The request for an investigation was made by an entity which is not a sovereign state within the terms of the Rome Statute, under which only sovereign states may delegate jurisdiction to the Court over their territory.
By Friends of Israel Initiative
Dear Mr. Khan,
Congratulations on your election as Chief Prosecutor of the ICC. We are the Board members of the Friends of Israel Initiative, an independent body of former heads of government, cabinet ministers and others. We came together out of concern for the unprecedented campaign of delegitimization against Israel waged by the enemies of the Jewish State and supported by numerous international institutions.
We are writing to urge you to re-evaluate the decision taken by your predecessor, Ms. Fatou Bensouda, to investigate Israel over “alleged crimes committed in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, since 13 June 2014.ā As you are aware, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber recently adjudged that the Court has jurisdiction over these allegations.
The Friends of Israel Initiative has opposed this investigation since a preliminary examination was initiated at the request of the Palestinian Authority in 2015. In addition to the substance of the allegations against Israel, which we firmly believe to be spurious, we have several other serious concerns.
Israel is not a party to the Rome Statute and has not consented to the Court’s jurisdiction. The request for an investigation was made by an entity which is not a sovereign state within the terms of the Rome Statute, under which only sovereign states may delegate jurisdiction to the Court over their territory. This view is strongly supported by the government of the United States of America, as well as the governments of Rome Statute state-parties Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Australia, Canada, Uganda and Brazil, as well as by leading international law scholars.
In assigning itself jurisdiction, the ICC disregards and undermines the Oslo Accords, an internationally binding set of agreements that remain in force and continue to be recognized by both Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Under the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority has no criminal jurisdiction over Israelis anywhere in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip or East Jerusalem. That jurisdiction, by agreement of both Israel and the Palestinian Authority, remains with Israel alone. Therefore, even if it were a state-party, the Palestinian Authority could not delegate any such authority to the ICC.
As you know, the ICC is mandated to investigate and try the gravest crimes of concern to the international community, as a court of last resort, when national jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to do so. This does not apply to Israel, which has a long-established and internationally respected legal system with a track record of investigating such crimes and prosecuting individuals when appropriate.
In addition to these concerns over jurisdiction, we believe that, by commencing this investigation, the ICC would actively undermine the prospects for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Recent months have seen unprecedented progress in the Middle East peace process, with peace agreements signed between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. Building on these developments, the new U.S. administration may now have an opportunity to further negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. For an international body with the prestige of the ICC to support the abrogation of the Oslo Accords and unilaterally endorse one side’s claims in a bilateral dispute would cripple the likelihood of future negotiations.
Finally, we have profound concerns over the effects of such an investigation on the ICC’s judicial integrity and, therefore, on its mandate of achieving international criminal justice, which is of the utmost importance in an increasingly turbulent world.Ā It is essential that the Court continue to observe the tenets of international law scrupulously, to operate within the mandate proscribed for it by the Rome Statute, and to avoid acting through political motivation or through the appearance of such. We believe that pursuit of this fundamentally flawed investigation jeopardizes all of these objectives.
We agree with the words of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s presiding judge, Peter Kovacs, who wrote:Ā “I find neither the Majority’s approach nor its reasoning appropriate in answering the question before this Chamber, and in my view, they have no legal basis in the Rome Statute, and even less so, in public international law.”
We wish you every success in your new role as ICC Chief Prosecutor. We are also willing to provide advice or assistance should you wish.
Hon. Stephen Harper, Chairman, Former Prime Minister of Canada.
She enchants everyone with her sophisticated appearance, reminding of a Patrician woman from ancient Rome. It takes seconds to understand she is no ordinary kind.
Born and raised in Bucharest, Andreea Gradinar is a highly educated Romanian, with economic background, a Master in International Law and a PhD in Economics.
āIt was my motherās dream that I join the Foreign Service ever since I was little. She was a public servant for more than four decades with a huge admiration for the diplomatic service. Diplomats have always belonged to the intellectual elite and had the enriching opportunity of working abroadā she says.
So she became a diplomat, and that’s where fate came in, that’s how she met her husband, a career diplomat himself. She remembers: āIt took us four years of friendship to finally decide to start a life together in Vienna, where we were both first posted. It has been an amazing journey ever since, with professional and personal commitments going hand in hand.ā
I imagine it hasnāt been easy to fulfil all that tasks that a diplomatic career and also a full role as supporting wife and mother usually require. But she has proved it is possible. In fact, women are nowadays increasingly more involved and active. She notices that recently āan entire narrative about women in diplomacy shifted from āwomen cannot be employed as diplomatic officers because of their well-known inability to keep a secretā to having more and more women in the Foreign Service and an increasing number of female ambassadors. In the Romanian Foreign Service, we now have a different type of gender issue, having more female diplomats actually.ā
She says that diplomatic life is not easy. She constantly misses her extended big family back home. āIt hurts knowing that there are only a few times when I am able to show my supportā, she says. Also ādiplomatic children are often affected by the constant changes, giving up their friends every couple of years and starting all over again someplace newā. She fully recognizes the toll which many diplomatic families pay, especially the accompanying spouses.
āIt is the untold story of the people living this life who are not part of the diplomatic system though. These people are the members of our family who follow us, especially our partners who most often sacrifice their careers for the sake of the family. I know so many of them who have spent a life to become successful and then had to give it all up. If you are not ready to make this sacrifice, sometimes relationships do not last for long. And if the accompanying spouse is male, itās even more complicated. Many of the male diplomatic spouses become main caregivers and take full responsibility of raising familyās children. Believe me, the societal misconceptions weigh much heavier on them!ā
She though, tells me that, for the moment, being a mother to her beautiful two daughters and a wife is far more rewarding than any of her own diplomatic achievements. Gently, she says: āI have many reasons to be thankful in life, as I measure happiness in the amount of love that I have received and given back throughout the years, in the number of extraordinary people that I have met along the way and changed the course of my life forever. It didnāt really matter where I lived, in Romania or abroad, my family was the driving force that made happiness a possible scenario everywhereā.
Obviously, beyond her aristocratic beauty lies an extremely sensitive and delicate soul. No wonder her passions are related to beauty, nature and arts. I’ve always been fascinated by her talent when it comes to flowers and decorations. She could have been a marvelous florist or event planner. Everything she touches turns magical and the humblest room gets royal brilliance. āMy passion for flowers started more than a decade ago with my bridal bouquet made by a young and promising floral designer that later became a close and dear friend. Ever since, flowers were markers of momentous events in my life. Throughout the years, they became a way of expressing my feelings, a powerful tool for telling each time a different story and most of all, for telling people how much they meant to me. I think that my creative side succeeded in adding a little extra to the events hosted at our residence. I recently embraced the more airy and light Danish style, combining my favourite flowers, pink peonies, together with many delicate flowers from the gardenā. I would also add that fate really has said its word here: her last name after marriage, āGradinarā, means āgardenerā in Romanianā¦
Andreea Gradinar and her girls.
Together with her husband, now ambassador to Denmark since 2016, she proudly welcomed to their beautifully decorated home great personalities, politicians and also royal guests. She confesses that one of her proudest moments was when she hosted HM Margareta, the Custodian of the Romanian Crown and daughter to late king Michael of Romania, to an official Easter luncheon. Other great moments were, as she remembers, being received by HM Queen Margrethe II of Denmark and also being a guest at a gala dinner hosted by the Swedish monarch.
āThere is a world full of opportunities unfolding in front of us, we make connections and meet new people every day. There are so many activities where we can play a central role in order to support our partners. In my opinion everything in life happens with a purpose, we just need to be prepared for new challenges. I also believe that kindness is a gift everyone can afford to give. And this is something that I am trying to teach my two daughters, Ana and Alexa, using the power of my own exampleā.
It is generally said that inside beauty is always seen outside. Indeed, you take a look at her and you see it, you see a refined, cultivated and sensitive woman, like the delicate flowers, that she so much adores.
“I think we live in a moment when the world is a very uncertain and restless place and when the global competition dynamics is indeed a feature of our lives as well, and I tink that the actual danger we have with a fairly large number of regional conflicts unfolding now is to be faced with an escalation triggered by a miscalculation”-General Sir Nick Carter, November 2020, in a SkyNews interview
We are an uncaring people. And, as a people, we are uncaring for we have repeatedly elected the wrong leaders. Moreover, it is widely known that Romania did not come up in the last decades with a single high standard politician. Not a single one!
Beguiled by the petty indigenous bickering raised by the stakeholders to frightening dimensions and blinded by meaningless appearances, we do not care we are surrounded by complicated conflicted situations, dormant or active, each of them with real potential of generating at any moment devastating armed clashes.
