Constitutions are foundational documents that shape the political and legal structure of a nation. In democratic systems, they are intended to establish a clear separation of powers, protect individual rights, and ensure that governance is responsive to the needs of the people.
However, leaders in countries like Venezuela, Russia, and Turkey have exploited constitutional amendments to centralize power, eroding democratic institutions. Indonesia faces similar risks with proposals like presidential term extensions and reintroducing state policy guidelines (PPHN), raising concerns over potential abuses of power. This article examines these issues through global comparisons and suggests reforms to safeguard democracy.
Hence, the following lines are examining how the mechanism of constitutional amendments can be misused to consolidate power and undermine democratic norms, a phenomenon known as abusive constitutionalism. By analyzing cases from Turkey, Russia, Venezuela, and China, it explores how leaders manipulate legal frameworks to entrench authority and foster a cult of personality. The paper highlights preventative measures such as eternity clauses, the basic structure doctrine, and civil society engagement as safeguards to protect democracy. It also considers how Indonesia can strengthen its constitutional framework to prevent authoritarianism.
Using conceptual legal research and a comparative approach, this study aims to answer three key questions: (1) What drives the proposed constitutional amendments in Indonesia? (2) How do these proposals align with principles of constitutionalism and democracy? (3) What safeguards can prevent abusive constitutional practices in Indonesia? It seeks to address the research questions by evaluating how constitutional amendments have led to abusive constitutionalism, focusing on Indonesia’s current proposals. Cases from countries such as India, Colombia, and Venezuela provide insights into how term limit extensions, power shifts, and personalization undermine democratic principles. The study emphasizes the role of civil society in maintaining accountability.
II. Constitution, Legal Order and Political Power
2.1 Comparative Framework: Abusive Constitutionalism in a Global Context
Abusive constitutionalism, as defined by David Landau, refers to the manipulation of constitutional mechanisms to undermine democracy under the guise of legal reform. This global phenomenon has been observed in countries like Hungary, Venezuela, Turkey, China, Colombia, and Indonesia. Tactics include extending presidential terms, weakening checks and balances, co-opting judicial institutions, and consolidating power under the rhetoric of stability or national progress.
In Colombia, the 1991 constitution limited the president to a single term to prevent the rise of authoritarian leaders, seeking to entrench power. However, President Álvaro Uribe Vélez sought to amend the constitution to allow re-election, raising concerns about democratic backsliding. Similarly, in Venezuela, constitutional reforms extended the presidential term from one four-year term to two six-year terms, enabling Hugo Chávez to consolidate power. Like Colombia’s example, these amendments were framed as necessary for national progress, but they ultimately allowed for the rise of authoritarian rule.
In Hungary, the ruling party employed both amendments and replacements to the constitution to consolidate power. This included adding more constitutional court judges, restructuring key state commissions, and making it more difficult to amend the constitution in ways that could challenge the ruling party’s dominance. These measures illustrate how constitutional reforms can be used as tools for entrenching power, rather than reforming governance. Similar trends are observable in Indonesia, where proposed constitutional amendments, such as reintroducing the National Guidelines (PPHN), may serve to further centralize authority in the hands of the president.
Rosalind Dixon and David Landau’s concept of Abusive Constitutional Borrowing highlights how democratic frameworks are repurposed for authoritarian control, often by weakening institutions like constitutional courts or anti-corruption bodies. Research shows that while leaders frequently attempt to evade term limits through constitutional changes, public resistance, rather than judicial intervention, is often the key deterrent.
The global patterns suggest that Indonesia’s proposed amendments may not aim to improve governance but rather consolidate power, exemplifying Landau’s concept of abusive constitutionalism.
2.2 SEA as a Case Study: Current Constitutional Proposals
This section examines the largest country of Southeastern Asia, that or RI’s proposed constitutional amendments, specifically the reintroduction of the National Guidelines (PPHN) and the extension of the presidential term, highlighting their potential to reshape the country’s political landscape. While these proposals are framed as governance and stability enhancements, they raise concerns about democratic principles and the risk of power consolidation. While Article 37 provides a structured framework for constitutional amendments, it centralizes power within the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), raising concerns about potential abuse. The MPR could prioritize the interests of the ruling party, potentially undermining democratic accountability.
Key concerns include:
Reintroduction of the PPHN: This could centralize policy control under the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), weakening the independence of other state institutions.
Presidential Term Extension: Extending the presidency to three terms risks eroding safeguards against power personalization and weakening democratic consolidation.
Though Article 37 legitimizes the amendment process, it also reveals vulnerabilities where mechanisms intended to enable constitutional change can be exploited for undemocratic purposes. This aligns with global trends in abusive constitutionalism, where amendment processes are used to entrench power rather than strengthen democracy. The subsequent analysis will assess whether these proposals represent genuine reforms or potential abuses.
2.3 The Role of the Cult of Personality in Consolidating Power
The cult of personality is a political strategy where leaders create a heroic and idealized image to centralize authority, often undermining institutional governance. Personalization of power centralizes decision-making, undermining institutional integrity and democratic norms. While it may offer short-term stability, it often results in volatile governance. A comparative analysis of China, Russia, and Turkey illustrates how personalization of power influences governance and constitutional changes.
In China,Xi Jinping has constructed a cult of personality through state propaganda, portraying himself as indispensable to China’s future. The removal of presidential term limits in 2018 marked a significant step toward consolidating indefinite rule, shifting governance from a collective leadership model to a centralized and personalized system. This strengthens Xi’s authority but risks long-term instability.
Similarly, Vladimir Putin has cultivated a strongman image tied to Russia’s global resurgence. Constitutional changes in 2020 reset term limits, allowing him to stay in power until 2036. Unlike China, Russia maintains a façade of democratic institutions, which are systematically weakened to ensure control.
In Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has used populist rhetoric to reshape governance. The 2017 constitutional referendum transitioned Turkey from a parliamentary to a Semi-Presidential system (of the French type), granting Erdoğan extensive executive powers while eroding judicial and legislative independence. His leadership demonstrates how personalization can align institutional frameworks with individual authority.
All three leaders use propaganda, legalistic and legal mechanism of constitutional amendments, and weakened institutional checks to consolidate power. However, their methods differ: China relies on institutional propaganda, Russia undermines democratic processes while maintaining a democratic façade, and Turkey invokes populist narratives.
While Indonesia faces some risk of developing a cult of personality under a charismatic leader like President Prabowo Subianto, its democratic safeguards act as barriers. The multi-party system, decentralized governance, and two-term presidential limit reduce the risk of power concentration. Additionally, Indonesia’s historical experience with Suharto’s authoritarian regime has fostered societal resistance to personalization of power. However, threats like media control, weakened institutions, or populist appeals remain, making vigilance and reform essential for preserving democracy.
2.4 Abusive Constitutionalism: Detection and Prevention
The personalization of power, as observed in China, Russia, and Turkey, often manifests through constitutional amendments that consolidate authority. To counteract such trends, it is essential to explore mechanisms that protect constitutional integrity and democratic principles from being abused—a concern that resonates with Indonesia’s ongoing constitutional debates.
Abusive constitutionalism, where leaders manipulate constitutional amendments to entrench their power, poses a significant threat to democratic integrity. Lessons from India, Colombia, and Venezuela highlight strategies to prevent such practices, focusing on eternity clauses, the basic structure doctrine, and civil society involvement. These mechanisms aim to protect the constitution’s fundamental principles from being jeopardized by constitutional amendments.
Eternity Clauses
Certain core democratic principles, like executive power limitations, should be enshrined as unalterable. For example, Colombia used eternity clauses to block amendments extending presidential terms, with civil society and courts preserving institutional integrity. Likewise, Indonesia’s constitution already includes immutable clauses (e.g., protecting the unitary state), but clauses related to term limits and the balance of powers should also be safeguarded.
Basic Structure Doctrine
This doctrine, pioneered in India, ensures that fundamental constitutional principles cannot be amended. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), India’s Supreme Court ruled that constitutional amendments cannot alter the constitution’s core framework. Indonesia’s judiciary could adopt similar judicial review mechanisms to block amendments concentrating power in the presidency or weakening checks and balances.
