First Latin American Food Festival with Chef Luis Rojas

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First Latin American Food Festival with Chef Luis Rojas

The tastes of Latin America are coming together for the very first edition of the Latin American Food Festival, led by renowned Peruvian Chef de Cuisine, Luis Rojas.

The real secret behind Hilton The Hague’s celebrated restaurant, Blue Blood, is its chef. Hilton The Hague succeeded in luring Chef Rojas away from Abu Dhabi, where he wore the toque at the Hilton restaurant on Yas Island. Trained in Lima and at the prestigious Cordon Bleu School—an epicenter of great cuisine in Latin America—Chef Rojas has honed his craft across the globe. Yet it is his roots and passion for Latin flavors that truly define his cooking.

Chef Rojas, a big, amiable, teddy bear of a man, exudes enthusiasm for the upcoming festival, which he has designed to be served in waves of dishes rather than courses. Each wave is both a feast for the eye and a sensation for the palate. Meeting him is a pleasure in itself—he speaks of his creations with vivid clarity, charming guests with his pride and passion.

H.E. Ms. Franca Deza Ferreccio, Ambassador of Peru to the Netherlands, expressed her congratulations to Blue Blood restaurant and, in particular, to Peruvian Chef Luis Rojas for organizing the Latin Food Festival, which will take place on Friday, October 17, 2025.

“We are confident that, as in previous editions of the Peruvian Food Festival, Chef Rojas will once again shine at this celebration dedicated to Latin American cuisine, demonstrating his talent, creativity, and commitment to promoting the rich flavors of our region.

The Embassy of Peru extends its best wishes to Blue Blood restaurant and its talented Peruvian chef, Luis Rojas, for the greatest success in this new culinary initiative.”

This festival will celebrate the rich culinary traditions of Latin America, offering an extensive buffet filled with authentic dishes that showcase the diversity, color, and flavor of the region. “For me, food is more than taste; it is memory, tradition, and celebration. Through this festival, I want to share the warmth and spirit of Latin America with every guest,” says Chef Rojas.

Dining at Blue Blood during the Latin American Food Festival is something you truly must not miss. Expect a festive atmosphere, exceptional food, and an unforgettable culinary journey guided by one of Latin America’s most passionate chefs. Reservations are highly recommended.

Abir Ali — Lebanon’s New Envoy to Germany

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Abir Ali — Lebanon’s New Envoy to Germany

On 13 October 2025, H.E. Ms. Abir Ali presented her credentials as Ambassador of Lebanon to Germany to H.E. Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Federal President of Germany. Following the ceremony at Bellevue Palace, Ambassador Ali remarked:

“Today I had the honor to present my letters of credence to H.E. Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier accrediting me as Ambassador of Lebanon to Germany.”

According to the official schedule of the Federal President’s Office, Ambassador Ali’s accreditation took place at 10:00 a.m. on that day.

Ambassador Ali previously served as Chargé d’Affaires of the Lebanese Embassy in The Hague, Netherlands (2013–2017), where she earned great respect across the diplomatic community. Known for her professionalism, intellect, and warm presence, she left behind a legacy of accomplishments and lasting friendships.

Presentation of Credentials to Germany H.E. Ms. Abir Ali, Ambassador of Lebanon.

During her farewell from The Hague, H.E. Abdelouahab Bellouki, Ambassador of Morocco, paid her a sincere tribute:

“Abir is the personification of class and grace, of elegance and style and even glamour. Educated, wise, and full of charm — she is the person you hope to be seated next to at a dinner party. A distinguished representative of her country, the beautiful Lebanon. Abir is known for her dedication to her job and her engagement for positive endeavors. Her sterling qualities command respect and consideration. Even though she was a one-person embassy, she succeeded in making the voice of Lebanon heard in the Netherlands on many fronts.”

Diplomat Magazine warmly congratulates Ambassador Abir Ali and wishes her a fruitful, inspiring, and successful posting in Germany.

Intermarium between NATO, Russia and the Great Powers

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Intermarium between NATO, Russia and the Great Powers

Romania’s Role in the Security Architecture from the Baltic to the Black, Caspian and Adriatic Seas

By Lieutenant (ret) General Corneliu Pivariu

The concept of Intermarium—originally conceived by Józef Piłsudski[1] during the interwar period—envisioned the creation of a confederation of states between the Baltic, the Black and the Adriatic Seas, capable of counterbalancing both Germany and Russia. Although the historical project never materialised, it periodically resurfaces in geopolitical analyses, especially in the context of the fragile security architecture of Central and Eastern Europe.

Today, through the Three Seas Initiative (3SI)[2], the Bucharest Nine (B9)[3], and under the pressure of the war in Ukraine, the idea of Intermarium gains renewed relevance, extending as far as the Caspian area, where energy and transport corridors link Europe to the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Although the Intermarium concept continues to be invoked in contemporary strategic analyses, in its historical form it remains more of a theoretical exercise; nevertheless, the idea of strengthened cooperation among the states between the Baltic, the Black and the Adriatic Seas continues to inspire regional initiatives with evolutionary potential.

Regional Strategic Context

The Baltic–Black–Caspian–Adriatic region forms a geopolitical arc of contact between NATO/the EU and the Russian sphere of influence. It includes:

  • The eastern flank of NATO – from the Baltic States to Romania and Bulgaria;
  • Energy and transport corridors – including Caspian routes, gas pipelines, and maritime and land interconnections;
  • The Western Balkans and the Adriatic – where the competition for influence between the West and Russia overlaps with China’s interests in infrastructure.