We do not realize that we are not only geographically but also economically, politically and militarily dangerously close to a genuine fire arc. The east European fire arc. It is marked by a series of open tensions or conflicts and spans from Kaliningrad, Belarus, Ukraine, Transnistria, Georgia (Abkhazia and Ossetia), Armenia-Azerbaijan, with the boiling Nagorno-Karabakh, and Syria reaching up to the Eastern Mediterranian troubled by the tempestuous relations between Turkey and Greece.
Kaliningrad (Kƶnigsberg in German)
It is a Russian semi-exclave to the Baltic Sea founded by the Germans in 1255.On 2nd August, 1945, the town and the northern part of the East Prussia was assigned to the USSR and in 1946 it has been decided to become a region (oblast) of the Russian SSR. The German population (around 150,000 civilians) was forcibly expelled between 1945-1947 and the town was populated by ethnic Russians. In 1946, the town was renamed Kaliningrad. The region has an area of 15,100 sq.km and a population of around 900,000 inhabitants and represents a Russian important outpost in the area. As of 1994, a Special Military Region was established which includes the Baltic Fleet, the Kaliningrad air defence forces, the 11th Guard Army, the border troops and the Kaliningrad Police. This region, together with the Leningrad and Moscow military regions were included from the 1st of September, 2010 into the West Military Region. According o some data published by the Russian Ministry of Defense in 2014, there were around 225,000 military in Kaliningrad and it has been decided in 2015 the enhancement of the Baltic Fleet and of the troops of the region by the deployment of a new Infantry Motorised Brigade and of a coastal battery. From quantitative deployment Russia moved to quality deployment and the increase of fire power and equiped the region with state-of-the art technique including SS-400 anti-aircraft systems and Iskender nuclear missiles. At 650 km distance from Berlin and around 1,200 km from Moscow, Kaliningrad is strategically placed towards Suwalki Gap (a land area 65 mi wide ā Poland-Lithuania border) that ends to the east in Belarus. It is considered the main Russiaās offensive direction towards the west.
The invisible divisions of the hybrid war of the worldās two of the most powerful military forces, Russia and the USA are facing each other in direct contact in the beautiful White Russia at a distance of only 500 km from the Romanian northern border.
Belarus, the country where starting with the night of 10th of August, 2020 (a strange coincidence with the date of the people of Bucharest revolt in 2019) the angry population reneged on their president, is boiling. During the recurrent violent outbursts among the periods of relative calm, the perspective of a civil war able to draw in its vortex the two great enemies is looming. The moves of the two, political, diplomatic or economic ones are intersecting on the Belarusian land in an open confrontation. The battle is waged both in the official, visible way and in the grey area specific to the intelligence services.
Close to the Republic of Belarusā borders, Russiaās and NATOās military drills are either under preparation or already underway. The foreign military presence adds inherently an extra pressure to the tensions among the domestic forces, both civilian and military which are since some time in an open, merciless confrontation.
Through the open communication channels and especially through the informal ones, promises are being made from the outside to each of the domestic adversaries. The international bodies responsible with monitoring and the avoidance of conflicted situations, which are predominantly hostiles to Russia, have sent their envoys to Belarus in order to both supervise and calm down a possible bloody conflict and not to miss from the inside the chance to tilt the balance at a propitious time in the desired direction. In paralel, the same fora issued new and new resolutions meant, at least apparently, to quench the blaze. The said resolutions, representing in themselves the product of certain political interests have overtly backed only one of the sides and contributed to increasing the mutual tensions and accusations between the two players closely clenched and hidden from the common onlooker behind the normality curtain which went down discretely in front of the burning stage.
The situation in Belarus, relatively quenched by the winter, by the the drift toward other areas of the two greatās immediate interests (the American presidential elections or the anti-Putin revolts in Russia) and disturbed by the disastuous effects of the pandemics remains tense. A detonating device set on a time delay that might turn at any moment the relative quiet to hellfire has been already activated in Minsk.
Ukraine
A little further south, in the territorially torn apart Ukraine by the geostrategic claims of the same two great powers who never cease to mutually blame themselves, the anti-Ukrainian and Russian forces are still in positions of battle alongside the pseudo borderline separating the hacked body of Ukraine from the separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. The situation remains explosive after roughly six years of conflict in which both the Western and the Eastern envoys played their roles and after more than 10,000 dead were recorded in spite of several ceasefires.
Seemingly to further complicate the situation, in 2014 after a referendum considered questionable by the West and illegal by Kyiv, Russia annexed Crimea, an important strategic point on the map of the disputes between the East and the West. Crimea, the peninsula with a troubled history as a result of its geostrategic position that allows the control of the Black Sea passed during the history from the grabber hands of the Greeks, Persians, Romans, of the Byzantine Empire, the Ottoman Empire to the Russian Empire and later on to the USSR from where it was transferred to Ukraine (a state then part of the USSR) in 1954 by a decree given by the General Secretary of the CC of the CPSU, Nikita Khrushtchev. Khrushtchev was born very close to the Ukrainian border and it is believed that the tranfer was directly linked to his controversial Ukrainian origins.
The annexation of Crimea, an act denounced as illegitimate by the West, showed everyone that Russia can do whatever it wants in its area of immediate interest. The situation in Ukraine is not stable either. A so called latent conflict smolders dangerously. That was proved by the fact that when confronted with the Westās protests in March 2015, the public TV channel Rossia1 stated that Russia was ready to resort to nuclear armament if the US and their allies intervene militarily in Ukraineās favor.
The situation in the separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as well as the annexation of Crimea are actions that raise the question of the credibility of the international guarantees (the observance of the territorial integrity within the borders at the respective date) granted toUkraine by the USA, Great Britain and Russia in accordance with the Budapest Memorandum of 5th of December, 1994 as a result of giving up the nuclear armament on its territory.
Crimea, based on its exceptional geostrategic position and on the military assets brought there by the Russian Federation, is closer to the NATO base in Dobrudja than Cluj and should represent one of the hot points permanently supervised by the Romanan military strategists and by those of the North Atlantic Alliance.
Source:https://euro-sd.com/ ESD Editorial TeamSource:https://euro-sd.com/ ESD Editorial Team
Transnistria
Moving southward on the fault line that emerged in the area where the interests of the two great powers collide, we find another spot of instability close to Romania and which represents an old generator of tensions: the Moldova ā Transnistria conflict (a territory recognized today by the Moldovan administration as the Autonomous Territorial Unit with special status Transnistria). Having in mind the importance of this minute land area for at least five east-European countries, we are not surprised that the worldās giants are disputing the control of a territory of only 4,163 sq.km and circa 470,000 inhabitants (2016), and that smaller and marginal states have joined the two as each of the former has something to gain or to lose at the end of the clash. Signs of a normalization of the situation are far away and a possible new escalation of the dispute is closer to reality.
The enclave is strategically important for Russia and Transnistria could not survive without massive Russian support (natural gas delivered so far and not paid amounts to around 6 bil. Dollars). The presence of the 1,500 or so Russian military on Transnistriaās territory complete the picture of Moscowās securing the control. The Cobasna weapons and ammunition storage (the biggest storage facility in Eastern Europe ā a remiscent of the Cold War ā where ammunition from the former GDR and Czechoslovakia were stored at the beginning of the 1990s) still accomodates around 20,000 tones of artilery and infantry ammunition, military equipment etc. The entire quantity of ammunition there has expired and a research of the Sciences Academy of the Republic of Moldova shows that in case of a deflagration, the explosion would equate to the explosions of the bombs launched on Hiroshima Či Nagasaki, to say nothing of the possible spilling of chemical compounds into the Dniestr River and then into the Black Sea.
The relations between the Republic of Moldovaās newly elected president ā Maia Sandu and Russia did not begin under the best of auspices as Sandu requested the complete withdrawal of the Russian troops and weapons from Transnistria. The request was immediately considered āirresponsibleā by the Russian minister of Foreign Affairs Serghei Lavrov.
Source: https://ro.wikipedia.org
Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia)
There are two separatist regions on Georgiaās teritory, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both regions have triggered conflicts (with Russiaās unacknowledged support) after the collapse of the USSR in order to gain their independence.
Abkhazia has an area of 8,600 sq.km. and a population of around 245,000 inhabitants (2018), and its ethnical structure has been changed after the 1991-1994 independence war when the Abkhaz represented 44% and the Georgians 21% (as compared to 1989 when the Georgians represented 48% and the Abkhaz 17%).
Abkhazia controls now half of the Georgian seashore and together with South Ossetia hosts numerous Russian military bases where the number of Russian military reached 10,000 at the beginning of 2020. In 2019 only, more than 130 Russian military drills were organized on these territories.