Civil Society
Active civil society is crucial for resisting constitutional abuses. Public pressure and grassroots activism can expose and challenge manipulative amendments. For example, Venezuela’s failure to maintain an independent judiciary or robust civil society allowed repeated amendments that eroded democracy under Hugo Chávez. In contrast, Colombia and India demonstrate how civil society and judicial action can resist overreach.
Indonesia’s vibrant civil society and constitutional safeguards have so far resisted elite-driven amendments, such as proposals for term extensions or system changes justified as necessary for stability. However, increasing media control and elite-driven reforms in Indonesia make public engagement and judicial oversight ever more crucial to prevent potential abuses of democratic principles.
Summary and outlook
This analysis highlights the risks posed by selected countries’ proposed constitutional amendments, which aim to strengthen the executive branch through measures like extending presidential terms and reintroducing the PPHN of largest country in SEA. These changes mirror trends in Russia, Turkey, and China, where centralizing power fosters a cult of personality, erodes institutional independence, and undermines democratic principles.
The amendments could diminish democratic accountability, weaken institutional safeguards, and pave the way for authoritarian rule by concentrating power among political elites. To counteract such risks, these countries must strengthen checks and balances, adopt mechanisms like eternity clauses and the basic structure doctrine, and ensure robust civil society engagement in constitutional processes.
A political culture emphasizing pluralism, transparency, and institutional independence is imperative to preserving democratic values and preventing the personalization of power. The analysis concludes that while constitutional reforms may be justified as necessary for progress, history shows their potential to consolidate power and erode democracy, emphasizing the importance of preventive measures against authoritarianism.
Authors:
Prof. Dr. Djawed Sangdel
Prof. Dr. Djawed Sangdel, Managing Rector of the Swiss UFEM University, Geneva. The State MP of the Swiss Confederation’s Genevé Grand Conseil.
Damla Mesulam
Damla Mesulam of Leiden University, The Hague, specialized in International Relations and Organizations. Her research spans EU-Turkey relations, sustainability, and social justice activism. Currently, she is research fellow of the International Institute IFIMES in Hague, Netherlands.
German and Bulgarian authorities have rolled up a criminal group that was involved in the large-scale theft of power cables across Germany. The disappearance of the cables caused major disruptions to large public construction sites. During a joint operation coordinated by Eurojust and Europol, eight suspects were arrested.
The criminal group consisting mostly of Bulgarian nationals, set up a large-scale operation to steal power cables in three states in Germany, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Hesse and Saarland. After stealing the power cables, the group sold them for substantial profits. Afterwards, the proceeds were then transferred to Bulgaria.
Through investigations, the authorities were able to link 45 individual cases of power cable theft to the criminal group. The total value of the stolen cables is around 1 million euros.
After German authorities discovered that the criminal group behind the theft was partly residing in Bulgaria and was moving their profits to Bulgaria, cooperation between the authorities was set up at Eurojust. The authorities worked together to plan the joint operation to arrest the suspects and stop the thefts. Europol supported the action day by deploying an expert with a mobile office to Bulgaria. Leading up to this, Europol organised an operational meeting, provided operational analysis and supported the cross-border surveillance with a virtual command post.
In the early hours of 17 December, authorities in Bulgaria and Germany took action with nearly 200 officers, investigators and prosecutors deployed. The operation was coordinated from Eurojust’s headquarters in The Hague. Twenty-four house searches, nine personal searches and six car searches took place in Bulgaria. During the searches, authorities were able to seize items such as telephones and document that will now be used to continue investigations into the group. Eight suspects were arrested, five in Bulgaria and three in Germany.
The following authorities were involved in the actions:
Germany: Public Prosecution Office Heilbronn; Heilbronn Police
Bulgaria: Public Prosecution Offices Varna and Shumen; Investigative Department to the Sofia City PO and the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Home Affairs-Varna
The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Karim A.A. Khan KC, is pleased to invite a second round of comments on a new policy initiative by the Office of the Prosecutor to advance accountability for environmental crimes under the Rome Statute.
The initiative will culminate in a new comprehensive policy paper that aims to guide the Office in ensuring a systematic approach to dealing with environmental crimes from the outset of the preliminary examination process to investigations and prosecutions.
The new policy will seek to further promote accountability, transparency, and predictability in the work of the Office in this crucial area. Developed on the basis of the Rome Statute, other regulatory instruments of the Court, applicable treaties, and the principles and rules of international law, the policy will also draw on the jurisprudence of the Court and other relevant jurisdictions in seeking to clarify the existing framework within which the Office may take action in this area. Emphasis will also be placed on how the Office can engage with and support national authorities to ensure a collective, effective approach to environmental crimes within the framework of the Rome Statute.
The initiative was launched in February 2024 and has already benefited from an initial round of more than 80 submissions received prior to the drafting process. This new round of consultations aims to solicit more specific and focused feedback on the text of the draft policy itself.
In highlighting the potential importance of the environmental crimes policy and the central role of stakeholder consultation in its development, Prosecutor Khan stated: “The natural environment forms the bedrock for human life. Our investigations in various regions of the world reveal a pattern: serious international crimes are often driven by or result in significant environmental damage, such as the poisoning of wells and water supplies in Darfur. This is why my Office is developing a policy on how it can harness the treaty that created the Court, the Rome Statute, to address such crimes and to support national authorities in doing the same. We need your input to shape this policy.”
Professor Kevin Jon Heller, Special Adviser to the Prosecutor on War Crimes, will be assisting the Prosecutor and the Office in developing the policy.
On 17 December 2024, the Defence and the Prosecution discontinued their appeals against the guilty verdict in the case The Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud before the International Criminal Court (ICC). The parties will not appeal the sentence. The verdict and the sentence in this case are now final and the case will proceed to the reparations stage.
Next steps: On 10 December 2024, Trial Chamber X issued an Order for Submissions on Reparations, giving instructions and deadlines to the Prosecution, the Legal representatives of victims, the Defence, the Registry, the Trust Fund for Victims and the Republic of Mali for various submissions on reparations to victims. The Chamber will then render its decision on reparations in the case in due course.
Mr Al Hassan will remain in the ICC detention centre until the ICC designates a country to serve his sentence.
Today, the Appeals Chamber, by majority, Judge Gocha Lordkipanidze and Judge Erdenebalsuren Damdin dissenting, invited the legal representatives of the participating victims to file any observations on the notices of discontinuance of appeals by 30 December 2024.
The 5th of December is a significant occasion in Thailand, celebrated as both the National Day and the birthday anniversary of His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej The Great. This day also serves as “Father’s Day” in the country.
On December 5, 2024, Thailand proudly hosted a series of celebrations to honor these important events. To commemorate this day, His Excellency Mr. Asi Mamanee, the Ambassador of Thailand in the Netherlands, successfully organized a National Day reception in The Hague. Prior to addressing his esteemed guests, Ambassador Mamanee respectfully paid homage to His Majesty the King of Thailand.
H.E. Mr. Asi Mamanee, Ambassador of Thailand welcome the Ambassador of Kazakhstan, H.E. Mr. Kairat Abdrakhmanov.
Below is the complete address delivered by H.E. Ambassador Asi Mamanee.
“For the people of Thailand, the 5th of December is an important day as it represents many auspicious occasions. It is the National Day of Thailand, and Birthday Anniversary of His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej The Great. With over 70 years of the late King’s devotion to the development of our country, the day also marks as “the Father’s Day” in Thailand.
As we gather to celebrate Thailand’s National day here today, the year 2024 is also a special year which marks a few other causes for celebration.
Ambassador of Thailand, welcome the Ambassador of Iran, H.E. Mr Dr Hadi Farajvand.
First, this year, the people of Thailand celebrate the 6th Cycle Birthday Anniversary of His Majesty King Maha Vajiralongkorn. Throughout this year, the Royal Thai Government, including the Thai Embassies around the world, organized series of events to commemorate the 72nd birthday anniversary of His Majesty the King of Thailand.