This area concentrates both vulnerabilities and opportunities:

  • vulnerability to Russian pressure (military, hybrid, and energy-related);
  • the importance of east–west and north–south transport corridors;
  • the position as a bridge towards the Middle East and Central Asia.

The Economic Dimension of Cooperation within the Intermarium Space

Although the Intermarium project was originally conceived as a political–military framework for balancing great powers, the realities of the 21st century require an expansion of the concept to include economic, energy, and logistical dimensions.

In this sense, the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) represents the most practical expression of the Intermarium logic, offering an institutional framework for cooperation among the states of Central and Eastern Europe in infrastructure, energy, and digitalisation[4].

Along this north–south axis—between the Baltic, the Black and the Adriatic Seas—a range of concrete projects is taking shape, capable of turning the region into an economic and energy corridor of strategic importance:

  • *Rail-2-Sea – the proposed railway connection between the ports of Gdańsk and Constanța;
  • *Via Carpatia – a transregional motorway linking Lithuania to Greece;
  • *The BRUA Corridor – a gas transport infrastructure connecting Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria;
  • *LNG terminals in Poland and Croatia supporting energy diversification in the region;
  • *Amber Rail Freight Corridor, later integrated into the Baltic–Adriatic Corridor, designed to streamline freight transport along the north–south axis.

Although these initiatives are in various stages of implementation, they express a clear trend towards functional regional integration, beyond military and political convergences. Their purpose is to reduce dependence on the traditional west–east infrastructure historically dominated by Germany and Russia, offering an economic alternative aligned with Euro-Atlantic strategic interests.

The NATO Dimension

For NATO, the Intermarium is synonymous with the Eastern Flank[5]. From the Baltic States—exposed to Russian military pressure—to the Black Sea, where the Alliance’s interests directly clash with Moscow’s, the region represents the contact line between two antagonistic geopolitical worlds.

Initiatives such as the Bucharest Nine (B9) or the strengthening of NATO’s forward presence in Poland and Romania demonstrate that the security of this region is a priority. However, the diversity of national interests means that the unity of the eastern flank remains more a declarative than a real objective.

The Russian Dimension

For Russia, the Intermarium represents a Western-imposed “sanitary cordon” meant to restrict its access to Central Europe and the Balkans. The Kremlin perceives any strengthening of cooperation among the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas as a direct threat.

In this sense, the war in Ukraine is also a battle to prevent Ukraine from becoming a pillar of a new Intermarium. Moscow seeks to counteract it through a strategy of destabilisation: maintaining frozen conflicts (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia), using propaganda, and exploiting energy dependencies. Moreover, the Kaliningrad[6] enclave plays an important role in this regard.

The Great Powers and the Intermarium

The United States supports the consolidation of the eastern flank and the Three Seas Initiative, seeing in the Intermarium a means to anchor regional allies and reduce energy dependence on Russia. Washington encourages investments in infrastructure, energy, and defence, treating the region as a vital bastion of the transatlantic order.

Germany and France regard the Intermarium idea with reserve, fearing that it could compete with the EU. However, in order not to let the US gain exclusive influence, they have accepted the Three Seas Initiative. France focuses on the Mediterranean and Africa, while Germany seeks control over critical European infrastructure.

Russia views the Intermarium as a structure of isolation, which fuels its anti-Western discourse.

China does not involve itself directly in regional security, but expresses interest through the Belt and Road Initiative, investing in ports, railways, and energy to strengthen its economic presence.

Thus, the great powers project their own interests onto the Intermarium, turning the region into an arena of emerging multipolarity.

Romania – A Geostrategic Pivot

Romania’s position is essential for any Intermarium project:

  • The Black Sea[7]: Romania is NATO’s main littoral state, responsible for securing this strategic area. The Bosporus and the energy routes from the Caucasus increase Romania’s strategic relevance.
  • The Carpathians and the Balkans[8]: Romania links the northern flank (Poland and the Baltic States) with the southern one (the Balkans and the Adriatic). North–south corridors and trans-Carpathian infrastructures are of vital importance.
  • Resources and Infrastructure[9]: Romania is an active participant in the Three Seas Initiative and can capitalise on energy projects (Black Sea gas, interconnections with Azerbaijan and Georgia) as well as infrastructural ones (motorways, railways, digital networks).

The opportunities for Romania lie in strategic visibility, attracting investments, and consolidating energy security. Yet the risks are equally significant: Russian pressure, internal vulnerabilities (corruption, political fragmentation), and the danger of being caught between divergent interests (the US, Germany, France).

Challenges and Perspectives

The Intermarium space is marked by:

  • lack of regional cohesion due to historical rivalries (Poland–Hungary, Croatia–Serbia, Romania–Hungary);
  • the risk of being instrumentalised by the great powers, in the absence of an autonomous regional integration project;
  • internal vulnerabilities such as political instability and governance issues, which limit Romania’s ability to act as a regional leader.
  •  

Conclusions

The Intermarium is not an alternative to NATO or the EU, but a complementary component that can strengthen the eastern flank and reduce structural dependencies. For Romania, it represents a dual challenge: managing geopolitical pressures while turning geographic vulnerability into strategic advantage.