Source: Andrei Nacu at English Wikipedia
South Ossetia has an area of 3,900 sq.km. and a population of around 53,500 inhabitants (2015). The importance of this region is based partially on the Roki Tunnel, one of the main routes for crossing the Caucasus. Partially affected by the 2008 conflict, it was rebuilt and reopened while the cost (around 400 mil dollars) was born by Russia.
The two separatist republics were officially recognized by Russia on 26th August 2008.
Although militarilly it was a small-size one, the August 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict had a significant impact worldwide as it was for the first time after the Afghanistan invasion of 1979 that the Russian Federation invaded a neighbouring state. Moscow proved on that occasion the desire of maintaining its influence in the ex-Soviet space. Moreover, the Russian military leadership reviewed thoroughfully all dysfunctions of the Russian military system including the performances of its military technique and took actions accordingly and that was proven later on during the military actions carried out in Syria starting with September 2015.
Source: Andrei Nacu at English Wikipedia
In the aftermath of the Russo-Georgian war, the West (the US, NATO, the EU and the individual states) realized the threat Russia represents for the peace and stability of the world security system taking into account its blatant revisionism and the use of force for obtaining the acknowledgement of some presumed rights in the post-Soviet space.
It seems that for the democratic world the resulting lessons have been in their greatest part either forgotten or misplaced in the historyās library. Yet Russia succeeded in slowing down or even halting Georgiaās orientation process towards the West and the European Union.
Nagorno-Karabakh
Moving further south on the strip of land between the two seas, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, we find a dispute stored-up since many years with periodical volcanic flares-up and which attracts in its turn some of the neighbouring military powers.
The tension prevailing there threatens the peace of the entire region reverberating up to the Black Seaās other shore. In this unreal area, for an insignificant patch of land too, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan having as subject matter the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabach is boiling. Not only two neighbouring countries but also two worldās important religious communions, the Armenian Christians and the Azeri Muslims, are on the brink of war ever since the end of the 1980s. Statistics show that tens of thousands of Armenians and Azeris died so far, millions of people have been relocated and record the massacres perpetrated by both sides as well. Russiaās and Turkeyās interests are mingled there in the south of Caucasus. Their presence is continuous and when they consider necessary each of them intervene for their own benefit without considering the extent of the collateral losses.
After the latest outbreak of violences, on 9th November 2020, president Putin, the Azeri president Ilham Aliyev and the Armenian prime-minister Nikol Pashinyan signed an armistice agreement for Nagorno-Karabakh under Russiaās direct supervision. The document states:āA 1,960-strong peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation with small arms, 90 armor personnel carriers, and 380 vehicles and other pieces of special equipment shall be deployed along the Lachin corridor (…)The peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation shall be deployed for five years and this term will be automatically prolonged for other five years periods if neither of the Parties declares six months before the expiration of the period its intention of terminating this provisionā.
For the time being, Turkeyās reaction to the fact of being brutally removed from the equation, in spite of its major interests in the region, did not materialize. Russian and Turkish officials state that the two presidents Putin and Erdogan had a long phone call. On that occasion, the Turkish side declared it was content that such a long conflict came to an end, and president Putin proposed Turkey a partnership for monitoring the peace keeping in the region. At the same time, American and French sources point out to an increase of tensions between Ankara and Moscow.
The tense situation lingers on. The Azeri are discontent as they were on the verge of conquering the entire enclave and assert that the fight is not over. āThe Peace Deal is extremely vagueā an Azeri citizen declared. āI do not trust Armenia as I trust Russia even lessā.
Armenia considers the Peace Deal tantamount to a national disaster and declares it will continue its fight.
The situation is far from having a sustainable solution, yet Moscow proved this time, too, that it is the unavoidable international player in finding a solution, even a temporary one, in case of a conflict within the space of the former USSR.
Mention should be made here of the importance of the economic interests in the area as the trade routes sidestep Armenia which remains dependent on Russia and Iran while Russia preserves all its economic interests including through the opening of the railroad to Turkey (making use of the the Baku ā Tbilisi ā Kars railroad opened in 2017 with a traffic of 6.5 million tons/year, expected to be increased to 17 million tons/year). The first train from Ankara bound for Moscow left on 29th January 2021, and arrived on 9th February 2021, (around 4,600 km). A first Turkey ā China railroad cargo transport took place at the end of 2020.
Syria
Circumscribed with burning letters within this east-European fire arc, close, even very close to Nagorno-Karabakh, a seemingly never ending conflict fed by the strategic interests of the two great ones (who are joined this time by Turkey, a great military power in the making), consumes Syria. The tens of thousands of killed, the inner sanguinary disputes, the blossoming of the terrorist organization and their dissemination, the ruthless civil war and the endless exodus of emigrants turned Syria into a real war theatre. The Syrian conflict, artificially maintained to a great extent, offered the great powers the opportunity of experimenting new forms of hybrid warfare, new arnaments and fighting technique, new fighting tactics and to check their diplomatic capabilities regionally and worldwide.
The USā and its alliesā hesitations there enabled Russia to strengthen its position in Syria and in east Mediterranean both by expanding its military bases in the country (the main bases are in Lattakia area ā the Hmeimim airbase inaugurated in 2015 and Syria granted 8 hectares more in 2020 for its expansion; Tartous ā naval base and ship repair centre and an underground base for submarines; Russia has in north-east Syria another smaller bases or checkpoints) and by enhancing its political position in Damascus. No solution could be viable for Syria lacking Moscowās involvment. The situation is much more intricate as it supposes the involment of numerous global and regional players. Syriaās reconstruction calls for huge investments with 2020 figures ranging from 240-400 billion dollars to even 1 trillion dollars.
The regional and international developments are not encouraging in what concern the start of Syriaās reconstruction in a predictable time horizon.
Source: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, www.swp-berlin.org
Turkey-Greece
The hostility between Turkey and Greece is deep rooted in history. Without taking into account the innumerable small scale confrontations, it is worth mentioning that during more than 200 years the enmity between the two nations was fed by four major wars. Even after the two states joined NATO (1952) the tensions did not alleviate as the control over Cyprus (with 1974 Turkeyās invasion of the island and its 1983 declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) and the delimitation of the territorial waters remain the main disputed issues.
To give an idea about the extent of the conflict it suffices to point out some of the 2020 disputes that marked the year: Greece accused Turkey during the spring of organizing a large scale cyber attack against the governments and civil organizations in Greece and some other Middle Eastern countries hostiles to Turkey; during the same period, Greece blamed Turkey for triggering naval incidents in the Aegean Sea and presented video images for supporting the accusations; a conflict between ships belongind to the two states took place in June when a Turkish military ship opposed under fire threat a control operation intended by a Greek ship (on behalf of the European Union ā Irni Operation) on a cargo ship under Tanzanian pavillion suspected of carrying arms to Libya; the tension escalated again in August when Turkish military ships escorted surveying boats to a disputed area rich in oil deposits in the eastern Mediterranean; in August, too, both states carried out ample military naval exercises close to the Island of Cyprus; Greece accused Turkey in October of forbiding the access to the national air space of an aircraft carrying the Greek minister of Foreign Affairs; president Erdogan accused Greece in November of determining a German military ship to stop and check a Turkish commercial cargo near the Libyan coasts.
The dispute has a well-marked economic nature especially after the discovery of large oil and gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean. The negotiations between the Greek and Turkish officials for the demarcation of the maritime borders have been resumed under international pressures and the 61st round of negotiations took place in Ankara on 25th January 2021; the date of the following round, which is to be held in Athens, could not be agreed upon.
Turkeyās hegemonic tendencies, its desire of enhancing the status of a regional military power, the attempt of controlling and imposing its will in ever larger areas of interest, its coming closer to Moscow in certain circumstances prompted reactions from the US and from other NATO states, France being one of them.
The prospects of reasonably solving this conflict, sometimes dangerously close to explosion, all the more significant as two states belonging to the same alliance are in dispute, does not seem close although important European or oversea powers tried to mediate.
The escalation of tensions between two member states of the North Atlantic Alliance harms not only NATO but also amplifies the state of uncertainty and sometimes of inquietude in the already extremely sensitive south eastern European strategic area.
Under Erdoganās leadership, Turkey is heading resolutely towards maximizing its role and its geopolitical position capitalizing on great playersā hesitations such as on the USā, Chinaās, Russiaās. It is difficult to assess to what extent it will accomplish these plans.
The main players, the US and the Russian Federation, send contradictory signals
Through successive decisions, the US invited, on the one hand, Europe and implicitly the European Union to secure their own defense as America is not willing to spend funds or sacrifice her youth for defending an indolent Europe.
