H.E. Ms Madeleine Liguemoh Ondoua , Ambassador of the Republic of Cameroon

On Wednesday 9 December 2020, the Ambassador of the Republic of Cameroon to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, H.E. Ms. Madeleine Liguemoh Ondoua, presented her Letters of Credence to the King of the Netherlands, His Majesty Willem-Alexander Claus George Ferdinand.

In prelude to the event that unfolded in solemnity and pomp, the King’s Chamberlain received and led the Ambassador to the palace after the performance of the National Anthem of the Republic of Cameroon and the associated military honours reserved for the occasion. Upon fulfilment of all relevant official and ceremonial requirements, King Willem-Alexander granted an audience to the Ambassador in the course of which they reviewed the state of cooperation between Cameroon and the Netherlands.

A diplomat by profession H.E. Madeleine Liguemoh Ondoua started her career at the Ministry of External Relations in 2005 and in the hierarchical order of the corps she is at the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary. She gained admission into the International Relations Institute of Cameroon (IRIC) in 1994, after obtaining a Bachelor’s degree in Francophone Private Law from the University of YaoundĂ© II in 1994. At IRIC, she obtained a Professional Master’s degree in 1997, a Diploma of Higher Specialized Studies in 1999 and a Doctorate in International Relations in 2005. From there she was integrated into the Ministry of External Relations as an official in the Department of Information, Documentation and Diplomatic Archives.

With regard to important markers in the evolution of her career she served as an Assistant Research Officer in the Department of Legal Affairs and Treaties from 2006 to 2011 and from 2011 to 2017, she was a Sub-Director in the Department of Cameroonians Abroad. In 2017, the wave of appointments and deployment of Cameroonian diplomats abroad led her to occupy the post of First Counsellor at the Cameroonian Embassy in Berne (Switzerland). Her tenure in this position lasted from 7 November 2017 to 11 September 2020, when she was appointed as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Cameroon to the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

A trail of capacity building endeavours at home and abroad including training seminars on dispute settlement organised by the World Trade Organization (WTO), IRIC and the Higher Institute of Public Management (ISMP), equally underpin H.E. Liguemoh Ondoua’s career and academic progression.

She has also built a solid foundation on years of social engagement in interprofessional associations and active participation in key projects. She has notably served as Vice-President of the association regrouping Cameroonian female diplomats (Dynamique des Femmes de la Diplomatie Camerounaise, DYFEDCAM) and she was a member of the International Women’s Organisation (IWO) in Uganda. She was the Editor -in-Chief of the journal for Women in Cameroonian Diplomacy “Diploladies” and she served as the President of the Scientific Committee of the first Diaspora Forum (FODIAS) organized by the Government of Cameroon.

Moreover, the mother of two is an awardee of the prestigious Henry Dunant Award issued by Ugandan Red Cross Society in 2002.

Oman celebrates its 50th National Day with a new vision and a renewed renaissance

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The Sultanate of Oman celebrated the 50th Anniversary of its National Day; a premiĂšre under the novel leadership of His Majesty Sultan Haitham bin Tariq bin Taimur Al Said. The latter took power in January 2020 from the late Sultan Qaboos bin Said bin Taimur, father of the Omani Renaissance. 

Sultan Haitham bin Tariq has vowed to ensure the continuation and preservation of the Sultanate by building on his predecessor’s legacy.

His Majesty Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al Said

His Majesty the Sultan is the Head of State, Chair of the Council of Ministers as well as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. He is the symbol of national unity and the guardian of the preservation, and the protection thereof.

Sultan Haitham was born in Muscat on 11 October 1955. After receiving his elementary education at the Sa’idiyya School in Muscat, he moved abroad to pursue his studies – following the wishes of his late father, Sayyid Tariq bin Taimur Al Said. First, then Sayyid Haitham moved to Lebanon, where he attended Broumana High School. Subsequently he moved to the United Kingdom, where he pursued his secondary studies and attended university at the prestigious University of Oxford.

During his career, Sultan Haitham held a number of important positions, which prepared him to eventually take on the leadership of Oman in January 2020. First, the would-be Sultan became involved in the work of the Omani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he reached the crucial position of Secretary General.

Eventually then Sayyid Haitham bin Tariq worked as Minister of Heritage and Culture for nearly 18 years, during which he further approached the grandeur of Omani history, heritage, and culture. In addition, he assumed the chairmanship of several committees, the most important of which was the main committee for the future vision “Oman 2040”.

As a culmination to his successful career, H.M. Sultan Haitham bin Tariq took executive power in Oman on 11 January 2020, succeeding the late Sultan Qaboos bin Said bin Taimur in a smooth transition of power that was appreciated and admired throughout the world. In his first speech after his inauguration as monarch, H.M. Sultan Haitham commended the achievements of his predecessor and pledged to build upon his legacy.

He also affirmed that he would follow the footsteps of the late Sultan in foreign policy, stressing the principles he had set for the Sultanate’s foreign policy based on peaceful coexistence between nations and peoples, good neighbourhood, non-interference in the internal affairs of others, and respect for the sovereignty of states.

Besideshis involvement in politics, H.M. Sultan Haitham has wide interests, including sports. For instance, from 1983 to 1986 he chaired the first Omani Football Association, overseeing the establishment of many organizational aspects in the work of football and sports clubs in the Sultanate. During this time period, the Sultanate hosted the seventh Gulf Cup. His Majesty also chaired the organizing committee of the second Asian Beach Games that the Sultanate hosted in 2010.

Decorations and honours received by His Majesty

During his career, His Majesty Sultan Haitham bin Tariq has received several royal decorations, in the forefront of which was the Order of Alrusoukh (Firmness), which he received from the late Sultan Qaboos bin Said in November 2010, in addition to the Order of Al Said, the Order of Oman and the Order of the Omani Renaissance.

In March 2001 he was also awarded the Decoration of Honour for Services provided by the Republic of Austria, and in December 2006 he received the King Abdul Aziz Sash (First Class). He received an Honorary Knighthood, Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order from the United Kingdom in November of 2010.

Oman and The Netherlands

The bilateral relations between the Sultanate of Oman and the Kingdom of the Netherlands are witnessing a close and continuous development at all levels.

This year, His Majesty King Willem-Alexander of the Kingdom of Netherlands paid a visit to the Sultanate and met with His Majesty Haitham bin Tariq, Sultan of Oman. The Dutch monarch presented his condolences on the demise of late Sultan Qaboos bin Said.

His Excellency Sayyid Badr bin Hamad bin Hamoud Al Busaidi, Foreign Minister of Oman, also conducted a virtual conference with His Excellency Stef Blok, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Their Excellencies the foreign ministers of both countries discussed most of the bilateral political and economic issues.

Another virtual meeting was performed between several parties in the Sultanate of Oman and the Kingdom of the Netherlands with the participation of Their Excellencies Ambassador Sheikh Dr. Abdullah bin Salim bin Hamed Al Harthi and Ambassador Laetitia van Asch, and a wide number of companies from both countries.

The Sultanate of Oman and the Kingdom of the Netherlands will continue to strengthen their partnership and will work side to side  to prosper, widen and deepen cooperation at political, economic and social levels. 

Oman is distinguished by its geographical position and its easy access to its neighbours (Asia, Africa and Gulf States) which attracts Dutch Companies to invest in several sectors.

Oman provides enormous opportunities and facilities to all kind of investment. The Sultanate with its unique location offers many chances to expand its economical connections beyond its borders. With that in mind, Oman bids a number of incentives encouraging foreign businesses, such as low tax, cheap energy, skilled labour and land allocation by the Government.

Oman

Foreign Policy and the Future Vision

As soon as he assumed power, in his first nation address, His Majesty Sultan Haitham reaffirmed the permanent stands of the Sultanate’s foreign policy, saying that the Sultanate advocates peaceful co-existence among nations, good neighbourliness and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. His Majesty the Sultan moreover stressed that he would follow the footsteps of the late Sultan Qaboos bin Said bin Taimur.

In his allocution, His Majesty the Sultan said, “We shall trace the course of the late Sultan, reaffirming the fundamentals of our country’s foreign policy based on peaceful co-existence with nations, good neighbourliness, non-interference in the internal affairs of others, respect for countries’ sovereignty and international cooperation in various spheres.”

This stance was reaffirmed by the Sultanate’s Government last September in a speech delivered by Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi before the 75th general assembly of the United Nations. Sayyid Badr said, “His Majesty the Sultan has reaffirmed beyond any doubt that the Sultanate will continue the prudent policy set by the late His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said bin Taimur, Founder of Oman’s Modern Renaissance and architect of its foreign policy and its international relations over the past 50 years.”

In addition, the principles of Omani foreign policy as established in its blessed renaissance espouse dialogue as a means for solving disputes. They also support values of tolerance, justice equality and the settlement of conflicts in accordance with the UN charter and rules of the International Law. This enhanced the Sultanate’s regional and international status and made it a lighthouse of peace and security.

It is worth noting that Omani foreign policy principles are derived from basics of Oman’s centuries-old civilisation and original values of Omani society that indicate a sincere desire to promote humanity and moderation. As a result, the Sultanate is widely accepted as mediator in the international arena.

The HCCH: A Constant in a World of Change

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By Dr Christophe Bernasconi, HCCH Secretary General.

As you read these lines, millions of people are actively engaged in international exchanges or otherwise involved in cross-border situations. Work, business, studies, shopping, travel, relationships – these can all easily be the source of cross-border interactions between people and commercial operators. Even in times of limited mobility, we cross borders, online and offline. This world – our world – is a world of private international law.

The reality of this world is that interconnectivity is more present, and more important, than ever. Yet, interconnectivity across borders also means interaction of different legal systems. The resulting challenges can be inherently complex, giving rise to the need for rules that guide people and commercial operators, pointing them to the applicable legal system and offering effective means of cooperation to overcome the challenges of cross-border legal procedures.

The mandate of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) is to unify these rules, so that all across the world, they “point” in the same direction. This provides legal certainty and predictability – key attributes for effective cross-broader commerce, foreign investment and peaceful relations between individuals across borders.

A Rich Tradition of Effective Multilateralism

With its origins dating back to 1893 – the year of the very first “Hague Conference” convened by Tobias Asser – the HCCH is the oldest intergovernmental organisation based in The Hague. It also is the only one with a legislative mandate. And while it may not be well-known to a wider audience, its work has a significant practical impact on people’s lives and on cross-border trade and commerce. 

For over 125 years, the HCCH has been a respected forum for effective multilateralism, bringing nations together to develop legal frameworks designed to facilitate cross-border mobility, transactions, and dispute resolution for individuals, families, and companies across the globe.

The HCCH executes its mandate primarily through the negotiation and adoption of international treaties: the HCCH Conventions. These Conventions provide clarity and direction in cross-border relations across three main areas: international family and child protection law, international legal cooperation and transnational litigation, as well as international commercial and financial law.

As an intergovernmental organisation, the steadily increasing HCCH membership is testament to the significance of its work. Membership has almost doubled in the last two decades and today, the Organisation has 85 Members (84 Member States and the European Union), with several States currently in the process of joining. Many non-Members have either signed or become Contracting Parties to one or more HCCH Conventions, meaning that over 150 States are connected to our work worldwide.

By joining HCCH Conventions, States benefit from an extensive legal cooperation network and implement uniform international standards, eliminating the need to independently negotiate hundreds of bilateral agreements. In fact, while globally, there are over 930 instances of an HCCH Convention being brought into force for a State, more than 29,000 bilateral agreements would be needed to achieve an equivalent network of treaty relations. This shows how effective multilateralism through HCCH Conventions can be!