The success of this project depends on:

  • tangible support from the US and the EU for the Three Seas Initiative;
  • Romania’s ability to modernise its infrastructure and armed forces;
  • the resilience of regional states in the face of Russian pressure and the geopolitical temptations offered by China.

As mentioned at the beginning of this study, although the Intermarium concept continues to be invoked in contemporary strategic analyses, in its historical form it remains largely a theoretical exercise; nevertheless, the idea of strengthened cooperation among the states situated between the Baltic, the Black and the Adriatic Seas continues to inspire regional initiatives with genuine potential for evolution.

If Romania intelligently capitalises on its position as a pivot between the Black Sea, the Carpathians and the Balkans, it can move from the status of a vulnerable frontier to that of an indispensable actor within Europe’s security architecture.

Selective Bibliography
Historical and Foundational Sources
  • Piłsudski, Józef. Political Writings. Documents on the Intermarium Project. Warsaw: Translated and Annotated Editions, 2005.
  • Mackinder, Halford J. Democratic Ideals and Reality. Bucharest: Editura Militară, 1995.
  • Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. Bucharest: Univers Enciclopedic, 2000.
General and Contemporary Geopolitical Analyses
  • Kaplan, Robert D. The Revenge of Geography. Bucharest: Litera, 2013.
  • Friedman, George. The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century. Bucharest: Litera, 2011.
  • Motyl, Alexander J. “Intermarium: Conceptualising a Geopolitical Space between the Baltic and the Black Seas.” East European Studies Journal, no. 2/2017.
  • Chatham House. Russia, Ukraine and the Future of European Security. Reports 2022–2025.
  • Council on Foreign Relations. Eastern Europe and NATO’s Frontier Security. Washington, 2023.
Institutional Documents and Initiatives
  • NATO. Strategic Concept 2022. Brussels, 2022.
  • European Union. Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. Brussels, 2016.
  • Three Seas Initiative. Summit Declarations (2016–2024). Warsaw, Bucharest, Tallinn, Sofia.
Romanian and Regional Contributions
  • Pivariu, Corneliu. Geopolitical and Military Lessons from the Russia–Ukraine Conflict. Bucharest: Financial Intelligence, 2025.
  • Pivariu, Corneliu. Global Geopolitical Developments in the First Quarter of the 21st Century. Romania in this Context. Forecasts for 2050. Bucharest: Financial Intelligence, 2025.
  • Ioniță, Sorin. “The Three Seas Initiative and its Relevance for Romania.” Revista 22, no. 10/2019.
  • Dungaciu, Dan; Rusu, Petrișor. The Black Sea: NATO and the EU on the Eastern Frontier. Bucharest: Tritonic, 2016.
  • Chifu, Iulian. Geopolitics in the Extended Black Sea Region. Bucharest: Curtea Veche, 2018.
  • European Institute of Romania. Studies on Strategy and Regional Security. Bucharest, 2020–2023.
Complementary Works and Reports
  • International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The Military Balance (Editions 2022–2025). London.
  • RAND Corporation. Deterring Russia in the Baltics. Santa Monica, 2022.
  • Atlantic Council. Three Seas Initiative: A Strategy for Transatlantic Unity. Washington, 2023.

[1] Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935), Polish statesman and military leader, promoted after the First World War the idea of a federation of states between the Baltic and the Black Seas (“Intermarium”), intended to balance the influence of Germany and Russia.

[2] The Three Seas Initiative (TSI) was launched in 2015 at the joint proposal of Poland (President Andrzej Duda) and Croatia (President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović). It brings together 13 European Union member states located between the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas, aiming to develop infrastructure, enhance energy and digital connectivity, and strengthen regional cohesion and security.

[3] The Bucharest Nine (B9) group was established in 2015 at the initiative of Romania (President Klaus Iohannis) and Poland (President Andrzej Duda). Comprising nine Eastern European NATO member states — Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary — the group aims to coordinate regional positions on Euro-Atlantic security and to strengthen the Alliance’s eastern flank. The initiative enjoys consistent support from the United States and NATO and is regarded as a complementary instrument for enhancing allied unity and resilience.

[4] Although numerous projects have been proposed and several have already been implemented, critics point out that only a relatively small number have been completed so far — some reports note that only 14 of the 143 priority projects have been finalized (or have reached an advanced stage of implementation). Major obstacles include high levels of bureaucracy, difficult cross-border coordination, divergent national priorities, the lack of a strong central implementation mechanism, and dependence on EU or external funding. Although the 3SI was conceived as a framework for coordination among states on regional projects, it lacks strong executive mechanisms in itself — its success lies rather in the fact that governments have begun to design major projects from a regional perspective.

[5] The term “eastern flank” is the established NATO formulation which, from a military standpoint—as I have noted on other occasions and as other prominent military analysts have also stated—is a political definition rather than a militarily accurate one. In fact, it should be referred to as the “eastern front,” a formulation that could gradually gain acceptance if Russia continues its aggression in Ukraine.

[6] Kaliningrad is an enclave of the Russian Federation located on the Baltic Sea coast, between Poland and Lithuania. A former German territory (Königsberg) annexed by the Soviet Union in 1945, the region holds exceptional strategic importance as Russia’s westernmost military base. It hosts the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet and a dense complex of A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) capabilities, including Iskander-M ballistic and anti-ship missile systems, S-400 and Bastion systems, as well as aviation and electronic warfare units.
Its position enables control over maritime and air routes across northern Poland and the Baltic states, serving as a major leverage point against NATO. Since 2022, Moscow has strengthened its military presence in Kaliningrad, expanding ammunition storage infrastructure and intensifying joint exercises with the Baltic Fleet, accompanied by rhetoric about the potential deployment of tactical nuclear weapons.

