universities in Pakistan, enriching its educational environment and bringing diversity to the university life in Germany. Global dynamics have undergone a major transformation in recent years, necessitating candid exchange of views and discussions between German and Pakistani leadership on regional and international events that continue to impact and shape our future.
The vital role of Germany in the European Union is universally acknowledged as is its visibly proactive role at the global level. The recent visits by the two Foreign Ministers and the previous visits of the German Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in January 2020 and of Foreign Minister Heiko Maas in March 2019 are testimony to the breadth and depth of our relationship.
Simultaneously Pakistan is playing a constructive and responsible role, especially in its challenging neighborhood, to ensure peace and prosperity. This role acknowledged and appreciated by the international community has been especially instrumental in facilitating the Afghanistan peace process. In sync with its constructive engagement on regional and international issues, deepening economic collaboration through increased trade and investment is a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy. The recent visit of the Foreign Minister and other upcoming engagements and interactions for the year have this objective at their core. Germany is Pakistan’s fourth largest trading partner globally, there is however a need to diversify this cooperation for the benefit of both Germany and Pakistan.
Cooperation in the fields of energy & power, vaccines, transfer of technology, agriculture, technical training exchanges, legal migration etc. are some of the areas that would provide opportunities for substantive engagement on both sides. It is hoped that recent high-level visits and exchanges in near future would set in motion a series of substantive activities leading to the visit of the Prime Minister of Pakistan to Germany. It is important that while we make efforts to bolster our cooperation in recent times, we should not forget that Pakistan’s relations with Germany are augmented by historical linkages, as our revered national poet, Dr. Allama Muhammad Iqbal, lived and studied philosophy in Heidelberg and Munich.
Iqbal’s deep admiration for Germany, its people and its literary culture resonate in his poetry and also amongst the people of Pakistan. His work reflects the German influence, especially the poem dedicated to river Neckar, Heidelberg. There is an Iqbal-Ufer (Iqbal Embankment) in Heidelberg and a plaque in Munich to commemorate Allama Iqbal, the poet of the east. There is an Allama Iqbal Fellowship at South Asia Institute of Heidelberg University, which is considered extremely significant and the Institute has time and again expressed its appreciation regarding the deputation of Pakistani scholars.
Being alma mater of our national poet, the Iqbal Chair at Heidelberg University carries immense significance for Pakistan. I am hopeful that my Mission’s efforts would be instrumental in providing the much-needed impetus to deepen and strengthen the existing ties for the benefit of both the countries through substantive economic, educational, scientific and cultural exchanges.
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Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in the Federal Republic of Germany: https://pakemb.de ——–
By Steven van Hoogstraten, Former director Carnegie Foundation
Andrew Carnegie (1835 – 1919) was probably the most important philanthropist of the early 20th century, and still is an inspirational force in todays world of philanthropy. Andrew Carnegie was born in Dumfernline, Scotland but moved with his parents to the USA (Pittsburg) at the age of 13. He was an avid young learner, became a messenger boy, mastered the secrets of the Telegraph, and quickly moved through the ranks of a railway company. He ended in the business of making steel for bridges, railways and naval purposes. After selling his interests in the steel industry – the Carnegie Steel Company – to JP Morgan for an – in that era – immense sum of 480 million USD, he devoted his life to giving all his wealth away to good causes.
These causes were closely related to peace & arbitration, science and education. Famous are the 2.500 libraries that were built on his funds and that carry his name. In the Netherlands, Andrew Carnegie became well known because in 1904 he provided the funds for the construction of the Peace Palace, after concerting with the Dutch government.
Carnegie was a great believer in the value of international arbitration, in order to avoid military conflict. He also stipulated that a library of international law should be part of the set up. Carnegie was inspired by the idea that people after becoming rich should not hang on to their wealth. They should spend their “surplus wealth” for the benefit of the communities, and administer it accordingly. A rich man is merely the trustee of his surplus wealth for the well being of those less well in society, was his view.
Andrew Carnegie
Remarkable was his expression that “a man who dies thus rich, dies in disgrace”. Not a motto that his contemporaneous like John D. Rockefeller necessarily agreed with, as they would rather pass down their wealth within their families. Carnegie easily irritated his fellow millionaires by taking the moral high ground. But Carnegie made it the central theme of his philanthropy that accumulated wealth should be redistributed : “Private wealth for the public good”. Carnegie was followed in his steps by many other industrialists, most visibly in these times by Bill and Melinda Gates of Microsoft. Gates is investing heavily in world health issues (fight against malaria, HIV, COVID) . Together with Warren Buffet he launched in 2010 the Giving Pledge, which commits billionaires to give more than half of their fortunes away to society. The Giving Pledge is signed at present by more than 200 philanthropist names.