The year 2024 also marks 420th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Thailand and the Netherlands, which commenced in 1604, when the Dutch VOC or the Dutch East India Company began its trade with Ayutthaya, capital of Siam which is present day Thailand. The VOC sent the Dutch envoys to the royal court of Ayutthaya to have an audience with the Siamese king. This historic encounter was deemed an official establishment of the ties between Thailand and the Netherlands. It is the longest formal diplomatic friendship Thailand has with any country in the world.
On this important milestone, the Royal Thai Embassy organized a number of activities throughout the year to celebrate this special occasion. To name just a few example, the 15th Thailand Grand Festival, our flagship event to showcase a variety of Thai soft power through Thai cuisine and culture was organized at the Lange Voorhout, in the past summer. The event was well attended by over twenty thousand people on a one day festivity.
National day kingdom of Thailand .
On the historical side, the Thai Embassy commissioned an academic research on the first Siamese diplomatic mission to the Netherlands in 1608. You can learn more about this adventurous journey of the Siamese delegation, which was graciously received by Prince Maurits, the Stadholder, from the QR code on the souvenir postcards you will receive upon your departure.
At the end of this month, a year-long major renovation of our chancery building at the beautiful Archipelbuurt will be completed, and will resume its function. The refurbishment has preserved the original aesthetics of this monumental building while enhancing its functionality. It is a testament of Thailand’s cherishment and heartfelt investment towards this over 4 centuries of Thai-Dutch relations.
For more than 4 centuries, Thailand and the Netherlands have maintained strong and cordial bonds. We share the same values, particularly in our aspiration to promote sustainable development. We boast vibrant and open societies. Both countries are leading food exporters, and are hybrid nations firmly situated in the mainland with maritime linkage, which contributes to the strength we maintain in regional connectivity.
National day kingdom of Thailand 2024.
At a bilateral level, water management cooperation between Thailand and the Netherlands remains robust as ever as both face common challenges of sea-level rises. We strive to effectively implement Thailand-the Netherlands MoU on the cooperation in the field of integrated water resources management and climate change adaptation which was signed in 2021. We jointly organized many activities this year including the seminar on “Water Diplomacy” and the co-signing of the Letter of Intent (LOI) for research and development of innovations in sustainable water resource management between Chulalongkorn University of Thailand, and Deltares Institute.
On an economic front, the Netherlands is the biggest EU source of foreign direct investment in Thailand, and has recently become no. 4 globally, with investment in areas ranging from agriculture to petrochemicals. The Netherlands is also the largest EU destination for Thai Direct Investment (TDI) overseas and no. 3 globally.
Our people-to-people ties are vibrant and strong. Over 200,000 Dutch tourists visited Thailand last year. On the other hand, there are more than 20,000 Thais living here in the Netherlands, making it one of the largest Thai community in Europe.
I am also pleased to note that Thailand and the Netherlands play progressive role in multilateral cooperation. Thailand is pleased that the ASEAN-Netherlands Development Partnership is gaining strong momentum. Thailand looks forward to joining the Netherlands in being the Members of the United Nations Human Rights Council next year to advance the cause of human rights. We will also work closely together in many areas of our mutual interest, including advancing sustainable development cooperation.
We have varieties of Thai food for you to try during the reception today, including our famous Tom Yum Koong or Thai Hot and Sour Shrimp Soup. We are proud to share with you that Tom Yum Goong will be inscribed on the UNESCO list of ‘Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity’ during the nineteenth session of the Intergovernmental Committee for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage which will take place later today in Asunción, Republic of Paraguay. So I hope you would enjoy it.
May I now kindly invite you to join me in a toast to the good health and happiness of His Majesty King Maha Vajiralongkorn of Thailand and His Majesty King Willem-Alexander of the Netherlands.”
More than 250 attendees participated in the celebration, including notable figures from the Netherlands, such as H.E. Mrs. Dominique Kurhling, Director of the Department of Asia and Oceania.The event also attracted key friends of Thailand, with members of the Diplomatic Corps, leaders from the private sector, academia, the media, and the Thai community all in attendance.
En 2017, le Sénégal a offert l’œuvre emblématique Paix par la Justice de Khalidou Kassé à la Cour pénale internationale (CPI) à La Haye. Ce tableau magistral a subi quelques égratignures au fil des années. Diplomat Magazine a rencontré l’artiste alors qu’il restaurait son œuvre avant son retour au Sénégal. Lors de cette visite, Son Excellence Mme Ramatoulaye Ba Epse Faye, Ambassadrice de la République du Sénégal aux Pays-Bas, nous a également honorés de sa présence.
Diplomat Magazine (DM) – La restauration de cette œuvre ici, à La Haye, souligne son importance. Quels sentiments ou réflexions cela vous inspire-t-il de travailler à nouveau sur cette pièce emblématique dans le contexte de la Cour pénale internationale ? Est-ce différent de l’époque où vous l’aviez créée au Sénégal ?
Khalidou Kassé – Oui, il faut dire que c’est différent. C’est différent parce que j’ai eu un recul, de 2017 à aujourd’hui, pour réexaminer l’œuvre. En la revoyant, je l’ai réétudiée, et j’ai réalisé que, dans ce tableau, j’avais atteint ce que je cherchais. Une œuvre d’art, dit-on, n’est jamais vraiment achevée, car chaque fois que l’artiste la contemple, il ressent l’envie d’y ajouter quelque chose.
Mais en revoyant ce tableau, j’ai constaté qu’il était complet. En 2017, je ne pensais pas revenir pour le restaurer. Pourtant, chaque détail, chaque coup de pinceau m’a rappelé le processus créatif qui m’a conduit à l’offrir à la CPI.
L’artiste Sénégalais Khalidou Kassé et Mme Ramatoulaye Ba Epse Faye, Ambassadrice du Sénégal aux Pays-Bas.
DM – C’est comme retrouver un enfant qui a grandi.
Kassé – Absolument, un enfant qui a grandi tout en conservant ses qualités et sa finesse. Cette restauration m’a aussi permis de raviver le message que j’avais voulu transmettre à travers cette œuvre. Paix par la Justice est une grande œuvre, et je suis profondément honoré qu’elle soit ici, à la Cour pénale internationale.
Je tiens à exprimer ma gratitude à Son Excellence Mme l’Ambassadrice Ramatoulaye Ba Epse Faye, qui n’a ménagé aucun effort pour faciliter ma venue. Elle a coordonné les échanges entre le ministère sénégalais de la Culture et celui des Affaires étrangères, permettant ainsi la restauration de cette œuvre.
En ce qui concerne le tableau, il véhicule un message clair : la paix par la justice. L’œuvre porte un message de paix, d’amour et d’espoir. La véritable mission de l’art est de tisser des liens et de résoudre les conflits.
DM – Pouvez-vous nous parler des éléments symboliques présents dans l’œuvre ?
Kassé – Bien sûr. Cette œuvre s’inspire notamment de la Charte de Kurukan Fuga, considérée comme l’une des premières constitutions au monde. À travers ce tableau, j’ai voulu rappeler que les droits de l’homme transcendent les différences.
On y voit deux mains tendues – une noire et une blanche – symbolisant l’unité nécessaire pour sauver l’humanité, un monde en plein tumulte. Les couleurs vives évoquent les migrations, sans distinction de race ni d’origine.
Le tableau est également illuminé par un soleil, symbole d’espoir, qui éclaire notre chemin collectif à travers trois lumières : celle du cœur, de l’esprit et de l’action. Enfin, la colombe de la paix écrit, de sa plume, sur les pages de la conscience collective un message universel.
Osvaldo Zavala Giler, Greffier de la CPI offre un exemplaire du statut de Rome a Khalidou Kassé en guise de remerciement.
DM – Votre carrière de militant et vos collaborations avec des organisations internationales témoignent de votre passion pour des causes mondiales. Comment ces expériences ont-elles façonné votre vision de l’art comme outil de changement et de dialogue global ?
Kassé – L’art est pour moi un outil puissant pour défendre les causes sociales. Mon engagement remonte à ma jeunesse, où j’ai été confronté à des injustices dans ma propre famille. Depuis, j’ai œuvré pour les enfants démunis et les jeunes, que ce soit aux États-Unis, au Sénégal ou ailleurs.