[7] Romania holds a geostrategically vital position on the Black Sea, located at the intersection of economic, energy, and military corridors linking Central Europe, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. The Port of Constanța, the largest port on the Black Sea and one of the most important in Europe, functions as the main logistical hub of the European Union’s and NATO’s eastern flank.
Through its rail and river connections (via the Danube–Black Sea Canal), the port provides direct access to the European transport network (TEN-T), serving as the natural terminus of the Rail-2-Sea project and as a key link in the north–south interconnection axis promoted by the Three Seas Initiative. At the same time, the port serves as critical infrastructure for allied mobility within NATO, holding strategic value comparable to that of the ports of Gdańsk and Koper.

[8] Romania occupies a unique geographical and strategic position at the confluence of the Carpathian arc and the Balkan sphere of influence, forming a natural link between Central and South-Eastern Europe. The Carpathian mountain chain, which crosses its territory for more than 900 km, provides a distinctive defensive terrain while granting control over the main access routes from Pannonia, Ukraine, and the Black Sea.
Situated north of the Balkans, Romania serves as a bridge between the Danubian–Carpathian area and the Balkan Peninsula, playing a role of regional stability and strategic continuity within the European security architecture.
Its geographic position enables Romania to become the connecting element between the northern and southern segments of the Intermarium axis, thereby strengthening the geopolitical relevance of the region within the broader Euro-Atlantic framework.

[9] Romania possesses significant potential in natural and energy resources, including substantial reserves of natural gas (both onshore and offshore in the Black Sea), crude oil, coal, non-ferrous ores, as well as considerable hydroelectric and agricultural resources. The development of gas exploitation projects in the Neptun Deep and Midia Gas Development perimeters strengthens its role as a regional energy producer.
From an infrastructural standpoint, Romania is crossed by the main European transport corridors (TEN-T), connecting the Black Sea with Central and Western Europe through railway, road, and river networks (including the Danube–Black Sea Canal).
This combination of resources and infrastructure makes Romania an essential energy and logistical pillar of the European Union’s and NATO’s eastern flank, while also providing economic and strategic support for the regional projects of the Three Seas Initiative and the broader Intermarium concept.
Nevertheless, the national infrastructure remains affected by structural and investment gaps, an insufficiently modernized transport network, and partial dependence on energy imports—factors that currently limit the full exploitation of its strategic potential.

“Between empires and alliances, the lands between the Baltic and the Black Seas have always been less the masters of their own destiny and more the arena where destinies are decided.”
— (attributed to George F. Kennan, paraphrased from American Diplomacy)

Day of Cuban Culture

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Day of Cuban Culture

The Cuban Embassy and the Hispanic Association of The Hague will celebrate the Cuban Culture Day with a salsa class. Diplomats and their couples are invited to join.

Sudan’s War is not Between Equals:  It’s a Nation Defending itself Against a Militia

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Sudan’s War is not Between Equals:  It’s a Nation Defending itself Against a Militia

By Ambassador Mohamed Osman Akasha, PhD, Charge’ d’Affaires a.i, Embassy of the Republic of the Sudan in Nairobi 

Why calling Sudan’s war a conflict between “two equal parties” is a moral and factual distortion

A dangerous myth persists in international discourse that Sudan’s devastating conflict is a war between “two equal parties.” This framing, repeated in some international and regional circles and a few media reports, is not only false but deeply unjust. It blurs the moral and legal line between a national army defending its state and people, and a militia waging terror against them.

To understand Sudan’s war, one must look beyond slogans and into logic, evidence, and the lived experience of millions of Sudanese civilians.

Legitimacy Cannot Be Shared Between a State and a Militia

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) is a constitutionally established institution, recognised by international law and tasked with safeguarding Sudan’s sovereignty and unity.

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, by contrast, is not a legitimate national force. It is the rebranded face of the Janjaweed militia, a group of supremacists responsible for genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass atrocities in Darfur since 2003.

According to the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2005), the Janjaweed were responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against non-Arab communities.[¹] These militias,  were reorganised and renamed as the RSF under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”), keeping their same command structures and violent practices and also their genocidal nature.[²][³]

For years, the international community condemned the Janjaweed for mass killings, rape, village burnings, and forced displacement. Yet today, many of those same international actors risk moral amnesia by equating this genocidal militia with Sudan’s national army.

The RSF militia seized Sudan’s political instability, as in April 2023, it turned its guns on the state, attacking government institutions, airports, and residential areas in an endeavour to consolidate power through a well-planned coup d’état.

To describe both as “equal sides” is like calling a nation’s police and an armed gang “two parties in conflict.” One defends the rule of law; the other destroys it. Legitimacy is not a matter of opinion, it is a matter of law.

Civilians Know Who Protects Them

The truest test of legitimacy is found in the movement of civilians. Across Sudan, millions have fled RSF militia-controlled areas, streaming toward army-held zones or neighbouring countries in search of safety.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), more than nine million people have been displaced since the war began, most fleeing violence, looting, and sexual abuse committed by RSF militias in Darfur, Al-Gezira, Sinnar, and Khartoum.[⁴]

If both sides were equal, the population would be divided. They are not. Sudanese civilians are voting with their feet, escaping the RSF militias seeking refuge under the army’s protection.