Members determine the work programme of the HCCH and of its secretariat, the Permanent Bureau. Notably, they actively participate in the negotiation of new Conventions, ensuring that the voice of each Member is part of the global dialogue and its interests are taken into account. Members also benefit from priority access to post-Convention assistance, which effectively supports the proper implementation and sound practical operation of the HCCH Conventions.

Committed to regional engagement, the Permanent Bureau has two Regional Offices: the Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. The work of these Regional Offices is invaluable in assisting the Organisation to increase its visibility in these regions and to be responsive to their respective needs.

HCCH 125 Anniversary HM King Willem – Alexander and Dr Christophe Bernasconi Photography Sicco van Grieken.

Practical Tools for Modern Times

HCCH Conventions are widely used in practice, most of them several thousands of times each year around the world. In the case of the Apostille Convention, which facilitates the recognition of public documents abroad, it is even millions of times each year. HCCH Conventions thus have a direct, practical impact on peoples’ lives and commercial transactions, effectively benefiting all those involved in cross-border interactions.

HCCH Conventions do not seek to alter substantive domestic laws. They respect legal, cultural, and religious diversity. HCCH Conventions are like bridges, connecting different legal systems while simultaneously ensuring autonomy at the national level. Achieving consensus in developing the Conventions may not always be easy, but the HCCH has a remarkable ability to evolve and adapt to the world around it, engaging with a wide range of dedicated experts, including representatives of government, the judiciary, academia, and the broader legal profession.

Just last year, we saw what the culmination of this work looks like, with the adoption of our most recent international instrument, the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention. This Convention, dealing with the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil or commercial matters, fills an important gap in the private international law landscape and is a potential gamechanger for international dispute resolution. It will be essential in reducing transactional and litigation costs in international dealings, ultimately promoting effective access to justice for all and facilitating cross-border trade and commerce.

HCCH Signing of the Final Act of the HCCH 2019 Photography Sicco van Grieken.

The adoption of any Convention is of course a momentous occasion and I was pleased that we were once again able to celebrate the adoption of this Convention in the hallowed halls of the Peace Palace. However, ensuring the effective practical operation of a Convention requires further work – work which I am proud to say is also a key part of what we do at the HCCH. Our post-Convention activities take a variety of different forms, ranging from official meetings for authorities to share experiences and exchange best practices, to the publication of official Handbooks and Guides. By monitoring and supporting their practical operation, the HCCH ensures that its Conventions remain effective and that they keep pace with the latest legal and technological developments.

The events of this year have reinforced the importance of this post-Convention work, with COVID-19 triggering a series of new challenges, not only in everyday life, but in accessing legal and administrative processes. Although the pandemic may have temporarily stifled cross-border movement, we remain individuals in a globalised world and private international law issues abound.

The work of the HCCH is more relevant than ever before, providing valuable assistance in navigating the new reality in which we find ourselves. Our many years of work pioneering the electronic authentication and recognition of public documents under the Apostille Convention has proven essential; the publication of our Guide on the use of video-link under the Evidence Convention proved particularly timely; and the application of the Child Abduction Convention has been at the centre of international family law discussions in times of COVID-19. These Conventions, together with a number of others, including those on intercountry adoption and the recovery of child support abroad, are considered “core” HCCH Conventions.

The pandemic has affected our lives in ways we never expected and it will almost certainly have a lasting impact on our lives in the future. Fortunately, the HCCH Permanent Bureau was well set up to work remotely and our team adjusted quickly to the changes, which allowed day‑to‑day business to continue largely uninterrupted. We will continue our work in fulfilment of our mandate, in particular with a view to finding ways to harness the power of technology as we continue to promote effective access to justice for all and encourage cross-border trade and commerce.

Global Engagement

As mentioned, we live in a world of private international law. Despite the new challenges, cross-border connections and relationships continue to flourish, helped in no small part by technological innovation. If anything, recent world events have served only to underscore the need for legal certainty across borders, and for practical, effective multilateralism – a relatable form of multilateralism that makes a real difference to people’s lives.

The participation of as many countries and regions as possible in the work of the HCCH is central to its operation. With this in mind, universality and inclusiveness were enshrined as pillars of the HCCH Strategic Plan 2019-2022 and as Secretary General, I am proud to say that they remain high priorities for me, personally.

The diplomatic corps plays a key role in our efforts to increase the visibility of the HCCH and to convey our message to the capitals of the world. Being based in The Hague, the city of peace and justice, the HCCH has already had the privilege of engaging with many of the States represented here. Yet there remains a lot of work to be done. It is my hope that we will have the privilege of welcoming many more States to be part of our work in the future and I remain committed to facilitating their involvement, both as Contracting Parties to HCCH Conventions and as Members of the Organisation.

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Main picture by Hester Dijkstra.

In the pursuit of international criminal justice, without fear or favour

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“What is required, today more than ever, is greater support for the ICC, its independent and impartial work, and the international rule of law.”

By Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

My mandate as Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (”ICC” or ”Court”), is to independently and impartially examine and investigate the world’s gravest crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction – namely, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression – and prosecute the perpetrators to deliver a measure of justice for the victims. 

With this mandate comes great responsibility and fortitude. I had no illusions of the enormity of the task when I assumed my new role as Prosecutor back in 2012. I knew then, as I do now with a few scars to show for it, that to truly live by and give breath to the Rome Statute as the treaty’s founders envisaged, meant genuine commitment, pain and courage in the face of adversity. It meant an unyielding devotion to the pursuit of international criminal justice without fear or favour, and a firm belief in the enduring value of the Court to the progress of humanity where wars and conflicts are checked by the power of the law without fail. It also meant always striving for excellence to honourably discharge a complex multi-faceted mandate, one that is largely without precedent with over a dozen countries where investigations have been opened, with an additional nine under preliminary examinations, covering situations spanning the globe.

My term as ICC Prosecutor is coming to an end next summer. It is therefore an opportune moment to reflect on the achievements, but also the setbacks and challenges encountered during my term in office.

When I became Prosecutor, the Court had been functioning for nearly a decade. Having previously served as Deputy Prosecutor, I took over the office with an intimate familiarity with what worked well and what required improvement. Now, in my new role as Prosecutor in the driver’s seat, it was important to engage in critical self-reflection on past performance, see where we could build on what was accomplished, and to enhance our operations.

The changes we undertook were sweeping. We announced and quickly moved to take a number of initiatives concerning strategic direction, organisational management, and internal office culture. We adopted a new prosecutorial strategy with a major shift in how we investigate and build our cases. The strategy, among other things, focused on in-depth investigations and being as trial-ready as possible before triggering the judicial process. We enhanced our quality control mechanisms, streamlined and strengthened our administrative procedures, improved transparency in how we conduct our work, and made significant efforts to build a positive office culture, including by adopting a Code of Conduct for the Office with mandatory trainings, and instituting the Core Values of “Dedication, Integrity, and Respect.” These organisational values are to guide all aspects of our work. We are strengthening an Office that is accountable at all levels, both in terms of performance and professional conduct.

Our focus has been on quality rather than quantity to secure successes in court. A number of important litigation successes and landmark decisions have since ensued, including the ruling delivered in the Myanmar/Bangladesh situation confirming the Court’s jurisdiction over the alleged deportation of Rohingya people (an investigation is now open), and the appellate ruling  on head of state immunity in the Al Bashir case in the Darfur (Sudan) situation, to name a few.  As a direct result of the changes in our new investigative and prosecutorial strategies, we have secured important convictions in the Katanga, Ntaganda and Al Mahdi cases (in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali situations, respectively) and in proceedings regarding offenses against the administration of justice against other accused persons. In January 2021, we also expect judgement in the Ongwen case in the Uganda situation.

In the Ntaganda case, my Office secured the conviction of the accused on all counts, including, for the first time in the Court’s history, the crime of sexual slavery as well as the crime of rape against women and men. Through this case, we have contributed to emerging jurisprudence by extending the protections under international humanitarian law to also cover crimes committed by an armed group against members of their own group.

The Al Mahdi case sent a clear message that the intentional attacks against historic monuments and buildings dedicated to religion is a serious crime under international law. This message was widely recognized and amplified as it reverberated through a variety of international actors, including our institutional partners at UNESCO who were invested and assisted with this case. We have since strengthened our important institutional relationship with UNESCO. There is no better celebration of our common humanity and the richness of our diversity than cultural heritage. Protecting it is an act of self-preservation and a joint responsibility.

These cases, I believe demonstrate, the unique contribution my Office can make in the fight against impunity for atrocity crimes, including with respect to those crimes that are typically underreported and/or insufficiently addressed at the domestic level, such as sexual and gender-based crimes, crimes against or affecting children, and crimes against cultural heritage. We have elevated the first two issues to key priorities under the Office’s Strategic Plans and adopted comprehensive policy papers to highlight the importance of addressing these crimes, to elaborate on the applicable legal framework, take a systematic approach to the prosecution of these crimes and to provide a reference to the extent that our work and best practices can be helpful to efforts at the national level. A third policy, on the protection of cultural heritage within the Rome Statute framework, is currently being finalised and will be launched prior to the end of my mandate.

The demands for the Office’s intervention are ever increasing. We are currently conducting preliminary examinations in situations across the globe, including in Venezuela, Nigeria, Ukraine, The Philippines, and elsewhere, to determine if there is a legal basis to commence investigations in accordance with the Rome Statute. We are additionally actively collecting evidence during our investigations in the situations in Libya, Darfur (Sudan), Georgia, Bangladesh/Myanmar, and others. And we are engaged in prosecuting cases against alleged perpetrators of Rome Statute crimes, including in the Central African Republic and Mali situations.

Across situations, the scale of criminality we deal with coupled with our severe resource constraints means we have to make tough choices, including which cases to prioritise as we try to manage the expectation of victims and affected communities. We are committed to responsible and accountable stewardship of our resources, and we produce transparent budget proposals, making flexible and efficient use of resources and ensuring sound financial management. But there is a limit to how much we can do.

The Office carefully thinks through and seeks to discuss, through open and frank dialogue with States Parties and other stakeholders, a number of critical challenges faced by the Office, including as it concerns the mismatch between its limited resources and demands, possibilities for further prioritization, and the development of completion strategies.

While the work is progressing well in most situations, we have, however, not escaped some setbacks, despite our best efforts. We have had cases overturned on appeal, notably the Bemba acquittal amid a divided appeals bench, or charges vacated in the Kenyatta, Ruto and Sang cases which operated in a complex environment where we experienced lack of sufficient cooperation and witness tampering, and more recently, acquittals in Gbagbo and Ble Goude cases, which are currently on appeal.

These setbacks have given rise to questions and criticism. While we are not fazed by misplaced and ill-informed commentary, we have always and will continue to embrace well-founded critique as an opportunity for self-reflection and, ultimately, growth. The Office, under my direction, is committed to a culture of continuous learning and improvement. We recognise that setbacks can serve as a learning experience and an opportunity to make improvements where required. This embrace of change management and continuous learning is reflected in the three consecutive strategic plans issued during my term.

In this spirit, along with my senior management, I hence also fully supported the mandate for the group of independent experts commissioned by the States Parties at the Assembly of States Parties in 2019, to review and enhance the functioning of the Court as a whole, culminating in a report published this autumn. We are currently studying the report’s recommendations and are pleased to note that many of them confirm our own processes, thinking and improvement projects. We will be looking to the report of the Independent Experts for inspiration and fact-based actionable recommendations which we can then carry forward with this overall objective in mind.