J’ai également collaboré avec des figures telles que la Princesse Lalla Meryem au Maroc et des institutions qui utilisent l’art pour sensibiliser et mobiliser. Aujourd’hui, je continue de croire que l’art a le pouvoir de transformer les cœurs et les esprits.
DM – Votre Excellence, comment percevez-vous le rôle de l’art contemporain dans la promotion de la paix et de la justice à l’échelle mondiale ?
Dr. Mayelinne De Lara, Diplomat Magazine, Ambassadeur Ramatoulaye Ba Epse Faye, Khalidou Kassé, Henry Pierre Sarr, Premier Secrétaire a l’ambassade du Sénégal.
Ambassadrice Ramatoulaye Ba Epse Faye – L’art contemporain est un langage universel. Il accompagne les peuples dans leur quête de paix et de sérénité. À travers cette œuvre, Khalidou Kassé illustre parfaitement ce rôle, en rappelant que la justice et la paix sont essentielles dans les relations internationales.
Lorsque nous avons été informés, par Osvaldo Zavala Giler, Greffier de la CPI, des besoins de restauration, l’ambassade du Sénégal a immédiatement pris les dispositions nécessaires. Je tiens à remercier le ministère de la Culture et le ministère des Affaires étrangères du Sénégal, qui ont facilité le déplacement de M. Kassé pour qu’il puisse accomplir ce travail.
Ce tableau est un symbole fort, admiré par mes collègues ambassadeurs et tous les diplomates qui fréquentent les locaux de la CPI. Il incarne des valeurs fondamentales : la paix, la justice, la solidarité et le vivre-ensemble.
DM – Un dernier mot pour conclure cette entrevue ?
Kassé – Je tiens à remercier Son Excellence Mme l’Ambassadrice pour son soutien indéfectible et l’équipe de l’ambassade pour leur accueil chaleureux. Restaurer Paix par la Justice a été un honneur et une occasion de raviver son message universel. Merci à tous ceux qui ont rendu cela possible.
On Saturday, the 29th of June, the Netherlands celebrated its annual Veterans Day in the city of The Hague, paying tribute to the men and women who have served in the armed forces. The event featured a variety of activities, including a grand parade of veterans and active military personnel, which took place in the presence of His Majesty King Willem-Alexander of the Netherlands. Earlier that day His Majesty’s speech at Royal Theatre signaled the start of the all day festivities.
The defense attachés from embassies in The Hague were invited by Anton Lutter chairman of Stichting Herdenking Veteranen to drinks after they witnessed the parade. Representatives from several nations, including France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, People’s Republic of China, Turkey and the USA were among the attendees at the annual military parade. Also one of the guests was HE Hyong-chan choe, ambassador of South Korea to The Netherlands, who recently has been appointed as Chancellor of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy
The reception was hosted at Restaurant Poentjak, a historic venue that also serves as the meeting place for the Stichting Herdenking Veteranen (Foundation Commemoration Veterans), commonly known as The Hague Veterans Club.
The Ambassador of South Korea, H.E. Mr. Hyoung Chan Choe with the vice president of the Dutch State Council Thom de Graaff.
Stichting Herdenking Veteranen
Founded in 2005, the Stichting Herdenking Veteranen aims to promote societal recognition of the contributions made by veterans toward peace and security. The organization is dedicated to promote knowledge about veterans and increasing public appreciation for their sacrifices. Its informal “clubhouse” at Restaurant Poentjak provides a regular meeting space for members.
The Foundation’s Committee of Recommendation includes distinguished figures such as Dr. Wim van Eekelen and Mr. Hans Hillen, both former Secretaries of Defense; Maj. Gen. (ret.) Leen Noordzij, former president of the National Veterans Platform.
Diplomat Magazine’s Publisher and a veteran from Dutch Army, together with the Ambassador of South Korea, H.E. Mr. Hyoung Chan Choe.
Netherlands Veterans Day has become a meaningful occasion for recognizing the sacrifices of the country’s veterans also for fostering international connections. The participation of foreign military representatives highlights the shared commitment to peace and security across nations. As the event grows in prominence, it continues to strengthen the bond between the local community, the international diplomatic corps, and veterans themselves.
This year’s celebration served as a reminder of the enduring impact of veterans’ service and the importance of cherishing their contributions to society. By hosting such events, The Hague reinforces its role as a city dedicated to peace, justice, and global solidarity. The 20th edition of Veteran’s Day was attended by more then 100.000 persons watching the parade and visiting the public activities at the Malieveld.
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a Sunni Islamist militant group primarily active in Syria, particularly in the rebel-held Idlib Province. Formed in 2017, it is an alliance dominated by Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, which was previously affiliated with al-Qaeda. The group took several key cities on December 7 and 8,ultimately leading to the downfall of the Assad regime after 53 years.
The directive explicitly forbids compelling women to wear specific clothing or interfering with their choice of attire, according to the newspaper, which published details of the announcement.
“The High Command categorically prohibits forcing women to wear particular clothing or interfering with their right to choose their attire or making claims regarding their appearance,” the newspaper quoted the opposition leadership as saying.
The hijab, a traditional head covering in Islamic culture that conceals the hair, ears, and neck, has been a subject of debate in many Middle Eastern nations regarding personal freedom and religious practice.
In a parallel move suggesting broader social reforms, the opposition command also issued strict prohibitions against the persecution of media workers, including employees of Syrian television, broadcasting agencies and social media platform owners.
“Any threats against these individuals are prohibited,” Al-Watan reported, citing the opposition’s statement.
The opposition leadership has established penalties for violations of these directives, with perpetrators facing up to one year in prison.
These measures come as the opposition works to establish its authority and define its governance approach in post-Assad Syria, particularly regarding personal freedoms and press rights.
In a later message by the opposition forces, they announced, “We are here now to build a new Syria that accommodates everyone without exception.
Published by Human Rights Without Frontiers https://hrwf.eu/syria-armed-opposition-leadership-bans-forced-wearing-of-hijab/
The Dominican Republic has taken an important step in strengthening its international trade thanks to the efforts of Ambassador Juan Bautista Durán, Dominican representative in the Netherlands. At the end of December 2024, 23.5 tons of Dominican tobacco leaves were exported to the Chinese market, a significant achievement as a result of a trade mission organized by the Dominican Embassy in The Hague.
A bridge between local producers and the global market
Guangdong Royal Gaspar International Trade Co. Ltd., of Chinese origin, was the protagonist of this successful transaction. Initially, the company showed interest in acquiring large traditional cigar factories, such as Davidoff or La Aurora. However, as they were not available for sale, Ambassador Durán played a crucial role in redirecting its interests towards small and medium-sized producers in the Navarrete and Santiago regions. This approach not only created opportunities for local producers, but also opened the door for Dominican tobacco to reach new international markets.
Ambassador Juan Bautista Durán visiting Aurora cigars factory.
The relationship between Guangdong Royal Gaspar International and Dominican producers was the result of three years of constant exchanges, visits to government agencies and meetings with the private sector. The export of the first 23 tons marks the beginning of a commercial relationship that is projected to expand considerably by 2025, with the expected purchase of up to 1,000 tons of tobacco leaves.
Future plans: growth and local production
The company’s plans are not limited to tobacco purchases. Guangdong Royal Gaspar International also plans to acquire land in the Dominican Republic to start producing tobacco exclusively for the Chinese market. This project could have a positive impact on the local economy, generating jobs and increasing international recognition of the quality of Dominican tobacco.
Meeting cigars producers in Dominican Republic.
Economic diplomacy: a model of success
Ambassador Durán has demonstrated how economic diplomacy can be a key tool to boost national development. In addition to this transaction, the ambassador has led three investor commissions to the Dominican Republic, facilitating meetings with government authorities and private companies. This active and visionary approach has strengthened ties between the two countries, making the embassy in The Hague a key player in promoting Dominican trade.