The RSF’s Documented Crimes

The RSF’s record is one of systematic brutality, not political legitimacy. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has documented mass killings, torture, and sexual violence by RSF militia fighters in Darfur, warning that the crimes amount to crimes against humanity.[⁵]

Human Rights Watch recorded ethnic massacres in El Geneina, where RSF militia forces and allied militias slaughtered non-Arab civilians and burned entire neighbourhoods to the ground.[⁶]

Amnesty International confirmed widespread rape, abductions, and forced disappearances used as weapons of war by the RSF militia.[⁷]

Meanwhile, the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan traced foreign arms supplies and illicit financial flows that sustain the militia’s operations, violating international sanctions and prolonging Sudan’s agony.[⁸]

These are not the actions of a movement seeking justice or reform, they are the crimes of a mercenary militia, driven by greed, tribal domination, and foreign sponsorship.

The National Army’s Role Is Defensive, Not Aggressive

The war did not begin with the Sudanese Armed Forces. It began when the RSF militia launched a coordinated assault on state institutions, looting public assets, seizing airports, and occupying homes in Khartoum. According to the UN Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council (S/2023/700), the RSF militia initiated the fighting on 15 April 2023, attacking both military installations and civilian neighbourhoods.[⁹]

Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, every sovereign state has the right and the duty to defend itself from internal rebellion. Sudan is no exception. To condemn the national army for defending the nation is to deny Sudan’s right to exist as a state.

The Danger of False Neutrality

In the name of “balance,” some international voices continue to speak of “both sides.” But false neutrality is not fairness, it is complicity. Equating the Sudanese Armed Forces with a militia accused of genocide and crimes against humanity is morally untenable and strategically reckless.

This misguided parity rewards the perpetrators and punishes the victims. Peace cannot be built on deception, it requires acknowledging who defends the nation and who destroys it.

Truth Before Peace

Sudan’s war is not a clash between equals. It is a nation under attack by a rebranded genocidal militia. The Sudanese Armed Forces represent the continuity of the state, the flag, and the people’s collective will to defend their homeland. The RSF militia represents anarchy, foreign interference, and mass suffering. To call them “equal parties” is not diplomacy, it is denial. Truth must come before peace, because peace without truth sanctifies injustice. Sudan is not at war with itself. It is fighting for its survival.

References

  • *United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the Secretary-General, 25 January 2005.
  • *Human Rights Watch, “Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Janjaweed Militias,” May 2004.
  • *Amnesty International, “Too Many People Killed for No Reason: Darfur, 2003–2004,” 2004.
  • *UNHCR, Sudan Situation Update, August 2025.
  • *OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Violations in Sudan (April–December 2023), Geneva, 2024.
  • *Human Rights Watch, “Darfur: RSF Massacres Civilians, Ethnic Targeting in El Geneina,” July 2023.
  • *Amnesty International, “Sudan: Sexual Violence and Killings by RSF in Darfur,” November 2023.
  • *UN Panel of Experts on Sudan, Final Report Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2676 (2023), February 2024.
  • *United Nations Secretary-General, Situation in the Sudan, Report to the Security Council (S/2023/700), October 2023.

Building Bridges, Dams and Locks through the Practice of International Law

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Building Bridges, Dams and Locks through the Practice of International Law

Reflections from The Ambassador Lecture Series at Maastricht University

On 22 September 2025, H.E. Ms. Carolina Olarte Bácares, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, delivered a captivating lecture at Maastricht University’s Faculty of Law titled “Building bridges, dams and locks through the practice of international law.”

Drawing inspiration from Dutch feats of engineering, Ambassador Olarte Bácares used dikes, bridges, and locks as metaphors to explore how international law can be taught, practised, and lived. Her reflections, imaginative yet deeply grounded in experience, invited the audience to see law as a dynamic instrument—one that shields, connects, and enables passage through turbulent times.

Dikes: Protecting through Understanding

The Afsluitdijk, the great Dutch barrier between the Zuiderzee and the Wadden Sea, became her metaphor for academia. For more than two decades, Olarte Bácares has taught and disseminated international law, including to Colombia’s army during the years of armed conflict. Just as a dike both separates and joins two bodies of water, she explained, international humanitarian law, human rights law, and international criminal law are not watertight compartments; they interact continuously. Teaching law to lawyers and non-lawyers alike, she argued, protects societies by making the law understandable and applicable.

Bridges: Building Connections

The Hovenring, a circular bridge in Eindhoven, symbolised her work on business and human rights. Law, she observed, must bridge states, companies, and civil society without collisions. Constructing such bridges requires awareness of diverse perspectives and a preventive mindset rooted in human-rights due diligence. Through such conscious connection, international law becomes an architecture of trust rather than confrontation.

Locks: Linking Legal Orders

Her final image, the Prinses Beatrixsluis (Princess Beatrix lock), reflected her diplomatic role as Colombia’s representative before international courts and tribunals. National and international jurisdictions, she noted, operate like two water levels communicating through a lock. The metaphor highlighted how diplomacy enables dialogue between legal orders, ensuring that one domain informs and elevates the other.

A Plural Discipline

Ambassador Olarte Bácares concluded that there is no single way to “do” international law. Whether as professor, consultant, or diplomat, each professional path enriches the discipline and makes it more human. She called for international law to step outside institutional walls—to be shared with soldiers, students, and citizens alike—so that it can serve as a living tool for protection, cooperation, and peace.