The review should necessarily also take into account the performance of other actors in the Rome Statute system. The ongoing process provides an opportunity to render the system as effective and efficient as possible, always true to the Statute’s laudable goals and values. 

One key external challenge for the next Prosecutor will continue to be the political environment and other outside conditions under which the Office operates.

Tangible and timely cooperation is crucial to the Office’s ability to conduct effective investigations and prosecutions. While cooperation has been generally forthcoming, it also remains a continuous challenge and needs to be promoted and fostered. My Office actively engages with States and other relevant stakeholders – including through the many Embassies in The Hague as key stakeholders and first entry points –to ensure the requisite level of assistance to our operations, to enhance diplomatic and political support for its work, and to improve the general understanding of its mandate. We are proud of the relationships of trust and mutual respect that we have fostered during my tenure.

We are enhancing our own efforts to identify, support, and engage with initiatives undertaken at the domestic level, to respond to situations where crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court may occur, including by responding, where possible, to requests for assistance from States to access our information, or to share our lessons learned and best practices. This is another way we contribute to closing the impunity gap through exploring synergies and cooperation with other actors. The Court was not designed to address all instances of criminality under its subject matter jurisdiction. It is a court of last resort that fully respects the primary jurisdiction of states.

As my Office and the Court more broadly, carry out our crucial functions, we must be allowed to do so without interference.

In this context, I wish to refer, in particular, to the unprecedented coercive measures taken by the current US administration through the issuance of an Executive Order against the Court, and the imposition of economic sanctions on me and a senior staff member of my Office as well as travel plans. I hasten to add that these tactics will not deter us from continuing to do our work dispassionately and honourably. I do hope the US Government reconsiders its policy of hostility and adopts a more constructive approach towards the ICC and its crucial work of fighting impunity for atrocity crimes.

The response from the States Parties and other stakeholders in the face of such challenges will determine in many ways how the Rome Statute system will shape up for the foreseeable future. I wish to seize this opportunity to thank all the States Parties and other supporters of the Court’s work in the United States and across the globe that have stood up in no uncertain terms in the defence of the ICC.

I equally hope that my successor, whoever that may be, will equally pay homage to the Rome Statute as we have done – with utmost integrity and professionalism, led by our sense of unflinching responsibility towards our mandate, solely by the dictates of the Rome Statute.

Ultimately, international criminal justice, with the ICC at its core, serves humanity as a whole.

What is required, today more than ever, is greater support for the ICC, its independent and impartial work, and the international rule of law.

I am very proud of my dedicated and professional staff, who work day in day out in the trenches to fight impunity for the world’s gravest crimes.

During my tenure, I have done everything in my power, with dedication and integrity, to ensure that as many victims as possible will have their voices heard, and be able to reap the benefits of justice.

We must protect the progress made towards a culture of accountability for atrocity crimes as an essential pillar of a rules-based global order.

We cannot undo the suffering of the past and the horrors of history, but we have a joint responsibility not to repeat them.

* Fatou Bensouda is the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. and the first woman to serve in that capacity. She was elected by consensus by the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute and assumed her nine year mandate in 2012.

Russia and CSTO criticize politicization of OPCW’s work

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In the picture H.E. Mr. Alexander Shulgin, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to The Netherlands and Permanent Representative to the OPCW.

Between November 30th and December 4th, representatives of the OPCW’s (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) member states convened for the 25th Session of the Conference of the State Parties (CSP) to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The aim of the conference was to oversee the CWC’s implementation, promote its objectives, and reviewing compliance with the treaty.

Over the past few years, the OPCW has often been a theatre for confrontation, several times with respect to investigations on the use of chemical weapons in Syria, but also in occasion of the poisoning of a former Russian spy and a Russian opposition leader. These incidents have regularly pitted two blocks – one led by Russia, and the other led by the United States and other Western countries – against each other. On the one hand, Western countries have accused Russia of being behind the two individual poisonings, as well as of shielding the Syrian government from international pressure in the wake of chemical attacks in the country. On the other hand, Russia has vigorously rejected these charges, accusing in turn these countries of politicizing the work of the OPCW to advance their own geopolitical interests.

Below you can find the statements delivered by the representative of the Russian Federation and of the Collective Security Treaty Organization at the 25th Session of the CSP.

Statement by the Delegation of The Russian Federation at the 25th Session of The Conference of The States Parties

On behalf of the Russian delegation, we would like to congratulate the Permanent Representative of Mexico JosĂ© Antonio Zabalgoitia Trejo on his election as the Chair of the Conference of the States Parties (CSP) to the CWĐĄ and assure him of our willingness to cooperate constructively for the Conference to be as fruitful as possible. Allow me also to thank the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria Krasimir Kostov and the Director-General Fernando Arias for their great work to organize and prepare today’s event.

The session is taking place in extraordinary conditions of COVID-19. It affects everyone, including our Organization, which has to hold its core meetings in a truncated format and virtually in the absence of delegates from capitals.

The work within the framework of the CWC continues. Summing up the results of the outgoing year, we note with deep regret that the crisis that emerged in the OPCW several years ago is gradually becoming systemic. As a cancerous tumor, it corrodes all areas of the OPCW work, undermines efforts to universalize the Convention and trust to the Organization as an outpost of non-proliferation of chemical weapons and disarmament. Exorbitant politicization of many agenda items, violation of the principle of consensus, imposing for consideration of issues outside the legal scope of the Convention, and blurring of the OPCW mandate to serve political interests of certain countries and their geopolitical ambitions are not episodes but trends of everyday life.

President Vladimir Putin during the CSTO meeting.

Such examples are numerous. Particularly flagrant were cases of drawing the Organization, which was an important pillar of the international security system for many years, into political games involving blatant provocations. Syria has been targeted for a long time, but recently such approaches have been applied to Russia – suffice to mention the events in Salisbury and the most recent debacle with A. Navalny.

In our view, the unbridled campaign concerning the so-called poisoning of that Russian blogger and related efforts by Germany and its Euro-Atlantic allies on the platform of the OPCW show their intention to use this international organization to exert political and sanction pressure on the Russian Federation. Evidently, someone got an idea to repeat the «success» of the UK in inciting Russophobia with regard to the so-called Skripals case. The fake-story initially launched by Germany of the alleged poisoning of Mr. Navalny in Russia by some exotic «Novichok» and then the saving of his life in Omsk by Russian doctors and rapid departure to Berlin for treatment cannot withstand any criticism of common sense. The subsequent events are beyond all bounds in a civilized society. Instead of trying to look into what had happened, Germany and its allies resorted to megaphone diplomacy, unleashed a mass disinformation campaign against Russia and started to demand some «independent international investigation» under the auspices of the OPCW.

But it was just a verbal propagandistic stunt. In reality, from the beginning the German Government started to actively counter Russia’s pre-investigation review of the situation with A. Navalny, impeding the establishment of truth. The evidence of it is its utter refusal to cooperate with Russian law-enforcement and health agencies, blatant disregard of or formal replies to already five requests from the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation submitted in accordance with the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and two Additional Protocols thereto.

Berlin committed a direct violation of the CWC norms. How else can one qualify the unwillingness of Germany to fulfill its obligations under Articles VII and IX of the CWC, which clearly stipulate that States Parties shall afford each other legal assistance, and make every effort to clarify, through exchange of information and consultations among themselves, any matter which may be considered ambiguous?

The German side classified the information on the substance allegedly found in A. Navalny’s samples. But according to the conclusions of the OPCW Technical Secretariat (Secretariat) on the outcomes of the technical assistance to Germany it is not controlled under the Convention. Does not Berlin understand the absurdity of its conduct? We would like to remind that after the events in Salisbury/Amesbury the States Parties undertook without delay steps to ban new lethal substances, adding them to respective lists. But in this case they tell us: we know but will tell no one which dangerous «Novichok» we have found. If Germany, along with France and Sweden, which also conducted relevant investigations, were really concerned about strengthening the Convention, they would have informed without delay about their findings not only Russia, but also the entire OPCW. But if they have nothing to present, all this hype is a blatant provocation in worst traditions of a “hybrid war”. There is only one evidently positive thing: Mr. Navalny is alive and healthy and is resting, as we understand, in Germany.

The Secretariat was also beneath the mark in that story. It could not give answers to legitimate questions of Russia, having hidden under the guise of policy of confidentiality. Who, if not the Secretariat, should have carefully hinted the German side that it is counterproductive to classify detailed data on the analysis of A. Navalny’s samples and is inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Convention, especially in light of the request for Russia’s technical assistance. The truth can only be found when comparing the results of such analysis received by our countries.

Everything around this semi-detective story is perplexing and makes us wonder whether it is the same Organization that its founding fathers envisaged and created, and whether we are witnessing a cardinal shift of its paradigm? Another deep divide within the OPCW, which bothers everyone, is, certainly, attribution. The decision imposed in June 2018 by voting on mandating the Secretariat with obligations to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons is absolutely illegal. This innovation is outside the Organization’s mandate, it goes beyond the scope of the Convention and infringes on the exclusive competence of the UN Security Council.

The first conclusions of the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) on the events in Ltamenah on 24, 25 and 30 March 2017 were not a revelation to us, as likely to the majority of the OPCW Members. There was no doubt that the IIT was created with the only goal to serve as an instrument of pressure on the undesired Member States, first of all Syria. The ultimatum decision taken by the Executive Council last July and containing deliberately impossible measures was an evidence of that. There is another dangerous precedent set when dubious politicized conclusions Ă  la «there are reasonable grounds to believe» made by an illegitimate structure are taken for granted without discussion and are simply “rubber-stamped” by a decision of the policy-making organ of the Organization. The authors of this action deliberately refused to use mechanisms set out in the Convention to address the concerns, in particular, those mentioned in Article IX of the CWC. And now they are trying to steamroll within the OPCW the decision on depriving Syria of its rights and privileges, which is absolutely unacceptable and just shatters the faith in the Organization and ruins prospects of its universalization. Which of the remaining «overboard» countries will want to join the OPCW if it is becoming a «kangaroo court» for its Member States?

Despite difficulties caused by the bloody war, Syria completely destroyed under strict international control its stockpiles of chemical weapons and continues to diligently cooperate with the Secretariat in the framework of the mechanisms set out in the Convention. The evidence of it is the progress in verifying Syria’s initial declaration under the CWC. The relevant special mission (the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT)) and the Syrian side have done a tremendous job in this direction. The Syrian authorities are taking unprecedented measures of transparency with regard to providing documentation and to additional declaration of past activities. However, it is necessary to realize that after so many years and in the conditions of a protracted armed conflict Damascus cannot provide confirming data with respect to a part of claims. As we see, the Secretariat also falters, as it was in the case of loss of samples taken in Syria in October 2019. There were precedents in the past when the Secretariat was not able to confirm the number of the destroyed or «vanished» chemical weapons by this or that State Party. Nevertheless, exceptions were made and those issues were closed. In the case of Syria, we should be realistic and remove “in-limbo” issues from the agenda, as such a state of affairs cannot last forever. But it requires the political will which is not yet observed.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization at the 25th Session of the CSP.

Russia has repeatedly stated the need for a substantial reform of the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) in Syria. We repeat time and again the demand to put an end to «in-office investigations», which are carried out without visits to sites of incidents and sample collection by inspectors, without following the sequence of actions while ensuring the chain of custody, and relying on the biased NPOs funded by Damascus’s adversaries. The exposed egregious case of rigging the results of investigations of events in Douma will remain a blot on the OPCW history. The revelations of the politically motivated report to justify the missile strike on Syria by Washington, London and Paris without any trial and in violation of the UN Charter seriously damaged the OPCW reputation.