And the US too, the NATOās undisputed leader, decided in December 2020 that: āBesides the measures meant to stall the sudden withdrawal of the troops from Germany, the Congres resolution requests the Department of Defense and EUCOM to review the level of forces in south-east Europe. According to NDAA, and having in mind Russiaās aggressive posture, the Pentagon shall consider committing extra troops to Romania, Greece and Bulgaria. Most probably, the American military shall be stationed in the three countries on a permanent basisā.
On the other side, it seems that the Russian Federation pays lip service for tranquility and amity in the international relations. āIt is our interest that tranquility prevails everywhere in the world and first of all around our borders, and no simmering conflicts exist. The Russian Federation has no interest in maintaining āfrozenā conflicts, neither in Karabakh, nor in Transnistria and anywhere else in the post-Soviet spaceā, Serghei Lavrov, the Russian minister for Foreign Affairs declared recently to journalists.
Letās not be fooled by the show.The Russian political scientist Dmitri Trenin keeps us grounded: āThis does not suggest that Russiawill withdraw into itself or is willing to make concessions to others. It merely means that its modus operandi is undergoing an adjustment and that its position in Eurasia is being reconfiguredā.
In the extensive article āThe Black Sea-Baltic Sea Strategic Fault Lineā, General (ret) Gheorghe VÄduva, stated: āNo matter what they say or what they will say, Russia will always consider, as long as it will exist in this configuration, that the Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine and the Caucasian states will constitute its essential strategic area towards the west. And this is a source of very serious and very complicated dangers and threats demonstrated by the trenchant posture of the colossus of the East and materialized in Russiaās rearming and in its already very aggressive stance, a stance that can be understood both as the form of an active and dissuasive defense and also as strategic warningā.
Realizing even from the end of the last century the Black Seaās strategic importance, the US launched through Harvard University a cooperation and security program to be carried out during almost 20 years which nevertheless did not reach entirely its goals especially after Russiaās withdrawal from the program in 2010. In the end, as a natural consequence of the American foreign policy during the last years, Harvard University quit this initiative and offered the said program to Romania starting with 2017 and after that the program lost almost completely its international importance.
No matter what the political statements of the American or Russian officials of the moment are, the eastern part of Europe remains a dangerous area for the peace of the world. It is the place where the geopolitical interests of the two great adversaries are in a direct confrontation not only diplomatically or through the subtle interventions of the intelligence services but also through a succession of some violent social explosions covertly conducted.
On 25th January 2021, Russia lost at the European Court of Human Rights the lawsuit filed 12 years ago by Tbilisi after the 2008 conflict. Russia was declared by the Courtās decision occupier and responsible for the situation in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the Georgian undisputed territories occupied as buffer zones.
After the lawsuits concerning Transnistria, which constitute the precedents, the lawsuit filed by Ukraine for the annexation of Crimea and the military aggression in Luhansk and Donetsk follows for Moscow.
Upon the declarations issued by the European Union concerning the possibility of imposing new economic sanctions against the Kremlin on which it seems that Germany and France agreed, the Russian minister for Foreign Affairs Serghei Lavrov adopted a trenchant stance and declared on 12th February 2021, that Russia is prepared to break the relations with the European Union in case of imposing new important economic sanctions: āWe take as starting point the fact that we are prepared (for that ā breaking the relations o.n.) in the situation where we see the adoption of new sanctions generates risks for our economy, including in the most sensitive fields…We do not wish to isolate ourselves from the global life but we have to be ready for that. If you want peace, then get ready for warā, Lavrov added.
Let us see what will the foreign policy actions of the new American Administration be in 2021 although it has lost a lot of ground in Europe and the Middle East during the last two presidentsā mandates. The problems the US is confronted with domestically call for even greater efforts internationally in order to increase its relevance in the present global context.
Romania seems to remain uncaring
Specific to states lacking a geostrategical vision clearly outlined, Romania, having the eyes glazing down and her sense of judgement clouded by the multitude of her domestic problems, most of them minor ones, is indulging in a permanent succession of petty and trivial inner conflicts.
Ignorant, visionless politicians who are unable to see beyond their immediate petty interests, are despising and humiliating the entire Romanian people and a national army brought on the brink of collapse since almost two decades.
An entire procession of frauds accompanies the effort of army equiping program. Billions of dollars have been spent on technically and morally outdated, third hand military equipment which has weakened the troopsā fighting capabilities instead of raising it. There are quite frequent stances stressing that during peace time the military are useless and fingers are pointed at as a needless spender of money that some other social cathegories are entitled to.
The domestic attack against their own army takes place when beyond the borders, sometimes intimidatingly close, what is going on is not at all comforting.
Let us imagine Europeās map. In the east, from Belarus through Ukraine, Transnistria, Armenia, Syria to the Eastern Mediterranean blue waters, a huge fire arc is connecting the main hot points of the continent. It is the contact line between the huge tectonic plates of influence of the worldās great political, military and economic powers.
Romania is held fast and has an important role in this dangerous game. It is one of the top American military, Lt.Gen. (ret) Ben Hodges, currently the Pershing Chair at the Centre for European Policy Analysis who tells: ā On a short to medium run, NATO should designate Romania as its gravity centre due to its proximity to other allies such as Ukraine and Moldova (…) Romania could create its own protection area of the maritime seashore as well as capabilities to deny access in the entire East European area by using weapons with long striking range such as HIMARS missiles systems, attack helicopters, the Maritime Unmanned Systems and UAVs. Romania should also be ready to host a NATO Centre of Excellence for Unmanned Weapons Systems having in mind the ideal flying conditions, the length of its Black Sea seashore and the existence of the Danube River as well. Finally, Romania should continue expanding the training and logistics infrastructure of the Mihail KogÄlniceanu Air Base and the SmĆ¢rdan and Cincu training areas by enhancing their capabilities in the sense of allowing the carrying out of high standard joint exercises with the participation of not only the US Army but also of the US Air Forceā.
Aside from some in fact American military bases but named NATOās and which are more simbol in what the last generation equipment and personnel are concerned, there are some multinational NATO structures deployed in Romania for the time being. Part of them are already operational and the rest are being installed and readied. On the occasion of his visit to the Headquarters of NATOās Multinational Corps ā South East (HQ MS-SE) now in the course of construction, the minister of Defense Nicolae CiucÄ declared on 28th January 2021, that HQ MS-SE āwill have an important role in preparing the contingency elements in exercising the command and control of the other NATOās structures on the Romanian soil ā NATO Forces Integration Unit, the South-East Multinational Brigade and the HQ MS-SE in order to secure the connection between the tactic and strategic levels(…)The four NATOās structures of our country represent Romaniaās contribution to enhancing a deterrence and credible defense posture of the North Atlantic Alliance on the Eastern flank and in the Black Sea Regionā.
The existence on the national territory of such kind of Headquarters demonstrates indeed a certain attachment to the military alliance Romania is part of and offers to the naive ones a reasom to be proud. Yet can these four NATO structurea defend us in a way against the Russian ballistic missiles? Can they be a substitute for state-of-the-art attack aircrafts, the intelligent ammunitions, the armored carriers equiped with the most modern weapons, the high performance tanks and navies which we completely lack?
Romanian āstrategistsā with futuristic vision on war tell us about the impossibility of a classical war breaking out. They tell us relentessly theories about assymetric warfares, about cyber attacks and fights…
Let us look around us! Did anyone fired in Ukraine soft elements? No! As āclassicā as possible missiles and shells have been launched and caused thousands of victims. Did they fought with microchips in Syria? During the āArab Springā did the assymetric strikes kill hundreds of thousands of people and turned entire countries into ruins? Did they or are they engaged in cyber fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Maybe we ought to open the eyes and look more attentively around us. The threats are abundant, sometimes open, other times cleverly hidden. We live in a time when the defense of the country cannot be an abstract thing floating ethereally in government or presidential acts beautifully garnished with words. It ought to be solid and undertaken by governors no matter the party they belong to.
Unfortunately, the defense of the country, this vital political desideratum for any nation, is today at the mercy of some unconscious politicians whose mouths get soured when they pronounce the world Homeland and is completely left into the arms of a far away ally, itself confronted with serious inner problems as it is left, too, at the mercy of a military alliance erroded from inside by more and more dissensions.
Retired General and intelligence officer with a military career of over 40 years. After retirement he led some government agencies committed to Romaniaās defense policy. He authored several books.
He published a large number of newspaper items and his op-ed pieces and articles appear in numerous Romanian and foreign news outlets.
Corneliu Pivariu. Photographer: Ionus Paraschiv.
Corneliu Pivariu
Two star General of Romaniaās Army who retired in 2003. During 2006-2019 he was CEO of INGEPO Consulting Co., founder and Director of the geopolitical analyses magazine The Geostrategic Pulse.