The lecture formed part of The Ambassador Lecture Series, a bi-monthly initiative convened by Professor Fabián Raimondo at Maastricht University’s Faculty of Law. Organised with the assistance of the European Law Students’ Association (ELSA) Maastricht and under the auspices of the Maastricht Centre for Human Rights, the series provides a forum for ambassadors to reflect on international law, international relations, and diplomacy from national perspectives. This inspiring lecture marked the opening of the 2025–2026 academic year.

Author: Gaia Ziliani, Vice President Seminars & Conferences, European Law Students’ Association with the invaluable support in the note taking of Polly Grünig, President of ELSA Maastricht and Emilia Cozariuc, Traineeships Director. 

For inquiries about The Ambassador Lecture Series, please contact Professor Raimondo at fabian.raimondo@maastrichtuniversity.nl.

Bolivia Celebrates its Bicentennial in The Hague

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Bolivia Celebrates its Bicentennial in The Hague

With Art, Culture, and Joy

In commemoration of the 200th Anniversary of the Declaration of Independence of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, H.E. Ambassador Roberto Calzadilla Sarmiento hosted a remarkable National Day reception in August at the Embassy of Bolivia in The Hague. The celebration beautifully captured the essence of Bolivia’s rich cultural heritage and the pride of a nation marking two centuries of independence.

The embassy premises and garden were filled with diplomats, academics, members of the Bolivian diaspora, and friends of Bolivia from various sectors of Dutch society. The ambiance reflected a true spirit of joy, and hospitality—hallmarks of Bolivian culture.

Guests were greeted with a colorful program blending tradition, and art. The La Plata Ensemble opened the evening with an exquisite performance of Chiquitano baroque music, connecting Bolivia’s historical depth with its living artistic expression.

Guests attending the 200 Anniversary of Bolivia in The Hague.
Bolivia National Day 2025.

In his address, Ambassador Calzadilla Sarmiento delivered inspiring and warm remarks:

“We gather today in The Hague not only to commemorate two centuries since the signing of the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Bolivia on August 6, 1825, but also, in this Bicentennial year, to renew our firm commitment to continue building a truly free, sovereign, just, and united Bolivia.”

The Ambassador reflected on Bolivia’s journey—from its liberation struggles led by Simón Bolívar, Antonio José de Sucre, Juana Azurduy, and other heroes, to the nation’s transformation into a Plurinational State in 2009. He highlighted the importance of recognizing Bolivia’s 36 indigenous and peasant nations, their languages, and systems of self-government, as well as the nation’s advances in social inclusion, intercultural education, and environmental rights.

Bolivia, the La Plata Ensemble.

Ambassador Calzadilla Sarmiento also emphasized Bolivia’s foreign policy of peace and dialogue, anchored in “diplomacy of the peoples and diplomacy for Living Well,” which advocates harmony with nature, respect for human rights, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. He reaffirmed Bolivia’s support for multilateralism and climate justice, referencing the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on climate obligations.

“Our foreign policy, based on “diplomacy of the peoples and diplomacy for Living Well” and on a culture of peace, promotes dialogue, respect for human and environmental rights, harmony with nature, rejection of racism and oppression, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. At the global level, we have joined the BRICS and, in our region, MERCOSUR, amplifying our voice.

The climate crisis has brought historic droughts, frosts, floods, and forest fires that have devastated our Amazonian forests and productive communities. However, we remain steadfast in our support for productive recovery, knowing that the fight against climate change is inseparable from the fight for social justice.”

The Ambassador also underscored the importance of Bolivia’s relations with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, highlighting cooperation in sustainable trade, energy, forestry, and academia, as well as its engagement with Portugal and solidarity with the State of Palestine.

Ambassador Calzadilla Sarmiento and Cees van Casteren, leading international connoisseur of Bolivian wine culture.

Following his inspiring speech, the evening turned into a festive celebration of color and rhythm, as the Alma Latina dance group took the stage with dynamic performances of traditional Bolivian dances, including Tobas and Morenada. The dances, full of energy , rhythm and symbolism, brought the spirit of Bolivia to life, mesmerizing the audience.

Chef Rodrigo Arandia head of Iskay. Bolivia 200 Anniversary.

The culinary experience was another highlight of the evening. Bolivian venture Iskay and international chef Rodrigo Arandia curated a flavorful gastronomic journey through Bolivia’s diverse regions—featuring quinoa and anticuchos from the Andes, menudito from the valleys, and majadito from the tropical lowlands. Guests also enjoyed a tasting of Bolivian wines and singani, guided by renowned Dutch ethnologist and wine expert Cees van Casteren, whose work in Bolivia has made him one of the leading international connoisseurs of Bolivian wine culture.

Cees van Casteren, leading international connoisseur of Bolivian wine culture.

The evening concluded with awards presented to Bolivians and organizations that have significantly contributed to promoting Bolivia’s image and culture in the Netherlands.

Under the leadership of Ambassador Roberto Calzadilla Sarmiento, the Bicentennial celebration in The Hague stood as a meaningful symbol of Bolivia’s proud identity: a country of diversity, resilience, and profound cultural wealth, proudly sharing its vision of a just and united future.

Ambassador Calzadilla Sarmiento awarded Bolivians and organizations.

¡Jallalla Bolivia! Viva Bolivia.