We cannot be silent about outrageous double standards in the work of this structure: investigations of incidents reported by the Syrian Government, unlike those declared by the opposition, are procrastinated and do not confirm by some reason the facts of the use of chemical weapons by terrorists. An illustration of that is the ineffective two-year investigation into the chemical attack in Aleppo committed by militants on 24 November 2018. We are deeply concerned by the fact that the information submitted by two Member States was not compelling for the Secretariat. Such conclusions are beneficial only for those who continue, with impunity, to use chemicals for military purposes. 

We condemn the threats of using chemical weapons by anyone, including on civilian facilities. In this regard, we do not accept the use of any dangerous chemicals, including white phosphorus.

We are extremely disappointed by the last-year process of agreeing on the draft OPCW Programme and Budget for 2021. We strongly oppose the imposition to Member States against their will of financial obligations due to the illegitimate work of the attribution mechanism. We regret to state that certain Members of the Organization, ignoring opinions of other delegations, try to ensure their interests by jamming through the “omnibus” version of the financial document unacceptable for others. And the Secretariat, unfortunately, plays rather a destructive than a constructive role as it is the sponsor of the draft. We understand the critical importance of the OPCW budgeting, however, we do not accept flawed methods used for it.

We should also mention the disruptive role the US has been playing in the life of the OPCW in recent years. It is seen both in «major» and «minor» things. As for the latter, we recall Washington’s attempts to politicize the activity of the Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial Matters (ABAF). The nomination of national candidates to this structure or their dismissal is a prerogative of the respective Member State, which is consistent with the best practices of other international organizations. However, on the whim of the US delegation ABAF’s work has been blocked for two years (reports have not been adopted). The removal of the Russian expert from ABAF at the initiative of the US was a flagrant infringement of the independence of the activity of this entity.

Not a less representative example of the shattering of the OPCW pillars is persistent steamrolling by the US of the ban on the use of aerosolized chemicals affecting the central nervous system for law-enforcement purposes. In this matter, Americans hide behind the backs of its co-sponsors, but they are well known to be the key driver of that distorted initiative. If we start to implement the Convention on the basis of some «understandings» beyond its legal norms and principles, it will become sooner or later just a blank sheet of paper. Certain Member States should not be deluded by assurances of the proponents that their obligations would not increase. They would feel the opposite as soon as they would need to be pointed out at it for political motives.

As a State that stood at the origin of the elaboration of the Convention, Russia deems the earliest destruction of the chemical weapon stockpiles in the entire world an imperative. That is why our country fulfilled its obligations under the CWC three years ahead of the deadline, having destructed the world-biggest arsenal of the former USSR of 40,000 tons. As of today, there is only the US with declared chemical weapon stockpiles. We call on the US counterparts to follow our example and expedite as much as possible the destruction of the declared stockpiles to complete this process ahead of the set time limit.

We are convinced that all the identified problems can be solved given the political will of the Member States and unbiased and impartial approach of the OPCW Secretariat. It requires abandoning, once and forever, the escalation of confrontation and politicization of the work the Organization, which is technical in its nature, and restoring its unity and the priority of consensus decision-making. We are ready for that.

In conclusion, we would like to assure you, Mr. Chair, in our unwavering support and commitment to constructive work.

Statement on behalf of The Collective Security Treaty Organisation Member States which are parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention at the 25th Session of The Conference of The States Parties

I have the honor of delivering this statement on behalf of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) members which are States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

In these difficult times, when the efforts of the entire international community are focused on fighting the coronavirus pandemic, it is critical for the OPCW to show unity in the face of turbulent politics and global economy, its commitment to the goals and purposes of the Convention, and readiness to do away with one of the most dangerous and deadly types of WMD.

In this regard, first of all we would like to thank Chairperson of the 24th Session of the Conference of the States Parties (CSP), H.E. Ambassador Krassimir Kostov of Bulgaria, and Chairperson of the Executive Council H.E. Ambassador AgustĂ­n VĂĄsquez GĂłmez of El Salvador for their efforts in guiding the inter-sessional work and the preparation of this meeting. At the same time, we avail ourselves of this opportunity to point out the efforts of Director-General H.E. Fernando Arias and the Technical Secretariat in managing this event and taking measures against COVID-19 that emphasize that safety and security of participating delegations are the absolute priority.

We congratulate H.E. Ambassador José Antonio Zabalgoitia Trejo of Mexico upon his election to the post of the Chair of the 25th CSP Session and are confident that his professionalism and experience will help to ensure the success of this event.

Recognizing global problems related to the pandemic, and its unprecedented negative effects, as well as significant multilateral efforts to prevent further spread of the disease, we are still convinced that universal accession to the Convention is utmost goal. In this regard, we value the ongoing work of the Technical Secretariat in this area. CSTO Member States attach great importance to the universal nature of the CWC, and we encourage States which are not yet its parties to ratify the Convention without delay or to accede to it.

We reiterate that the integrity of the OPCW and consensus building in decision-making within the Organisation play a fundamental role in maintaining stability of the global architecture of non-proliferation and disarmament. The apolitical, purely technical, and unconfrontational nature of its work is one of the major prerequisites for achieving the main aim of the CWC – to create a world free of chemical weapons. This is why we encourage Member States to refrain from any attempt to politicize OPCW activities. Such actions can only deepen the rift between its Member States instead of leading to a search for compromise to achieve the goals and objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In this context, we are concerned about the interpretation of provisions of the Convention in the interests of certain countries.

Attribution in the OPCW and the granting of non-relevant powers of identifying the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons to the Technical Secretariat are unacceptable. We are sure that the United Nations Security Council has the exclusive competence in this regard and therefore believe that the reshaping of the OPCW mandate is a mistake. We proceed from the fact that any additional obligations of Member States can only be introduced by amending the Convention accordingly.

We strongly condemn the threats of using chemical weapons by anyone, including on civilian facilities. We strongly oppose the use of any dangerous chemicals, including white phosphorus.

CSTO Member States are convinced that the effective work of the OPCW largely depends on the role of the Technical Secretariat as an independent working body serving the interests of all its Member States. In order to strengthen its potential, gender and geographical balance needs to be improved through a transparent recruitment process. We urge for taking corresponding efforts to reach progress in this area.

Since its establishment, the CSTO has evolved into a multifunctional institution able to successfully respond to challenges within the area of its responsibility. Bearing in mind the lessons learned, we call for closer cooperation between our organisations in order to strengthen the international security.

Mr. Chair, in conclusion, CSTO Member States encourage all States Parties to the Conference to work in good faith towards the successful conclusion of the current session.

We request to treat this report as an official document and publish it on the OPCW external server and public website.

Un siĂšcle de justice universelle permanente

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Par S. Exc. M. Philippe Couvreur, Juge ad hoc et ancien Greffier de la Cour internationale de Justice.

L’annĂ©e 2020 touche insensiblement Ă  sa fin et l’irruption si brutale de la pandĂ©mie de COVID-19, Ă  laquelle elle demeurera longtemps associĂ©e, aura eu raison de bien de nos habitudes de vie, dont celle de commĂ©morer des faits historiques qui, sur ce fond de crise sans prĂ©cĂ©dent, apparaissent dĂ©sormais d’importance, sinon moindre, assurĂ©ment plus mĂ©diate.

À La Haye, « capitale de la justice internationale Â», on ne peut pour autant manquer d’évoquer cette annĂ©e le souvenir de deux Ă©tapes majeures dans l’histoire de cette justice: le 26 juin dernier s’est cĂ©lĂ©brĂ©, avec la discrĂ©tion voulue par les circonstances, le 75Ăšme anniversaire de l’adoption du Statut de la Cour internationale de Justice ( CIJ ), partie intĂ©grante de la Charte des Nations Unies; et le 13 dĂ©cembre prochain on commĂ©morera, avec sans doute la mĂȘme maniĂšre de retenue, le centenaire de l’adoption du Statut de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale ( CPJI ), sur lequel le Statut de la CIJ est fondĂ©, conformĂ©ment aux termes de l’article 92 de la Charte des Nations Unies. 

Longtemps, la guerre est demeurĂ©e l’ « ultima ratio regum Â», formule gravĂ©e par Louis XIV sur ses canons. DĂšs les XVIIĂšme et XVIIIĂšme siĂšcles, divers projets tendant Ă  promouvoir la paix entre nations au moyen de l’établissement d’une organisation internationale dotĂ©e d’un tribunal ont vu le jour. Certains Ă©taient particuliĂšrement ambitieux, comme le Projet de Paix perpĂ©tuelle ( 1712-1716 ) de l’ AbbĂ© de Saint-Pierre; mais les esprits clairvoyants qui les avaient conçus  Ă©taient hĂ©las trop en avance sur leur temps: l’Ɠuvre de Saint-Pierre suscita railleries et quolibets, et son auteur fut banni de l’AcadĂ©mie. 

Au cours de la premiĂšre moitiĂ© du XIXĂšme siĂšcle, les associations pacifistes se multipliĂšrent en Europe et aux Etats-Unis. Elles furent Ă  l’origine d’importants congrĂšs prĂŽnant le recours Ă  l’arbitrage, la limitation des armements et la codification du droit des gens. Celui qui se tint Ă  Paris en 1849 fut prĂ©sidĂ© par Victor Hugo. Le dĂ©sastreux conflit franco-allemand de 1870 eut au moins l’heureux effet de renforcer encore davantage les courants pacifistes, qui s’exprimĂšrent notamment dans la crĂ©ation de maintes ligues et sociĂ©tĂ©s n’ayant de cesse de promouvoir l’arbitrage inter-Ă©tatique. 

Bien que l’arbitrage eĂ»t dĂ©jĂ  Ă©tĂ© utilisĂ© dans l’antiquitĂ© pour rĂ©soudre des diffĂ©rends tels ceux opposant citĂ©s du monde hellĂ©nistique, c’est la sentence de l’Alabama, rendue en 1872, qui marqua son renouveau sous une forme moderne. Les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne Ă©taient convenus, par le traitĂ© de Washington de 1871, de soumettre Ă  un tribunal arbitral leur diffĂ©rend relatif aux obligations de cette derniĂšre en tant que puissance neutre lors de la guerre de sĂ©cession. Ce fut la premiĂšre fois qu’un tribunal arbitral, composĂ© d’une majoritĂ© d’arbitres d’une nationalitĂ© distincte de celle des parties, Ă©tait créé ( aux arbitres amĂ©ricain et britannique s’ajoutĂšrent en effet un brĂ©silien, un italien et un suisse ). La procĂ©dure mise en Ɠuvre par ce tribunal prĂ©senta au demeurant de nombreux traits caractĂ©ristiques de la procĂ©dure judiciaire. Sa sentence, condamnant la Grande-Bretagne Ă  verser aux Etats-Unis des indemnitĂ©s d’un montant de 15,5 millions Ă  titre de rĂ©paration, pour avoir manquĂ© Ă  son devoir de neutralitĂ©, fut immĂ©diatement exĂ©cutĂ©e, en dĂ©pit de la dissidence de l’arbitre britannique.