Most philanthropists are associated with countries like the USA and the UK, but certainly not all. What to think of Japanese management phillosofer Kazuo Inamori ( founder of Kyocera) whose Inamori Foundation is very active in the world of philanthropy. Or the name of the Danish Moller Maersk Foundation, who gave Copenhagen a brand new Opera House. And not to forget the Netherlands’ Postcode Loterij, which spends large sums each year to worthy causes in distinct areas. The lottery follows a formula which is very smart: people participate in the lottery with their postal code in order to win, but if that is not so, their money is spent on good causes.
Andrew Carnegie at the opening of The Peace Palace, 1913.
Grass root philanthropy, one might say. Other Dutch philanthropies are Foundation Benevolentia (fam. Brenninkmeijer), the van Leer Foundation, Fam. Van der Vorm, and Foundation Adessium, to name the few which are highest on the list. The work of Rotary International may be mentioned here as well, because their Foundation is active in 6 areas of focus to do well in the world, and alleviate the burdens that still are so abundant: lack of clean water, health of mother and child, prevention of diseases, promoting peace and solving conflict, helping local economies grow, education and literacy. Their donations exceed 100 million USD per annum.
Andrew Carnegie in his golf cottage near St Andrews golf Links, Westchester Co. N.Y. Picture public domain.
Notwithstanding the fact that all this sounds really positive and intriguing, there is a perceived shadow-side to the role of big philanthropists. This was highlighted only last week by the law philosopher Luuk van de Middelaar, who normally writes on constitutional issues of the EU . In essence, he points at the lack of democratic control which goes hand in hand with major donations (NRC, 12 May) . Who effectively decides on the needs to be addressed, and who can exercise control over the goals and activities covered by the philanthropies? Aren’t philanthropists taking over the role of the public authorities – without accountability – or even the Church ?
Sometimes state organs are weak, sometimes they are quite happy to see that a social vacuum is filled, so that they can spend their resources elsewhere. This critique is serious, and it definitely provides food for thought. But these critical remarks should not be considered in isolation, but always be compared to the needs in question.
Andrew Carnegie
To me it seems more important that the good work of philanthropists helps to alleviate poverty, and helps to organize education and health notably in developing countries. Or provides funds for the arts, or helps to fight the climate warming, a world wide issue without real ownership. But clearly, philanthropist should not be allowed to follow just their own convictions. Their initiatives should be covered by a form of guidance by public authorities, whenever necessary.
Philantropy is indeed a matter of public debate in the Netherlands. In a letter to Parliament of 18 october 2019, the Dutch Minister of Legal Protection (Rechtsbescherming) acknowledged the need for an explicit government policy related to philantropy. Minister Sander Dekker said that – inter alia – he aims at a strengthening of the interest of philantropy for society as a whole. Whereas its main feature is free choice, philantropy should never be a subsitute for tasks which belong to the government or public authorities. The two sides should cooperate to a maximum, which in essence means no “solo behaviour” by philantropists.
Let’s us go back for a moment to the thinking of Andrew Carnegie, the radical philantropist. He was convinced that succesful industrialists could and should play a role in the running of a state. If you are good at running an efficient company, surely one must be able to run an efficient government. That thought was explained in the Gospel of Wealth, one of his best known publications (1889) . The essay emphasizes the duties of every rich person, and these are the famous last lines:
Yet the man who dies leaving behind many millions of available wealth, which was his to administer during life, will pass away “unwept, unhonored and unsung”, no matter to what uses he leaves the dross which he cannot take with him. Of such as these the public verdict will then be “The man who dies thus rich dies disgraced”
This is a powerful and original perspective, and one that modern times philantropists like Bill Gates and those affiliated with the Giving Pledge have well understood. “Private wealth for the public good” is a handy and positive catchphrase. And one that should not be overshadowed by critical remarks over the lack of democaratic control. The available surplus wealth should indeed be destined to make the world a better place.
About the author:
Steven van Hoogstraten
Steven van Hoogsstraten studied law at the University of Groningen, and took up a career with the government in various positions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EU, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Justice and UN. Steven van Hoogstraten is a former general Director of the Carnegie Foundation (Peace Palace) and Treasurer of the Hague Academy of International Law,
Behind the logo of the Vitruvian man, multiple employees ensure that the Leonardo Royal Hotel Den Haag Promenade provides excellent, customized, hospitality services to all.