Doha World Negotiation Day 2025: Negotiating Peace in a Fragmented World

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Doha World Negotiation Day 2025: Negotiating Peace in a Fragmented World

The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) is pleased to announce the second edition of the Doha World Negotiation Day, taking place on 8 December 2025 in Doha, Qatar. Hosted by UNITAR in collaboration with the Doha Forum and QatarDebate, this year’s event will center on the theme “Negotiating Peace in a Fragmented World: The Case for Preventive Diplomacy.”

Bringing together some of the world’s most respected figures in the fields of negotiation, diplomacy, and conflict resolution, the Doha World Negotiation Day provides a high-level platform for dialogue on the art and science of negotiation in today’s complex geopolitical landscape. The 2025 edition will feature an opening ceremony, two high-level panel discussions with senior representatives from international organizations, government, and the private sector, as well as an award ceremony and closing remarks.

A highlight of the event will be the presentation of the “Doha Best Negotiator of the Year” Award — a prestigious recognition honoring an outstanding negotiator whose leadership, creativity, and resilience have made a significant impact in advancing peaceful solutions to global challenges. The laureate will be selected by an esteemed international jury composed of accomplished negotiators and diplomatic leaders.

Nominees for the award must demonstrate exceptional negotiation skills in resolving complex, multi-stakeholder conflicts and embody the following principles:

  • Adherence to the values of the United Nations Charter, including respect for human rights and equality among nations;
  • Upholding integrity and ethical conduct throughout negotiations;
  • Engaging in responsible and inclusive dialogue with multiple stakeholders;
  • Reaching constructive and sustainable outcomes in high-stakes negotiations;
  • Promoting human rights protection and advancing a precautionary approach to environmental challenges.
Doha World Negotiation 2025

UNITAR welcomes nominations for the Doha Best Negotiator of the Year Award until 1 November 2025. Nominations can be submitted via email to dwnd@unitar.org.

To participate in the event, interested individuals may register online and choose to attend either in person or virtually.

As an additional opportunity for professional development, UNITAR will also offer a Free Masterclass on Key Cross-Cultural Negotiation Skills ahead of the main event. This practical, one-hour session will explore core competencies such as active listening, cultural awareness, emotional intelligence, and trust-building across diverse cultural contexts.

The Doha World Negotiation Day 2025 reaffirms UNITAR’s commitment to advancing preventive diplomacy and empowering individuals and institutions to resolve conflicts through dialogue and understanding.

Cyprus Marks 65th Anniversary of Independence

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Cyprus Marks 65th Anniversary of Independence

By Roy Lie Atjam.

His Excellency Dr. Spyros Attas, Ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus, and Madam Domna Paschalidou-Attas hosted a reception to celebrate the 65th Anniversary of the Independence of the Republic of Cyprus.

The festive event took place on October 1, 2025, in The Hague. Cyprus, formerly known as Kittim or Cethima, is an ancient country strategically located at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa. Throughout history, many world powers, including the Crusaders, have sought to dominate this territory. It was a former British colony that gained independence in 1960 and joined the European Union in 2004.

Ambassador Dr. Spyros Attas addressed the guests, sharing light moments during his speech.

“I would like first to extend a warm welcome to the Attorney General of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr George Savvides, and the Deputy Attorney General, Mr Savvas Angelides, who are present with us at this reception; it is an honour to have you here.”

Furthermore, Ambassador Spyros Attas thanked the members of the Jazz Trio, led by Marios Charalambous, who performed the national anthems of Cyprus and the Netherlands in a very creative and engaging way. The members of the trio are: Marios Charalambous (Cyprus) on saxophone, Evan van der Feen on double bass, and Arjun Ramdas on keyboard.

“My friends, our country, born out of a bitter anti-colonial struggle in 1960, has preserved its independence in the face of exceptionally difficult circumstances, many of which persist to this day. As the Ambassador of Cyprus to the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, I am proud to represent a democratic nation, member of the European Union, and to promote the values we hold in common: respect for the rule of law, human rights and freedom, respect for the UN Charter and international law.

Domna Paschalidou-Attas, the Ambassador’s spouse, Mr. George Savvides, Attorney General of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Savvas Angelides, Deputy Attorney General, and H.E. Dr. Spyros Attas, Ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus to the Benelux.

 Given its geostrategic location, Cyprus has made it a national priority to offer assistance in times of crisis to all those in need. We were pleased to facilitate the Netherlands and other nations in their humanitarian evacuation operations from Sudan and Lebanon in recent years, ensuring the safe return of their citizens. This exemplary cooperation culminated in an exchange of visits at the level of Heads of State, the latest being that of the visit of His Majesty King Willem-Alexander and Queen Máxima to Cyprus last March. The visit of Their Majesties constitutes a milestone to our already existing excellent relations. There are many fields in which we cooperate, such as research, agriculture, and tourism.

We work together with the Netherlands, in advancing shared objectives both within the European Union and globally. Many Cypriot citizens, especially our young generation, choose this country for their university studies and often stay to pursue their careers. A brilliant example is no-other than the Marios Charalambous jazz trio performing for us today, and many others.

Cyprus also takes pride in its achievements in various sectors, including science, business, and shipping. Our vision is one of strength through cooperation with like-minded partners, in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. However, Cyprus faces one of the gravest challenges in its history, which threatens its very existence as an independent country and even the physical existence of its people.