Member of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) since 2007 and of Chatham House (2015). Member of the Board of the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES). He authored several books in the intelligence and geopolitical fields.
In the picture Dunja MijatovicĢ, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights.
“2020 has been a disastrous year for human rights in Europe,” commented Dunja MijatoviÄ, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, at a speech in front of the Council of Europe at the end of last year.
In an unprecedented fashion, the COVID-19 pandemic (C-19) has brought to fore a tremendous increase in human rights violations in 2020 throughout the world. According to Reporters Without Bordersā tracker 19 mapping human rights cases of abuse worldwide, Europe is no exception to the rule. While it contains one of the most advanced human rights protection systems globally, the old continent has seen itself prey to governmental and media attempts to erode democracy and human rights.
Infringement to human rights peaked last March in Hungary when President Viktor OrbƔn used the pandemic to seize unlimited power through an emergency law granting him absolute power to suspend rules, bypass the Parliament and adopt decrees, without any judicial oversight. This law also offered the Hungarian Prime Minister the ability to jail journalists and activists criticizing his policies under the pretext of spreading disinformation.
While Hungary arguably remains a specific case within Europe for its long-standing record of human rights violations, the region indicates some worrying trends in its ability to protect the rights encompassed in the European Convention on Human Rights.
Degradation of human rights protection in the COVID-19 era
The response to the COVID-19 pandemic by member states of the Council of Europe has not remained undisputed as far as the protection of fundamental freedoms is concerned. Many European states declared a state of emergency. They introduced a wide range of legal measures that derogate from their internal constitutional laws and the European Convention on Human Rights.
While these measures have undeniably affected society’s normal functioning and people’s way of life, the Convention itself does not preclude derogations from the obligations outlined in emergency times. Article 15 indicates that derogations from obligations under the Convention are allowed “in time of war and other public emergencies threatening the life of the nation.” Nevertheless, this clause remains valid “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.” Until today, the application of Article 15 had remained confined to situations of political violence and terrorism.
As Europe faced the second wave of the virus, many member States reintroduced states of emergency. These typically allow temporary limitations to individual rights, such as freedom of movement under Article 45 of the Convention, freedom of assembly and association under Article 12, as well as private life under Article 7.
Nevertheless, in its “COVID-19: Toolkit for member States” published last April, the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Marija PejÄinoviÄ BuriÄ, posed limits to the ability of states to derogate from the Convention’s obligations. Any derogation must have “a clear basis in domestic law” to prevent arbitrariness and cannot justify any action that goes against the “essential requirements of lawfulness and proportionality” set out in the Convention. The common understanding is that the pandemic’s exceptional circumstances can uphold some rights, yet governments shall deploy substantial efforts to preserve them.
However, such efforts towards human rights protection from national authorities have failed to materialize across Europe.
A worrying trend took shape in the increasing deficit of transparency from governmental authorities, including mandatory detentions and technological surveillance, as observed in Ireland. To add, civil society organizations in several member states expressed concerns over police misconduct during protests. Alarming instances of racism have also been observable, as exemplified by the violent beating of a black man in front of his house by two French police officers in Paris.
COVID-19 exposes the structural vulnerabilities of Europe’s social democracies
The coronavirus-related health challenges have provided certain actors and authorities with a pretext to infringe on human rights and fundamental freedoms. Such a context dominated by the discourse on an “emergency” situation with an exceptional character requires increased attentiveness to human rights violations.
Vulnerable populations, such as migrants, refugees, racial minorities, the homeless, elders, women, disabled people, and children, have found themselves on the frontline of these violations. Arguably, the COVID-19 pandemic did not create, yet only laid bare structural challenges, and fragilities of Europe’s democracies, highlighted by the glaring social inequalities deepened across the continent.
For instance, women have been significantly impacted by governmental responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, which further exacerbated gender violence and inequality. According to a study requested by the European Parliament, across Europe, calls to domestic violence outlines have increased by 20 – 60%.
Furthermore, the coronavirus response also disproportionately impacted disadvantaged children across member states by infringing on the fundamental right to education. A report by Save the Children shows that in Romania, 23% of vulnerable families could not purchase medicines for their children. In Spain, emergency food measures could only reach half of the children normally provided with school meals during the crisis.
Older people have also been particularly vulnerable to the coronavirus lockdown measures because of their social settings which isolated them further from their families and communities. Shortages in the healthcare sector and isolation of elders have increased the risk of abuse, with data from the UK suggesting a 37% rise in the country.
Several asylum-seekers have also been unlawfully rejected at EU borders and sent back to their home countries, violating the 1951 Refugee Convention. To add, the inadequacy of living conditions and overcrowding in detention centers raised alarming concerns. Asylum seekers in Italy launched a hunger strike to protest against the spread of the virus in the center, inadequately equipped to respond to the health crisis. In Belgium, some centers released detainees without any assistance.
Suppose the issues listed above receive the attention they deserve. In that case, the COVID-19 pandemic could provide an opportunity to formulate a wake-up call for increased social inclusion across European countries, with solidarity at the heart of its response. Recalling Mahatma Gandhi’s words, this is today more compelling than ever to bear in mind that “the true measure of any society can be found in how it treats its most vulnerable members.”
Empowering the citizen base and improving social “bonding” for human rights protection
As highlighted in the November Bulletin by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, local authorities and grassroots organizations have played a prominent role in supporting society’s most vulnerable groups.
Local and regional authorities appeared to have taken up an unprecedented responsibility in providing access to services and information directed towards certain societal groups on a daily basis. The Bulletin also noted that member states with greater decentralization of responsibilities had proven better-equipped authorities to tackle the pandemic’s health challenges.
The voluntary sector also took a primary seat in proactively advocating for the rights and interests of the diverse marginalized groups within society and increased its role as an essential social service provider. Altogether, these structures have proven uniquely capable of strengthening the citizen base at its core and instilling a sense of solidarity within communities.
Robert Putnam, in his sociological study ‘Bowling alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community,’ suggests that increased social capital and trust within society generates adequate civil engagement, necessary for the healthy functioning of democracies.
Further, according to Putnam, increased trust and civic engagement in society go hand-in-hand with the efficient protection of freedom and human rights. “Far from being incompatible, liberty and fraternity are mutually supportive,” notes Putnam, in his study demonstrating the strong positive correlation between equality and bonding social capital.
In contrast, the beginning of 2021 witnessed widespread anti-lockdown protests, primarily dominated by extreme rights across the continent. Trust in government institutions across Europe has reached its lowest. In such a societal context captured by distrust, a weakened citizen base could prevent the European societies’ ability to deliver sustainable solutions supported and trusted by the population.
Arguably, the media, when providing factual and objective information on all matters of public interest, plays an essential role in consolidating social “bonding.” In contrast, when resorting to “sensationalism, improper language, or reporting in ways that may raise the alarm unnecessarily or provide a platform for divisive views to spread,” as Dunja MijatoviÄ warns, the media could instead decrease trust among society, endangering the health of healthy democratic societies.
More salient than ever is the mobilization of all citizens around a collective response to the virus. In democracies, social trust or ābonding capitalā plays a central role in empowering the citizen base. And this trust cannot be achieved without an irrevocable and unconditional commitment to human rights.
The COVID-19 crisis taught us that only governance in compliance with the rule of law and human rights is capable of adequately managing the challenges associated with this unprecedented crisis. More clearly than ever before, preserving human rights proves an essential pillar to managing the health crisis and must be actively incorporated within public policies.
Paying heed to the many challenges to individual rights posed by the health crisis must be part of a genuine effort to restore trust in today’s European societies.
By Makhmud Istamov, Member of the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
Exactly one year has passed since the Parliamentary and Local elections held in our country on the basis of the new legislation.
In a democratic state and society, it is paramount that the will of the people is respected above all else, without deviation.
Article 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan stipulates that āthe people are the sole source of state powerā and Article 32 states that āCitizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall have the right to participate in the management of public and state affairs, both directly and through representativesā.
These rights find their practical expression exactly in the elections. The dedication of a separate chapter in the Constitution to electoral issues has served as an important legal basis for the formation of the national electoral legislation of the country. At the same time, this constitutional provision is an important factor in the continuous improvement of electoral legislation in Uzbekistan.
From this point of view, if we focus on the changes that have taken place in the electoral legislation and practice in recent years, we can see a high degree of efficiency of the systematic reforms in the field of national elections.
Over the past six years, Uzbekistan has held two parliamentary and two presidential elections. The extensive practical and legal experience gained during these elections, as well as the recommendations made by both national and international observers, have played an important role in improving electoral legislation.
In 2014, amendments were introduced to Article 117 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Central Election Commission was granted constitutional status and guarantees of its formation and independent activity were established.