A promising horizon
Exporting tobacco to China is just the beginning. This type of initiative lays the groundwork for future agreements that will benefit local producers and strengthen the Dominican Republic’s presence in international markets. With the volume of exports expected to increase significantly by 2025, Ambassador Juan Bautista Durán’s work stands out as an example of how diplomacy can positively impact trade and national development.
Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas adopta por abrumadora mayoría resolución sobre libre determinación del pueblo palestino
Por Nicolas Boeglin, Profesor de Derecho Internacional Público, Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Costa Rica (UCR). Contacto: nboeglin(a)gmail.com
Este 17 de diciembre, con una abrumadora mayoría de 172 votos a favor y tan solo siete en contra, la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas adoptó su tradicional resolución sobre el derecho del pueblo palestino a la libre determinación (véase texto de la proyecto de resolución A/C.3/79/L.49).
Se trata de un ejercicio diplomático anual al que se someten los 193 Estados Miembros de Naciones Unidas: en el 2023, el 19 de diciembre se adoptó una resolución similar (véase texto de la resolución A/Res/78/192) con 172 votos a favor y cuatro en contra (Estados Unidos, Israel, Micronesia y Nauru), 10 Estados optando por la abstención (entre los cuales Guatemala y Paraguay) según el detalle de la votación.
El voto observado en breve este 17 de diciembre del 2024
El tablero de la votación de este 17 de diciembre del 2024 puede ser consultado en este video de YouTube: esta vez, Israel y su incondicional aliado norteamericano pudieron contar con los votos en contra de Argentina, Micronesia, Nauru, Paraguay, y Papua Nueva Guinea. Cabe precisar que se trata de votaciones en las que aliados tradicionales de Israel en este tipo de ejercicios como suelen serlo para otras resoluciones Austría, Australia, Canadá, Hungría o República Checa se desmarcan y no acceden a las solicitudes de Israel (y de Estados Unidos) de votar en contra.
La única actualización al texto del 2023, es una referencia que se añadió a la opinión consutiva de la Corte Internacional de Justicia (CIJ) del 19 de julio del 2024, confirmando el carácter ilegal de la colonización y ocupación del territorio palestino por parte de Israel. La Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas acogió esta opinión consultiva en una votación realizada el 18 de septiembre del 2024 y optó por declarar ilegal dicha colonización (véase comunicado oficial de Naciones Unidas).
Con relación a América Latina, Argentina (así como Paraguay) están en este año 2024 sustituyendo a las pequeñas islas del Pacífico tradicionalmente muy atentas a las solicitudes de Israel (Islas Fidji, Islas Marshall, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua Nueva Guinea), conformando desde varios años en Naciones Unidas la única “coalición” para acompañar a Israel y a Estados Unidos en este tipo de contiendas diplomáticas (Nota 2). Por su parte, Ecuador y Panamá optaron por abstenerse, siendo los únicos dos Estados de América Latina en escoger esta opción, conjuntamente con seis otros Estados.
No está de más recordar un hecho bastante inusual observado en Naciones Unidas (y en Argentina…) cuando las actuales autoridades argentinas optaron el pasado 30 de octubre por destituir a su máxima autoridad diplomática, al haber instruído a su delegación en Naciones Unidas a votar en favor de un proyecto de resolución también anual (véase texto) que solicita levantar el embargo contra Cuba (véase nota de ElPais/España): en esta ocasión solamente Estados Unidos e Israel votaron en contra, al tiempo que 182 votaron a favor (véase comunicado oficial de Naciones Unidas). Idéntica “oposición ultra minoritaria” se observó en noviembre del 2023 con 187 votos a favor (véase comunicado oficial de Naciones Unidas).
El aislamiento de Israel en el seno de la comunidad internacional
Este nuevo informe de Human Rights Watch dado a conocer este 19 de diciembre del 2024 detalla el uso del faltante de agua como arma de guerra en Gaza por parte de Israel, confirmando para los investigadores de esta reconocida ONG su intención genocida en Gaza.
Al respecto, el pasado 4 de diciembre, el genocidio en curso en Gaza iniciado desde la tarde noche del 7 de octubre del 2023 fue confirmado en un contundente informe de otra reconocida ONG Amnistía Internacional, antecedido en octubre por el informe de la Relatora Especial de Naciones Unidas titulado “El genocidio como supresión colonial “, precedido de su informe de julio titulado “Anatomía de un genocidio”: la poca difusión en medios de prensa internacionales de estos informes plantea interrogantes muy válidas.
Adicionalmente a ello, las acciones militares en el Líbano por parte de Israel desde mediados de septiembre, así como en Siria desde hace dos semanas parecieran responder a un intento bastante sutil para desviar la atención medática internacional sobre lo que ocurre en Gaza y en Cisjordania.
El último informe de Naciones Unidas sobre la situación en Cisjordania (al 19 de diciembre) está disponible en este enlace. A su vez, con relación a Gaza, el último informe sobre la situación al 17 de diciembre realizado por Naciones Unidas (véase informe) detalla cómo el ritmo de muertos y de heridos y de destrucción por parte de Israel se ha mantenido ininterrumpido, con un ensañamiento en contra de la población civil palestina de Gaza raramente observado (y pasado por alto por buena parte de los medios de prensa internacional). Al dramático saldo de víctimas palestinas que supera ya las 45.000 personas, se puede leer además que:
“Israeli bombardment from the air, land and sea continues to be reported across the Gaza Strip, resulting in further civilian casualties, displacement, and destruction of civilian infrastructure. In the North Gaza governorate, the Israeli military has been carrying out a ground offensive since 6 October 2024, with fighting reported between Israeli forces and Palestinian armed groups. Israeli forces have continued to impose a tightened siege on Beit Lahiya, Beit Hanoun and parts of Jabalya and humanitarian assistance has been largely denied for more than 10 weeks (see data below). Rocket firing by Palestinian armed groups towards Israel was reported.
Between the afternoons of 10 and 17 December, according to the Ministry of Health (MoH) in Gaza, 273 Palestinians were killed and 853 were injured. Between 7 October 2023 and 17 December 2024, at least 45,059 Palestinians were killed and 107,041 were injured, according to MoH in Gaza.
Between the afternoons of 10 and 17 December, two Israeli soldiers were killed in Gaza, according to the Israeli military. Between 7 October 2023 and 17 December 2024, according to the Israeli military and official Israeli sources cited in the media, more than 1,586 Israelis and foreign nationals were killed, the majority on 7 October 2023 and its immediate aftermath. The figure includes 386 soldiers killed in Gaza or along the border in Israel since the beginning of the ground operation. In addition, 2,488 Israeli soldiers were reported injured since the beginning of the ground operation. As of 17 December, it is estimated that 100 Israelis and foreign nationals remain captive in Gaza, including hostages who have been declared dead and whose bodies are withheld in Gaza.
Attacks on schools sheltering internally displaced people (IDPs) in Gaza continue to be reported, with nine such incidents documented so far in December 2024 by the UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR). According to the Education Cluster, between 6 October and 15 December 2024, 95 incidents involving attacks on school buildings, mostly serving as IDP shelters, were documented, including 61 incidents in North Gaza governorate. On 14 and 15 December alone, four schools were hit, as follows:
– On 14 December, two schools-turned shelters were reportedly hit in Gaza city, resulting in the killing of seven Palestinians, including three children, and the injury of tens of others, according to Palestinian Civil Defense (PCD).
– On 15 December, Israeli troops reportedly surrounded and raided Khalil Owaidah School sheltering IDPs in ‘Izbat Beit Hanun, in North Gaza, where it was reported that male IDPs were detained while women and children were forced to move southwards. Tens of people were reported killed, but the exact circumstances remain unclear. Citing IDP testimonies, PCD reported that fatalities included 10-15 people who were incinerated, and the school was destroyed.