Par la suite, les Etats se montrĂšrent de plus en plus enclins Ă  conclure des traitĂ©s gĂ©nĂ©raux d’arbitrage et Ă  insĂ©rer des clauses d’arbitrage dans des conventions de nature variĂ©e. Les idĂ©es pacifistes avaient entre-temps fait une entrĂ©e remarquĂ©e dans la vie politique et le fameux motto La Paix par le Droit, produit de l’école sociale de NĂźmes (1887), avait fait son chemin. AprĂšs l’élaboration, par la confĂ©rence panamĂ©ricaine de 1889-1890, d’un traitĂ© gĂ©nĂ©ral relatif Ă  la solution pacifique des conflits internationaux, qui prĂ©voyait le recours Ă  l’arbitrage, sauf pour les « affaires d’honneur Â» et celles touchant aux « intĂ©rĂȘts vitaux Â» des parties, les initiatives parlementaires en faveur de ce mode de rĂšglement des diffĂ©rends se succĂ©dĂšrent un peu partout Ă  cadence Ă©levĂ©e. La rĂ©union tenue par l’Union interparlementaire, Ă  La Haye, en 1894, fut d’une grande importance, dans la mesure oĂč y fut acceptĂ©e la proposition prĂ©sentĂ©e par Stanhope, qui tendait Ă  la crĂ©ation d’une « Cour permanente Â». Le projet de texte y affĂ©rent fut dĂ©veloppĂ© Ă  l’occasion de la ConfĂ©rence interparlementaire de Bruxelles de 1895 et envoyĂ© aux puissances avec un mĂ©moire rĂ©digĂ© par le chevalier Descamps. Enfin, la ConfĂ©rence interparlementaire qui eut lieu Ă  Budapest l’annĂ©e suivante adopta la suggestion, avancĂ©e par sir Randal Cremer, d’approcher certains gouvernements pour les convaincre d’adhĂ©rer, fĂ»t-ce provisoirement, au projet de Bruxelles. On y a vu l’origine de l’initiative russe de 1898.

Le manifeste du Tsar Nicolas II, en date du 12/24 aoĂ»t 1898, qui proposait la convocation d’une confĂ©rence internationale Ă  l’effet de mettre un terme au dĂ©veloppement Ă  outrance des armements, devenu plus que prĂ©occupant, suscita des rĂ©ticences de la part de l’Allemagne; il dut en consĂ©quence ĂȘtre prĂ©cisĂ© par une circulaire du comte Mouravieff, datĂ©e du 30 dĂ©cembre 1898/11 janvier 1899, qui circonscrivait la portĂ©e des futurs pourparlers Ă  la « recherch(e)…de moyens (pour) limiter les armements Â» et « Ă©viter que les conflits soient rĂ©solus par un recours Ă  la force Â». La ConfĂ©rence de la Paix, qui se rĂ©unit Ă  La Haye le 18 mai 1899, et Ă  laquelle prirent part 26 Etats, adopta, Ă  la date du 29 juillet 1899, la cĂ©lĂšbre Convention relative Ă  la solution pacifique des conflits internationaux, dont le quatriĂšme titre traitait de l’arbitrage international et Ă©tablissait notamment, outre des rĂšgles de procĂ©dure (chapitre 3), une « Cour permanente d’arbitrage Â» ( chapitre 2). Cette appellation, d’abord contestĂ©e par l’Allemagne, fut finalement retenue, aprĂšs qu’il eut Ă©tĂ© renoncĂ© Ă  l’idĂ©e d’un arbitrage obligatoire, initialement formulĂ©e par la Russie. Le mot « Cour Â» devait dĂ©signer « l’organisme dans son entier Â», les Â« commissions arbitrales formĂ©es sĂ©parĂ©ment Â» Ă©tant dĂ©nommĂ©es « tribunaux Â». Seul le « Bureau international Â», qui devait  servir de greffe Ă  ceux-ci, Ă©tait appelĂ© Ă  revĂȘtir un caractĂšre de « permanence Â». Cette nouvelle institution prĂ©sentait certes l’avantage de simplifier dĂ©sormais le recours Ă  l’arbitrage; mais, dans le mĂȘme temps, son mode de fonctionnement risquait d’en diminuer l’influence sur le dĂ©veloppement du droit. En effet, le nombre Ă©levĂ© de jurisconsultes composant la « Cour Â» et susceptibles d’exercer la fonction d’arbitre limitait les occasions pour eux de siĂ©ger et entravait, partant, la formation d’une jurisprudence cohĂ©rente.

La seconde ConfĂ©rence de La Haye s’ouvrit le 15 juin et ne termina ses travaux que le 18 octobre 1907. Un  plus grand nombre d’Etats y furent invitĂ©s et y participĂšrent ( 45 ); par ailleurs, l’ordre du jour en Ă©tait particuliĂšrement chargĂ©, puisqu’il s’agissait globalement de dĂ©passer l’ensemble des acquis de 1899, mĂȘme si l’Allemagne, soutenue par l’Autriche-Hongrie, avait d’emblĂ©e entendu exclure toute tentative de nĂ©gocier un « dĂ©sarmement Â». S’agissant de la solution pacifique des conflits internationaux, la question de l’arbitrage obligatoire revint sur le tapis. Si la ConfĂ©rence ne rĂ©ussit pas Ă  instituer un tel arbitrage ( sauf en matiĂšre de diffĂ©rends relatifs au recouvrement de dettes contractuelles, suivant la proposition du ministre des affaires Ă©trangĂšres de l’Argentine, Luis Drago ), elle n’en rĂ©alisa pas moins un pas en avant, pour thĂ©orique qu’il fut, en adoptant Ă  l’unanimitĂ© une dĂ©claration prĂ©sentĂ©e par l’Italie, qui, d’une part, reconnaissait le « principe Â» de l’arbitrage obligatoire et, de l’autre, prĂ©cisait qu’il Ă©tait des diffĂ©rends qui, tels ceux concernant l’interprĂ©tation et l’application des stipulations conventionnelles internationales, Ă©taient « susceptibles Â» d’ĂȘtre soumis Ă  l’arbitrage obligatoire sans autre restriction.

Au demeurant, il Ă©tait devenu courant de faire observer que la Cour permanente d’arbitrage ( CPA ) n’était pas une cour et n’avait pas grand-chose de permanent, et qu’il Ă©tait en consĂ©quence impĂ©ratif de la transformer ou de la remplacer. La Russie proposa la formation d’un tribunal permanent constituĂ© de trois membres choisis chaque annĂ©e au scrutin secret parmi les arbitres figurant sur la liste de la CPA. Quant aux Etats-Unis, ils envisageaient la crĂ©ation d’une Cour toute nouvelle « composĂ©e de quinze juges jouissant de la plus haute considĂ©ration morale et d’une compĂ©tence reconnue dans les questions de droit international…, dĂ©signĂ©s (ainsi que)…dĂ©termin(Ă©) par (la) ConfĂ©rence, mais choisis (de maniĂšre telle) que les diffĂ©rents systĂšmes de (droit) et les principa(les) langu(es) soient (Ă©quitablement) reprĂ©sentĂ©s Â». Cette nouvelle Cour « siĂ©ger(ait) annuellement Ă  La Haye Ă  une date spĂ©cifiĂ©e et demeurer(ait) en session aussi longtemps qu’il ser(ait) nĂ©cessaire Â»; elle « Ă©tablira(it) son propre rĂšglement Â»; ses dĂ©cisions seraient prises « Ă  la majoritĂ© des voix Â» et « neuf membres constituer(aient) un quorum Â»; enfin, ses juges « ser(aient) d’un rang Ă©gal, jouir(aient) de l’immunitĂ© diplomatique et recevr(aient) un traitement suffisant pour leur permettre de se consacrer Ă  la considĂ©ration des affaires…portĂ©es devant eux Â». La compĂ©tence de ladite Cour devait ĂȘtre assez large, puisqu’il Ă©tait proposĂ© que celle-ci connĂ»t de « tous les …diffĂ©rends, ayant un caractĂšre international, entre les Etats souverains, qui n’auraient pu ĂȘtre rĂ©glĂ©s par la voie diplomatique, et qui lui seraient soumis par un accord entre les parties Â». On aura aisĂ©ment reconnu, dans cette proposition quelque peu audacieuse pour l’époque, nombre de traits qui allaient ultĂ©rieurement caractĂ©riser la Cour permanente de Justice internationale (CPJI) et la Cour internationale de Justice (CIJ). Le projet amĂ©ricain fut envoyĂ© Ă  une sous-commission spĂ©ciale chargĂ©e de le complĂ©ter. La sous-commission proposa l’élection annuelle, au sein de la Cour, d’une « dĂ©lĂ©gation Â» de trois juges auxquels il appartiendrait de trancher, notamment, les affaires les plus urgentes; le prĂ©sident et le vice-prĂ©sident de la Cour seraient Ă©lus par les juges pour trois ans; les juges ayant la nationalitĂ© de l’une des parties et ceux ayant antĂ©rieurement participĂ© Ă  l’affaire Ă  un autre titre devraient se dĂ©porter; et le Conseil d’administration ainsi que le Bureau de la CPA joueraient, Ă  l’égard de cette nouvelle Cour de Justice arbitrale, le mĂȘme rĂŽle qu’à l’égard de celle-lĂ .  La question Ă©pineuse du mode d’élection des juges fit l’objet de propositions d’origine variĂ©e. L’une d’elles tendait Ă  la mise en place d’un systĂšme de rotation inĂ©galitaire, les « six grandes puissances europĂ©ennes Â», les Etats-Unis et le Japon disposant d’un juge sur le siĂšge pendant douze ans, alors que cette pĂ©riode Ă©tait rĂ©duite Ă  dix, quatre, deux, voire mĂȘme un an seulement pour d’autres groupes d’Etats. Rui Barbosa s’y opposa farouchement. Une autre prĂ©conisait l’élection des juges par les membres de la CPA. Une troisiĂšme imaginait un systĂšme de nomination de candidats par les puissances signataires, suivie de l’élection des juges par celles-ci, Ă  partir d’une liste consolidĂ©e des candidats nominĂ©s, Ă©tablie par le Bureau de la CPA. Aucune de ces propositions ne fut finalement acceptĂ©e et le projet incomplet, accompagnĂ© d’un vƓu, fut annexĂ© comme tel Ă  l’Acte final de la ConfĂ©rence. Les tentatives menĂ©es immĂ©diatement aprĂšs la clĂŽture de celle-ci, pour permettre Ă  la nouvelle Cour de commencer Ă  fonctionner, n’aboutirent pas davantage. Mais ces nombreux efforts ne furent pas vains, car ils se rĂ©vĂ©lĂšrent plus tard avoir constituĂ© une prĂ©cieuse source d’inspiration pour les rĂ©dacteurs du Statut de la CPJI.