The independence of the CEC members is guaranteed by the fact that their term of office is not limited in time and they are elected by local representative bodies and parliament.
According to the Law of 2015 and presumption of innocence it was determined that polling stations should be set up in temporary detention places to ensure that persons under investigation and whose guilt is not established by legal order participate in the elections.
The number of signatures in support of presidential candidates has also been sharply reduced, based on international electoral standards. Specifically, the required number of signatures was reduced from five to one per cent of the total number of voters.
In 2019, on the initiative of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the adoption of a single and unified Election Code, which included five existing election laws and dozens of by-laws, created an important legal basis for raising the electoral practice to a high quality level.
The adoption of the Election Code allowed to systemize the norms of electoral legislation (codification), eliminate similar norms and unify this sphere of legislation.
The draft Code was subject to international legal examination by the Venice Commission and a conclusion was obtained. The Code has implemented a number of international election standards, as well as recommendations of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR). As a result, the Election Code has been enriched with a number of improvements.
These important changes include: allowing the participation in the elections of persons who have committed misdemeanors and crimes not constituting great social danger; abolishment of 15 reserved seats for Ecological Movement in the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis; participation in the observations of elections by the representatives of non-governmental non-profit organization ā citizensā self-government bodies; allowing voters to sign in support of one or more political parties or presidential candidates.
Reforms in the electoral legislation and practice have been widely recognized not only by the participants of the electoral process, but also by the international community. This was also evident in the 2019 elections to the parliament and local Kengashes.
Specifically, the report of OSCE ODIHRās full-fledged Election Observation Mission in connection with the 2019 parliamentary elections under the slogan āNew Uzbekistan ā New Electionsā acknowledges a number of positive changes.
In particular, the Mission emphasizes in its report that āthe elections took place under improved legislation and with greater tolerance of independent voices. There is more acceptance of free expression. The contesting parties presented their political platforms and the media hosted debates, many aired live. The Election Code incorporates several previous ODIHR recommendations and brings the legal framework closer in line with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections. The elections showed that the ongoing reforms need to continueā.
Undoubtedly, the updated electoral legislation of 2019, as well as the strengthening and widening environment of openness and transparency in our country, allowed the Central Election Commission to organize the parliamentary elections and raise it to a new, higher level.
What are the systematic changes that are being steadily implemented?
The formation of a single electronic voter list to ensure the implementation of the principle of āone voter ā one voteā has become a completely new practice in the national electoral system of Uzbekistan. The list includes information on more than the 20.5 million citizens of voting age and was used during the previous elections.
Political parties and candidates have been provided with more opportunities than ever before to hold pre-election meetings. The 26 TV debates they held were all broadcast live. All this contributed, for the first time in the history of modern Uzbekistan, to elections held in a true competitive environment.
The opportunity of all our compatriots living abroad to vote is another important change. At 55 polling stations established in 38 foreign countries, 112,411 citizens exercised their constitutional right to vote. In the previous elections, only registered citizens in the diplomatic missions of our country abroad could participate in the elections.
During the preparation for the elections, about 180,000 members of election commissions were trained in practical seminars.
One of the most important innovations in the national electoral system of Uzbekistan ā for the first time in the history of our country persons who have committed misdemeanors and crimes not constituting a great social danger had the honor to vote. Thus 4,308 such individuals exercised their right to vote in the previous elections.
A mechanism for a rapid response to media, social networks and citizens reports of electoral violations has been created which also allowed appropriate legal action to be taken if necessary. Through this mechanism, the results of the elections of the local representative bodies in two constituencies were declared invalid and the process of repeat elections was used for the first time in the national electoral practice.
It should be noted that this is, first of all, a clear confirmation of changes in the socio-political environment of new Uzbekistan, the principles of democracy, openness and transparency are beginning to be implemented. The whole world is watching with interest as the reforms are being steadily implemented, which require great wisdom, patriotism, a huge devotion to national traditions and ideas of modern democracy and a strong political will.
The adoption and successful implementation of the Election Code was a major step towards further strengthening and improving our national electoral legislation, which was formed during the years of independence, and relied on our nearly thirty years of experience in conducting democratic elections.
For the first time, the Central Election Commission has developed analytical information on the parliamentary elections in 2019, which, along with the achievements in the organization of elections, reflected the shortcomings and problems, the measures to be taken.
Further improvement of our national electoral legislation, to bring it in line with universally recognized international standards is a continuous and ongoing process.
The recommendations of international organizations on the improvement of the electoral system will be taken into account and implemented in compliance with the ongoing structural reforms in our country, of course, based on the national traditions and unique cultural values of our people.
At the same time, the analysis of Uzbekistanās scores in the World Democracy Index over the past six years in the āElectoral Process and Pluralismā category raises some concerns and we hope that our international partners will pay more attention to this issue.
For six years in a row from 2014 to 2019, the score of Uzbekistan was the same ā 0.08 in the World Democracy Index āElectoral Process and Pluralismā. According to the criterion of āfree and fair electionsā of the Transformation Index, compiled by the Bertelsmann Foundation ā 2.
However, we believe that the effective reforms implemented in the electoral system of Uzbekistan in 2019 alone will significantly improve these numbers. As noted, it would be considered fair if the next international rankings reflect the adoption of a single Election Code and the analytical reports of influential international organizations published in 2020.
Of course, the ultimate goal is not to improve the numbers in the rankings. The most important thing is to firmly establish democracy, which is steadily strengthening in new Uzbekistan, and to further improve the conditions that serve to expand the electoral rights of citizens.
Dans son long arrĆŖt (voir le texte complet de 60 pages en anglais), la Chambre de la CPI conclut dans son dispositif (page 60):
ā- that Palestine is a State Party to the Statute; (…)
– by majority, Judge KovĆ”cs dissenting, that, as a consequence, Palestine qualifies as ā[t]he State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurredā for the purposes of article 12(2)(a) of the Statute; and (…)
– by majority, Judge KovĆ”cs dissenting, that the Courtās territorial jurisdiction in the Situation in Palestine extends to the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, namely Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalemā
Ā« Libman noted that the ICC was the most dangerous issue for Israel and wondered whether the U.S. could simply state publicly its position that the ICC has no jurisdiction over Israel regarding the Gaza operation Ā».
“We are also deeply concerned by news reports that one state party, namely Canada, has āreminded the Courtā of its provision of budgetary resources in a letter to the ICC concerning its jurisdiction over the āsituation in Palestineā, which appears to be a threat to withdraw financial support”.
One of the authors, Isabel Amaral, left on the photo, granted the honour to hand out a copy to Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, President of the Portuguese Republic, signed by all 5 authors.
Amsterdam University Press recently published the book āProtocol to Manage Relationships Today: Modern Relationship Management Based Upon Traditional Valuesā, a book written by leading protocol experts from The Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom and with contributions from protocol experts at the European Union, the British Royal Household, the military, Gucci, ABN AMRO Bank, the cities of The Hague and Meijerijstad, UEFA and many others.
The book describes the successful application of contemporary protocol to build strong relationships by, among others, the Dutch King, atĀ the Royal Wedding of Prince Harry to Meghan Markle and at the World Press Photo awards show. In the book Dutch fashion and lifestyle expert Maik de Boer explains the value of protocol in the world of fashion as well as the protocol of the famous Berlin techno club Berghain is described.
Protocol to Manage Relationships Today: Modern Relationship Management Based Upon Traditional Values.
āProtocol to Manage Relationships Todayā also describes the success of Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, the recently re-elected President of the Portuguese Republic, to balance the protocol between tradition and modernity. The book explains that if the rules of protocol are applied too strictly, a meeting will be too formal and uncomfortable. Too casual and too little focus is also not good and applying too few rules leads to chaos. Also, too much symbolism in protocol will make people laugh and if there is no symbolism, we will not be able to recognize the story and/or understand why we are attending the event.
Protocol is all about balancing between tradition and modernity.
āThe night before the state visit to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Grand Duke Henri and the President of Portugal decided to go out for a few beers. The President felt right at home: an estimated 120,000 of the 550,000 people in Luxembourg are either born in Portugal or are of Portuguese ancestry. Even the Grand Duke himself has two Portuguese great-grandmothers. The President was welcomed with open arms and the unofficial and unorthodox start of the state visit was the beginning of a very good friendship between the two Heads of state.
āThis is a great example of how relations are built,ā the Founder and director of The standard Companion, the Australian-based etiquette school, Retallack explains in an interview in our book. āBuilding diplomatic relations relies heavily on face-to-face interactions where true connections are made. I admire the approach of the Portuguese President.ā The approach of the Portuguese President towards protocol is not about abolishing it but introducing small changes. It allowed him to achieve a lot and it is part of the reasons why he is so popular.