More than one-third of its territory remains under illegal military occupation by Turkey. For 51 years, the Republic of Cyprus and its people have endured much suffering, including gross violations of human rights and ethnic cleansing, by being subjected to the first forcible attempt to change borders in Europe since the Second World War.

As a consequence of its own experience, Cyprus, fully understands the struggles of other nations facing aggression. It would be hypocritical to seek solidarity for our cause without extending it to others. That is why we stand firmly with Ukraine and its people against Russia’s illegal invasion. As President Christodoulides underlined before the UN General Assembly a few days ago: “Appeasement never works.” “Each time we turn a blind eye to violations of sovereignty and territorial integrity, we create space for the next aggressor.” In both cases, the UN Charter was violated. Illegality cannot be transformed into legality – no matter who the perpetrator is or who the victim may be. There cannot be double standards.

As I mentioned at the beginning of my speech, Cyprus has always upheld a principled position in multilateralism and international law, particularly international humanitarian law. Cyprus assumed yet again its moral responsibility to its region and the suffering of civilians in Gaza by working closely with our partners to establish the “Amalthia maritime corridor” for the delivery of desperately needed humanitarian aid to the population of Gaza. The route has recently been reactivated, and we want to see the unhindered flow of aid in order to avert the humanitarian catastrophe and alleviate suffering, in much anticipation of the end of the war.

H.E. Dr. Spyros Attas, Ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus during his speech.

In January 2026, Cyprus will assume the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. We will exercise fully this responsibility, striving for a stronger, more secure and more resilient European Union. We are committed to serving as an honest broker,to strengthening relations with our Southern Neighbourhood, and to advancing key priorities such as competitiveness, security, and defense capabilities.

I would like to thank the staff of the Embassy of Cyprus in The Hague for their dedicated work and assistance, as well as the person standing by my side, my spouse Madam Domna Paschalidou – Attas, for her support and devotion throughout these years.”

Deputy Attorney General, Mr. Savvas Angelides, H.E. Mr. Jeffrey Curmi, Ambassador of the Republic of Malta, Ms. Domna Paschalidou-Attas, and H.E. Dr. Spyros Attas.

The ambiance of the  reception at the emblematic Hotel Des Indes, was lively, comfortable with Ambassador  Spyros Attas sharing warm moments with his guests.

The gathering  attracted a diverse group of guests, including several ambassadors and diplomats from countries such as Italy, Greece, Armenia, Uruguay, Malta, Japan, El Salvador, Belgium, North Macedonia, Mexico, Yemen, Georgia, Yemen, and Malaysia, as well as the Director-General of the OPCW, ICMP, PCA and other high-ranking officials.

The afternoon concluded with beverages and appetizers, leaving attendees united in their celebration of this significant milestone in Cypriot history.

Coordinated Action Nabs Gang Behind 100+ Luxury Car Thefts in Europe

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Coordinated Action Nabs Gang Behind 100+ Luxury Car Thefts in Europe

With the assistance of Eurojust and Europol, authorities in Italy, Spain and Belgium have arrested nine members of a gang of thieves stealing high-end luxury cars. Well-targeted thefts of over one hundred high-value vehicles, worth an estimated total of at least EUR 3 million, took place in Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands and other EU countries.

Eurojust supported a joint investigation team (JIT) of the Italian and Spanish authorities to dismantle the organised crime group (OCG).

The OCG mainly consisted of Moldovan suspects. They specifically targeted high-profile events, for example, knowing that many owners of luxury sports vehicles would be present. The gang members used sophisticated equipment to open the cars and neutralise the alarm and GPS systems. The suspects also managed to dismantle security transponders to prevent further tracking of the stolen vehicles.

After the thefts, fake ownership documents and license plates of professional quality were made before the sports cars were sold. Many of the stolen vehicles were shipped in containers to destinations outside the European Union via the port of Antwerp in Belgium. The OCG has been active since the beginning of 2024.

Investigations by Italian and Spanish authorities into individual car thefts rapidly revealed a similar pattern and modus operandi. Eurojust coordinated investigations and provided cross-border support starting in October 2024 and assisted with the setting up and funding of the JIT. The Agency also coordinated a joint action today, enabling collaboration with the Belgian authorities.

Europol coordinated the international phase of the investigations, bringing together investigators from all involved countries and hosting operational meetings at its headquarters. Europol also supported national authorities with analysis and intelligence sharing and will continue to provide on-the-spot support during follow-up actions.

During the action day, close to twenty places were searched and four vehicles were seized, as well as fake license plates from various countries. Furthermore, kits to clone car keys or devices to break into vehicles and equipment to jam and disturb electronic signals were seized and also over EUR 180 000 in cash and cryptocurrencies.

The operations were carried out at the request of and by the following authorities:

  • Italy: Public Prosecutor’ Office (PPO) Reggio Emilia; Carabinieri – Provincial Command Reggio Emilia (with the financial support of @ON project of the Anti-Mafia Investigative Directorate (DIA) financed by the European Commission), supported by the Ministry of Interior’s Police International Cooperation Service (SCIP) – SI.RE.NE and INTERPOL Divisions
  • Spain: Investigative Judge Court no.5 of Marbella; Regional PPO Marbella; Guardia Civil – UCO – specialised unit against organised crime on motor vehicles
  • Belgium: Investigative Judge of Court of Antwerp; PPO Antwerp; Federal Judicial Police Antwerp
  • Romania: Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT)
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