On peut en dire autant des tentatives infructueuses menĂ©es pour crĂ©er une Cour internationale des Prises, qui eĂ»t statuĂ© en appel ou en cassation des dĂ©cisions rendues par les tribunaux des prises des Etats parties (voire de novo dans les Ă©ventualitĂ©s oĂč leur constitution se fĂ»t opposĂ©e Ă  un tel recours). L’utilitĂ© d’une Cour de cette nature ne faisait Ă  l’époque guĂšre de doute, les tribunaux nationaux Ă©tant regardĂ©s comme trop souvent partiaux en matiĂšre de prises. Par ailleurs, en dĂ©pit de l’opposition de certains Etats, surtout latino-amĂ©ricains, une majoritĂ© de participants Ă  la DeuxiĂšme ConfĂ©rence de La Haye paraissaient dans ce cas prĂ©cis s’accommoder de ce que la composition de la future Cour reposĂąt sur le principe de rotation, dĂšs lors que celle-ci  devait ĂȘtre organisĂ©e suivant un critĂšre objectivement vĂ©rifiable: le tonnage des marines des Etats parties. À l’issue de la ConfĂ©rence, un texte de Convention fut ouvert Ă  signature et finalement signĂ© par plus de trente Etats, mais il ne fut jamais ratifiĂ©, faute pour la quatriĂšme commission d’avoir pu progresser dans la codification du droit Ă  appliquer par la Cour. La confĂ©rence de Londres de 1908-1909 eut le grand mĂ©rite de rĂ©ussir cette gageure en Ă©tablissant une DĂ©claration relative au  droit de la guerre maritime, de pas moins de 71 articles. Toutefois, cette dĂ©claration, qui contenait aussi du droit nouveau, ne fut Ă  son tour pas ratifiĂ©e, et l’idĂ©e d’une cour internationale des prises tomba dĂ©finitivement dans l’oubli.

Dans le sillage de la DeuxiĂšme ConfĂ©rence de La Haye se tint Ă  Washington, du 14 novembre au 20 dĂ©cembre 1907, une confĂ©rence de portĂ©e historique, Ă  laquelle participĂšrent activement cinq Etats d’AmĂ©rique centrale ( Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras et Nicaragua ). Au cours de cette confĂ©rence, El Salvador prĂ©senta un projet de crĂ©ation d’une cour de justice arbitrale. Ladite confĂ©rence dĂ©boucha sur la signature de neuf instruments, dont un traitĂ© gĂ©nĂ©ral de paix et d’amitiĂ©, ainsi qu’une convention instituant une Cour de Justice centre-amĂ©ricaine pour une durĂ©e de dix ans Ă  compter de la derniĂšre ratification. Cette Cour Ă©tait composĂ©e de cinq juges ( et dix juges supplĂ©ants ), chacun nommĂ© par son gouvernement pour un terme de cinq ans, qui devaient jouir de la plus haute considĂ©ration morale et rĂ©unir les conditions pour exercer les plus hautes fonctions judiciaires dans leur pays d’origine. Ils Ă©taient soumis Ă  un rĂ©gime d’incompatibilitĂ©s et bĂ©nĂ©ficiaient de privilĂšges et immunitĂ©s. La Cour disposait d’une compĂ©tence extrĂȘmement large, dĂšs lors qu’elle pouvait connaĂźtre de n’importe quelle affaire entre les Etats parties, que ceux-ci n’étaient pas arrivĂ©s Ă  rĂ©soudre par eux-mĂȘmes, ainsi que des affaires opposant l’un des Etats parties Ă  un national d’un autre, pourvu qu’il ait au prĂ©alable Ă©puisĂ© les voies de recours internes ouvertes. Les juges de la nationalitĂ© des parties pouvaient demeurer sur le siĂšge. La Cour avait « libertĂ© absolue Â» pour juger des faits et devait se prononcer sur les questions de droit conformĂ©ment aux traitĂ©s et aux « principes du droit international Â». Elle connut de dix affaires, dont cinq impliquant directement des individus. Si l’établissement  de cette premiĂšre cour internationale permanente, produit de la solidaritĂ© centre-amĂ©ricaine, fut un Ă©vĂ©nement d’une importance historique non nĂ©gligeable, son bilan concret  fut plutĂŽt mitigĂ©, du fait de la trop grande dĂ©pendance de ses membres par rapport Ă  leur gouvernement, de sa compĂ©tence trop large et de sa procĂ©dure Ă  certains Ă©gards dĂ©faillante. La Cour de Justice centre-amĂ©ricaine fut dissoute le 12 mars 1918, en dĂ©pit de plusieurs tentatives d’en prolonger l’existence.

Entre-temps, la TroisiĂšme ConfĂ©rence de la Paix, qui devait se tenir Ă  La Haye en 1915, n’avait pu avoir lieu: les efforts entrepris depuis 1899 n’avaient pas suffi Ă  empĂȘcher la premiĂšre guerre mondiale. Mais les horreurs sans prĂ©cĂ©dent de la grande guerre eurent pour effet de convaincre la sociĂ©tĂ© internationale de la nĂ©cessitĂ© d’instituer une organisation internationale chargĂ©e de faire respecter la paix et la sĂ©curitĂ© internationales, au sein de laquelle prendrait place une cour de justice responsable de l’application du droit. DĂšs avant la rĂ©union de la ConfĂ©rence de la Paix de Paris, en 1919, des projets divers en ce sens avaient Ă©tĂ© Ă©laborĂ©s. La Commission de la SociĂ©tĂ© des Nations ( SdN ), constituĂ©e aux fins d’établir un projet de Pacte, avait par ailleurs Ă©tĂ© saisie d’un projet anglo-amĂ©ricain ( le projet Hurst-Miller ), prĂ©sentĂ© par le prĂ©sident Wilson, d’un projet français, soumis par LĂ©on Bourgeois et d’un projet italien, produit par Vittorio Emanuele Orlando. Cette Commission fonda ses travaux essentiellement sur le premier, mais celui-ci ne distinguait pas suffisamment clairement le recours Ă  la nouvelle Cour permanente de Justice internationale de celui au mĂ©canisme traditionnel de l’arbitrage. Il fut donc remaniĂ© sur ce point, en mĂȘme temps qu’y Ă©tait ajoutĂ©e, Ă  la requĂȘte du prĂ©sident Wilson et de sir Robert Cecil, la possibilitĂ© pour le Conseil et l’AssemblĂ©e de la SociĂ©tĂ© de demander Ă  la Cour des avis consultatifs, ainsi qu’envisagĂ© dans les autres projets. Dans sa version finale, constituant la premiĂšre partie des traitĂ©s de paix de 1919-1920, le Pacte de la SociĂ©tĂ© des Nations contenait un article 13 relatif Ă  l’arbitrage et un article 14 affĂ©rent au rĂšglement judiciaire, lequel Ă©tait ainsi conçu: « Le Conseil est chargĂ© de prĂ©parer un projet de Cour permanente de Justice internationale et de le soumettre aux membres de la SociĂ©tĂ©. Cette Cour connaĂźtra de tous diffĂ©rends d’un caractĂšre international que les parties lui soumettront. Elle donnera aussi des avis consultatifs sur tout diffĂ©rend ou tout point, dont la saisira le Conseil ou l’AssemblĂ©e. Â» L’article 13 fut amendĂ© en 1924 afin d’y ajouter une rĂ©fĂ©rence expresse Ă  l’obligation pour les parties d’exĂ©cuter les dĂ©cisions de la Cour, Ă  l’instar de ce qu’il prĂ©voyait dĂ©jĂ  pour les sentences arbitrales.

Lors de sa seconde session, tenue en fĂ©vrier 1920, le Conseil, conformĂ©ment au mandat qu’il tenait de l’article 14 du Pacte, constitua un ComitĂ© de Juristes de dix membres (dont la composition changea Ă  plusieurs reprises), chargĂ© de prĂ©parer un projet de Cour permanente de Justice internationale et de lui faire rapport. Les personnalitĂ©s choisies possĂ©daient toutes une connaissance approfondie du droit international. Maintes d’entre elles avaient participĂ© aux ConfĂ©rences de La Haye de 1899 et 1907; certaines de ces personnalitĂ©s devinrent ultĂ©rieurement des PrĂ©sidents ( Adatci, Loder ) et Membres Ă©minents ( Altamira, Fromageot ) de la CPJI. Le ComitĂ© fut assistĂ© d’un secrĂ©tariat restreint dirigĂ© par le Commendatore Anzilotti ( qui prĂ©sida Ă©galement, plus tard, la CPJI ), lequel Ă©tait Ă  ce moment sous-secrĂ©taire gĂ©nĂ©ral et conseiller juridique de la SdN, auquel avait Ă©tĂ© adjoint Ake Hammarskjöld, alors fonctionnaire de la SociĂ©tĂ© ( qui devint par la suite Greffier, puis Membre, de la CPJI ). Le secrĂ©tariat soumit au ComitĂ© un tableau de tous les projets antĂ©rieurs pertinents, y compris ceux, sus-Ă©voquĂ©s, de 1907. Le ComitĂ©, prĂ©sidĂ© par le baron Descamps, se rĂ©unit au Palais de la Paix, Ă  La Haye, du 16 juin au 24 juillet 1920 et remit au Conseil un avant-projet de 61 articles. Ce document Ă©tait innovateur, en particulier, Ă  trois Ă©gards. S’agissant tout d’abord du mode d’élection des Juges, une solution conciliatrice des intĂ©rĂȘts des « Grandes Puissances Â» et des plus « petits Â» Etats fut enfin trouvĂ©e, qui reconnaissait le rĂŽle principal que devaient  jouer en la matiĂšre les organes politiques de la SdN, tout en n’oubliant pas les acquis de l’ « Ć“uvre de La Haye Â»: ainsi, les candidats seraient prĂ©sentĂ©s par les groupes nationaux de la CPA, mais Ă©lus par le Conseil (oĂč les « Grandes Puissances Â» devaient ĂȘtre majoritaires ) et l’AssemblĂ©e ( oĂč les autres Etats constitueraient la majoritĂ© ), siĂ©geant sĂ©parĂ©ment mais simultanĂ©ment. En ce qui concerne la compĂ©tence de la future Cour, celle-ci serait obligatoire. Enfin, pour ce qui est du droit Ă  appliquer, l’avant-projet retenait, suivant un ordre hiĂ©rarchique, les traitĂ©s et la coutume internationale, auxquels le ComitĂ© avait ajoutĂ© les « principes gĂ©nĂ©raux de droit reconnus par les nations civilisĂ©es Â», aux fins de permettre Ă  la Cour de statuer en droit, sans ĂȘtre tentĂ©e de lĂ©gifĂ©rer, dans les cas oĂč feraient dĂ©faut traitĂ©s et coutume pertinents.

Le Conseil entama l’examen de l’avant-projet Ă  sa huitiĂšme session, tenue Ă  Saint SĂ©bastien en juillet-aoĂ»t 1920, et dĂ©cida de le transmettre tel quel aux Membres de la SociĂ©tĂ©. La question de la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour vis-Ă -vis de ceux-ci,  du seul fait pour eux de devenir parties au nouveau Statut, fut mise en cause, notamment par l’Italie. Le Conseil reprit ses travaux sur l’avant-projet du ComitĂ© Ă  sa dixiĂšme session, Ă  Bruxelles, en octobre 1920. Entre-temps saisi d’un certain nombre d’observations d’Etats membres, il se rĂ©solut Ă  amender plusieurs articles de l’avant-projet afin de mieux en assurer la compatibilitĂ© avec le Pacte. Ainsi le Conseil remplaça la disposition  affĂ©rente Ă  la compĂ©tence obligatoire de la Cour par un texte se limitant Ă  indiquer que ladite compĂ©tence Ă©tait « dĂ©finie par les articles 12, 13 et 14 du Pacte Â», sans autrement trancher la question de sa nature. En effet, l’article 14 Ă©tait apparu pouvoir ĂȘtre interprĂ©tĂ© dans un sens favorable Ă  la compĂ©tence obligatoire,  comme Ă  son encontre. De surcroĂźt, la disposition prĂ©voyant que le français serait la seule langue officielle de la Cour fut retouchĂ©e pour y ajouter l’anglais.