At the end of 2020 the authors of the book were granted the honour to hand out a copy to the President of the Portuguese Republic.
There is a widespread view that Germany’s policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina has always been friendly. Also, that such a policy stimulated the European Union to adopt a positive approach to the Bosnian quest to eventually become a part of the Euro-Atlantic integrations. However, Stefan Schwarz, a renowned German politician, in his recent comment for Deutsche Welle, raised the question of the true nature of Germany’s policy towards Bosnia, from 1992 to the present day. Here we shall try to offer possible answers to this question, so as to present a brief history of that policy.
A history of (un)recognition
Germany officially recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state on April 6, 1992. Prior to that, such recognition had been granted to two other former Yugoslav republics, Slovenia and Croatia, on January 15, 1992. Germany recognised these two states against the advice by Robert Badinter, a jurist delegated by the European Commission to arbitrate in the process of dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, to recognize all Yugoslav republics simultaneously.
Under the pressure by Germany, 12 members of the European Community (United Kingdom, Italy, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Greece, Austria) recognized Slovenia and Croatia in January 1992. As Washington Post wrote on January 16, 1992,
The German government hailed today’s event as a historic development and immediately opened embassies in the two republics. But France and Britain, which still harbor doubts about the wisdom of early recognition, said they would wait to see if Croatia fulfilled its promises on human rights before carrying out an exchange of ambassadors.
There is a well-known myth, spread by the diplomats of Britain and France, that ‘early recognition’ of Slovenia and Croatia triggered the war in the former Yugoslavia. Such a claim is both absurd and obscene, bearing in mind that Serbia had already waged war against Slovenia and Croatia and was preparing a military attack on Bosnia for several months. However, the question that should be posed here is, why Germany recognised Slovenia and Croatia separately, instead of recognition of all the Yugoslav republics simultaneously, as advised by Badinter and strongly supported by the US? Does that imply that Germany practically left the rest of the republics to their fate, to be occupied and annexed by Serbia, which controled the former Yugoslav army and its resources? Was it a deliberate policy, or simply a reckless decision? In the same article, WP quotes the then German Minister of Foreign Affairs:
“The German policy on Yugoslavia has proved correct,” said German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. “We’ve said for months that if the Community decided on recognition . . . that would initiate a process of rethinking, above all by the leadership of the Yugoslav army.”
Mr. Genscher probably offered a definite answer to that question. Also, the actual response of the Yugoslav army’s leadership to the German push for separate recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, counted in hundreds of thousands of dead and millions of ethnically cleansed in Croatia and Bosnia, testifies to the ‘correctness’ of such thinking. Yet, was it a momentary miscalculation by Genscher, the then Minister, or a long-term German foreign policy towards Bosnia, already projected to be the ultimate victim of the Yugoslav army’s agression?
An answer to this question is not very difficult to reach if we consider the German policy concerning the initiatives for ethnic partition of Bosnia, disseminated through the channels of the European Community. These proposals may have been initiated and instigated by the British Foreign Office and the French Quai d’Orsay; yet, partition along ethnic lines has always been the only European consensus about Bosnia, a consensus in which Germany participated with all its political will and weight.
Appeasement, from Munich to Lisbon
Prior to the 1992-1995 war, the European Community delegated the British and Portugese diplomats, Lord Carrington and Jose Cutileiro, to design a suitable scheme for ethnic partition of Bosnia, and in February 1992 they launched the so-called Lisbon Conference, with the aim of separating Bosnian ethno-religious communities and isolating them into distinct territories. This was the initiation of the process of ethnic partition, adopted in each subsequent plan to end the war in Bosnia. However, at the Lisbon Conference such a ‘solution’ was imposed by Carrington and Cutileiro as the only available when there was no war to end, indeed, no war in sight; and, curiously, it has remained the only concept the European Community, and then the European Union, has ever tried to apply to Bosnia.
Contrary to the foundations of political theory, sovereignty of the Bosnian state was thus divided, and its parts were transferred to the chiefs of three ethnic parties. The EC recognised these usurpers of the state sovereignty, having promoted them into legitimate representatives of their respective ethnic communities. The Carrington-Cutileiro maps were tailored to determine the territorial reach of each of these communities. What remained to be done afterwards was their actual physical separation, and that could only be performed by war, genocide and ethnic cleansing. For, ethnically homogenous territories, as envisaged by Carrington and Cutileiro, could only be created by a mass slaughter and mass expulsion of those who did not fit the prescribed model of ethnic homogeneity. In this way, the European Community created a recipe for the war in Bosnia. Yet, ever since the war broke out, the European diplomats have never ceased claiming that the ‘chaos’ was created by ‘the wild Balkan tribes’, who ‘had always slaughtered each other’.
No one ever noticed German opposition to the Lisbon principles of ethnic separation and territorial partition, clearly leading to war and bloodshed. Is it, then, possible that German foreign policy was truly surprised by the Lisbon’s bloody outcome? Or the Lisbon Agreement was tailored in the best tradition of the Munich Agreement, as a consensus on another country’s partition between the three leading European powers ā Great Britain, France, and Germany āĀ again, in the name of peace?
Mostar Bridge, Bosnia Herzegovina
Landgrab rewarded
In the following ‘peace plans’ for Bosnia, the European Community was represented by Lord Owen, accompanied by the representatives of the Organization of United Nations, Cyrus Vance and Thorwald Stoltenberg. Although the British diplomacy was clearly dominant in these attempts to find a ‘proper’ model for Bosnia’s ethnic partition, Germany’s Foreign Ministry was always fully present there through its Director of Policy Planning Staff, Wolfgang Ischinger. In the structure of the German Ministry, this position is occuppied by the most senior career diplomat, so that there can be no doubt about Ischinger’s capacity to articulate Germany’s strategic interests. During the process of negotiations under the Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg plans, Ischinger coordinated German policy towards Bosnia together with Michael Steiner, the head of āSoBosā (Sonderstab Bosnien), a special Bosnian unit established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[i]
During the war in Bosnia, from 1992 to 1995, Germany and the European Community never abandoned the concept of Bosnia’s ethnic partition. In 1994, Germany took a more active role in its implementation within the (informal) International Contact Group, consisting of the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the US, where Germany was represented by both Ischinger and Steiner. The Contact Group Plan defined the final model of ethnic separation, having led to the ultimate breakup of the Bosnian territory into two ethnically cleansed and homogenised ‘entities’, tailored in accordance with an arbitrary proportion of 51:49%, which was subsequently implemented in the Dayton Peace Accords.
The entire struggle within the Contact Group was fought over the percentage and disposition of territory granted to particular ethnic communities, two of which served as Serbia’s and Croatia’s proxies. The principle of ethnic partition was never put in question. In this process, Germany became the exclusive advocate of Croatian interests, in Croatia’s attempts to cede the south-western part of Bosnia, whereas Britain and France advocated the interests of Serbia in its efforts to cede eastern and western parts of Bosnia. To some people’s surprise, the United States was the sole defender of Bosnia’s territorial integrity within the Contact Group. However, under the pressure by the European Community, the US was forced to make concessions, so as to eventually accept the prescribed 51:49% territorial distribution as an ‘internal reorganisation’ of Bosnia.
The US thus tacitly accepted the European initiatives to reward the landgrab of Bosnia’s territory, performed by Serbia and Croatia, against the UN Charter and international law. The European Community’s leading powers ā Great Britain, France, and Germany ā claimed that there was no other option but to accept such a landgrab, because the status quo, caused by the neighbours’ military aggression, could not possibly be altered. To strengthen this argument, the European Community also played the main role in imposing an arms embargo on the ‘warring parties’. This embargo effectively deprived the landlocked Bosnian army of the capacity to purchase weaponry and thus alter the status quo and liberate the country’s territory. Here the EC acted as a whole, again, without any dissent on Germany’s or anyone else’s part.
Whose responsibility?
The Dayton Peace Accords is commonly perceived as an American political project. The partition of Bosnia is thus being interpreted as a concept that emerged for the first time during the Dayton negotiations, and its authorship is ascribed exclusively to the American negotiator, Richard Holbrooke. However, it is not so. The history of Bosnia’s partition clearly demonstrates that this very concept has persistently been promoted by the European Community, and then by the European Union, from the 1992 Lisbon Conference to the present day. Even the notorious partition proportion of 51:49% was determined by the Contact Group, well before the Dayton Conference.