– On 15 December, the third floor of an UNRWA school sheltering IDPs in Al Mawasi, in Khan Younis, was hit. Within minutes, the emergency department of the nearby Nasser Medical Complex was flooded with casualties, most of them women and children. Many were severely injured and died on site or en route to the hospital, reported international doctors from Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP) operating in the facility as part of a joint Emergency Medical Team (EMT) with the International Rescue Committee. An internal medicine and emergency care consultant counted at least 18 people dying in the emergency department, including 12 children under the age of 12. The first patient arrived in the facility was “a three-year-old girl who had the left side of her forehead torn open by shrapnel fragments which had penetrated her skull,” and who, due to shortages of painkillers and anaesthetics, had to be treated “with very little access to medications,” added the consultant. A plastic surgeon also noted that his first patient was a 12 to 14-year-old boy whose face was entirely burnt, and who had open wounds on his chest and on both of his legs.
Other deadly incidents reported between 10 and 15 December include:
– On 10 December, at about 23:00, 22 Palestinians were reportedly killed and others injured when a three-story building was hit near Kamal Adwan Hospital in Beit Lahiya in North Gaza.
– On 12 December, at about 00:30, seven Palestinians including children and women were reportedly killed and others injured when two apartments in a residential tower were hit in northwestern Gaza city.
– On 12 December, on two occasions at about 00:01 and 00:55, 22 Palestinians were reportedly killed and others injured when people were hit in Khan Younis and Rafah. According to the Government Media Office (GMO), fatalities included 15 people tasked with securing the movement of aid trucks, raising the number of people killed while securing aid trucks to 720 so far.
– On 12 December, at about 02:00, 15 Palestinians including at least one woman and seven children were reportedly killed, and several others injured, when a house sheltering IDPs was hit in western An Nuseirat refugee camp in northern Deir al Balah.
– On 12 December, at about 20:30, at least 34 Palestinians were reportedly killed and 40 others injured, when two residential buildings were hit in central An Nuseirat refugee camp, in Deir al Balah, according to PCD. According to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), at least eight children were among the fatalities (see below). Extensive damage of the residential block was also reported.
– On 14 December, at about 13:45, 12 Palestinians, including at least two girls, one woman and the mayor, were reportedly killed and others injured when Deir al Balah Municipality in central Deir al Balah was hit.
– On 15 December, at about 21:05, at least ten Palestinians were reportedly killed and others injured when a house was hit in Ash Shuja’iyeh neighbourhood in eastern Gaza city.
– On 15 December, six people were reportedly killed and others injured when a PCD centre was hit in An Nuseirat refugee camp, in northern Deir al Balah. Fatalities reportedly included a cameraperson and four PCD staff and volunteers. The cameraman is among four journalists reported killed in Gaza between 11 and 15 December, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). As of 17 December, the Palestinian Journalists Syndicate reported that 188 journalists and media workers have been killed in Gaza”.
Con relación a los 188 periodistas asesinados deliberadamente por Israel desde el 7 de octubre del 2023 en Gaza (a un ritmo de más de 11 profesionales de la comunicación asesinados por mes…), se espera siempre que el Colegio de Periodistas de Costa Rica externe alguna expresión de pesar y de condena al actuar de Israel: tuvimos hace poco (8 de diciembre) la ocasión de externarlo desde un medio costarricense, durante la emisión radial de Interferencia de Radio UCR titulada “Gaza / Israel y el cerco de la justicia internacional que se cierra” (véase enlace).
A modo de conclusión
Más allá de la extraña omisión de círculos usualmente muy atentos a la suerte que puedan correr profesionales de la comunicación en su labor informativa, esta votación acaecida el 17 de diciembre en Nueva York confirma el pronunciado aislamiento de Israel en el seno de la comunidad internacional: en América Latina, dos Estados en este 2024 logran no obstante maquillar esta situación, a saber Argentina y Paraguay. Es de notar que en el caso de otro Estado que se mostró sumamente cercano a Israel en años recientes (Brasil), sus servicios de inteligencia descubrieron la existencia de una nube electrónica albergada en un servidor en Israel con datos privados de más de 30.000 brasileños (véase nota de prensa de ElDiario /Argentina, de enero del 2024): se trata muy probablemente de uno de los efectos de la denominada “asociación estratégica” con Israel anunciada en el 2018 por el entonces mandatario brasileño (véase nota de France24).
Se reproduce a continuación el texto en inglés y en español de la resolución adoptada este 17 de diciembre del 2024, dada la poca difusión hecha a la misma en los medios de prensa internacionales: una tendencia que se observa cada vez que las diplomacias israelí y norteamericana fracasan de manera estrepitosa en Naciones Unidas.
Con relación a la justicia internacional (otro ámbito en el que la prensa internacional pareciera bastante omisa), nótese que este 18 de diciembre, la Sala de Apelaciones de la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI) acordó un pequeño plazo para la presentación de escritos por parte del Fiscal de la CPI ante una tardía solicitud hecha por Israel. Esta última intenta restarle válidez a las órdenes de arresto contra dos de su máximas figuras, confirmadas el 21 de noviembre por la Sala de lo Preliminar de la CPI luego de 6 largos meses de examen: véase decisión de la CPI del 18 de diciembre del 2024 pasada prácticamente desapercibida en la prensa internacional.
Finalmente, con relación a otra jurisdicción internacional también situada en La Haya, Israel y su incondicional aliado se prepararon para una votación en la que no escatimaron en sus esfuerzos en aras de obtener un número significativo de votos en contra: se trata de una iniciativa de Noruega para emplazar a la CIJ a dictaminar una nueva opinión consultiva luego de la del 19 de julio del 2024, en cuya votación acaecida en diciembre del 2022, Costa Rica votó en contra (Nota 3). Esta iniciativa de Noruega que fue oficialmente anunciada el 29 de octubre del 2024 en Oslo (véase comunicado oficial), se votó este 19 de diciembre del 2024, con una amplia mayoría de 137 votos a favor y 12 en contra, con lo cual, las presiones ejercidas por Israel y Estados Unidos se limitaron a recoger 10 votos en contra únicamente, entre los cuales los previsibles de Argentina, Hungría, Paraguay y República Checa (Nota 4). El detalle del voto puede revisarse en este video de YouTube. Entre los 22 Estados que optaron por la abstención figura únicamente por América Latina, Panamá.
En la propuesta de Noruega que circulaba desde varias semanas en Naciones Unidas (véase texto del proyecto A/79/L.28/Rev.1), se lee el punto 10 de la siguiente manera:
“10. Decide, de conformidad con el Artículo 96 de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, solicitar a la Corte Internacional de Justicia, de conformidad con el Artículo 65 del Estatuto de la Corte, con carácter prioritario y con la máxima urgencia, que emita una opinión consultiva sobre la cuestión que se indica a continuación, teniendo en cuenta las normas y principios del derecho internacional, en particular la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, el derecho internacional humanitario, el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos, las prerrogativas e inmunidades aplicables en virtud del derecho internacional a las organizaciones internacionales y a los Estados, las resoluciones pertinentes del Consejo de Seguridad, la Asamblea General y el Consejo de Derechos Humanos, la opinión consultiva de la Corte de 9 de julio de 2004 y la opinión consultiva de la Corte de 19 de julio de 2024, en que la Corte reafirmó el deber de la Potencia ocupante de administrar el territorio ocupado en beneficio de la población local y afirmó que Israel no tiene derecho a la soberanía sobre ninguna parte del Territorio Palestino Ocupado ni puede ejercer poderes soberanos en él debido a su ocupación:
¿Cuáles son las obligaciones de Israel, como Potencia ocupante y como miembro de las Naciones Unidas, en lo que respecta a la presencia y las actividades de las Naciones Unidas, incluidos sus organismos y órganos, otras organizaciones internacionales y terceros Estados en el Territorio Palestino Ocupado y en relación con él, incluida la garantía y facilitación de la provisión sin trabas de los suministros que se necesitan con urgencia y son esenciales para la supervivencia de la población civil palestina, así como de servicios básicos y asistencia humanitaria y para el desarrollo, en beneficio de la población civil palestina y en apoyo del derecho del pueblo palestino a la libre determinación?”
Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas adopta por abrumadora mayoría resolución sobre libre determinación del pueblo palestino
Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas adopta por abrumadora mayoría resolución sobre libre determinación del pueblo palestino
Nicolas Boeglin, Profesor de Derecho Internacional Público, Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Costa Rica (UCR). Contacto: nboeglin(a)gmail.com
Este 17 de diciembre, con una abrumadora mayoría de 172 votos a favor y tan solo siete en contra, la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas adoptó su tradicional resolución sobre el derecho del pueblo palestino a la libre determinación (véase texto de la proyecto de resolución A/C.3/79/L.49).
Se trata de un ejercicio diplomático anual al que se someten los 193 Estados Miembros de Naciones Unidas: en el 2023, el 19 de diciembre se adoptó una resolución similar (véase texto de la resolución A/Res/78/192) con 172 votos a favor y cuatro en contra (Estados Unidos, Israel, Micronesia y Nauru), 10 Estados optando por la abstención (entre los cuales Guatemala y Paraguay) según el detalle de la votación.
El voto observado en breve este 17 de diciembre del 2024
El tablero de la votación de este 17 de diciembre del 2024 puede ser consultado en este video de YouTube: esta vez, Israel y su incondicional aliado norteamericano pudieron contar con los votos en contra de Argentina, Micronesia, Nauru, Paraguay, y Papua Nueva Guinea. Cabe precisar que se trata de votaciones en las que aliados tradicionales de Israel en este tipo de ejercicios como suelen serlo para otras resoluciones Austría, Australia, Canadá, Hungría o República Checa se desmarcan y no acceden a las solicitudes de Israel (y de Estados Unidos) de votar en contra.
Con relación al texto como tal, la única actualización con relación al texto del 2023 es una referencia que se añadió a la opinión consutiva de la Corte Internacional de Justicia (CIJ) del 19 de julio del 2024, confirmando el carácter ilegal de la colonización y ocupación del territorio palestino por parte de Israel. Cabe recordar que cuando la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas acogió esta opinión consultiva en una votación realizada el 18 de septiembre del 2024 y optó por declarar ilegal dicha colonización (véase comunicado oficial de Naciones Unidas), Costa Rica optó por abstenerse sin dar explicaciones de su voto a las demás delegaciones presentes en Nueva York, como sí lo hizo por ejemplo Alemania. La justificación del voto en cambio apareció posteriormente en un comunicado oficial colgado por el aparato diplomático costarricense: véase al respecto una nota nuestra (Nota 1) publicada en LaRevista.cr, en el acápite “Algunas breves acotaciones con respecto a la ‘justificación’ aportada oficialmente por la diplomacia costarricense”. De manera a no causar mayor sonrojo al ya causado, omitiremos reeditar dichas acotaciones.
Con relación a América Latina, Argentina (así como Paraguay) están en este año 2024 sustituyendo a las pequeñas islas del Pacífico tradicionalmente muy atentas a las solicitudes de Israel (Islas Fidji, Islas Marshall, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua Nueva Guinea), conformando desde varios años en Naciones Unidas la única “coalición” para acompañar a Israel y a Estados Unidos en este tipo de contiendas diplomáticas (Nota 2). Por su parte, Ecuador y Panamá optaron por abstenerse, siendo los únicos dos Estados de América Latina en escoger esta opción, conjuntamente con seis otros Estados.
No está de más recordar un hecho bastante inusual observado en Naciones Unidas (y en Argentina…) cuando las actuales autoridades argentinas optaron el pasado 30 de octubre por destituir a su máxima autoridad diplomática, al haber instruído a su delegación en Naciones Unidas a votar en favor de un proyecto de resolución también anual (véase texto) que solicita levantar el embargo contra Cuba (véase nota de ElPais/España): en esta ocasión solamente Estados Unidos e Israel votaron en contra, al tiempo que 182 votaron a favor (véase comunicado oficial de Naciones Unidas). Idéntica “oposición ultra minoritaria” se observó en noviembre del 2023 con 187 votos a favor (véase comunicado oficial de Naciones Unidas).
El aislamiento de Israel en el seno de la comunidad internacional
Este nuevo informe de Human Rights Watch dado a conocer este 19 de diciembre del 2024 detalla el uso del faltante de agua como arma de guerra en Gaza por parte de Israel, confirmando para los investigadores de esta reconocida ONG su intención genocida en Gaza.
Al respecto, el pasado 4 de diciembre, el genocidio en curso en Gaza iniciado desde la tarde noche del 7 de octubre del 2023 fue confirmado en un contundente informe de otra reconocida ONG Amnistía Internacional, antecedido en octubre por el informe de la Relatora Especial de Naciones Unidas titulado “El genocidio como supresión colonial “, precedido de su informe de julio titulado “Anatomía de un genocidio”: la poca difusión en medios de prensa internacionales de estos informes plantea interrogantes muy válidas.
Adicionalmente a ello, las acciones militares en el Líbano por parte de Israel desde mediados de septiembre, así como en Siria desde hace dos semanas parecieran responder a un intento bastante sutil para desviar la atención medática internacional sobre lo que ocurre en Gaza y en Cisjordania.
El último informe de Naciones Unidas sobre la situación en Cisjordania (al 19 de diciembre) está disponible en este enlace. A su vez, con relación a Gaza, el último informe sobre la situación al 17 de diciembre realizado por Naciones Unidas (véase informe) detalla cómo el ritmo de muertos y de heridos y de destrucción por parte de Israel se ha mantenido ininterrumpido, con un ensañamiento en contra de la población civil palestina de Gaza raramente observado (y pasado por alto por buena parte de los medios de prensa internacional). Al dramático saldo de víctimas palestinas que supera ya las 45.000 personas, se puede leer además que:
“Israeli bombardment from the air, land and sea continues to be reported across the Gaza Strip, resulting in further civilian casualties, displacement, and destruction of civilian infrastructure. In the North Gaza governorate, the Israeli military has been carrying out a ground offensive since 6 October 2024, with fighting reported between Israeli forces and Palestinian armed groups. Israeli forces have continued to impose a tightened siege on Beit Lahiya, Beit Hanoun and parts of Jabalya and humanitarian assistance has been largely denied for more than 10 weeks (see data below). Rocket firing by Palestinian armed groups towards Israel was reported.
Between the afternoons of 10 and 17 December, according to the Ministry of Health (MoH) in Gaza, 273 Palestinians were killed and 853 were injured. Between 7 October 2023 and 17 December 2024, at least 45,059 Palestinians were killed and 107,041 were injured, according to MoH in Gaza.
Between the afternoons of 10 and 17 December, two Israeli soldiers were killed in Gaza, according to the Israeli military. Between 7 October 2023 and 17 December 2024, according to the Israeli military and official Israeli sources cited in the media, more than 1,586 Israelis and foreign nationals were killed, the majority on 7 October 2023 and its immediate aftermath. The figure includes 386 soldiers killed in Gaza or along the border in Israel since the beginning of the ground operation. In addition, 2,488 Israeli soldiers were reported injured since the beginning of the ground operation. As of 17 December, it is estimated that 100 Israelis and foreign nationals remain captive in Gaza, including hostages who have been declared dead and whose bodies are withheld in Gaza.
Attacks on schools sheltering internally displaced people (IDPs) in Gaza continue to be reported, with nine such incidents documented so far in December 2024 by the UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR). According to the Education Cluster, between 6 October and 15 December 2024, 95 incidents involving attacks on school buildings, mostly serving as IDP shelters, were documented, including 61 incidents in North Gaza governorate. On 14 and 15 December alone, four schools were hit, as follows:
– On 14 December, two schools-turned shelters were reportedly hit in Gaza city, resulting in the killing of seven Palestinians, including three children, and the injury of tens of others, according to Palestinian Civil Defense (PCD).
– On 15 December, Israeli troops reportedly surrounded and raided Khalil Owaidah School sheltering IDPs in ‘Izbat Beit Hanun, in North Gaza, where it was reported that male IDPs were detained while women and children were forced to move southwards. Tens of people were reported killed, but the exact circumstances remain unclear. Citing IDP testimonies, PCD reported that fatalities included 10-15 people who were incinerated, and the school was destroyed.