Saisie du projet du Conseil en novembre 1920, l’AssemblĂ©e de la SdN en confia l’examen Ă  sa TroisiĂšme Commission, prĂ©sidĂ©e par M. Bourgeois, laquelle constitua Ă  cet effet une sous-commission, prĂ©sidĂ©e par M. Hagerup. D’importants amendements furent adoptĂ©s Ă  l’unanimitĂ© par la Commission le 11 dĂ©cembre 1920, et soumis Ă  la plĂ©niĂšre. Les plus importants avaient trait Ă  la compĂ©tence de la Cour et Ă  sa fonction consultative, ainsi qu’au droit qu’elle aurait Ă  appliquer. Sur le premier point, il Ă©tait dĂ©sormais proposĂ© que la juridiction de la future Cour ne soit pas, comme telle, obligatoire, mais puisse le devenir de par la libre souscription des Membres de la SociĂ©tĂ© Ă  la fameuse « clause facultative de juridiction obligatoire Â», c’est-Ă -dire, concrĂštement, par le dĂ©pĂŽt, auprĂšs du SecrĂ©taire gĂ©nĂ©ral de la SdN, d’une dĂ©claration unilatĂ©rale reconnaissant la compĂ©tence obligatoire de la Cour sur une base de rĂ©ciprocitĂ©. Quant Ă  la fonction consultative, des dĂ©saccords substantiels ayant surgi au sein de la Commission, notamment sur la question de savoir si les avis demandĂ©s au sujet de diffĂ©rends pendants devaient ĂȘtre donnĂ©s suivant une procĂ©dure particuliĂšre, il fut jugĂ© prĂ©fĂ©rable de n’insĂ©rer aucune disposition spĂ©cifique concernant cette fonction dans le Statut, laissant Ă  la future Cour le soin de mettre directement en Ɠuvre, dans son RĂšglement, les dispositions pertinentes de l’article 14 du Pacte. Enfin, en ce qui est du droit applicable, la Commission supprima toute hiĂ©rarchie entre traitĂ©s, coutume et principes gĂ©nĂ©raux, en mĂȘme temps qu’elle retint la possibilitĂ© pour la future Cour de dĂ©cider en Ă©quitĂ©, pourvu que les parties y consentissent. Le projet de Statut de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale fut adoptĂ© Ă  l’unanimitĂ©, dans sa forme finale, par rĂ©solution de l’AssemblĂ©e plĂ©niĂšre en date du 13 dĂ©cembre 1920. 

Comme l’avait prĂ©conisĂ© la TroisiĂšme Commission, cette rĂ©solution emportait approbation du Statut et Ă©tablissement de la nouvelle Cour comme institution Ă©troitement liĂ©e Ă  la SociĂ©tĂ© des Nations, mais indĂ©pendante; en mĂȘme temps, ladite rĂ©solution prĂ©voyait que l’acceptation du Statut par les Membres de la SociĂ©tĂ© devait se matĂ©rialiser dans la signature et la ratification par ceux-ci d’un Protocole sĂ©parĂ©, qui leur ouvriraient  l’accĂšs Ă  la Cour ( compĂ©tence ratione personae ). La rĂ©solution prĂ©cisait en outre qu’il appartiendrait au Conseil de la SociĂ©tĂ©, conformĂ©ment Ă  l’article 14 du Pacte, d’établir un tel Protocole et que le Statut de la CPJI entrerait en vigueur dĂšs que ce Protocole aurait Ă©tĂ© ratifiĂ© par une majoritĂ© de Membres. Tel fut le cas Ă  la date du 1er septembre 1921. Les Ă©lections Ă  la Cour permanente de Justice internationale purent en consĂ©quence se tenir encore la mĂȘme annĂ©e et la Cour fut Ă  mĂȘme de commencer ses travaux dĂšs le mois de fĂ©vrier 1922.

Le Statut de 1920 ne contenait aucune disposition affĂ©rente Ă  de possibles amendements de cet instrument. NĂ©anmoins, Ă  l’initiative de la France, l’AssemblĂ©e de la SdN adopta, le 20 septembre 1928, une rĂ©solution appelant l’attention du Conseil sur l’opportunitĂ© de procĂ©der, avant le renouvellement du mandat des Membres de la CPJI, Ă  l’examen du Statut en vue de l’introduction de toute modification qui fĂ»t apparue nĂ©cessaire Ă  la lumiĂšre de la pratique de la Cour. Il s’agissait notamment de porter remĂšde Ă  la difficultĂ© rĂ©currente de rĂ©unir la Cour en dehors des sessions d’étĂ©, ce qui avait pour effet de faire frĂ©quemment monter les juges supplĂ©ants (essentiellement europĂ©ens ) sur le siĂšge et de malmener quelque peu, ce faisant,  les Ă©quilibres entre « grandes formes de civilisation Â» ainsi qu’entre « principaux systĂšmes juridiques du monde Â» prĂ©vus Ă  l’article 9. Le 13 dĂ©cembre 1928, le Conseil constitua un ComitĂ© de Juristes de douze membres ( dont trois futurs membres de la CPJI ); celui-ci se rĂ©unit Ă  GenĂšve en mars 1929 et invita le PrĂ©sident ( Anzilotti ) et le Vice-PrĂ©sident ( Huber ) de la Cour. Le 12 juin 1929, le Conseil dĂ©cida de communiquer le rapport du ComitĂ© aux Membres de la SociĂ©tĂ© et de convoquer une ConfĂ©rence des Etats parties au Statut. La ConfĂ©rence transmit Ă  son tour Ă  l’AssemblĂ©e une liste d’amendements suggĂ©rĂ©s ainsi qu’un projet de protocole destinĂ© Ă  les mettre en Ɠuvre. L’AssemblĂ©e les adopta le 14 septembre 1929 et le Protocole, auquel les amendements Ă©taient joints en annexe, fut ouvert Ă  signature le mĂȘme jour: il spĂ©cifiait devoir entrer en vigueur le 1er septembre 1930, Ă  la condition que tous les Membres ayant ratifiĂ© le Protocole du 16 dĂ©cembre 1920,  qui ne l’eussent pas ratifiĂ© lui-mĂȘme Ă  cette date, n’aient pas d’objection Ă  l’égard des amendements. De telles objections ayant Ă©tĂ© Ă©levĂ©es, le Protocole de 1929  n’entra en vigueur, avec les amendements y annexĂ©s, que le 1er fĂ©vrier 1936. Les Ă©lections de 1930 se dĂ©roulĂšrent donc sous l’empire du Statut original. Toutefois, certains des changements prĂ©conisĂ©s Ă©taient susceptibles d’ĂȘtre mis en Ɠuvre sans attendre que la procĂ©dure d’amendement arrivĂąt Ă  son terme. Ainsi, l’AssemblĂ©e, qui avait le pouvoir d’accroĂźtre le nombre de Membres de la Cour proprio motu, porta ce nombre de onze Ă  quinze dĂšs 1930; l’institution des juges supplĂ©ants ( quatre ) ne disparut en revanche qu’en 1936. Pour sa part, la Cour rĂ©visa son RĂšglement en 1931 et avança notamment sa session annuelle au mois de janvier, ce qui devait avoir pour effet qu’elle reste toujours en fonction, comme allait le prescrire le Statut Ă  compter de 1936. Il fallut Ă©galement attendre cette annĂ©e-lĂ  pour voir inclure dans le Statut de la Cour l’essentiel du contenu matĂ©riel des dispositions rĂ©glementaires concernant la procĂ©dure consultative, qui reflĂ©taient les enseignements de la pratique.

L’établissement de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, premiĂšre juridiction permanente Ă  vocation universelle et Ă  compĂ©tence gĂ©nĂ©rale, est apparu comme la consĂ©cration ultime d’annĂ©es de lutte passionnĂ©e pour la paix. Sans ĂȘtre formellement un organe de la SdN, elle y Ă©tait trĂšs Ă©troitement liĂ©e et constituait l’un des Ă©lĂ©ments majeurs du nouveau dispositif mis en place par le Pacte. Le budget de la Cour permanente faisait l’objet de l’une des trois sections du budget de la SdN, et atteignait, Ă  la fin des annĂ©es 1930, quelque 8% de celui-ci. Le rĂŽle de la Cour  fut fondateur. De 1922 Ă  1940, la Cour permanente a rendu  32 arrĂȘts et donnĂ© pas moins de 27 avis consultatifs, tous Ă  la demande du Conseil. Son intervention, tant au contentieux qu’au consultatif,  permit de rĂ©soudre maints diffĂ©rends, dont certains, particuliĂšrement complexes, Ă©taient nĂ©s des transferts de territoires opĂ©rĂ©s par les traitĂ©s de paix de 1919. La Cour contribua grandement, de par sa jurisprudence de haute tenue, encore si souvent citĂ©e aujourd’hui, au dĂ©veloppement du droit international, en particulier dans les domaines du droit des traitĂ©s et du droit de la responsabilitĂ©. En mĂȘme temps, elle sut mettre sur pied, grĂące Ă  ses travaux rĂ©glementaires d’une rare richesse, s’inspirant tant des pratiques internes qu’arbitrales, une vĂ©ritable procĂ©dure judiciaire internationale qui demeure, jusques ores, un modĂšle de rĂ©fĂ©rence. La Cour fit aussi montre d’une remarquable efficacitĂ© dans l’exercice de ses fonctions, ayant coutume de fixer des dĂ©lais de procĂ©dure trĂšs brefs et de rendre ses dĂ©cisions ( de trois Ă  quatre par an ) avec cĂ©lĂ©ritĂ©, la durĂ©e moyenne d’une affaire devant elle excĂ©dant rarement un an. Il n’est donc guĂšre surprenant qu’au plus profond de la crise internationale des annĂ©es 1930, et alors que divers Etats, et non des moindres, se retiraient de la SdN, la Cour continuĂąt de jouir de la confiance de la sociĂ©tĂ© internationale Ă  un point tel que, des 55 Etats parties Ă  son Statut en 1935, 42 avaient souscrit Ă  la clause facultative de juridiction obligatoire. 

En 1945, il Ă©tait devenu impossible pour la Cour permanente de Justice internationale de reprendre ses activitĂ©s. Les organes de la SdN n’étaient plus Ă  mĂȘme de pourvoir Ă  l’élection de ses Juges et une rupture historique radicale s’était produite, qui rendait nĂ©cessaire la crĂ©ation d’une nouvelle Cour, pleinement intĂ©grĂ©e dans la nouvelle organisation universelle dessinĂ©e par la Charte des Nations Unies. L’expĂ©rience Ă©minemment positive de la CPJI ne fut cependant jamais remise en question, comme en tĂ©moignent les nombreux Ă©lĂ©ments de continuitĂ© observĂ©s dans l’organisation et le fonctionnement de la Cour internationale de Justice. La sĂ©ance inaugurale de la CIJ se tint le 18 avril 1946, le jour mĂȘme oĂč disparurent formellement la SdN et la CPJI. Et le salvadorien Jose Gustavo Guerrero, qui avait Ă©tĂ© le dernier prĂ©sident  de la CPJI, devint le premier prĂ©sident de la CIJ.

A pandemic year

By Alexandra Paucescu.

2020 is definitely going to be a year to remember!

For me, it was the year I published my first book and I rediscovered my deep and old passion for writing.

For all of us, it is a year like no other. If somebody would have told us, while we were cheering and counting the last ten seconds till 2020, what kind of year it is going to be, most of us would have laughed frantically to such a wild imagination.