A clear responsibility of the US negotiators is that they caved in to the pressures by the EC within the Contact Group. Still, the consistent striving to impose ethnic partition as the sole appropriate concept for Bosnia should definitely be attributed to its real advocates ā the members of the European Community. Since Italy and Yeltsin’s Russia certainly played a minor role in the Contact Group, the lion’s share of responsibility for the final outcome, verified in Dayton, belongs equally to three EC powers, Great Britain, France, and Germany. The fact that the British policy-makers conceived the very principle of ethnic partition, that their French colleagues were so enthusiastic about its implementation, while the Germans accepted it as the best available mode of appeasement, abolishes neither of them of gigantic moral and political responsibility for all the suffering the Bosnians have had to go through.Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā
[i] As consequent advocates of the German foreign policy in the Bosnian episode, both Ischinger and Steiner have continuously enjoyed upward promotion within the ranks of the German foreign policy establishment. Thus Ischinger first took the position of the Ministry’s Political Director under Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, and then of the StaatssekretƤr (deputy foreign minister) underĀ Foreign MinisterĀ Joschka Fischer. Ischinger also represented Germany at numerous international and European conferences, including the 1999 G8 and EU summit meetings in Cologne/Germany and the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at the United Nations, New York. He was also appointed as the European Union Representative in theĀ Troika negotiations on the future of Kosovo in 2007. Since 2019, Ischinger has been co-chairing on the Transatlantic Task Force of theĀ German Marshall FundĀ and theĀ Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-StiftungĀ (BKHS) and, finally, has become the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference (!). During his mandate in the Contact Group, Steiner was awarded the position of head of the Ministry’s co-ordination unit for multilateral peace efforts. After the war, he served six months (JanuaryāJuly 1997) as a principal deputy toĀ Carl Bildt, the first high representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1998, he was selected by ChancellorĀ Gerhard SchrƶderĀ to work as the Chancellor’s foreign and security policy adviser.
About the authors:
Dr. Zlatko HadžidediÄ is the founder and director of the Center for Nationalism Studies, in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (www.nationalismstudies.org).
Adnan IdrizbegoviÄ, Independent Researcher, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina
We often hear stories about captivating and fascinating diplomatic life, but how is it experienced by those who are behind the scenes? This month, we begin our new article column dedicated to sharing diverse life stories of diplomatic offspring.
R: āYes, definitely. What shocked me the most was the national development of the country and overall quality of life. Compared to our home country, Australia has great infrastructure and availability of public facilities.ā
K: āI was younger than Regi, so my memories are very childish. However, I was amazed to find out Australians to be very welcoming and genuine; everyone was willing to help. Indeed, most surprisingly, I experienced actual culture shock when I returned to my home country, Indonesia.
It might sound paradoxical but adapting to life back in my country was harder than I imagined. The mentalities are different. This does not only refer to the overall surroundings and lifestyle but also language confusion. I often unintentionally code-switched English and Indonesian, which caused giggles of my fellow students. At that time, it seemed to be a struggle.ā
Smiling, Kiky and Regi answered: āA lot! Indonesian is our mother tongue, and English can be considered as the first foreign language. In Australia, we learned some Arabic in the Islamic school and French in a public school. After returning to Jakarta, we had to take language German classes and Mandarin. Then, before moving to The Netherlands, we completed intermediate Dutch. This might be astonishing, but we donāt have any solid knowledge of languages, with the only exception being Indonesian and English, which we use on a regular basis.ā
Two years ago, Kiky (18) moved with the parents to The Netherlands, whereas Regi (21) decided to stay and undertake his undergraduate studies in Indonesia. Kiky finished Indonesian school in The Hague and also enrolled in the same university as Regi. However, they chose different career paths.
Do you see your future career related to the diplomatic sphere?
K: āNot at all. Iām proud to be the first generation of doctors in my family. I always have been passionate about the field of medicine. Thus, when it was time to decide on the degree, without any doubt, it was dentistry. I havenāt regretted it.ā
R: āMy career interests diverge from Kikyās. Iām specializing in economics, similar to my momās profession. In the future, I would like to improve the quality of life for Indonesians, and I believe that economy plays a fundamental part in it. Living in Australia and The Netherlands have just convinced me even more that Indonesia needs good economic policy implemented.ā
During the pandemic, Kiky and Regi reunited with their parents in The Hague and have followed online classes since then. They acknowledge that being family members of a diplomat is tough with continuous life on the go, but it always brings adventures, the aspect they enjoy the most.
During the 16 Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence from the 25th of November to the 10th of December, the Ban Ki-moon Centre for Global Citizens contributes to the Orange the World Campaign globally and in Austria, calling for the elimination of violence against women and girls.
Five years ago, in 2015, the member states of the United Nations (UN) agreed on 17 global goals to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all. Since then, these Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have evolved into a guiding roadmap for finding long term solutions to global challenges. āLeaving No One Behindā has become the key message of this agenda, as the global community emphasised that the SDGs can only be achieved if peace and prosperity holds true for everyone.
Women make up half of the worldās population, but they still struggle to even exercise their fundamental human rights. A staggering one in three women experiences physical or sexual violence in their lifetime.[1] Violence against women and girls is, thus, one of the most pervasive human rights violations and perhaps the most obvious manifestation of the deeply rooted imbalances in power in our societies. How will we ever reach the SDGs if such inequalities still exist?
In 2008, the UN, under the leadership of its 8th Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, pushed for a multi-year effort aimed at preventing and eliminating violence against women and girls around the world, called UNiTE to End Violence against Women. The campaign called on governments, civil society, womenās organizations, young people, the private sector, the media and the entire UN system to join forces in addressing the global pandemic of violence against women and girls. It has, for example, worked to adopt and enforce national laws to address and punish all forms of violence against women and girls, in line with international human rights standards.[2]
In 2015 UN Women became the agency entrusted to lead the UNās efforts to advocate the elimination of violence against women and girls. To strengthen UNiTE, UN Women announced the āOrange the Worldā campaign, to take place annually during the period between the 25th of November, the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, and the 10th of December, Human Rights Day. During these 16 Days of Activism Against Gender-Based Violence, the worldās most prominent monuments and buildings are illuminated in orange, representing a future free from violence against women and girls.
Hosting the United Nations and located in the heart of Europe, Austria plays a key role in boosting the campaign on a local and international level. UN Women Austria, Soroptimist International Austria, HeForShe Austria and the Ban Ki-moon Centre are working in close partnership on the Austrian contribution to Orange the World. In 2019, the partners counted over 130 Austrian buildings in monuments illuminated in orange during the 16 Days of Activism. In 2020, the aim is to surpass this number and to shed light on current challenges regarding gender-based violence with the support of the Austrian actress Ursula Strauss as the campaignās spokesperson.
2020 has been rattled by the Covid-19 pandemic and emerging data has shown that the lock-down measures around the world were accompanied by a spike in reported domestic violence cases. This alarming development demonstrates that action must be taken to prevent the aggravation and contribute to the elimination of what UN Women has named āThe Shadow Pandemicā.[3]
To spread the message of the campaign to a wider audience and discuss the issues of the Shadow Pandemic with high-level actors, two online events will take place during the Orange the World timeframe.
At a virtual high-level roundtable on November 26th titled āTackling the Shadow Pandemic ā Violence Against Women During COVID-19 Timesā, Executive Director of UN Women Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, former Prime Minister of New Zealand Helen Clark, Regional Director of UN Women Asia and Pacific Mohammad Naciri, CEO of Avon Angela Cretu, and womenās rights activist Trisha Shetty will discuss what steps can be taken to address the spike in violence against women during COVID-19. The event will be hosted by the Co-chairs of the Ban Ki-moon Centre, 8th UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and 11th President of Austria Heinz Fischer.
On December 1st, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Ban Ki-moon Centre will host a Virtual Expo called āEducation, Empowerment, and Effective Policies: Innovative Initiatives Preventing Gender-Based Violenceā. As part of UNODCās Education for Justice Global Dialogue Series, changemakers from around the world will come together and present how they take action to prevent violence against women and girls.
To make the world a safer and better place for all, we must all do our part to eliminate violence against women and girls in all its forms. We encourage you to get active in the Orange the World campaign by hosting an event, sharing its messages, and becoming part of this global movement!
About the Ban Ki-moon Centre:
In 2018, Ban Ki-moon and Heinz Fischer founded the Ban Ki-moon Centre for Global Citizens (BKMC), to empower women and youth to become global citizens within the framework of the SDGs. Acknowledging that gender-based violence restricts, if not prevents individuals to be a part of and contribute to the 2030 Agenda, the BKMC, based in Vienna, Austria, also advocates for the elimination of violence against women and girls. The Ban Ki-moon Centre has been an active contributor to the Orange the World Campaign in Austria since 2018. (www.bankimooncentre.org)
About the author:
Text by:
Viola Christian, Program Officer Ban Ki-moon Centre for Global Citizens (advocacy, empowerment)