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Name: Maurice Meinders Nationality: Dutch Function: Supervisor Health club & Spa Department: Health club & Spa
When did you start working at the Promenade Hotel?
August 2019.
Have you always worked in the same department?
No, I started out as a pastry chef in different companies but 10 years ago I had the opportunity to turn my hobby and passion into my profession. Within the Promenade Hotel, I have only worked in the Promenade Healthclub & Spa department.
What was the most remarkable (diplomatic) event you experienced?
The Italian food festival. The Italian chefs who cooked with love and passion for the profession and prepared beautiful dishes. The atmosphere in the restaurant and lobby attracts many international guests from different embassies. Naturally, all food festivals are great but I especially liked this one.
What international habit, tradition or event that you have observed, appeals to you?
The event ‘Las Fallas’ in Valencia. All the big and well-known names from the fireworks industry present their very best fireworks here. The city exhibits their passion for fireworks for days
Why?
The city literally ablaze between 15 and 19 March. If you walk through the streets of the city, you will see all around you how the smallest Valencians receive explanations from their parents about setting off fireworks. During the deafening mascletà at 2:00 PM in Plaza Del Ayuntamiento, you will see that the elderly from Valencia want to see this spectacle from ringside and how to enjoy it intensely. That was special to see.
What do you consider interesting about the international guests and events organized at the hotel? The different cultures about events our internal food festivals
What is a(n) (international) habit that you find interesting?
That the Icelandic population uses their nose to great someone, instead of giving kisses on cheeks.
As almost everyone now knows our planet’s climate is changing. Temperatures are rising, weather patterns are becoming less predictable and storms more violent. Arctic ice is melting rapidly, threatening a dramatic rise in the sea level. Droughts, wildfires, hurricanes, and other scourges leave millions of people homeless and hungry.
It is generally accepted that the greenhouse gas emissions of carbon dioxide and methane are the main culprits. Methane is a more potent greenhouse gas, but it doesn’t remain in the atmosphere all that long. CO2 is there for the long haul (see Steven E. Koonin, ‘Unsettled’). To counter this development the main focus today is on reducing the output of CO2.
Depending on whom you talk to we should get to (not just strive towards) halve the emissions by 2030, and stop them altogether by 2050 in order to keep the warming up of our planet to a maximum of 1.5 degrees Celsius. But the climate is already changing under the current concentration of the stuff in the atmosphere and it isn’t going away. Moreover cutting output in ‘the West’ is easily overtaken by growth in countries like China, India, Indonesia etc. So obviously,just slowing down emissions to a full stop some thirty years from now is not enough.
We have to take CO2 backout of the atmosphere. While there appear to be some chemical ways to do that, they haven’t proven that they can be viable on the massive scale required and at present they are prohibitively expensive (Koonin). The best route still seems to let nature do the work, by planting trees or fostering the growth of aquatic organisms that capture CO2.
Planting trees is wonderful. Everyone loves green, but areas with the right soil and water conditions for trees to grow, and that are not already being used for farming, are limited. Yet it is imperative that we find a solution.
Therefore let me take you on a little thought experiment. There are plenty of empty spaces on our planet with enough sun, but hardly any water.
At the same time our planet is awash in water. Over two-thirds of its surface shows blue from space. The problem is that most of it is salty. And while desalination technology is getting better all the time, it is still an expensive and energy-consuming process. But there is hope. Renewable energy by all known technologies is getting cheaper all the time and people all over the world are working on still newer and better methods. It is not at all impossible for abundant renewable energy to become virtually free in the near future.
Norman MacRae, a respected former editor of The Economist, once pointed out that most shortages, once recognised, are turned into surpluses within ten years. And as an example of how dramatically technology and costs can change, in the late sixties the workhorse of computing, the bulky IBM 360/30 computer, had 30K bytes of memory and cost well over $100,000 or not too far from a million dollars in today’s money. And it had just 30 kilobytes of memory, while my current smartphone has 256 gigabytes, almost nine million times as much, and costs about $1,250.
Now assume that in the next few years the cost of energy drops down so dramatically that we can ignore it. Then think about building massive desalination plants financed by the world community. At current prices, it would take about one billion dollars to build a plant that produces one million tons of freshwater per day. Tropical savannas need 100 cm of rainfall per year or 0.275 cm a day. This translates into 2,750 tons of water per km2 per day. That one million tons per day plant produces enough water to turn more than 360,000 km2 of desert into savanna. Build one on either side of Africa (at a fraction of the World Bank annual budget for investment in water projects) and you get enough water to create a swath of 100 km wide from East to West as a green barrier against the encroaching Sahara.