But as the year started to unfold, month after month, the strange and sometimes even cruel reality revealed how small and powerless we really are, how in just a moment, our whole world can turn upside down and there’s really not much to do about it
 maybe only to hope it will go away quickly


Viewed with distrust and detachment at first, this pandemic showed its ugly face, tragically ending the lives of many, changing the peaceful course of the lives of others. Sadly many still try to deny reality, history lessons seem useless and dark conspiracies are blamed for the situation. 

We were lucky to be posted to Germany, one of the countries with the best approach and strategy towards COVID-19, so far. But still, we learned to social distance, sadly all diplomatic events vanished (my poor high-heeled shoes, they miss me terribly, I presume), lovely lunches with friends became a distant memory. On the other hand, we spent more time within our family, with our children, we played board games, watched favorite movies and took long walks daily. I even heard jokes about spending so much time at home with family and partners.

Greece, during Covid restrictions. October 2020. By Alexandra Paucescu.

It is said that after the madness passes, either the birth rate or the number of divorces will increase
I would add that our mental state could also be affected … to always be worried about the health of loved ones, many of them in another country, far away and without our immediate help and support, is a difficult test for anyone. We are diplomats, used to live miles away from our parents and other relatives, used to see them seldom and for short times, but now it is even more challenging. 

So many things, which used to be familiar, have changed, some for good. But what this pandemic also taught us is that human beings are much more resilient than we generally think. We have the power to overcome any setbacks. We have also the optimism to look and hope for a brighter future ahead.

Spring went away in seconds, summer was soon gone too
 and not too much changed
Same worries, same already established safety routines. School luckily started for our children again in autumn and we tried to pretend that our lives were normal (of course, for that to fully succeed, you’d need to completely shut down any news and concentrate only on everyday life, itself). But this disease affected all aspects of everybody’s lives and added an almost unbearable amount of stress at times. We desperately needed a break, time out. But where to go, in a world almost equally and entirely affected? 

We decided to go to Greece. As one of the least affected countries in Europe, it seemed like the best and only option for a sunny holiday in October. But, as you all know by now, things can rapidly and dramatically change for the worst, so we decided not to let ourselves get too excited, not until we stepped on the Greek soil anyway… I didn’t want to risk being disappointed, in case something would have changed or cancelled our plans. Travelling in ‘Corona times’ can be risky and awfully complicated, depending on your destination. And you realize there is nothing normal about your holiday, when you see that half your suitcase is full of masks and disinfectant gels.

Luckily, the long awaited departure date came. I have travelled many times to Greece before, but I was never so happy to see the perfect blue waters surrounding the islands! The sea seemed more beautiful than ever, the sun brighter and, unfortunately, the days shorter


Looking back now, while writing this thoughts, it was a total bliss, a time to forget all worries, as sweet as a good cake after a long period of strict diet :). That’s how we felt. In times like these, when uncertainty level reaches its peak, my motto of life is more valid than ever: ‘Enjoy life today, tomorrow is never promised!’ After all, who knows what’s next? …

About the author:

Alexandra Paucescu

Alexandra Paucescu (42)  – Romanian, born in Bucharest. Former exchange high-school student in the USA,  has a university degree in Management and a Master in Business, she speaks Romanian, English, French, German and Italian. 

Turned diplomatic spouse by the age of 30, mother of two, active volunteer for UNICEF and United Nations Women’s Guild, author of ‘Just a diplomatic spouse’ book. Loves music, skiing and tennis.

The drama of Mali

By Marco Pizzorno.

On March 31, 2018, Mr. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud was arrested for war crimes and crimes against humanity. He appeared before Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, at the ICC headquarters in The Hague, on April 4, 2018.

Judge Brichambaut set the hearing to confirm the accusations against Al Hassam, for September 24, 2018.

The charges

The arrest warrant alleges that Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag is a member of Ansar Eddine and head of the Islamic police.

He is suspected of crimes against humanity committed in Timbuktu, Mali between April 1, 2012 and January 28, 2013. His crimes include widespread and systematic attack by Ansar Eddine and Al Qaeda armed groups in the Islamic Maghreb against the civilian population of Timbuktu. Some of the crimes include torture, rape, sexual slavery, other inhuman acts, including forced marriages, persecutions; and war crimes, in the context of a non-international armed conflict that occurred in the same period between April 2012 and January 2013.

What are the reasons that led to the trial?

The reasons that definitively led to the trial provided verbatim that the Chambet is convinced that that Al Hassan is criminally responsible pursuant to article 25 (3) (a) or 25 (3) (b ) of the Rome Statute for crimes against humanity for crimes of torture, rape and sexual slavery; also for persecuting the inhabitants of Timbuktu for religious and gender reasons and finally for other inhuman acts.

Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua, who chairs; Judge Tomoko Akane; and judge Kimberly Prost.

The previous cases in Mali

The first time an investigation was opened in Mali, by the Court

In the Hague, for war crimes and destruction of historic and religious buildings, refers to the Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi case in 2015. He was accused of committing war crimes in the northern city of Timbuktu, attacking and destroying part of the historical heritage and numerous religious buildings between 30 June and 10 July 2012.

Humanitarian situation

Le Monde reports fifty jihadists affiliated with Al-Qaeda were killed by the French army, on Friday 30 October, during an operation carried out in Mali, near the border with Burkina Faso, as part of the “Barkhane” operation.

A major effort by the United States is taking place to facilitate a transitional government. The US embassy reports verbatim: “The United States views the establishment of a transitional government in the Republic of Mali as an initial step towards a return to constitutional order. We urge the transitional government to honor its commitments to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), including holding democratic elections within 18 months”. Although the work of the US and France is really complicated it is necessary, the humanitarian situation remains disastrous and the questions are: “What are the policies to restore the dignity of the state and the protection of people’s lives while fighting terrorism?

What else can be done to save people’s lives while organizing a democracy?

Diplomat Magazine celebrated its anniversary!!!

Our mission is to  support the diplomatic community in the Netherlands, in Europe and in the world. Part of our duties have been the coordination of diplomatic events, offering space in both, online and in our printed edition to heads of diplomatic missions, chief of States, ministers, academics and so forth. 

Under strict Covid-19’s protocol, some of our team of photographers and editors met for a traditional lunch, enjoying the fabulous dishes offered by Leonardo Royal Hotel.

Happy 7th Anniversary to Diplomat Magazine!

“Bridging Justice, Sustainability and Prosperity” – the IIJS approach

IIJS Founding Members Claudia S. de Windt, Sheila Abed and MarĂ­a Amparo AlbĂĄn. Courtesy of IIJS.

“In times of fast paced emerging and evolving challenges on environment, climate, health, economic and social wellbeing, our mission to strengthen the rule of law and good governance is all the more important”. These are the words used by the Inter-American Institute on Justice and Sustainability (IIJS) to describe its mission – the contribution that it wants to make to society.

In the vast panorama of public and private actors working on these topics, the IIJS is a rather innovative kind of organization, presenting itself as an “institutional start-up” – that is, an organization that is private in essence, but operating in the public interest. Operating throughout the Americas and relying on a wide network of experts, the IIJS has decided to channel its efforts towards three major goals: strengthening the role of judicial systems; ensuring the sustainability of businesses, financial operations, and markets; and supporting the relationship between sustainable development and trade.

Diplomat Magazine had the pleasure to interview IIJS’s founding members: Ms. Claudia S. de Windt, who is also the organization’s CEO, as well as Ms. Sheila Abed and Ms. María Amparo Albán.

DM: Thank you very much for being here with us. Just to introduce IIJS to our readers, can you tell us what are your goals, and who will be the beneficiaries of your efforts?

CdW: We aim to strengthen the rule of law and good governance to protect the environment, people, and society. It may look like a simple goal, but it is actually a great challenge in a world filled with uncertainties and major socio-economic shocks. In these critical times, where we see fragmentation in societies and innumerable risks like the current pandemic, we are building bridges between diverse stakeholders and disciplines to address the fast-paced, evolving environmental, health, economic and social well-being challenges. We focus on environmental and climate justice, as well as the sustainability of business, development, and trade.  Best practices in these fields are critical for compliance with human rights and environmental law, as well as with social norms in the Americas. We are private in essence but with a public interest mission to positively impact sustainability. Our webpage shares concrete examples of the services we offer.

Claudia S. de Windt greets the Pope during encounter on Our Common Home and Laudato Si encyclical letter. Courtesy of IIJS.

SA: At IIJS, we work at the country level to build social investment, strengthen collaboration and partnerships with international stakeholders such as International Financial Institutions and International Governmental Organizations.  Our success is measured as a result of bringing agendas together to develop and implement public and private sector policies, secure funding as well as improve measures that build a broader sense of justice, sustainability and prosperity that our region needs.

DM: The COVID-19 pandemic has been a defining event for our times. How has the pandemic impacted sustainability in the Americas?

CdW: The COVID-19 pandemic highlights how climate change and human interaction with the environment calls for a holistic commitment to sustainability.

MAA: Already before the pandemic we were seeing a slowdown in global trade, finance and productivity following the boom brought by globalization up until the nineties. Geopolitical rivalry between East and West, coupled with trade tensions has cast doubts on globalization, impacting financial and trade flows. In our region, the economic model is vulnerable, and the pandemic has enhanced the fragility of the multilateral system. The intensification of industrial processes in the past led to higher natural resource extraction rates and pollution, which has stoked underlying social tensions that are a central challenge in the Americas today.

Sheila Abed, greets Secretary General of OAS Luis Almagro, during Global Judicial Symposium in Washington, DC. Photo by OAS.

SA: The problems we face are complex and are no longer simply distant enemies. Now we face multiple immediate threats in an economic system that continues to fuel growth, but also inequality and environmental degradation. Harmful production practices pressure ecosystems, contribute to climate change and fail to improve the livelihoods of rural communities. If the region wants to prevent and avert future crises, we need a unified perspective of prosperity based on the role of justice and responsible investment for a sustainable future. Strengthening the rule of law across sectors is the necessary foundation.

DM: Were the region’s institutions prepared for the challenges that COVID-19 brought about? And especially, what will you do to drive change?

CdW: If the COVID-19 crisis has taught us anything, it is that there is an urgent need to factor risk into how we approach daily decisions as nations, communities, and individuals. The severity of climate risk has been overshadowed by the global health crisis, testing all social and economic priorities and systems. Sadly, we see that neither modern society nor our institutions are prepared for the risks we face on a global, regional, and local scale. Laws are being challenged, public decisions scrutinized with more accountability demands and judiciaries are increasingly becoming the guardians of democracy and sustainability.

Maria Amparo Alban with Guatemalan, Nobel Prize, K’iche’ Indigenous feminist and human rights activist Rigoberta Menchú. Courtersy of IIJS.

MAA: What the Americas needs is a Sustainable Path. Truly moving from the Social Contract to a Green New Deal. We created IIJS to overcome segmentation and break down barriers. Key to this is a change in narrative, confidence and building the trust needed to develop common knowledge and add value. The IIJS proposal calls for empowering new leadership. Our future, as a region and as a planet, depends on the capacity to change assumptions—to create new priorities that fuel a shift to a broader notion of justice, innovation and social investment, while forging partnerships.

CdW: Our “Bridging Justice, Sustainability and Prosperity” approach enables driving change through our leading expertise. We bring unique diversity in our board’s geographic composition and background and at the same time gender differentiated perspective, innovation, and contextual knowledge.  These are the basis for critical thinking, planning and adapting cutting-edge solutions.  All aimed at enhancing rule of law to face the unconventional challenges of today’s risk-filled world.  Bridging the multilateral and domestic systems while maintaining each countries’ uniqueness and identity is part of the value IIJS adds.