– On 15 December, the third floor of an UNRWA school sheltering IDPs in Al Mawasi, in Khan Younis, was hit. Within minutes, the emergency department of the nearby Nasser Medical Complex was flooded with casualties, most of them women and children. Many were severely injured and died on site or en route to the hospital, reported international doctors from Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP) operating in the facility as part of a joint Emergency Medical Team (EMT) with the International Rescue Committee. An internal medicine and emergency care consultant counted at least 18 people dying in the emergency department, including 12 children under the age of 12. The first patient arrived in the facility was “a three-year-old girl who had the left side of her forehead torn open by shrapnel fragments which had penetrated her skull,” and who, due to shortages of painkillers and anaesthetics, had to be treated “with very little access to medications,” added the consultant. A plastic surgeon also noted that his first patient was a 12 to 14-year-old boy whose face was entirely burnt, and who had open wounds on his chest and on both of his legs.
Other deadly incidents reported between 10 and 15 December include:
– On 10 December, at about 23:00, 22 Palestinians were reportedly killed and others injured when a three-story building was hit near Kamal Adwan Hospital in Beit Lahiya in North Gaza.
– On 12 December, at about 00:30, seven Palestinians including children and women were reportedly killed and others injured when two apartments in a residential tower were hit in northwestern Gaza city.
– On 12 December, on two occasions at about 00:01 and 00:55, 22 Palestinians were reportedly killed and others injured when people were hit in Khan Younis and Rafah. According to the Government Media Office (GMO), fatalities included 15 people tasked with securing the movement of aid trucks, raising the number of people killed while securing aid trucks to 720 so far.
– On 12 December, at about 02:00, 15 Palestinians including at least one woman and seven children were reportedly killed, and several others injured, when a house sheltering IDPs was hit in western An Nuseirat refugee camp in northern Deir al Balah.
– On 12 December, at about 20:30, at least 34 Palestinians were reportedly killed and 40 others injured, when two residential buildings were hit in central An Nuseirat refugee camp, in Deir al Balah, according to PCD. According to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), at least eight children were among the fatalities (see below). Extensive damage of the residential block was also reported.
– On 14 December, at about 13:45, 12 Palestinians, including at least two girls, one woman and the mayor, were reportedly killed and others injured when Deir al Balah Municipality in central Deir al Balah was hit.
– On 15 December, at about 21:05, at least ten Palestinians were reportedly killed and others injured when a house was hit in Ash Shuja’iyeh neighbourhood in eastern Gaza city.
– On 15 December, six people were reportedly killed and others injured when a PCD centre was hit in An Nuseirat refugee camp, in northern Deir al Balah. Fatalities reportedly included a cameraperson and four PCD staff and volunteers. The cameraman is among four journalists reported killed in Gaza between 11 and 15 December, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). As of 17 December, the Palestinian Journalists Syndicate reported that 188 journalists and media workers have been killed in Gaza”.
Con relación a los 188 periodistas asesinados deliberadamente por Israel desde el 7 de octubre del 2023 en Gaza (a un ritmo de más de 11 profesionales de la comunicación asesinados por mes…), se espera siempre que el Colegio de Periodistas de Costa Rica externe alguna expresión de pesar y de condena al actuar de Israel: tuvimos hace poco (8 de diciembre) la ocasión de externarlo desde un medio costarricense, durante la emisión radial de Interferencia de Radio UCR titulada “Gaza / Israel y el cerco de la justicia internacional que se cierra” (véase enlace).
A modo de conclusión
Más allá de la extraña omisión de círculos usualmente muy atentos a la suerte que puedan correr profesionales de la comunicación en su labor informativa, esta votación acaecida el 17 de diciembre en Nueva York confirma el pronunciado aislamiento de Israel en el seno de la comunidad internacional: en América Latina, dos Estados en este 2024 logran no obstante maquillar esta situación, a saber Argentina y Paraguay. Es de notar que en el caso de otro Estado que se mostró sumamente cercano a Israel en años recientes (Brasil), sus servicios de inteligencia descubrieron la existencia de una nube electrónica albergada en un servidor en Israel con datos privados de más de 30.000 brasileños (véase nota de prensa de ElDiario /Argentina, de enero del 2024): se trata muy probablemente de uno de los efectos de la denominada “asociación estratégica” con Israel anunciada en el 2018 por el entonces mandatario brasileño (véase nota de France24).
Se reproduce a continuación el texto en inglés y en español de la resolución adoptada este 17 de diciembre del 2024, dada la poca difusión hecha a la misma en los medios de prensa internacionales: una tendencia que se observa cada vez que las diplomacias israelí y norteamericana fracasan de manera estrepitosa en Naciones Unidas.
Con relación a la justicia internacional (otro ámbito en el que la prensa internacional pareciera bastante omisa), nótese que este 18 de diciembre, la Sala de Apelaciones de la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI) acordó un pequeño plazo para la presentación de escritos por parte del Fiscal de la CPI ante una tardía solicitud hecha por Israel. Esta última intenta restarle válidez a las órdenes de arresto contra dos de su máximas figuras, confirmadas el 21 de noviembre por la Sala de lo Preliminar de la CPI luego de 6 largos meses de examen: véase decisión de la CPI del 18 de diciembre del 2024 pasada prácticamente desapercibida en la prensa internacional.
Finalmente, con relación a otra jurisdicción internacional también situada en La Haya, Israel y su incondicional aliado se prepararon para una votación en la que no escatimaron en sus esfuerzos en aras de obtener un número significativo de votos en contra: se trata de una iniciativa de Noruega para emplazar a la CIJ a dictaminar una nueva opinión consultiva luego de la del 19 de julio del 2024, en cuya votación acaecida en diciembre del 2022, Costa Rica votó en contra (Nota 3). Esta iniciativa de Noruega que fue oficialmente anunciada el 29 de octubre del 2024 en Oslo (véase comunicado oficial), se votó este 19 de diciembre del 2024, con una amplia mayoría de 137 votos a favor y 12 en contra, con lo cual, las presiones ejercidas por Israel y Estados Unidos se limitaron a recoger 10 votos en contra únicamente, entre los cuales los previsibles de Argentina, Hungría, Paraguay y República Checa (Nota 4). El detalle del voto puede revisarse en este video de YouTube. Entre los 22 Estados que optaron por la abstención figura únicamente por América Latina, Panamá.
En la propuesta de Noruega que circulaba desde varias semanas en Naciones Unidas (véase texto del proyecto A/79/L.28/Rev.1), se lee el punto 10 de la siguiente manera:
“10. Decide, de conformidad con el Artículo 96 de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, solicitar a la Corte Internacional de Justicia, de conformidad con el Artículo 65 del Estatuto de la Corte, con carácter prioritario y con la máxima urgencia, que emita una opinión consultiva sobre la cuestión que se indica a continuación, teniendo en cuenta las normas y principios del derecho internacional, en particular la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, el derecho internacional humanitario, el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos, las prerrogativas e inmunidades aplicables en virtud del derecho internacional a las organizaciones internacionales y a los Estados, las resoluciones pertinentes del Consejo de Seguridad, la Asamblea General y el Consejo de Derechos Humanos, la opinión consultiva de la Corte de 9 de julio de 2004 y la opinión consultiva de la Corte de 19 de julio de 2024, en que la Corte reafirmó el deber de la Potencia ocupante de administrar el territorio ocupado en beneficio de la población local y afirmó que Israel no tiene derecho a la soberanía sobre ninguna parte del Territorio Palestino Ocupado ni puede ejercer poderes soberanos en él debido a su ocupación:
¿Cuáles son las obligaciones de Israel, como Potencia ocupante y como miembro de las Naciones Unidas, en lo que respecta a la presencia y las actividades de las Naciones Unidas, incluidos sus organismos y órganos, otras organizaciones internacionales y terceros Estados en el Territorio Palestino Ocupado y en relación con él, incluida la garantía y facilitación de la provisión sin trabas de los suministros que se necesitan con urgencia y son esenciales para la supervivencia de la población civil palestina, así como de servicios básicos y asistencia humanitaria y para el desarrollo, en beneficio de la población civil palestina y en apoyo del derecho del pueblo palestino a la libre determinación?”