The benefits of this would be stupendous. It could provide work to thousands of Africans planting trees. The growing trees and shrubs would gorge on the carbon dioxide, the herdsmen in the Sahel would have predictable water for their cattle and maize. Perhaps, if the green area would become large enough, it might change the soil and the weather patterns sufficiently so that less desalinated water is needed and can be used to make ever more of the Sahara green.
The desalination of two million cubic meters a day would need about 400 megawatts of electrical power. I have no idea how low the price of renewable energy needs to be for this idea to become viable, but if you look at the cost of the tornadoes, typhoons, droughts, the rising sea level, and hunger relief programs today, it almost seems like a feasible solution at today’s prices. And if this is seen to work in Africa, then the deserts of the Arabian peninsula, the Negev, Chile, and the Gobi could also become our new centers of green, storing the carbon dioxide and feeding the planet, and allowing more food production for the planet’s growing population.
Why is there a need for oversight of U.S. presidential sovereignty?
President Trump & Sheikh Nasser Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Jabr Al Sabah – Picture by US Department of State.
As President Trump was preparing to leave office, his hands were occupied signing pardons but likewise honors for foreign leaders that received meager attention in the U.S. media.
Heads of state of Morocco, Bahrain and even Qatar’s[1] foreign minister received orders and medals, in a last-minute display of presidential stately might that required no congressional assent. Most remarkable is that Donald Trump bestowed a military accolade -in peace time- to leaders who aligned to his policies such as Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison, India’s Narendra Modi, or the Nipponese Abe Shinzo in December 2020, or to Arab leaders who were at the heart of his policies advancing Israel’s diplomatic weight in the Middle East. While neighbours closer to home in Canada, or Mexico were utterly ignored, the bedridden, late Emir of Kuwait, Sabah IV, was made ‘Chief Commander’ in the Legion of Merit (LOM) in September 2020; a première since 1991 for a head of state, and merely the third Arab awardee to ever be granted a LOM[2].
While the bestowal barely raised any eyebrows, it ought to be highlighted that this is one of the rare U.S. government accolades that act much like an order of chivalry, including degrees of rank, and a ribbon order, that is, by tradition, reserved to non-United Staters.
Being a military award, its bestowal is placed solely upon the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces’ discretion.
Albeit the LOM was established by virtue of an act of Congress[3], it further only requires the presidential authorization for its bestowal. Much as regal accolades granted at a sovereign’s pleasure, the U.S. President is able to display powers of unrestricted ‘sovereignty and favor’ analogous to the ones of monarchies.
HM Queen Elizabeth II is still capable to grace Commonwealth citizens with three orders of chivalry without ministerial countersigning. Even the constitutionally debilitate King of Sweden HM Carl XVI Gustaf, can distribute medals to his countrymen, and foreigners alike[4], and so it came as no surprise that the most dynastic acting president in U.S. history, took advantage of a discretionary power that allows him to court patronage vis-à-vis foreign leaders without congressional surveillance. A few days before he left the White House, he still inked LOMs certificates for the King of Morocco, HM Mohammed VI and subsequently for the King of Bahrain, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa.
Whereas the revival of LOMs in times of peace, and for non-military merits may seem innocuous, in fact, President Trump acted in the spirit of a presidency originally created to mimic European monarchies. After all, a coarse ‘Mr President’ was meant to be ‘His Highness’’[5], or ‘His Mightiness the President’.
Albeit acting within the framework of his presidential prerogatives, it is conspicuous that President Trump adjudicated accolades to people politically faithful to his policies, and who on the grounds of their regal offices are here to stay long term, may be useful business partners, and eventual donors for Trumpism in the future. Notably the far more meritorious yet penniless Abdullah II of Jordan was side-lined throughout by the Trump administration. Hence it would be only appropriate to restrict such displays of presidential sovereignty through honours without a congressional approval. Needless to say, such scrutiny ought to apply to the presidential pardons, an absolute privilege that dwells into the independence of the judiciary.
Businessman and dynast Donald Trump is célèbre for heeding for lasting partnerships, and who is to say the latter would not be the case with the Arab states? Sharifan king Mohammed VI is Africa’s richest monarch[6]; Abu Dhabi alone controls four of the largest sovereign wealth funds, and Saudi Arabia two of them[7]. Who knows if a Trump – any, for that matter- may in the future hang a LOM on the neck of a ‘KMbS’?
About the author:
Henri Estramant is Senior Editor and diplomatic adviser for Diplomat Magazine with particular expertise in the German and Austrian federal states, the European Union, the Gulf Arab states and China.
